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* [[ | * [[Ricardo's model: productivity differences as a determinant of trade]] | ||
* [[ | * [[The Heckscher-Ohlin model: differences in factor endowments as a determinant of trade]] | ||
* [[ | * [[Economies of scale as a determinant of trade: beyond comparative advantage]] | ||
* [[ | * [[Trade policy instruments]] | ||
* [[ | * [[Multilateral trade agreements]] | ||
* [[ | * [[Preferential Trade Agreements]] | ||
* [[ | * [[The Free Trade Challenge]] | ||
* [[ | * [[International Macroeconomics: Issues and Overview]] | ||
* [[ | * [[National Accounts and Balance of Payments]] | ||
* [[ | * [[Exchange rates and the foreign exchange market]] | ||
* [[ | * [[Short-term exchange rates: the asset-based approach]] | ||
* [[ | * [[Long-term exchange rates: the monetary approach]] | ||
* [[ | * [[Domestic product and short-term exchange rates]] | ||
* [[ | * [[Floating exchange rates]] | ||
* [[ | * [[Fixed exchange rates and intervention on the foreign exchange market]] | ||
}} | }} | ||
{{Translations | {{Translations | ||
| | | fr = La Contestation du libre-échange | ||
| es = | | es = El desafío del libre comercio | ||
}} | }} | ||
= Arguments | = Theoretical Arguments for an Interventionist Trade Policy = | ||
== | == The terms of trade argument == | ||
Case of a large country (influences world prices for the good in question) | |||
* | * Introduction of a tariff reduces the world price of imports Improves the terms of trade (see Chapter 5) | ||
* | *This benefit may outweigh the costs associated with the distortions created by the tax Exists an optimal welfare-maximizing tariff | ||
* | * Higher national welfare with this optimal rate than with free trade * | ||
* | * Symmetrical reasoning for exports | ||
* | *Exists an optimal tax on exports that maximizes the national welfare of a large country - e.g. oil exports. | ||
Limit of the argument: | |||
* | *Valid only for large countries (US, EU, some countries in a given sector) at the expense of foreign economies. | ||
* | *Predatory behaviour that interferes with trading partner relationships | ||
* | *Risk of retaliation | ||
== | == The market failure argument == | ||
Ex : | Ex : Production externalities | ||
* | *Firms cannot appropriate the benefit of a positive externality (R&D investment) or do not take into account the cost of a negative externality (pollution); | ||
* | *social cost different from private cost (see Chapter 5). | ||
* | *National authorities intervene to stimulate production if positive externality (tax on imports) or restrict production if negative externality (tax on exports). | ||
* | *This social gain may exceed the costs associated with the usual distortions Again, there is an interventionist trade policy that maximizes the welfare of the economy. | ||
* | *Special case of the second-order optimum = an interventionist policy may be desirable (welfare-enhancing) in the event of market failure. | ||
Limitation of the argument : | |||
* | *Trade policy is not necessarily the best instrument, better to deal directly with market failures (e.g. subsidy or production tax). | ||
* | *Difficult to identify market failures and therefore an interventionist policy may aggravate the problem instead of offsetting it. | ||
[[File:économie internationale argument des défaillances de marché 1.png|thumb|center|Les externalités positives de production (ex. R&D).]] | [[File:économie internationale argument des défaillances de marché 1.png|thumb|center|Les externalités positives de production (ex. R&D).]] | ||
The tariff makes it possible to reach the social optimum of production at point B, but it introduces a consumer loss. A production subsidy would have allowed to wait for B, and the gain of positive externality for the other producers without introducing a consumer loss. The subsidy is the optimal policy, and the tariff is only a "second best" (second-best policy). | |||
But subsidies are politically and administratively costly. | |||
== | == The argument of external economies of scale == | ||
Argument | Emerging Industry Argument (see Chapter 4) | ||
a PvD with a potential advantage in a manufacturing sector may not be able to compete with older, better-established industries | |||
countries, from developed countries | |||
Need for temporary trade protection of the industry concerned until it is productive enough to compete internationally | |||
Historically, most developed countries began their industrialization without customs barriers. | |||
This argument is all the more relevant if there are market failures (imperfection of the financial system, appropriateness problem). | |||
Limit of the argument: | |||
* | * Requires an initial stock of physical and human capital... | ||
* | *Be sure there are strong enough economies of scale | ||
Otherwise, trade protection will not improve the competitiveness of the industry. | |||
= | = Imperfect Competition and Strategic Trade Policies = | ||
== | == The Trade Policy Argument Strategic == | ||
Small number of competing firms with market power International competition among these firms to capture as much rent as possible | |||
possible | |||
A government can intervene to change the rules of the game and transfer part of the annuities held by foreign companies to domestic companies (e.g. subsidy). | |||
Example from Boeing and Airbus, Krugman and Obstfeld 2009, pages 275-278 | |||
Limit of the argument: | |||
* | *"Such a policy requires very detailed information, difficult to gather... | ||
* | *Risk of retaliation, trade war | ||
= | = Globalization in the face of social challenges = | ||
== | == Effects of free trade on wages and working conditions == | ||
Refers to the principles of comparative advantage (see chapters 2 and 3) | |||
Example of maquiladoras = factories located in Mexico close to the US border following the signing of NAFTA - K&O 2009, pages 282-284 | |||
Problem: if wages are low, refers to differences in productivity and if working conditions are poor, is this a deterioration? | |||
== Introduction | == Introduction of Social Clauses / Fair Trade == | ||
{{Article détaillé| | {{Article détaillé|Trade and geographical advantages}} | ||
Consumers are willing to pay more if they know that the good has been produced in decent conditions / Certification system, e.g. Max Havelaar | |||
Alternative: | Alternative: Explicit inclusion of social clauses in international trade agreements (especially since there is a fear of social dumping)? | ||
Opposition | Opposition from the developing countries who see this inclusion as a protective instrument for developed countries.<ref>http://www.voxeu.org/article/social-dumping-misconceptions</ref> | ||
== | == Cultural Diversity == | ||
Cultural homogenization | |||
Argument | Argument of market failures invoked to justify policies aimed at protéger national cultural specificities (France during UR, 1994) | ||
= | = Trade and environment = | ||
Any economic activity, whether production or consumption, is often a source of pollution. | |||
Economic growth, by multiplying the volumes produced and consumed, should therefore always lead to more environmental damage. | |||
Relationship Economic growth / pollutant emissions not linear | |||
Environmental Kuznets curve | |||
[[File:économie internationale courbe de Kuznets environnementale 1.png|thumb|center|]] | [[File:économie internationale courbe de Kuznets environnementale 1.png|thumb|center|]] | ||
China is catching up with the US and the EU .... | |||
[[File:économie internationale émissions de dioxyde de carbone 1.png|thumb|center|]] | [[File:économie internationale émissions de dioxyde de carbone 1.png|thumb|center|]] | ||
== | == Link global trade/environment? == | ||
Transport costs (multiplied by the verticalization of trade) | |||
Geographic redistribution of the global industry | |||
* | *Pollution hotspots: location of the most polluting industries in the most lax countries in terms of environmental standards - e.g. Alang in India. | ||
* | *Some examples exist but it's hard to generalize... | ||
[[File:économie internationale étude de la Banque mondiale de 1998 1.png|thumb|center|]] | [[File:économie internationale étude de la Banque mondiale de 1998 1.png|thumb|center|]] | ||
E.g.: World Bank study of 1998 | |||
This study establishes that in 1986 the PvDs were already net importers of polluting goods, and the poorest countries were relatively the weakest exporters of polluting products. | |||
In 1995, this trend became more pronounced: far from environmental dumping, there was a greater concentration of polluting production intended for export in the richest countries. | |||
== | == Geographical redistribution of the global industry? == | ||
Conclusions | Conclusions confirmed by other researchers such as Frankel and Rose (2003) or Antweiler, Copeland and Taylor (2001). | ||
* | * rich countries have high capital-labour ratios, and capital-intensive industries are often polluting | ||
* | * "this factor-based pollution-haven effect dominates the income-based pollution-haven effect" | ||
However, for some groups of countries and some particular sectors, it can be observed that richer nations tend to import more and export less pollution-intensive goods (see survey in Frankel 2009). | |||
but the phenomenon remains limited and differences in environmental standards have only a secondary effect on specialisation and trade. | |||
= Annexes = | = Annexes = | ||
Version actuelle datée du 28 septembre 2021 à 23:09
The Free Trade Challenge
| Professeur(s) | |
|---|---|
| Cours | International Economy |
Lectures
- Ricardo's model: productivity differences as a determinant of trade
- The Heckscher-Ohlin model: differences in factor endowments as a determinant of trade
- Economies of scale as a determinant of trade: beyond comparative advantage
- Trade policy instruments
- Multilateral trade agreements
- Preferential Trade Agreements
- The Free Trade Challenge
- International Macroeconomics: Issues and Overview
- National Accounts and Balance of Payments
- Exchange rates and the foreign exchange market
- Short-term exchange rates: the asset-based approach
- Long-term exchange rates: the monetary approach
- Domestic product and short-term exchange rates
- Floating exchange rates
- Fixed exchange rates and intervention on the foreign exchange market
Theoretical Arguments for an Interventionist Trade Policy[modifier | modifier le wikicode]
The terms of trade argument[modifier | modifier le wikicode]
Case of a large country (influences world prices for the good in question)
- Introduction of a tariff reduces the world price of imports Improves the terms of trade (see Chapter 5)
- This benefit may outweigh the costs associated with the distortions created by the tax Exists an optimal welfare-maximizing tariff
- Higher national welfare with this optimal rate than with free trade *
- Symmetrical reasoning for exports
- Exists an optimal tax on exports that maximizes the national welfare of a large country - e.g. oil exports.
Limit of the argument:
- Valid only for large countries (US, EU, some countries in a given sector) at the expense of foreign economies.
- Predatory behaviour that interferes with trading partner relationships
- Risk of retaliation
The market failure argument[modifier | modifier le wikicode]
Ex : Production externalities
- Firms cannot appropriate the benefit of a positive externality (R&D investment) or do not take into account the cost of a negative externality (pollution);
- social cost different from private cost (see Chapter 5).
- National authorities intervene to stimulate production if positive externality (tax on imports) or restrict production if negative externality (tax on exports).
- This social gain may exceed the costs associated with the usual distortions Again, there is an interventionist trade policy that maximizes the welfare of the economy.
- Special case of the second-order optimum = an interventionist policy may be desirable (welfare-enhancing) in the event of market failure.
Limitation of the argument :
- Trade policy is not necessarily the best instrument, better to deal directly with market failures (e.g. subsidy or production tax).
- Difficult to identify market failures and therefore an interventionist policy may aggravate the problem instead of offsetting it.
The tariff makes it possible to reach the social optimum of production at point B, but it introduces a consumer loss. A production subsidy would have allowed to wait for B, and the gain of positive externality for the other producers without introducing a consumer loss. The subsidy is the optimal policy, and the tariff is only a "second best" (second-best policy).
But subsidies are politically and administratively costly.
The argument of external economies of scale[modifier | modifier le wikicode]
Emerging Industry Argument (see Chapter 4)
a PvD with a potential advantage in a manufacturing sector may not be able to compete with older, better-established industries countries, from developed countries
Need for temporary trade protection of the industry concerned until it is productive enough to compete internationally
Historically, most developed countries began their industrialization without customs barriers.
This argument is all the more relevant if there are market failures (imperfection of the financial system, appropriateness problem).
Limit of the argument:
- Requires an initial stock of physical and human capital...
- Be sure there are strong enough economies of scale
Otherwise, trade protection will not improve the competitiveness of the industry.
Imperfect Competition and Strategic Trade Policies[modifier | modifier le wikicode]
The Trade Policy Argument Strategic[modifier | modifier le wikicode]
Small number of competing firms with market power International competition among these firms to capture as much rent as possible
A government can intervene to change the rules of the game and transfer part of the annuities held by foreign companies to domestic companies (e.g. subsidy).
Example from Boeing and Airbus, Krugman and Obstfeld 2009, pages 275-278
Limit of the argument:
- "Such a policy requires very detailed information, difficult to gather...
- Risk of retaliation, trade war
Globalization in the face of social challenges[modifier | modifier le wikicode]
Effects of free trade on wages and working conditions[modifier | modifier le wikicode]
Refers to the principles of comparative advantage (see chapters 2 and 3)
Example of maquiladoras = factories located in Mexico close to the US border following the signing of NAFTA - K&O 2009, pages 282-284
Problem: if wages are low, refers to differences in productivity and if working conditions are poor, is this a deterioration?
Introduction of Social Clauses / Fair Trade[modifier | modifier le wikicode]
Article détaillé : Trade and geographical advantages.
Consumers are willing to pay more if they know that the good has been produced in decent conditions / Certification system, e.g. Max Havelaar
Alternative: Explicit inclusion of social clauses in international trade agreements (especially since there is a fear of social dumping)?
Opposition from the developing countries who see this inclusion as a protective instrument for developed countries.[10]
Cultural Diversity[modifier | modifier le wikicode]
Cultural homogenization
Argument of market failures invoked to justify policies aimed at protéger national cultural specificities (France during UR, 1994)
Trade and environment[modifier | modifier le wikicode]
Any economic activity, whether production or consumption, is often a source of pollution.
Economic growth, by multiplying the volumes produced and consumed, should therefore always lead to more environmental damage.
Relationship Economic growth / pollutant emissions not linear
Environmental Kuznets curve
China is catching up with the US and the EU ....
Link global trade/environment?[modifier | modifier le wikicode]
Transport costs (multiplied by the verticalization of trade)
Geographic redistribution of the global industry
- Pollution hotspots: location of the most polluting industries in the most lax countries in terms of environmental standards - e.g. Alang in India.
- Some examples exist but it's hard to generalize...
E.g.: World Bank study of 1998
This study establishes that in 1986 the PvDs were already net importers of polluting goods, and the poorest countries were relatively the weakest exporters of polluting products.
In 1995, this trend became more pronounced: far from environmental dumping, there was a greater concentration of polluting production intended for export in the richest countries.
Geographical redistribution of the global industry?[modifier | modifier le wikicode]
Conclusions confirmed by other researchers such as Frankel and Rose (2003) or Antweiler, Copeland and Taylor (2001).
- rich countries have high capital-labour ratios, and capital-intensive industries are often polluting
- "this factor-based pollution-haven effect dominates the income-based pollution-haven effect"
However, for some groups of countries and some particular sectors, it can be observed that richer nations tend to import more and export less pollution-intensive goods (see survey in Frankel 2009).
but the phenomenon remains limited and differences in environmental standards have only a secondary effect on specialisation and trade.
Annexes[modifier | modifier le wikicode]
References[modifier | modifier le wikicode]
- ↑ Page personnelle de Federica Sbergami sur le site de l'Université de Genève
- ↑ Page personnelle de Federica Sbergami sur le site de l'Université de Neuchâtel
- ↑ Page personnelle de Federica Sbergami sur Research Gate
- ↑ Céline Carrère - Faculté d'économie et de management - UNIGE
- ↑ Céline Carrère - Google Scholar Citations
- ↑ Director Céline Carrère - Rectorat - UNIGE
- ↑ Céline Carrère | Sciences Po - Le Laboratoire Interdisciplinaire d'Evaluation des Politiques Publiques (LIEPP)
- ↑ Céline Carrere - EconPapers
- ↑ Céline Carrère's research works - ResearchGate
- ↑ http://www.voxeu.org/article/social-dumping-misconceptions