The United States and the New International Order
|Faculté||Faculté des sciences de la société|
|Département||Département de science politique et relations internationales|
|Professeur(s)||Rémi Baudoui (2011 - )|
|Cours||Terrorism and international relations|
- Terrorism or terrorisms? Some epistemological considerations
- National security and counter-terrorism: the example of Latin America
- Internationalisation of struggles and emergence of international terrorism
- International relations and the fight against international terrorism
- The United States and the New International Order
- Middle East Geopolitics
- September 11, 2001 ruptures
- Al-Qaida and the "geopolitics of radical terrorism"
- Combating terrorism and rebuilding transatlantic relations
- Arab Spring Against Terrorism: Issues and Perspectives
- Homegrown jihadism: How to prevent terrorist catastrophe?
How do States think of the world and how does terrorism fit into this space? The Clinton years are a position that puts the United States back on its territory and explains why it did not understand what happened before 9/11, and why they do not understand why violence is returning home.
Until the late 1980s, terrorism and counterterrorism mainly involved nation-states, major institutions of global governance such as the United Nations and regional organizations such as the European Union.
In order to understand the evolutions of terrorism in the 1990s and 2000s and the new forms of counter-terrorism, we must go back to the very evolution of international relations during this period. Paradoxically, the epicentre is a space of extreme freedom that takes place with the fall of the Berlin Wall.
- 1 Conceptualizing the concept of international order
- 1.1 The concept of international order
- 1.2 There are several possible conceptions of the "international order".
- 1.3 The thinkers of war as a state of nature
- 1.4 Objective: How to reduce wars? And by what means?
- 1.5 But how do we go after that? What are the risks of truce?
- 1.6 Theorists of domination: hegemony precedes the international order
- 1.7 Tools of the international order
- 1.8 The Four Models of construction of the International Order
- 2 The United States: Towards the Refusal of a Multilateral International Order
- 2.1 Difficult U.S.-United Nations relationships and the international community
- 2.2 With the end of the Cold War in 1989, new hope: to see the United Nations return to service
- 2.3 The Moment of Grace: The Gulf Crisis and the Myth of the "New International Order"
- 2.4 This "discovery" of East-West reconciliation triggers a euphoric discourse on the "New World Order".
- 2.5 The 12 Security Council resolutions adopted by the required majority of 11 votes, including the 5 permanent members.
- 2.6 A general binding measure
- 3 United States vs. the UN
- 4 Conclusion: the end of multilateralism and the return of force in international relations
- 5 Annexes
- 6 References
Conceptualizing the concept of international order[modifier | modifier le wikicode]
The great ordering event was the fall of the Berlin Wall and the collapse of the USSR. The current international system born of the Cold War. Terror has produced a balance, that is, a country that has the atomic bomb is a superpower, but when two have the atomic bomb the balance of power will change.
The first questioning of the main principles of international relations and also a questioning of the balance between the major powers in the Cold War. The end of a bipolar world, secured by relations between the USSR and the United States, will bring about a world that is much more complicated to read. New concepts will appear that will show the evolutions of this world. It is the emergence of a more complex world with new concepts and new rivalries:
- unbalance between powers;
- new rivalries that reflect the changing international relations between powers.
There is an absolute paradox where nuclear terror had established a paradoxical balance. With this change in the international order, there is the loss of a paradoxical equilibrium linked to nuclear terror.
The concept of international order[modifier | modifier le wikicode]
"Order" and "international" are two adjoining words that bear witness to the fact that the field of exchanges between powers falls within an organizational domain. It is a constructed discourse, the international order is an excessively important concept in order to try to define the natures of construction of an "order" in opposition to the "disorder". Order means that something built, there is construction. We are on the side of peace and not on the side of disorder, this concept refers to the ability to be together and to live in society. Society says it's like an order. This construction will work by common rules and practices.
When we talk about international relations, we can contrast "international order" with "international relations". An international order is a system of rules, organizational norms, customs, customs and an intelligible system of values. International relations do not prejudge whether or not an order is created.
The field of international relations can only be thought of in terms of scientific object and in analytical terms between order and disorder. Society is lived as an order[or orders] and functions by rules, customs and customs.
In terms of international relations, Michel Girard, specialist in international relations, defines the international order as "the set of principles of intelligible organization that govern or must govern relations between nations".
International relations are therefore based on two fundamental notions:
- Order: refers to the concepts of rules, norms, organization, intelligibility of relations, it is a foundation of shared common values;
- Disorder: refers to the rupture, the impossibility of agreeing on common values.
It is important to make a distinction between the terms international relationsand international order:
- The system of international relations is an open field, a space made up of interactions between States in which interactions make a system;
- The international order implies an organized, rationalized management of the behaviour of States in which one order prevails over another.
So there is implicitly the notion of power relations. In order for an international order to emerge, there must be powerful people, stronger actors than others if necessary, who impose their order.
The international order opposes other words such as "anarchy","self-regulation" and the concept of war, which contains the idea of the end of rules. This notion also includes the notion of stability, even if this stability is constituted by power relations. The international order is opposed to a naturalistic vision of relations between powers, namely the idea of a "natural balance" between nations.
In the concept of international order, there may be implicitly a construction of order that suggests power relations. Behind these words, the process modality is different. It is postulated that the international order will avoid war and produce stability that will benefit everyone to a greater or lesser extent.
There are several possible conceptions of the "international order".[modifier | modifier le wikicode]
There are several possible conceptions of the international order. "Order" can be achieved in different ways and in different relationships.
To understand this, let us take the case of Jacques Chirac who visited Polynesia in 2003: « I am convinced that the organization of the world can only be multipolar and can only be based on multilateralism. Against the political chaos that would result from the blind play of international rivalries, France is working to build a multipolar world ». The international order comes from a multipolar world.
The implicit idea is to fight a world of power relations and domination of some over the majority. Multilateralism as a possible order of international relations. For France, stability will come from the creation of "several poles of stability" building a stable system. The French position cannot be shared by all countries. There are therefore several possible conceptions of the concept of international order.
Before defining their contours, let us look at what unifies and brings together the conceptions of the international order. Order is a political construct and refers to the notion of stability. Any theory of international order challenges the State of nature. Nature is situated on the side of anarchy which can therefore be assimilated to a state of war. The state of war is therefore the first and cannot be the foundation of the international order.
The thinkers of war as a state of nature[modifier | modifier le wikicode]
For Thomas Hobbes[1588-1679], « War is not only about battle and actual combat, but also about time and space where the will? to fight each other in battles is sufficiently strong ». War is an internal and external disorder, a state of nature as opposed to civilized status. Hobbes considers the state of nature to be anarchic.
For Jean-Jacques Rousseau[1712-1778], « I call war of power to power the effect of a mutual, constant and manifested disposition to destroy the enemy state or weaken it at least by all possible effects. This provision reduced in act is the war itself. As long as it has no effect, it is only a state of war. In my opinion, the state of war is natural between the powers ».
War would therefore be of all times, of all cultures, a kind of natural state to the human condition.
Objective: How to reduce wars? And by what means?[modifier | modifier le wikicode]
The primary purpose of building the international order is to avoid war. The hypotheses are to put an end to the desire to fight and end the state of anarchy. Solutions? Kant's solution of a world government is the most interesting, but probably the most difficult to implement.
Several types of positions will address this question of considering the establishment of a world government.
For Kenneth Walz (1924 - 2013) who is a political scientist professor at Columbia,« War exists because nothing prevents it. So it is true that with an international government, there would be no more international wars. But such a solution to be logically irrefutable is nonetheless practically impossible ». The Kantian concepts of international peace must be taken up again, but this project is not feasible.
But how do we go after that? What are the risks of truce?[modifier | modifier le wikicode]
Through the question of the reduction of war, different interpretations of what constitutes the international order are possible. Can we propose a truce? (Principle of the Realistic School or neo-realists). Waltz considers that one cannot separate oneself from war, the creation of an international order cannot result from large institutions, but from attitude and defence, that is what he calls the self-help. First, everyone must rely on his or her own strengths to defend and act. The international order will not be created by a large infrastructure of global governance, but will come from the fact that states need to help themselves and build their own structures to protect themselves and act.
For those who are realistic, the truce is a matter for the constitution of the international order:"The international order can be defined as an international system temporarily sheltered from a general war". According to Waltz, the essential element is self-help, i. e. each person can only rely on his or her own strengths to defend and act.
How can we proceed so that this international order can exist and last?
- to push back the state of nature;
- to push back the latent state of war;
- limit and avoid wars.
This theory includes divorce, which lies in the interpretation and difference between "obtaining" international order and "maintaining" international order:
- obtain: by a balance between powers. The force itself cannot proceed from the creation of a balance. On the balance of power.
- maintain: places the action on the side of strength and power. Prevent other states from entering into war. On the side of strength and supremacy.
Henri Kissinger[1923 -] Diplomat, security adviser, great theorist of the equilibrium of national powers, Secretary of State of Richard Nixon and Gerald Ford said:"Each State must prevent any other State from accumulating forces superior to those of its coalition rivals... The order will have to emerge[...] The order will have to emerge[...]".conciliation and balancing of competing national interests ". It is a theory compatible with the Cold War stakes, so Kissinger is therefore on the side of the Self-help theory.
Theorists of domination: hegemony precedes the international order[modifier | modifier le wikicode]
Theorists of domination say that hegemony precedes the international order.
According to Robert Gilpin, Professor Emeritus of Economics and international economics specialist,"The dominant nation has created a system in which rules and standards provide benefits in the economic and security fields. It is supported by a set of satisfied nations. Under these conditions, initiating an armed conflict is counterproductive, since the dominant nation would subvert the rules it has established, which it cannot do without undermining the support it receives.
The international order will be built on the balance of power, and a balance of power will be re-established which will be able to federate a certain number of States. War is counterproductive because it will return to a production of decoupling.
Gilpin makes a link with the economic hegemony which assures by military and symbolic resources the domination of a country and which makes it possible to:
- Maintain an existing order
- mastering relations to secondary powers that it inscribes in its orbit (theory of bandwaggoning)"hook the wagons". The Middle East has been a land of stakes since the 19th century, both from the American and Russian point of view. The challenge is to hang on to their movement from third countries.
The leadership of the dominant power must be complete and absolute. There is no question of changing the balance of power, but only in maintaining and extending it.
There is an incompatibility between these theorists of hegemonic domination and others, for there is an absolute incompatibility between the "equilibrist" doctrine which is positive and the "hegemonic" doctrine which is negative.
Tools of the international order[modifier | modifier le wikicode]
What enables the international order to be realized to the extent that the realization of an international order is not a state of nature? In international relations, there is the issue of treaty production and international relations. In public international law, we observe the production of major international congresses that will produce texts of regulations between States. In international relations, the notion of a treaty or convention is a strong concept, because it is a document credited with a legal value that determines the nature of relations and exchanges between two States, or between one and several States or between groups of States. A treaty is a sum of obligations to define rules for collective life and to guarantee collective peace.
The first major treaty was the Treaty of Westphalia of 24 October 1648, which was concluded at the end of the Thirty Years' War. From the Treaty of Westphalia onwards, there has been a proliferation of treaties to manage international relations in Europe:
- 1815: Congress of Vienna - Defining monarchical Europe after Napoleon;
- 1856: Paris Congress - End of the Crimean War;
- 1885: Congress of Berlin - Settling colonial disputes between major powers;
- 1919: SDN Pact - Thinking Peace after the First World War.
There is a whole field of public international law that will have to deal with these issues. After the Second World War there will be strong diplomatic activity. The UN and UN conventions to regulate the planet and avoid conflicts. When the rules and agreements are not applied, there may be disputes with recourse before third jurisdictions and in the event of refusal to perform, disputes can escalate into disputes and go to war. For example, the Falklands War between Argentina and the United Kingdom in 1982 was a dispute between nation states over a portion of territorial sovereignty.
In order to answer the question of how to reduce the potential for conflict in the field of International Relations, it is proposed to frame the "belligerent activities of some States" by others.
The Four Models of construction of the International Order[modifier | modifier le wikicode]
They are models built on the modality of power relations.
Morton Kaplan (1921), a major theorist and professor of political science at the University of Chicago, is also the author of System and Process in International Politics, published in 1957, distinguishes four constituted systems:
- balance of powers;
- the balance of terror.
The domination[modifier | modifier le wikicode]
An Empire exercises its power of control over a territory and has the strength to be respected. The result of the concept of domination is that of "preponderance". Without having all the imperial capacities, it is a question for a nation-state, without being able to claim to control everything, of acquiring in a particular field the means to arbitrate in specific international situations or contexts. We are talking about the Spanish preponderance to describe modern Spain in the 16th and 18th centuries. Preponderance is more limited in space-time, probably more fragile and uncertain.
Balance of Powers[modifier | modifier le wikicode]
Build an appropriate set of alliances to avoid being marginalized in international relations. It is an ancient practice already deployed under the Ancient Regime, updated in the 19th century and in the first half of the 20th century to try to avoid conflicts or the logic of domination. One can cite the Franco-Italian agreement attempt at the time Hitler came to power in Germany, or the Franco-Russian agreements to limit Germanic expansion around the First World War. Leaders use this method when they have no other options. This is called "ring games".
Consultation[modifier | modifier le wikicode]
Form of intervention reserved for the Great Powers. Debate to avoid future problems and difficulties and negotiate together. Consultation can be visible, semi-visible or absolutely secret. For example, the American-Iranian negotiations or the negotiations on the Syrian issue...
The Balance of Terror[modifier | modifier le wikicode]
The most obvious example is the Cold War with the risk of widespread nuclear conflict. Each party is engaged in the arms race and at the same time organises coalitions of conflict. But "balance in terror" favours the freezing of all major conflicts. This is what Morton Kaplan calls the "bipolar rigid system".
Which international model is the United States moving towards at the turn of the 1980s and 1990s? Depending on the nature of the international order, this will influence the way one thinks about one's internal and external security.
The United States: Towards the Refusal of a Multilateral International Order[modifier | modifier le wikicode]
Difficult U.S.-United Nations relationships and the international community[modifier | modifier le wikicode]
The paradox of U. S. relations with the rest of the world is built on the ambiguity of isolationism in a way of being, but they also need to ensure their security thinking of liberal democracy as an exportable and global model. In the name of the universality of their interests, they can be hegemonic. On the one hand, by liberal ideology, the United States is isolationist, but at the same time the American model is the only model of universal thought. This paradox situates them as isolationist and of the other hegemonist, which translates into a very great historical mistrust of international organizations, because they take too much power. If the UN had too much power, it could limit their ability to act. In other words, there is an isolationist temptation with the idea of a world in their image and to export democracy; and a hegemonic temptation with the universality of American interests.
The American Congress has often refused to take a step forward, especially with the refusal to ratify the League of Nations in 1919. The great principle of the United Nations is the rejection of the "one nation, one vote" principle. The main fundamental question of the Security Council is that the major powers do not want to relinquish their place while the General Assembly has become the seat of expression of the Third Worlds. The UN will be tossed around in hegemonic influence games. The constitution of the UN cannot be thought outside their power with a permanent seat and American financial assistance.
With the end of the Cold War in 1989, new hope: to see the United Nations return to service[modifier | modifier le wikicode]
With the end of the Cold War, there is the idea of coming out of a hegemonic management of great power. As a result, the first sentence that Bill Clinton uttered in 1992 was « That the UN be strengthened and given its troops so that it can respond quickly to conflicts around the world ». It's the idea of the UN having a clean army. When the world collapsed in 1989, the first American phase was to strengthen the United Nations. Initially, the assumption is that as we enter a new world, we must strengthen the United Nations.
With Egypt's appointment of Boutros Boutros-Ghali as UN Secretary-General, new challenges are emerging. The United States no longer has any counterbalance to the Security Council and is beginning to doubt the validity of the United Nations, particularly in its peacekeeping operations such as Rwanda and Bosnia. The United States will distance itself from the UN on suspicion of engaging in risky operations for the West.
Bill Clinton, elected in 1993, initiated a reversal of position and the U. S. Congress withdrew funding from the UN. In 1999, the United States owed the UN $1.6 billion and Bill Gates offered to pay the U. S. dues. We return to an isolationist position with a distance from UN peacekeeping operations. It is a return to conquering isolationism, because the United Nations is no longer able to meet the challenges of the New Century.
The Moment of Grace: The Gulf Crisis and the Myth of the "New International Order"[modifier | modifier le wikicode]
Michel Merle in his book The Gulf Crisis and the New International Order, published in 1991, initially identified a "banal" fact in 1990, namely the invasion of Kuwait by Saddam Hussein. In full relaxation, the latter thinks that the "Greats will not move". However, there is opposition from Arab countries who see a provocation against other Arabs. Gorbachev wants to establish a co-management between the United States and the former USSR, but there is no Soviet support. A new political discourse is pronounced, namely that of the East-West agreement and the former USSR sits behind the Western position to sanction Iraq. The UN, until now paralysed by the exercise of the right of veto, legalizes the use of force against Iraq by the resolution of November 29,1990.
The golf crisis is the rare moment when the new international order seems to be able to come true. It is carried out through a military operation that brings together a coalition with many countries of the world, the United States and the former Soviet Union, giving the impression that it has entered a new era of peace and consensus. This is the only time the UN will return to the international stage because everyone agrees and, paradoxically, it is the major powers that will redelegate a leading role to the UN. It's a short moment in history, and then it's going to go back down again.
This "discovery" of East-West reconciliation triggers a euphoric discourse on the "New World Order".[modifier | modifier le wikicode]
The Security Council is going to be extremely active beginning to build some sort of US policy of war against Iraq with some form of ambiguity. We imagine a new international order within the framework of relaxation, all countries will agree to reach a consensus.
« At a time when, for the first time in the history of the United Nations, there is an opportunity to build a world order based on the common law of the right of peoples to self-determination, it would seem inconceivable that France should refrain from providing assistance. »
— François Mitterrand, 17 janvier 1991
« We are ready to use force to defend the new order that is emerging among the world's states, a world of sovereign states living in peace. We have seen too often in this century how quickly a threat to a country becomes a threat to us. At this decisive moment in history, when the Cold War is over, we cannot fail. The issue is not only a distant country called Kuwait. The issue is the kind of world we will live in. »
— Georges W. Bush, 5 janvier 1991
The constitution of a new international order will be made by the war against a major power in the Middle East that is Iraq, but also in strategic and military terms, over-equipped by the Western countries as a strong link to control Khomeini's Iran. The first war against Iraq is a contradiction. We must get rid of Saddam Hussein, particularly for his regional ambitions, but we do not want to destroy him, because Iraq plays an important role in religious geopolitics and oil. The question is to make war with him under a UN mandate.
This leads to the manufacture of blockades in order to bend a state by the fact that they will be forced to do so by UN laws and very strict military control. The blockade is a perverse and vicious weapon since it affects the population and in particular the poorest people who can consolidate the richest who have their own network. We're gonna fold up a country without trying to destroy it.
The 12 Security Council resolutions adopted by the required majority of 11 votes, including the 5 permanent members.[modifier | modifier le wikicode]
From 1990 onwards, the Security Council will adopt a series of measures that may be the only consensual war of the 20th century. :
- R660: Conviction of assault. Request immediate withdrawal;
- R662: Is it declared "null and void" the annexation of Kuwait by Iraq;
- R664: requires "the immediate departure of third-country nationals from Kuwait";
- R667: Condemns Iraq for the aggression of diplomatic personnel in Kuwait;
- R674: Condemns the actions of "forces of the authorities and occupying forces in Kuwait";
- R677: Condemns measures to alter Kuwait's demographic identity.
- R661: Commercial, financial and military boycott of Iraq;
- R665: authorizes the use of force to enforce the embargo;
- R670: air embargo against Iraq and blockade in Iraqi ships' ports.
Two mitigation measures: $R666: is placed under the control of the UN and the Red Cross any individual delivery of food aid to Iraq;
- R669: the Sanctions Committee examines requests for assistance from countries affected by the embargo on Iraq.
A general binding measure[modifier | modifier le wikicode]
It is a binding space, and with R 678, force is authorized to enforce UN sanctions. Iraq is placed under guardianship since military sanctions can accompany non-compliance with economic sanctions. Iraq is therefore under strict surveillance. It is not only sanctioned, but must also pay compensation in the form of oil delivery. With R 687 of 3 April 1991, Iraq was placed under guardianship.
This leads to sovereignty restrictions, the implementation of international control procedures giving access to Iraqi territory, pressure exerted by maintaining the embargo, and absolute disarmament. In addition, Iraq must accept the destruction and neutralization of its armaments, including the elimination of chemical weapons and the destruction of ballistic missiles.
A special commission is hereby established to carry out on-site inspections of nuclear and chemical weapons of mass destruction sites with a view to inventorying and destroying them within the framework of UNSCOM. On the other hand, there is Iraq's obligation to subscribe to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. Iraq is under permanent control for an unlimited period of time.
The Iraqi crisis is a singular example of the UN returning to the international stage on a regular basis. What is interesting is the question of whether, even if it succeeds, the United Nations authorizes the use of force to coerce a State, and who may be asking us the opposite, namely whether the United Nations was an actor or was used in a case that went beyond it?
United States vs. the UN[modifier | modifier le wikicode]
From 1992 to 1993, there will be a reversal of American policy towards the UN. All of Al Qaeda's creation and its emergence as a political force emerges in the Russian-Afghan conflict as Afghanistan struggles against the Soviet presence and there is a geopolitical process that develops out of Islam. Al Qaeda is emerging in an international context linked to the Middle East. Bin Laden's early fatwas were linked to questions about dictatorships, political autonomy, influence and the weight of the United States in the Middle East.
The International Criminal Court (ICC)[modifier | modifier le wikicode]
The overthrow is being carried out through the International Criminal Court and the case of the former Yugoslavia. That is the idea that an International Criminal Court should be established to combat human rights violations. This is a noble idea, since we can see that in the 1990s there was a return to genocide, barbarism as in the former Yugoslavia. The International Criminal Court would be a court to regulate these conflicts, making it possible to punish all criminals and genocidaires.
These debates initially see the United States as a carrier of this debate. According to Bill Clinton on Rwanda and Bosnia,"We must establish a permanent international court to prosecute the most serious violations of humanitarian law. There is a misunderstanding, because for supporters of an International Criminal Court, Bill Clinton appears to be a powerful ally.
Already in 1996, David Scheffer, the American representative on this project, wrote:"In the toolbox of Foreign Affairs of a civilized world, it will be a beautiful new hammer that we can use in the next few years".
These comforting words quickly engage diplomatic actors and supporters in the debate on the establishment of an International Criminal Court.
Two possible models for the ICC[modifier | modifier le wikicode]
Two debates were possible at the time:
- The International Criminal Court must be placed under the responsibility of the United Nations Security Council with the 5 permanent members;
- It must be independent outside the Security Council. It is the concept of independence of judgement.
One quickly realizes that the United States is beginning to ask itself some questions being for war crimes courts that are local courts with the Rwanda issue and the Bosnia issue. There is a malaise, because if we create an international court that is a little free, we do not know where it will go. One of the fears is that justice will escape the Security Council and, above all, instructions and challenges. Bill Clinton's position is first of all to subscribe to solution 1. The U. S. Congress is opposed to the idea that this future court may have the authority to judge U.S. citizens. The challenge is not to subject American nationals to an international jurisdiction that could become uncontrollable.
The school case is that of military personnel who inadvertently kill civilians in an operation by bombardment, so why then submit them to uncontrollable international justice? It is a return to the position that we cannot let anything be done through an International Criminal Court that would challenge the integrity of the United States.
Jess Helms, close to Bill Clinton, illustrates this reversal of American positions:
« Finally, what this Court is proposing is to sit to judge the national security policy of the United States. Imagine what would have happened if this Court had been established when the United States invaded Panama or when the United States invaded Grenada or the American bombing of Tripoli. In none of these cases has the United States sought authorization from the UN to defend our interests. So while I'm alive, never - I mean, never, never - the United States will allow any international criminal court to judge their decisions regarding their national security. »
Rome Conference: 15 June to 17 July 1998[modifier | modifier le wikicode]
The Rome Conference accepts the establishment of the International Criminal Court. However, the United States will retreat. It is a diplomatic conference of the Plenipotentiaries for the creation of an international criminal court with the participation of more than 160 governments assisted by a large number of their delegations.
The Rome clauses allow the prosecution of nationals of signatory countries and any person committing a crime on the territory of signatories. 120 countries vote in favour of the ICC, 21 abstain, 7 countries vote against it, including the United States, Israel, China, Iraq and Qatar. Thus, the United States finds itself on the same level as the rogue states it condemns.
For the UN Secretary-General, the International Criminal Court is "a gift of hope for future generations, a giant step on the road to universal human rights and the rule of law. But for Jesse Helms,"he's a monster and it's our responsibility to wax him before he grows and eats us".
There is a very obvious incompatibility between US foreign policy and the International Criminal Court. There is a Congress that hesitates, but will support the American position on the basis that the American sovereign cannot be called into question on behalf of an international criminal court. Switzerland adopts the ICC on 18 July 1998. We must keep in mind this reversal, which is that the United States began to raise the idea after the first golf war that the United Nations may not be the most appropriate institution to defend the new international order. The 1990s witnessed an American disengagement in global governance and world affairs. September 11 forced the Americans to return.
The Conflict in the Former Yugoslavia[modifier | modifier le wikicode]
From 1992 to 1993, the UN became involved in peacekeeping operations with the support of the United States. However, from 1994 to 1995, however, peacekeeping operations under the responsibility of the United Nations increased. The Americans will begin to be suspicious of the proliferation of peacekeeping operations, which are particularly costly. Concerns have arisen from the Americans in particular as to whether these operations would not take them too far.
Madeleine Albright, U. S. Ambassador to the United Nations, said,"Since we have the right of veto, we can block any peace operation that is not in our interests. Since we believe that United Nations peacekeeping gained far too much momentum in 1992 and 1993, we adopted strict guidelines to decide when a new operation should start. There are therefore fewer peacekeeping troops at the UN today than there have been in the last two years.
U. S.-United Nations Interest Gap Analysis[modifier | modifier le wikicode]
The downsizing that gives the major powers and an advantage to the fund and from an interesting economic point of view, but requires a change of attitude. The United States will reduce U. S. troops under the responsibility of the UN to rebuild room for manoeuvre in American security policy. This goes hand in hand with the Vietnamese syndrome, which is a fear of getting bogged down in military affairs that would eventually paralyze the world's leading power.
The only American concession is to accept only bombing. In 1992, Clinton campaigned against Bush in favour of U. S. support for the UN on Serbia's case. The United Nations is in Bosnia for peacekeeping to establish security zones. However, there is a progressive criticism from the United States of the UN's weakness in protecting the population and the victories of Bosnian Serbs.
At the end of 1995, with the fall of Srebrenica, the United States took a clearer position rejecting the reinforcement of UN troops. UN troops are forced to withdraw and must give way to NATO, which is engaged in air raids. The United States excludes the UN from the peace negotiations that will lead to the Dayton Accords, conducted in partnership with the European Union and Russia. The United States reaffirms unilateralism, i. e. a thought of peace dictated by the balance of power between American management and interests.
« By putting the UN on the front line while depriving it of the necessary tools and using it as a scapegoat, the United States and the West have saved time....The harm done to the already? torn UN and on the brink of bankruptcy would not be easily identifiable, nor would the damage done to the fundamental principles of international behaviour... »
— Boutros-Boutros Ghali, Secretary-General of the UN.
Boutros-Ghali's second term was fought by the Americans and he was ousted in favor of Kofi Annan. It is an interpretation of the UN as a structure that can be complementary to US policy. The idea is to disengage from the UN or the UN is subservient to American interests.
« UN peacekeeping missions add to our capabilities and do not withdraw anything. The United Nations allows us to choose between acting unilaterally or standing on the sidelines while conflicts escalate. It allows us to influence events without bearing the full burden of cost and risk. And it gives the weight of law and global opinion to causes and principles that we support. »
— Madeleine Albright, 1995
There has been a weakening of the United Nations on the international scene and a strengthening of the American position on the basis of a disengagement from international affairs. The great weakness is that they will not see the events provoked by Al Qaeda.
Conclusion: the end of multilateralism and the return of force in international relations[modifier | modifier le wikicode]
The years 1989 to 1995 were pivotal years in international relations. The fall of the Berlin Wall is seen as an opportunity to rebuild a peaceful international order. However, the interpretation varies from country to country.
The First Gulf War suggests the possibility of building a "new international order" based on the agreement between the major powers. The conflicts between the United States and the United Nations mark the end of multilateralism and the return of American unilateralism in international relations. This return to unilateralism is based on the defence of American interests. At a time when Al Qaeda is being created, the American position cannot understand the stakes of Al Qaeda's position.
Annexes[modifier | modifier le wikicode]
- G.W. Hopple. ‘Intelligence and Warning: Implications and Lessons of the Falkland Islands War.’ World Politics. Volume 36, Issue 3. April 1984, pp. 339-361.
Bibliographie[modifier | modifier le wikicode]
- Dario Battistella, Théories des relations internationales, Paris, Presses de la Fondation Nationale des Sciences Politiques, 2006 ;
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- Nicholas Guyatt, Encore une siècle américain, Tunis, 2002 ;
- Jean-Jacques Roche, Théorie des relations internationales, Paris, Montchrestien, 204 , Alaa Tahir, Irak, aux origines du régime militaire, Paris, L’Harmattan, 1989 ;
- « Un ordre mondial incertain », Esprit, Paris, n° 5, mai 2001.
References[modifier | modifier le wikicode]
- Page personnelle de Rémi Baudoui sur le site de l'Université de Genève
- "Security Council Resolutions - 1990." UN News Center. UN, n.d. Web. 13 July 2014. <http://www.un.org/docs/scres/1990/scres90.htm>.