Al-Qaida and the "geopolitics of radical terrorism"

De Baripedia

The concept of "Qaida" [القاعدة] is a reference frame that refers to the concept of structure:

  • the base;
  • the rule;
  • base and standard.

Al Qâ' ida al sulba means "The solid base" which would designate the city of Medina, the base of the troops of Muhammad in order to carry the holy war towards Mecca. The concept of "Qaida" refers to an "inking geographically delimited" according to the words of Jean-Pierre Filiu. This refers to something that structures a geographically defined territory. There is a specific reference to the construction of a territory.

Al-Qaida predates the September 11 attacks. Al-Qaida has its origins in the crucible of the war in Afghanistan waged against Soviet troops in support of President Najibullah's communist regime, which is disputed by the people. The Soviet troops were threatened and came to protect the communist regime. It is the local context of a conflict that appears on populations who rely on Islam to federate and group together, making Islam an element of political and ideological force against a regime judged as secular and treacherous, since it was forced to ask the Soviets for help in order to protect it.

Al-Qaida is paid on the side of a guerrilla-type "war of national liberation". Afghanistan is a complicated territory, very mountainous, the political power controls the plains, but does not control the mountain. What is going to happen is an opposition between the plains that can be controlled and the mountains that serve as refuges for the mujahideen who are the fighters. Afghanistan becomes a place of civil war which will interest the great powers being placed on a strategic axis in terms of pipeline. This is an important area of strategic management, which means that Western countries will be interested in Afghanistan before 9/11. Some movements reportedly received some military support to fight against the Marxist regime in order to limit the Soviet Union's area of influence.

There is a double legacy:

  • The war of national liberation on the part of the guerrillas and guerrillas of Latin America with the integration of the struggle of the weak against a strong state;
  • of the holy war which is the idea of saying that Islam is a revolutionary force against the struggle against all forms of oppression. The Qur'an explains that aid to the poorest and a necessity which is one of the foundations of Islam. There is an anti-imperialist vision assembled with Islam as a form of combat.

It is a distant and close story rooted in the history of political violence in the Middle East.

The case of Abdallah Azzam is a Palestinian religious scholar who was a member of the Palestinian guerrilla from 1967 to 1969. He studies Muslim law at the University of Al Azhar in Cairo, which is a high place of Sunni Islam. He joined Afghanistan to fight the pro-Soviet regime. In 1984, he called for the defence of Muslim territories, which advocated individual jihad for every Muslim in the world. He is the founder with Bin Laden [1957 - 2011] of the first training camp for the "Arabs" in Afghanistan who are the internationalists and not the Afghans forming those who are already internationalizing to take advantage of Afghanistan as a place of internationalization of the Islamic revolution.

The origins of Al-Qaida[modifier | modifier le wikicode]

Several types of struggles in different contexts will form a series of passages that accumulate creating meaning that leads to Al-Qaida. It is a slow story played out in several acts and in several theatres of military operations.

The Afghan conflict[modifier | modifier le wikicode]

The Red Army in the Afghan mountains in 1983.

The origins are far away with the entry of the Red Army into Afghanistan to support the Marxist political regime of President Najibullah. Many countries are going to push for the creation of resistance. Saudi Arabia decides to fight the Soviet Union through the Organization of the Islamic Conference[OIC] which demands "the immediate and unconditional withdrawal of Soviet troops".

At the head of the Mujahedeen, one finds member of the Islamic Union for the Liberation of Afghanistan which is the Afghan Abdul Rasul Sayyaf [1946 -] is a Ulema trained in Cairo and Saudi Arabia. He is appalled by his recent detention in communist prisons and receives the support of Ryad in the form of volunteer fighters. Hence the complexity of the influences that will appear in the Afghan conflict.

The ideological and religious influence: Wahhabism - Sunni Doctrine back to a purified Islam[modifier | modifier le wikicode]

Wahhabism draws its origins and doctrine from the writings of Muhammad Ibn Al Wahhab[1703 - 1792] in order to purify Islam from its impurities through prohibition:

  • of the cult of saints;
  • funerary monuments;
  • luxury mosques;
  • from any source of legislation other than the Qur'an.

The complexity of these influences mobilizes against the communist regime. The fighting mechanism was formed in the Pakistani tribal areas with the arrival of Wahhabite preachers from Saudi Arabia and the indoctrination, mobilization and training of Afghan refugees for the Afghan National Liberation War. These tribal areas become a buffer zone in preparation for the national liberation war against the communist regime of Najibullah.

The idea of the territorial concept of a regenerated Islam emerges. In 1981 is founded by Sayyaf of the Islamic Union for the Liberation of Afghanistan. He binds with Bin Laden during the conflict with the Soviet Army.

Arab Jihad in Afghanistan[modifier | modifier le wikicode]

Appears the idea that there is an Arab jihad to lead in Afghanistan which is seen as the potentiality of building an Islamic khalîfa.

Abdullah Yusuf Azzam

A second essential figure of the device is the Palestinian Abdullah Azzam [1941 - 1989]. Born in the West Bank, he studied in Damascus and Cairo. He binds himself with Sayyid Qobt's family, an ideologist of the Muslim Brotherhood. Then he moved to Damascus and managed the Jordanian branch of the Muslim Brotherhood. After 1980, he committed himself to Afghan jihad against the Soviet occupation. He was disowned by the Jordanian Muslim Brotherhood and wrote a fatwa prescribing Afghan jihad as an individual obligation.

« Any Arab who wants to accomplish jihad in Palestine can start there, but whoever cannot, let him go to Afghanistan. As for the other Muslims, I think they should start their jihad in Afghanistan. »

Afghanistan is becoming a place of transit or a means of making the jihad that cannot be done in Palestine. It is impossible to fight in Palestine already to achieve this, but also because the PLO is already firmly established there.

Azzam's convictions seduce Bin Laden, son of a wealthy Saudi construction entrepreneur who is a businessman who made his fortune in religious real estate. Bin Laden inherits an organized structure knowing what it's like to finance a territory. In Ben Landen's legacy, there is the understanding of economic power at the service of building a territory.


Azzam and Bin Laden open a "Service Bureau" in Peshawar for the future Arab Mujahedin. It is a reception centre for Arab fighters who want to go to Afghanistan. This will cause the gradual arrival of the fighters, particularly Egyptian extremists imprisoned under Sadat.

Among them is Ayman al Zawahiri, an Egyptian physician, a former member of the Muslim Brotherhood who was imprisoned for three years and has been in Afghanistan. He arrived in Afghanistan on the basis of accusations that the Muslim Brotherhood had abandoned the path of jihad. It will see Afghanistan as an ideal land of protection and struggle. Azzam, Bin Laden and Zawahiri develop guest houses to gather their supporters.

With Sayyaf's help, they obtained permission from Pakistani authorities to open training camps for Arab fighters. In 1985, Azzam became head of the Islamic Humanitarian Organizations Coordinating Committee in Peshawar and Bin Laden supervised the infrastructure works in tribal areas, moved to Afghanistan in 1986 and set up the supporters' den with a few dozen fighters.

The Qâ’ida 
[modifier | modifier le wikicode]

The fundamental challenge is to anchor the struggle by a militant vanguard based on Azzam's theory. Territorial anchoring is necessary to amplify the struggle and transform it into a general model of combat. The Qâ' ida model will be thought mimetically of the prophet's life. The Medinese experience of the Prophet will lead them to gather in a third place, to reorganize and launch the struggle against Mecca. Medina is the Qaida needed to launch jihad and conquer Arabia.

The Mujahideen Wars[modifier | modifier le wikicode]

In April 1987 the first battles of Bin Laden's troops against the Red Army took place. In April 1988 the Soviet withdrawal was announced. Afghan troops from Al-Qaida are part of the effort to overthrow the communist regime in Kabul. The battle of Jelalabad is a failure for the Muslim troops. An interesting paradox is that the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan breaks the momentum of jihad. Afghanistan is falling into factional conflict. A period of conflict is beginning between the different factions of the Afghan resistance. In 1989, Azzam disappeared in a car bomb attack.

Abdul Rashid Dostom
Ahmad Shah Massoud

Between 1989 and 1996, the Afghan civil war took place. Alliances and counter-allocations between the various factions leading to the constitution of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan in 1992, which is an absolute fiction because of the conflicts between the various protagonists: Uzbek General Rachid Dostom, Tajik, Commander Massoud who is the leader of the Northern Alliance of Afghanistan fighting the power of the Taliban from 1996 until his death in 2001.

Between 1992 and 1996, Kabul suffered four years of conflict leading to nearly 40,000 deaths. In Pakistani and Afghan tribal areas, a new political force emerged: the Taliban.

"Taleb is the one who writes", Students in Religion "who gather under the leadership of their leader Mohammed Omar, a modest Pashtun mullah from a village in Kandahar. The heart of the Taliban problem is not the construction of an Islamic state, but a return to the purified more with respect for the Koran, divine law and Sharia law. The Taliban are a presence of fundamentalist religious moralization. In other words, they are neo-fundamentalists who advocate a re-Islamicisation of more and are not primarily interested in the question of the Islamic state. Through morality and the re-Islamisation of morals, the divine law which must guide society and men and women will be respected.

1994 are the first victories of the Taliban who will fight against the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan. In 1996 there is a Taliban war going on against the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, which will control the country's clamour. On 27 September 1996, Kabul fell into the hands of the Taliban. Mullah Omar, leader of the Taliban, becomes the self-proclaimed new head of state under the title of commander of believers. It gathers the allegiance of the assembled tribal and religious notables. He becomes an emir[the one who commands] and calls for jihad against the unbelievers. The junction will be able to operate with Bin Laden in order to multiply their forces.

The Terrorist Emirate[modifier | modifier le wikicode]

The Sudanese parenthesis
[modifier | modifier le wikicode]

Between 1989 and 1990, Bin Laden returned to Saudi Arabia. It is the moral and financial reference for veterans. He helped them to relocate to the country and engaged the "Afghan Yemeni" to launch a jihad against the Marxist regime in Aden. The break with the Saudi Arabian authorities comes with the invasion of Kuwait by Saddam Hussein. He urged the Minister of Defense to mobilize the "veterans" to defend Kuwait, but the principle of solidarity? Arab led to a refusal on his part.

The point of contention is the agreement given to the Saudi government in the United States to protect it from Saddam Hussein by accepting the establishment of American military bases in Saudi Arabia. It is impossible to tolerate the presence of "unfaithful soldiers" on the Holy Places.

Bin Laden's new speech[modifier | modifier le wikicode]


According to Bin Laden, the Saudi regime is endangering the security and interests of Islam. Bin Laden returns to Peshawar, whom he no longer recognises and decides to go into exile in Khartoum. Khartoum is an Islamic regime in Sudan with its close companions. Together with his company, he is involved in major construction and development projects in the region. At the same time, it will continue to mobilize itself on international issues financing combatants and is committed to supporting all extremist causes. Bin Laden is a kind of "godfather" of an international jihad without borders.

Bin Laden will be implicated in several international attacks including Ryad and Islamabad. In 1994, he lost his Saudi nationality and had to leave Sudan where he no longer felt safe. In 1996, after five years of absence from the Afghan scene, Bin Laden returned to Afghanistan.

The rapprochement with the Taliban[modifier | modifier le wikicode]

The Afghanistan that Bin Laden discovers has nothing to do with the country he once knew. The power is in the hands of Mullah Omar, commander of the Believers. He decides to join the Afghan mountains to rebuild the Qaida and revive jihad.

Its position in this particular context was taken by the 1996 Jihad declaration against the Americans. He will develop "a secure[Qa' ida] base nestled in these summits on which the world's greatest atheistic military power has crashed", reduce "the American conspiracy and their allies", fight "this misleading propaganda on human rights[which] has given way to the beatings and massacres perpetrated against Muslims", repel "the unfaithful occupier". He is in fact an internationalist.

This is the first public appearance of Al-Qaida with a double bottom-up concept:

  • Territorial to hire jihad: it is necessary to structure resources, money, training camps.
  • Qâ'ida al-m'lûmatä] of Afghanistan veterans to recruit.

Meanwhile, the Taliban enter Kabul, President Najibullah is executed and the Taliban continue the war against Major Massoud.

Everything separates Bin Laden from Mollah Omar[modifier | modifier le wikicode]

Ben laden + mollah omar.png

Between Stateless and Pashtun, Internationalist and localist, planetary jihadist and supporter of an Afghan war, everything separates Bin Laden and Mullah Omar. The only commonality is Islam as a political force and a purification system. Moreover, each of them claims a historical destiny:

  • Ben Laden: Planetary jihad and the government of Islam;
  • Mollah Omar: putting on the Prophet's coat.

In 1996, the alliance between the two men was formed. The agreement is being concluded is Bin Laden's assistance in fighting Massoud and encouraging the deployment of political Islam in Afghanistan. In response, Mullah Omar offers hospitality to Bin Laden in his montages.

The 1998 changeover[modifier | modifier le wikicode]

Starting in 1998, there was a switchover. Arab jihadists are engaged by Bin Laden in the operations of Mullah Omar. Al-Zawahiri relaunches the series of international attacks. In February 1998, the World Islamic Jihad Front against Jews and Crusaders was formed. It is a device that refers to the Middle Ages in a Manichean vision.

The concept of the Crusader gives Bin Laden a specific stature, that of assimilating him to the very battle of the Prophet. The liberation of the holy places of Jerusalem and Mecca remains the main objective. We must "Killing the Americans and their allies, whether civilian or military, is a duty incumbent upon any Muslim who can do so in the country where he will be". The rupture is consumed with the prophetic tradition of jihad and the historical practice of Islam.

L'attentat à Nairobi en 1998 avait fait plus de 111 victimes. Photo : AFP

Two major attacks took place in 1998. On 7 August, to commemorate the eighth anniversary of the deployment of American troops in Saudi Arabia, the two attacks by the American embassies in Dar es Salaam and Nairobi were carried out on 7 August. The first U. S. counterattack with the firing of 60 cruise missiles at Al-Qaida positions on the Afghan-Pakistani border. The Americans demanded the delivery of Bin Laden to Mullah Omar who refused in the name of the sanctity of Pashtun hospitality leading to the constitution of the World Islamic Jihad Front. In the strategy of Bin Laden and Mullah Omar, terror must be brought to the international level, but Afghanistan under the Taliban regime must become an impregnable "jihadist", the basis of global subversion. Hence the need to engage with Mullah Omar against Commander Massoud, who is calling for the departure of "Arab" fighters from Afghanistan.

The idea is that the liberation of Afghanistan for the Taliban is no longer an end in itself, but becomes a platform for the jihadist. Afghanistan must become a "jihadistan", that is, a place to export its struggle. This explains the fact that Mullah Omar and Bin Laden are sponsoring the assassination of Major Massoud. This is the time when the hijacking of airliners on targets was conceptualized in 1999.

In the summer of 2000, the Taliban and Al-Qaida mobilized their troops to stifle the Northern Alliance. Massoud is forced to return to the mountains. On October 12,2000, the Al-Qaida bombing took place against an American destroyer in the Aden Bay. An agreement between Bin Laden and Mullah Omar has been reached to remove Major Massoud, who is a major obstacle to the establishment of a unified Afghanistan under Taliban rule. Commander Massoud was suppressed a few days before the attacks of 11 September 2001, murdered by a group claiming to be a journalist. Commander Massoud's death is a sign of 9/11.

The Strategic terrorist doctrine[modifier | modifier le wikicode]

A political doctrine of "liberation"[modifier | modifier le wikicode]

One must be interested in the content of the text of Al Qaida, which is a doctrine that presents itself as a liberation doctrine based on an interpretation of oppression. Al Qaeda's speech is to say that we are oppressed by powers. The oppression increased all the more as American bases were established 80 kilometres from Mecca. The classic discourse is: "The enemy oppresses us, we are his prisoners. We must free ourselves from our chains.

The methods of liberation are not only to make justice triumph, but also to make the divine justice triumph with God who is the bearer of equity, justice and equality. There is a recovery of the prophetic tradition at Bin Laden. It is an important representation system. The struggle is to "rebel in the name of God, fight to the point of giving one's life, liberate oneself to commit the victory of God, justice, good and freedom".

The discourse is not that of waging war against other monotheistic religions, but against an oppression that groups together secular dimensions of societies that have not understood the conformity of god and human traditions, it is to be waged against a bondage that involves non-Muslims.

The claimed strategy is that of a war against the powerful, so it is a war of subversion in which mentalities must be transformed and subverted in order to join the cause and overthrow. Subversive theories take into account the asymmetric relationship of means between majority and minority. The war must be waged by everyone in a personal jihadist reflection. Bin Laden presents himself, first of all, as a defender of freedom suggesting a charismatic dimension, but he also presents himself as the only one who can bring the freedom that is done in communion with God and be in accord with God. In other words, Bin Laden presents himself according to God's order as a defender of freedom, a defender of service to God and the true theorist of freedom. He defines himself as a liberator and contrasts with his image of the President of the United States as the only "terrorist". The dialectical reversal is interesting because it represents itself as a liberator who fights against the American oppressor and the terrorism of the Western powers who come to define on its territory the ways of life. On the other hand, Bin Laden leads his struggle humbly in a relationship with God which is a freedom of religion acting within the framework of the Koran which gives the elements of ethical behavior doing so for the umma which is the community of believers in the world.

As a fighter of God and for God, he recalls the foundations of Islam according to him:

  • Islam is one - not two or three after Judaism and Christianity;
  • Islam is truth:"The supremacy of truth and the development of goodness go together";
  • God's uniqueness creates the principle of freedom;
  • freedom is beyond the dichotomy of right and wrong, but freedom is not in "everyone does what he likes".
  • freedom is in the strict application of religious principles
  • Freedom is not of the order of confiscation or possession.
  • It is in the name of God and for God, to order good is to forbid evil: it is therefore necessary to read the world as a division between good and evil.

The production of good requires jihad. Every Muslim must produce this good and the power belongs to the Al Qaeda community. Without Jihad, Muslims will only be able to enjoy their rights in the West "as slaves collecting the crumbs of the master's meal".

Who are the first enemies? The first enemies are not Christians and Jews, but Shiites who contested the succession of the prophets. Chi'ism for Al Zarquawi is a polytheistic religion that has nothing to do with Islam. Al Qaeda reproduces the very great conflict between Sunnis and Shiites. Then come the Jews who dispossessed them and the Christians who are in a system. There is the reconstruction of an imaginary with the ideal of purity is the desire for a return to purity. It is a reference and reference manipulation game with a form of denial of reality.

An asymmetrical combat doctrine
[modifier | modifier le wikicode]

Asymmetric combat is a new type of warfare after the fall of the Berlin Wall linked to the end of a bipolar world. Wars are more dispersed on the planet and are no longer those of the Westphalian system, but the principle of Hobbesian anarchy between "partisans" or between "partisans" and nation-states based on the dissymmetry of means and on the effect of asymmetric surprise. Surprise is the golden rule. The asymmetry of the battles must be integrated into the fight, it is a military fight, but also a technological one in order to convince psychologically of the validity of the fight. There is a composite image with traditional military elements and extreme modernity. Technical domination is no longer enough and the mujahedeen prove their superiority in asymmetrical battles. The surprise effect is the prerequisite for success in asymmetric conflict.

The new fight is not only military, but also psychological:

« One of the Western strategies is that the best way to provoke psychological defeat is to attack the enemy, where the enemy feels protected and safe. That's exactly what the mujahedin did in New York City. It therefore appears that this imbalance between America and the Mujahedin is perfectly suited to the confrontation with the Western war machine, in particular the American machine. The Americans and the West understand the nature of this new challenge and the difficulty of the task ahead.

The time has come for Islamic movements facing a general offensive by the Crusaders to develop appropriate strategic thinking and to work on the necessary military preparations. They must increase their interest in proselytism and gain the public and political support of the people. It is not only a religious duty, but also one of the keys to the success of the war. Former strategists such as Von Clausewitz and Mao Tse Toung noted this. Perhaps the best example is the phenomenon of the Intifada, which has swept away the superiority of Zionist military power over the Palestinian Muslim people.

America wants to use military action to destroy the Mujaheddin's psychological successes and the resonances and positive ramifications of their heroic acts that attract support and sympathy in the Islamic world.

We pray to Allah that He will bring to the Islamic nation a new generation of preachers and religious leaders, capable of meeting the new challenges of the new war. »

This is seen as a device that goes from the military act, to the communication of acts of violence and the constitution of a Qaida on a global scale with the formation of religious authorities capable of explaining the war.

Towards the Fourth Generation Warfare[modifier | modifier le wikicode]

Abou Moussab al-Souri, de son vrai nom Mustafa Setmariam Nasar. © DR

Mustafa Setmariam Nasar aka Abu Musab Al-Suri is a jihadist who in 2004 published an important jihadist encyclopedia of more than 1960 pages. The call to global Islamic resistance is made by taking up the theses of the colonel of the Marine Corps William Lind who wrote in 1989 an article on the Fourth Generation Warfare[2]. The Fourth Generation War is a new asymmetric war which gives an important place to uncontrollable conflict phenomena, giving a special place to terrorism as a military act. This new form of warfare would be "non-linear" and "without a definable battlefield". It allows and authorizes to strike one's enemy everywhere, even beyond borders that prove useless and uncertain.

The invention of the Internet is a technique that allows IT systems to be decentralized so that IT systems can continue to function if even a hub is destroyed. The Internet is a modern way of thinking that produces interconnections, which means that information will use systems randomly to ensure the flow of a message. What is interesting is that in the reconfiguration of the Internet, Al Qaida has integrated these concepts with the implementation of a decentralized jihad. Action must be decentralized in terms of spreading the organization, battlefields and operational decisions. The Al Qaeda model is extremely modern. It is a model of the multinational. What does Abu Musab Al-Suri say? If jihad is globalized, it must be decentralized. Decentralization includes action, but also decisions. Dissemination offers a multiplicity of choices and actions: it is an essential organizational aspect. It refers to a spread of the battlefield and the dissemination of operational levels.

What is reflected in the nebula concept used to describe Al-Qaida is that each cell has a commander and each cell is autonomous. There is no organizational hierarchy, as individuals must function autonomously. Logistics is decentralized. The top of the organization is run by Bin Laden and his commanding officers and functions by impulses through press releases, messengers and messages, the Internet, propaganda videos, position papers and various demands and press releases. On the field. The principle of non-linearity offers the multidimensionality of conflict, the multiplicity of forms of conflict and the possibility to strike everywhere and at any time. The autonomy and self-sufficiency of the cells are the strength in recruiting jihadists, financing terrorist operations and training and conducting operations.

Conclusion[modifier | modifier le wikicode]

Al-Qaida terrorism will be a well-adapted form of terrorism from the mid-1990s to the mid-2000s, which are the first years of global jihadism, particularly because the fight against terrorism will take hold. But in the long run, however, there is a sum of contradictions and the question arises as to whether a planetary jihad can do without a material base with a Qaida, in this case Afghanistan. Hence the importance of the conflict in Afghanistan. It is also questionable whether, in the long term, there would be conflicts of interest between the Arabs and international jihad and Islamic national liberation movements, as in the case of Chechnya or the PLO and Hamas in Palestine and the Gaza Strip. There is a contradiction with a universalized jihad is the reality on the ground that makes the struggles on specific territories with precise stakes. This partly explains the difficulty of establishing Al Qaeda in Palestine.

The question of leadership and doctrine refers to whether global jihad should not be called into question and what lessons should be learned today from a global jihad that is increasingly deprived of its backbones? Nor should we underestimate the capacity of Al-Qaida to federate with, for example, the case of Al-Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb.

Annexes[modifier | modifier le wikicode]

Articles[modifier | modifier le wikicode]

Bibliography[modifier | modifier le wikicode]

  • Peter L. Bergen, Guerre sainte et multinationale, Paris, Gallimard, 2002 ;
  • Jean-Paul Charnay, L’Islam et la guerre, Paris, Fayard, 1986 ;
  • Dictionnaire mondial de l’islamisme, Paris, Plon, 2002 ;
  • Rik Coolsaet, Le mythe Al-Qaida, le terrorisme symptôme d’une société malade, Bruxelles, Editions Mols, 2004 ;
  • Bruno Etienne, L’islamisme radical, Paris, Hachette, 1987 ;
  • Bruno Etienne, Les combattants suicidaires suivi de les amants de l’apocalypse, L’Aube, 2005 ;
  • Jean-Pierre Filiu, Les frontières du jihad, Paris, Fayard, 2006 ;
  • Les neuf vies d’Al-Qaida, Paris, Fayard, 2009 ;
  • Jean Cyrille Godefroy, Frères Musulmans dans l’ombre d’Al Qaeda, Paris, 2005 ;
  • Nilüfer Gölr Interpénétrations. L’Islam et l’Europe, Paris, Galaade Editions, 2005. ;
  • Rohan Gunaratna, Al-Qaida, Au cœur du premier réseau terroriste mondial, Paris, Autrement, 2002 ;
  • Gilles Kepel, Le Prophète et Pharaon, Les mouvements islamistes dans l’Egypte contemporaine, Paris, La Découverte, 1984 ;
  • Gilles Kepel, Jihad. Expansion et déclin dl’islamisme, Paris, Gallimard, 2000 ;
  • Farhad Khosrokhavar, Les Nouveaux Martyrs d’Allah, Paris, Flammarion, 2002 ;
  • Michel Koutouzis, L’argent du djihad, Arte, Mille et une nuit, août 2002 ;
  • Loretta Napoleoni Qui finance le terrorisme international , Paris, Autrement, 2004 ;
  • Marc Sageman, Le vrai visage des terroristes. Psychologie et sociologie des acteurs du djihad, Paris, Denöel, 2005 ;
  • Dominique Thomas, Les hommes d’Al-Qaïda, Paris, Michalon, 2005 ;
  • Malet, David. Foreign Fighters: Transnational Identity in Civil Conflicts

References[modifier | modifier le wikicode]

  1. Page personnelle de Rémi Baudoui sur le site de l'Université de Genève
  2. William S. Lind, Colonel Keith Nightengale (USA), Captain John F. Schmitt (USMC), Colonel Joseph W. Sutton (USA), Lieutenant Colonel Gary I. Wilson (USMCR) (October 1989). "The Changing Face of War: Into the Fourth Generation". Marine Corps Gazette. url: