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== Foundations and aspirations of Nasserism ==
== Foundations and aspirations of Nasserism ==
Le nassérisme, une idéologie politique arabe, tire son nom du président égyptien Gamal Abdel Nasser, dont le règne de 1956 à 1970 a marqué une période de transformations radicales dans le monde arabe. Cette idéologie se caractérise par sa quête d'une unité arabe, son aspiration à une indépendance complète des nations arabes, et son intérêt pour une forme de socialisme adaptée au contexte arabe.
Nasserism, an Arab political ideology, takes its name from the Egyptian president Gamal Abdel Nasser, whose reign from 1956 to 1970 marked a period of radical change in the Arab world. This ideology is characterised by its quest for Arab unity, its aspiration for complete independence for the Arab nations, and its interest in a form of socialism adapted to the Arab context.


Nasser, en tant que figure charismatique et leader influent, a incarné et propagé le nassérisme à travers ses politiques et ses discours. L'un des exemples les plus marquants de cette idéologie en action a été la nationalisation du canal de Suez en 1956, un acte qui a non seulement défié les intérêts occidentaux dans la région, mais a aussi symbolisé la revendication de la souveraineté et de l'autodétermination des pays arabes. Cette décision a entraîné une crise internationale et a finalement renforcé le statut de Nasser en tant que champion de l'indépendance arabe face à l'impérialisme occidental. Le nassérisme visait également à renforcer l'unité entre les pays arabes, partant du principe que malgré leurs différences, ces nations partageaient une histoire, une langue et des aspirations communes. Cette vision s'est concrétisée, bien que brièvement, avec la formation de la République Arabe Unie en 1958, une union politique entre l'Égypte et la Syrie. Bien que cette union ait échoué en 1961, elle reste un exemple historique des efforts de Nasser pour unifier le monde arabe sous une même bannière.
Nasser, as a charismatic figure and influential leader, embodied and propagated Nasserism through his policies and speeches. One of the most striking examples of this ideology in action was the nationalisation of the Suez Canal in 1956, an act that not only challenged Western interests in the region, but also symbolised the Arab countries' demand for sovereignty and self-determination. This decision led to an international crisis and ultimately reinforced Nasser's status as the champion of Arab independence in the face of Western imperialism. Nasserism also aimed to strengthen unity between Arab countries, based on the premise that despite their differences, these nations shared a common history, language and aspirations. This vision was realised, albeit briefly, with the formation of the United Arab Republic in 1958, a political union between Egypt and Syria. Although this union failed in 1961, it remains a historic example of Nasser's efforts to unite the Arab world under a single banner.


== Impacts et Réformes du Nassérisme ==
== Impacts and reforms of Nasserism ==
Sur le plan économique et social, le nassérisme s'est traduit par une série de réformes socialistes. Nasser a initié des programmes de nationalisation et de réforme agraire, visant à redistribuer les richesses et à réduire les inégalités. Ces mesures, bien que différentes du socialisme soviétique, reflétaient une volonté d'adapter les principes socialistes à la réalité arabe, en mettant l'accent sur l'autonomie économique et la justice sociale. D'un point de vue théorique, le nassérisme peut être interprété à travers le prisme de la théorie de la dépendance et du nationalisme postcolonial. En tant que réponse à la domination coloniale et néocoloniale, le nassérisme cherchait à établir une voie indépendante de développement et d'émancipation pour les pays arabes. Cette approche reflète un désir de briser les chaînes de la dépendance économique et politique et de forger une identité nationale et régionale distincte.
In economic and social terms, Nasserism led to a series of socialist reforms. Nasser initiated programmes of nationalisation and agrarian reform, aimed at redistributing wealth and reducing inequalities. These measures, although different from Soviet socialism, reflected a desire to adapt socialist principles to Arab reality, with the emphasis on economic autonomy and social justice. From a theoretical point of view, Nasserism can be interpreted through the prism of dependency theory and post-colonial nationalism. As a response to colonial and neo-colonial domination, Nasserism sought to establish an independent path of development and emancipation for Arab countries. This approach reflected a desire to break the shackles of economic and political dependence and forge a distinct national and regional identity.


Le nassérisme, contrairement au baasisme, est une idéologie qui s'est développée et cristallisée principalement après que Gamal Abdel Nasser ait accédé au pouvoir en Égypte. Cette particularité marque une différence fondamentale dans la trajectoire des deux idéologies au sein du paysage politique arabe. Le baasisme, initié par Michel Aflaq et Salah al-Din al-Bitar, était déjà bien établi en tant qu'idéologie politique avant la prise de pouvoir du parti Baath en Syrie et en Irak. Ce mouvement avait développé une base théorique solide et des objectifs clairs concernant l'unité arabe, le socialisme et la laïcité, bien avant de devenir un acteur politique dominant. En revanche, le nassérisme a émergé comme un ensemble d'idées et de pratiques liées directement à l'ascension et aux actions de Nasser en tant que leader de l'Égypte. Nasser n'était pas à l'origine un idéologue dans le sens traditionnel ; ses idées et ses politiques se sont formées et affinées au cours de son règne. Après le renversement de la monarchie égyptienne en 1952 par le Mouvement des Officiers Libres, dont Nasser était un membre clé, il a progressivement élaboré une vision pour l'Égypte et le monde arabe qui allait devenir connue sous le nom de nassérisme. Cette vision s'est concrétisée avec des actes tels que la nationalisation du canal de Suez et la promotion de l'unité arabe, qui ont été des moments décisifs dans la définition du nassérisme. De plus, les réformes socio-économiques entreprises par Nasser en Égypte, telles que la réforme agraire et la nationalisation des industries, ont reflété ses principes idéologiques.
Nasserism, unlike Baathism, is an ideology that developed and crystallised mainly after Gamal Abdel Nasser came to power in Egypt. This feature marks a fundamental difference in the trajectory of the two ideologies within the Arab political landscape. Baathism, initiated by Michel Aflaq and Salah al-Din al-Bitar, was already well established as a political ideology before the Baath party took power in Syria and Iraq. This movement had developed a solid theoretical basis and clear objectives concerning Arab unity, socialism and secularism long before it became a dominant political player. Nasserism, on the other hand, emerged as a set of ideas and practices directly linked to Nasser's rise and actions as Egypt's leader. Nasser was not originally an ideologue in the traditional sense; his ideas and policies were formed and refined during his reign. After the overthrow of the Egyptian monarchy in 1952 by the Free Officers Movement, of which Nasser was a key member, he gradually developed a vision for Egypt and the Arab world that would become known as Nasserism. This vision took shape in acts such as the nationalisation of the Suez Canal and the promotion of Arab unity, which were decisive moments in the definition of Nasserism. In addition, the socio-economic reforms undertaken by Nasser in Egypt, such as land reform and the nationalisation of industries, reflected his ideological principles.


== Nassérisme, Baasisme et la République Arabe Unie ==
== Nasserism, Baathism and the United Arab Republic ==
La fondation de la République Arabe Unie (RAU) en 1958 est l'une des manifestations les plus significatives de la pensée nassériste. Cette union, qui regroupait l'Égypte et la Syrie, était motivée par l'ambition de Gamal Abdel Nasser de réaliser l'unité arabe, un des piliers centraux de son idéologie. La vision de Nasser pour la RAU allait au-delà d'une simple alliance politique; elle visait à créer une entité politique et économique unifiée qui pourrait agir comme un moteur de développement et de puissance dans la région. Pour Nasser, la RAU était une étape vers la réalisation d'un rêve panarabe, où les nations arabes pouvaient transcender leurs frontières coloniales et historiques pour former une union plus grande et plus forte. Cependant, dans la pratique, la RAU a rencontré plusieurs défis. L'un des aspects les plus controversés était la perception, surtout en Syrie, que l'union menait à une sorte de domination égyptienne. En théorie, la RAU était censée être une union entre égaux, mais en pratique, elle a souvent été perçue comme une tentative par l'Égypte, et en particulier par Nasser, de contrôler ou d'influencer la politique syrienne. Cette perception a été exacerbée par la centralisation du pouvoir au Caire et la marginalisation des voix politiques syriennes.
The founding of the United Arab Republic (UAR) in 1958 was one of the most significant manifestations of Nasserist thinking. This union, which brought together Egypt and Syria, was motivated by Gamal Abdel Nasser's ambition to achieve Arab unity, one of the central pillars of his ideology. Nasser's vision for the RAU went beyond a mere political alliance; it aimed to create a unified political and economic entity that could act as an engine of development and power in the region. For Nasser, the RAU was a step towards the realisation of a pan-Arab dream, where Arab nations could transcend their colonial and historical borders to form a larger and stronger union. In practice, however, the UAR faced a number of challenges. One of the most controversial aspects was the perception, especially in Syria, that the union led to a kind of Egyptian domination. In theory, the RAU was supposed to be a union between equals, but in practice it was often perceived as an attempt by Egypt, and Nasser in particular, to control or influence Syrian politics. This perception was exacerbated by the centralisation of power in Cairo and the marginalisation of Syrian political voices.


La Syrie, dans le cadre de la RAU, était souvent vue comme une province égyptienne plutôt qu'un partenaire égal. Cette dynamique a contribué à la montée du mécontentement en Syrie, où de nombreux politiciens et citoyens se sont sentis marginalisés et dominés par l'Égypte. Cette situation a finalement conduit à la dissolution de la RAU en 1961, lorsque la Syrie s'est retirée de l'union. La RAU, malgré son existence éphémère, reste un chapitre important dans l'histoire du nationalisme arabe et de la pensée nassériste. Elle symbolise les aspirations à l'unité arabe et les défis associés à la mise en œuvre de cette idée dans une région caractérisée par une grande diversité politique, culturelle et sociale. L'expérience de la RAU a également souligné les limites de l'approche centralisée et dirigiste de Nasser en matière d'unification arabe.
Syria, within the framework of the RAU, was often seen as an Egyptian province rather than an equal partner. This dynamic contributed to growing discontent in Syria, where many politicians and citizens felt marginalised and dominated by Egypt. This situation eventually led to the dissolution of the RAU in 1961, when Syria withdrew from the union. The RAU, despite its short-lived existence, remains an important chapter in the history of Arab nationalism and Nasserist thought. It symbolises the aspirations for Arab unity and the challenges associated with implementing this idea in a region characterised by great political, cultural and social diversity. The RAU experience also highlighted the limits of Nasser's centralised and dirigiste approach to Arab unification.


== Nassérisme dans le Contexte Régional et Mondial ==
== Nasserism in the Regional and Global Context ==
Les accords de Camp David, signés en 1979 entre l'Égypte et Israël, représentent un tournant majeur dans l'histoire du Moyen-Orient et sont souvent cités comme marquant la fin de l'ère du panarabisme. Ces accords, qui ont conduit à un traité de paix entre l'Égypte et Israël, ont été perçus par de nombreux pays arabes comme une trahison des principes du panarabisme et de la solidarité arabe. Le panarabisme, en tant que mouvement politique et idéologique, avait longtemps promu l'idée d'une unité arabe contre les influences et les interventions étrangères, notamment contre l'État d'Israël, perçu comme un implant colonial en terre arabe. Les accords de Camp David, négociés et signés par le président égyptien Anouar el-Sadate, ont rompu avec cette ligne de pensée en établissant des relations diplomatiques officielles et une reconnaissance mutuelle entre l'Égypte et Israël.
The Camp David Accords, signed in 1979 between Egypt and Israel, represent a major turning point in the history of the Middle East and are often cited as marking the end of the era of pan-Arabism. These agreements, which led to a peace treaty between Egypt and Israel, were seen by many Arab countries as a betrayal of the principles of pan-Arabism and Arab solidarity. Pan-Arabism, as a political and ideological movement, had long promoted the idea of Arab unity against foreign influence and intervention, particularly against the State of Israel, seen as a colonial implant on Arab soil. The Camp David Accords, negotiated and signed by Egyptian President Anwar Sadat, broke with this line of thinking by establishing official diplomatic relations and mutual recognition between Egypt and Israel.


La signature de ces accords a eu des répercussions considérables. L'Égypte, l'un des leaders historiques du monde arabe et un fervent défenseur du panarabisme sous Nasser, a été isolée dans le monde arabe. En réponse à la normalisation des relations avec Israël, la Ligue arabe a suspendu l'adhésion de l'Égypte et a déplacé son siège hors du Caire. Cette exclusion symbolisait le profond mécontentement et la désapprobation des autres pays arabes face à la décision unilatérale de l'Égypte.
The signing of these agreements had considerable repercussions. Egypt, one of the historic leaders of the Arab world and a fervent supporter of pan-Arabism under Nasser, was isolated in the Arab world. In response to the normalisation of relations with Israel, the Arab League suspended Egypt's membership and moved its headquarters out of Cairo. This exclusion symbolised the deep dissatisfaction and disapproval of other Arab countries with Egypt's unilateral decision.


La fin des années 1970 et le début des années 1980 marquent ainsi une période de transition dans la politique arabe, avec un déclin de l'influence du panarabisme comme force unificatrice et une augmentation des politiques nationales et des intérêts individuels des États. Les accords de Camp David ont non seulement redéfini les relations entre l'Égypte et Israël, mais ont également eu un impact durable sur la dynamique régionale et la perception de l'unité arabe. Cette évolution reflète la complexité de la politique du Moyen-Orient, où les aspirations idéologiques se heurtent souvent aux réalités politiques et géopolitiques. Le passage de l'ère du panarabisme à une ère de politiques nationales plus pragmatiques illustre la nature changeante des alliances et des priorités dans la région.
The late 1970s and early 1980s thus marked a period of transition in Arab politics, with a decline in the influence of pan-Arabism as a unifying force and an increase in national politics and the interests of individual states. The Camp David Accords not only redefined relations between Egypt and Israel, but also had a lasting impact on regional dynamics and perceptions of Arab unity. These developments reflect the complexity of Middle East politics, where ideological aspirations often clash with political and geopolitical realities. The shift from pan-Arabism to more pragmatic national policies illustrates the changing nature of alliances and priorities in the region.


=La ligue des États arabes (ligue arabe)=
=The League of Arab States (Arab League)=


=== Les Prémices de la Coopération Arabe et les Concepts d'Union ===
=== The Beginnings of Arab Cooperation and the Concepts of Union ===
En 1944, l'Égypte, sous le règne du roi Farouk, jouait un rôle de premier plan dans les discussions visant à établir une forme de coopération ou d'union entre les pays arabes. Cette période marque une étape importante dans les efforts de collaboration régionale, précédant la formation de la Ligue arabe en 1945. À cette époque, plusieurs idées et projets concernant l'unité ou la coopération arabe étaient en discussion. L'un des concepts clés était celui de la Grande Syrie, qui envisageait une union des territoires syriens, libanais, jordaniens et palestiniens. Cette idée, enracinée dans l'histoire et la culture commune de la région, était considérée par certains comme une façon naturelle de réunir ces peuples partageant des liens étroits.  
In 1944, Egypt, under the reign of King Farouk, played a leading role in discussions aimed at establishing some form of cooperation or union between Arab countries. This period marked an important stage in efforts at regional collaboration, preceding the formation of the Arab League in 1945. At that time, several ideas and projects concerning Arab unity or cooperation were under discussion. One of the key concepts was Greater Syria, which envisaged a union of the Syrian, Lebanese, Jordanian and Palestinian territories. This idea, rooted in the region's shared history and culture, was seen by some as a natural way of bringing together these peoples who share close ties.  


Un autre concept était celui du "Croissant Fertile", qui comprenait la Syrie, l'Irak, le Liban, la Jordanie et la Palestine. Cette idée était fondée sur des considérations géographiques et économiques, le Croissant Fertile étant une région historiquement riche et fertile, considérée comme le berceau de plusieurs civilisations anciennes. En outre, l'idée de créer une ligue ou une fédération des pays arabes gagnait également du terrain. Cette proposition visait à établir une structure formelle pour la coopération politique, économique et culturelle entre les États arabes, permettant une coordination plus efficace de leurs politiques et intérêts communs.
Another concept was that of the "Fertile Crescent", which included Syria, Iraq, Lebanon, Jordan and Palestine. This idea was based on geographical and economic considerations, the Fertile Crescent being a historically rich and fertile region, considered to be the cradle of several ancient civilisations. The idea of creating a league or federation of Arab countries was also gaining ground. This proposal aimed to establish a formal structure for political, economic and cultural cooperation between the Arab states, enabling more effective coordination of their common policies and interests.


=== La Formation et les Défis de la Ligue des États Arabes ===
=== The Formation and Challenges of the League of Arab States ===
Ces discussions ont abouti à la formation de la Ligue arabe en 1945, une organisation régionale destinée à favoriser la coopération entre les États membres et à promouvoir les intérêts et l'identité arabes. La création de la Ligue arabe a été un moment décisif dans l'histoire moderne du Moyen-Orient, symbolisant la reconnaissance de l'importance de la coopération régionale et de l'unité arabe. Ces différentes propositions reflètent la diversité des approches et des visions concernant l'unité arabe à cette époque. Elles montrent également comment, avant même l'essor du nassérisme et du baasisme, des efforts étaient déjà en cours pour établir des structures politiques et des alliances régionales parmi les pays arabes.
These discussions led to the formation of the Arab League in 1945, a regional organisation designed to foster cooperation between member states and promote Arab interests and identity. The creation of the Arab League was a decisive moment in the modern history of the Middle East, symbolising the recognition of the importance of regional cooperation and Arab unity. These different proposals reflect the diversity of approaches and visions of Arab unity at that time. They also show how, even before the rise of Nasserism and Baathism, efforts were already underway to establish political structures and regional alliances among Arab countries.


Le protocole d'Alexandrie, signé en 1944, a jeté les bases de ce qui allait devenir la Ligue des États arabes. Cette étape cruciale a marqué un effort concerté des nations arabes pour formaliser une structure de coopération régionale, une initiative qui reflétait les aspirations croissantes à l'unité et à la collaboration au sein du monde arabe. Le 22 mars 1945, la Ligue des États arabes a été officiellement formée. Ses membres fondateurs, l'Égypte, l'Arabie Saoudite, l'Irak, la Jordanie (alors Transjordanie), le Liban, la Syrie et le Yémen du Nord, représentaient un large éventail de la diversité politique, culturelle et économique du monde arabe. L'objectif de la Ligue était de promouvoir les intérêts politiques, économiques, culturels et sociaux des pays arabes, ainsi que de coordonner leurs efforts dans des domaines d'intérêt commun.  
The Alexandria Protocol, signed in 1944, laid the foundations for what was to become the League of Arab States. This crucial step marked a concerted effort by Arab nations to formalise a structure for regional cooperation, an initiative that reflected the growing aspirations for unity and collaboration within the Arab world. On 22 March 1945, the League of Arab States was officially formed. Its founding members, Egypt, Iraq, Jordan (then Transjordan), Lebanon, Saudi Arabia, Syria and North Yemen, represented a broad cross-section of the political, cultural and economic diversity of the Arab world. The aim of the League was to promote the political, economic, cultural and social interests of the Arab countries, and to coordinate their efforts in areas of common interest.


Cependant, le fonctionnement interne de la Ligue des États arabes s'est avéré complexe. Sa structure, nécessitant un consensus parmi ses membres pour les décisions majeures, a souvent rendu difficile la prise de décisions rapides et efficaces. Cette difficulté était exacerbée par la grande diversité des systèmes politiques, des orientations idéologiques et des intérêts nationaux des États membres. En outre, malgré leur identité culturelle et historique commune, les pays arabes présentaient peu d'intégration économique. Les échanges commerciaux entre les États membres étaient relativement limités, et leurs économies étaient souvent orientées vers des relations avec des partenaires non-arabes. Cette situation reflétait les défis posés par les frontières et les structures économiques héritées de l'époque coloniale, ainsi que par les disparités en termes de ressources naturelles et de développement industriel. La Ligue des États arabes, en dépit de ces défis, a représenté un pas important vers la reconnaissance et l'affirmation de l'identité arabe sur la scène internationale. Toutefois, la réalisation de ses objectifs d'unité et de coopération a souvent été entravée par les réalités politiques et économiques complexes du monde arabe.
However, the internal workings of the League of Arab States proved complex. Its structure, requiring a consensus among its members for major decisions, often made it difficult to take quick and effective decisions. This difficulty was exacerbated by the great diversity of political systems, ideological orientations and national interests of the member states. In addition, despite their common cultural and historical identity, the Arab countries showed little economic integration. Trade between member states was relatively limited, and their economies were often oriented towards relations with non-Arab partners. This situation reflected the challenges posed by borders and economic structures inherited from the colonial era, as well as disparities in terms of natural resources and industrial development. Despite these challenges, the League of Arab States represented an important step towards the recognition and affirmation of Arab identity on the international stage. However, the achievement of its goals of unity and cooperation has often been hampered by the complex political and economic realities of the Arab world.


=== Tentatives d'Unité Régionale: Union des Républiques Arabes et le Maghreb ===
=== Attempts at regional unity: Union of Arab Republics and the Maghreb ===
La tentative de créer l'Union des Républiques arabes en 1971 est un autre exemple des efforts pour renforcer l'unité et la coopération dans le monde arabe, bien que, elle n'ait pas abouti à des résultats concrets. Cette initiative, qui visait à unir l'Égypte, la Libye et la Syrie dans une fédération, reflétait la poursuite de l'idéal d'unité arabe qui avait été au cœur de nombreuses politiques régionales depuis les années 1950. Cependant, en dépit de son annonce en grande pompe, l'Union des Républiques arabes a souffert de désaccords internes et d'un manque de coordination concrète entre les pays membres. Les différences idéologiques, les intérêts nationaux divergents et les personnalités fortes de leurs dirigeants ont entravé toute intégration politique ou économique significative. Cette expérience a mis en évidence les défis inhérents à la création d'une union politique dans une région aussi diversifiée.
The attempt to create the Union of Arab Republics in 1971 is another example of efforts to strengthen unity and cooperation in the Arab world, although it did not lead to concrete results. This initiative, which aimed to unite Egypt, Libya and Syria in a federation, reflected the pursuit of the ideal of Arab unity that had been at the heart of many regional policies since the 1950s. However, despite its announcement with great fanfare, the Union of Arab Republics suffered from internal disagreements and a lack of practical coordination between the member countries. Ideological differences, divergent national interests and the strong personalities of their leaders hampered any meaningful political or economic integration. This experience has highlighted the challenges inherent in creating a political union in such a diverse region.


Au Maghreb également, diverses tentatives de rassembler les États de la région n'ont pas abouti. Malgré des liens culturels et historiques communs, les pays du Maghreb (Maroc, Algérie, Tunisie, Libye et Mauritanie) ont connu des trajectoires politiques différentes, rendant difficile la mise en place d'une coopération régionale étroite. Les tentatives de création d'organisations ou d'unions ont souvent été entravées par des rivalités politiques, des différences d'orientation idéologique et des problèmes économiques.
In the Maghreb, too, various attempts to bring the states of the region together have failed. Despite shared cultural and historical links, the Maghreb countries (Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, Libya and Mauritania) have experienced different political trajectories, making it difficult to establish close regional cooperation. Attempts to create organisations or unions have often been hampered by political rivalries, differences in ideological orientation and economic problems.


=== Le Conseil de Coopération du Golfe Face aux Nouvelles Dynamiques Régionales ===
=== The Gulf Cooperation Council and the New Regional Dynamics ===
Après la révolution islamique en Iran en 1979, les pays du Golfe, confrontés à une nouvelle dynamique régionale, ont tenté de former un conseil de concertation. Cette initiative visait à coordonner les politiques et à renforcer la sécurité collective face à ce qui était perçu comme une menace croissante de l'Iran. Cependant, là encore, les résultats concrets ont été limités. Bien que le Conseil de coopération du Golfe (CCG) ait été formé en 1981, regroupant l'Arabie saoudite, le Koweït, les Émirats arabes unis, le Qatar, Bahreïn et Oman, il a été confronté à ses propres défis internes, notamment en termes de politique étrangère et de sécurité.
After the Islamic revolution in Iran in 1979, the Gulf states, faced with a new regional dynamic, attempted to form a consultation council. The aim of this initiative was to coordinate policies and strengthen collective security in the face of what was perceived as a growing threat from Iran. Once again, however, concrete results were limited. Although the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) was formed in 1981, bringing together Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, the United Arab Emirates, Qatar, Bahrain and Oman, it has faced its own internal challenges, particularly in terms of foreign and security policy.


Ces différentes tentatives soulignent la complexité des efforts d'unification et de coopération dans une région marquée par des divisions politiques, économiques et idéologiques profondes. Elles reflètent également les limites des initiatives régionales dans le contexte d'un Moyen-Orient et d'un Maghreb en constante évolution.
These various attempts underline the complexity of unification and cooperation efforts in a region marked by deep political, economic and ideological divisions. They also reflect the limits of regional initiatives in the context of an ever-changing Middle East and Maghreb.


=Le panislamisme=
=The pan-Islamic movement=


==Le wahhabisme==
==The Wahhabism==


Le wahhabisme, une doctrine religieuse et une forme de mouvement islamique, a eu une influence significative dans certaines régions du monde arabe, mais son lien avec l'arabisme ou le nationalisme arabe est complexe et mérite d'être clarifié.  
Wahhabism, a religious doctrine and a form of Islamic movement, has had a significant influence in certain regions of the Arab world, but its link with Arabism or Arab nationalism is complex and needs to be clarified.  


Le wahhabisme, fondé par Mohammed ibn Abd al-Wahhab au XVIIIe siècle dans la péninsule arabique, prône une interprétation stricte et puritaine de l'islam. Il se concentre sur un retour aux pratiques des "salaf" ou des premières générations de musulmans, considérées comme des modèles de piété et de pratique islamique. Cette approche insiste sur la stricte adhésion à la sharia (loi islamique) et rejette les innovations (bid'ah) dans la pratique religieuse. Cependant, le lien entre le wahhabisme et l'arabisme ou le nationalisme arabe est indirect. Le nationalisme arabe, en tant que mouvement politique et idéologique, met l'accent sur l'unité et l'indépendance des Arabes en tant que peuple, souvent en se concentrant sur des aspects culturels, linguistiques et historiques communs. Bien que le wahhabisme soit une force influente dans la péninsule arabique, en particulier en Arabie saoudite, il est principalement une réforme religieuse plutôt qu'un mouvement nationaliste.
Wahhabism, founded by Mohammed ibn Abd al-Wahhab in the 18th century in the Arabian Peninsula, advocates a strict and puritanical interpretation of Islam. It focuses on a return to the practices of the "salaf" or first generations of Muslims, considered to be models of piety and Islamic practice. This approach insists on strict adherence to sharia (Islamic law) and rejects innovations (bid'ah) in religious practice. However, the link between Wahhabism and Arabism or Arab nationalism is indirect. Arab nationalism, as a political and ideological movement, emphasises the unity and independence of Arabs as a people, often focusing on common cultural, linguistic and historical aspects. Although Wahhabism is an influential force in the Arabian Peninsula, particularly in Saudi Arabia, it is primarily a religious reform rather than a nationalist movement.


Le wahhabisme a cependant joué un rôle dans la formation de l'identité politique et religieuse dans certaines parties du monde arabe, en particulier en Arabie saoudite. L'alliance entre Mohammed ibn Abd al-Wahhab et la maison des Saoud a été cruciale dans la formation de l'État saoudien moderne. Cette alliance a intégré des éléments du wahhabisme dans les structures politiques et sociales de l'Arabie saoudite, mais cela ne doit pas être confondu avec le nationalisme arabe en tant que tel. Il est également important de noter que le nationalisme arabe et le wahhabisme peuvent même être en tension. Le nationalisme arabe, avec ses tendances laïques et son accent sur l'unité politique et culturelle, peut entrer en conflit avec l'approche religieuse conservatrice et parfois sectaire du wahhabisme. En résumé, bien que le wahhabisme ait influencé l'histoire et la politique de certaines régions arabes, il représente une tendance distincte et parfois même contradictoire par rapport aux principes du nationalisme arabe.
Wahhabism has, however, played a role in shaping political and religious identity in some parts of the Arab world, particularly Saudi Arabia. The alliance between Muhammad ibn Abd al-Wahhab and the House of Saud was crucial in the formation of the modern Saudi state. This alliance integrated elements of Wahhabism into the political and social structures of Saudi Arabia, but this should not be confused with Arab nationalism as such. It is also important to note that Arab nationalism and Wahhabism may even be in tension. Arab nationalism, with its secular tendencies and emphasis on political and cultural unity, can come into conflict with the conservative and sometimes sectarian religious approach of Wahhabism. In short, although Wahhabism has influenced the history and politics of certain Arab regions, it represents a distinct and sometimes even contradictory trend in relation to the principles of Arab nationalism.


La relation entre Mohammed Ben Abdelwahhab, le fondateur du wahhabisme, et Mohammed Ibn Saoud, le chef de la maison Saoud, est cruciale pour comprendre la genèse de l'Arabie saoudite moderne et l'influence du wahhabisme dans la région. Mohammed Ben Abdelwahhab, né en 1703, a prêché une forme de réforme islamique qui visait à purifier la pratique religieuse de ce qu'il considérait comme des innovations et des superstitions qui s'étaient introduites dans l'islam au fil du temps. Son enseignement se concentrait sur un retour strict aux enseignements du Coran et de la Sunna, en suivant l'exemple des premières générations de musulmans (salaf).  
The relationship between Mohammed Ben Abdelwahhab, the founder of Wahhabism, and Mohammed Ibn Saud, the head of the House of Saud, is crucial to understanding the genesis of modern Saudi Arabia and the influence of Wahhabism in the region. Mohammed Ben Abdelwahhab, born in 1703, preached a form of Islamic reform that aimed to purify religious practice of what he considered to be the innovations and superstitions that had crept into Islam over time. His teaching focused on a strict return to the teachings of the Koran and the Sunna, following the example of the first generations of Muslims (salaf).


Sa rencontre et son alliance avec Mohammed Ibn Saoud au milieu du XVIIIe siècle ont marqué un tournant décisif. Ibn Saoud, le dirigeant de la région de Najd dans la péninsule arabique, a adopté les enseignements de Abdelwahhab et a intégré ses principes dans la gouvernance de son territoire. Cette alliance a combiné la réforme religieuse wahhabite avec l'ambition politique et militaire des Saoud, créant une force puissante dans la région. Ensemble, ils ont remis en question l'autorité du califat ottoman, dominant dans la région à l'époque, et ont cherché à étendre leur influence. Leur mouvement n'était pas seulement religieux, mais aussi politique, cherchant à établir un nouvel ordre basé sur les principes wahhabites. Cette combinaison de réforme religieuse et d'ambition politique a entraîné une politisation croissante de la religion dans la région. Le résultat de cette alliance a été la création du premier Émirat saoudien, avec sa capitale à Dariya. Cet émirat a été le prédécesseur de l'Arabie saoudite moderne et a posé les bases de l'influence wahhabite dans la gouvernance et la société saoudiennes. L'alliance entre les Saoud et Abdelwahhab a ainsi joué un rôle clé dans la formation de l'État saoudien et a eu une influence durable sur la politique et la pratique religieuse dans la région du Golfe.
His meeting and alliance with Mohammed Ibn Saud in the mid-eighteenth century marked a decisive turning point. Ibn Saud, ruler of the Najd region of the Arabian Peninsula, adopted Abdelwahhab's teachings and incorporated his principles into the governance of his territory. This alliance combined Wahhabi religious reform with Saud political and military ambition, creating a powerful force in the region. Together, they challenged the authority of the Ottoman Caliphate, dominant in the region at the time, and sought to extend their influence. Their movement was not only religious, but also political, seeking to establish a new order based on Wahhabi principles. This combination of religious reform and political ambition led to an increasing politicisation of religion in the region. The result of this alliance was the creation of the first Saudi Emirate, with its capital in Dariya. This Emirate was the predecessor of modern Saudi Arabia and laid the foundations for Wahhabi influence in Saudi governance and society. The alliance between the Sauds and Abdelwahhab thus played a key role in the formation of the Saudi state and had a lasting influence on politics and religious practice in the Gulf region.


L'accord entre Mohammed Ben Abdelwahhab et Mohammed Ibn Saoud est souvent décrit comme un pacte de partage de pouvoir et de soutien mutuel qui a jeté les bases de l'État saoudien moderne. Ce pacte, qui remonte au milieu du XVIIIe siècle, a établi une division des responsabilités entre les deux parties : Ben Abdelwahhab se concentrait sur les questions religieuses, prêchant et établissant les fondements wahhabites de l'islam, tandis qu'Ibn Saoud s'occupait des aspects politiques et militaires, étendant son pouvoir sur la région. Ce partenariat unique entre le pouvoir religieux et le pouvoir politique a été essentiel pour la fondation et l'expansion de l'Émirat saoudien, l'entité politique qui allait finalement devenir l'Arabie saoudite. Ben Abdelwahhab a fourni la légitimité religieuse, en insistant sur une interprétation puritaine et stricte de l'islam, tandis qu'Ibn Saoud a utilisé cette légitimité pour unifier et étendre son pouvoir sur les tribus et territoires de la péninsule arabique.
The agreement between Mohammed Ben Abdelwahhab and Mohammed Ibn Saud is often described as a pact of power-sharing and mutual support that laid the foundations of the modern Saudi state. The pact, which dates back to the mid-18th century, established a division of responsibilities between the two parties: Ben Abdelwahhab focused on religious matters, preaching and establishing the Wahhabi foundations of Islam, while Ibn Saud took care of the political and military aspects, extending his power over the region. This unique partnership between religious and political power was essential to the foundation and expansion of the Saudi Emirate, the political entity that would eventually become Saudi Arabia. Ben Abdelwahhab provided religious legitimacy, insisting on a puritanical and strict interpretation of Islam, while Ibn Saud used this legitimacy to unify and extend his power over the tribes and territories of the Arabian Peninsula.


Le pacte entre les deux hommes a établi une relation symbiotique entre la maison des Saoud et les descendants religieux de Ben Abdelwahhab (souvent appelés les "Al ash-Sheikh"), qui a persisté pendant près de 300 ans. Cette relation a été caractérisée par un soutien mutuel, les Saoud protégeant et promouvant le wahhabisme, tandis que les chefs religieux wahhabites légitimaient le pouvoir politique des Saoud. Cette alliance a fourni l'impulsion idéologique et politique nécessaire à l'expansion saoudienne dans la péninsule arabique. Elle a également établi un modèle de gouvernance dans lequel la religion et l'État sont étroitement liés, avec le wahhabisme devenant une caractéristique définissant de l'identité nationale saoudienne. L'accord original entre Ben Abdelwahhab et Ibn Saoud a donc joué un rôle fondamental dans la formation de l'Arabie saoudite et continue d'influencer la structure politique et religieuse du pays. Cette relation unique entre le pouvoir religieux et le pouvoir politique reste un élément central de la société et de la politique saoudiennes.
The pact between the two men established a symbiotic relationship between the House of Saud and the religious descendants of Ben Abdelwahhab (often referred to as the "Al ash-Sheikh"), which persisted for almost 300 years. This relationship was characterised by mutual support, with the Saud protecting and promoting Wahhabism, while Wahhabi religious leaders legitimised the Saud's political power. This alliance provided the ideological and political impetus for Saudi expansion in the Arabian Peninsula. It also established a model of governance in which religion and state are closely intertwined, with Wahhabism becoming a defining feature of Saudi national identity. The original agreement between Ben Abdelwahhab and Ibn Saud therefore played a fundamental role in the formation of Saudi Arabia and continues to influence the country's political and religious structure. This unique relationship between religious and political power remains central to Saudi society and politics.


==Le modernisme arabe ou « nahda »==
==Arab modernism or 'nahda==


La Nahda, ou Renaissance arabe, est une période cruciale dans l'histoire intellectuelle et culturelle du monde arabe, et l'Égypte a joué un rôle central dans ce mouvement. Jamal al-Din al-Afghani (1839-1897) est souvent cité comme l'un des principaux théoriciens de cette époque. Son influence et ses idées ont été déterminantes dans le façonnement du modernisme arabe et du modernisme islamique.   
The Nahda, or Arab Renaissance, was a crucial period in the intellectual and cultural history of the Arab world, and Egypt played a central role in this movement. Jamal al-Din al-Afghani (1839-1897) is often cited as one of the leading theorists of this period. His influence and ideas were decisive in shaping Arab modernism and Islamic modernism.   


Al-Afghani, un penseur et un activiste politique, s'est établi en Égypte dans la trentaine. Son séjour en Égypte a été marqué par une collaboration étroite avec Mohammed Abduh, qui allait devenir mufti d'Égypte. Ensemble, ils ont entrepris de réformer et de moderniser la pensée et les institutions islamiques, cherchant à répondre aux défis posés par l'expansion européenne et la domination coloniale. Leur approche, souvent qualifiée de modernisme islamique, visait à réconcilier les principes islamiques avec les idées modernes et les avancées scientifiques. Ils prônaient une interprétation du Coran et des traditions islamiques qui était à la fois fidèle aux sources et ouverte à de nouvelles interprétations et adaptations aux réalités contemporaines. Cette vision cherchait à dynamiser la société musulmane et à promouvoir l'éducation, la rationalité et le progrès scientifique comme moyens de résister à l'influence occidentale et de revitaliser la culture arabo-musulmane.
Al-Afghani, a thinker and political activist, moved to Egypt in his thirties. His time in Egypt was marked by close collaboration with Mohammed Abduh, who was to become Mufti of Egypt. Together they set about reforming and modernising Islamic thought and institutions, seeking to respond to the challenges posed by European expansion and colonial rule. Their approach, often referred to as Islamic modernism, aimed to reconcile Islamic principles with modern ideas and scientific advances. They advocated an interpretation of the Koran and Islamic traditions that was both faithful to the sources and open to new interpretations and adaptations to contemporary realities. This vision sought to revitalise Muslim society and promote education, rationality and scientific progress as a means of resisting Western influence and revitalising Arab-Muslim culture.


Le modernisme islamique d'Al-Afghani et d'Abduh a eu un impact significatif dans le monde arabe, influençant de nombreux intellectuels et réformateurs ultérieurs. Leur travail a contribué à la Nahda en encourageant un esprit de questionnement et de réforme dans les domaines de la religion, de la philosophie, de la littérature et de la politique. La Nahda, en tant que mouvement, a représenté un tournant décisif pour le monde arabe, marquant une période de renaissance intellectuelle, culturelle et politique. L'influence de penseurs comme Al-Afghani et Abduh a été cruciale pour façonner une vision du monde arabe qui était à la fois ancrée dans son héritage et tournée vers l'avenir, cherchant à trouver un équilibre entre tradition et modernité.
The Islamic modernism of Al-Afghani and Abduh had a significant impact on the Arab world, influencing many later intellectuals and reformers. Their work contributed to the Nahda by encouraging a spirit of questioning and reform in the fields of religion, philosophy, literature and politics. The Nahda, as a movement, represented a decisive turning point for the Arab world, marking a period of intellectual, cultural and political renaissance. The influence of thinkers such as Al-Afghani and Abduh was crucial in shaping a vision of the Arab world that was both rooted in its heritage and forward-looking, seeking to strike a balance between tradition and modernity.


Le processus de la Nahda a entraîné un essor culturel remarquable dans le monde arabe, caractérisé par une redécouverte et une réévaluation du patrimoine historique et culturel arabe. Ce mouvement a marqué une période de réveil intellectuel et artistique, au cours de laquelle les intellectuels, écrivains, poètes, et artistes arabes ont exploré et célébré l'histoire et la culture arabes, tout en les intégrant dans un contexte moderne. L'arabisme culturel de cette période a été marqué par un regain d'intérêt pour la langue arabe, la littérature, l'histoire et les arts. Les intellectuels de la Nahda ont cherché à revivifier la langue arabe, la modernisant tout en préservant son héritage riche et complexe. Cette période a vu l'émergence de nouvelles formes littéraires, telles que le roman et la nouvelle, ainsi que le renouveau de formes classiques comme la poésie.
The Nahda process led to a remarkable cultural upsurge in the Arab world, characterised by a rediscovery and reappraisal of Arab historical and cultural heritage. This movement marked a period of intellectual and artistic awakening, during which Arab intellectuals, writers, poets and artists explored and celebrated Arab history and culture, while integrating them into a modern context. The cultural Arabism of this period was marked by a renewed interest in the Arabic language, literature, history and the arts. The intellectuals of the Nahda sought to revitalise the Arabic language, modernising it while preserving its rich and complex heritage. This period saw the emergence of new literary forms, such as the novel and the short story, as well as the revival of classical forms such as poetry.


La redécouverte du patrimoine historique et glorieux du monde arabe a été une autre composante clé de l'arabisme culturel de la Nahda. Les historiens et les penseurs ont réexaminé les périodes de grandeur de la civilisation arabo-musulmane, comme l'âge d'or islamique, et ont cherché des moyens de renouer avec cet héritage dans le contexte des défis contemporains. Cette approche visait à renforcer le sentiment de fierté et d'identité arabe tout en fournissant un cadre pour la modernisation et le progrès. En outre, l'essor culturel de la Nahda a également été caractérisé par un dialogue accru avec les cultures et les idées occidentales. Les intellectuels de la Nahda ont souvent plaidé pour une approche équilibrée, embrassant les avancées scientifiques et intellectuelles de l'Occident tout en préservant les valeurs et les traditions arabes. La Nahda, dans son ensemble, a donc représenté un moment crucial dans l'histoire culturelle du monde arabe, marquant une période de renouvellement, de réflexion et d'innovation. L'impact de ce mouvement se fait encore sentir aujourd'hui, tant dans le domaine de la culture que dans celui de la pensée politique et sociale dans le monde arabe.
The rediscovery of the historical and glorious heritage of the Arab world was another key component of the cultural Arabism of the Nahda. Historians and thinkers revisited periods of greatness in Arab-Muslim civilisation, such as the Islamic Golden Age, and looked for ways to reconnect with this heritage in the context of contemporary challenges. This approach aimed to strengthen a sense of Arab pride and identity while providing a framework for modernisation and progress. In addition, the cultural rise of the Nahda was also characterised by increased dialogue with Western cultures and ideas. Nahda intellectuals often advocated a balanced approach, embracing Western scientific and intellectual advances while preserving Arab values and traditions. The Nahda as a whole therefore represented a crucial moment in the cultural history of the Arab world, marking a period of renewal, reflection and innovation. The impact of this movement is still felt today, both in the field of culture and in political and social thought in the Arab world.


Le mouvement de la Nahda, caractérisé par son approche inclusive et son accent sur la langue arabe, a transcendé les distinctions confessionnelles, unifiant les Arabes de différentes croyances autour d'un patrimoine culturel et linguistique commun. Ce mouvement, en mettant l'accent sur l'arabe comme langue de la littérature, de l'éducation, et du discours public, a favorisé un sentiment d'identité panarabe qui allait au-delà des divisions religieuses ou sectaires. La Nahda a encouragé une renaissance dans tous les aspects de la vie intellectuelle et culturelle. Elle a vu la création de partis politiques, d'associations, de ligues et d'organisations qui promouvaient divers aspects de l'éducation, de la réforme sociale et de la modernisation. Ces groupes étaient souvent animés par l'idée que la renaissance culturelle et linguistique était essentielle pour le renouveau politique et social du monde arabe.  
The Nahda movement, characterised by its inclusive approach and its emphasis on the Arabic language, transcended denominational distinctions, uniting Arabs of different faiths around a common cultural and linguistic heritage. By emphasising Arabic as the language of literature, education and public discourse, this movement fostered a sense of pan-Arab identity that went beyond religious or sectarian divisions. The Nahda encouraged a renaissance in all aspects of intellectual and cultural life. It saw the creation of political parties, associations, leagues and organisations that promoted various aspects of education, social reform and modernisation. These groups were often driven by the idea that cultural and linguistic renaissance was essential to the political and social renewal of the Arab world.


Les partis politiques formés pendant cette période cherchaient à canaliser les aspirations nationales et régionales en programmes politiques. Ces partis, bien que divers dans leurs orientations idéologiques, partageaient souvent un engagement envers le renforcement de l'identité arabe et la modernisation de la société. Les associations et ligues créées durant la Nahda jouaient un rôle clé dans la diffusion d'idées nouvelles, l'organisation d'activités culturelles, et la promotion de l'éducation et de la recherche. Elles étaient des espaces où les intellectuels et les artistes pouvaient se rencontrer, échanger des idées et collaborer sur des projets culturels et éducatifs. Cette période a également vu l'émergence de nouvelles formes de médias, comme les journaux et les magazines, qui ont joué un rôle crucial dans la diffusion des idées de la Nahda. Ces publications offraient une plateforme pour les débats sur la réforme, la politique, la littérature et la culture, et étaient essentielles pour atteindre un public plus large.
The political parties formed during this period sought to channel national and regional aspirations into political programmes. These parties, although diverse in their ideological orientations, often shared a commitment to strengthening Arab identity and modernising society. The associations and leagues created during the Nahda played a key role in disseminating new ideas, organising cultural activities and promoting education and research. They were places where intellectuals and artists could meet, exchange ideas and collaborate on cultural and educational projects. This period also saw the emergence of new forms of media, such as newspapers and magazines, which played a crucial role in spreading the ideas of the Nahda. These publications provided a platform for debates on reform, politics, literature and culture, and were essential for reaching a wider audience.


Le panislamisme promu par le sultan ottoman Abdülhamid II (règne de 1876 à 1909) représente une approche politique particulière qui a influencé le nationalisme arabe, bien qu'il soit distinct de ce dernier. Le panislamisme d'Abdülhamid II visait à consolider l'autorité ottomane et à unifier les divers peuples musulmans de l'empire autour de l'islam, en réponse aux pressions internes et externes auxquelles l'Empire ottoman était confronté à cette époque.
The pan-Islamism promoted by the Ottoman sultan Abdülhamid II (reigned 1876-1909) represented a particular political approach that influenced Arab nationalism, although it was distinct from the latter. Abdülhamid II's pan-Islamism aimed to consolidate Ottoman authority and unify the empire's diverse Muslim peoples around Islam, in response to the internal and external pressures facing the Ottoman Empire at the time.


Abdülhamid II, confronté à des défis tels que la montée des nationalismes dans différentes parties de l'empire et les pressions des puissances européennes, a adopté une stratégie de centralisation politique et administrative. Il a cherché à renforcer le contrôle central de l'Empire sur ses territoires, y compris les régions arabes, en mettant en place des procédures de centralisation, d'investigation et de répression. L'accent mis par Abdülhamid sur l'islam comme élément unificateur visait à contrer les tendances séparatistes et à maintenir la cohésion de l'empire. Cependant, cette stratégie a souvent eu l'effet contraire dans les régions arabes, où la centralisation et la répression ont suscité du ressentiment et ont alimenté les sentiments nationalistes arabes.
Faced with challenges such as the rise of nationalism in various parts of the empire and pressure from European powers, Abdülhamid II adopted a strategy of political and administrative centralisation. He sought to strengthen the Empire's central control over its territories, including the Arab regions, by putting in place procedures for centralisation, investigation and repression. Abdülhamid's emphasis on Islam as a unifying element was intended to counter separatist tendencies and maintain the cohesion of the empire. However, this strategy often had the opposite effect in Arab regions, where centralisation and repression created resentment and fuelled Arab nationalist sentiments.


De nombreux activistes et intellectuels arabes, en réponse aux politiques répressives d'Abdülhamid II, ont trouvé refuge en Égypte, qui était alors perçue comme un centre de pensée libérale et de relative autonomie par rapport à l'autorité ottomane. L'Égypte est devenue un foyer pour la pensée nationaliste arabe et la Nahda, où les exilés pouvaient s'exprimer plus librement et participer au débat intellectuel et politique. Bien que le panislamisme d'Abdülhamid ait été conçu comme un moyen de renforcer l'empire ottoman, il a eu des répercussions importantes sur le développement du nationalisme arabe. Les politiques du sultan ont contribué, paradoxalement, à l'éveil d'une conscience nationale parmi les Arabes, qui ont commencé à chercher des moyens de réaliser leur propre autonomie politique et culturelle.
Many Arab activists and intellectuals, in response to Abdülhamid II's repressive policies, sought refuge in Egypt, which was then perceived as a centre of liberal thought and relative autonomy from Ottoman rule. Egypt became a hotbed of Arab nationalist thought and the Nahda, where exiles could express themselves more freely and participate in intellectual and political debate. Although Abdülhamid's pan-Islamism was conceived as a means of strengthening the Ottoman Empire, it had a significant impact on the development of Arab nationalism. The Sultan's policies contributed, paradoxically, to the awakening of a national consciousness among the Arabs, who began to seek ways of achieving their own political and cultural autonomy.


=Le conflit israélo-palestinien=
=The Israeli-Palestinian conflict=


== Origines Historiques du Nom "Palestine" ==
== Historical origins of the name "Palestine ==
La notion de "Palestine" remonte bien avant l'Empire ottoman, trouvant ses origines dans l'Antiquité. Le nom "Palestine" lui-même a des racines historiques qui remontent à plusieurs millénaires.
The notion of "Palestine" dates back long before the Ottoman Empire, with its origins in antiquity. The name "Palestine" itself has historical roots stretching back several millennia.


Le terme "Palestine" est dérivé de "Philistie" ou "Péleshet" en hébreu, qui faisait référence à une région habitée par les Philistins autour du 12ème siècle avant notre ère. Les Philistins étaient un peuple de la mer Égée qui s'est installé le long de la côte sud-est de la Méditerranée, dans la région qui comprend aujourd'hui la bande de Gaza et ses environs. Le terme "Palestina" a été utilisé pour la première fois de manière officielle par l'empereur romain Hadrien après la révolte juive de Bar Kokhba en 135 après J.-C. Dans un effort pour effacer le lien juif avec la terre d'Israël suite à la révolte, Hadrien a rebaptisé la province de Judée en "Syria Palaestina", nom qui est par la suite devenu courant dans la littérature et les documents historiques.
The term "Palestine" is derived from "Philistia" or "Peleshet" in Hebrew, which referred to a region inhabited by the Philistines around the 12th century BC. The Philistines were a people of the Aegean Sea who settled along the south-eastern coast of the Mediterranean, in the region that today includes the Gaza Strip and its environs. The term "Palestina" was first used officially by the Roman emperor Hadrian after the Jewish revolt of Bar Kokhba in 135 AD. In an effort to erase the Jewish connection to the land of Israel following the revolt, Hadrian renamed the province of Judea "Syria Palaestina", a name that subsequently became commonplace in literature and historical documents.


Au fil des siècles, la région a connu diverses dominations et influences, y compris par les Byzantins, les Arabes musulmans, les Croisés, les Mamelouks, et finalement les Ottomans, chacun laissant leur empreinte culturelle et historique. Toutefois, le terme "Palestine" a continué à être utilisé à travers ces périodes pour désigner cette région géographique. Il est important de noter que la conception moderne de la Palestine en tant qu'entité politique et nationale distincte a pris forme plus récemment dans l'histoire, en particulier avec le démantèlement de l'Empire ottoman après la Première Guerre mondiale et la mise en place du mandat britannique sur la Palestine. La notion contemporaine de la Palestine, en tant que territoire et identité nationale, est donc en partie le résultat des développements politiques du XXe siècle.  
Over the centuries, the region has experienced various dominations and influences, including the Byzantines, the Arab Muslims, the Crusaders, the Mamluks and finally the Ottomans, each leaving their own cultural and historical imprint. However, the term "Palestine" has continued to be used throughout these periods to designate this geographical region. It is important to note that the modern conception of Palestine as a distinct political and national entity took shape more recently in history, in particular with the dismantling of the Ottoman Empire after the First World War and the establishment of the British Mandate over Palestine. The contemporary notion of Palestine as a territory and a national identity is therefore partly the result of twentieth-century political developments.


Durant les premiers siècles de l'expansion islamique, après la conquête arabe de la région au 7ème siècle, la "terre sainte" était souvent incluse dans des entités administratives plus larges sous le califat islamique. Cependant, le terme "Palestine" était utilisé dans divers contextes pour désigner la région, bien que ce ne fût pas une entité administrative officielle sous la domination islamique. Ce terme était employé à la fois par les populations locales et par les étrangers pour désigner la région géographique qui comprenait la Judée, la Samarie, la Galilée, et d'autres zones. Avec les conquêtes européennes, notamment lors des croisades, le terme "Palestine" a commencé à être utilisé plus fréquemment pour désigner cette région. Les croisés, qui cherchaient à contrôler les lieux saints du christianisme, ont utilisé ce terme dans leurs descriptions et leurs cartographies.
During the first centuries of Islamic expansion, after the Arab conquest of the region in the 7th century, the "holy land" was often included in larger administrative entities under the Islamic caliphate. However, the term "Palestine" was used in various contexts to refer to the region, although it was not an official administrative entity under Islamic rule. The term was used both by the local population and by foreigners to refer to the geographical region that included Judea, Samaria, Galilee and other areas. With the European conquests, particularly during the Crusades, the term "Palestine" began to be used more frequently to refer to this region. The Crusaders, seeking to control the holy places of Christianity, used the term in their descriptions and maps.


Au fil du temps, et particulièrement au XIXe et XXe siècles, avec l'accroissement de l'intérêt européen pour la région et le déclin de l'Empire ottoman, le terme "Palestine" a été de plus en plus utilisé pour décrire spécifiquement cette région. Ce changement a coïncidé avec l'émergence du nationalisme arabe et du sionisme, où les deux mouvements ont revendiqué des liens historiques et culturels avec la Palestine. Les habitants arabes de cette région ont commencé à adopter le terme "Palestine" pour désigner le territoire sur lequel ils envisageaient la création d'un futur État arabe. Cette utilisation a été renforcée par le mandat britannique sur la Palestine après la Première Guerre mondiale, où la Palestine a été reconnue officiellement comme une unité territoriale distincte.
Over time, and particularly in the 19th and 20th centuries, as European interest in the region grew and the Ottoman Empire declined, the term "Palestine" was increasingly used to describe the region specifically. This change coincided with the emergence of Arab nationalism and Zionism, with both movements claiming historical and cultural links with Palestine. The Arab inhabitants of this region began to adopt the term "Palestine" to designate the territory on which they envisaged the creation of a future Arab state. This use was reinforced by the British Mandate over Palestine after the First World War, when Palestine was officially recognised as a separate territorial unit.


== Palestine sous l'Influence Ottomane et le Mandat Britannique ==
== Palestine under Ottoman Influence and the British Mandate ==
Au 19ème siècle, Jérusalem et d'autres parties de ce qui était alors connu sous le nom de Palestine étaient le théâtre de rivalités intenses et complexes, impliquant des Églises, des États et des puissances étrangères. Ces tensions ont été particulièrement aiguës à Jérusalem, un lieu de grande importance religieuse pour les chrétiens, les musulmans et les juifs. Les "Lieux saints" de Jérusalem et de ses environs étaient au centre de luttes d'influence entre différentes confessions chrétiennes (catholiques, orthodoxes, arméniennes, etc.) ainsi qu'entre les puissances européennes, chacune cherchant à étendre ou à protéger son influence dans la région. Cette compétition était souvent liée aux ambitions impérialistes des puissances européennes, notamment la France, la Russie et le Royaume-Uni, chacune utilisant la protection des communautés chrétiennes comme prétexte pour intervenir dans les affaires ottomanes.  
In the 19th century, Jerusalem and other parts of what was then known as Palestine were the scene of intense and complex rivalries involving churches, states and foreign powers.These tensions were particularly acute in Jerusalem, a place of great religious importance for Christians, Muslims and Jews. The "Holy Places" in and around Jerusalem were at the centre of struggles for influence between different Christian denominations (Catholic, Orthodox, Armenian, etc.) as well as between European powers, each seeking to extend or protect its influence in the region.This competition was often linked to the imperialist ambitions of the European powers, notably France, Russia and the United Kingdom, each of which used the protection of Christian communities as a pretext to intervene in Ottoman affairs.  


Face à ces tensions et à l'ingérence étrangère croissante, l'Empire ottoman a pris des mesures pour renforcer son contrôle direct sur Jérusalem. Placer la ville sous l'autorité directe de Constantinople (aujourd'hui Istanbul) était un moyen pour le gouvernement ottoman de maintenir l'ordre et d'affirmer sa souveraineté sur ce territoire stratégiquement et symboliquement important. Cette décision reflétait également la nécessité de gérer les relations délicates entre les différentes communautés religieuses et de répondre aux pressions des puissances étrangères. Cette période a vu l'application du Statu quo, un ensemble de règles et de conventions établies pour réguler les droits et les privilèges des différentes communautés religieuses dans les Lieux saints. Le Statu quo était destiné à maintenir l'équilibre entre les différentes communautés et à prévenir les conflits, bien que les tensions aient persisté.
Faced with these tensions and growing foreign interference, the Ottoman Empire took steps to strengthen its direct control over Jerusalem.Placing the city under the direct authority of Constantinople (now Istanbul) was a way for the Ottoman government to maintain order and assert its sovereignty over this strategically and symbolically important territory. This decision also reflected the need to manage the delicate relations between the different religious communities and to respond to pressure from foreign powers.This period saw the application of the Statu quo, a set of rules and conventions established to regulate the rights and privileges of the different religious communities in the Holy Places.The Statu quo was intended to maintain a balance between the different communities and prevent conflict, although tensions persisted.


La période suivant la disparition de l'Empire ottoman après la Première Guerre mondiale a été une ère de profonds changements politiques et territoriaux au Moyen-Orient, y compris pour la région que nous connaissons aujourd'hui sous le nom de Palestine. Avec la fin de l'Empire ottoman, la Palestine est passée sous mandat britannique, conformément aux accords de la Société des Nations. Les Britanniques ont continué à utiliser le terme "Palestine" pour désigner ce territoire, bien que l'expression "Syrie du Sud" ait également été employée parfois pour faire référence à la région, reflétant sa proximité géographique et historique avec la Syrie.  
The period following the demise of the Ottoman Empire after the First World War was one of profound political and territorial change in the Middle East, including the area we know today as Palestine. With the end of the Ottoman Empire, Palestine came under British mandate, in accordance with the League of Nations agreements.The British continued to use the term "Palestine" to refer to this territory, although the expression "Southern Syria" was also sometimes used to refer to the region, reflecting its geographical and historical proximity to Syria.


Du côté sioniste, le terme "État arabe" était parfois utilisé pour désigner la partie du mandat britannique de Palestine envisagée pour la majorité arabe dans le cadre de la proposition de partition de l'ONU en 1947. Cette proposition envisageait la création de deux États distincts, l'un juif et l'autre arabe, avec Jérusalem sous un régime international spécial. Cependant, l'État arabe envisagé dans le plan de partage n'a jamais été établi, en partie à cause du rejet du plan par les dirigeants arabes et de la guerre israélo-arabe de 1948.
On the Zionist side, the term "Arab state" was sometimes used to refer to the part of the British Mandate of Palestine envisaged for the Arab majority in the 1947 UN partition proposal.This proposal envisaged the creation of two separate states, one Jewish and one Arab, with Jerusalem under a special international regime.However, the Arab state envisaged in the partition plan was never established, partly due to the rejection of the plan by Arab leaders and the 1948 Arab-Israeli war.


== Émergence du Nationalisme Palestinien et Conflits du 20ème Siècle ==
== The Emergence of Palestinian Nationalism and the Conflicts of the 20th Century ==
Le processus de nationalisme arabe dans la région de la Palestine mandataire était complexe et influencé par divers facteurs. Les vagues de migrations, tant de Juifs fuyant les persécutions en Europe que d'Arabes venant d'autres régions du Moyen-Orient, ont modifié la composition démographique de la région. De plus, les enjeux politico-religieux, liés à la fois à l'essor du sionisme et au nationalisme arabe, ont joué un rôle clé dans la définition des identités et des revendications territoriales. Pour les nationalistes arabes dans la Palestine mandataire et ailleurs, la défense de la terre était souvent exprimée en termes d'arabisme, une idéologie qui mettait l'accent sur l'identité et l'unité arabe. Ce sentiment a été renforcé par la perception d'une menace à l'identité arabe et aux droits des populations arabes face à l'immigration juive et aux aspirations sionistes dans la région.
The process of Arab nationalism in the region of Mandate Palestine was complex and influenced by a variety of factors. Waves of migration, both of Jews fleeing persecution in Europe and of Arabs from other parts of the Middle East, altered the demographic composition of the region. In addition, politico-religious issues, linked to both the rise of Zionism and Arab nationalism, played a key role in defining identities and territorial claims. For Arab nationalists in Mandate Palestine and elsewhere, the defence of land was often expressed in terms of Arabism, an ideology that emphasised Arab identity and unity. This sentiment was reinforced by a perceived threat to Arab identity and the rights of Arab populations in the face of Jewish immigration and Zionist aspirations in the region.


Pendant la période du mandat britannique en Palestine, les tensions entre les communautés juive et arabe ont conduit à une série de violences, dont des massacres, des assassinats et des attentats. La Grande Révolte arabe de 1936-1939 en Palestine est un moment clé de cette période. Elle a été déclenchée par des frustrations croissantes au sein de la population arabe en raison de l'immigration juive et des politiques du mandat britannique. Cette révolte a vu des attaques contre des cibles juives et britanniques et a été marquée par une répression sévère de la part des Britanniques. En réponse à cette révolte et aux tensions croissantes, le gouvernement britannique a fait appel à la Société des Nations, qui a mis en place la Commission Peel en 1937. La Commission Peel a proposé le premier plan de partage de la Palestine, envisageant la création de deux États distincts, l'un juif et l'autre arabe, avec Jérusalem sous contrôle international. Ce plan a été rejeté par la majorité des leaders arabes, qui s'opposaient à toute forme de division territoriale et à l'idée d'un État juif. Il a également été rejeté par les groupes révisionnistes juifs, qui revendiquaient un territoire plus vaste pour l'État juif.  
During the period of the British Mandate in Palestine, tensions between the Jewish and Arab communities led to a series of acts of violence, including massacres, assassinations and bombings. The Great Arab Revolt of 1936-1939 in Palestine was a key moment in this period. It was triggered by growing frustration among the Arab population over Jewish immigration and the policies of the British Mandate. The revolt saw attacks on Jewish and British targets and was marked by severe British repression. In response to the revolt and rising tensions, the British government appealed to the League of Nations, which set up the Peel Commission in 1937. The Peel Commission proposed the first partition plan for Palestine, envisaging the creation of two separate states, one Jewish and one Arab, with Jerusalem under international control. This plan was rejected by the majority of Arab leaders, who were opposed to any form of territorial division and to the idea of a Jewish state. It was also rejected by Jewish revisionist groups, who demanded a larger territory for the Jewish state.


Les tensions ont continué à monter jusqu'en 1947, moment où les Britanniques, épuisés par les difficultés de gouvernance et ne parvenant pas à maintenir la paix, ont décidé de remettre leur mandat sur la Palestine à l'Organisation des Nations Unies (ONU). L'ONU a alors proposé un second plan de partage en 1947, qui prévoyait également la création de deux États. Ce plan a été accepté par la majorité des représentants juifs, mais rejeté par les Arabes palestiniens et les États arabes voisins. La période qui a suivi a vu l'escalade des hostilités et a mené à la guerre israélo-arabe de 1948, suite à la déclaration d'indépendance de l'État d'Israël. Cette guerre et les événements qui l'ont entourée ont été déterminants dans la formation du conflit israélo-arabe moderne, avec des conséquences durables pour la région.
Tensions continued to rise until 1947, when the British, exhausted by the difficulties of governance and unable to keep the peace, decided to hand over their mandate over Palestine to the United Nations (UN). The UN then proposed a second partition plan in 1947, which also provided for the creation of two states. This plan was accepted by the majority of Jewish representatives, but rejected by the Palestinian Arabs and neighbouring Arab states. The period that followed saw the escalation of hostilities and led to the 1948 Arab-Israeli War, following the declaration of independence of the State of Israel. This war and the events surrounding it were instrumental in shaping the modern Arab-Israeli conflict, with lasting consequences for the region.


== Nakba et Formation de la Diaspora Palestinienne ==
== Nakba and Formation of the Palestinian Diaspora ==
L'exode palestinien de 1948, communément appelé la Nakba (qui signifie "catastrophe" en arabe), est un événement central dans l'histoire palestinienne et du conflit israélo-arabe. Il fait référence à la fuite et à l'expulsion de centaines de milliers de Palestiniens arabes de leurs maisons et de leurs terres pendant la guerre de 1948 qui a suivi la création de l'État d'Israël. La Nakba a commencé en contexte de la guerre civile dans le mandat britannique de Palestine, exacerbée par le plan de partage de l'ONU en 1947, et s'est intensifiée avec la guerre arabo-israélienne de 1948. Durant cette période, de nombreux villages et villes arabes ont été vidés de leurs habitants en raison des combats, des expulsions, des peurs de massacres, et de la pression psychologique. Cette période a vu des déplacements massifs de population, aboutissant à une crise humanitaire et à la formation d'une importante population de réfugiés palestiniens.  
The 1948 Palestinian exodus, commonly known as the Nakba (which means "catastrophe" in Arabic), is a central event in Palestinian history and in the Arab-Israeli conflict. It refers to the flight and expulsion of hundreds of thousands of Arab Palestinians from their homes and lands during the 1948 war that followed the creation of the State of Israel. The Nakba began in the context of the civil war in the British Mandate of Palestine, exacerbated by the UN partition plan in 1947, and intensified with the Arab-Israeli war of 1948. During this period, many Arab towns and villages were emptied of their inhabitants due to fighting, expulsions, fears of massacres and psychological pressure. This period saw massive population displacements, leading to a humanitarian crisis and the formation of a large Palestinian refugee population.  


La question des réfugiés palestiniens est devenue l'une des problématiques les plus complexes et les plus durables du conflit israélo-arabe. Beaucoup de ces réfugiés et leurs descendants vivent aujourd'hui dans des camps de réfugiés dans des pays voisins tels que le Liban, la Jordanie, et la Syrie, ainsi que dans la bande de Gaza et en Cisjordanie. Le droit au retour des réfugiés palestiniens est un sujet clé dans les négociations de paix, mais reste un point de discorde majeur. La Nakba a également été un facteur déterminant dans la formation de la diaspora palestinienne. Les Palestiniens qui ont été déplacés de leurs maisons et qui se sont établis dans d'autres pays ont continué à maintenir leur identité culturelle et nationale, contribuant à la cause palestinienne de différentes manières. La commémoration annuelle de la Nakba est un moment important pour la communauté palestinienne, tant dans les territoires palestiniens que dans la diaspora, symbolisant leur expérience partagée de la perte, de la résistance et de l'espoir de retour.
The Palestinian refugee question has become one of the most complex and enduring issues in the Arab-Israeli conflict. Many of these refugees and their descendants now live in refugee camps in neighbouring countries such as Lebanon, Jordan and Syria, as well as in the Gaza Strip and the West Bank. The right of return of Palestinian refugees is a key issue in the peace negotiations, but remains a major point of contention. The Nakba was also a determining factor in the formation of the Palestinian diaspora. Palestinians who were displaced from their homes and settled in other countries have continued to maintain their cultural and national identity, contributing to the Palestinian cause in different ways. The annual commemoration of the Nakba is an important moment for the Palestinian community, both in the Palestinian territories and in the diaspora, symbolising their shared experience of loss, resistance and hope for return.


== Le Mouvement Palestinien de Libération: De l'OLP au Hamas ==
== The Palestinian Liberation Movement: From the PLO to Hamas ==
Le mouvement nationaliste palestinien a connu une évolution significative vers la fin des années 1950 et au début des années 1960, marquée par un recentrage sur l'identité palestinienne spécifique, en partie en réaction à la perception que les intérêts palestiniens n'étaient pas suffisamment représentés ou défendus par les leaders arabes régionaux. Cette période a vu l'émergence de nouvelles organisations et mouvements politiques palestiniens, dont le plus notable est l'Organisation de libération de la Palestine (OLP), fondée en 1964. Yasser Arafat, qui est devenu une figure de proue du mouvement palestinien, a joué un rôle crucial dans cette évolution. Arafat et ses collègues, au sein de la structure de l'OLP et notamment du mouvement Fatah, ont commencé à articuler une vision qui mettait l'accent sur la lutte pour un État palestinien indépendant, distinct des objectifs panarabes plus larges qui avaient dominé les discours antérieurs sur la Palestine.  
The Palestinian nationalist movement underwent a significant evolution in the late 1950s and early 1960s, marked by a refocusing on specific Palestinian identity, partly in response to the perception that Palestinian interests were not sufficiently represented or defended by regional Arab leaders. This period saw the emergence of new Palestinian political organisations and movements, the most notable of which was the Palestine Liberation Organisation (PLO), founded in 1964. Yasser Arafat, who became a leading figure in the Palestinian movement, played a crucial role in this development. Arafat and his colleagues within the PLO structure and particularly within the Fatah movement began to articulate a vision that emphasised the struggle for an independent Palestinian state, distinct from the broader pan-Arab objectives that had dominated earlier discourses on Palestine.  


Cette redéfinition du mouvement palestinien s'est accompagnée d'une stratégie de lutte armée, vue comme un moyen de libération et de revendication de droits sur la terre palestinienne. L'OLP et d'autres groupes palestiniens ont mené diverses opérations militaires et attaques contre des cibles israéliennes, tant à l'intérieur qu'à l'extérieur d'Israël. Cette période a également été marquée par des tensions et des conflits avec les États arabes voisins, certains soutenant le mouvement palestinien tandis que d'autres s'opposaient à ses méthodes ou à ses objectifs politiques. Les années 1958-59 ont marqué un tournant dans le mouvement nationaliste palestinien, avec un passage d'une orientation panarabe à une concentration sur l'identité et les aspirations nationales palestiniennes. Sous la direction de figures comme Yasser Arafat, le mouvement a commencé à revendiquer de manière plus explicite la création d'un État palestinien, utilisant la lutte armée comme un moyen de parvenir à ses objectifs.
This redefinition of the Palestinian movement was accompanied by a strategy of armed struggle, seen as a means of liberation and claiming rights to Palestinian land. The PLO and other Palestinian groups carried out various military operations and attacks against Israeli targets, both inside and outside Israel. This period was also marked by tensions and conflicts with neighbouring Arab states, some of which supported the Palestinian movement while others opposed its methods or political objectives. The years 1958-59 marked a turning point in the Palestinian nationalist movement, with a shift from a pan-Arab orientation to a focus on Palestinian national identity and aspirations. Under the leadership of figures such as Yasser Arafat, the movement began to call more explicitly for the creation of a Palestinian state, using armed struggle as a means to achieve its goals.


Dès 1963, des opérations militaires menées par des groupes palestiniens, notamment le Fatah dirigé par Yasser Arafat, ont commencé à opérer depuis la Jordanie contre des cibles israéliennes. Ces actions ont contribué à établir Arafat comme une figure centrale du mouvement palestinien, gagnant le soutien populaire parmi les Arabes grâce à ces initiatives militaires. Cependant, les ripostes israéliennes à ces attaques ont mis la Jordanie dans une position délicate. En 1970, après une série de tensions croissantes et de conflits, connus sous le nom de Septembre Noir, le roi Hussein de Jordanie a ordonné une action militaire qui a conduit à l'expulsion des combattants palestiniens du pays. Ces combattants se sont alors largement réinstallés au Liban. Au Liban, la présence des groupes armés palestiniens a eu des répercussions considérables. Ils se sont retrouvés impliqués dans la guerre civile libanaise, compliquant davantage la situation. En 1982, après une tentative d'assassinat contre l'ambassadeur israélien à Londres, Israël a lancé l'opération "Paix en Galilée", une invasion majeure du Liban. L'objectif déclaré était de détruire les bases des combattants palestiniens et de repousser l'armée syrienne. Cette invasion a eu des conséquences dramatiques, tant pour le Liban que pour les Palestiniens.
As early as 1963, military operations led by Palestinian groups, notably Fatah led by Yasser Arafat, began operating from Jordan against Israeli targets. These actions helped to establish Arafat as a central figure in the Palestinian movement, gaining popular support among Arabs through these military initiatives. However, Israeli responses to these attacks put Jordan in a delicate position. In 1970, after a series of escalating tensions and conflicts known as Black September, King Hussein of Jordan ordered military action that led to the expulsion of Palestinian fighters from the country. These fighters then largely resettled in Lebanon. In Lebanon, the presence of Palestinian armed groups had considerable repercussions. They became involved in the Lebanese civil war, further complicating the situation. In 1982, after an assassination attempt on the Israeli ambassador in London, Israel launched Operation Peace in Galilee, a major invasion of Lebanon. The declared aim was to destroy the bases of the Palestinian fighters and push back the Syrian army. This invasion had dramatic consequences, both for Lebanon and for the Palestinians.


Durant cette période, la perception des Palestiniens au Liban a souffert, et le quartier général de l'OLP s'est finalement déplacé en Afrique du Nord. Yasser Arafat et l'OLP ont commencé à revoir leurs objectifs, envisageant même l'acceptation d'une solution à deux États. L'intifada, qui a commencé en 1987 dans les territoires palestiniens, a redynamisé le mouvement nationaliste palestinien. Ce soulèvement populaire a attiré l'attention internationale sur la cause palestinienne et a contribué à changer la dynamique du conflit. Cette période de tumulte et de réalignements a finalement conduit aux accords d'Oslo dans les années 1990, où l'OLP, sous la direction d'Arafat, a reconnu officiellement l'État d'Israël et a accepté le principe d'une autonomie palestinienne en échange de la paix. Ces accords ont marqué un moment significatif dans l'histoire du conflit israélo-palestinien, ouvrant la voie à une nouvelle ère de négociations et de dialogue, bien que le processus de paix reste complexe et inachevé.
During this period, the perception of the Palestinians in Lebanon suffered, and the PLO headquarters finally moved to North Africa. Yasser Arafat and the PLO began to review their objectives, even considering acceptance of a two-state solution. The intifada, which began in 1987 in the Palestinian territories, reinvigorated the Palestinian nationalist movement. This popular uprising drew international attention to the Palestinian cause and helped to change the dynamics of the conflict. This period of turmoil and realignments eventually led to the Oslo Accords in the 1990s, when the PLO, under Arafat's leadership, officially recognised the State of Israel and accepted the principle of Palestinian autonomy in exchange for peace. These agreements marked a significant moment in the history of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, paving the way for a new era of negotiations and dialogue, although the peace process remains complex and unfinished.


== Conflit Continu et Division Politique Actuelle ==
== Ongoing conflict and the current political divide ==
Les négociations entre l'OLP sous la direction de Yasser Arafat et Israël, bien que marquant un tournant historique avec les accords d'Oslo, ont connu des échecs, particulièrement sur des questions sensibles telles que les colonies israéliennes dans les territoires palestiniens et le droit au retour des réfugiés palestiniens. Ces questions sont restées des points de discorde majeurs, entravant le progrès vers une solution durable au conflit. En parallèle, Yasser Arafat et l'Autorité palestinienne ont fait face à des critiques internes, notamment de la part de groupes nationalistes et islamistes comme le Hamas. Arafat a été accusé d'incompétence, de corruption et de népotisme, ce qui a contribué à une perte de confiance et de légitimité auprès de certaines parties de la population palestinienne.  
Negotiations between the PLO under the leadership of Yasser Arafat and Israel, although marking a historic turning point with the Oslo Accords, have failed, particularly on sensitive issues such as Israeli settlements in the Palestinian territories and the right of return of Palestinian refugees. These issues have remained major points of contention, hampering progress towards a lasting solution to the conflict. At the same time, Yasser Arafat and the Palestinian Authority have faced internal criticism, particularly from nationalist and Islamist groups such as Hamas. Arafat was accused of incompetence, corruption and nepotism, which contributed to a loss of confidence and legitimacy among certain sections of the Palestinian population.  


Le Hamas, un mouvement islamiste palestinien, a gagné en influence politique au cours de cette période. Fondé en 1987, le Hamas a défendu une approche plus islamique du mouvement palestinien, se distinguant de l'OLP par sa position idéologique et ses tactiques. Le Hamas a rejeté les accords d'Oslo et a maintenu une position de résistance armée contre Israël, considérant la lutte armée comme un moyen essentiel pour atteindre les objectifs palestiniens. L'ascension du Hamas et d'autres groupes islamistes a marqué une troisième phase dans le mouvement palestinien, où les lignes de fracture entre différentes factions palestiniennes se sont approfondies. Cette phase a été caractérisée par une diversification des approches et des stratégies au sein du mouvement palestinien, reflétant une palette plus large d'opinions et de tactiques concernant la réalisation des objectifs palestiniens. Cette période a également vu des tensions croissantes entre l'Autorité palestinienne, dominée par le Fatah, et le Hamas, notamment après que ce dernier a remporté les élections législatives palestiniennes de 2006. Ces tensions ont conduit à des conflits internes et à une division politique entre la bande de Gaza, contrôlée par le Hamas, et la Cisjordanie, sous l'autorité de l'Autorité palestinienne.
Hamas, a Palestinian Islamist movement, gained political influence during this period. Founded in 1987, Hamas advocated a more Islamic approach to the Palestinian movement, distinguishing itself from the PLO in its ideological stance and tactics. Hamas rejected the Oslo Accords and maintained a position of armed resistance against Israel, seeing armed struggle as an essential means of achieving Palestinian goals. The rise of Hamas and other Islamist groups marked a third phase in the Palestinian movement, where the fault lines between different Palestinian factions deepened. This phase was characterised by a diversification of approaches and strategies within the Palestinian movement, reflecting a wider range of views and tactics regarding the achievement of Palestinian goals. This period also saw growing tensions between the Fatah-dominated Palestinian Authority and Hamas, particularly after the latter won the 2006 Palestinian legislative elections. These tensions led to internal conflicts and a political division between the Gaza Strip, controlled by Hamas, and the West Bank, under the authority of the Palestinian Authority.


La reprise de la lutte armée et des actions de type intifada par le Hamas dans les territoires palestiniens est marquée par une rhétorique de djihad contre Israël. Le Hamas, fondé en 1987, se compose d'une branche politique et d'une branche armée, et a joué un rôle important dans le conflit israélo-palestinien. En 2006, le Hamas a remporté une victoire significative lors des élections législatives palestiniennes. Cependant, le Hamas est considéré comme une organisation terroriste par plusieurs pays, dont les États-Unis et des membres de l'Union européenne. Cette désignation est due à l'utilisation par le Hamas de tactiques de lutte armée, y compris des attentats-suicides et des tirs de roquettes contre des cibles civiles israéliennes.  
The resumption of armed struggle and intifada-style actions by Hamas in the Palestinian territories is marked by a rhetoric of jihad against Israel. Founded in 1987, Hamas has both a political and an armed wing, and has played an important role in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. In 2006, Hamas won a significant victory in the Palestinian legislative elections. However, Hamas is considered a terrorist organisation by several countries, including the United States and members of the European Union. This designation is due to Hamas' use of armed struggle tactics, including suicide bombings and the firing of rockets against Israeli civilian targets.


La victoire électorale du Hamas a conduit à une division politique majeure au sein des territoires palestiniens. Deux gouvernements distincts ont émergé : l'un contrôlé par le Fatah en Cisjordanie et l'autre par le Hamas dans la bande de Gaza. Cette division a exacerbé les difficultés politiques et économiques dans les territoires palestiniens. Le territoire palestinien reste morcelé, et les défis tels que le chômage, la pauvreté et la corruption ont rendu la situation politique et économique encore plus précaire. L'autorité palestinienne en Cisjordanie, ainsi que le gouvernement de Hamas à Gaza, sont confrontés à des défis internes et externes importants dans leur gestion des affaires palestiniennes.
Hamas's electoral victory led to a major political division within the Palestinian territories. Two separate governments emerged: one controlled by Fatah in the West Bank and the other by Hamas in the Gaza Strip. This division has exacerbated the political and economic difficulties in the Palestinian territories. The Palestinian territory remains fragmented, and challenges such as unemployment, poverty and corruption have made the political and economic situation even more precarious. Both the Palestinian Authority in the West Bank and the Hamas government in Gaza face significant internal and external challenges in their management of Palestinian affairs.


=Le cas kurde=
=The Kurdish case=


== Contexte Historique du Mouvement Kurde ==
== Background to the Kurdish Movement ==
Le mouvement kurde, avec ses aspirations à l'autodétermination, est ancré dans l'histoire complexe et tumultueuse du Moyen-Orient, en particulier dans le contexte de la dissolution de l'Empire ottoman après la Première Guerre mondiale. Le peuple kurde, dispersé principalement entre la Turquie, l'Iran, l'Irak et la Syrie, a constamment cherché à affirmer son identité et à revendiquer ses droits politiques et culturels dans une région marquée par des frontières souvent tracées sans tenir compte des réalités ethniques et culturelles.
The Kurdish movement, with its aspirations for self-determination, is rooted in the complex and tumultuous history of the Middle East, particularly in the context of the dissolution of the Ottoman Empire after the First World War. The Kurdish people, scattered mainly between Turkey, Iran, Iraq and Syria, have constantly sought to assert their identity and claim their political and cultural rights in a region marked by borders often drawn without regard for ethnic and cultural realities.


Après la Première Guerre mondiale, le traité de Sèvres de 1920 avait envisagé la création d'un État kurde. Cependant, ce traité a été remplacé par le traité de Lausanne en 1923, qui a redéfini les frontières de la Turquie moderne sans accorder d'État indépendant aux Kurdes. Ce revirement a été un moment déterminant, laissant les Kurdes sans un État-nation, malgré leur distincte identité ethnique et culturelle. En Irak, le mouvement kurde a traversé plusieurs phases de rébellion et de négociations avec le gouvernement central. La région du Kurdistan irakien, après des décennies de conflit, a acquis une autonomie substantielle à la suite de la guerre du Golfe en 1991, et sa position a été renforcée après l'invasion de l'Irak en 2003. Le gouvernement régional du Kurdistan, dirigé par des figures telles que Massoud Barzani, a établi une entité semi-autonome, dotée de sa propre administration et forces de sécurité. En Turquie, le conflit kurde a été largement dominé par la lutte du Parti des travailleurs du Kurdistan (PKK), dirigé par Abdullah Öcalan. Fondé dans les années 1970, le PKK a mené une guerre de guérilla pour les droits et l'autonomie des Kurdes, un conflit qui a entraîné des dizaines de milliers de morts. Malgré plusieurs tentatives de paix, la situation en Turquie reste tendue, avec des périodes de conflit et de réconciliation.
After the First World War, the 1920 Treaty of Sèvres envisaged the creation of a Kurdish state. However, this treaty was replaced by the Treaty of Lausanne in 1923, which redefined the borders of modern Turkey without granting the Kurds an independent state. This was a watershed moment, leaving the Kurds without a nation-state, despite their distinct ethnic and cultural identity. In Iraq, the Kurdish movement has gone through several phases of rebellion and negotiations with the central government. The Iraqi Kurdistan Region, after decades of conflict, gained substantial autonomy following the Gulf War in 1991, and its position was strengthened after the invasion of Iraq in 2003. The Kurdistan Regional Government, led by figures such as Massoud Barzani, has established a semi-autonomous entity with its own administration and security forces. In Turkey, the Kurdish conflict has been largely dominated by the struggle of the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK), led by Abdullah Öcalan. Founded in the 1970s, the PKK has waged a guerrilla war for Kurdish rights and autonomy, a conflict that has resulted in tens of thousands of deaths. Despite several attempts at peace, the situation in Turkey remains tense, with periods of conflict and reconciliation.


La guerre civile en Syrie a créé une nouvelle dynamique pour les Kurdes dans cette région. Les forces kurdes, notamment les Unités de protection du peuple (YPG), ont pris le contrôle de larges portions du nord-est de la Syrie, établissant une administration autonome de facto dans ces zones. Cette situation a ajouté une nouvelle couche de complexité à la géopolitique régionale, notamment avec l'implication des Kurdes dans la lutte contre l'État islamique (EI). Le mouvement kurde, dans sa quête pour la reconnaissance et les droits, continue de façonner la politique du Moyen-Orient. Leur situation, souvent qualifiée de "problème kurde", reste l'un des défis les plus épineux de la région, impliquant une mosaïque d'intérêts locaux, régionaux et internationaux. Les Kurdes, tout en cherchant à préserver leur identité unique, se battent pour une place dans un Moyen-Orient en constante évolution, où les questions d'autonomie et d'indépendance sont au cœur des débats politiques et sociaux.
The civil war in Syria has created a new dynamic for the Kurds in the region. Kurdish forces, notably the People's Protection Units (YPG), have taken control of large parts of north-eastern Syria, establishing a de facto autonomous administration in these areas. This has added a new layer of complexity to regional geopolitics, particularly with the Kurds' involvement in the fight against the Islamic State (EI). The Kurdish movement, in its quest for recognition and rights, continues to shape the politics of the Middle East. Their situation, often referred to as the "Kurdish problem", remains one of the thorniest challenges in the region, involving a mosaic of local, regional and international interests. The Kurds, while seeking to preserve their unique identity, are fighting for a place in an ever-changing Middle East, where questions of autonomy and independence are at the heart of political and social debates.


== Histoire et Signification du Terme 'Kurdistan' ==
== History and meaning of the word 'Kurdistan ==
Le terme "Kurdistan", littéralement signifiant "le pays des Kurdes", est utilisé depuis plusieurs siècles, avec des références remontant au moins au 12ème siècle. Ce terme géographique historique fait référence à la région habitée principalement par les Kurdes, un groupe ethnique autochtone de la région montagneuse à cheval entre la Turquie moderne, l'Iran, l'Irak et la Syrie. Dans les textes historiques, le terme "Kurdistan" a été utilisé pour décrire les régions habitées par les Kurdes, mais il est important de noter que la délimitation précise et l'étendue de cette région ont varié au fil du temps, en fonction de la dynamique politique, des changements de frontières et des mouvements de population. Au cours de l'histoire, cette région a été intégrée dans divers empires et États, y compris les empires perses, arabes, turcs et ottomans. Les Kurdes, tout en conservant leur identité culturelle et linguistique distincte, ont souvent été soumis à des règles extérieures et ont rarement joui d'une autonomie ou d'un État-nation indépendant.
The term "Kurdistan", literally meaning "the land of the Kurds", has been in use for several centuries, with references dating back to at least the 12th century. This historical geographical term refers to the region inhabited mainly by the Kurds, an ethnic group indigenous to the mountainous region straddling modern Turkey, Iran, Iraq and Syria. In historical texts, the term "Kurdistan" has been used to describe the regions inhabited by the Kurds, but it is important to note that the precise delimitation and extent of this region has varied over time, depending on political dynamics, border changes and population movements. Throughout history, this region has been part of various empires and states, including the Persian, Arab, Turkish and Ottoman empires. The Kurds, while retaining their distinct cultural and linguistic identity, have often been subject to external rule and have rarely enjoyed autonomy or an independent nation state.


La notion de Kurdistan en tant qu'entité politique distincte a gagné en importance au début du 20ème siècle, particulièrement après la Première Guerre mondiale et la chute de l'Empire ottoman, lorsque les Kurdes ont commencé à aspirer à une plus grande autonomie ou indépendance. Toutefois, les aspirations à un Kurdistan indépendant ou autonome se sont heurtées aux réalités politiques des États-nations modernes de la région. Aujourd'hui, bien que le Kurdistan en tant qu'État souverain n'existe pas, le terme est largement utilisé pour désigner les régions à majorité kurde, en particulier le Kurdistan irakien, qui jouit d'un degré significatif d'autonomie au sein de l'Irak.
The notion of Kurdistan as a distinct political entity gained prominence in the early 20th century, particularly after the First World War and the fall of the Ottoman Empire, when Kurds began to aspire to greater autonomy or independence. However, aspirations for an independent or autonomous Kurdistan clashed with the political realities of the region's modern nation-states. Today, although Kurdistan as a sovereign state does not exist, the term is widely used to refer to Kurdish-majority regions, particularly Iraqi Kurdistan, which enjoys a significant degree of autonomy within Iraq.


== Impacts de la Guerre Ottomano-Séfévide sur les Kurdes ==
== Impact of the Ottoman-Seville War on the Kurds ==
La guerre entre les Séfévides iraniens et les Ottomans en 1514, marquée par la bataille emblématique de Chaldoran, est un moment déterminant dans l'histoire du Moyen-Orient et a une importance particulière pour le peuple kurde. Cette confrontation entre deux grandes puissances de l'époque, l'Empire ottoman sunnite sous le règne de Selim I et l'Empire séfévide chiite dirigé par Shah Ismail I, s'est soldée par une victoire ottomane qui a redéfini l'équilibre géopolitique de la région. La région kurde, située à cheval entre ces deux empires, a été profondément affectée par ce conflit. La bataille de Chaldoran n'a pas seulement été une lutte pour le pouvoir territorial mais aussi un affrontement idéologique entre le chiisme et le sunnisme, ce qui a eu un impact direct sur la population kurde. Les territoires kurdes ont été divisés, certains passant sous le contrôle ottoman et d'autres sous l'influence séfévide.
The war between the Iranian Sefevids and the Ottomans in 1514, marked by the emblematic battle of Chaldoran, was a defining moment in the history of the Middle East and is of particular importance to the Kurdish people. This confrontation between two great powers of the time, the Sunni Ottoman Empire under the reign of Selim I and the Shiite Sefavid Empire led by Shah Ismail I, resulted in an Ottoman victory that redefined the geopolitical balance in the region. The Kurdish region, which straddles the border between these two empires, was profoundly affected by this conflict. The Battle of Chaldoran was not only a struggle for territorial power but also an ideological clash between Shiism and Sunnism, which had a direct impact on the Kurdish population. Kurdish territories were divided, with some coming under Ottoman control and others under Sefevid influence.


Dans ce contexte, les chefs kurdes ont été confrontés à des choix difficiles. Certains ont choisi de s'allier avec les Ottomans, espérant une autonomie ou des avantages politiques, tandis que d'autres ont vu dans l'alliance avec les Séfévides une opportunité similaire. Ces décisions étaient souvent influencées par des considérations locales, notamment des rivalités tribales et des intérêts politiques et économiques. Les conséquences de la bataille de Chaldoran et des guerres ottomano-séfévides subséquentes sur les Kurdes ont été significatives. Elles ont entraîné une fragmentation politique et territoriale qui a perduré pendant des siècles. Les Kurdes, répartis entre différents empires et, plus tard, États-nations, ont lutté pour maintenir leur identité culturelle et linguistique unique et pour préserver leur autonomie.
In this context, Kurdish leaders were faced with difficult choices. Some chose to ally themselves with the Ottomans, hoping for autonomy or political advantages, while others saw the alliance with the Sefevids as a similar opportunity. These decisions were often influenced by local considerations, including tribal rivalries and political and economic interests. The consequences of the Battle of Chaldoran and the subsequent Ottoman-Sevid wars on the Kurds were significant. They led to political and territorial fragmentation that lasted for centuries. The Kurds, divided between different empires and later nation states, struggled to maintain their unique cultural and linguistic identity and to preserve their autonomy.


Cette période a posé les bases des défis politiques et des aspirations autonomistes kurdes dans les siècles suivants. Leur position géographique à la croisée des empires a fait des Kurdes des acteurs clés dans la dynamique régionale, tout en les plaçant souvent dans une position de vulnérabilité face aux ambitions des puissances environnantes. Ainsi, la bataille de Chaldoran et ses répercussions sont cruciales pour comprendre la complexité de l'histoire kurde et les défis auxquels ce peuple a été confronté dans sa quête d'autonomie et de reconnaissance dans une région en constante évolution.
This period laid the foundations for Kurdish political challenges and autonomous aspirations in the centuries that followed. Their geographical position at the crossroads of empires made the Kurds key players in regional dynamics, while often placing them in a position of vulnerability to the ambitions of neighbouring powers. The Battle of Chaldoran and its repercussions are therefore crucial to understanding the complexity of Kurdish history and the challenges faced by this people in their quest for autonomy and recognition in an ever-changing region.


== Traité de Qasr-e Shirin et Ses Conséquences pour les Kurdes ==
== Treaty of Qasr-e Shirin and its consequences for the Kurds ==
Le traité de Qasr-e Shirin, également connu sous le nom de Traité de Zuhab, signé en 1639 entre l'Empire ottoman et la dynastie séfévide de Perse, a établi les frontières entre ces deux empires, affectant de facto les territoires kurdes. Ce traité a marqué la fin d'une série de guerres ottomano-persanes et a fixé des frontières qui, dans une large mesure, sont restées stables pendant plusieurs siècles et ont préfiguré les frontières modernes de la région. Cependant, il est important de noter que bien que le traité de 1639 ait établi des frontières entre les empires ottoman et séfévide, ces frontières n'étaient pas toujours clairement définies ou administrées, surtout dans les régions montagneuses habitées par les Kurdes. Les Kurdes eux-mêmes ne disposaient pas d'un État-nation propre et étaient répartis de part et d'autre de cette frontière, vivant sous la souveraineté ottomane ou persane (plus tard iranienne) selon la région.
The Treaty of Qasr-e Shirin, also known as the Treaty of Zuhab, signed in 1639 between the Ottoman Empire and the Sephardic dynasty of Persia, established the borders between these two empires, de facto affecting the Kurdish territories. This treaty marked the end of a series of Ottoman-Persian wars and established borders which, to a large extent, remained stable for several centuries and prefigured the modern borders of the region. However, it is important to note that although the 1639 treaty established borders between the Ottoman and Sephardic empires, these borders were not always clearly defined or administered, especially in the mountainous regions inhabited by the Kurds. The Kurds themselves did not have their own nation-state and were spread out on either side of this border, living under Ottoman or Persian (later Iranian) sovereignty depending on the region.


Ce n'est qu'au cours du 20ème siècle, en particulier après la Première Guerre mondiale et la chute de l'Empire ottoman, que les frontières des États modernes du Moyen-Orient ont commencé à être formées et administrées de manière plus rigide. Les accords Sykes-Picot de 1916, suivis par le traité de Sèvres de 1920 et le traité de Lausanne de 1923, ont redéfini les frontières dans la région, entraînant la division des territoires kurdes entre plusieurs nouveaux États-nations, notamment la Turquie, l'Irak, la Syrie et l'Iran. Ces développements dans les années 1940 ont formalisé les frontières existantes et ont eu un impact profond sur la question kurde. La division des territoires kurdes entre différents États a posé des défis uniques pour le peuple kurde en matière de droits culturels, politiques et linguistiques, et a façonné leur lutte pour l'autonomie et la reconnaissance tout au long du 20ème siècle et jusqu'à aujourd'hui.
It was not until the 20th century, particularly after the First World War and the fall of the Ottoman Empire, that the borders of the modern states of the Middle East began to be shaped and administered more rigidly. The Sykes-Picot Agreement of 1916, followed by the Treaty of Sèvres in 1920 and the Treaty of Lausanne in 1923, redefined borders in the region, resulting in the division of Kurdish territories between several new nation states, including Turkey, Iraq, Syria and Iran. These developments in the 1940s formalised the existing borders and had a profound impact on the Kurdish question. The division of Kurdish territories between different states posed unique challenges for the Kurdish people in terms of cultural, political and linguistic rights, and shaped their struggle for autonomy and recognition throughout the 20th century and to the present day.


== Conséquences Post-Première Guerre Mondiale pour les Kurdes ==
== Post-First World War consequences for the Kurds ==
Dans la période qui a suivi la Première Guerre mondiale, le Moyen-Orient a été témoin de transformations politiques et territoriales considérables, influençant de manière significative la situation des Kurdes. La chute de l'Empire ottoman et la montée du panislamisme, ainsi que la création de nouveaux États-nations, ont marqué le début d'une nouvelle ère pour les populations kurdes. Après la guerre, les aspirations à l'autonomie des Kurdes ont été largement mises de côté dans le contexte de la formation des nouveaux États-nations. En Turquie, par exemple, sous la direction de Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, une politique de turquification a été mise en place, visant à créer une identité nationale unifiée centrée sur l'identité turque. Cette politique a eu des répercussions négatives sur les droits linguistiques et culturels des Kurdes, exacerbant les tensions et alimentant des aspirations autonomistes. En Irak et en Syrie, sous les mandats britannique et français respectivement, la situation des Kurdes a été complexe et fluctuante. Malgré certaines mesures visant à reconnaître les droits des Kurdes, notamment en termes de prestations sociales, ces efforts étaient souvent insuffisants pour répondre pleinement à leurs aspirations politiques et culturelles. Ces politiques ont souvent été marquées par des périodes de répression et de marginalisation.
In the period following the First World War, the Middle East witnessed considerable political and territorial transformations, significantly influencing the situation of the Kurds. The fall of the Ottoman Empire and the rise of pan-Islamism, as well as the creation of new nation states, marked the beginning of a new era for the Kurdish people. After the war, Kurdish aspirations for autonomy were largely set aside in the context of the formation of new nation states. In Turkey, for example, under the leadership of Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, a policy of turquification was put in place, aimed at creating a unified national identity centred on the Turkish identity. This policy had a negative impact on the linguistic and cultural rights of the Kurds, exacerbating tensions and fuelling autonomist aspirations. In Iraq and Syria, under the British and French mandates respectively, the situation of the Kurds has been complex and fluctuating. Despite certain measures aimed at recognising Kurdish rights, particularly in terms of social benefits, these efforts were often insufficient to fully meet their political and cultural aspirations. These policies were often marked by periods of repression and marginalisation.


Durant cette période, les relations entre les Kurdes et d'autres groupes ethniques de la région, comme les Arméniens, ont été tendues. Les conflits dans l'est de l'Anatolie et les régions frontalières entre la Turquie et l'Arménie ont été exacerbés par les politiques étatiques et les bouleversements sociaux. Le génocide arménien, par exemple, a entraîné d'importants déplacements de population et des tensions intercommunautaires. Le contexte géopolitique post-ottoman a ainsi profondément affecté la vie des Kurdes. Coincés entre les ambitions nationalistes des nouveaux États et les dynamiques régionales, les Kurdes se sont retrouvés dans une position difficile, cherchant à préserver leur identité et leurs droits dans un environnement politique instable et souvent hostile. Cette époque a jeté les bases des luttes contemporaines pour l'autodétermination kurde, soulignant les défis persistants auxquels ce peuple est confronté pour obtenir reconnaissance et autonomie.
During this period, relations between the Kurds and other ethnic groups in the region, such as the Armenians, were strained. Conflicts in eastern Anatolia and the border regions between Turkey and Armenia were exacerbated by state policies and social upheaval. The Armenian genocide, for example, led to major population displacements and inter-community tensions. The post-Ottoman geopolitical context has had a profound effect on the lives of the Kurds. Caught between the nationalist ambitions of the new states and regional dynamics, the Kurds found themselves in a difficult position, seeking to preserve their identity and their rights in an unstable and often hostile political environment. This era laid the foundations for contemporary struggles for Kurdish self-determination, underlining the persistent challenges faced by this people in gaining recognition and autonomy.


== Création de la Première Organisation Politique Kurde ==
== Creation of the First Kurdish Political Organisation ==
L'année 1919 marque un tournant dans l'histoire du peuple kurde, avec la création de la première organisation politique kurde, signifiant l'émergence d'un mouvement nationaliste kurde structuré. Cette période, au lendemain de la Première Guerre mondiale et de la dissolution de l'Empire ottoman, a ouvert des opportunités et des défis inédits pour les aspirations kurdes.
The year 1919 marked a turning point in the history of the Kurdish people, with the creation of the first Kurdish political organisation, signifying the emergence of a structured Kurdish nationalist movement. This period, in the aftermath of the First World War and the dissolution of the Ottoman Empire, opened up unprecedented opportunities and challenges for Kurdish aspirations.


L'organisation politique kurde créée en 1919 a été une expression concrète du désir croissant parmi les Kurdes de prendre en main leur destin politique. Elle visait à unifier les différentes tribus et communautés kurdes sous une bannière commune et à articuler des revendications pour l'autonomie, voire l'indépendance. Le traité de Sèvres, signé en 1920, a semblé ouvrir la voie à la réalisation de ces aspirations. Ce traité, qui a redessiné les frontières de la région après la chute de l'Empire ottoman, incluait des dispositions pour l'autonomie du territoire kurde, et la possibilité d'une indépendance future si les communautés kurdes le désiraient. Cette reconnaissance formelle de l'autonomie kurde dans le traité de Sèvres a été perçue comme une victoire significative pour le mouvement nationaliste kurde. Cependant, l'espoir suscité par le traité de Sèvres s'est rapidement évanoui. Le traité n'a jamais été ratifié par la nouvelle République turque, dirigée par Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, et a été remplacé en 1923 par le traité de Lausanne. Le traité de Lausanne n'a pas fait mention d'un Kurdistan autonome, laissant ainsi les aspirations kurdes sans soutien international. La période suivant la Première Guerre mondiale a donc été à la fois une époque de possibilités et de frustrations pour les Kurdes. Malgré l'émergence d'un nationalisme kurde organisé et la reconnaissance initiale de leurs droits dans le traité de Sèvres, les espoirs d'autonomie et d'indépendance se sont heurtés à la réalité des nouveaux équilibres politiques et des intérêts nationaux dans la région reconfigurée du Moyen-Orient.
The Kurdish political organisation created in 1919 was a concrete expression of the growing desire among Kurds to take their political destiny into their own hands. Its aim was to unite the various Kurdish tribes and communities under a common banner and to articulate demands for autonomy and even independence. The Treaty of Sèvres, signed in 1920, seemed to pave the way for the realisation of these aspirations. This treaty, which redrew the borders of the region after the fall of the Ottoman Empire, included provisions for autonomy for Kurdish territory, and the possibility of future independence if the Kurdish communities so wished. This formal recognition of Kurdish autonomy in the Treaty of Sèvres was seen as a significant victory for the Kurdish nationalist movement. However, the hopes raised by the Treaty of Sèvres quickly evaporated. The treaty was never ratified by the new Turkish Republic, led by Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, and was replaced in 1923 by the Treaty of Lausanne. The Treaty of Lausanne made no mention of an autonomous Kurdistan, leaving Kurdish aspirations without international support. The period following the First World War was therefore one of both opportunity and frustration for the Kurds. Despite the emergence of an organised Kurdish nationalism and the initial recognition of their rights in the Treaty of Sèvres, hopes of autonomy and independence came up against the reality of new political balances and national interests in the reconfigured Middle East.


== Défis de l'Établissement d'un État Kurde ==
== Challenges of establishing a Kurdish state ==
Dans la période suivant la Première Guerre mondiale, le Moyen-Orient a été redessiné par les puissances victorieuses, affectant profondément les aspirations des peuples de la région, y compris celles des Kurdes. Le traité de Sèvres en 1920, qui a promis un certain degré d'autonomie pour les Kurdes, a suscité l'espoir d'un État kurde indépendant. Cependant, cet espoir a été de courte durée en raison de plusieurs facteurs clés. La répartition géographique des populations kurdes, éparpillées entre les sphères d'influence de la France, de la Grande-Bretagne, et de la Russie, a entravé la formation d'un État kurde unifié. Cette division territoriale a compliqué toute tentative de créer une entité politique kurde cohérente, chaque zone étant soumise à des politiques et des influences différentes. De plus, les puissances alliées, principalement la Grande-Bretagne et la France, qui avaient redessiné la carte du Moyen-Orient, étaient réticentes à modifier leurs plans pour accueillir un État kurde. Ces puissances, préoccupées par leurs propres intérêts stratégiques dans la région, n'étaient pas disposées à soutenir la cause kurde au détriment de leurs objectifs géopolitiques.
In the period following the First World War, the Middle East was redrawn by the victorious powers, profoundly affecting the aspirations of the peoples of the region, including those of the Kurds. The Treaty of Sèvres in 1920, which promised a degree of autonomy for the Kurds, raised hopes of an independent Kurdish state. However, this hope was short-lived due to a number of key factors. The geographical distribution of Kurdish populations, scattered between the spheres of influence of France, Great Britain and Russia, hampered the formation of a unified Kurdish state. This territorial division complicated any attempt to create a coherent Kurdish political entity, as each area was subject to different policies and influences. In addition, the allied powers, mainly Britain and France, who had redrawn the map of the Middle East, were reluctant to change their plans to accommodate a Kurdish state. These powers, preoccupied with their own strategic interests in the region, were not prepared to support the Kurdish cause to the detriment of their own geopolitical objectives.


La question de l'autonomie arménienne a également joué un rôle dans l'échec de l'établissement d'un État kurde. Les territoires envisagés pour l'autonomie arménienne recouvraient des zones peuplées par les Kurdes, créant ainsi des conflits de revendications territoriales. Ces tensions ont exacerbé la complexité de la situation, rendant encore plus difficile la réalisation d'un consensus sur la question kurde. Un autre facteur important était la faiblesse relative du nationalisme kurde à cette époque. Contrairement à d'autres mouvements nationaux dans la région, le nationalisme kurde n'avait pas encore développé une base forte et unifiée capable de mobiliser efficacement les masses. Les divisions internes, les différences tribales et régionales, ainsi que les divergences d'opinions sur la stratégie à adopter, ont limité la capacité des Kurdes à présenter un front uni. En outre, il y avait un débat au sein de la communauté kurde sur la question de l'acceptation ou du rejet du traité de Sèvres. Certains Kurdes envisageaient de s'aligner avec le nationalisme turc dans l'espoir de préserver une certaine forme d'autonomie au sein d'un territoire turc unifié.
The question of Armenian autonomy also played a role in the failure to establish a Kurdish state. The territories envisaged for Armenian autonomy overlapped with areas populated by Kurds, thus creating conflicts over territorial claims. These tensions exacerbated the complexity of the situation, making it even more difficult to reach a consensus on the Kurdish question. Another important factor was the relative weakness of Kurdish nationalism at the time. Unlike other national movements in the region, Kurdish nationalism had not yet developed a strong, unified base capable of effectively mobilising the masses. Internal divisions, tribal and regional differences, as well as differences of opinion on the strategy to adopt, limited the ability of the Kurds to present a united front. In addition, there was a debate within the Kurdish community on whether to accept or reject the Treaty of Sevres. Some Kurds were considering aligning themselves with Turkish nationalism in the hope of preserving some form of autonomy within a unified Turkish territory.


Finalement, ces défis et obstacles ont conduit à l'abandon de l'idée d'un État kurde indépendant dans les années qui ont suivi la Première Guerre mondiale. La réalité politique du Moyen-Orient, façonnée par les intérêts des puissances coloniales et les dynamiques internes complexes, a rendu la réalisation de l'autonomie kurde extrêmement difficile, posant les bases des luttes kurdes pour la reconnaissance et l'autonomie dans les décennies suivantes.
Ultimately, these challenges and obstacles led to the idea of an independent Kurdish state being abandoned in the years following the First World War. The political reality of the Middle East, shaped by the interests of colonial powers and complex internal dynamics, made the achievement of Kurdish autonomy extremely difficult, laying the foundations for Kurdish struggles for recognition and autonomy in the decades that followed.


==Kurdistan turc==
==Turkish Kurdistan==


=== Politique d'Assimilation en Turquie et Négation de l'Identité Kurde ===
=== Turkey's Assimilation Policy and the Denial of Kurdish Identity ===
Le début des années 1920 en Turquie, sous la direction de Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, a été marqué par des changements radicaux dans le cadre de la construction de l'État-nation turc. L'un des aspects de cette transformation a été la politique d'assimilation et d'acculturation vis-à-vis des minorités ethniques, en particulier les Kurdes. En 1924, dans le cadre de ces efforts, l'usage des termes "kurde" et "Kurdistan" a été officiellement interdit en Turquie, ce qui symbolisait une négation explicite de l'identité kurde.
The early 1920s in Turkey, under the leadership of Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, were marked by radical changes in the construction of the Turkish nation-state. One aspect of this transformation was the policy of assimilation and acculturation of ethnic minorities, particularly the Kurds. In 1924, as part of these efforts, the use of the terms "Kurd" and "Kurdistan" was officially banned in Turkey, symbolising an explicit denial of Kurdish identity.


Cette politique faisait partie d'une stratégie plus large d'homogénéisation culturelle et linguistique visant à forger une identité turque unifiée. Les autorités turques ont mis en œuvre des politiques visant à assimiler de force les populations kurdes, incluant le déplacement de populations et la suppression des expressions culturelles et linguistiques kurdes. Les Kurdes étaient souvent décrits par les autorités turques comme des "Turcs montagnards", dans une tentative de réinterpréter et de nier leur identité distincte. Cette théorisation visait à justifier les politiques d'assimilation en affirmant que les différences linguistiques et culturelles étaient simplement des variations régionales au sein de la population turque.
This policy was part of a wider strategy of cultural and linguistic homogenisation aimed at forging a unified Turkish identity. The Turkish authorities implemented policies aimed at forcibly assimilating Kurdish populations, including the displacement of populations and the suppression of Kurdish cultural and linguistic expressions. Kurds were often described by the Turkish authorities as "mountain Turks", in an attempt to reinterpret and deny their distinct identity. This theorisation aimed to justify assimilation policies by asserting that linguistic and cultural differences were simply regional variations within the Turkish population.


Ces politiques ont conduit à un contexte de révolte permanente au sein de la population kurde. Les Kurdes, confrontés à la négation de leur identité et à la répression de leurs droits culturels et linguistiques, ont résisté à ces efforts d'assimilation. Cette résistance a pris diverses formes, allant de la révolte armée à la préservation clandestine de la culture et de la langue kurdes. Les révoltes kurdes en Turquie, notamment celles dirigées par des figures comme Sheikh Said en 1925, ont été des moments de confrontation directe avec l'État turc. Ces rébellions, bien que réprimées, ont mis en évidence les tensions profondes et les désaccords entre le gouvernement turc et sa population kurde.
These policies led to a context of permanent revolt within the Kurdish population. The Kurds, faced with the denial of their identity and the repression of their cultural and linguistic rights, resisted these efforts at assimilation. This resistance has taken various forms, from armed revolt to the clandestine preservation of Kurdish culture and language. The Kurdish revolts in Turkey, particularly those led by figures such as Sheikh Said in 1925, were moments of direct confrontation with the Turkish state. These rebellions, although suppressed, highlighted the deep tensions and disagreements between the Turkish government and its Kurdish population.


=== Renaissance Culturelle Kurde et Tensions Politiques Post-Seconde Guerre Mondiale ===
=== Kurdish Cultural Renaissance and Post-World War II Political Tensions ===
À la fin de la Seconde Guerre mondiale, la Turquie a connu une période de transformation et de crise identitaire qui a indirectement contribué au renouveau de l'intérêt pour la langue, la culture et l'histoire kurdes. Cette période a marqué une renaissance du nationalisme kurde, bien que les circonstances aient été complexes et souvent contradictoires. La période d'après-guerre en Turquie a été caractérisée par une ouverture relative et un questionnement sur l'identité nationale turque. Cette ouverture a permis une certaine redécouverte de la culture kurde, auparavant réprimée sous les politiques d'assimilation kémalistes. Des intellectuels kurdes et turcs ont commencé à explorer l'histoire et la culture kurdes, contribuant à une prise de conscience croissante de l'identité kurde distincte. Ce renouveau culturel a servi de catalyseur au développement du nationalisme kurde, avec une nouvelle génération de Kurdes revendiquant plus ouvertement leurs droits culturels et politiques.
At the end of the Second World War, Turkey underwent a period of transformation and identity crisis that indirectly contributed to a renewed interest in Kurdish language, culture and history. This period marked a renaissance of Kurdish nationalism, although the circumstances were complex and often contradictory. The post-war period in Turkey was characterised by a relative openness and a questioning of Turkish national identity. This openness led to a certain rediscovery of Kurdish culture, which had previously been repressed under Kemalist assimilation policies. Kurdish and Turkish intellectuals began to explore Kurdish history and culture, contributing to a growing awareness of a distinct Kurdish identity. This cultural revival served as a catalyst for the development of Kurdish nationalism, with a new generation of Kurds demanding their cultural and political rights more openly.


Cependant, cette période a également été marquée par une instabilité politique en Turquie, avec plusieurs coups d'État militaires et une répression accrue. Les régimes militaires qui ont pris le pouvoir en Turquie pendant les années 1960 et 1980, bien que parfois ouverts à certaines réformes, ont maintenu une ligne dure en matière de politique ethnique, en particulier en ce qui concerne la question kurde. Les politiques nationalistes de ces régimes ont souvent conduit à une répression renouvelée des expressions culturelles et politiques kurdes. La tension entre la renaissance culturelle kurde et la répression étatique a conduit à une période de conflit accru. Le mouvement kurde, de plus en plus organisé et politisé, a été confronté à des défis majeurs, tant de la part de l'État turc que de ses propres dynamiques internes. La question kurde est devenue un enjeu central dans la politique turque, symbolisant les limites du modèle d'État-nation en Turquie et les défis posés par la diversité ethnique et culturelle du pays.
However, this period was also marked by political instability in Turkey, with several military coups and increased repression. The military regimes that came to power in Turkey during the 1960s and 1980s, although sometimes open to certain reforms, maintained a hard line on ethnic policy, particularly with regard to the Kurdish question. The nationalist policies of these regimes often led to renewed repression of Kurdish cultural and political expression. The tension between the Kurdish cultural renaissance and state repression has led to a period of increased conflict. The Kurdish movement, increasingly organised and politicised, has faced major challenges, both from the Turkish state and from its own internal dynamics. The Kurdish question has become a central issue in Turkish politics, symbolising the limits of the nation-state model in Turkey and the challenges posed by the country's ethnic and cultural diversity.


=== Lutte Armée du PKK et Impact sur la Question Kurde en Turquie ===
=== PKK Armed Struggle and Impact on the Kurdish Question in Turkey ===
La lutte armée du Parti des travailleurs du Kurdistan (PKK), initiée en 1984, représente un tournant décisif dans l'histoire du mouvement kurde en Turquie. Fondé par Abdullah Öcalan en 1978, le PKK a émergé comme un mouvement marxiste-léniniste, orienté vers la lutte des classes et l'indépendance kurde. La décision du PKK de lancer une campagne de guérilla contre l'État turc a marqué le début d'une période prolongée de conflit armé qui a profondément marqué le sud-est de la Turquie et la communauté kurde.  
The armed struggle of the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK), which began in 1984, represents a decisive turning point in the history of the Kurdish movement in Turkey. Founded by Abdullah Öcalan in 1978, the PKK emerged as a Marxist-Leninist movement, oriented towards class struggle and Kurdish independence. The PKK's decision to launch a guerrilla campaign against the Turkish state marked the beginning of a prolonged period of armed conflict that has had a profound effect on south-east Turkey and the Kurdish community.  


Le contexte dans lequel le PKK a commencé sa lutte armée était complexe. La période des années 1980 en Turquie était marquée par des tensions politiques et une répression accrue contre les groupes dissidents, y compris les mouvements kurdes. En réponse à ce qu'ils percevaient comme une oppression systématique et la négation de leurs droits culturels et linguistiques, le PKK a opté pour la lutte armée comme moyen de revendiquer l'autonomie kurde. Dans ses premières années, le PKK a bénéficié d'un certain degré de soutien de pays alignés sur le bloc soviétique. Ce soutien a pris la forme d'entraînement, de fourniture d'armes et d'appui logistique, bien que l'étendue et la nature exactes de ce soutien aient été sujettes à débat. Ce soutien était en partie dû aux dynamiques de la Guerre froide, où le PKK était perçu comme un allié potentiel par les ennemis de la Turquie, membre de l'OTAN. La réponse du gouvernement turc à l'insurrection du PKK a été caractérisée par une répression militaire intense. Des opérations de sécurité massives ont été lancées dans les régions kurdes, entraînant de graves conséquences humanitaires, y compris des pertes civiles et militaires, ainsi que le déplacement de populations kurdes.
The context in which the PKK began its armed struggle was complex. The 1980s in Turkey were a period of political tension and increased repression against dissident groups, including Kurdish movements. In response to what they perceived as systematic oppression and the denial of their cultural and linguistic rights, the PKK opted for armed struggle as a means of demanding Kurdish autonomy. In its early years, the PKK enjoyed a degree of support from countries aligned with the Soviet bloc. This support took the form of training, arms supplies and logistical support, although the exact extent and nature of this support was open to debate. This support was partly due to the dynamics of the Cold War, when the PKK was seen as a potential ally by NATO member Turkey's enemies. The Turkish government's response to the PKK insurgency was characterised by intense military repression. Massive security operations were launched in the Kurdish regions, with serious humanitarian consequences, including civilian and military casualties and the displacement of Kurdish populations.


Au fil du temps, le PKK a évolué dans sa philosophie et ses objectifs. Alors que ses racines étaient profondément ancrées dans l'idéologie marxiste-léniniste, le mouvement a progressivement adapté ses revendications, passant de l'exigence d'un État kurde indépendant à des appels pour une plus grande autonomie et la reconnaissance des droits culturels et linguistiques kurdes. La lutte armée du PKK a mis la question kurde au centre de l'attention nationale et internationale, soulignant la complexité et les défis de la question kurde en Turquie. Elle a également polarisé les opinions, à la fois au sein de la Turquie et de la communauté kurde, sur les stratégies et les objectifs appropriés dans la quête de l'autonomie et des droits kurdes. Le conflit entre le PKK et l'État turc reste une question épineuse, symbolisant la tension entre les aspirations kurdes à l'autonomie et les impératifs de sécurité et d'unité nationale de la Turquie.
Over time, the PKK's philosophy and objectives have evolved. While its roots were deeply rooted in Marxist-Leninist ideology, the movement gradually adapted its demands, moving from the demand for an independent Kurdish state to calls for greater autonomy and recognition of Kurdish cultural and linguistic rights. The PKK's armed struggle put the Kurdish question at the centre of national and international attention, highlighting the complexity and challenges of the Kurdish question in Turkey. It has also polarised opinion, both within Turkey and the Kurdish community, on the appropriate strategies and objectives in the quest for Kurdish autonomy and rights. The conflict between the PKK and the Turkish state remains a thorny issue, symbolising the tension between Kurdish aspirations for autonomy and Turkey's imperatives of security and national unity.


=== Contexte International et Intérêt Soviétique pour les Régions Kurdes ===
=== International context and Soviet interest in the Kurdish Regions ===
Depuis 1946, l'Union soviétique a manifesté un intérêt accru pour le Moyen-Orient, notamment pour les régions à forte concentration kurde et azérie. Cette implication soviétique s'inscrit dans le cadre plus large de la Guerre froide et de la stratégie de l'URSS pour étendre son influence dans des régions stratégiquement importantes. L'un des exemples les plus significatifs de cette politique a été le soutien soviétique à la République autonome d'Azerbaïdjan iranien. En 1945, à la fin de la Seconde Guerre mondiale, l'Union soviétique, qui avait occupé le nord de l'Iran pendant la guerre, a encouragé et soutenu la création de la République autonome d'Azerbaïdjan, ainsi que celle de la République du Kurdistan, en Iran. Ces entités autonomes ont été établies avec le soutien des communistes locaux et des Soviétiques, et elles ont représenté un défi direct à l'autorité du gouvernement central iranien, alors dirigé par Reza Shah Pahlavi. La création de ces républiques autonomes était perçue par l'URSS comme une opportunité d'étendre son influence dans la région et de contrer la présence britannique et américaine.
Since 1946, the Soviet Union has shown a growing interest in the Middle East, particularly in regions with a high concentration of Kurds and Azeris. This Soviet involvement is part of the wider context of the Cold War and the USSR's strategy to extend its influence in strategically important regions. One of the most significant examples of this policy was Soviet support for the Iranian Autonomous Republic of Azerbaijan. In 1945, at the end of the Second World War, the Soviet Union, which had occupied northern Iran during the war, encouraged and supported the creation of the Autonomous Republic of Azerbaijan, as well as the Republic of Kurdistan, in Iran. These autonomous entities were established with the support of local communists and the Soviets, and represented a direct challenge to the authority of the central Iranian government, then led by Reza Shah Pahlavi. The creation of these autonomous republics was seen by the USSR as an opportunity to extend its influence in the region and counter the British and American presence.


Cependant, le conflit irano-soviétique qui s'ensuivit a conduit à une pression internationale sur l'Union soviétique pour qu'elle retire ses troupes d'Iran. En 1946, sous la pression de la communauté internationale et en particulier des États-Unis, l'URSS a retiré son soutien aux républiques autonomes, qui ont été rapidement reprises par les forces iraniennes. Cette période a été significative pour les relations internationales dans la région, montrant comment la dynamique de la Guerre froide influençait les politiques régionales. Le soutien soviétique aux mouvements autonomistes en Iran reflétait non seulement les intérêts géopolitiques de l'URSS, mais a également mis en lumière les aspirations des minorités ethniques dans la région, y compris les Kurdes et les Azéris, pour plus d'autonomie et de reconnaissance.
However, the ensuing Iranian-Soviet conflict led to international pressure on the Soviet Union to withdraw its troops from Iran. In 1946, under pressure from the international community and the United States in particular, the USSR withdrew its support for the autonomous republics, which were quickly taken over by Iranian forces. This period was significant for international relations in the region, showing how the dynamics of the Cold War influenced regional policies. Soviet support for autonomous movements in Iran not only reflected the geopolitical interests of the USSR, but also highlighted the aspirations of ethnic minorities in the region, including the Kurds and Azeris, for greater autonomy and recognition.


=== Tensions Religieuses et Politiques des Kurdes en Iran ===
=== Religious and political tensions among Kurds in Iran ===
Depuis le début des années 2000, la situation des Kurdes en Iran a été caractérisée par une tension croissante en raison de divergences religieuses et politiques. L'Iran, un État majoritairement chiite, a vu ses relations avec sa population kurde, principalement sunnite, se tendre en raison de facteurs religieux, culturels et politiques. La différence sectaire entre la majorité chiite de l'Iran et la minorité kurde sunnite est un aspect clé de cette tension. Alors que l'Iran a consolidé son identité chiite depuis la révolution islamique de 1979, les Kurdes iraniens ont souvent ressenti une marginalisation en raison de leur appartenance religieuse sunnite. Cette situation est exacerbée par des questions de droits culturels et linguistiques, les Kurdes revendiquant une plus grande reconnaissance de leur identité ethnique et culturelle.
Since the early 2000s, the situation of the Kurds in Iran has been characterised by growing tension due to religious and political differences. Iran, a predominantly Shia state, has seen its relations with its predominantly Sunni Kurdish population strained by religious, cultural and political factors. The sectarian difference between Iran's Shia majority and the Sunni Kurdish minority is a key aspect of this tension. While Iran has consolidated its Shia identity since the Islamic revolution of 1979, Iranian Kurds have often felt marginalised because of their Sunni religious affiliation. This situation is exacerbated by issues of cultural and linguistic rights, with Kurds demanding greater recognition of their ethnic and cultural identity.


Les tensions politiques entre les Kurdes iraniens et le gouvernement central se sont intensifiées en raison de perceptions de marginalisation et de négligence économique. Les Kurdes en Iran ont longtemps lutté pour une plus grande autonomie régionale et pour la reconnaissance de leurs droits linguistiques et culturels, notamment le droit à l'éducation et aux médias dans leur langue maternelle. La réponse du gouvernement iranien à ces revendications a souvent été la répression. Les mouvements politiques kurdes en Iran ont été étroitement surveillés et parfois réprimés. Des affrontements armés ont éclaté à plusieurs reprises entre les forces de sécurité iraniennes et des groupes armés kurdes, ces derniers cherchant à défendre les droits et l'autonomie des Kurdes.
Political tensions between Iranian Kurds and the central government have intensified due to perceptions of marginalisation and economic neglect. Kurds in Iran have long fought for greater regional autonomy and recognition of their linguistic and cultural rights, including the right to education and media in their mother tongue. The Iranian government's response to these demands has often been repression. Kurdish political movements in Iran have been closely monitored and sometimes repressed. Armed clashes have broken out on several occasions between the Iranian security forces and armed Kurdish groups, the latter seeking to defend Kurdish rights and autonomy.


La situation des Kurdes en Iran est également influencée par les dynamiques régionales. Les développements concernant les Kurdes en Irak, notamment la création d'une région autonome du Kurdistan irakien, ont eu un impact sur les aspirations des Kurdes en Iran. Parallèlement, la politique étrangère de l'Iran, en particulier son implication dans des conflits régionaux comme en Syrie et en Irak, a des répercussions sur sa politique intérieure envers sa propre population kurde. En conclusion, les tensions entre les Kurdes et le gouvernement iranien depuis les années 2000 sont le résultat d'un mélange complexe de facteurs religieux, culturels et politiques. Ces tensions reflètent les défis de la gouvernance dans une société multiethnique et multiconfessionnelle et soulignent les difficultés persistantes des minorités dans la région à obtenir une reconnaissance et une autonomie accrues.
The situation of the Kurds in Iran is also influenced by regional dynamics. Developments concerning the Kurds in Iraq, notably the creation of an autonomous region of Iraqi Kurdistan, have had an impact on the aspirations of the Kurds in Iran. At the same time, Iran's foreign policy, in particular its involvement in regional conflicts such as Syria and Iraq, is having an impact on its domestic policy towards its own Kurdish population. In conclusion, the tensions between the Kurds and the Iranian government since the 2000s are the result of a complex mix of religious, cultural and political factors. These tensions reflect the challenges of governance in a multi-ethnic and multi-faith society and underline the persistent difficulties of minorities in the region to gain greater recognition and autonomy.


==Kurdistan irakien==
==Iraqi Kurdistan==


=== Les Origines du Kurdistan Irakien et le Vilayet de Mossoul ===
=== The Origins of Iraqi Kurdistan and the Vilayet of Mosul ===
L'histoire du Kurdistan irakien et sa relation avec le vilayet de Mossoul pendant la période du mandat britannique est cruciale pour comprendre les dynamiques politiques et ethniques de la région. Après la Première Guerre mondiale et la dissolution de l'Empire ottoman, la province ottomane du vilayet de Mossoul est devenue un enjeu central dans le redessinement des frontières du Moyen-Orient.  
The history of Iraqi Kurdistan and its relationship with the vilayet of Mosul during the British Mandate is crucial to understanding the political and ethnic dynamics of the region. After the First World War and the dissolution of the Ottoman Empire, the Ottoman province of Mosul vilayet became a central issue in the redrawing of the borders of the Middle East.  


Le vilayet de Mossoul, riche en diversité ethnique, incluait une population significative de Kurdes, ainsi que d'autres groupes comme des Arabes, des Assyriens et des Turkmènes. Lors de l'établissement du mandat britannique sur la Mésopotamie, qui allait devenir l'Irak, l'avenir de cette province a été largement débattu. Les Britanniques, désireux de contrôler les ressources pétrolières de la région, ont plaidé pour son inclusion dans l'Irak, malgré les revendications territoriales de la Turquie. En 1925, après un long processus de négociations et de délibérations, la Société des Nations a tranché en faveur de l'annexion du vilayet de Mossoul à l'Irak. Cette décision a été cruciale dans la définition des frontières nord de l'Irak et a eu un impact significatif sur la population kurde de la région. La décision de la SDN a placé un grand nombre de Kurdes sous administration irakienne, modifiant ainsi le paysage politique et ethnique du nouvel État.
The Mosul vilayet was rich in ethnic diversity and included a significant Kurdish population, as well as other groups such as Arabs, Assyrians and Turkmen. At the time of the establishment of the British mandate over Mesopotamia, which was to become Iraq, the future of this province was widely debated. The British, keen to control the region's oil resources, argued for its inclusion in Iraq, despite Turkey's territorial claims. In 1925, after a long process of negotiation and deliberation, the League of Nations decided in favour of annexing the vilayet of Mosul to Iraq. This decision was crucial in defining Iraq's northern borders and had a significant impact on the region's Kurdish population. The League's decision placed a large number of Kurds under Iraqi administration, changing the political and ethnic landscape of the new state.


=== La Lutte pour l'Autonomie Kurde au 20e Siècle ===
=== The Struggle for Kurdish Autonomy in the 20th Century ===
L'intégration du vilayet de Mossoul dans l'Irak a influencé le mouvement kurde dans le pays. Les Kurdes, cherchant à préserver leur identité culturelle et linguistique et à obtenir une plus grande autonomie politique, ont été confrontés à divers défis sous les gouvernements successifs de Bagdad. La lutte pour l'autonomie kurde s'est intensifiée tout au long du 20e siècle, culminant dans la création d'une région autonome du Kurdistan dans les années 1990, après des décennies de conflit et de négociations. Le développement du Kurdistan irakien en tant que région autonome a été renforcé après l'invasion de l'Irak en 2003, établissant la région comme un acteur clé dans la politique irakienne. L'histoire du vilayet de Mossoul et son intégration dans l'Irak moderne sont donc essentielles pour comprendre les dynamiques actuelles du Kurdistan irakien, soulignant les complexités historiques et politiques de la formation des États-nations dans la région et les enjeux persistants liés à la diversité ethnique et culturelle.
The integration of the Mosul vilayet into Iraq has influenced the Kurdish movement in the country. The Kurds, seeking to preserve their cultural and linguistic identity and achieve greater political autonomy, have faced a variety of challenges under successive governments in Baghdad. The struggle for Kurdish autonomy intensified throughout the 20th century, culminating in the creation of an autonomous Kurdistan region in the 1990s, after decades of conflict and negotiations. The development of Iraqi Kurdistan as an autonomous region was reinforced after the invasion of Iraq in 2003, establishing the region as a key player in Iraqi politics. The history of the vilayet of Mosul and its integration into modern Iraq are therefore essential to understanding the current dynamics of Iraqi Kurdistan, highlighting the historical and political complexities of nation-state formation in the region and the persistent challenges of ethnic and cultural diversity.


La décision de la Société des Nations en 1925 d'annexer le vilayet de Mossoul au mandat britannique de l'Irak a été une étape cruciale dans la formation de l'État irakien moderne et a eu des implications profondes pour le mouvement nationaliste kurde dans la région. Cette décision a intégré un territoire avec une population kurde importante à l'Irak, établissant ainsi les bases d'une lutte kurde continue pour la reconnaissance et l'autonomie. Le mouvement nationaliste kurde en Irak s'est caractérisé par une résilience et une continuité remarquables, malgré les défis politiques et les obstacles. La lutte des Kurdes en Irak pour l'autonomie et la reconnaissance de leurs droits a été ponctuée de rébellions, de négociations et parfois de violentes répressions. Cette persévérance reflète la spécificité du nationalisme kurde en Irak, où les aspirations à l'autonomie régionale et à la préservation de l'identité culturelle kurde ont été des thèmes constants.  
The League of Nations' decision in 1925 to annex the vilayet of Mosul to the British mandate of Iraq was a crucial step in the formation of the modern Iraqi state and had profound implications for the Kurdish nationalist movement in the region. The decision incorporated a territory with a sizeable Kurdish population into Iraq, laying the foundations for an ongoing Kurdish struggle for recognition and autonomy. The Kurdish nationalist movement in Iraq has been characterised by remarkable resilience and continuity, despite political challenges and obstacles. The struggle of the Kurds in Iraq for autonomy and recognition of their rights has been punctuated by rebellions, negotiations and sometimes violent repression. This perseverance reflects the specific nature of Kurdish nationalism in Iraq, where aspirations for regional autonomy and the preservation of Kurdish cultural identity have been constant themes.


Les tentatives de négociations et d'accords entre les dirigeants kurdes et le gouvernement irakien ont souvent été infructueuses, marquées par des promesses non tenues et des accords violés. L'un des facteurs contribuant à ces échecs a été le manque de soutien international constant pour la cause kurde. En particulier, le retrait du soutien de l'Iran au nationalisme kurde a été un revers significatif. L'Iran, qui a ses propres populations kurdes et ses préoccupations concernant l'autonomie kurde à l'intérieur de ses frontières, a souvent oscillé dans son soutien aux Kurdes en Irak, en fonction de ses propres intérêts géopolitiques et de sécurité. La situation des Kurdes en Irak a continué d'évoluer au cours du 20e siècle, avec des périodes de répression sévère sous des régimes comme celui de Saddam Hussein, ainsi que des avancées significatives, comme l'établissement d'une région autonome du Kurdistan dans les années 1990. Ces développements ont été influencés par une variété de facteurs régionaux et internationaux, reflétant la complexité de la question kurde dans la région.
Attempts at negotiations and agreements between the Kurdish leadership and the Iraqi government have often been unsuccessful, marked by broken promises and violated agreements. One of the factors contributing to these failures has been the lack of consistent international support for the Kurdish cause. In particular, Iran's withdrawal of support for Kurdish nationalism has been a significant setback. Iran, which has its own Kurdish populations and concerns about Kurdish autonomy within its borders, has often wavered in its support for the Kurds in Iraq, depending on its own geopolitical and security interests. The situation of the Kurds in Iraq has continued to evolve over the course of the 20th century, with periods of severe repression under regimes such as that of Saddam Hussein, as well as significant advances, such as the establishment of an autonomous Kurdistan region in the 1990s. These developments have been influenced by a variety of regional and international factors, reflecting the complexity of the Kurdish question in the region.


=== L'Émergence de l'Autonomie Kurde dans les Années 1990 ===
=== The Emergence of Kurdish Autonomy in the 1990s ===
L'année 1991 a été un moment déterminant pour le mouvement kurde en Irak, notamment à la suite de la guerre du Golfe et de l'affaiblissement du régime de Saddam Hussein. La fin de cette guerre a créé une opportunité sans précédent pour les Kurdes irakiens de mettre en place une forme d'autonomie de facto dans leurs régions.  
1991 was a defining moment for the Kurdish movement in Iraq, particularly following the Gulf War and the weakening of Saddam Hussein's regime. The end of this war created an unprecedented opportunity for the Iraqi Kurds to establish a form of de facto autonomy in their regions.  


Après la défaite de l'Irak dans la guerre du Golfe, un soulèvement populaire a éclaté dans le nord du pays, principalement parmi les Kurdes. Ce soulèvement a été brutalement réprimé par le régime de Saddam Hussein, entraînant une grave crise humanitaire et des déplacements massifs de populations. En réponse, les États-Unis, le Royaume-Uni et la France ont mis en place une zone d'exclusion aérienne au nord du 36e parallèle, permettant ainsi aux Kurdes de gagner un degré significatif d'autonomie. Cette autonomie de facto a permis aux Kurdes de développer leurs propres institutions politiques et administratives, une avancée majeure pour le nationalisme kurde en Irak. Le gouvernement régional du Kurdistan (GRK) a été formé, avec ses propres structures administratives, législatives et de sécurité. Bien que cette autonomie n'ait pas été reconnue officiellement par le gouvernement irakien à l'époque, elle a représenté un tournant dans l'histoire kurde en Irak.
Following Iraq's defeat in the Gulf War, a popular uprising broke out in the north of the country, mainly among the Kurds. This uprising was brutally put down by Saddam Hussein's regime, leading to a serious humanitarian crisis and massive population displacement. In response, the United States, the United Kingdom and France set up a no-fly zone north of the 36th parallel, allowing the Kurds to gain a significant degree of autonomy. This de facto autonomy enabled the Kurds to develop their own political and administrative institutions, a major step forward for Kurdish nationalism in Iraq. The Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) was formed, with its own administrative, legislative and security structures. Although this autonomy was not officially recognised by the Iraqi government at the time, it represented a turning point in Kurdish history in Iraq.


=== Le Kurdistan Irakien dans le Nouveau Contexte Politique Post-2003 ===
=== Iraqi Kurdistan in the New Post-2003 Political Context ===
La situation a évolué de manière significative après la chute du régime de Saddam Hussein en 2003. La nouvelle constitution irakienne, adoptée en 2005, a reconnu officiellement le Kurdistan irakien comme une entité fédérale au sein de l'Irak. Cette reconnaissance constitutionnelle a légalisé l'autonomie kurde et a été une étape majeure dans la réalisation des aspirations politiques kurdes. L'inclusion de l'autonomie du Kurdistan dans la constitution irakienne a également symbolisé une évolution importante dans la politique irakienne, marquant une rupture avec les politiques centralisées et répressives des régimes précédents. Elle a également reflété les changements dans la dynamique politique du Moyen-Orient post-Saddam, où les questions d'identité ethnique et régionale sont devenues de plus en plus prégnantes.
The situation changed significantly after the fall of Saddam Hussein's regime in 2003. The new Iraqi constitution, adopted in 2005, officially recognised Iraqi Kurdistan as a federal entity within Iraq. This constitutional recognition legalised Kurdish autonomy and was a major step towards realising Kurdish political aspirations. The inclusion of Kurdish autonomy in the Iraqi constitution also symbolised an important evolution in Iraqi politics, marking a break with the centralised and repressive policies of previous regimes. It also reflected changes in the political dynamics of the post-Saddam Middle East, where issues of ethnic and regional identity have become increasingly prominent.


Le retrait des troupes américaines d'Irak en 2009 et les événements subséquents ont eu un impact significatif sur la situation des Kurdes en Irak, exacerbant les tensions entre le gouvernement régional du Kurdistan (GRK) et le gouvernement central de Bagdad. Après le retrait américain, les relations entre Erbil, la capitale du Kurdistan irakien, et Bagdad se sont détériorées. Les Kurdes ont souvent exprimé des préoccupations concernant une marginalisation croissante de la part du gouvernement central irakien. Ces tensions portaient sur diverses questions, notamment le partage des revenus pétroliers, le statut des zones disputées (comme Kirkouk, riche en pétrole), et l'autonomie politique et administrative du Kurdistan irakien.
The withdrawal of US troops from Iraq in 2009 and subsequent events had a significant impact on the situation of the Kurds in Iraq, exacerbating tensions between the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) and the central government in Baghdad. After the US withdrawal, relations between Erbil, the capital of Iraqi Kurdistan, and Baghdad deteriorated. The Kurds often expressed concerns about increasing marginalisation by the central Iraqi government. These tensions centred on a range of issues, including the sharing of oil revenues, the status of disputed areas (such as oil-rich Kirkuk), and the political and administrative autonomy of Iraqi Kurdistan.


Le référendum sur l'indépendance du Kurdistan irakien, tenu en septembre 2017, a marqué un point culminant de ces tensions. Ce référendum, qui a vu une majorité écrasante de votes en faveur de l'indépendance, a été organisé par le GRK malgré une forte opposition de Bagdad ainsi que des avertissements internationaux. Le gouvernement irakien, ainsi que plusieurs pays voisins et la communauté internationale, ont considéré le référendum comme illégal et une menace pour l'intégrité territoriale de l'Irak. En réponse au référendum, le gouvernement central irakien a pris des mesures sévères, y compris la reprise militaire du contrôle de certaines zones disputées, comme Kirkouk, et l'imposition de restrictions économiques et de transport sur le Kurdistan irakien. Ces actions ont souligné la fragilité de l'autonomie kurde en Irak et ont mis en évidence les défis politiques et sécuritaires auxquels la région est confrontée. Le référendum et ses conséquences ont également révélé les divisions internes au sein du mouvement kurde irakien, ainsi que les complexités de la politique régionale. Alors que certains leaders kurdes ont vu le référendum comme un pas vers une indépendance tant attendue, d'autres ont exprimé des inquiétudes quant à son timing et à ses implications potentielles.
The referendum on the independence of Iraqi Kurdistan, held in September 2017, marked a high point in these tensions. The referendum, which saw an overwhelming majority vote in favour of independence, was organised by the KRG despite strong opposition from Baghdad as well as international warnings. The Iraqi government, as well as several neighbouring countries and the international community, considered the referendum illegal and a threat to Iraq's territorial integrity. In response to the referendum, the Iraqi central government took severe measures, including the military takeover of some disputed areas, such as Kirkuk, and the imposition of economic and transport restrictions on Iraqi Kurdistan. These actions underlined the fragility of Kurdish autonomy in Iraq and highlighted the political and security challenges facing the region. The referendum and its aftermath also revealed the internal divisions within the Iraqi Kurdish movement, as well as the complexities of regional politics. While some Kurdish leaders saw the referendum as a step towards long-awaited independence, others expressed concerns about its timing and potential implications.


==Kurdistan syrien==
==Syrian Kurdistan==


=== La Création de la 'Ceinture Arabe' et Ses Répercussions ===
=== The creation of the 'Arab Belt' and its repercussions ===
Dans les années 1960, la situation des Kurdes en Syrie a été profondément affectée par les politiques du gouvernement nationaliste syrien. Durant cette période, la Syrie, sous l'influence du parti Baas, a adopté une approche de nationalisme arabe qui a exacerbé les divisions ethniques, en particulier parmi la communauté kurde. Une des politiques les plus notables et controversées de cette époque a été la création de la "Ceinture Arabe". Cette initiative visait à changer la composition démographique des régions à forte concentration kurde le long de la frontière avec la Turquie. Le gouvernement a encouragé les Arabes à s'installer dans ces régions, souvent en déplaçant de force les populations kurdes. Cette politique était en partie justifiée par des projets de développement, comme la construction d'une ligne de chemin de fer, mais avait des motivations clairement politiques visant à diluer la présence kurde.  
In the 1960s, the situation of the Kurds in Syria was profoundly affected by the policies of the Syrian nationalist government. During this period, Syria, under the influence of the Ba'ath party, adopted an Arab nationalist approach which exacerbated ethnic divisions, particularly among the Kurdish community. One of the most notable and controversial policies of this period was the creation of the "Arab Belt". This initiative aimed to change the demographic composition of the regions with a high concentration of Kurds along the border with Turkey. The government encouraged Arabs to settle in these areas, often by forcibly displacing Kurdish populations. This policy was partly justified by development projects, such as the construction of a railway line, but was clearly politically motivated in order to dilute the Kurdish presence.  


Ces actions ont entraîné des déplacements forcés et une marginalisation économique et sociale accrue des Kurdes en Syrie. La "Ceinture Arabe" a non seulement provoqué des bouleversements démographiques, mais a également alimenté un sentiment d'injustice et d'exclusion parmi les Kurdes syriens. Ces politiques ont renforcé les tensions ethniques dans la région et ont contribué à un sentiment croissant de méfiance envers le gouvernement central. Les conséquences de ces politiques ont été durables. Les Kurdes en Syrie ont continué à lutter pour la reconnaissance de leurs droits culturels et politiques, ainsi que pour leur autonomie. Ces tensions ont été exacerbées lors de la guerre civile syrienne qui a éclaté en 2011, où les Kurdes ont joué un rôle significatif, cherchant à établir une forme d'autonomie dans le nord-est de la Syrie.
These actions led to forced displacement and increased economic and social marginalisation of the Kurds in Syria. The 'Arab Belt' not only caused demographic upheaval, but also fuelled a sense of injustice and exclusion among Syrian Kurds. These policies have heightened ethnic tensions in the region and contributed to a growing sense of mistrust towards central government. The consequences of these policies have been long-lasting. Kurds in Syria have continued to struggle for recognition of their cultural and political rights, as well as for autonomy. These tensions were exacerbated during the Syrian civil war that broke out in 2011, in which the Kurds played a significant role, seeking to establish some form of autonomy in north-eastern Syria.


=== Les Kurdes en Syrie et la Lutte pour l'Autonomie ===
=== The Kurds in Syria and the Struggle for Autonomy ===
Dans les années 2000, et plus particulièrement avec le début de la guerre civile syrienne en 2011, les Kurdes de Syrie ont commencé à manifester de manière plus visible pour l'autonomie. Cette période a marqué un tournant dans la lutte des Kurdes syriens pour la reconnaissance et l'autodétermination.
In the 2000s, and particularly with the start of the Syrian civil war in 2011, the Kurds of Syria began to demonstrate more visibly for autonomy. This period marked a turning point in the Syrian Kurds' struggle for recognition and self-determination.


Avant la guerre civile, les Kurdes en Syrie étaient souvent marginalisés et privés de droits fondamentaux. Le régime de Bashar al-Assad, tout comme celui de son père Hafez al-Assad, a maintenu une politique de répression à l'égard de la culture kurde et des aspirations politiques kurdes. Cependant, avec l'éclatement de la guerre civile, le pouvoir central à Damas s'est affaibli, offrant ainsi aux Kurdes une opportunité sans précédent de revendiquer leur autonomie. Profitant du vide de pouvoir créé par le conflit, les groupes kurdes, principalement les Unités de protection du peuple (YPG) et le Parti de l'union démocratique (PYD), ont pris le contrôle de vastes régions dans le nord de la Syrie. Ces groupes ont établi une forme de gouvernance autonome dans ces régions, comprenant des aspects tels que l'administration civile, la défense et l'éducation.
Before the civil war, Kurds in Syria were often marginalised and deprived of basic rights. The regime of Bashar al-Assad, like that of his father Hafez al-Assad, maintained a policy of repression towards Kurdish culture and Kurdish political aspirations. However, with the outbreak of the civil war, central power in Damascus weakened, giving the Kurds an unprecedented opportunity to claim autonomy. Taking advantage of the power vacuum created by the conflict, Kurdish groups, principally the People's Protection Units (YPG) and the Democratic Union Party (PYD), took control of large areas of northern Syria. These groups have established a form of autonomous governance in these areas, including aspects such as civil administration, defence and education.


Cette autonomie de facto a été renforcée par le rôle crucial joué par les forces kurdes dans la lutte contre l'État islamique (EI), attirant le soutien et la reconnaissance de la communauté internationale, en particulier des États-Unis. Les Kurdes ont réussi à établir des zones d'autonomie relativement stables, connues sous le nom de l'administration autonome du nord et de l'est de la Syrie, malgré les défis persistants, y compris les tensions avec le gouvernement syrien et les menaces de la Turquie voisine. Cependant, la situation reste précaire. La reconnaissance officielle de l'autonomie kurde en Syrie par le gouvernement de Damas reste incertaine, et les tensions régionales continuent de menacer la stabilité des régions kurdes. La quête des Kurdes syriens pour l'autonomie est donc un processus en cours, profondément lié à l'évolution politique et sécuritaire complexe de la Syrie et de la région en général.
This de facto autonomy has been reinforced by the crucial role played by Kurdish forces in the fight against the Islamic State (EI), attracting the support and recognition of the international community, particularly the United States. The Kurds have managed to establish relatively stable areas of autonomy, known as the Northern and Eastern Syrian Autonomous Administration, despite continuing challenges, including tensions with the Syrian government and threats from neighbouring Turkey. However, the situation remains precarious. Official recognition of Kurdish autonomy in Syria by the government in Damascus remains uncertain, and regional tensions continue to threaten the stability of the Kurdish regions. The Syrian Kurds' quest for autonomy is therefore an ongoing process, deeply linked to the complex political and security developments in Syria and the wider region.


=== La Remise en Question des États-Nations au Moyen-Orient ===
=== The Questioning of Nation-States in the Middle East ===
Depuis l'intervention anglo-américaine en Irak en 2003, suivie par la guerre civile irakienne et la crise syrienne à partir de 2011, le concept des États-nations stables au Moyen-Orient a été profondément remis en question. L'invasion de l'Irak, visant à renverser Saddam Hussein, a déclenché un ensemble de conséquences imprévues, entraînant le pays dans une spirale de violence sectaire et d'instabilité politique. La situation s'est compliquée avec l'émergence de l'État islamique, qui a exploité le chaos en Irak et en Syrie pour établir un califat transfrontalier, remettant ainsi en cause la légitimité des frontières et des gouvernements nationaux.
Since the Anglo-American intervention in Iraq in 2003, followed by the Iraqi civil war and the Syrian crisis from 2011 onwards, the concept of stable nation-states in the Middle East has been profoundly challenged. The invasion of Iraq, aimed at overthrowing Saddam Hussein, triggered a series of unforeseen consequences, sending the country into a spiral of sectarian violence and political instability. The situation was further complicated by the emergence of the Islamic State, which exploited the chaos in Iraq and Syria to establish a cross-border caliphate, challenging the legitimacy of national borders and governments.


La guerre civile syrienne, débutant avec le soulèvement populaire contre le régime de Bashar al-Assad en 2011, a encore aggravé l'instabilité régionale. Le conflit a attiré une multitude d'acteurs régionaux et internationaux, chacun poursuivant ses propres objectifs stratégiques. Les répercussions de ces conflits ont dépassé les frontières nationales, exacerbant les tensions sectaires et ethniques et provoquant d'importants flux de réfugiés. Ces événements ont mis en évidence les failles des États-nations du Moyen-Orient, dont les frontières avaient été tracées par les puissances coloniales après la Première Guerre mondiale. Ces frontières, souvent établies sans égard pour les réalités ethniques, culturelles et religieuses sur le terrain, ont engendré des tensions et des conflits persistants.
The Syrian civil war, which began with the popular uprising against the regime of Bashar al-Assad in 2011, further exacerbated regional instability. The conflict has attracted a multitude of regional and international actors, each pursuing its own strategic objectives. The repercussions of these conflicts have extended beyond national borders, exacerbating sectarian and ethnic tensions and triggering large-scale refugee flows. These events have exposed the flaws in the Middle East's nation-states, whose borders were drawn by the colonial powers after the First World War. These borders, often established without regard for the ethnic, cultural and religious realities on the ground, have given rise to persistent tensions and conflicts.


Malgré ces défis, les frontières établies au Moyen-Orient ont montré une résilience remarquable. Elles restent des éléments déterminants de l'ordre politique régional, bien qu'elles soient le théâtre de conflits incessants. Les États de la région, bien que fragilisés, continuent de lutter pour maintenir leur souveraineté et leur intégrité territoriale face aux mouvements sécessionnistes et aux ingérences étrangères. L'avenir des États-nations au Moyen-Orient reste incertain. Les conflits en Irak et en Syrie ont révélé des divisions profondes et ont posé des questions fondamentales sur la légitimité et la viabilité des structures étatiques existantes. Dans ce contexte, de nouvelles configurations politiques et territoriales pourraient émerger, redéfinissant le paysage politique du Moyen-Orient dans les années à venir.
Despite these challenges, the borders established in the Middle East have shown remarkable resilience. They remain key elements of the regional political order, despite being the scene of incessant conflict. The states of the region, though weakened, continue to struggle to maintain their sovereignty and territorial integrity in the face of secessionist movements and foreign interference. The future of nation-states in the Middle East remains uncertain. The conflicts in Iraq and Syria have revealed deep divisions and raised fundamental questions about the legitimacy and viability of existing state structures. Against this backdrop, new political and territorial configurations could emerge, redefining the political landscape of the Middle East in the years to come.


=== Perspectives Controversées sur les Frontières du Moyen-Orient et la Guerre Civile Syrienne ===
=== Controversial Perspectives on Middle East Borders and the Syrian Civil War ===
Ralph Peters, un ancien officier de l'armée américaine et commentateur sur les questions géopolitiques, a présenté une perspective controversée sur les frontières du Moyen-Orient. Dans ses écrits, il soutient que les frontières actuelles de la région, largement héritées de l'époque coloniale et post-Première Guerre mondiale, ne reflètent pas la réalité politique, culturelle et religieuse sur le terrain. Peters argue que ces frontières artificielles ont contribué à de nombreux conflits en ne correspondant pas aux identités nationales, ethniques et religieuses des sociétés locales. Sa vision, parfois illustrée par des cartes redessinées du Moyen-Orient, propose une reconfiguration des frontières pour mieux correspondre à ces réalités. Par exemple, il suggère la création d'un État kurde indépendant qui engloberait des parties de l'Irak, de la Syrie, de l'Iran et de la Turquie, où vivent des populations kurdes importantes. De même, il envisage des ajustements territoriaux pour d'autres groupes ethniques et religieux, dans le but de créer des États plus homogènes.
Ralph Peters, a former US Army officer and commentator on geopolitical issues, has presented a controversial perspective on the borders of the Middle East. In his writings, he argues that the region's current borders, largely inherited from the colonial and post-First World War era, do not reflect the political, cultural and religious reality on the ground. Peters argues that these artificial borders have contributed to many conflicts by failing to reflect the national, ethnic and religious identities of local societies. His vision, sometimes illustrated by redrawn maps of the Middle East, proposes a reconfiguration of borders to better reflect these realities. For example, he suggests the creation of an independent Kurdish state encompassing parts of Iraq, Syria, Iran and Turkey, where large Kurdish populations live. It also envisages territorial adjustments for other ethnic and religious groups, with the aim of creating more homogenous states.


Cette proposition a suscité un vif débat et de nombreuses critiques, y compris au sein de l'OTAN et d'autres cercles internationaux. Les critiques soulignent que le redécoupage des frontières selon des critères ethniques et religieux est extrêmement complexe et risqué. Ils mettent en avant les dangers d'aggraver les tensions existantes et de créer de nouveaux conflits. De plus, la redéfinition des frontières nationales soulève des questions sur la souveraineté, l'autodétermination et l'intervention internationale. Les idées de Peters reflètent un défi plus large auquel est confronté le Moyen-Orient : comment gérer la diversité ethnique et religieuse dans des États-nations formés selon des lignes tracées par des puissances étrangères. Alors que ses propositions peuvent paraître logiques d'un point de vue géopolitique simplifié, elles ne tiennent pas compte de la complexité des identités nationales, des relations historiques entre les groupes, et des réalités politiques sur le terrain.[[Fichier:MOMCENC_-_Ralph_Peters-_Near_East_-_Middle_East.png|centré|]]
This proposal has provoked heated debate and widespread criticism, including within NATO and other international circles. Critics point out that redrawing borders along ethnic and religious lines is extremely complex and risky. They point to the dangers of aggravating existing tensions and creating new conflicts. Moreover, redefining national borders raises questions about sovereignty, self-determination and international intervention. Peters' ideas reflect a wider challenge facing the Middle East: how to manage ethnic and religious diversity in nation-states formed along lines drawn by foreign powers. While his proposals may seem logical from a simplified geopolitical perspective, they fail to take into account the complexity of national identities, historical relationships between groups, and political realities on the ground.[[Fichier:MOMCENC_-_Ralph_Peters-_Near_East_-_Middle_East.png|centré|]]
   
   
La guerre civile syrienne, qui a éclaté en 2011, a entraîné des changements fondamentaux dans la structure et la composition de la nation syrienne, remettant en question la viabilité du modèle de l'État-nation dans le contexte du Moyen-Orient. Alors que le régime de Bachar Al-Assad semble gagner du terrain, la réalité sur le terrain a profondément altéré la nature même de la nation syrienne. Le conflit en Syrie a mis en évidence les failles profondes d'un État construit sur des bases hétérogènes, où les diverses communautés ethniques et religieuses, notamment les Kurdes, les Alaouites, les Sunnites, les Chrétiens et d'autres, ont été intégrées de manière précaire. La guerre a exacerbé ces divisions, détruisant le tissu social et provoquant une crise humanitaire de grande ampleur. Les villes historiques comme Alep et Homs ont été dévastées, tandis que des millions de Syriens ont été déplacés à l'intérieur du pays ou ont fui à l'étranger, formant d'importantes communautés en diaspora.
The Syrian civil war, which broke out in 2011, has brought about fundamental changes in the structure and composition of the Syrian nation, calling into question the viability of the nation-state model in the context of the Middle East. While Bashar Al-Assad's regime appears to be gaining ground, the reality on the ground has profoundly altered the very nature of the Syrian nation. The conflict in Syria has exposed the deep-seated flaws of a state built on heterogeneous foundations, in which the various ethnic and religious communities, including Kurds, Alawites, Sunnis, Christians and others, have been integrated in a precarious manner. The war has exacerbated these divisions, destroying the social fabric and causing a major humanitarian crisis. Historic cities such as Aleppo and Homs have been devastated, while millions of Syrians have been displaced within the country or have fled abroad, forming large diaspora communities.


La Syrie, après la guerre, sera confrontée à d'énormes défis pour reconstruire non seulement ses infrastructures, mais aussi sa société. La gouvernance centralisée et souvent autoritaire d'Assad devra s'adapter à une réalité où différentes communautés aspirent à une reconnaissance et une représentation accrues. Ces communautés, bien que géographiquement délimitées par les frontières nationales de la Syrie, sont intrinsèquement liées par des liens confessionnels, culturels et historiques qui transcendent ces frontières. Le concept de diaspora est devenu particulièrement pertinent pour la Syrie. Les Syriens à l'étranger maintiennent des liens étroits avec leur patrie, jouant un rôle clé dans la préservation de l'identité culturelle et dans la reconstruction potentielle du pays. La diaspora syrienne représente une diversité d'opinions et d'expériences, reflétant la complexité de la société syrienne dans son ensemble.
Post-war Syria will face enormous challenges in rebuilding not only its infrastructure, but also its society. Assad's centralised and often authoritarian governance will have to adapt to a reality where different communities aspire to greater recognition and representation. These communities, although geographically delimited by Syria's national borders, are intrinsically linked by confessional, cultural and historical ties that transcend these borders. The concept of diaspora has become particularly relevant for Syria. Syrians abroad maintain close links with their homeland, playing a key role in the preservation of cultural identity and in the potential reconstruction of the country. The Syrian diaspora represents a diversity of opinions and experiences, reflecting the complexity of Syrian society as a whole.


=Le Golfe persique=
=The Persian Gulf=


== Le Golfe Persique : Histoire, Importance et Débats sur la Terminologie ==
== The Persian Gulf: History, Importance and Debates on Terminology ==
La région connue sous le nom de "Golfe Persique" est souvent au centre de débats concernant son appellation. En effet, certains États, notamment ceux du monde arabe, préfèrent utiliser l'appellation "Golfe arabe". Ce débat sur la terminologie reflète les tensions et les dynamiques politiques dans la région, où l'histoire, la culture et l'identité nationale jouent un rôle clé dans la manière dont les lieux sont nommés. Le Golfe, qu'il soit appelé "Golfe Persique" ou "Golfe arabe", est une région de grande importance stratégique, économique et culturelle. Il est bordé par plusieurs pays clés, dont le Koweït, le Qatar, le Bahreïn, les Émirats arabes unis et Oman, ainsi que par l'Iran et l'Arabie Saoudite. Cette région est connue pour ses vastes réserves de pétrole et de gaz naturel, ce qui en fait une des zones les plus riches et les plus stratégiquement importantes du monde.
The region known as the Persian Gulf is often at the centre of debate over its name. Indeed, some states, particularly those in the Arab world, prefer to use the term "Arab Gulf". This debate over terminology reflects the tensions and political dynamics in the region, where history, culture and national identity play a key role in how places are named. The Gulf, whether called the "Persian Gulf" or the "Arab Gulf", is a region of great strategic, economic and cultural importance. It is bordered by several key countries, including Kuwait, Qatar, Bahrain, the United Arab Emirates and Oman, as well as Iran and Saudi Arabia. The region is known for its vast reserves of oil and natural gas, making it one of the richest and most strategically important areas in the world.


Au cours des dernières décennies, le Golfe est devenu synonyme de prospérité et de luxe, en particulier dans les États du Conseil de coopération du Golfe (CCG), qui comprend le Koweït, le Qatar, le Bahreïn, les Émirats arabes unis, l'Oman et l'Arabie Saoudite. Ces pays ont utilisé leurs richesses pétrolières pour développer des économies modernes et diversifiées, investissant massivement dans l'urbanisme, le tourisme, l'éducation et les infrastructures. Les villes comme Dubaï aux Émirats arabes unis et Doha au Qatar sont devenues des symboles de cette prospérité, attirant des investissements internationaux et des touristes du monde entier. Ces États ont également cherché à jouer un rôle plus important sur la scène internationale, que ce soit par la diplomatie, les investissements économiques ou l'organisation d'événements d'envergure mondiale.
In recent decades, the Gulf has become synonymous with prosperity and luxury, particularly in the states of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), which includes Kuwait, Qatar, Bahrain, the United Arab Emirates, Oman and Saudi Arabia. These countries have used their oil wealth to develop modern, diversified economies, investing heavily in urban development, tourism, education and infrastructure. Cities such as Dubai in the United Arab Emirates and Doha in Qatar have become symbols of this prosperity, attracting international investment and tourists from all over the world. These states have also sought to play a greater role on the international stage, whether through diplomacy, economic investment or the organisation of world-class events.


== Prospérité et Transformation dans les États du Golfe Persique ==
== Prosperity and Transformation in the Persian Gulf States ==
L'histoire politique et économique du Golfe Persique est étroitement liée à l'influence britannique dans la région, qui a commencé à se manifester de manière significative au 19e siècle. À cette époque, l'empire britannique, cherchant à sécuriser les routes maritimes vers l'Inde, son joyau colonial, a commencé à établir une présence dans le Golfe Persique. Cette influence s'est traduite par des accords de protectorat avec les émirats locaux, offrant à la Grande-Bretagne un contrôle significatif sur les affaires politiques et économiques de la région. L'intérêt britannique pour le Golfe s'est accentué avec la découverte de pétrole au début du 20e siècle. Les Britanniques ont joué un rôle crucial dans le développement de l'industrie pétrolière, notamment en établissant des compagnies comme l'Anglo-Persian Oil Company (qui deviendra plus tard British Petroleum, ou BP). Cette période a vu une transformation de la région, passant d'une importance stratégique principalement maritime à un centre de l'économie pétrolière mondiale.
The political and economic history of the Persian Gulf is closely linked to British influence in the region, which began to manifest itself significantly in the 19th century. At that time, the British Empire, seeking to secure the sea routes to India, its colonial jewel, began to establish a presence in the Persian Gulf. This influence took the form of protectorate agreements with the local emirates, giving Britain significant control over the political and economic affairs of the region. British interest in the Gulf increased with the discovery of oil in the early 20th century. The British played a crucial role in the development of the oil industry, notably by establishing companies such as the Anglo-Persian Oil Company (which later became British Petroleum, or BP). This period saw a transformation of the region from a primarily maritime strategic importance to a centre of the global oil economy.


Le retrait britannique de la région dans les années 1960 et 1970 a marqué une nouvelle ère pour les États du Golfe. Cette période de décolonisation a coïncidé avec une hausse significative de la demande mondiale de pétrole, propulsant ces États nouvellement indépendants vers une prospérité économique sans précédent. L'indépendance a également donné lieu à la formation de structures politiques propres à chaque État, souvent sous la forme de monarchies, qui continuent de caractériser la gouvernance dans la région. Cependant, l'héritage britannique dans le Golfe Persique a laissé des traces durables. Les frontières tracées pendant la période coloniale, ainsi que les alliances politiques et économiques établies, ont continué à influencer les relations internationales et la politique intérieure des États du Golfe. Les relations étroites entre ces États et les puissances occidentales, notamment les États-Unis après le retrait britannique, ont joué un rôle crucial dans la politique de sécurité et économique de la région.
The British withdrawal from the region in the 1960s and 1970s marked a new era for the Gulf States. This period of decolonisation coincided with a significant rise in global demand for oil, propelling these newly independent states towards unprecedented economic prosperity. Independence also led to the formation of state-specific political structures, often in the form of monarchies, which continue to characterise governance in the region. However, the British legacy in the Persian Gulf has left lasting traces. The borders drawn during the colonial period, and the political and economic alliances established, have continued to influence the international relations and domestic politics of the Gulf States. The close relationship between these states and the Western powers, particularly the United States after the British withdrawal, has played a crucial role in the region's security and economic policy.


Le Golfe Persique, au cours de son histoire, a été étroitement lié à la Mésopotamie, en partie grâce à son riche commerce de perles, une activité économique prédominante bien avant l'avènement de l'ère pétrolière. Des centres importants de ce commerce étaient établis au Bahreïn et à Oman, où la pêche aux perles constituait une source de revenus essentielle pour les populations locales. Dès l'Antiquité, les eaux du Golfe Persique étaient renommées pour leurs riches gisements de perles. La région de Bahreïn, en particulier, était connue comme un centre majeur de la perliculture, attirant commerçants et marchands de diverses parties du monde antique. À Oman, la longue façade maritime favorisait également le développement d'un commerce maritime actif, y compris le commerce des perles. Ces activités étaient cruciales pour les économies locales, surtout dans des régions autrement limitées en ressources naturelles.  
Throughout its history, the Persian Gulf has been closely linked to Mesopotamia, thanks in part to its rich pearl trade, a predominant economic activity long before the advent of the oil era. Important centres of this trade were established in Bahrain and Oman, where pearl fishing was an essential source of income for the local populations. Since ancient times, the waters of the Persian Gulf have been renowned for their rich pearl deposits. The region of Bahrain, in particular, was known as a major centre for pearl farming, attracting traders and merchants from various parts of the ancient world. In Oman, the long coastline also favoured the development of an active maritime trade, including the pearl trade. These activities were crucial to local economies, especially in regions otherwise limited in natural resources.


L'essor économique et culturel sous les Abbassides, à partir du 8e siècle, a contribué à l'expansion du commerce dans le Golfe Persique. Cette période a vu un développement florissant des échanges commerciaux, avec les ports du Golfe servant de hubs importants pour le commerce régional et international. Le commerce des perles, ainsi que d'autres marchandises, a prospéré sous l'administration abbasside, qui a intégré efficacement la région dans un empire étendu. Cependant, le déclin du califat abbasside au 13e siècle a marqué le début d'une période plus difficile pour la région. Les invasions, les troubles politiques et la fragmentation de l'empire ont perturbé le commerce et affaibli l'économie régionale. Malgré ces défis, le commerce des perles a continué à jouer un rôle économique significatif jusqu'au 20e siècle.
The economic and cultural boom under the Abbasids, from the 8th century onwards, contributed to the expansion of trade in the Persian Gulf. This period saw a flourishing development of trade, with the Gulf ports serving as important hubs for regional and international commerce. Trade in pearls, as well as other goods, flourished under the Abbasid administration, which effectively integrated the region into an extended empire. However, the decline of the Abbasid caliphate in the 13th century marked the beginning of a more difficult period for the region. Invasions, political unrest and the fragmentation of the empire disrupted trade and weakened the regional economy. Despite these challenges, the pearl trade continued to play a significant economic role until the 20th century.


À partir du 15ème siècle, une nouvelle ère commence pour le Golfe Persique avec l'arrivée des puissances européennes, motivées par le commerce des épices et la maîtrise des routes maritimes. Les Portugais, menés par des navigateurs tels que Vasco de Gama, ont été les premiers à établir une présence dans la région au début du 16ème siècle, cherchant à contrôler les voies commerciales vers l'Inde et à accéder directement aux sources lucratives d'épices. Le commerce maritime est devenu le principal moyen d'influence européenne dans le Golfe. Les Portugais ont établi plusieurs bases, comme celle d'Ormuz, qui leur permettaient de contrôler les routes commerciales et d'influencer les politiques locales. Cette présence a ouvert la voie à d'autres puissances européennes, notamment les Britanniques et les Hollandais, qui ont également cherché à établir leur influence dans la région.  
From the 15th century onwards, a new era began for the Persian Gulf with the arrival of the European powers, motivated by the spice trade and the mastery of maritime routes. The Portuguese, led by navigators such as Vasco da Gama, were the first to establish a presence in the region in the early 16th century, seeking to control the trade routes to India and gain direct access to the lucrative sources of spices. Maritime trade became the main means of European influence in the Gulf. The Portuguese established several bases, such as Hormuz, which enabled them to control trade routes and influence local politics. This presence paved the way for other European powers, notably the British and the Dutch, who also sought to establish their influence in the region.


L'impact de l'arrivée européenne dans le Golfe a été profond. Elle a non seulement modifié les structures de pouvoir existantes, mais a également introduit de nouvelles technologies maritimes et militaires. Les États locaux ont dû naviguer dans ce nouvel environnement géopolitique, souvent en formant des alliances avec ou contre ces puissances étrangères. L'implication européenne a considérablement changé la dynamique régionale du Golfe. La rivalité entre les puissances européennes pour le contrôle des routes commerciales et des points stratégiques a eu des répercussions importantes sur l'histoire de la région. Par exemple, la compétition entre les Portugais et les Britanniques a finalement conduit à une domination britannique plus établie dans le Golfe au 19ème siècle. Cette période marque ainsi un tournant dans l'histoire du Golfe Persique, où la région est passée d'un centre commercial et culturel relativement autonome à un théâtre de rivalités internationales et de domination étrangère. Ces événements ont posé les bases des relations futures entre le Golfe et l'Occident, et ont influencé le développement politique, économique et social de la région jusqu'à l'époque moderne.
The impact of Europe's arrival in the Gulf was profound. It not only altered existing power structures, but also introduced new maritime and military technologies. Local states have had to navigate this new geopolitical environment, often forming alliances with or against these foreign powers. European involvement has significantly changed the regional dynamics of the Gulf. Rivalry between European powers for control of trade routes and strategic points has had a significant impact on the history of the region. For example, competition between the Portuguese and the British eventually led to more established British domination of the Gulf in the 19th century. This period thus marks a turning point in the history of the Persian Gulf, where the region moved from being a relatively autonomous commercial and cultural centre to a theatre of international rivalry and foreign domination. These events laid the foundations for future relations between the Gulf and the West, and influenced the political, economic and social development of the region until modern times.


== Influence Britannique dans le Golfe Persique ==
== British influence in the Persian Gulf ==
L'implication britannique dans le Golfe Persique a connu une évolution significative à partir du 18ème siècle, marquée par un renforcement des échanges commerciaux et l'émergence de défis sécuritaires. La présence britannique dans la région était principalement motivée par la protection des routes commerciales maritimes vers l'Inde, un joyau de l'empire colonial britannique. Le commerce avec l'Inde a été intensifié sous l'influence britannique, transformant le Golfe en un carrefour commercial vital. Cependant, cette période a également été marquée par des défis en termes de sécurité. La région était perturbée par la piraterie et les conflits entre divers chefs locaux, ce qui menaçait la libre circulation des marchandises et la sécurité des routes maritimes. Les Britanniques se sont donc retrouvés confrontés à la nécessité de stabiliser la région pour maintenir et sécuriser leurs intérêts commerciaux.  
British involvement in the Persian Gulf evolved significantly from the 18th century onwards, marked by an increase in trade and the emergence of security challenges. The main reason for the British presence in the region was to protect the maritime trade routes to India, a jewel in the crown of the British colonial empire. Trade with India was intensified under British influence, transforming the Gulf into a vital commercial crossroads. However, this period was also marked by security challenges. The region was troubled by piracy and conflicts between various local chieftains, which threatened the free flow of goods and the safety of shipping routes. The British were therefore faced with the need to stabilise the region in order to maintain and secure their commercial interests.  


Avec l'expansion française dans la région, notamment à la suite de la campagne d'Égypte de Napoléon Bonaparte à la fin du 18ème siècle, les Britanniques ont ressenti une menace accrue à leurs intérêts. En réponse, ils ont établi des pactes avec les acteurs locaux, comme le traité conclu avec Oman, visant à contenir l'expansionnisme français. Ces accords étaient essentiels pour établir des relations amicales et garantir une certaine stabilité dans la région. En plus des menaces extérieures, les Britanniques ont dû traiter avec les activités de piraterie dans le Golfe. Ils ont adopté une approche de négociation avec les pirates, cherchant à mettre fin à leurs raids sur le commerce maritime. Ces accords ont joué un rôle clé dans la sécurisation des voies maritimes et ont permis un commerce plus fluide dans la région.
With French expansion in the region, particularly following Napoleon Bonaparte's Egyptian campaign at the end of the 18th century, the British felt an increased threat to their interests. In response, they established pacts with local actors, such as the treaty with Oman, aimed at containing French expansionism. These agreements were essential to establishing friendly relations and guaranteeing a degree of stability in the region. In addition to external threats, the British had to deal with piracy activities in the Gulf. They adopted a negotiating approach with the pirates, seeking to end their raids on maritime trade. These agreements played a key role in securing the sea lanes and allowing trade to flow more smoothly in the region.


Au 19ème siècle, ces traités conclus par la Grande-Bretagne ont déterminé sa politique économique et stratégique dans le Golfe. Ils ont non seulement permis de sécuriser la région, mais ont également posé les bases des relations futures entre la Grande-Bretagne et les États du Golfe. Bien que la région ait été marquée par l'instabilité, l'engagement croissant des chefs locaux à ne plus se livrer à la guerre a contribué à une stabilisation relative, permettant aux Britanniques de maintenir une influence considérable. Ces développements historiques ont été cruciaux pour façonner la politique et l'économie du Golfe Persique, préfigurant les dynamiques modernes de la région. La période de l'influence britannique a jeté les bases des structures politiques et des alliances qui caractérisent encore aujourd'hui les États du Golfe.
In the 19th century, these treaties determined Britain's economic and strategic policy in the Gulf. Not only did they secure the region, they also laid the foundations for future relations between Britain and the Gulf States. Although the region has been marked by instability, the growing commitment of local leaders to refrain from war has contributed to relative stabilisation, allowing the British to maintain considerable influence. These historical developments were crucial in shaping the politics and economy of the Persian Gulf, foreshadowing the modern dynamics of the region. The period of British influence laid the foundations for the political structures and alliances that still characterise the Gulf States today.


== Le Golfe Persique Durant la Première Guerre Mondiale ==
== The Persian Gulf during the First World War ==
Lorsque la Première Guerre mondiale a éclaté, elle a créé une nouvelle dynamique géopolitique dans le Golfe Persique, une région déjà marquée par l'influence croissante des puissances européennes. Le Koweït, situé stratégiquement à l'entrée du Golfe, a joué un rôle crucial dans cette nouvelle configuration. Dirigé à l'époque par le cheikh Mubarak Al-Sabah, le Koweït a cherché à renforcer sa position en s'alignant de plus près avec la Grande-Bretagne. Déjà sous un accord de protectorat signé en 1899, où le cheikh Mubarak Al-Sabah s'était engagé à ne pas céder, louer ou vendre de territoire sans l'accord britannique en échange de la protection britannique, le Koweït a vu dans la guerre une opportunité de consolider cette relation. La montée de l'Empire ottoman comme menace pendant la guerre a accentué le besoin de sécurité et de soutien pour le Koweït. En réponse à ces circonstances, le Koweït et la Grande-Bretagne ont renforcé leur accord de protectorat. Cet accord renouvelé assurait une protection plus ferme du Koweït contre les ambitions ottomanes et renforçait les liens politiques et économiques avec la Grande-Bretagne. Pour la Grande-Bretagne, sécuriser le Koweït était essentiel pour protéger ses routes maritimes vers l'Inde et pour maintenir son influence dans la région du Golfe, riche en pétrole.
When the First World War broke out, it created a new geopolitical dynamic in the Persian Gulf, a region already marked by the growing influence of the European powers. Kuwait, strategically located at the entrance to the Gulf, played a crucial role in this new configuration. Led at the time by Sheikh Mubarak Al-Sabah, Kuwait sought to strengthen its position by aligning itself more closely with Great Britain. Already under a protectorate agreement signed in 1899, in which Sheikh Mubarak Al-Sabah had undertaken not to cede, lease or sell territory without British consent in return for British protection, Kuwait saw the war as an opportunity to consolidate this relationship. The rise of the Ottoman Empire as a threat during the war accentuated Kuwait's need for security and support. In response to these circumstances, Kuwait and Britain strengthened their protectorate agreement. This renewed agreement provided stronger protection for Kuwait against Ottoman ambitions and strengthened political and economic ties with Britain. For Britain, securing Kuwait was essential to protect its shipping routes to India and to maintain its influence in the oil-rich Gulf region.


La Première Guerre mondiale a ainsi eu un impact significatif sur le Golfe Persique, redéfinissant les relations entre les États locaux et les puissances européennes. Les accords conclus pendant cette période entre des États comme le Koweït et la Grande-Bretagne ont façonné l'avenir géopolitique de la région, jetant les bases de la structure politique et économique qui prévaudrait pendant des décennies. Cette période historique a également souligné l'importance stratégique du Golfe Persique, non seulement pour les puissances régionales, mais aussi pour les acteurs mondiaux. Les décisions prises et les alliances formées pendant la Première Guerre mondiale ont eu des répercussions durables, influençant les politiques, les économies et les sociétés de cette région clé.
The First World War thus had a significant impact on the Persian Gulf, redefining relations between local states and European powers. The agreements reached during this period between states such as Kuwait and Great Britain shaped the geopolitical future of the region, laying the foundations for the political and economic structure that would prevail for decades to come. This historic period also underlined the strategic importance of the Persian Gulf, not only for regional powers, but also for global players. The decisions taken and alliances formed during the First World War had lasting repercussions, influencing the politics, economies and societies of this key region.


== Retrait Britannique et Emergence des États Modernes du Golfe ==
== British withdrawal and the emergence of the modern Gulf States ==
L'époque des années 1960 a été une période charnière pour le Golfe Persique, caractérisée par un changement fondamental dans les relations internationales de la région. Ce changement a été principalement induit par la décision du Royaume-Uni de se retirer de ses positions stratégiques à l'est de Suez, y compris du Golfe Persique. Cette décision, annoncée en 1968, est intervenue dans un contexte où la Grande-Bretagne, affectée par des contraintes économiques et un changement de paradigme politique, réévaluait son rôle impérial à travers le monde. Le retrait britannique du Golfe, qui a été progressivement mis en œuvre, a coïncidé avec une période de réalignement géopolitique. L'indépendance de l'Inde et du Pakistan en 1947 avait déjà marqué le début de la fin de l'empire britannique, et la perte de ces colonies clés a influencé la décision de réduire la présence militaire britannique dans d'autres régions. Dans le Golfe, ce retrait a laissé un vide de pouvoir qui a eu des implications majeures pour les États de la région.
The 1960s were a pivotal period for the Persian Gulf, characterised by a fundamental change in the region's international relations. This change was mainly driven by the United Kingdom's decision to withdraw from its strategic positions east of Suez, including the Persian Gulf. This decision, announced in 1968, came at a time when Britain, affected by economic constraints and a change in political paradigm, was reassessing its imperial role around the world. Britain's gradual withdrawal from the Gulf coincided with a period of geopolitical realignment. The independence of India and Pakistan in 1947 had already marked the beginning of the end of the British Empire, and the loss of these key colonies influenced the decision to reduce the British military presence in other regions. In the Gulf, this withdrawal left a power vacuum that had major implications for the states of the region.


Les États du Golfe, qui avaient longtemps été sous l'influence ou la protection britannique, se sont retrouvés dans une position où ils devaient naviguer de manière autonome dans un environnement international complexe. Cette situation a accéléré le processus de formation d'États-nations modernes dans la région et a donné lieu à la création de nouvelles structures politiques et alliances, comme le Conseil de coopération du Golfe (CCG) fondé en 1981. Le retrait britannique a également ouvert la porte à d'autres influences internationales, en particulier celle des États-Unis. Dans le contexte de la Guerre froide et de la montée en importance stratégique du pétrole, les États-Unis ont renforcé leur présence dans le Golfe, établissant des relations étroites avec des pays comme l'Arabie saoudite, le Koweït et les Émirats arabes unis. Cette nouvelle configuration a redéfini l'équilibre des pouvoirs dans la région et a eu un impact significatif sur les politiques régionales et internationales.
The Gulf States, which had long been under British influence or protection, found themselves in a position where they had to navigate autonomously in a complex international environment. This accelerated the process of the formation of modern nation states in the region and gave rise to the creation of new political structures and alliances, such as the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) founded in 1981. The British withdrawal also opened the door to other international influences, in particular that of the United States. In the context of the Cold War and the growing strategic importance of oil, the United States strengthened its presence in the Gulf, establishing close relations with countries such as Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and the United Arab Emirates. This new configuration has redefined the balance of power in the region and had a significant impact on regional and international policies.


== Découverte de Pétrole et Deuxième Vague d'Indépendance ==
== Oil discovery and the Second Wave of Independence ==
À la suite du retrait britannique du Golfe Persique dans les années 1960, les princes et dirigeants locaux, qui avaient auparavant établi des alliances avec le Royaume-Uni, se sont retrouvés face à des décisions cruciales concernant l'avenir de leurs territoires. Cette période a été caractérisée par un profond changement politique, marquant la formation des États-nations modernes dans la région du Golfe. Le retrait britannique a laissé un vide de pouvoir et a ouvert la voie à la souveraineté complète des États du Golfe. Des exemples notables incluent l'indépendance du Bahreïn et du Qatar en 1971, suivie peu après par la formation des Émirats arabes unis, une fédération de sept émirats. Ces événements ont été des étapes cruciales dans la définition des frontières politiques et des structures gouvernementales de ces nations.
Following the British withdrawal from the Persian Gulf in the 1960s, local princes and rulers, who had previously established alliances with the UK, were faced with crucial decisions about the future of their territories. This period was characterised by profound political change, marking the formation of modern nation states in the Gulf region. British withdrawal left a power vacuum and paved the way for full sovereignty for the Gulf States. Notable examples include the independence of Bahrain and Qatar in 1971, followed shortly afterwards by the formation of the United Arab Emirates, a federation of seven emirates. These events were crucial steps in defining the political boundaries and governmental structures of these nations.


Les dirigeants de ces nouveaux États ont dû naviguer dans un paysage complexe, équilibrant la nécessité de développer des institutions gouvernementales stables et de gérer les relations internationales, tout en exploitant les ressources naturelles abondantes, notamment le pétrole et le gaz. L'ère post-britannique a également été marquée par des efforts pour moderniser et développer ces pays, comme en témoigne le règne du sultan Qaboos bin Said à Oman, qui a initié une série de réformes pour transformer son pays. Cette période de transition a également vu une augmentation de l'influence des États-Unis dans la région. Les États du Golfe, riches en ressources pétrolières, sont devenus des alliés stratégiques importants pour les États-Unis, notamment dans le contexte de la Guerre froide et des intérêts énergétiques. Le retrait britannique a marqué une ère de transformation significative pour les États du Golfe. Les décisions prises par les dirigeants locaux pendant cette période ont non seulement façonné les structures politiques et économiques de leurs pays, mais ont également eu un impact profond sur les dynamiques régionales et internationales. L'histoire de cette période illustre comment les changements géopolitiques peuvent influencer la formation et le développement des États-nations, ainsi que la complexité des relations internationales dans une région riche en ressources.
The leaders of these new states have had to navigate a complex landscape, balancing the need to develop stable government institutions and manage international relations, while exploiting abundant natural resources, particularly oil and gas. The post-British era has also been marked by efforts to modernise and develop these countries, as witnessed by the reign of Sultan Qaboos bin Said in Oman, who initiated a series of reforms to transform his country. This period of transition has also seen an increase in the influence of the United States in the region. The Gulf States, rich in oil resources, became important strategic allies for the United States, particularly in the context of the Cold War and energy interests. The British withdrawal marked an era of significant transformation for the Gulf States. The decisions taken by local leaders during this period not only shaped the political and economic structures of their countries, but also had a profound impact on regional and international dynamics. The story of this period illustrates how geopolitical changes can influence the formation and development of nation states, as well as the complexity of international relations in a resource-rich region.


La découverte de pétrole dans le Golfe Persique a radicalement transformé la région, attirant un regain d'intérêt significatif de la part des puissances occidentales. Cette richesse en hydrocarbures a coïncidé avec une période de transition politique majeure, menant à une deuxième vague d'indépendance pour plusieurs États de la région dans les années 1970. Le pétrole, découvert pour la première fois dans le Golfe au début du 20ème siècle, a commencé à jouer un rôle crucial dans l'économie mondiale, en particulier après la Seconde Guerre mondiale. Les pays du Golfe, dotés de certaines des plus grandes réserves de pétrole au monde, sont rapidement devenus des acteurs clés dans le marché énergétique global. Cette richesse a attiré l'attention des puissances occidentales, désireuses de sécuriser l'accès à ces ressources vitales.
The discovery of oil in the Persian Gulf radically transformed the region, attracting significant renewed interest from Western powers. This hydrocarbon wealth coincided with a period of major political transition, leading to a second wave of independence for several states in the region in the 1970s. Oil, first discovered in the Gulf in the early 20th century, began to play a crucial role in the global economy, particularly after the Second World War. With some of the world's largest oil reserves, the Gulf countries quickly became key players in the global energy market. This wealth attracted the attention of Western powers keen to secure access to these vital resources.


Dans les années 1970, avec la fin de l'ère du protectorat britannique et le retrait britannique de la région, les États du Golfe ont entrepris un processus d'affirmation de leur souveraineté et d'indépendance politique. Cette période a vu l'émergence de nations indépendantes et souveraines telles que les Émirats arabes unis en 1971, qui ont uni les émirats de la Trêve sous une seule fédération. Le Bahreïn et le Qatar ont également obtenu leur indépendance durant cette période. L'essor économique dû au pétrole a permis à ces jeunes nations d'investir massivement dans le développement et la modernisation. Les revenus pétroliers ont transformé des sociétés autrefois principalement axées sur la pêche et le commerce des perles en États modernes avec des infrastructures avancées, des services sociaux et des économies diversifiées. Cependant, l'intérêt accru des Occidentaux pour la région n'était pas sans implications géopolitiques. Les relations entre les pays producteurs de pétrole du Golfe et les puissances occidentales, en particulier les États-Unis, sont devenues un aspect central de la politique internationale. Ces relations ont été marquées par des dynamiques complexes de coopération, de dépendance économique et de tensions politiques.
In the 1970s, with the end of the British protectorate and the British withdrawal from the region, the Gulf States began a process of asserting their sovereignty and political independence. This period saw the emergence of independent and sovereign nations such as the United Arab Emirates in 1971, which united the Trucial Emirates under a single federation. Bahrain and Qatar also gained independence during this period. The oil-driven economic boom enabled these young nations to invest massively in development and modernisation. Oil revenues transformed societies that had previously focused primarily on fishing and the pearl trade into modern states with advanced infrastructures, social services and diversified economies. However, increased Western interest in the region was not without geopolitical implications. Relations between the oil-producing countries of the Gulf and the Western powers, particularly the United States, became a central aspect of international politics. These relations have been marked by complex dynamics of cooperation, economic dependence and political tensions.


=L’islam politique=
=Political Islam=


== Emergence et Fondements de l'Islam Politique ==
== The Emergence and Foundations of Political Islam ==
L'islam politique est une idéologie qui a pris de l'ampleur au cours du 20ème siècle, influençant de manière significative la politique et la société dans les pays à majorité musulmane. Cette idéologie vise à structurer la société et l'État selon les principes et les lois de l'islam, basés sur une interprétation spécifique des textes religieux comme le Coran et la Sunna. L'émergence de l'islam politique peut être vue comme une réponse aux défis posés par le colonialisme, la modernisation, et les transformations sociales. Des figures comme Hassan al-Banna, fondateur des Frères musulmans en Égypte en 1928, et Sayyid Qutb, un théoricien influent du même mouvement, ont été des pionniers dans la formulation et la promotion de l'idéologie de l'islam politique. Leurs enseignements et écrits ont jeté les bases pour une vision de la société où les principes islamiques sont intégrés à tous les aspects de la vie, y compris la gouvernance.   
Political Islam is an ideology that gained ground during the 20th century, significantly influencing politics and society in Muslim-majority countries. This ideology aims to structure society and the state according to the principles and laws of Islam, based on a specific interpretation of religious texts such as the Koran and the Sunna. The emergence of political Islam can be seen as a response to the challenges posed by colonialism, modernisation and social change. Figures such as Hassan al-Banna, founder of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt in 1928, and Sayyid Qutb, an influential theoretician of the same movement, were pioneers in formulating and promoting the ideology of political Islam. Their teachings and writings laid the foundations for a vision of society in which Islamic principles are integrated into all aspects of life, including governance.   


L'islam politique se manifeste sous différentes formes, allant des mouvements réformistes modérés aux groupes plus radicaux. Certains groupes, comme les Frères musulmans, ont cherché à atteindre leurs objectifs par des moyens politiques et sociaux, tandis que d'autres, comme Al-Qaïda ou l'État islamique, ont adopté des méthodes extrémistes et violentes. Un exemple marquant de l'impact de l'islam politique est la Révolution iranienne de 1979, menée par l'Ayatollah Khomeini. Cette révolution a conduit à l'établissement d'une république islamique en Iran, où les lois et la gouvernance sont basées sur des interprétations spécifiques de l'islam chiite.
Political Islam manifests itself in different forms, ranging from moderate reformist movements to more radical groups. Some groups, such as the Muslim Brotherhood, have sought to achieve their goals through political and social means, while others, such as al-Qaeda or the Islamic State, have adopted extremist and violent methods. A striking example of the impact of political Islam is the Iranian Revolution of 1979, led by Ayatollah Khomeini. This revolution led to the establishment of an Islamic republic in Iran, where laws and governance are based on specific interpretations of Shia Islam.


L'islam politique a également joué un rôle significatif dans les événements des Printemps arabes de 2011, où plusieurs mouvements islamistes ont émergé comme des acteurs politiques clés dans des pays comme l'Égypte, la Tunisie et la Libye. Toutefois, l'islam politique est un sujet de controverse et de débat. Ses critiques soulignent les risques de restriction des libertés individuelles, notamment en matière de droits des femmes et des minorités. D'autre part, ses partisans le considèrent comme un moyen de préserver les valeurs culturelles et de résister à l'influence occidentale. L'ascension de l'islam politique dans le monde arabe peut être largement attribuée à l'échec du panarabisme, un mouvement politique qui prônait l'unité et la coopération entre les pays arabes tout en s'opposant à la domination occidentale. Cette idéologie, qui a connu son apogée dans les années 1950 et 1960 sous des leaders comme Gamal Abdel Nasser en Égypte, a commencé à décliner dans les années 1970, laissant un vide idéologique que l'islam politique a commencé à remplir.
Political Islam also played a significant role in the Arab Spring events of 2011, where several Islamist movements emerged as key political actors in countries such as Egypt, Tunisia and Libya. However, political Islam is a subject of controversy and debate. Its critics point to the risks of restricting individual freedoms, particularly as regards the rights of women and minorities. On the other hand, its supporters see it as a means of preserving cultural values and resisting Western influence. The rise of political Islam in the Arab world can largely be attributed to the failure of pan-Arabism, a political movement that advocated unity and cooperation between Arab countries while opposing Western domination. This ideology, which reached its peak in the 1950s and 1960s under leaders such as Gamal Abdel Nasser in Egypt, began to decline in the 1970s, leaving an ideological vacuum that political Islam began to fill.


L'année 1979 est souvent considérée comme un tournant dans l'histoire de l'islam politique, marquée par deux événements majeurs. D'abord, la Révolution iranienne a vu la chute du Shah d'Iran et l'émergence d'une république islamique sous l'Ayatollah Khomeini, un développement qui a eu un impact profond dans toute la région. Ensuite, la signature du traité de paix entre l'Égypte et Israël, connu sous le nom d'Accords de Camp David, a été perçue par de nombreux Arabes comme une trahison de la cause arabe et une capitulation face à Israël. La normalisation des relations entre l'Égypte et Israël a été un choc pour de nombreux Arabes, renforçant les sentiments d'antagonisme envers Israël, perçu comme un symbole de l'influence et de l'intervention occidentale dans la région. Cette perception a alimenté l'imaginaire de l'islam politique, où la lutte contre Israël et l'opposition à l'ingérence occidentale sont devenues des thèmes centraux.
The year 1979 is often seen as a turning point in the history of political Islam, marked by two major events. Firstly, the Iranian Revolution saw the fall of the Shah of Iran and the emergence of an Islamic republic under Ayatollah Khomeini, a development that had a profound impact throughout the region. Secondly, the signing of the peace treaty between Egypt and Israel, known as the Camp David Accords, was seen by many Arabs as a betrayal of the Arab cause and a capitulation to Israel. The normalisation of relations between Egypt and Israel came as a shock to many Arabs, reinforcing feelings of antagonism towards Israel, which was seen as a symbol of Western influence and intervention in the region. This perception fuelled the imagination of political Islam, where the fight against Israel and opposition to Western interference became central themes.


Dans ce contexte, les mouvements islamistes ont gagné en popularité en se présentant comme des alternatives crédibles au panarabisme défaillant et en promettant de restaurer la dignité et l'autonomie des sociétés musulmanes à travers la mise en œuvre des principes islamiques. Ces mouvements ont varié dans leurs approches, certains prônant une réforme politique et sociale progressive, tandis que d'autres ont adopté des positions plus radicales. L'échec du panarabisme et les événements de 1979 ont créé un terrain propice à l'essor de l'islam politique, une idéologie qui a depuis lors joué un rôle majeur dans la politique du Moyen-Orient. La montée de cette idéologie a été une réponse aux désillusions politiques, aux défis socio-économiques et aux aspirations de nombreuses sociétés musulmanes, redéfinissant le paysage politique de la région.
Against this backdrop, Islamist movements gained in popularity by presenting themselves as credible alternatives to failed pan-Arabism and promising to restore the dignity and autonomy of Muslim societies through the implementation of Islamic principles. These movements varied in their approaches, some advocating gradual political and social reform, while others adopted more radical positions. The failure of pan-Arabism and the events of 1979 created fertile ground for the rise of political Islam, an ideology that has since played a major role in Middle Eastern politics. The rise of this ideology has been a response to the political disillusionment, socio-economic challenges and aspirations of many Muslim societies, redefining the political landscape of the region.


== L'Islam Politique Face à l'Échec du Panarabisme ==
== Political Islam Faced with the Failure of Pan-Arabism ==
Le fondamentalisme, un courant significatif au sein de l'islam politique, a pris racine dans le monde musulman dès le 8ème siècle, mais c'est avec l'apparition du wahhabisme au 18ème siècle que cette tendance a acquis une influence notable. Mohammed ibn Abd al-Wahhab, le fondateur du wahhabisme, a prôné un retour aux pratiques et croyances des premières générations de musulmans, une interprétation rigoureuse de l'islam qui est devenue la base idéologique de l'Arabie saoudite moderne. Le fondamentalisme en tant que tel se caractérise par une volonté de transcender l'histoire pour revenir aux sources premières de la religion. Cette approche se manifeste par une lecture littérale et intransigeante des textes sacrés, rejetant souvent les interprétations contemporaines ou contextuelles. Le fondamentalisme s'oppose fréquemment aux influences culturelles et politiques occidentales, perçues comme des menaces à l'authenticité et à la pureté de la foi islamique.
Fundamentalism, a significant trend within political Islam, took root in the Muslim world as early as the 8th century, but it was with the emergence of Wahhabism in the 18th century that this trend gained significant influence. Mohammed ibn Abd al-Wahhab, the founder of Wahhabism, advocated a return to the practices and beliefs of the first generations of Muslims, a rigorous interpretation of Islam that became the ideological basis of modern Saudi Arabia. Fundamentalism as such is characterised by a desire to transcend history and return to the original sources of religion. This approach manifests itself in a literal and uncompromising reading of the sacred texts, often rejecting contemporary or contextual interpretations. Fundamentalism frequently opposes Western cultural and political influences, which are perceived as threats to the authenticity and purity of the Islamic faith.


La période coloniale a eu un impact profond sur l'imaginaire politique du monde arabe. La domination et l'intervention européenne dans les affaires du Moyen-Orient ont été perçues comme une agression directe contre les sociétés musulmanes. Cette perception a alimenté un sentiment de résistance qui s'est souvent exprimé par un recours aux valeurs et principes islamiques. Le mouvement de libération nationale, qui a émergé en réaction à la pénétration occidentale, a été fortement imprégné de la tradition islamique. Les luttes pour l'indépendance, tout en cherchant à se libérer du joug colonial, ont également visé à réaffirmer l'identité islamique comme fondement de la souveraineté nationale. Dans ce contexte, le fondamentalisme islamique a évolué pour devenir une réponse non seulement aux défis internes des sociétés musulmanes, mais aussi à l'ingérence étrangère. Les mouvements islamistes qui en ont découlé ont varié dans leurs approches et objectifs, allant de la réforme sociale et politique à des formes plus radicales de résistance. Cette dynamique complexe entre tradition, modernité, et influences externes continue de façonner le paysage politique et social dans de nombreux pays à majorité musulmane.
The colonial period had a profound impact on the political imagination of the Arab world. European domination and intervention in Middle Eastern affairs were perceived as a direct aggression against Muslim societies. This perception has fuelled a sense of resistance that has often been expressed through recourse to Islamic values and principles. The national liberation movement, which emerged as a reaction to Western penetration, was strongly imbued with the Islamic tradition. Struggles for independence, while seeking to free themselves from the colonial yoke, also sought to reaffirm Islamic identity as the basis of national sovereignty. In this context, Islamic fundamentalism evolved into a response not only to the internal challenges of Muslim societies, but also to foreign interference. The resulting Islamist movements have varied in their approaches and objectives, ranging from social and political reform to more radical forms of resistance. This complex dynamic between tradition, modernity and external influences continues to shape the political and social landscape in many Muslim-majority countries.


Le mouvement des Frères Musulmans, fondé en Égypte en 1928 par Hassan Al-Banna, représente un jalon important dans l'histoire de l'islam politique au 20ème siècle. Cette organisation a émergé comme une réponse aux défis sociaux, politiques et culturels auxquels était confrontée la société égyptienne à cette époque. Hassan Al-Banna a créé les Frères Musulmans avec l'objectif initial d'islamiser la société égyptienne, en réaction à la modernisation rapide et à l'influence occidentale croissante dans le pays. La vision d'Al-Banna était de réformer la société en s'appuyant sur les principes islamiques, considérant le Coran comme la constitution ultime et infaillible pour la vie sociale et politique. L'une des particularités des Frères Musulmans était leur structure organisationnelle, qui comprenait une branche paramilitaire. Cette caractéristique reflétait non seulement la tradition militaire de la société égyptienne, mais était également une réponse à la présence britannique en Égypte. La capacité des Frères Musulmans à mobiliser à la fois politiquement et militairement a contribué à leur influence croissante.
The Muslim Brotherhood movement, founded in Egypt in 1928 by Hassan Al-Banna, represents an important milestone in the history of political Islam in the 20th century. The organisation emerged as a response to the social, political and cultural challenges facing Egyptian society at the time. Hassan Al-Banna founded the Muslim Brotherhood with the initial aim of Islamising Egyptian society, as a reaction to the rapid modernisation and growing Western influence in the country. Al-Banna's vision was to reform society based on Islamic principles, considering the Koran to be the ultimate and infallible constitution for social and political life. One of the distinctive features of the Muslim Brotherhood was its organisational structure, which included a paramilitary branch. This characteristic not only reflected the military tradition of Egyptian society, but was also a response to the British presence in Egypt. The Muslim Brotherhood's ability to mobilise both politically and militarily contributed to its growing influence.


Les Frères Musulmans ont rapidement gagné en popularité et en influence, devenant l'une des premières et des plus importantes organisations islamistes du 20ème siècle. Leur approche combinant activisme social, politique et parfois militant a servi de modèle pour d'autres mouvements islamistes à travers le monde musulman. Toutefois, le mouvement a également été sujet à controverse et à répression. Les gouvernements égyptiens successifs ont alterné entre tolérance, coopération et répression sévère à l'égard de l'organisation. Les Frères Musulmans ont été impliqués dans diverses luttes politiques en Égypte, notamment lors du renversement du président Mohamed Morsi en 2013, qui était issu de leurs rangs.
The Muslim Brotherhood rapidly gained in popularity and influence, becoming one of the first and most important Islamist organisations of the 20th century. Their approach, combining social, political and sometimes militant activism, served as a model for other Islamist movements throughout the Muslim world. However, the movement was also subject to controversy and repression. Successive Egyptian governments have alternated between tolerance, cooperation and severe repression of the organisation. The Muslim Brotherhood has been involved in various political struggles in Egypt, including the overthrow of President Mohamed Morsi in 2013, who came from its ranks.


Depuis sa création en 1928 par Hassan al-Banna, le mouvement des Frères Musulmans a traversé des périodes fluctuantes, oscillant entre influence politique significative et répression sévère. Bien que l'organisation n'ait pas originellement adopté l'action armée comme tactique principale, elle s'est trouvée impliquée dans des conflits majeurs qui ont marqué l'histoire de la région. Lors de la guerre arabo-israélienne de 1948, un conflit crucial pour l'avenir de la Palestine, les Frères Musulmans ont participé aux combats. Cette implication reflétait leur engagement envers la cause palestinienne, considérée comme une lutte à la fois nationale et religieuse. Leur engagement dans cette guerre illustre la flexibilité de l'organisation quant à l'utilisation de la force armée pour des causes qu'elle jugeait justes et alignées sur ses objectifs islamiques. En 1952, les Frères Musulmans ont joué un rôle dans la révolution égyptienne qui a renversé la monarchie et mené à la fondation de la République égyptienne. Initialement, ils ont soutenu les officiers libres, espérant que le nouveau régime serait favorable à leurs aspirations islamiques. Cependant, les relations entre les Frères Musulmans et le leader révolutionnaire Gamal Abdel Nasser se sont rapidement détériorées, entraînant une période de répression intense contre l'organisation.
Since its creation in 1928 by Hassan al-Banna, the Muslim Brotherhood movement has gone through fluctuating periods, oscillating between significant political influence and severe repression. Although the organisation did not originally adopt armed action as its main tactic, it has found itself involved in major conflicts that have marked the history of the region. During the 1948 Arab-Israeli war, a conflict crucial to the future of Palestine, the Muslim Brotherhood took part in the fighting. This involvement reflected their commitment to the Palestinian cause, seen as both a national and a religious struggle. Their involvement in this war illustrates the organisation's flexibility in the use of armed force for causes it considered just and in line with its Islamic objectives. In 1952, the Muslim Brotherhood played a role in the Egyptian revolution that overthrew the monarchy and led to the founding of the Egyptian Republic. Initially, they supported the free officers, hoping that the new regime would be favourable to their Islamic aspirations. However, relations between the Muslim Brotherhood and the revolutionary leader Gamal Abdel Nasser soon deteriorated, leading to a period of intense repression against the organisation.


Le parcours des Frères Musulmans en Égypte est caractérisé par des hauts et des bas, illustrant la complexité de leur positionnement politique. Sous différents régimes, ils ont alterné entre une présence politique influente et des périodes où ils étaient réprimés et marginalisés. Cette dynamique témoigne des tensions persistantes entre les mouvements islamistes et les gouvernements laïcs ou séculiers dans la région. L'histoire des Frères Musulmans est donc celle d'une organisation influente mais souvent controversée, dont le rôle dans les événements clés comme la guerre de 1948 et la révolution de 1952 témoigne de son importance dans la politique du Moyen-Orient. Cependant, leur parcours a aussi été jalonné de confrontations et de conflits avec les pouvoirs en place, reflétant la nature complexe et parfois conflictuelle de l'islam politique.
The history of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt is characterised by highs and lows, illustrating the complexity of its political positioning. Under different regimes, they have alternated between an influential political presence and periods when they were repressed and marginalised. This dynamic reflects the persistent tensions between Islamist movements and secular or secular governments in the region. The history of the Muslim Brotherhood is therefore that of an influential but often controversial organisation, whose role in key events such as the 1948 war and the 1952 revolution testifies to its importance in Middle Eastern politics. However, their path has also been marked by confrontations and conflicts with the powers that be, reflecting the complex and sometimes conflicting nature of political Islam.


Sayyid Qutb, né en 1906 et décédé en 1966, est une figure emblématique de l'islam politique. Sa pensée et son œuvre ont eu un impact considérable sur la vision de l'État islamique et sur le mouvement islamiste en général. Théoricien éminent, Qutb a élaboré une critique radicale des sociétés musulmanes de son époque, qu'il jugeait égarées de la vraie voie de l'Islam. Qutb a été un critique virulent de l'occidentalisation et du nationalisme panarabe, dominant en Égypte et dans d'autres pays arabes au milieu du 20ème siècle. Selon sa perspective, ces sociétés s'étaient éloignées des principes fondamentaux de l'Islam, tombant dans un état de « Jahiliya », un terme islamique traditionnellement utilisé pour décrire l'ignorance religieuse prévalant avant la révélation du Coran au prophète Mahomet. Pour Qutb, la Jahiliya moderne n'était pas seulement une ignorance religieuse, mais aussi un éloignement des lois et valeurs islamiques dans la gouvernance et la vie sociale.  
Sayyid Qutb, born in 1906 and died in 1966, is an emblematic figure of political Islam. His thought and work have had a considerable impact on the vision of the Islamic State and on the Islamist movement in general. An eminent theorist, Qutb developed a radical critique of the Muslim societies of his time, which he judged to have strayed from the true path of Islam. Qutb was a virulent critic of Westernisation and pan-Arab nationalism, dominant in Egypt and other Arab countries in the mid-20th century. In his view, these societies had drifted away from the fundamental principles of Islam, falling into a state of "Jahiliya", an Islamic term traditionally used to describe the religious ignorance prevailing prior to the revelation of the Koran to the Prophet Muhammad. For Qutb, the modern Jahiliya was not just religious ignorance, but also a departure from Islamic laws and values in governance and social life.


Son expérience personnelle de la répression a également influencé sa pensée. Arrêté et torturé par le régime de Nasser en Égypte en raison de ses opinions dissidentes et de son appartenance aux Frères Musulmans, Qutb est devenu convaincu que les régimes en place dans le monde arabe étaient corrompus et illégitimes. Dans ses écrits, il a développé l'idée que la résistance, y compris le recours à la violence, était légitime contre ces gouvernements «jahili». Condamné à mort pour complot contre l'État égyptien, Qutb a refusé de faire appel de sa condamnation, choisissant de devenir un martyr pour sa cause. Sa mort en 1966 a renforcé son statut de figure emblématique dans l'islamisme radical, et ses écrits continuent d'influencer des mouvements islamistes dans le monde entier. Qutb a donc joué un rôle central dans le développement de l'islam politique, notamment en justifiant l'opposition violente à des régimes jugés non islamiques. Sa vision de l'Islam comme un système complet de vie, englobant à la fois la gouvernance et la société, a profondément marqué les mouvements islamistes contemporains et le débat sur la nature et l'avenir de l'État islamique.
His personal experience of repression also influenced his thinking. Arrested and tortured by Nasser's regime in Egypt for his dissident views and membership of the Muslim Brotherhood, Qutb became convinced that the regimes in place in the Arab world were corrupt and illegitimate. In his writings, he developed the idea that resistance, including the use of violence, was legitimate against these "jahili" governments. Sentenced to death for plotting against the Egyptian state, Qutb refused to appeal his conviction, choosing to become a martyr for his cause. His death in 1966 reinforced his status as an emblematic figure in radical Islamism, and his writings continue to influence Islamist movements around the world. Qutb thus played a central role in the development of political Islam, notably by justifying violent opposition to regimes deemed un-Islamic. His vision of Islam as a complete system of life, encompassing both governance and society, has had a profound impact on contemporary Islamist movements and the debate on the nature and future of the Islamic state.


La pensée de Sayyid Qutb, bien que marginale au début, a gagné en influence et en pertinence à la fin des années 1970, une période marquée par plusieurs événements cruciaux qui ont redéfini le paysage politique et idéologique du monde musulman. En 1979, plusieurs événements majeurs ont bouleversé le contexte idéologique du Moyen-Orient et au-delà. Tout d'abord, l'échec du panarabisme, symbolisé par la signature des accords de paix entre l'Égypte et Israël, a laissé un vide idéologique dans le monde arabe. La décision de l'Égypte, un acteur majeur du nationalisme arabe, de normaliser les relations avec Israël a été perçue comme une trahison par de nombreux Arabes et a affaibli la crédibilité du panarabisme comme mouvement unificateur. Dans le même temps, la Révolution iranienne de 1979 a vu l'émergence de la République islamique d'Iran, établissant un gouvernement basé sur des principes islamiques chiites. Cette révolution a eu un impact considérable dans toute la région, montrant la viabilité de l'islam politique comme alternative aux régimes séculiers ou pro-occidentaux. Par ailleurs, l'invasion soviétique de l'Afghanistan en 1979 a déclenché une guerre de dix ans, où les moudjahidines afghans, soutenus par divers pays, y compris les États-Unis, l'Arabie saoudite et le Pakistan, ont combattu contre les forces soviétiques. Cette guerre a attiré des combattants islamistes de tout le monde musulman, galvanisés par l'appel à défendre une terre musulmane contre une puissance étrangère non musulmane. Ces événements ont contribué à un renouveau et à une radicalisation de l'islam politique. Les idées de Qutb, en particulier sa critique de la Jahiliya moderne et sa légitimation de la lutte armée contre les régimes jugés non islamiques, ont trouvé un écho auprès de ceux qui étaient déçus par les échecs du panarabisme et inquiets de l'influence étrangère dans le monde musulman. En conséquence, l'islam politique, sous ses diverses formes, est devenu un acteur majeur dans la politique régionale et mondiale, influençant les dynamiques de pouvoir et les conflits dans les décennies suivantes.
Although initially marginal, Sayyid Qutb's thought gained in influence and relevance in the late 1970s, a period marked by several crucial events that redefined the political and ideological landscape of the Muslim world. In 1979, several major events changed the ideological context in the Middle East and beyond. Firstly, the failure of pan-Arabism, symbolised by the signing of the peace agreements between Egypt and Israel, left an ideological vacuum in the Arab world. The decision by Egypt, a major player in Arab nationalism, to normalise relations with Israel was seen as a betrayal by many Arabs and weakened the credibility of pan-Arabism as a unifying movement. At the same time, the Iranian Revolution of 1979 saw the emergence of the Islamic Republic of Iran, establishing a government based on Shia Islamic principles. This revolution had a considerable impact throughout the region, demonstrating the viability of political Islam as an alternative to secular or pro-Western regimes. On the other hand, the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979 triggered a ten-year war in which the Afghan Mujahideen, supported by various countries including the United States, Saudi Arabia and Pakistan, fought against the Soviet forces. This war attracted Islamist fighters from all over the Muslim world, galvanised by the call to defend a Muslim land against a non-Muslim foreign power. These events contributed to a revival and radicalisation of political Islam. Qutb's ideas, in particular his critique of modern Jahiliya and his legitimisation of armed struggle against regimes deemed un-Islamic, resonated with those who were disappointed by the failures of pan-Arabism and worried about foreign influence in the Muslim world. As a result, political Islam, in its various forms, became a major player in regional and global politics, influencing power dynamics and conflicts in the decades that followed.


== La Notion de Martyr dans l'Islam Politique ==
== The Notion of Martyr in Political Islam ==
La notion de martyr dans l'islam politique a gagné une signification et une importance accrues vers la fin du 20ème siècle, notamment dans les conflits opposant les forces islamistes à diverses puissances étrangères. Cette conceptualisation du martyr, au-delà de son sens religieux traditionnel, est devenue un élément clé de la mobilisation et de la rhétorique des mouvements islamistes. Dans le contexte des conflits comme la guerre soviéto-afghane de 1979-1989, la figure du martyr a acquis une dimension centrale. Les combattants moudjahidines, luttant contre l'occupation soviétique en Afghanistan, étaient souvent célébrés comme des martyrs, des héros qui sacrifiaient leur vie pour la défense de l'islam. Cette glorification du martyr a servi à motiver les combattants, attirer le soutien international et justifier la résistance armée contre une superpuissance perçue comme oppressante. La promotion de la mort en martyr dans ces contextes est devenue un puissant outil de recrutement pour les mouvements islamistes, attirant des combattants de diverses régions du monde musulman. La promesse du martyr, souvent interprétée comme une voie vers le paradis et l'honneur, a été un élément clé dans la mobilisation des individus prêts à participer à des luttes armées contre des ennemis jugés injustes ou anti-islamiques.
The notion of martyrdom in political Islam gained greater significance and importance towards the end of the 20th century, particularly in conflicts pitting Islamist forces against various foreign powers. This conceptualisation of martyrdom, over and above its traditional religious meaning, has become a key element in the mobilisation and rhetoric of Islamist movements. In the context of conflicts such as the Soviet-Afghan war of 1979-1989, the figure of the martyr acquired a central dimension. Mujahideen fighters against the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan were often celebrated as martyrs, heroes who sacrificed their lives in defence of Islam. This glorification of the martyr served to motivate fighters, attract international support and justify armed resistance against a superpower perceived as oppressive. The promotion of martyrdom in these contexts has become a powerful recruitment tool for Islamist movements, attracting fighters from various parts of the Muslim world. The promise of martyrdom, often interpreted as a path to paradise and honour, has been a key element in mobilising individuals ready to take part in armed struggles against enemies deemed unjust or anti-Islamic.


Cependant, la notion de martyr dans l'islam politique a suscité de vives controverses et critiques. Beaucoup considèrent que l'encouragement à la mort en martyr, en particulier dans le cadre d'actions violentes, constitue une distorsion des enseignements islamiques et une source de conflits. Cette conception du martyr a été remise en question tant au sein de la communauté musulmane que par les observateurs externes. La figure du martyr dans l'islam politique symbolise la manière dont des concepts religieux peuvent être réinterprétés et utilisés dans des cadres politiques et conflictuels. Elle reflète la complexité des mouvements islamistes et la façon dont ils intègrent des éléments religieux dans leur stratégie et leur idéologie. Cette approche a non seulement façonné les dynamiques des mouvements islamistes, mais a également eu des implications profondes sur le plan international, influençant les politiques et les perceptions de l'islam politique dans le monde.
However, the notion of martyrdom in political Islam has given rise to much controversy and criticism. Many consider that the encouragement of martyrdom, particularly in the context of violent action, is a distortion of Islamic teachings and a source of conflict. This conception of martyrdom has been challenged both within the Muslim community and by outside observers. The figure of the martyr in political Islam symbolises the way in which religious concepts can be reinterpreted and used in political and conflictual settings. It reflects the complexity of Islamist movements and the way in which they integrate religious elements into their strategy and ideology. This approach has not only shaped the dynamics of Islamist movements, but has also had profound implications internationally, influencing policies and perceptions of political Islam around the world.


== Changements Politiques et Géopolitiques ==
== Political and Geopolitical Change ==
Dans le paysage politique complexe et parfois instable du monde musulman, certains États ont réagi à la montée de l'islam politique en intégrant des politiques islamistes, visant à renforcer leur autorité et à stabiliser leur gouvernement. Cette stratégie a été adoptée dans divers contextes, en réponse aux défis internes et externes auxquels ces pays étaient confrontés. L'adoption de politiques islamistes par certains régimes a souvent été motivée par le désir de légitimer leur pouvoir auprès de populations majoritairement musulmanes. En s'alignant sur les valeurs et les principes islamiques, ces gouvernements cherchaient à se présenter comme des protecteurs et des défenseurs de l'islam, gagnant ainsi le soutien populaire et contrant les mouvements d'opposition qui pourraient menacer leur stabilité.
In the complex and sometimes unstable political landscape of the Muslim world, some states have responded to the rise of political Islam by incorporating Islamist policies, aimed at strengthening their authority and stabilising their government. This strategy has been adopted in a variety of contexts, in response to the internal and external challenges facing these countries. The adoption of Islamist policies by certain regimes has often been motivated by the desire to legitimise their power among predominantly Muslim populations. By aligning themselves with Islamic values and principles, these governments sought to present themselves as protectors and defenders of Islam, thereby winning popular support and countering opposition movements that might threaten their stability.


Cette approche a été particulièrement visible dans des contextes où les gouvernements cherchaient à contrer l'influence de groupes islamistes radicaux ou à répondre à des crises politiques et sociales. Par exemple, l'Iran, suite à la Révolution islamique de 1979, a mis en place un système de gouvernance islamique, avec l'Ayatollah Khomeini comme figure emblématique, établissant une république islamique basée sur des principes chiites. Dans des pays comme l'Arabie saoudite, le Pakistan et certains États du Golfe, des éléments islamistes ont été incorporés dans la législation et les politiques publiques, reflétant et renforçant les valeurs religieuses dominantes. Toutefois, cette stratégie n'est pas sans risques ni critiques. L'utilisation de l'islam politique comme outil de gouvernance peut conduire à des tensions et à des contradictions internes, surtout lorsque les aspirations de la population diffèrent des politiques gouvernementales. De plus, le recours à l'islamisme pour consolider le pouvoir peut entraîner des restrictions des libertés civiles et des droits de l'homme, suscitant des préoccupations tant au niveau national qu'international.
This approach has been particularly visible in contexts where governments have sought to counter the influence of radical Islamist groups or to respond to political and social crises. For example, Iran, following the Islamic Revolution of 1979, introduced a system of Islamic governance, with Ayatollah Khomeini as its emblematic figure, establishing an Islamic republic based on Shia principles. In countries such as Saudi Arabia, Pakistan and some Gulf States, Islamist elements have been incorporated into legislation and public policy, reflecting and reinforcing dominant religious values. However, this strategy is not without its risks and criticisms. The use of political Islam as a tool of governance can lead to internal tensions and contradictions, especially when the aspirations of the population differ from government policies. Moreover, the use of Islamism to consolidate power can lead to restrictions on civil liberties and human rights, raising concerns at both national and international level.


== Transformation de l'Islam Politique dans les Années 1990 ==
== Transformation of Political Islam in the 1990s ==
Au cours des années 1990, certains spécialistes et observateurs ont conclu à l'échec de l'islam politique, en partie parce que les mouvements islamistes n'avaient pas réussi à s'emparer du pouvoir dans de nombreux pays. Cependant, cette analyse s'est avérée prématurée face à l'évolution ultérieure des événements et à la résurgence de l'islamisme sous différentes formes. Après la fin de la guerre en Afghanistan et le retrait des forces soviétiques en 1989, les combattants islamistes, ou moudjahidines, qui avaient mené le jihad contre l'URSS, ont commencé à rediriger leur lutte vers de nouveaux ennemis. L'un des changements les plus significatifs a été la montée du jihad contre les États-Unis, perçus comme une nouvelle force impérialiste dans la région, et leurs alliés, y compris Israël. Cette réorientation du jihad était en partie une réponse à la présence américaine dans le Golfe Persique, notamment après la Guerre du Golfe de 1991, et à l'alignement perçu des États-Unis avec Israël et contre les intérêts des populations musulmanes.
During the 1990s, some scholars and observers concluded that political Islam had failed, partly because Islamist movements had failed to seize power in many countries. However, this analysis proved premature in the light of subsequent developments and the resurgence of Islamism in various forms. After the end of the war in Afghanistan and the withdrawal of Soviet forces in 1989, the Islamist fighters, or mujahideen, who had waged jihad against the USSR, began to redirect their struggle towards new enemies. One of the most significant changes was the rise of jihad against the United States, perceived as a new imperialist force in the region, and its allies, including Israel. This reorientation of jihad was in part a response to the US presence in the Persian Gulf, particularly after the 1991 Gulf War, and the perceived alignment of the US with Israel and against the interests of Muslim populations.


Cette période a également vu l'émergence ou la consolidation de groupes islamistes radicaux comme Al-Qaïda, dirigé par Oussama ben Laden, qui avait auparavant combattu en Afghanistan. Ben Laden et d'autres leaders islamistes ont commencé à cibler les États-Unis et leurs alliés, les considérant comme des ennemis principaux dans leur lutte pour établir un ordre islamique. La perspective que l'islam politique avait échoué a donc été contredite par ces développements ultérieurs. Les mouvements islamistes n'avaient peut-être pas pris le pouvoir de manière conventionnelle, mais ils avaient réussi à s'imposer comme des forces significatives dans la politique régionale et mondiale. Leur capacité à mobiliser, à influencer et à mener des actions violentes a démontré que l'islam politique restait une force dynamique et influente, capable de s'adapter à de nouveaux contextes et défis.
This period also saw the emergence or consolidation of radical Islamist groups such as al-Qaeda, led by Osama bin Laden, who had previously fought in Afghanistan. Bin Laden and other Islamist leaders began to target the United States and its allies as the main enemy in their struggle to establish an Islamic order. The view that political Islam had failed was therefore contradicted by these later developments. Islamist movements may not have come to power in the conventional way, but they had managed to establish themselves as significant forces in regional and global politics. Their ability to mobilise, influence and carry out violent actions demonstrated that political Islam remained a dynamic and influential force, capable of adapting to new contexts and challenges.


À partir des années 1990, une évolution marquante s'est opérée dans l'islam politique, avec une transformation significative des approches et des tactiques employées par certains mouvements islamistes. Cette période a vu l'émergence d'une forme de violence que l'on pourrait qualifier de sacrificielle, un changement radical par rapport aux pratiques antérieures. Cette nouvelle phase de violence dans l'islam politique a été caractérisée par l'utilisation d'attentats-suicides et d'autres formes de terrorisme. Ces actes n'étaient plus seulement vus comme des moyens de combattre un ennemi, mais aussi comme des actes de sacrifice ultime. Les auteurs de ces attentats étaient souvent célébrés comme des martyrs, une évolution de la notion traditionnelle de martyr dans l'islam, où la mort volontaire dans un acte de violence devenait un idéal glorifié. Un exemple frappant de cette évolution est les attentats du 11 septembre 2001 aux États-Unis, orchestrés par Al-Qaïda sous la direction d'Oussama ben Laden. Ces attaques, menées par des kamikazes, ont non seulement causé des destructions massives et des pertes en vies humaines, mais ont également changé la façon dont l'islam politique était perçu et combattu à l'échelle mondiale.
From the 1990s onwards, there was a marked evolution in political Islam, with a significant transformation in the approaches and tactics employed by certain Islamist movements. This period saw the emergence of a form of violence that could be described as sacrificial, a radical departure from previous practices. This new phase of violence in political Islam was characterised by the use of suicide bombings and other forms of terrorism. These acts were no longer seen simply as a means of fighting an enemy, but also as acts of ultimate sacrifice. The perpetrators of these attacks were often celebrated as martyrs, an evolution of the traditional notion of martyrdom in Islam, where voluntary death in an act of violence became a glorified ideal. A striking example of this evolution was the 11 September 2001 attacks in the United States, orchestrated by al-Qaeda under the leadership of Osama bin Laden. These attacks, carried out by suicide bombers, not only caused massive destruction and loss of life, but also changed the way in which political Islam was perceived and fought against on a global scale.


Cette période a également vu la montée en puissance de groupes tels que les talibans en Afghanistan, qui ont utilisé des tactiques similaires dans leur lutte contre les forces occidentales et le gouvernement afghan. Ces groupes ont justifié l'utilisation de la violence sacrificielle par une interprétation radicale de l'islam qui légitimait le jihad contre ce qu'ils percevaient comme des forces oppressives et anti-islamiques. La montée de cette nouvelle forme de violence dans l'islam politique a eu des conséquences profondes. Elle a entraîné une réaction internationale, avec des interventions militaires en Afghanistan et en Irak, et a suscité un débat mondial sur la nature de l'islam politique et la réponse appropriée à ses manifestations les plus extrêmes. Ces développements ont non seulement eu un impact sur la scène internationale, mais ont également provoqué des débats et des divisions au sein des communautés musulmanes, entre ceux qui soutenaient ces tactiques et ceux qui les condamnaient. La transformation de l'islam politique dans les années 1990 et au début des années 2000 a été marquée par une montée de la violence sacrificielle et du terrorisme. Cette évolution a redéfini les tactiques et les objectifs de certains mouvements islamistes, entraînant des conséquences durables pour la politique mondiale et les sociétés musulmanes.
This period also saw the rise of groups such as the Taliban in Afghanistan, who used similar tactics in their fight against Western forces and the Afghan government. These groups justified the use of sacrificial violence with a radical interpretation of Islam that legitimised jihad against what they perceived as oppressive, anti-Islamic forces. The rise of this new form of violence in political Islam had far-reaching consequences. It led to an international response, with military interventions in Afghanistan and Iraq, and sparked a global debate on the nature of political Islam and the appropriate response to its most extreme manifestations. These developments not only had an impact on the international scene, but also provoked debate and division within Muslim communities, between those who supported these tactics and those who condemned them. The transformation of political Islam in the 1990s and early 2000s was marked by a rise in sacrificial violence and terrorism. This has redefined the tactics and objectives of some Islamist movements, with lasting consequences for global politics and Muslim societies.


== L'Islam Politique en Irak Post-Saddam Hussein et émergence de l'État Islamique en 2014 ==
== Political Islam in post-Saddam Hussein Iraq and the emergence of the Islamic State in 2014 ==
Au début du 21ème siècle, les acteurs de l'islam politique ont connu des évolutions significatives, en particulier avec l'émergence d'Al-Qaïda comme un acteur majeur dans le panorama du terrorisme international. Cette période a également été marquée par une relocalisation géographique de ces acteurs, notamment en Irak, suite à l'intervention américaine et la chute du régime de Saddam Hussein. Après la chute de Saddam Hussein en 2003, l'Irak est entré dans une période de chaos politique et social. Le parti Baas, qui avait longtemps dominé la politique irakienne sous Saddam Hussein, a été interdit, et une nouvelle structure de pouvoir a émergé, dans laquelle la majorité chiite a pris une position de leadership. Cette transformation a créé des tensions sectaires et un sentiment de marginalisation parmi la population sunnite, qui avait été dominante sous le régime de Saddam Hussein.
At the beginning of the 21st century, the players in political Islam underwent significant changes, in particular with the emergence of al-Qaeda as a major player in the panorama of international terrorism. This period was also marked by a geographical relocation of these actors, particularly in Iraq, following the American intervention and the fall of Saddam Hussein's regime. After the fall of Saddam Hussein in 2003, Iraq entered a period of political and social chaos. The Baath Party, which had long dominated Iraqi politics under Saddam Hussein, was banned, and a new power structure emerged in which the Shiite majority took a leadership position. This transformation created sectarian tensions and a feeling of marginalisation among the Sunni population, which had been dominant under Saddam Hussein's regime.


Al-Qaïda, sous la direction de figures comme Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, a profité de ce climat d'instabilité pour établir une présence en Irak. Zarqawi, un jordanien, a fondé l'organisation "Al-Tawhid wal-Jihad", qui a ensuite fusionné avec Al-Qaïda, devenant une des branches les plus actives et les plus violentes du réseau terroriste. Sous sa direction, Al-Qaïda en Irak a ciblé non seulement les forces américaines et leurs alliés, mais aussi la population chiite, qu'ils considéraient comme des apostats et des collaborateurs des forces d'occupation. Les tactiques d'Al-Qaïda en Irak, notamment les attentats-suicides et les massacres de masse, ont exacerbé les tensions sectaires et plongé le pays dans une spirale de violence. La stratégie de Zarqawi, focalisée sur la provocation d'un conflit sectaire, a transformé l'Irak en un champ de bataille pour des luttes de pouvoir régionales et idéologiques, avec des répercussions profondes pour la région et le monde. L'évolution de l'islam politique en Irak pendant cette période reflète la complexité et la fluidité de ces mouvements. Al-Qaïda en Irak, bien qu'ayant des liens avec le réseau global d'Al-Qaïda, a développé ses propres objectifs et stratégies, enracinés dans le contexte politique et social irakien. Cette période a également souligné le rôle des dynamiques sectaires et de la marginalisation politique dans l'alimentation de l'extrémisme et du conflit.
Al-Qaeda, led by figures such as Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, took advantage of this climate of instability to establish a presence in Iraq. Zarqawi, a Jordanian, founded the organisation "Al-Tawhid wal-Jihad", which later merged with al-Qaeda, becoming one of the most active and violent branches of the terrorist network. Under its leadership, al-Qa'ida in Iraq targeted not only US forces and their allies, but also the Shia population, whom they regarded as apostates and collaborators with the occupying forces. Al Qaeda's tactics in Iraq, including suicide bombings and mass killings, exacerbated sectarian tensions and plunged the country into a spiral of violence. Zarqawi's strategy, focused on provoking sectarian conflict, has turned Iraq into a battleground for regional and ideological power struggles, with profound repercussions for the region and the world. The evolution of political Islam in Iraq during this period reflects the complexity and fluidity of these movements. Al-Qa'ida in Iraq, although linked to the global al-Qa'ida network, developed its own objectives and strategies, rooted in the Iraqi political and social context. This period also highlighted the role of sectarian dynamics and political marginalisation in fuelling extremism and conflict.


En 2014, le groupe connu sous le nom d'Al-Qaïda en Irak a subi une transformation significative, marquant un tournant dans l'histoire de l'islam politique. Ce groupe, qui avait évolué et gagné en influence dans le contexte post-invasion de l'Irak, a annoncé la formation de l'État Islamique (EI), également connu sous le nom de Daech (acronyme arabe pour al-Dawla al-Islamiya al-Iraq al-Sham). L'annonce de la création de l'État Islamique a été faite par son leader, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi. Cette déclaration signifiait non seulement un changement de nom, mais aussi une ambition territoriale et idéologique étendue. L'EI visait à établir un califat, une entité politique régie par la charia (loi islamique), englobant non seulement l'Irak mais aussi la Syrie et potentiellement d'autres régions. Sous la bannière de l'État Islamique, le groupe a rapidement étendu son contrôle sur de vastes régions en Irak et en Syrie, exploitant le vide de pouvoir créé par la guerre civile syrienne et la faiblesse du gouvernement irakien. L'EI a gagné en notoriété pour sa brutalité, y compris des exécutions massives, des actes de nettoyage ethnique, des destructions de sites historiques et des attentats terroristes dans le monde entier. La proclamation de l'État Islamique a représenté un défi majeur pour la stabilité régionale et la sécurité internationale. Elle a entraîné une intervention militaire internationale pour contenir et finalement réduire le territoire contrôlé par l'EI. La montée et la chute de l'État Islamique ont également suscité d'importants débats sur les causes et les réponses appropriées à l'extrémisme islamiste violent, ainsi que sur les moyens de traiter les conséquences humanitaires et sécuritaires de son expansion.
In 2014, the group known as al-Qaeda in Iraq underwent a significant transformation, marking a turning point in the history of political Islam. The group, which had evolved and gained influence in the post-invasion context of Iraq, announced the formation of the Islamic State (IS), also known as Daech (Arabic acronym for al-Dawla al-Islamiya al-Iraq al-Sham). The announcement of the creation of the Islamic State was made by its leader, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi. This declaration signified not only a change of name, but also an extended territorial and ideological ambition. The EI aimed to establish a caliphate, a political entity governed by sharia (Islamic law), encompassing not only Iraq but also Syria and potentially other regions. Under the banner of Islamic State, the group rapidly extended its control over vast areas of Iraq and Syria, exploiting the power vacuum created by the Syrian civil war and the weakness of the Iraqi government. The EI gained notoriety for its brutality, including mass executions, acts of ethnic cleansing, destruction of historical sites and terrorist attacks around the world. The proclamation of the Islamic State represented a major challenge to regional stability and international security. It led to international military intervention to contain and eventually reduce the territory controlled by the EI. The rise and fall of the Islamic State also sparked important debates about the causes of and appropriate responses to violent Islamist extremism, as well as how to deal with the humanitarian and security consequences of its expansion.


= Annexes =
= Annexes =

Version actuelle datée du 21 décembre 2023 à 12:46

Based on a course by Yilmaz Özcan.[1][2]

The Middle East, a region of fascinating complexity and considerable strategic importance, is the cradle of ancient civilisations and the point of convergence of several of the world's greatest religions. This geographical area, often defined by its borders stretching from Egypt to Iran, and from Turkey to Yemen, is a melting pot of cultures, ethnicities and beliefs that have intertwined and evolved over the millennia. At the heart of this diversity, political and religious currents play a central role, shaping not only people's daily lives, but also international relations and global geopolitics.

These currents are deeply rooted in history, influenced by events such as the rise and fall of empires, conquests, revolutions and reform movements. From the rise of Islam in the 7th century to the formation of the modern state, each historical period has left its mark on the political and religious structure of the region. Today, the Middle East is a living tableau of traditional monarchies, republics, fledgling democracies and authoritarian regimes, all intertwined with diverse interpretations of Islam and other religious beliefs, including Judaism and Christianity.


Arab nationalism[modifier | modifier le wikicode]

The Emergence and Foundations of Arab Nationalism[modifier | modifier le wikicode]

Arab nationalism, an ideology that has significantly shaped the political and cultural history of the Middle East, emerged in the early 20th century against a backdrop of Ottoman and European imperial domination. This ideology is based on the conviction that Arabs form a united people, sharing a common history, culture and language, and that they should be politically united in a single entity or in closely linked entities whose borders correspond to their cultural and ethnic identity. The genesis of Arab nationalism can be traced back to the Nahda, the Arab Renaissance, a period of cultural and intellectual renewal that saw Arab intellectuals engage in in-depth reflection on their identity and their future. This period laid the foundations for a political awakening that intensified with the break-up of the Ottoman Empire and the intervention of the European powers, particularly following the First World War.

Emblematic figures such as Gamal Abdel Nasser in Egypt played a crucial role in promoting Arab nationalism. Nasser, in particular, became a symbol of this ideology through his anti-imperialist rhetoric and his advocacy of Arab unity. His role in the nationalisation of the Suez Canal in 1956 and the short-lived creation of the United Arab Republic (1958-1961), a political union between Egypt and Syria, are concrete examples of attempts to realise Arab nationalist ideals. Arab nationalism was also influenced by other ideological currents, notably socialism and secularism, as demonstrated by the emergence of the Baath Party in Syria and Iraq. This party, founded by Michel Aflaq and Salah al-Din al-Bitar, advocated unity, freedom and socialism in the Arab world. However, the dream of Arab unity came up against many obstacles. Internal differences, divergent national interests and the failure of unitary projects such as the United Arab Republic gradually weakened Arab nationalism. In addition, the rise of competing ideological movements, particularly Islamism, has shifted the political centre of gravity in the region.

In terms of political theory, Arab nationalism illustrates the importance of identity-building and aspirations for self-determination in national liberation movements. It also highlights the challenges facing pan-nationalist ideologies in regions characterised by great ethnic, religious and cultural diversity. Today, although Arab nationalism is no longer the dominant force it was in the 1950s and 1960s, its legacy continues to influence politics and culture in the Middle East. It remains an important chapter in the modern history of the region and a key element in understanding current political and cultural dynamics.

The challenge to Arab nationalism began with the fall of the Ottoman Empire in the early 20th century, an event that profoundly redefined the political landscape of the Middle East. This period saw the emergence of various ideologies and nationalist movements, among which Baathism and Nasserism stood out as two notable interpretations of Arab nationalism. Baathism, embodied by the Baath Party, was founded in Syria by Michel Aflaq and Salah al-Din al-Bitar. It represented a grassroots approach to Arab nationalism, emphasising Arab unity, freedom and socialism. This movement aimed to mobilise the masses through a pan-Arab ideology, transcending traditional national boundaries. The Baath party acquired significant influence, not only in Syria but also in Iraq, where it came to power under the leadership of figures such as Saddam Hussein. On the other hand, Nasserism, named after Gamal Abdel Nasser, the Egyptian president, represented a form of Arab nationalism "from above", aimed more at the political and institutional elite. Nasser, a charismatic military leader, promoted Arab unity, independence from the West and economic and social development. His most emblematic action, the nationalisation of the Suez Canal in 1956, was seen as an act of defiance against Western imperialism and reinforced his status as a heroic figure in the Arab world.

Although these two movements had different approaches, they shared common objectives, notably the aspiration for Arab unity and liberation from colonialism and imperialism. However, their trajectories were marked by internal and external challenges. Nasserism, despite its initial appeal, suffered from the failure of the United Arab Republic and its defeat in the Six-Day War in 1967. As for Baathism, despite its initial success in Syria and Iraq, it was eventually confronted with internal contradictions and regional conflicts. These movements illustrate the diversity and complexity of Arab nationalism and highlight the challenges facing pan-nationalist ideologies. Their historical development offers valuable insights into the political dynamics of the Middle East in the twentieth century, as well as the limits and potential of Arab nationalism as a unifying and liberating force.

Historical context and transformation of the Ottoman Empire[modifier | modifier le wikicode]

The genesis of Arab nationalism cannot be fully appreciated without understanding the long and complex historical context that preceded and shaped it. The following key events play a significant role in this history. The conquest of Egypt by the Ottoman Empire in 1517, marking the capture of Cairo, and the capture of Baghdad in 1533, consolidated Ottoman control over vast areas of the Arab world. These conquests not only extended Ottoman domination but also introduced new administrative, military and social structures to these territories. For centuries, although these regions were part of the Ottoman Empire, they maintained a certain cultural and linguistic autonomy, laying the foundations for a distinct Arab identity. Napoleon Bonaparte's expedition to Egypt in 1798 was another turning point. This French military intervention had a profound impact, not only in Egypt but throughout the Arab world. It exposed the Ottoman Empire's military and technological weakness in the face of modern Europe and triggered a process of internal reform, known as the Tanzimat, aimed at modernising the empire. The expedition also marked the beginning of the European powers' growing interest in the region, paving the way for an era of foreign influence and intervention.

Against this backdrop, the Arab Revolt of 1916 is often seen as a decisive moment in the emergence of Arab nationalism. Encouraged by the British to weaken the Ottoman Empire during the First World War, the revolt, led by figures such as Cherif Hussein of Mecca and his son Faisal, was motivated by a desire for independence and the promise of an independent Arab state. Although the results of the revolt did not fully satisfy these aspirations - largely due to the Sykes-Picot agreements of 1916, which divided the region into zones of French and British influence - it nevertheless laid the foundations for modern Arab nationalism. These historic events shaped the political consciousness of the Arabs, awakening an aspiration for autonomy and self-determination. They also highlighted the tensions between local aspirations and foreign interference, themes that remain relevant to the politics of the contemporary Middle East.

The Young Turk revolution of 1908, followed by the authoritarian seizure of power in 1909, was a crucial element in the emergence of Arab nationalism. Initially aimed at modernising and reforming the Ottoman Empire, this movement rapidly evolved into a form of authoritarianism and exclusive Turkish nationalism, exacerbating tensions between the Turkish elites and the various nationalities within the Empire, particularly the Arabs. The authoritarian turn of the Young Turks manifested itself tragically with the massacre of the Armenian population in 1915, an event that was not only a terrible human tragedy but also served as a wake-up call for other ethnic and national groups within the Empire. The policy of Turkification, which aimed to impose the Turkish language and culture as central elements of imperial institutions, was seen as a direct threat to the identity and autonomy of Arab communities. Against this backdrop, a number of Arab intellectuals, influenced by Western ideas and aware of the need to defend their own cultural and political identity, began to organise resistance. The first General Arab Congress, held in Paris in 1913, was an important moment in this process. This congress brought together delegates from different Arab regions to discuss the future of the Arabs within the Ottoman Empire and to formulate demands for greater autonomy.

It is interesting to note Egypt's particular position in this context. The Egyptian delegate to the Paris Congress presented himself as an observer, reflecting a distinct Egyptian identity that did not necessarily see itself as "Arab" in the political context of the time. This distinction was partly due to cultural and historical reasons - Egypt had a long history and a civilisational identity distinct from those of other Arab regions - and partly to the political situation of Egypt, then under British rule. This period of history illustrates the complexity of the process of shaping Arab nationalism, highlighting the various influences and the different political and cultural trajectories within the Arab world. It also shows how the internal dynamics of the Ottoman Empire, as well as the intervention and influence of the European powers, played a decisive role in shaping identities and political movements in the region.

Impact of the First World War and the Sykes-Picot Accords[modifier | modifier le wikicode]

During the First World War, the Arabs, although culturally and historically linked, were geographically and politically divided. This division was exacerbated by the Sykes-Picot agreements of 1916, in which the European powers (mainly France and the United Kingdom) shared out areas of influence in the Middle East, redrawing borders without taking ethnic and cultural realities into account. In addition, the Balfour Declaration of 1917, promising the establishment of a "Jewish national home" in Palestine, added another layer of complexity and tension to the region. Pan-Arabism, as a unifying ideology, gained popularity against this backdrop of fragmentation. It was driven by the feeling that Arabs, as a people, had to transcend colonial borders and unite to achieve autonomy and prosperity. This idea was reinforced by Nazi propaganda during the Second World War, which sought to influence the region against the British and French Allies, and by the exposure of Arab intellectuals to nationalist and anti-colonial ideas in Europe.

However, the dream of pan-Arabism came up against many challenges. National political ambitions and realities, cultural and religious differences within the Arab world, and the conflicting interests of regional and international powers hampered Arab unity. Notable failures, such as the dissolution of the United Arab Republic between Egypt and Syria in 1961, marked the limits of the pan-Arab ideal. The failure of pan-Arabism left an ideological vacuum in the region, which was gradually filled by Islamism. This movement, which seeks to organise society according to Islamic principles, gained ground against a backdrop of growing disillusionment with secular and nationalist ideologies. The following decades saw the rise of various Islamist movements, which capitalised on the feeling of disenchantment and the search for identity, by proposing an alternative based on religion and tradition.

The pan-Arab movement[modifier | modifier le wikicode]

The First Promises and Deceptions: The Alliance of Sherif Hussein and the British Mandate[modifier | modifier le wikicode]

Notables such as Sherif Hussein of Mecca played a crucial role as local leaders and intermediaries between the Arab populations and the colonial powers. In Hussein's case, his position as guardian of the Islamic holy sites gave him significant religious and political authority. During the First World War, he sought an alliance with the British, motivated by the promise of support for the establishment of an independent Arab kingdom after the war, in return for help against the Ottoman Empire. This alliance is emblematic of the strategy of the region's traditional notables, who sought to navigate between local interests and the ambitions of foreign powers. However, the promises made to Hussein by the British, known as the Hussein-McMahon correspondence, were ambiguous and ultimately proved to contradict other commitments made by the British, notably the Sykes-Picot agreements and the Balfour Declaration.

The outcome of these diplomatic negotiations proved to be a great disappointment for Arab aspirations. After the war, instead of the promised independence, the League of Nations established several mandates in the region, placing territories under British and French administration. Hussein's vision of a unified Arab kingdom collapsed, and the region was divided into several states, often with artificial borders that did not reflect ethnic and cultural realities. This period was marked by a growing sense of betrayal and disillusionment among Arabs, who saw their hopes of independence and unity evaporate. This disappointment laid the foundations for discontent with the Western powers and fuelled nationalist and anti-colonial movements in the decades that followed. The figure of Hussein and his failed attempt to create an independent Arab kingdom remains a powerful symbol of the Arab struggle for self-determination and of the complexity of relations between the Middle East and the Western powers in the early twentieth century.

Emergence of Arab Nationalist Theorists and Leaders[modifier | modifier le wikicode]

At the end of the First World War, the figure of Faisal, one of the sons of Sherif Hussein of Mecca, emerged as a key player in the formation of Arab nationalism. Fayçal, who had played a leading role in the Arab revolt against the Ottoman Empire, became a symbol of the Arab aspiration for self-determination. His companion and adviser, Sati Al Husri, had a considerable influence on the theorisation of Arab nationalism. Sati Al Husri, who later became Minister of Education, is often regarded as the first major theorist of Arab nationalism. His approach was strongly influenced by the German conception of the nation, which emphasised linguistic and cultural aspects as the foundations of national identity. For Al Husri, the Arabic language was a central element of Arab identity, a bond that transcended religious, regional or tribal differences within the Arab world.

This focus on language and culture as defining elements of national identity was in part a response to the challenges posed by the diversity of the Arab world. By emphasising these common elements, Al Husri sought to create a sense of unity and solidarity among Arabs, irrespective of their individual differences. His approach helped shape the ideology of Arab nationalism in the decades that followed, influencing educational and cultural policies in several Arab countries. The post-war period, with the efforts of figures such as Faisal and the theories of Al Husri, was therefore crucial in the crystallisation of Arab nationalism. Although aspirations for Arab unity were thwarted by post-war political realities and international agreements, the idea of a common Arab identity, based on language and culture, continued to exert a profound influence on politics and society in the Middle East.

Arab nationalism between the wars: betrayal and external influence[modifier | modifier le wikicode]

The inter-war period was a crucial time for the development of Arab nationalism, largely influenced by the failure to fulfil the promises made to the Arabs during the First World War. The Sykes-Picot agreements of 1916, which secretly divided the Middle East between France and the United Kingdom, became the symbol of the betrayal of Arab aspirations for independence and self-determination. These agreements, revealed after the war, profoundly undermined Arab confidence in the Western powers and fuelled a feeling of mistrust and resentment.

Against this backdrop, other factors accelerated the rise of Arab nationalism. Fascist and Nazi propaganda resonated with certain segments of Arab society, particularly because of their shared opposition to British and French colonialism. The Nazi regime, seeking to extend its influence in the region, exploited Arab discontent with the colonial powers. This culminated in the 1941 pro-Nazi coup in Baghdad, known as the Rashid Ali al-Gillani Coup, which briefly established a pro-German government in Iraq before being overthrown by British forces. At the same time, the debate on Arab independence continued to grow in intensity. Intellectuals, politicians and opinion leaders in the Arab world were actively discussing ways of achieving political autonomy and resisting foreign influence. This period saw the emergence of several nationalist movements and the formation of political parties that were to play a major role in the region's post-colonial history. The inter-war period was one of intense political transformation for the Middle East. The combination of the non-fulfilment of promises made during the First World War, the influence of fascist and Nazi ideologies, and the internal debate over independence helped to shape the political landscape of the region and lay the foundations for the events and movements that would follow in subsequent decades.

The Baathist movement[modifier | modifier le wikicode]

Origins and Context of Baathism: The Annexation of the Sandjak of Alexandrette[modifier | modifier le wikicode]

The annexation of the Sandjak of Alexandrette by Turkey in 1939 is an event often seen as a significant catalyst in the emergence of Baathism, a political movement that would play a major role in the contemporary history of the Middle East.

The Sandjak of Alexandrette, a region in the north-west of modern Syria, was annexed by Turkey following an agreement with France, then the Mandatory Power in Syria. This annexation, which was perceived as a humiliating territorial loss for the Arabs, exacerbated nationalist feelings in the region. For many, it illustrated the vulnerability of Arab nations to the interests of foreign and regional powers. In this context of frustration and desire for resistance, Baathism, or the "Arab resurrection", took shape. Founded by Michel Aflaq and Salah al-Din al-Bitar, two Syrian intellectuals, the Baath party promoted an ideology based on Arab nationalism, socialism and secularism. The Baath movement aimed to unify the Arab world, promote economic and social development, and resist imperialism and colonialism.

The annexation of the Sandjak of Alexandrette therefore served as an impetus for the development of this ideology, which sought to respond to the challenges facing Arab countries. It reinforced the feeling that collective action and Arab unity were needed to counter foreign influence and intervention in the region. Baathism, as a political and ideological force, subsequently played a central role in the politics of several Arab countries, notably Syria and Iraq. Although the movement has evolved and faced many challenges over the years, its emergence in the 1940s remains a key moment in the history of Arab nationalism and continues to influence the politics of the Middle East.

Foundation and Philosophy of the Baath Party: The First Congress in 1947[modifier | modifier le wikicode]

The first Baath Party Congress, held in 1947, played a crucial role in defining the ideology and objectives of the movement. This congress marked an important stage in the crystallisation of the Baath vision for the future of the Arab world, based on three fundamental pillars: unity, independence and Arab socialism. The emphasis on unity reflected the aspiration to create a unified Arab state or federation of Arab states, transcending established colonial and national borders. This idea of territorial unity was rooted in Arab nationalism and aimed to counter the influence of Western and regional powers in the region.

Independence was another central pillar, underlining the need for Arab countries to achieve complete political and economic autonomy. This involved not only liberation from colonialism, but also the development of independent political and economic structures and systems. Arab socialism, as advocated by the Baath Party, sought to modernise and reform Arab society. It was not a copy of Soviet socialism, but rather an adaptation of socialist principles to Arab realities and needs, with an emphasis on land reform, industrialisation and social justice.

In addition to these three pillars, the Baath Party was characterised by its secular and non-confessional approach. This secular orientation was significant in a region marked by great religious and sectarian diversity. The Baath promoted the idea that all religious and ethnic communities should assimilate into the Arab national identity, creating a unified society across denominational divides. Finally, anti-Zionism was a prominent element of the party's ideology. This position reflected opposition to the Zionist movement and the creation of the State of Israel, perceived as a colonial settlement and a threat to the Arab world's aspirations for unity and autonomy. The first congress of the Baath Party thus defined the contours of a movement that was to have a profound influence on Middle East politics in the decades that followed. Its legacy, complex and sometimes controversial, continues to influence politics and society in the region.

Michel Aflaq and the Formation of Baathist Ideology[modifier | modifier le wikicode]

Michel Aflaq, born in 1910 in Damascus, was a central figure in the founding and development of the Baath Party. Born into a Greek Orthodox family, Aflaq played a decisive role in shaping the Arab nationalist and secular thinking that characterised the Baath movement. In 1943, Aflaq, together with Salah al-Din al-Bitar and other intellectuals, founded the Baath party, whose full name is "Party of the Arab Socialist Resurrection". The party was created in the context of the nationalist awakening in the Arab world and in response to the challenges posed by colonialism and internal divisions in the region.

Aflaq served as Secretary General of the Baath Party, strongly influencing its ideological and political direction. His vision of Arab nationalism was inclusive, transcending religious and sectarian divisions, which was reflected in his own background as an Arab Christian. He firmly believed in the need for Arab unity, social progress and secularism as a means of modernising Arab society and resisting foreign influence. Under his leadership, the Baath Party sought to establish branches in several Arab countries, including Iraq. The Baath philosophy gained influence, particularly after the Second World War, in the context of the rise of nationalism in the region and the struggles for independence against the colonial powers. However, Aflaq's vision for the Baath Party and his interpretation of Arab nationalism were subject to various interpretations and adaptations, particularly in Syria and Iraq, where the party came to power. In Iraq, particularly under Saddam Hussein, the Baath Party took a distinctly more authoritarian turn, moving away from some of the original principles promoted by Aflaq. Michel Aflaq, who spent much of his life working for the Baath movement and promoting Arab unity, died in 1989. His contribution to Arab political thought remains an important subject of study and debate in the historical and contemporary context of the Middle East.

The evolution of Baathism in the Arab world and its association with power in various countries reveals a complex history of reform and progress, but also of conflict and repression. After it was founded by Michel Aflaq and his colleagues, the Baath Party sought to establish national sections in various Arab countries. The Baath ideology, centred on Arab unity, socialism and secularism, resonated in many of these countries, particularly in the 1950s and 1960s, a period marked by anti-colonial struggles and a desire for modernisation and independence. In Syria and Iraq, for example, the Baath party came to power in 1963 and 1968 respectively. These Baathist regimes initiated numerous reforms, particularly in education, industry and agriculture, aimed at modernising the economy and reducing inequalities. They also promoted secularism and tried to reduce the influence of religion in state affairs, a move that broke with the political tradition of many countries in the region.

However, the Baath's rise to power was also accompanied by forms of violence and repression. In Iraq, under the leadership of Saddam Hussein, the Baathist regime was marked by authoritarian policies, repression of dissidents, and internal and external conflicts, such as the Iran-Iraq war (1980-1988) and the invasion of Kuwait in 1990. In Syria, under Hafez al-Assad and later his son Bashar al-Assad, the regime was also characterised by strong centralisation of power, close surveillance of society and repression of dissent. This complex history of Baathism as an ideology and as a practice of power underlines the difficulty of implementing nationalist and socialist ideals in a context of ethnic, religious and political diversity. Baathist regimes have, on the one hand, brought about significant change and reform in the countries they have ruled, but on the other hand they have often resorted to violence and repression to maintain their control, leading to divisions and conflicts that have profoundly marked the recent history of the Middle East.

The failure of the United Arab Republic and its repercussions[modifier | modifier le wikicode]

The founding of the United Arab Republic (UAR) in 1958 represented a significant moment in the history of Arab nationalism and in particular of the Baathist movement. This ambitious project aimed to give concrete form to the ideal of Arab unity, a central principle of Baathist ideology. The RAU was a political union between Egypt and Syria. It was largely inspired and promoted by Egyptian President Gamal Abdel Nasser, a leading figure in Arab nationalism. Nasser, although not a member of the Baath party, shared many of its aims, particularly in terms of Arab unity, socialism and resistance to imperialism.

The union was seen as a first step towards greater Arab unity, a goal long dreamt of by many nationalists in the region. It generated great enthusiasm and hope among those who aspired to see the Arab world unite politically and economically to form a major regional and global force. However, the United Arab Republic proved short-lived. In 1961, just three years after its creation, the union collapsed due to a number of factors. Political and economic differences between Egypt and Syria, the centralisation of power in Egypt, and growing discontent in Syria with perceived Egyptian domination all contributed to the dissolution of the union. The failure of the RAU was a blow to the Arab unity movement and illustrated the challenges inherent in achieving such a union in such a diverse region. Despite its failure, the RAU remains an important chapter in the history of Arab nationalism and continues to be studied as a significant example of attempts at political unity in the Arab world.

Baathism in Power: Reform and Repression in Syria[modifier | modifier le wikicode]

The coming to power of the Baath Party in Syria in March 1963 marked a significant turning point in the political history of the country and of the Baathist movement as a whole. This seizure of power was achieved through a military coup, reflecting the rise of the Baath as a regional political force. Under the leadership of the Baath Party, Syria underwent a series of radical reforms in line with the ideals of Arab nationalism, socialism and secularism. These reforms included the nationalisation of industries, land reform, and the modernisation of education and infrastructure. The aim was to transform Syria into a modern, socialist and united state, breaking with the political and economic structures of the past. However, the Baathist regime in Syria was also marked by increased centralisation of power and political repression. This period saw the consolidation of power in the hands of a small elite, often dominated by members of the Alawite community, a branch of Shi'ism. This concentration of power within a confessional minority has led to sectarian tensions and a certain confessionalisation of Syrian politics.

Confessionalisation, or the increasing importance of religious and sectarian identity in politics, was at odds with the secular ideology of the Baath. Yet it has become a feature of governance in Syria, contributing to internal divisions and instability. This dynamic was exacerbated by Baath party policies which, although officially secular, sometimes favoured certain faith groups over others, leading to feelings of marginalisation and discontent among various segments of the Syrian population. The experience of the Baath Party in power in Syria, with its initial successes in social and economic reform and its subsequent failures, particularly in terms of sectarian governance and political repression, has had a profound impact on the country's development and continues to influence Syrian politics and society.

The Nasserist movement[modifier | modifier le wikicode]

Foundations and aspirations of Nasserism[modifier | modifier le wikicode]

Nasserism, an Arab political ideology, takes its name from the Egyptian president Gamal Abdel Nasser, whose reign from 1956 to 1970 marked a period of radical change in the Arab world. This ideology is characterised by its quest for Arab unity, its aspiration for complete independence for the Arab nations, and its interest in a form of socialism adapted to the Arab context.

Nasser, as a charismatic figure and influential leader, embodied and propagated Nasserism through his policies and speeches. One of the most striking examples of this ideology in action was the nationalisation of the Suez Canal in 1956, an act that not only challenged Western interests in the region, but also symbolised the Arab countries' demand for sovereignty and self-determination. This decision led to an international crisis and ultimately reinforced Nasser's status as the champion of Arab independence in the face of Western imperialism. Nasserism also aimed to strengthen unity between Arab countries, based on the premise that despite their differences, these nations shared a common history, language and aspirations. This vision was realised, albeit briefly, with the formation of the United Arab Republic in 1958, a political union between Egypt and Syria. Although this union failed in 1961, it remains a historic example of Nasser's efforts to unite the Arab world under a single banner.

Impacts and reforms of Nasserism[modifier | modifier le wikicode]

In economic and social terms, Nasserism led to a series of socialist reforms. Nasser initiated programmes of nationalisation and agrarian reform, aimed at redistributing wealth and reducing inequalities. These measures, although different from Soviet socialism, reflected a desire to adapt socialist principles to Arab reality, with the emphasis on economic autonomy and social justice. From a theoretical point of view, Nasserism can be interpreted through the prism of dependency theory and post-colonial nationalism. As a response to colonial and neo-colonial domination, Nasserism sought to establish an independent path of development and emancipation for Arab countries. This approach reflected a desire to break the shackles of economic and political dependence and forge a distinct national and regional identity.

Nasserism, unlike Baathism, is an ideology that developed and crystallised mainly after Gamal Abdel Nasser came to power in Egypt. This feature marks a fundamental difference in the trajectory of the two ideologies within the Arab political landscape. Baathism, initiated by Michel Aflaq and Salah al-Din al-Bitar, was already well established as a political ideology before the Baath party took power in Syria and Iraq. This movement had developed a solid theoretical basis and clear objectives concerning Arab unity, socialism and secularism long before it became a dominant political player. Nasserism, on the other hand, emerged as a set of ideas and practices directly linked to Nasser's rise and actions as Egypt's leader. Nasser was not originally an ideologue in the traditional sense; his ideas and policies were formed and refined during his reign. After the overthrow of the Egyptian monarchy in 1952 by the Free Officers Movement, of which Nasser was a key member, he gradually developed a vision for Egypt and the Arab world that would become known as Nasserism. This vision took shape in acts such as the nationalisation of the Suez Canal and the promotion of Arab unity, which were decisive moments in the definition of Nasserism. In addition, the socio-economic reforms undertaken by Nasser in Egypt, such as land reform and the nationalisation of industries, reflected his ideological principles.

Nasserism, Baathism and the United Arab Republic[modifier | modifier le wikicode]

The founding of the United Arab Republic (UAR) in 1958 was one of the most significant manifestations of Nasserist thinking. This union, which brought together Egypt and Syria, was motivated by Gamal Abdel Nasser's ambition to achieve Arab unity, one of the central pillars of his ideology. Nasser's vision for the RAU went beyond a mere political alliance; it aimed to create a unified political and economic entity that could act as an engine of development and power in the region. For Nasser, the RAU was a step towards the realisation of a pan-Arab dream, where Arab nations could transcend their colonial and historical borders to form a larger and stronger union. In practice, however, the UAR faced a number of challenges. One of the most controversial aspects was the perception, especially in Syria, that the union led to a kind of Egyptian domination. In theory, the RAU was supposed to be a union between equals, but in practice it was often perceived as an attempt by Egypt, and Nasser in particular, to control or influence Syrian politics. This perception was exacerbated by the centralisation of power in Cairo and the marginalisation of Syrian political voices.

Syria, within the framework of the RAU, was often seen as an Egyptian province rather than an equal partner. This dynamic contributed to growing discontent in Syria, where many politicians and citizens felt marginalised and dominated by Egypt. This situation eventually led to the dissolution of the RAU in 1961, when Syria withdrew from the union. The RAU, despite its short-lived existence, remains an important chapter in the history of Arab nationalism and Nasserist thought. It symbolises the aspirations for Arab unity and the challenges associated with implementing this idea in a region characterised by great political, cultural and social diversity. The RAU experience also highlighted the limits of Nasser's centralised and dirigiste approach to Arab unification.

Nasserism in the Regional and Global Context[modifier | modifier le wikicode]

The Camp David Accords, signed in 1979 between Egypt and Israel, represent a major turning point in the history of the Middle East and are often cited as marking the end of the era of pan-Arabism. These agreements, which led to a peace treaty between Egypt and Israel, were seen by many Arab countries as a betrayal of the principles of pan-Arabism and Arab solidarity. Pan-Arabism, as a political and ideological movement, had long promoted the idea of Arab unity against foreign influence and intervention, particularly against the State of Israel, seen as a colonial implant on Arab soil. The Camp David Accords, negotiated and signed by Egyptian President Anwar Sadat, broke with this line of thinking by establishing official diplomatic relations and mutual recognition between Egypt and Israel.

The signing of these agreements had considerable repercussions. Egypt, one of the historic leaders of the Arab world and a fervent supporter of pan-Arabism under Nasser, was isolated in the Arab world. In response to the normalisation of relations with Israel, the Arab League suspended Egypt's membership and moved its headquarters out of Cairo. This exclusion symbolised the deep dissatisfaction and disapproval of other Arab countries with Egypt's unilateral decision.

The late 1970s and early 1980s thus marked a period of transition in Arab politics, with a decline in the influence of pan-Arabism as a unifying force and an increase in national politics and the interests of individual states. The Camp David Accords not only redefined relations between Egypt and Israel, but also had a lasting impact on regional dynamics and perceptions of Arab unity. These developments reflect the complexity of Middle East politics, where ideological aspirations often clash with political and geopolitical realities. The shift from pan-Arabism to more pragmatic national policies illustrates the changing nature of alliances and priorities in the region.

The League of Arab States (Arab League)[modifier | modifier le wikicode]

The Beginnings of Arab Cooperation and the Concepts of Union[modifier | modifier le wikicode]

In 1944, Egypt, under the reign of King Farouk, played a leading role in discussions aimed at establishing some form of cooperation or union between Arab countries. This period marked an important stage in efforts at regional collaboration, preceding the formation of the Arab League in 1945. At that time, several ideas and projects concerning Arab unity or cooperation were under discussion. One of the key concepts was Greater Syria, which envisaged a union of the Syrian, Lebanese, Jordanian and Palestinian territories. This idea, rooted in the region's shared history and culture, was seen by some as a natural way of bringing together these peoples who share close ties.

Another concept was that of the "Fertile Crescent", which included Syria, Iraq, Lebanon, Jordan and Palestine. This idea was based on geographical and economic considerations, the Fertile Crescent being a historically rich and fertile region, considered to be the cradle of several ancient civilisations. The idea of creating a league or federation of Arab countries was also gaining ground. This proposal aimed to establish a formal structure for political, economic and cultural cooperation between the Arab states, enabling more effective coordination of their common policies and interests.

The Formation and Challenges of the League of Arab States[modifier | modifier le wikicode]

These discussions led to the formation of the Arab League in 1945, a regional organisation designed to foster cooperation between member states and promote Arab interests and identity. The creation of the Arab League was a decisive moment in the modern history of the Middle East, symbolising the recognition of the importance of regional cooperation and Arab unity. These different proposals reflect the diversity of approaches and visions of Arab unity at that time. They also show how, even before the rise of Nasserism and Baathism, efforts were already underway to establish political structures and regional alliances among Arab countries.

The Alexandria Protocol, signed in 1944, laid the foundations for what was to become the League of Arab States. This crucial step marked a concerted effort by Arab nations to formalise a structure for regional cooperation, an initiative that reflected the growing aspirations for unity and collaboration within the Arab world. On 22 March 1945, the League of Arab States was officially formed. Its founding members, Egypt, Iraq, Jordan (then Transjordan), Lebanon, Saudi Arabia, Syria and North Yemen, represented a broad cross-section of the political, cultural and economic diversity of the Arab world. The aim of the League was to promote the political, economic, cultural and social interests of the Arab countries, and to coordinate their efforts in areas of common interest.

However, the internal workings of the League of Arab States proved complex. Its structure, requiring a consensus among its members for major decisions, often made it difficult to take quick and effective decisions. This difficulty was exacerbated by the great diversity of political systems, ideological orientations and national interests of the member states. In addition, despite their common cultural and historical identity, the Arab countries showed little economic integration. Trade between member states was relatively limited, and their economies were often oriented towards relations with non-Arab partners. This situation reflected the challenges posed by borders and economic structures inherited from the colonial era, as well as disparities in terms of natural resources and industrial development. Despite these challenges, the League of Arab States represented an important step towards the recognition and affirmation of Arab identity on the international stage. However, the achievement of its goals of unity and cooperation has often been hampered by the complex political and economic realities of the Arab world.

Attempts at regional unity: Union of Arab Republics and the Maghreb[modifier | modifier le wikicode]

The attempt to create the Union of Arab Republics in 1971 is another example of efforts to strengthen unity and cooperation in the Arab world, although it did not lead to concrete results. This initiative, which aimed to unite Egypt, Libya and Syria in a federation, reflected the pursuit of the ideal of Arab unity that had been at the heart of many regional policies since the 1950s. However, despite its announcement with great fanfare, the Union of Arab Republics suffered from internal disagreements and a lack of practical coordination between the member countries. Ideological differences, divergent national interests and the strong personalities of their leaders hampered any meaningful political or economic integration. This experience has highlighted the challenges inherent in creating a political union in such a diverse region.

In the Maghreb, too, various attempts to bring the states of the region together have failed. Despite shared cultural and historical links, the Maghreb countries (Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, Libya and Mauritania) have experienced different political trajectories, making it difficult to establish close regional cooperation. Attempts to create organisations or unions have often been hampered by political rivalries, differences in ideological orientation and economic problems.

The Gulf Cooperation Council and the New Regional Dynamics[modifier | modifier le wikicode]

After the Islamic revolution in Iran in 1979, the Gulf states, faced with a new regional dynamic, attempted to form a consultation council. The aim of this initiative was to coordinate policies and strengthen collective security in the face of what was perceived as a growing threat from Iran. Once again, however, concrete results were limited. Although the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) was formed in 1981, bringing together Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, the United Arab Emirates, Qatar, Bahrain and Oman, it has faced its own internal challenges, particularly in terms of foreign and security policy.

These various attempts underline the complexity of unification and cooperation efforts in a region marked by deep political, economic and ideological divisions. They also reflect the limits of regional initiatives in the context of an ever-changing Middle East and Maghreb.

The pan-Islamic movement[modifier | modifier le wikicode]

The Wahhabism[modifier | modifier le wikicode]

Wahhabism, a religious doctrine and a form of Islamic movement, has had a significant influence in certain regions of the Arab world, but its link with Arabism or Arab nationalism is complex and needs to be clarified.

Wahhabism, founded by Mohammed ibn Abd al-Wahhab in the 18th century in the Arabian Peninsula, advocates a strict and puritanical interpretation of Islam. It focuses on a return to the practices of the "salaf" or first generations of Muslims, considered to be models of piety and Islamic practice. This approach insists on strict adherence to sharia (Islamic law) and rejects innovations (bid'ah) in religious practice. However, the link between Wahhabism and Arabism or Arab nationalism is indirect. Arab nationalism, as a political and ideological movement, emphasises the unity and independence of Arabs as a people, often focusing on common cultural, linguistic and historical aspects. Although Wahhabism is an influential force in the Arabian Peninsula, particularly in Saudi Arabia, it is primarily a religious reform rather than a nationalist movement.

Wahhabism has, however, played a role in shaping political and religious identity in some parts of the Arab world, particularly Saudi Arabia. The alliance between Muhammad ibn Abd al-Wahhab and the House of Saud was crucial in the formation of the modern Saudi state. This alliance integrated elements of Wahhabism into the political and social structures of Saudi Arabia, but this should not be confused with Arab nationalism as such. It is also important to note that Arab nationalism and Wahhabism may even be in tension. Arab nationalism, with its secular tendencies and emphasis on political and cultural unity, can come into conflict with the conservative and sometimes sectarian religious approach of Wahhabism. In short, although Wahhabism has influenced the history and politics of certain Arab regions, it represents a distinct and sometimes even contradictory trend in relation to the principles of Arab nationalism.

The relationship between Mohammed Ben Abdelwahhab, the founder of Wahhabism, and Mohammed Ibn Saud, the head of the House of Saud, is crucial to understanding the genesis of modern Saudi Arabia and the influence of Wahhabism in the region. Mohammed Ben Abdelwahhab, born in 1703, preached a form of Islamic reform that aimed to purify religious practice of what he considered to be the innovations and superstitions that had crept into Islam over time. His teaching focused on a strict return to the teachings of the Koran and the Sunna, following the example of the first generations of Muslims (salaf).

His meeting and alliance with Mohammed Ibn Saud in the mid-eighteenth century marked a decisive turning point. Ibn Saud, ruler of the Najd region of the Arabian Peninsula, adopted Abdelwahhab's teachings and incorporated his principles into the governance of his territory. This alliance combined Wahhabi religious reform with Saud political and military ambition, creating a powerful force in the region. Together, they challenged the authority of the Ottoman Caliphate, dominant in the region at the time, and sought to extend their influence. Their movement was not only religious, but also political, seeking to establish a new order based on Wahhabi principles. This combination of religious reform and political ambition led to an increasing politicisation of religion in the region. The result of this alliance was the creation of the first Saudi Emirate, with its capital in Dariya. This Emirate was the predecessor of modern Saudi Arabia and laid the foundations for Wahhabi influence in Saudi governance and society. The alliance between the Sauds and Abdelwahhab thus played a key role in the formation of the Saudi state and had a lasting influence on politics and religious practice in the Gulf region.

The agreement between Mohammed Ben Abdelwahhab and Mohammed Ibn Saud is often described as a pact of power-sharing and mutual support that laid the foundations of the modern Saudi state. The pact, which dates back to the mid-18th century, established a division of responsibilities between the two parties: Ben Abdelwahhab focused on religious matters, preaching and establishing the Wahhabi foundations of Islam, while Ibn Saud took care of the political and military aspects, extending his power over the region. This unique partnership between religious and political power was essential to the foundation and expansion of the Saudi Emirate, the political entity that would eventually become Saudi Arabia. Ben Abdelwahhab provided religious legitimacy, insisting on a puritanical and strict interpretation of Islam, while Ibn Saud used this legitimacy to unify and extend his power over the tribes and territories of the Arabian Peninsula.

The pact between the two men established a symbiotic relationship between the House of Saud and the religious descendants of Ben Abdelwahhab (often referred to as the "Al ash-Sheikh"), which persisted for almost 300 years. This relationship was characterised by mutual support, with the Saud protecting and promoting Wahhabism, while Wahhabi religious leaders legitimised the Saud's political power. This alliance provided the ideological and political impetus for Saudi expansion in the Arabian Peninsula. It also established a model of governance in which religion and state are closely intertwined, with Wahhabism becoming a defining feature of Saudi national identity. The original agreement between Ben Abdelwahhab and Ibn Saud therefore played a fundamental role in the formation of Saudi Arabia and continues to influence the country's political and religious structure. This unique relationship between religious and political power remains central to Saudi society and politics.

Arab modernism or 'nahda[modifier | modifier le wikicode]

The Nahda, or Arab Renaissance, was a crucial period in the intellectual and cultural history of the Arab world, and Egypt played a central role in this movement. Jamal al-Din al-Afghani (1839-1897) is often cited as one of the leading theorists of this period. His influence and ideas were decisive in shaping Arab modernism and Islamic modernism.

Al-Afghani, a thinker and political activist, moved to Egypt in his thirties. His time in Egypt was marked by close collaboration with Mohammed Abduh, who was to become Mufti of Egypt. Together they set about reforming and modernising Islamic thought and institutions, seeking to respond to the challenges posed by European expansion and colonial rule. Their approach, often referred to as Islamic modernism, aimed to reconcile Islamic principles with modern ideas and scientific advances. They advocated an interpretation of the Koran and Islamic traditions that was both faithful to the sources and open to new interpretations and adaptations to contemporary realities. This vision sought to revitalise Muslim society and promote education, rationality and scientific progress as a means of resisting Western influence and revitalising Arab-Muslim culture.

The Islamic modernism of Al-Afghani and Abduh had a significant impact on the Arab world, influencing many later intellectuals and reformers. Their work contributed to the Nahda by encouraging a spirit of questioning and reform in the fields of religion, philosophy, literature and politics. The Nahda, as a movement, represented a decisive turning point for the Arab world, marking a period of intellectual, cultural and political renaissance. The influence of thinkers such as Al-Afghani and Abduh was crucial in shaping a vision of the Arab world that was both rooted in its heritage and forward-looking, seeking to strike a balance between tradition and modernity.

The Nahda process led to a remarkable cultural upsurge in the Arab world, characterised by a rediscovery and reappraisal of Arab historical and cultural heritage. This movement marked a period of intellectual and artistic awakening, during which Arab intellectuals, writers, poets and artists explored and celebrated Arab history and culture, while integrating them into a modern context. The cultural Arabism of this period was marked by a renewed interest in the Arabic language, literature, history and the arts. The intellectuals of the Nahda sought to revitalise the Arabic language, modernising it while preserving its rich and complex heritage. This period saw the emergence of new literary forms, such as the novel and the short story, as well as the revival of classical forms such as poetry.

The rediscovery of the historical and glorious heritage of the Arab world was another key component of the cultural Arabism of the Nahda. Historians and thinkers revisited periods of greatness in Arab-Muslim civilisation, such as the Islamic Golden Age, and looked for ways to reconnect with this heritage in the context of contemporary challenges. This approach aimed to strengthen a sense of Arab pride and identity while providing a framework for modernisation and progress. In addition, the cultural rise of the Nahda was also characterised by increased dialogue with Western cultures and ideas. Nahda intellectuals often advocated a balanced approach, embracing Western scientific and intellectual advances while preserving Arab values and traditions. The Nahda as a whole therefore represented a crucial moment in the cultural history of the Arab world, marking a period of renewal, reflection and innovation. The impact of this movement is still felt today, both in the field of culture and in political and social thought in the Arab world.

The Nahda movement, characterised by its inclusive approach and its emphasis on the Arabic language, transcended denominational distinctions, uniting Arabs of different faiths around a common cultural and linguistic heritage. By emphasising Arabic as the language of literature, education and public discourse, this movement fostered a sense of pan-Arab identity that went beyond religious or sectarian divisions. The Nahda encouraged a renaissance in all aspects of intellectual and cultural life. It saw the creation of political parties, associations, leagues and organisations that promoted various aspects of education, social reform and modernisation. These groups were often driven by the idea that cultural and linguistic renaissance was essential to the political and social renewal of the Arab world.

The political parties formed during this period sought to channel national and regional aspirations into political programmes. These parties, although diverse in their ideological orientations, often shared a commitment to strengthening Arab identity and modernising society. The associations and leagues created during the Nahda played a key role in disseminating new ideas, organising cultural activities and promoting education and research. They were places where intellectuals and artists could meet, exchange ideas and collaborate on cultural and educational projects. This period also saw the emergence of new forms of media, such as newspapers and magazines, which played a crucial role in spreading the ideas of the Nahda. These publications provided a platform for debates on reform, politics, literature and culture, and were essential for reaching a wider audience.

The pan-Islamism promoted by the Ottoman sultan Abdülhamid II (reigned 1876-1909) represented a particular political approach that influenced Arab nationalism, although it was distinct from the latter. Abdülhamid II's pan-Islamism aimed to consolidate Ottoman authority and unify the empire's diverse Muslim peoples around Islam, in response to the internal and external pressures facing the Ottoman Empire at the time.

Faced with challenges such as the rise of nationalism in various parts of the empire and pressure from European powers, Abdülhamid II adopted a strategy of political and administrative centralisation. He sought to strengthen the Empire's central control over its territories, including the Arab regions, by putting in place procedures for centralisation, investigation and repression. Abdülhamid's emphasis on Islam as a unifying element was intended to counter separatist tendencies and maintain the cohesion of the empire. However, this strategy often had the opposite effect in Arab regions, where centralisation and repression created resentment and fuelled Arab nationalist sentiments.

Many Arab activists and intellectuals, in response to Abdülhamid II's repressive policies, sought refuge in Egypt, which was then perceived as a centre of liberal thought and relative autonomy from Ottoman rule. Egypt became a hotbed of Arab nationalist thought and the Nahda, where exiles could express themselves more freely and participate in intellectual and political debate. Although Abdülhamid's pan-Islamism was conceived as a means of strengthening the Ottoman Empire, it had a significant impact on the development of Arab nationalism. The Sultan's policies contributed, paradoxically, to the awakening of a national consciousness among the Arabs, who began to seek ways of achieving their own political and cultural autonomy.

The Israeli-Palestinian conflict[modifier | modifier le wikicode]

Historical origins of the name "Palestine[modifier | modifier le wikicode]

The notion of "Palestine" dates back long before the Ottoman Empire, with its origins in antiquity. The name "Palestine" itself has historical roots stretching back several millennia.

The term "Palestine" is derived from "Philistia" or "Peleshet" in Hebrew, which referred to a region inhabited by the Philistines around the 12th century BC. The Philistines were a people of the Aegean Sea who settled along the south-eastern coast of the Mediterranean, in the region that today includes the Gaza Strip and its environs. The term "Palestina" was first used officially by the Roman emperor Hadrian after the Jewish revolt of Bar Kokhba in 135 AD. In an effort to erase the Jewish connection to the land of Israel following the revolt, Hadrian renamed the province of Judea "Syria Palaestina", a name that subsequently became commonplace in literature and historical documents.

Over the centuries, the region has experienced various dominations and influences, including the Byzantines, the Arab Muslims, the Crusaders, the Mamluks and finally the Ottomans, each leaving their own cultural and historical imprint. However, the term "Palestine" has continued to be used throughout these periods to designate this geographical region. It is important to note that the modern conception of Palestine as a distinct political and national entity took shape more recently in history, in particular with the dismantling of the Ottoman Empire after the First World War and the establishment of the British Mandate over Palestine. The contemporary notion of Palestine as a territory and a national identity is therefore partly the result of twentieth-century political developments.

During the first centuries of Islamic expansion, after the Arab conquest of the region in the 7th century, the "holy land" was often included in larger administrative entities under the Islamic caliphate. However, the term "Palestine" was used in various contexts to refer to the region, although it was not an official administrative entity under Islamic rule. The term was used both by the local population and by foreigners to refer to the geographical region that included Judea, Samaria, Galilee and other areas. With the European conquests, particularly during the Crusades, the term "Palestine" began to be used more frequently to refer to this region. The Crusaders, seeking to control the holy places of Christianity, used the term in their descriptions and maps.

Over time, and particularly in the 19th and 20th centuries, as European interest in the region grew and the Ottoman Empire declined, the term "Palestine" was increasingly used to describe the region specifically. This change coincided with the emergence of Arab nationalism and Zionism, with both movements claiming historical and cultural links with Palestine. The Arab inhabitants of this region began to adopt the term "Palestine" to designate the territory on which they envisaged the creation of a future Arab state. This use was reinforced by the British Mandate over Palestine after the First World War, when Palestine was officially recognised as a separate territorial unit.

Palestine under Ottoman Influence and the British Mandate[modifier | modifier le wikicode]

In the 19th century, Jerusalem and other parts of what was then known as Palestine were the scene of intense and complex rivalries involving churches, states and foreign powers.These tensions were particularly acute in Jerusalem, a place of great religious importance for Christians, Muslims and Jews. The "Holy Places" in and around Jerusalem were at the centre of struggles for influence between different Christian denominations (Catholic, Orthodox, Armenian, etc.) as well as between European powers, each seeking to extend or protect its influence in the region.This competition was often linked to the imperialist ambitions of the European powers, notably France, Russia and the United Kingdom, each of which used the protection of Christian communities as a pretext to intervene in Ottoman affairs.

Faced with these tensions and growing foreign interference, the Ottoman Empire took steps to strengthen its direct control over Jerusalem.Placing the city under the direct authority of Constantinople (now Istanbul) was a way for the Ottoman government to maintain order and assert its sovereignty over this strategically and symbolically important territory. This decision also reflected the need to manage the delicate relations between the different religious communities and to respond to pressure from foreign powers.This period saw the application of the Statu quo, a set of rules and conventions established to regulate the rights and privileges of the different religious communities in the Holy Places.The Statu quo was intended to maintain a balance between the different communities and prevent conflict, although tensions persisted.

The period following the demise of the Ottoman Empire after the First World War was one of profound political and territorial change in the Middle East, including the area we know today as Palestine. With the end of the Ottoman Empire, Palestine came under British mandate, in accordance with the League of Nations agreements.The British continued to use the term "Palestine" to refer to this territory, although the expression "Southern Syria" was also sometimes used to refer to the region, reflecting its geographical and historical proximity to Syria.

On the Zionist side, the term "Arab state" was sometimes used to refer to the part of the British Mandate of Palestine envisaged for the Arab majority in the 1947 UN partition proposal.This proposal envisaged the creation of two separate states, one Jewish and one Arab, with Jerusalem under a special international regime.However, the Arab state envisaged in the partition plan was never established, partly due to the rejection of the plan by Arab leaders and the 1948 Arab-Israeli war.

The Emergence of Palestinian Nationalism and the Conflicts of the 20th Century[modifier | modifier le wikicode]

The process of Arab nationalism in the region of Mandate Palestine was complex and influenced by a variety of factors. Waves of migration, both of Jews fleeing persecution in Europe and of Arabs from other parts of the Middle East, altered the demographic composition of the region. In addition, politico-religious issues, linked to both the rise of Zionism and Arab nationalism, played a key role in defining identities and territorial claims. For Arab nationalists in Mandate Palestine and elsewhere, the defence of land was often expressed in terms of Arabism, an ideology that emphasised Arab identity and unity. This sentiment was reinforced by a perceived threat to Arab identity and the rights of Arab populations in the face of Jewish immigration and Zionist aspirations in the region.

During the period of the British Mandate in Palestine, tensions between the Jewish and Arab communities led to a series of acts of violence, including massacres, assassinations and bombings. The Great Arab Revolt of 1936-1939 in Palestine was a key moment in this period. It was triggered by growing frustration among the Arab population over Jewish immigration and the policies of the British Mandate. The revolt saw attacks on Jewish and British targets and was marked by severe British repression. In response to the revolt and rising tensions, the British government appealed to the League of Nations, which set up the Peel Commission in 1937. The Peel Commission proposed the first partition plan for Palestine, envisaging the creation of two separate states, one Jewish and one Arab, with Jerusalem under international control. This plan was rejected by the majority of Arab leaders, who were opposed to any form of territorial division and to the idea of a Jewish state. It was also rejected by Jewish revisionist groups, who demanded a larger territory for the Jewish state.

Tensions continued to rise until 1947, when the British, exhausted by the difficulties of governance and unable to keep the peace, decided to hand over their mandate over Palestine to the United Nations (UN). The UN then proposed a second partition plan in 1947, which also provided for the creation of two states. This plan was accepted by the majority of Jewish representatives, but rejected by the Palestinian Arabs and neighbouring Arab states. The period that followed saw the escalation of hostilities and led to the 1948 Arab-Israeli War, following the declaration of independence of the State of Israel. This war and the events surrounding it were instrumental in shaping the modern Arab-Israeli conflict, with lasting consequences for the region.

Nakba and Formation of the Palestinian Diaspora[modifier | modifier le wikicode]

The 1948 Palestinian exodus, commonly known as the Nakba (which means "catastrophe" in Arabic), is a central event in Palestinian history and in the Arab-Israeli conflict. It refers to the flight and expulsion of hundreds of thousands of Arab Palestinians from their homes and lands during the 1948 war that followed the creation of the State of Israel. The Nakba began in the context of the civil war in the British Mandate of Palestine, exacerbated by the UN partition plan in 1947, and intensified with the Arab-Israeli war of 1948. During this period, many Arab towns and villages were emptied of their inhabitants due to fighting, expulsions, fears of massacres and psychological pressure. This period saw massive population displacements, leading to a humanitarian crisis and the formation of a large Palestinian refugee population.

The Palestinian refugee question has become one of the most complex and enduring issues in the Arab-Israeli conflict. Many of these refugees and their descendants now live in refugee camps in neighbouring countries such as Lebanon, Jordan and Syria, as well as in the Gaza Strip and the West Bank. The right of return of Palestinian refugees is a key issue in the peace negotiations, but remains a major point of contention. The Nakba was also a determining factor in the formation of the Palestinian diaspora. Palestinians who were displaced from their homes and settled in other countries have continued to maintain their cultural and national identity, contributing to the Palestinian cause in different ways. The annual commemoration of the Nakba is an important moment for the Palestinian community, both in the Palestinian territories and in the diaspora, symbolising their shared experience of loss, resistance and hope for return.

The Palestinian Liberation Movement: From the PLO to Hamas[modifier | modifier le wikicode]

The Palestinian nationalist movement underwent a significant evolution in the late 1950s and early 1960s, marked by a refocusing on specific Palestinian identity, partly in response to the perception that Palestinian interests were not sufficiently represented or defended by regional Arab leaders. This period saw the emergence of new Palestinian political organisations and movements, the most notable of which was the Palestine Liberation Organisation (PLO), founded in 1964. Yasser Arafat, who became a leading figure in the Palestinian movement, played a crucial role in this development. Arafat and his colleagues within the PLO structure and particularly within the Fatah movement began to articulate a vision that emphasised the struggle for an independent Palestinian state, distinct from the broader pan-Arab objectives that had dominated earlier discourses on Palestine.

This redefinition of the Palestinian movement was accompanied by a strategy of armed struggle, seen as a means of liberation and claiming rights to Palestinian land. The PLO and other Palestinian groups carried out various military operations and attacks against Israeli targets, both inside and outside Israel. This period was also marked by tensions and conflicts with neighbouring Arab states, some of which supported the Palestinian movement while others opposed its methods or political objectives. The years 1958-59 marked a turning point in the Palestinian nationalist movement, with a shift from a pan-Arab orientation to a focus on Palestinian national identity and aspirations. Under the leadership of figures such as Yasser Arafat, the movement began to call more explicitly for the creation of a Palestinian state, using armed struggle as a means to achieve its goals.

As early as 1963, military operations led by Palestinian groups, notably Fatah led by Yasser Arafat, began operating from Jordan against Israeli targets. These actions helped to establish Arafat as a central figure in the Palestinian movement, gaining popular support among Arabs through these military initiatives. However, Israeli responses to these attacks put Jordan in a delicate position. In 1970, after a series of escalating tensions and conflicts known as Black September, King Hussein of Jordan ordered military action that led to the expulsion of Palestinian fighters from the country. These fighters then largely resettled in Lebanon. In Lebanon, the presence of Palestinian armed groups had considerable repercussions. They became involved in the Lebanese civil war, further complicating the situation. In 1982, after an assassination attempt on the Israeli ambassador in London, Israel launched Operation Peace in Galilee, a major invasion of Lebanon. The declared aim was to destroy the bases of the Palestinian fighters and push back the Syrian army. This invasion had dramatic consequences, both for Lebanon and for the Palestinians.

During this period, the perception of the Palestinians in Lebanon suffered, and the PLO headquarters finally moved to North Africa. Yasser Arafat and the PLO began to review their objectives, even considering acceptance of a two-state solution. The intifada, which began in 1987 in the Palestinian territories, reinvigorated the Palestinian nationalist movement. This popular uprising drew international attention to the Palestinian cause and helped to change the dynamics of the conflict. This period of turmoil and realignments eventually led to the Oslo Accords in the 1990s, when the PLO, under Arafat's leadership, officially recognised the State of Israel and accepted the principle of Palestinian autonomy in exchange for peace. These agreements marked a significant moment in the history of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, paving the way for a new era of negotiations and dialogue, although the peace process remains complex and unfinished.

Ongoing conflict and the current political divide[modifier | modifier le wikicode]

Negotiations between the PLO under the leadership of Yasser Arafat and Israel, although marking a historic turning point with the Oslo Accords, have failed, particularly on sensitive issues such as Israeli settlements in the Palestinian territories and the right of return of Palestinian refugees. These issues have remained major points of contention, hampering progress towards a lasting solution to the conflict. At the same time, Yasser Arafat and the Palestinian Authority have faced internal criticism, particularly from nationalist and Islamist groups such as Hamas. Arafat was accused of incompetence, corruption and nepotism, which contributed to a loss of confidence and legitimacy among certain sections of the Palestinian population.

Hamas, a Palestinian Islamist movement, gained political influence during this period. Founded in 1987, Hamas advocated a more Islamic approach to the Palestinian movement, distinguishing itself from the PLO in its ideological stance and tactics. Hamas rejected the Oslo Accords and maintained a position of armed resistance against Israel, seeing armed struggle as an essential means of achieving Palestinian goals. The rise of Hamas and other Islamist groups marked a third phase in the Palestinian movement, where the fault lines between different Palestinian factions deepened. This phase was characterised by a diversification of approaches and strategies within the Palestinian movement, reflecting a wider range of views and tactics regarding the achievement of Palestinian goals. This period also saw growing tensions between the Fatah-dominated Palestinian Authority and Hamas, particularly after the latter won the 2006 Palestinian legislative elections. These tensions led to internal conflicts and a political division between the Gaza Strip, controlled by Hamas, and the West Bank, under the authority of the Palestinian Authority.

The resumption of armed struggle and intifada-style actions by Hamas in the Palestinian territories is marked by a rhetoric of jihad against Israel. Founded in 1987, Hamas has both a political and an armed wing, and has played an important role in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. In 2006, Hamas won a significant victory in the Palestinian legislative elections. However, Hamas is considered a terrorist organisation by several countries, including the United States and members of the European Union. This designation is due to Hamas' use of armed struggle tactics, including suicide bombings and the firing of rockets against Israeli civilian targets.

Hamas's electoral victory led to a major political division within the Palestinian territories. Two separate governments emerged: one controlled by Fatah in the West Bank and the other by Hamas in the Gaza Strip. This division has exacerbated the political and economic difficulties in the Palestinian territories. The Palestinian territory remains fragmented, and challenges such as unemployment, poverty and corruption have made the political and economic situation even more precarious. Both the Palestinian Authority in the West Bank and the Hamas government in Gaza face significant internal and external challenges in their management of Palestinian affairs.

The Kurdish case[modifier | modifier le wikicode]

Background to the Kurdish Movement[modifier | modifier le wikicode]

The Kurdish movement, with its aspirations for self-determination, is rooted in the complex and tumultuous history of the Middle East, particularly in the context of the dissolution of the Ottoman Empire after the First World War. The Kurdish people, scattered mainly between Turkey, Iran, Iraq and Syria, have constantly sought to assert their identity and claim their political and cultural rights in a region marked by borders often drawn without regard for ethnic and cultural realities.

After the First World War, the 1920 Treaty of Sèvres envisaged the creation of a Kurdish state. However, this treaty was replaced by the Treaty of Lausanne in 1923, which redefined the borders of modern Turkey without granting the Kurds an independent state. This was a watershed moment, leaving the Kurds without a nation-state, despite their distinct ethnic and cultural identity. In Iraq, the Kurdish movement has gone through several phases of rebellion and negotiations with the central government. The Iraqi Kurdistan Region, after decades of conflict, gained substantial autonomy following the Gulf War in 1991, and its position was strengthened after the invasion of Iraq in 2003. The Kurdistan Regional Government, led by figures such as Massoud Barzani, has established a semi-autonomous entity with its own administration and security forces. In Turkey, the Kurdish conflict has been largely dominated by the struggle of the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK), led by Abdullah Öcalan. Founded in the 1970s, the PKK has waged a guerrilla war for Kurdish rights and autonomy, a conflict that has resulted in tens of thousands of deaths. Despite several attempts at peace, the situation in Turkey remains tense, with periods of conflict and reconciliation.

The civil war in Syria has created a new dynamic for the Kurds in the region. Kurdish forces, notably the People's Protection Units (YPG), have taken control of large parts of north-eastern Syria, establishing a de facto autonomous administration in these areas. This has added a new layer of complexity to regional geopolitics, particularly with the Kurds' involvement in the fight against the Islamic State (EI). The Kurdish movement, in its quest for recognition and rights, continues to shape the politics of the Middle East. Their situation, often referred to as the "Kurdish problem", remains one of the thorniest challenges in the region, involving a mosaic of local, regional and international interests. The Kurds, while seeking to preserve their unique identity, are fighting for a place in an ever-changing Middle East, where questions of autonomy and independence are at the heart of political and social debates.

History and meaning of the word 'Kurdistan[modifier | modifier le wikicode]

The term "Kurdistan", literally meaning "the land of the Kurds", has been in use for several centuries, with references dating back to at least the 12th century. This historical geographical term refers to the region inhabited mainly by the Kurds, an ethnic group indigenous to the mountainous region straddling modern Turkey, Iran, Iraq and Syria. In historical texts, the term "Kurdistan" has been used to describe the regions inhabited by the Kurds, but it is important to note that the precise delimitation and extent of this region has varied over time, depending on political dynamics, border changes and population movements. Throughout history, this region has been part of various empires and states, including the Persian, Arab, Turkish and Ottoman empires. The Kurds, while retaining their distinct cultural and linguistic identity, have often been subject to external rule and have rarely enjoyed autonomy or an independent nation state.

The notion of Kurdistan as a distinct political entity gained prominence in the early 20th century, particularly after the First World War and the fall of the Ottoman Empire, when Kurds began to aspire to greater autonomy or independence. However, aspirations for an independent or autonomous Kurdistan clashed with the political realities of the region's modern nation-states. Today, although Kurdistan as a sovereign state does not exist, the term is widely used to refer to Kurdish-majority regions, particularly Iraqi Kurdistan, which enjoys a significant degree of autonomy within Iraq.

Impact of the Ottoman-Seville War on the Kurds[modifier | modifier le wikicode]

The war between the Iranian Sefevids and the Ottomans in 1514, marked by the emblematic battle of Chaldoran, was a defining moment in the history of the Middle East and is of particular importance to the Kurdish people. This confrontation between two great powers of the time, the Sunni Ottoman Empire under the reign of Selim I and the Shiite Sefavid Empire led by Shah Ismail I, resulted in an Ottoman victory that redefined the geopolitical balance in the region. The Kurdish region, which straddles the border between these two empires, was profoundly affected by this conflict. The Battle of Chaldoran was not only a struggle for territorial power but also an ideological clash between Shiism and Sunnism, which had a direct impact on the Kurdish population. Kurdish territories were divided, with some coming under Ottoman control and others under Sefevid influence.

In this context, Kurdish leaders were faced with difficult choices. Some chose to ally themselves with the Ottomans, hoping for autonomy or political advantages, while others saw the alliance with the Sefevids as a similar opportunity. These decisions were often influenced by local considerations, including tribal rivalries and political and economic interests. The consequences of the Battle of Chaldoran and the subsequent Ottoman-Sevid wars on the Kurds were significant. They led to political and territorial fragmentation that lasted for centuries. The Kurds, divided between different empires and later nation states, struggled to maintain their unique cultural and linguistic identity and to preserve their autonomy.

This period laid the foundations for Kurdish political challenges and autonomous aspirations in the centuries that followed. Their geographical position at the crossroads of empires made the Kurds key players in regional dynamics, while often placing them in a position of vulnerability to the ambitions of neighbouring powers. The Battle of Chaldoran and its repercussions are therefore crucial to understanding the complexity of Kurdish history and the challenges faced by this people in their quest for autonomy and recognition in an ever-changing region.

Treaty of Qasr-e Shirin and its consequences for the Kurds[modifier | modifier le wikicode]

The Treaty of Qasr-e Shirin, also known as the Treaty of Zuhab, signed in 1639 between the Ottoman Empire and the Sephardic dynasty of Persia, established the borders between these two empires, de facto affecting the Kurdish territories. This treaty marked the end of a series of Ottoman-Persian wars and established borders which, to a large extent, remained stable for several centuries and prefigured the modern borders of the region. However, it is important to note that although the 1639 treaty established borders between the Ottoman and Sephardic empires, these borders were not always clearly defined or administered, especially in the mountainous regions inhabited by the Kurds. The Kurds themselves did not have their own nation-state and were spread out on either side of this border, living under Ottoman or Persian (later Iranian) sovereignty depending on the region.

It was not until the 20th century, particularly after the First World War and the fall of the Ottoman Empire, that the borders of the modern states of the Middle East began to be shaped and administered more rigidly. The Sykes-Picot Agreement of 1916, followed by the Treaty of Sèvres in 1920 and the Treaty of Lausanne in 1923, redefined borders in the region, resulting in the division of Kurdish territories between several new nation states, including Turkey, Iraq, Syria and Iran. These developments in the 1940s formalised the existing borders and had a profound impact on the Kurdish question. The division of Kurdish territories between different states posed unique challenges for the Kurdish people in terms of cultural, political and linguistic rights, and shaped their struggle for autonomy and recognition throughout the 20th century and to the present day.

Post-First World War consequences for the Kurds[modifier | modifier le wikicode]

In the period following the First World War, the Middle East witnessed considerable political and territorial transformations, significantly influencing the situation of the Kurds. The fall of the Ottoman Empire and the rise of pan-Islamism, as well as the creation of new nation states, marked the beginning of a new era for the Kurdish people. After the war, Kurdish aspirations for autonomy were largely set aside in the context of the formation of new nation states. In Turkey, for example, under the leadership of Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, a policy of turquification was put in place, aimed at creating a unified national identity centred on the Turkish identity. This policy had a negative impact on the linguistic and cultural rights of the Kurds, exacerbating tensions and fuelling autonomist aspirations. In Iraq and Syria, under the British and French mandates respectively, the situation of the Kurds has been complex and fluctuating. Despite certain measures aimed at recognising Kurdish rights, particularly in terms of social benefits, these efforts were often insufficient to fully meet their political and cultural aspirations. These policies were often marked by periods of repression and marginalisation.

During this period, relations between the Kurds and other ethnic groups in the region, such as the Armenians, were strained. Conflicts in eastern Anatolia and the border regions between Turkey and Armenia were exacerbated by state policies and social upheaval. The Armenian genocide, for example, led to major population displacements and inter-community tensions. The post-Ottoman geopolitical context has had a profound effect on the lives of the Kurds. Caught between the nationalist ambitions of the new states and regional dynamics, the Kurds found themselves in a difficult position, seeking to preserve their identity and their rights in an unstable and often hostile political environment. This era laid the foundations for contemporary struggles for Kurdish self-determination, underlining the persistent challenges faced by this people in gaining recognition and autonomy.

Creation of the First Kurdish Political Organisation[modifier | modifier le wikicode]

The year 1919 marked a turning point in the history of the Kurdish people, with the creation of the first Kurdish political organisation, signifying the emergence of a structured Kurdish nationalist movement. This period, in the aftermath of the First World War and the dissolution of the Ottoman Empire, opened up unprecedented opportunities and challenges for Kurdish aspirations.

The Kurdish political organisation created in 1919 was a concrete expression of the growing desire among Kurds to take their political destiny into their own hands. Its aim was to unite the various Kurdish tribes and communities under a common banner and to articulate demands for autonomy and even independence. The Treaty of Sèvres, signed in 1920, seemed to pave the way for the realisation of these aspirations. This treaty, which redrew the borders of the region after the fall of the Ottoman Empire, included provisions for autonomy for Kurdish territory, and the possibility of future independence if the Kurdish communities so wished. This formal recognition of Kurdish autonomy in the Treaty of Sèvres was seen as a significant victory for the Kurdish nationalist movement. However, the hopes raised by the Treaty of Sèvres quickly evaporated. The treaty was never ratified by the new Turkish Republic, led by Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, and was replaced in 1923 by the Treaty of Lausanne. The Treaty of Lausanne made no mention of an autonomous Kurdistan, leaving Kurdish aspirations without international support. The period following the First World War was therefore one of both opportunity and frustration for the Kurds. Despite the emergence of an organised Kurdish nationalism and the initial recognition of their rights in the Treaty of Sèvres, hopes of autonomy and independence came up against the reality of new political balances and national interests in the reconfigured Middle East.

Challenges of establishing a Kurdish state[modifier | modifier le wikicode]

In the period following the First World War, the Middle East was redrawn by the victorious powers, profoundly affecting the aspirations of the peoples of the region, including those of the Kurds. The Treaty of Sèvres in 1920, which promised a degree of autonomy for the Kurds, raised hopes of an independent Kurdish state. However, this hope was short-lived due to a number of key factors. The geographical distribution of Kurdish populations, scattered between the spheres of influence of France, Great Britain and Russia, hampered the formation of a unified Kurdish state. This territorial division complicated any attempt to create a coherent Kurdish political entity, as each area was subject to different policies and influences. In addition, the allied powers, mainly Britain and France, who had redrawn the map of the Middle East, were reluctant to change their plans to accommodate a Kurdish state. These powers, preoccupied with their own strategic interests in the region, were not prepared to support the Kurdish cause to the detriment of their own geopolitical objectives.

The question of Armenian autonomy also played a role in the failure to establish a Kurdish state. The territories envisaged for Armenian autonomy overlapped with areas populated by Kurds, thus creating conflicts over territorial claims. These tensions exacerbated the complexity of the situation, making it even more difficult to reach a consensus on the Kurdish question. Another important factor was the relative weakness of Kurdish nationalism at the time. Unlike other national movements in the region, Kurdish nationalism had not yet developed a strong, unified base capable of effectively mobilising the masses. Internal divisions, tribal and regional differences, as well as differences of opinion on the strategy to adopt, limited the ability of the Kurds to present a united front. In addition, there was a debate within the Kurdish community on whether to accept or reject the Treaty of Sevres. Some Kurds were considering aligning themselves with Turkish nationalism in the hope of preserving some form of autonomy within a unified Turkish territory.

Ultimately, these challenges and obstacles led to the idea of an independent Kurdish state being abandoned in the years following the First World War. The political reality of the Middle East, shaped by the interests of colonial powers and complex internal dynamics, made the achievement of Kurdish autonomy extremely difficult, laying the foundations for Kurdish struggles for recognition and autonomy in the decades that followed.

Turkish Kurdistan[modifier | modifier le wikicode]

Turkey's Assimilation Policy and the Denial of Kurdish Identity[modifier | modifier le wikicode]

The early 1920s in Turkey, under the leadership of Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, were marked by radical changes in the construction of the Turkish nation-state. One aspect of this transformation was the policy of assimilation and acculturation of ethnic minorities, particularly the Kurds. In 1924, as part of these efforts, the use of the terms "Kurd" and "Kurdistan" was officially banned in Turkey, symbolising an explicit denial of Kurdish identity.

This policy was part of a wider strategy of cultural and linguistic homogenisation aimed at forging a unified Turkish identity. The Turkish authorities implemented policies aimed at forcibly assimilating Kurdish populations, including the displacement of populations and the suppression of Kurdish cultural and linguistic expressions. Kurds were often described by the Turkish authorities as "mountain Turks", in an attempt to reinterpret and deny their distinct identity. This theorisation aimed to justify assimilation policies by asserting that linguistic and cultural differences were simply regional variations within the Turkish population.

These policies led to a context of permanent revolt within the Kurdish population. The Kurds, faced with the denial of their identity and the repression of their cultural and linguistic rights, resisted these efforts at assimilation. This resistance has taken various forms, from armed revolt to the clandestine preservation of Kurdish culture and language. The Kurdish revolts in Turkey, particularly those led by figures such as Sheikh Said in 1925, were moments of direct confrontation with the Turkish state. These rebellions, although suppressed, highlighted the deep tensions and disagreements between the Turkish government and its Kurdish population.

Kurdish Cultural Renaissance and Post-World War II Political Tensions[modifier | modifier le wikicode]

At the end of the Second World War, Turkey underwent a period of transformation and identity crisis that indirectly contributed to a renewed interest in Kurdish language, culture and history. This period marked a renaissance of Kurdish nationalism, although the circumstances were complex and often contradictory. The post-war period in Turkey was characterised by a relative openness and a questioning of Turkish national identity. This openness led to a certain rediscovery of Kurdish culture, which had previously been repressed under Kemalist assimilation policies. Kurdish and Turkish intellectuals began to explore Kurdish history and culture, contributing to a growing awareness of a distinct Kurdish identity. This cultural revival served as a catalyst for the development of Kurdish nationalism, with a new generation of Kurds demanding their cultural and political rights more openly.

However, this period was also marked by political instability in Turkey, with several military coups and increased repression. The military regimes that came to power in Turkey during the 1960s and 1980s, although sometimes open to certain reforms, maintained a hard line on ethnic policy, particularly with regard to the Kurdish question. The nationalist policies of these regimes often led to renewed repression of Kurdish cultural and political expression. The tension between the Kurdish cultural renaissance and state repression has led to a period of increased conflict. The Kurdish movement, increasingly organised and politicised, has faced major challenges, both from the Turkish state and from its own internal dynamics. The Kurdish question has become a central issue in Turkish politics, symbolising the limits of the nation-state model in Turkey and the challenges posed by the country's ethnic and cultural diversity.

PKK Armed Struggle and Impact on the Kurdish Question in Turkey[modifier | modifier le wikicode]

The armed struggle of the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK), which began in 1984, represents a decisive turning point in the history of the Kurdish movement in Turkey. Founded by Abdullah Öcalan in 1978, the PKK emerged as a Marxist-Leninist movement, oriented towards class struggle and Kurdish independence. The PKK's decision to launch a guerrilla campaign against the Turkish state marked the beginning of a prolonged period of armed conflict that has had a profound effect on south-east Turkey and the Kurdish community.

The context in which the PKK began its armed struggle was complex. The 1980s in Turkey were a period of political tension and increased repression against dissident groups, including Kurdish movements. In response to what they perceived as systematic oppression and the denial of their cultural and linguistic rights, the PKK opted for armed struggle as a means of demanding Kurdish autonomy. In its early years, the PKK enjoyed a degree of support from countries aligned with the Soviet bloc. This support took the form of training, arms supplies and logistical support, although the exact extent and nature of this support was open to debate. This support was partly due to the dynamics of the Cold War, when the PKK was seen as a potential ally by NATO member Turkey's enemies. The Turkish government's response to the PKK insurgency was characterised by intense military repression. Massive security operations were launched in the Kurdish regions, with serious humanitarian consequences, including civilian and military casualties and the displacement of Kurdish populations.

Over time, the PKK's philosophy and objectives have evolved. While its roots were deeply rooted in Marxist-Leninist ideology, the movement gradually adapted its demands, moving from the demand for an independent Kurdish state to calls for greater autonomy and recognition of Kurdish cultural and linguistic rights. The PKK's armed struggle put the Kurdish question at the centre of national and international attention, highlighting the complexity and challenges of the Kurdish question in Turkey. It has also polarised opinion, both within Turkey and the Kurdish community, on the appropriate strategies and objectives in the quest for Kurdish autonomy and rights. The conflict between the PKK and the Turkish state remains a thorny issue, symbolising the tension between Kurdish aspirations for autonomy and Turkey's imperatives of security and national unity.

International context and Soviet interest in the Kurdish Regions[modifier | modifier le wikicode]

Since 1946, the Soviet Union has shown a growing interest in the Middle East, particularly in regions with a high concentration of Kurds and Azeris. This Soviet involvement is part of the wider context of the Cold War and the USSR's strategy to extend its influence in strategically important regions. One of the most significant examples of this policy was Soviet support for the Iranian Autonomous Republic of Azerbaijan. In 1945, at the end of the Second World War, the Soviet Union, which had occupied northern Iran during the war, encouraged and supported the creation of the Autonomous Republic of Azerbaijan, as well as the Republic of Kurdistan, in Iran. These autonomous entities were established with the support of local communists and the Soviets, and represented a direct challenge to the authority of the central Iranian government, then led by Reza Shah Pahlavi. The creation of these autonomous republics was seen by the USSR as an opportunity to extend its influence in the region and counter the British and American presence.

However, the ensuing Iranian-Soviet conflict led to international pressure on the Soviet Union to withdraw its troops from Iran. In 1946, under pressure from the international community and the United States in particular, the USSR withdrew its support for the autonomous republics, which were quickly taken over by Iranian forces. This period was significant for international relations in the region, showing how the dynamics of the Cold War influenced regional policies. Soviet support for autonomous movements in Iran not only reflected the geopolitical interests of the USSR, but also highlighted the aspirations of ethnic minorities in the region, including the Kurds and Azeris, for greater autonomy and recognition.

Religious and political tensions among Kurds in Iran[modifier | modifier le wikicode]

Since the early 2000s, the situation of the Kurds in Iran has been characterised by growing tension due to religious and political differences. Iran, a predominantly Shia state, has seen its relations with its predominantly Sunni Kurdish population strained by religious, cultural and political factors. The sectarian difference between Iran's Shia majority and the Sunni Kurdish minority is a key aspect of this tension. While Iran has consolidated its Shia identity since the Islamic revolution of 1979, Iranian Kurds have often felt marginalised because of their Sunni religious affiliation. This situation is exacerbated by issues of cultural and linguistic rights, with Kurds demanding greater recognition of their ethnic and cultural identity.

Political tensions between Iranian Kurds and the central government have intensified due to perceptions of marginalisation and economic neglect. Kurds in Iran have long fought for greater regional autonomy and recognition of their linguistic and cultural rights, including the right to education and media in their mother tongue. The Iranian government's response to these demands has often been repression. Kurdish political movements in Iran have been closely monitored and sometimes repressed. Armed clashes have broken out on several occasions between the Iranian security forces and armed Kurdish groups, the latter seeking to defend Kurdish rights and autonomy.

The situation of the Kurds in Iran is also influenced by regional dynamics. Developments concerning the Kurds in Iraq, notably the creation of an autonomous region of Iraqi Kurdistan, have had an impact on the aspirations of the Kurds in Iran. At the same time, Iran's foreign policy, in particular its involvement in regional conflicts such as Syria and Iraq, is having an impact on its domestic policy towards its own Kurdish population. In conclusion, the tensions between the Kurds and the Iranian government since the 2000s are the result of a complex mix of religious, cultural and political factors. These tensions reflect the challenges of governance in a multi-ethnic and multi-faith society and underline the persistent difficulties of minorities in the region to gain greater recognition and autonomy.

Iraqi Kurdistan[modifier | modifier le wikicode]

The Origins of Iraqi Kurdistan and the Vilayet of Mosul[modifier | modifier le wikicode]

The history of Iraqi Kurdistan and its relationship with the vilayet of Mosul during the British Mandate is crucial to understanding the political and ethnic dynamics of the region. After the First World War and the dissolution of the Ottoman Empire, the Ottoman province of Mosul vilayet became a central issue in the redrawing of the borders of the Middle East.

The Mosul vilayet was rich in ethnic diversity and included a significant Kurdish population, as well as other groups such as Arabs, Assyrians and Turkmen. At the time of the establishment of the British mandate over Mesopotamia, which was to become Iraq, the future of this province was widely debated. The British, keen to control the region's oil resources, argued for its inclusion in Iraq, despite Turkey's territorial claims. In 1925, after a long process of negotiation and deliberation, the League of Nations decided in favour of annexing the vilayet of Mosul to Iraq. This decision was crucial in defining Iraq's northern borders and had a significant impact on the region's Kurdish population. The League's decision placed a large number of Kurds under Iraqi administration, changing the political and ethnic landscape of the new state.

The Struggle for Kurdish Autonomy in the 20th Century[modifier | modifier le wikicode]

The integration of the Mosul vilayet into Iraq has influenced the Kurdish movement in the country. The Kurds, seeking to preserve their cultural and linguistic identity and achieve greater political autonomy, have faced a variety of challenges under successive governments in Baghdad. The struggle for Kurdish autonomy intensified throughout the 20th century, culminating in the creation of an autonomous Kurdistan region in the 1990s, after decades of conflict and negotiations. The development of Iraqi Kurdistan as an autonomous region was reinforced after the invasion of Iraq in 2003, establishing the region as a key player in Iraqi politics. The history of the vilayet of Mosul and its integration into modern Iraq are therefore essential to understanding the current dynamics of Iraqi Kurdistan, highlighting the historical and political complexities of nation-state formation in the region and the persistent challenges of ethnic and cultural diversity.

The League of Nations' decision in 1925 to annex the vilayet of Mosul to the British mandate of Iraq was a crucial step in the formation of the modern Iraqi state and had profound implications for the Kurdish nationalist movement in the region. The decision incorporated a territory with a sizeable Kurdish population into Iraq, laying the foundations for an ongoing Kurdish struggle for recognition and autonomy. The Kurdish nationalist movement in Iraq has been characterised by remarkable resilience and continuity, despite political challenges and obstacles. The struggle of the Kurds in Iraq for autonomy and recognition of their rights has been punctuated by rebellions, negotiations and sometimes violent repression. This perseverance reflects the specific nature of Kurdish nationalism in Iraq, where aspirations for regional autonomy and the preservation of Kurdish cultural identity have been constant themes.

Attempts at negotiations and agreements between the Kurdish leadership and the Iraqi government have often been unsuccessful, marked by broken promises and violated agreements. One of the factors contributing to these failures has been the lack of consistent international support for the Kurdish cause. In particular, Iran's withdrawal of support for Kurdish nationalism has been a significant setback. Iran, which has its own Kurdish populations and concerns about Kurdish autonomy within its borders, has often wavered in its support for the Kurds in Iraq, depending on its own geopolitical and security interests. The situation of the Kurds in Iraq has continued to evolve over the course of the 20th century, with periods of severe repression under regimes such as that of Saddam Hussein, as well as significant advances, such as the establishment of an autonomous Kurdistan region in the 1990s. These developments have been influenced by a variety of regional and international factors, reflecting the complexity of the Kurdish question in the region.

The Emergence of Kurdish Autonomy in the 1990s[modifier | modifier le wikicode]

1991 was a defining moment for the Kurdish movement in Iraq, particularly following the Gulf War and the weakening of Saddam Hussein's regime. The end of this war created an unprecedented opportunity for the Iraqi Kurds to establish a form of de facto autonomy in their regions.

Following Iraq's defeat in the Gulf War, a popular uprising broke out in the north of the country, mainly among the Kurds. This uprising was brutally put down by Saddam Hussein's regime, leading to a serious humanitarian crisis and massive population displacement. In response, the United States, the United Kingdom and France set up a no-fly zone north of the 36th parallel, allowing the Kurds to gain a significant degree of autonomy. This de facto autonomy enabled the Kurds to develop their own political and administrative institutions, a major step forward for Kurdish nationalism in Iraq. The Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) was formed, with its own administrative, legislative and security structures. Although this autonomy was not officially recognised by the Iraqi government at the time, it represented a turning point in Kurdish history in Iraq.

Iraqi Kurdistan in the New Post-2003 Political Context[modifier | modifier le wikicode]

The situation changed significantly after the fall of Saddam Hussein's regime in 2003. The new Iraqi constitution, adopted in 2005, officially recognised Iraqi Kurdistan as a federal entity within Iraq. This constitutional recognition legalised Kurdish autonomy and was a major step towards realising Kurdish political aspirations. The inclusion of Kurdish autonomy in the Iraqi constitution also symbolised an important evolution in Iraqi politics, marking a break with the centralised and repressive policies of previous regimes. It also reflected changes in the political dynamics of the post-Saddam Middle East, where issues of ethnic and regional identity have become increasingly prominent.

The withdrawal of US troops from Iraq in 2009 and subsequent events had a significant impact on the situation of the Kurds in Iraq, exacerbating tensions between the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) and the central government in Baghdad. After the US withdrawal, relations between Erbil, the capital of Iraqi Kurdistan, and Baghdad deteriorated. The Kurds often expressed concerns about increasing marginalisation by the central Iraqi government. These tensions centred on a range of issues, including the sharing of oil revenues, the status of disputed areas (such as oil-rich Kirkuk), and the political and administrative autonomy of Iraqi Kurdistan.

The referendum on the independence of Iraqi Kurdistan, held in September 2017, marked a high point in these tensions. The referendum, which saw an overwhelming majority vote in favour of independence, was organised by the KRG despite strong opposition from Baghdad as well as international warnings. The Iraqi government, as well as several neighbouring countries and the international community, considered the referendum illegal and a threat to Iraq's territorial integrity. In response to the referendum, the Iraqi central government took severe measures, including the military takeover of some disputed areas, such as Kirkuk, and the imposition of economic and transport restrictions on Iraqi Kurdistan. These actions underlined the fragility of Kurdish autonomy in Iraq and highlighted the political and security challenges facing the region. The referendum and its aftermath also revealed the internal divisions within the Iraqi Kurdish movement, as well as the complexities of regional politics. While some Kurdish leaders saw the referendum as a step towards long-awaited independence, others expressed concerns about its timing and potential implications.

Syrian Kurdistan[modifier | modifier le wikicode]

The creation of the 'Arab Belt' and its repercussions[modifier | modifier le wikicode]

In the 1960s, the situation of the Kurds in Syria was profoundly affected by the policies of the Syrian nationalist government. During this period, Syria, under the influence of the Ba'ath party, adopted an Arab nationalist approach which exacerbated ethnic divisions, particularly among the Kurdish community. One of the most notable and controversial policies of this period was the creation of the "Arab Belt". This initiative aimed to change the demographic composition of the regions with a high concentration of Kurds along the border with Turkey. The government encouraged Arabs to settle in these areas, often by forcibly displacing Kurdish populations. This policy was partly justified by development projects, such as the construction of a railway line, but was clearly politically motivated in order to dilute the Kurdish presence.

These actions led to forced displacement and increased economic and social marginalisation of the Kurds in Syria. The 'Arab Belt' not only caused demographic upheaval, but also fuelled a sense of injustice and exclusion among Syrian Kurds. These policies have heightened ethnic tensions in the region and contributed to a growing sense of mistrust towards central government. The consequences of these policies have been long-lasting. Kurds in Syria have continued to struggle for recognition of their cultural and political rights, as well as for autonomy. These tensions were exacerbated during the Syrian civil war that broke out in 2011, in which the Kurds played a significant role, seeking to establish some form of autonomy in north-eastern Syria.

The Kurds in Syria and the Struggle for Autonomy[modifier | modifier le wikicode]

In the 2000s, and particularly with the start of the Syrian civil war in 2011, the Kurds of Syria began to demonstrate more visibly for autonomy. This period marked a turning point in the Syrian Kurds' struggle for recognition and self-determination.

Before the civil war, Kurds in Syria were often marginalised and deprived of basic rights. The regime of Bashar al-Assad, like that of his father Hafez al-Assad, maintained a policy of repression towards Kurdish culture and Kurdish political aspirations. However, with the outbreak of the civil war, central power in Damascus weakened, giving the Kurds an unprecedented opportunity to claim autonomy. Taking advantage of the power vacuum created by the conflict, Kurdish groups, principally the People's Protection Units (YPG) and the Democratic Union Party (PYD), took control of large areas of northern Syria. These groups have established a form of autonomous governance in these areas, including aspects such as civil administration, defence and education.

This de facto autonomy has been reinforced by the crucial role played by Kurdish forces in the fight against the Islamic State (EI), attracting the support and recognition of the international community, particularly the United States. The Kurds have managed to establish relatively stable areas of autonomy, known as the Northern and Eastern Syrian Autonomous Administration, despite continuing challenges, including tensions with the Syrian government and threats from neighbouring Turkey. However, the situation remains precarious. Official recognition of Kurdish autonomy in Syria by the government in Damascus remains uncertain, and regional tensions continue to threaten the stability of the Kurdish regions. The Syrian Kurds' quest for autonomy is therefore an ongoing process, deeply linked to the complex political and security developments in Syria and the wider region.

The Questioning of Nation-States in the Middle East[modifier | modifier le wikicode]

Since the Anglo-American intervention in Iraq in 2003, followed by the Iraqi civil war and the Syrian crisis from 2011 onwards, the concept of stable nation-states in the Middle East has been profoundly challenged. The invasion of Iraq, aimed at overthrowing Saddam Hussein, triggered a series of unforeseen consequences, sending the country into a spiral of sectarian violence and political instability. The situation was further complicated by the emergence of the Islamic State, which exploited the chaos in Iraq and Syria to establish a cross-border caliphate, challenging the legitimacy of national borders and governments.

The Syrian civil war, which began with the popular uprising against the regime of Bashar al-Assad in 2011, further exacerbated regional instability. The conflict has attracted a multitude of regional and international actors, each pursuing its own strategic objectives. The repercussions of these conflicts have extended beyond national borders, exacerbating sectarian and ethnic tensions and triggering large-scale refugee flows. These events have exposed the flaws in the Middle East's nation-states, whose borders were drawn by the colonial powers after the First World War. These borders, often established without regard for the ethnic, cultural and religious realities on the ground, have given rise to persistent tensions and conflicts.

Despite these challenges, the borders established in the Middle East have shown remarkable resilience. They remain key elements of the regional political order, despite being the scene of incessant conflict. The states of the region, though weakened, continue to struggle to maintain their sovereignty and territorial integrity in the face of secessionist movements and foreign interference. The future of nation-states in the Middle East remains uncertain. The conflicts in Iraq and Syria have revealed deep divisions and raised fundamental questions about the legitimacy and viability of existing state structures. Against this backdrop, new political and territorial configurations could emerge, redefining the political landscape of the Middle East in the years to come.

Controversial Perspectives on Middle East Borders and the Syrian Civil War[modifier | modifier le wikicode]

Ralph Peters, a former US Army officer and commentator on geopolitical issues, has presented a controversial perspective on the borders of the Middle East. In his writings, he argues that the region's current borders, largely inherited from the colonial and post-First World War era, do not reflect the political, cultural and religious reality on the ground. Peters argues that these artificial borders have contributed to many conflicts by failing to reflect the national, ethnic and religious identities of local societies. His vision, sometimes illustrated by redrawn maps of the Middle East, proposes a reconfiguration of borders to better reflect these realities. For example, he suggests the creation of an independent Kurdish state encompassing parts of Iraq, Syria, Iran and Turkey, where large Kurdish populations live. It also envisages territorial adjustments for other ethnic and religious groups, with the aim of creating more homogenous states.

This proposal has provoked heated debate and widespread criticism, including within NATO and other international circles. Critics point out that redrawing borders along ethnic and religious lines is extremely complex and risky. They point to the dangers of aggravating existing tensions and creating new conflicts. Moreover, redefining national borders raises questions about sovereignty, self-determination and international intervention. Peters' ideas reflect a wider challenge facing the Middle East: how to manage ethnic and religious diversity in nation-states formed along lines drawn by foreign powers. While his proposals may seem logical from a simplified geopolitical perspective, they fail to take into account the complexity of national identities, historical relationships between groups, and political realities on the ground.

MOMCENC - Ralph Peters- Near East - Middle East.png

The Syrian civil war, which broke out in 2011, has brought about fundamental changes in the structure and composition of the Syrian nation, calling into question the viability of the nation-state model in the context of the Middle East. While Bashar Al-Assad's regime appears to be gaining ground, the reality on the ground has profoundly altered the very nature of the Syrian nation. The conflict in Syria has exposed the deep-seated flaws of a state built on heterogeneous foundations, in which the various ethnic and religious communities, including Kurds, Alawites, Sunnis, Christians and others, have been integrated in a precarious manner. The war has exacerbated these divisions, destroying the social fabric and causing a major humanitarian crisis. Historic cities such as Aleppo and Homs have been devastated, while millions of Syrians have been displaced within the country or have fled abroad, forming large diaspora communities.

Post-war Syria will face enormous challenges in rebuilding not only its infrastructure, but also its society. Assad's centralised and often authoritarian governance will have to adapt to a reality where different communities aspire to greater recognition and representation. These communities, although geographically delimited by Syria's national borders, are intrinsically linked by confessional, cultural and historical ties that transcend these borders. The concept of diaspora has become particularly relevant for Syria. Syrians abroad maintain close links with their homeland, playing a key role in the preservation of cultural identity and in the potential reconstruction of the country. The Syrian diaspora represents a diversity of opinions and experiences, reflecting the complexity of Syrian society as a whole.

The Persian Gulf[modifier | modifier le wikicode]

The Persian Gulf: History, Importance and Debates on Terminology[modifier | modifier le wikicode]

The region known as the Persian Gulf is often at the centre of debate over its name. Indeed, some states, particularly those in the Arab world, prefer to use the term "Arab Gulf". This debate over terminology reflects the tensions and political dynamics in the region, where history, culture and national identity play a key role in how places are named. The Gulf, whether called the "Persian Gulf" or the "Arab Gulf", is a region of great strategic, economic and cultural importance. It is bordered by several key countries, including Kuwait, Qatar, Bahrain, the United Arab Emirates and Oman, as well as Iran and Saudi Arabia. The region is known for its vast reserves of oil and natural gas, making it one of the richest and most strategically important areas in the world.

In recent decades, the Gulf has become synonymous with prosperity and luxury, particularly in the states of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), which includes Kuwait, Qatar, Bahrain, the United Arab Emirates, Oman and Saudi Arabia. These countries have used their oil wealth to develop modern, diversified economies, investing heavily in urban development, tourism, education and infrastructure. Cities such as Dubai in the United Arab Emirates and Doha in Qatar have become symbols of this prosperity, attracting international investment and tourists from all over the world. These states have also sought to play a greater role on the international stage, whether through diplomacy, economic investment or the organisation of world-class events.

Prosperity and Transformation in the Persian Gulf States[modifier | modifier le wikicode]

The political and economic history of the Persian Gulf is closely linked to British influence in the region, which began to manifest itself significantly in the 19th century. At that time, the British Empire, seeking to secure the sea routes to India, its colonial jewel, began to establish a presence in the Persian Gulf. This influence took the form of protectorate agreements with the local emirates, giving Britain significant control over the political and economic affairs of the region. British interest in the Gulf increased with the discovery of oil in the early 20th century. The British played a crucial role in the development of the oil industry, notably by establishing companies such as the Anglo-Persian Oil Company (which later became British Petroleum, or BP). This period saw a transformation of the region from a primarily maritime strategic importance to a centre of the global oil economy.

The British withdrawal from the region in the 1960s and 1970s marked a new era for the Gulf States. This period of decolonisation coincided with a significant rise in global demand for oil, propelling these newly independent states towards unprecedented economic prosperity. Independence also led to the formation of state-specific political structures, often in the form of monarchies, which continue to characterise governance in the region. However, the British legacy in the Persian Gulf has left lasting traces. The borders drawn during the colonial period, and the political and economic alliances established, have continued to influence the international relations and domestic politics of the Gulf States. The close relationship between these states and the Western powers, particularly the United States after the British withdrawal, has played a crucial role in the region's security and economic policy.

Throughout its history, the Persian Gulf has been closely linked to Mesopotamia, thanks in part to its rich pearl trade, a predominant economic activity long before the advent of the oil era. Important centres of this trade were established in Bahrain and Oman, where pearl fishing was an essential source of income for the local populations. Since ancient times, the waters of the Persian Gulf have been renowned for their rich pearl deposits. The region of Bahrain, in particular, was known as a major centre for pearl farming, attracting traders and merchants from various parts of the ancient world. In Oman, the long coastline also favoured the development of an active maritime trade, including the pearl trade. These activities were crucial to local economies, especially in regions otherwise limited in natural resources.

The economic and cultural boom under the Abbasids, from the 8th century onwards, contributed to the expansion of trade in the Persian Gulf. This period saw a flourishing development of trade, with the Gulf ports serving as important hubs for regional and international commerce. Trade in pearls, as well as other goods, flourished under the Abbasid administration, which effectively integrated the region into an extended empire. However, the decline of the Abbasid caliphate in the 13th century marked the beginning of a more difficult period for the region. Invasions, political unrest and the fragmentation of the empire disrupted trade and weakened the regional economy. Despite these challenges, the pearl trade continued to play a significant economic role until the 20th century.

From the 15th century onwards, a new era began for the Persian Gulf with the arrival of the European powers, motivated by the spice trade and the mastery of maritime routes. The Portuguese, led by navigators such as Vasco da Gama, were the first to establish a presence in the region in the early 16th century, seeking to control the trade routes to India and gain direct access to the lucrative sources of spices. Maritime trade became the main means of European influence in the Gulf. The Portuguese established several bases, such as Hormuz, which enabled them to control trade routes and influence local politics. This presence paved the way for other European powers, notably the British and the Dutch, who also sought to establish their influence in the region.

The impact of Europe's arrival in the Gulf was profound. It not only altered existing power structures, but also introduced new maritime and military technologies. Local states have had to navigate this new geopolitical environment, often forming alliances with or against these foreign powers. European involvement has significantly changed the regional dynamics of the Gulf. Rivalry between European powers for control of trade routes and strategic points has had a significant impact on the history of the region. For example, competition between the Portuguese and the British eventually led to more established British domination of the Gulf in the 19th century. This period thus marks a turning point in the history of the Persian Gulf, where the region moved from being a relatively autonomous commercial and cultural centre to a theatre of international rivalry and foreign domination. These events laid the foundations for future relations between the Gulf and the West, and influenced the political, economic and social development of the region until modern times.

British influence in the Persian Gulf[modifier | modifier le wikicode]

British involvement in the Persian Gulf evolved significantly from the 18th century onwards, marked by an increase in trade and the emergence of security challenges. The main reason for the British presence in the region was to protect the maritime trade routes to India, a jewel in the crown of the British colonial empire. Trade with India was intensified under British influence, transforming the Gulf into a vital commercial crossroads. However, this period was also marked by security challenges. The region was troubled by piracy and conflicts between various local chieftains, which threatened the free flow of goods and the safety of shipping routes. The British were therefore faced with the need to stabilise the region in order to maintain and secure their commercial interests.

With French expansion in the region, particularly following Napoleon Bonaparte's Egyptian campaign at the end of the 18th century, the British felt an increased threat to their interests. In response, they established pacts with local actors, such as the treaty with Oman, aimed at containing French expansionism. These agreements were essential to establishing friendly relations and guaranteeing a degree of stability in the region. In addition to external threats, the British had to deal with piracy activities in the Gulf. They adopted a negotiating approach with the pirates, seeking to end their raids on maritime trade. These agreements played a key role in securing the sea lanes and allowing trade to flow more smoothly in the region.

In the 19th century, these treaties determined Britain's economic and strategic policy in the Gulf. Not only did they secure the region, they also laid the foundations for future relations between Britain and the Gulf States. Although the region has been marked by instability, the growing commitment of local leaders to refrain from war has contributed to relative stabilisation, allowing the British to maintain considerable influence. These historical developments were crucial in shaping the politics and economy of the Persian Gulf, foreshadowing the modern dynamics of the region. The period of British influence laid the foundations for the political structures and alliances that still characterise the Gulf States today.

The Persian Gulf during the First World War[modifier | modifier le wikicode]

When the First World War broke out, it created a new geopolitical dynamic in the Persian Gulf, a region already marked by the growing influence of the European powers. Kuwait, strategically located at the entrance to the Gulf, played a crucial role in this new configuration. Led at the time by Sheikh Mubarak Al-Sabah, Kuwait sought to strengthen its position by aligning itself more closely with Great Britain. Already under a protectorate agreement signed in 1899, in which Sheikh Mubarak Al-Sabah had undertaken not to cede, lease or sell territory without British consent in return for British protection, Kuwait saw the war as an opportunity to consolidate this relationship. The rise of the Ottoman Empire as a threat during the war accentuated Kuwait's need for security and support. In response to these circumstances, Kuwait and Britain strengthened their protectorate agreement. This renewed agreement provided stronger protection for Kuwait against Ottoman ambitions and strengthened political and economic ties with Britain. For Britain, securing Kuwait was essential to protect its shipping routes to India and to maintain its influence in the oil-rich Gulf region.

The First World War thus had a significant impact on the Persian Gulf, redefining relations between local states and European powers. The agreements reached during this period between states such as Kuwait and Great Britain shaped the geopolitical future of the region, laying the foundations for the political and economic structure that would prevail for decades to come. This historic period also underlined the strategic importance of the Persian Gulf, not only for regional powers, but also for global players. The decisions taken and alliances formed during the First World War had lasting repercussions, influencing the politics, economies and societies of this key region.

British withdrawal and the emergence of the modern Gulf States[modifier | modifier le wikicode]

The 1960s were a pivotal period for the Persian Gulf, characterised by a fundamental change in the region's international relations. This change was mainly driven by the United Kingdom's decision to withdraw from its strategic positions east of Suez, including the Persian Gulf. This decision, announced in 1968, came at a time when Britain, affected by economic constraints and a change in political paradigm, was reassessing its imperial role around the world. Britain's gradual withdrawal from the Gulf coincided with a period of geopolitical realignment. The independence of India and Pakistan in 1947 had already marked the beginning of the end of the British Empire, and the loss of these key colonies influenced the decision to reduce the British military presence in other regions. In the Gulf, this withdrawal left a power vacuum that had major implications for the states of the region.

The Gulf States, which had long been under British influence or protection, found themselves in a position where they had to navigate autonomously in a complex international environment. This accelerated the process of the formation of modern nation states in the region and gave rise to the creation of new political structures and alliances, such as the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) founded in 1981. The British withdrawal also opened the door to other international influences, in particular that of the United States. In the context of the Cold War and the growing strategic importance of oil, the United States strengthened its presence in the Gulf, establishing close relations with countries such as Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and the United Arab Emirates. This new configuration has redefined the balance of power in the region and had a significant impact on regional and international policies.

Oil discovery and the Second Wave of Independence[modifier | modifier le wikicode]

Following the British withdrawal from the Persian Gulf in the 1960s, local princes and rulers, who had previously established alliances with the UK, were faced with crucial decisions about the future of their territories. This period was characterised by profound political change, marking the formation of modern nation states in the Gulf region. British withdrawal left a power vacuum and paved the way for full sovereignty for the Gulf States. Notable examples include the independence of Bahrain and Qatar in 1971, followed shortly afterwards by the formation of the United Arab Emirates, a federation of seven emirates. These events were crucial steps in defining the political boundaries and governmental structures of these nations.

The leaders of these new states have had to navigate a complex landscape, balancing the need to develop stable government institutions and manage international relations, while exploiting abundant natural resources, particularly oil and gas. The post-British era has also been marked by efforts to modernise and develop these countries, as witnessed by the reign of Sultan Qaboos bin Said in Oman, who initiated a series of reforms to transform his country. This period of transition has also seen an increase in the influence of the United States in the region. The Gulf States, rich in oil resources, became important strategic allies for the United States, particularly in the context of the Cold War and energy interests. The British withdrawal marked an era of significant transformation for the Gulf States. The decisions taken by local leaders during this period not only shaped the political and economic structures of their countries, but also had a profound impact on regional and international dynamics. The story of this period illustrates how geopolitical changes can influence the formation and development of nation states, as well as the complexity of international relations in a resource-rich region.

The discovery of oil in the Persian Gulf radically transformed the region, attracting significant renewed interest from Western powers. This hydrocarbon wealth coincided with a period of major political transition, leading to a second wave of independence for several states in the region in the 1970s. Oil, first discovered in the Gulf in the early 20th century, began to play a crucial role in the global economy, particularly after the Second World War. With some of the world's largest oil reserves, the Gulf countries quickly became key players in the global energy market. This wealth attracted the attention of Western powers keen to secure access to these vital resources.

In the 1970s, with the end of the British protectorate and the British withdrawal from the region, the Gulf States began a process of asserting their sovereignty and political independence. This period saw the emergence of independent and sovereign nations such as the United Arab Emirates in 1971, which united the Trucial Emirates under a single federation. Bahrain and Qatar also gained independence during this period. The oil-driven economic boom enabled these young nations to invest massively in development and modernisation. Oil revenues transformed societies that had previously focused primarily on fishing and the pearl trade into modern states with advanced infrastructures, social services and diversified economies. However, increased Western interest in the region was not without geopolitical implications. Relations between the oil-producing countries of the Gulf and the Western powers, particularly the United States, became a central aspect of international politics. These relations have been marked by complex dynamics of cooperation, economic dependence and political tensions.

Political Islam[modifier | modifier le wikicode]

The Emergence and Foundations of Political Islam[modifier | modifier le wikicode]

Political Islam is an ideology that gained ground during the 20th century, significantly influencing politics and society in Muslim-majority countries. This ideology aims to structure society and the state according to the principles and laws of Islam, based on a specific interpretation of religious texts such as the Koran and the Sunna. The emergence of political Islam can be seen as a response to the challenges posed by colonialism, modernisation and social change. Figures such as Hassan al-Banna, founder of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt in 1928, and Sayyid Qutb, an influential theoretician of the same movement, were pioneers in formulating and promoting the ideology of political Islam. Their teachings and writings laid the foundations for a vision of society in which Islamic principles are integrated into all aspects of life, including governance.

Political Islam manifests itself in different forms, ranging from moderate reformist movements to more radical groups. Some groups, such as the Muslim Brotherhood, have sought to achieve their goals through political and social means, while others, such as al-Qaeda or the Islamic State, have adopted extremist and violent methods. A striking example of the impact of political Islam is the Iranian Revolution of 1979, led by Ayatollah Khomeini. This revolution led to the establishment of an Islamic republic in Iran, where laws and governance are based on specific interpretations of Shia Islam.

Political Islam also played a significant role in the Arab Spring events of 2011, where several Islamist movements emerged as key political actors in countries such as Egypt, Tunisia and Libya. However, political Islam is a subject of controversy and debate. Its critics point to the risks of restricting individual freedoms, particularly as regards the rights of women and minorities. On the other hand, its supporters see it as a means of preserving cultural values and resisting Western influence. The rise of political Islam in the Arab world can largely be attributed to the failure of pan-Arabism, a political movement that advocated unity and cooperation between Arab countries while opposing Western domination. This ideology, which reached its peak in the 1950s and 1960s under leaders such as Gamal Abdel Nasser in Egypt, began to decline in the 1970s, leaving an ideological vacuum that political Islam began to fill.

The year 1979 is often seen as a turning point in the history of political Islam, marked by two major events. Firstly, the Iranian Revolution saw the fall of the Shah of Iran and the emergence of an Islamic republic under Ayatollah Khomeini, a development that had a profound impact throughout the region. Secondly, the signing of the peace treaty between Egypt and Israel, known as the Camp David Accords, was seen by many Arabs as a betrayal of the Arab cause and a capitulation to Israel. The normalisation of relations between Egypt and Israel came as a shock to many Arabs, reinforcing feelings of antagonism towards Israel, which was seen as a symbol of Western influence and intervention in the region. This perception fuelled the imagination of political Islam, where the fight against Israel and opposition to Western interference became central themes.

Against this backdrop, Islamist movements gained in popularity by presenting themselves as credible alternatives to failed pan-Arabism and promising to restore the dignity and autonomy of Muslim societies through the implementation of Islamic principles. These movements varied in their approaches, some advocating gradual political and social reform, while others adopted more radical positions. The failure of pan-Arabism and the events of 1979 created fertile ground for the rise of political Islam, an ideology that has since played a major role in Middle Eastern politics. The rise of this ideology has been a response to the political disillusionment, socio-economic challenges and aspirations of many Muslim societies, redefining the political landscape of the region.

Political Islam Faced with the Failure of Pan-Arabism[modifier | modifier le wikicode]

Fundamentalism, a significant trend within political Islam, took root in the Muslim world as early as the 8th century, but it was with the emergence of Wahhabism in the 18th century that this trend gained significant influence. Mohammed ibn Abd al-Wahhab, the founder of Wahhabism, advocated a return to the practices and beliefs of the first generations of Muslims, a rigorous interpretation of Islam that became the ideological basis of modern Saudi Arabia. Fundamentalism as such is characterised by a desire to transcend history and return to the original sources of religion. This approach manifests itself in a literal and uncompromising reading of the sacred texts, often rejecting contemporary or contextual interpretations. Fundamentalism frequently opposes Western cultural and political influences, which are perceived as threats to the authenticity and purity of the Islamic faith.

The colonial period had a profound impact on the political imagination of the Arab world. European domination and intervention in Middle Eastern affairs were perceived as a direct aggression against Muslim societies. This perception has fuelled a sense of resistance that has often been expressed through recourse to Islamic values and principles. The national liberation movement, which emerged as a reaction to Western penetration, was strongly imbued with the Islamic tradition. Struggles for independence, while seeking to free themselves from the colonial yoke, also sought to reaffirm Islamic identity as the basis of national sovereignty. In this context, Islamic fundamentalism evolved into a response not only to the internal challenges of Muslim societies, but also to foreign interference. The resulting Islamist movements have varied in their approaches and objectives, ranging from social and political reform to more radical forms of resistance. This complex dynamic between tradition, modernity and external influences continues to shape the political and social landscape in many Muslim-majority countries.

The Muslim Brotherhood movement, founded in Egypt in 1928 by Hassan Al-Banna, represents an important milestone in the history of political Islam in the 20th century. The organisation emerged as a response to the social, political and cultural challenges facing Egyptian society at the time. Hassan Al-Banna founded the Muslim Brotherhood with the initial aim of Islamising Egyptian society, as a reaction to the rapid modernisation and growing Western influence in the country. Al-Banna's vision was to reform society based on Islamic principles, considering the Koran to be the ultimate and infallible constitution for social and political life. One of the distinctive features of the Muslim Brotherhood was its organisational structure, which included a paramilitary branch. This characteristic not only reflected the military tradition of Egyptian society, but was also a response to the British presence in Egypt. The Muslim Brotherhood's ability to mobilise both politically and militarily contributed to its growing influence.

The Muslim Brotherhood rapidly gained in popularity and influence, becoming one of the first and most important Islamist organisations of the 20th century. Their approach, combining social, political and sometimes militant activism, served as a model for other Islamist movements throughout the Muslim world. However, the movement was also subject to controversy and repression. Successive Egyptian governments have alternated between tolerance, cooperation and severe repression of the organisation. The Muslim Brotherhood has been involved in various political struggles in Egypt, including the overthrow of President Mohamed Morsi in 2013, who came from its ranks.

Since its creation in 1928 by Hassan al-Banna, the Muslim Brotherhood movement has gone through fluctuating periods, oscillating between significant political influence and severe repression. Although the organisation did not originally adopt armed action as its main tactic, it has found itself involved in major conflicts that have marked the history of the region. During the 1948 Arab-Israeli war, a conflict crucial to the future of Palestine, the Muslim Brotherhood took part in the fighting. This involvement reflected their commitment to the Palestinian cause, seen as both a national and a religious struggle. Their involvement in this war illustrates the organisation's flexibility in the use of armed force for causes it considered just and in line with its Islamic objectives. In 1952, the Muslim Brotherhood played a role in the Egyptian revolution that overthrew the monarchy and led to the founding of the Egyptian Republic. Initially, they supported the free officers, hoping that the new regime would be favourable to their Islamic aspirations. However, relations between the Muslim Brotherhood and the revolutionary leader Gamal Abdel Nasser soon deteriorated, leading to a period of intense repression against the organisation.

The history of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt is characterised by highs and lows, illustrating the complexity of its political positioning. Under different regimes, they have alternated between an influential political presence and periods when they were repressed and marginalised. This dynamic reflects the persistent tensions between Islamist movements and secular or secular governments in the region. The history of the Muslim Brotherhood is therefore that of an influential but often controversial organisation, whose role in key events such as the 1948 war and the 1952 revolution testifies to its importance in Middle Eastern politics. However, their path has also been marked by confrontations and conflicts with the powers that be, reflecting the complex and sometimes conflicting nature of political Islam.

Sayyid Qutb, born in 1906 and died in 1966, is an emblematic figure of political Islam. His thought and work have had a considerable impact on the vision of the Islamic State and on the Islamist movement in general. An eminent theorist, Qutb developed a radical critique of the Muslim societies of his time, which he judged to have strayed from the true path of Islam. Qutb was a virulent critic of Westernisation and pan-Arab nationalism, dominant in Egypt and other Arab countries in the mid-20th century. In his view, these societies had drifted away from the fundamental principles of Islam, falling into a state of "Jahiliya", an Islamic term traditionally used to describe the religious ignorance prevailing prior to the revelation of the Koran to the Prophet Muhammad. For Qutb, the modern Jahiliya was not just religious ignorance, but also a departure from Islamic laws and values in governance and social life.

His personal experience of repression also influenced his thinking. Arrested and tortured by Nasser's regime in Egypt for his dissident views and membership of the Muslim Brotherhood, Qutb became convinced that the regimes in place in the Arab world were corrupt and illegitimate. In his writings, he developed the idea that resistance, including the use of violence, was legitimate against these "jahili" governments. Sentenced to death for plotting against the Egyptian state, Qutb refused to appeal his conviction, choosing to become a martyr for his cause. His death in 1966 reinforced his status as an emblematic figure in radical Islamism, and his writings continue to influence Islamist movements around the world. Qutb thus played a central role in the development of political Islam, notably by justifying violent opposition to regimes deemed un-Islamic. His vision of Islam as a complete system of life, encompassing both governance and society, has had a profound impact on contemporary Islamist movements and the debate on the nature and future of the Islamic state.

Although initially marginal, Sayyid Qutb's thought gained in influence and relevance in the late 1970s, a period marked by several crucial events that redefined the political and ideological landscape of the Muslim world. In 1979, several major events changed the ideological context in the Middle East and beyond. Firstly, the failure of pan-Arabism, symbolised by the signing of the peace agreements between Egypt and Israel, left an ideological vacuum in the Arab world. The decision by Egypt, a major player in Arab nationalism, to normalise relations with Israel was seen as a betrayal by many Arabs and weakened the credibility of pan-Arabism as a unifying movement. At the same time, the Iranian Revolution of 1979 saw the emergence of the Islamic Republic of Iran, establishing a government based on Shia Islamic principles. This revolution had a considerable impact throughout the region, demonstrating the viability of political Islam as an alternative to secular or pro-Western regimes. On the other hand, the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979 triggered a ten-year war in which the Afghan Mujahideen, supported by various countries including the United States, Saudi Arabia and Pakistan, fought against the Soviet forces. This war attracted Islamist fighters from all over the Muslim world, galvanised by the call to defend a Muslim land against a non-Muslim foreign power. These events contributed to a revival and radicalisation of political Islam. Qutb's ideas, in particular his critique of modern Jahiliya and his legitimisation of armed struggle against regimes deemed un-Islamic, resonated with those who were disappointed by the failures of pan-Arabism and worried about foreign influence in the Muslim world. As a result, political Islam, in its various forms, became a major player in regional and global politics, influencing power dynamics and conflicts in the decades that followed.

The Notion of Martyr in Political Islam[modifier | modifier le wikicode]

The notion of martyrdom in political Islam gained greater significance and importance towards the end of the 20th century, particularly in conflicts pitting Islamist forces against various foreign powers. This conceptualisation of martyrdom, over and above its traditional religious meaning, has become a key element in the mobilisation and rhetoric of Islamist movements. In the context of conflicts such as the Soviet-Afghan war of 1979-1989, the figure of the martyr acquired a central dimension. Mujahideen fighters against the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan were often celebrated as martyrs, heroes who sacrificed their lives in defence of Islam. This glorification of the martyr served to motivate fighters, attract international support and justify armed resistance against a superpower perceived as oppressive. The promotion of martyrdom in these contexts has become a powerful recruitment tool for Islamist movements, attracting fighters from various parts of the Muslim world. The promise of martyrdom, often interpreted as a path to paradise and honour, has been a key element in mobilising individuals ready to take part in armed struggles against enemies deemed unjust or anti-Islamic.

However, the notion of martyrdom in political Islam has given rise to much controversy and criticism. Many consider that the encouragement of martyrdom, particularly in the context of violent action, is a distortion of Islamic teachings and a source of conflict. This conception of martyrdom has been challenged both within the Muslim community and by outside observers. The figure of the martyr in political Islam symbolises the way in which religious concepts can be reinterpreted and used in political and conflictual settings. It reflects the complexity of Islamist movements and the way in which they integrate religious elements into their strategy and ideology. This approach has not only shaped the dynamics of Islamist movements, but has also had profound implications internationally, influencing policies and perceptions of political Islam around the world.

Political and Geopolitical Change[modifier | modifier le wikicode]

In the complex and sometimes unstable political landscape of the Muslim world, some states have responded to the rise of political Islam by incorporating Islamist policies, aimed at strengthening their authority and stabilising their government. This strategy has been adopted in a variety of contexts, in response to the internal and external challenges facing these countries. The adoption of Islamist policies by certain regimes has often been motivated by the desire to legitimise their power among predominantly Muslim populations. By aligning themselves with Islamic values and principles, these governments sought to present themselves as protectors and defenders of Islam, thereby winning popular support and countering opposition movements that might threaten their stability.

This approach has been particularly visible in contexts where governments have sought to counter the influence of radical Islamist groups or to respond to political and social crises. For example, Iran, following the Islamic Revolution of 1979, introduced a system of Islamic governance, with Ayatollah Khomeini as its emblematic figure, establishing an Islamic republic based on Shia principles. In countries such as Saudi Arabia, Pakistan and some Gulf States, Islamist elements have been incorporated into legislation and public policy, reflecting and reinforcing dominant religious values. However, this strategy is not without its risks and criticisms. The use of political Islam as a tool of governance can lead to internal tensions and contradictions, especially when the aspirations of the population differ from government policies. Moreover, the use of Islamism to consolidate power can lead to restrictions on civil liberties and human rights, raising concerns at both national and international level.

Transformation of Political Islam in the 1990s[modifier | modifier le wikicode]

During the 1990s, some scholars and observers concluded that political Islam had failed, partly because Islamist movements had failed to seize power in many countries. However, this analysis proved premature in the light of subsequent developments and the resurgence of Islamism in various forms. After the end of the war in Afghanistan and the withdrawal of Soviet forces in 1989, the Islamist fighters, or mujahideen, who had waged jihad against the USSR, began to redirect their struggle towards new enemies. One of the most significant changes was the rise of jihad against the United States, perceived as a new imperialist force in the region, and its allies, including Israel. This reorientation of jihad was in part a response to the US presence in the Persian Gulf, particularly after the 1991 Gulf War, and the perceived alignment of the US with Israel and against the interests of Muslim populations.

This period also saw the emergence or consolidation of radical Islamist groups such as al-Qaeda, led by Osama bin Laden, who had previously fought in Afghanistan. Bin Laden and other Islamist leaders began to target the United States and its allies as the main enemy in their struggle to establish an Islamic order. The view that political Islam had failed was therefore contradicted by these later developments. Islamist movements may not have come to power in the conventional way, but they had managed to establish themselves as significant forces in regional and global politics. Their ability to mobilise, influence and carry out violent actions demonstrated that political Islam remained a dynamic and influential force, capable of adapting to new contexts and challenges.

From the 1990s onwards, there was a marked evolution in political Islam, with a significant transformation in the approaches and tactics employed by certain Islamist movements. This period saw the emergence of a form of violence that could be described as sacrificial, a radical departure from previous practices. This new phase of violence in political Islam was characterised by the use of suicide bombings and other forms of terrorism. These acts were no longer seen simply as a means of fighting an enemy, but also as acts of ultimate sacrifice. The perpetrators of these attacks were often celebrated as martyrs, an evolution of the traditional notion of martyrdom in Islam, where voluntary death in an act of violence became a glorified ideal. A striking example of this evolution was the 11 September 2001 attacks in the United States, orchestrated by al-Qaeda under the leadership of Osama bin Laden. These attacks, carried out by suicide bombers, not only caused massive destruction and loss of life, but also changed the way in which political Islam was perceived and fought against on a global scale.

This period also saw the rise of groups such as the Taliban in Afghanistan, who used similar tactics in their fight against Western forces and the Afghan government. These groups justified the use of sacrificial violence with a radical interpretation of Islam that legitimised jihad against what they perceived as oppressive, anti-Islamic forces. The rise of this new form of violence in political Islam had far-reaching consequences. It led to an international response, with military interventions in Afghanistan and Iraq, and sparked a global debate on the nature of political Islam and the appropriate response to its most extreme manifestations. These developments not only had an impact on the international scene, but also provoked debate and division within Muslim communities, between those who supported these tactics and those who condemned them. The transformation of political Islam in the 1990s and early 2000s was marked by a rise in sacrificial violence and terrorism. This has redefined the tactics and objectives of some Islamist movements, with lasting consequences for global politics and Muslim societies.

Political Islam in post-Saddam Hussein Iraq and the emergence of the Islamic State in 2014[modifier | modifier le wikicode]

At the beginning of the 21st century, the players in political Islam underwent significant changes, in particular with the emergence of al-Qaeda as a major player in the panorama of international terrorism. This period was also marked by a geographical relocation of these actors, particularly in Iraq, following the American intervention and the fall of Saddam Hussein's regime. After the fall of Saddam Hussein in 2003, Iraq entered a period of political and social chaos. The Baath Party, which had long dominated Iraqi politics under Saddam Hussein, was banned, and a new power structure emerged in which the Shiite majority took a leadership position. This transformation created sectarian tensions and a feeling of marginalisation among the Sunni population, which had been dominant under Saddam Hussein's regime.

Al-Qaeda, led by figures such as Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, took advantage of this climate of instability to establish a presence in Iraq. Zarqawi, a Jordanian, founded the organisation "Al-Tawhid wal-Jihad", which later merged with al-Qaeda, becoming one of the most active and violent branches of the terrorist network. Under its leadership, al-Qa'ida in Iraq targeted not only US forces and their allies, but also the Shia population, whom they regarded as apostates and collaborators with the occupying forces. Al Qaeda's tactics in Iraq, including suicide bombings and mass killings, exacerbated sectarian tensions and plunged the country into a spiral of violence. Zarqawi's strategy, focused on provoking sectarian conflict, has turned Iraq into a battleground for regional and ideological power struggles, with profound repercussions for the region and the world. The evolution of political Islam in Iraq during this period reflects the complexity and fluidity of these movements. Al-Qa'ida in Iraq, although linked to the global al-Qa'ida network, developed its own objectives and strategies, rooted in the Iraqi political and social context. This period also highlighted the role of sectarian dynamics and political marginalisation in fuelling extremism and conflict.

In 2014, the group known as al-Qaeda in Iraq underwent a significant transformation, marking a turning point in the history of political Islam. The group, which had evolved and gained influence in the post-invasion context of Iraq, announced the formation of the Islamic State (IS), also known as Daech (Arabic acronym for al-Dawla al-Islamiya al-Iraq al-Sham). The announcement of the creation of the Islamic State was made by its leader, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi. This declaration signified not only a change of name, but also an extended territorial and ideological ambition. The EI aimed to establish a caliphate, a political entity governed by sharia (Islamic law), encompassing not only Iraq but also Syria and potentially other regions. Under the banner of Islamic State, the group rapidly extended its control over vast areas of Iraq and Syria, exploiting the power vacuum created by the Syrian civil war and the weakness of the Iraqi government. The EI gained notoriety for its brutality, including mass executions, acts of ethnic cleansing, destruction of historical sites and terrorist attacks around the world. The proclamation of the Islamic State represented a major challenge to regional stability and international security. It led to international military intervention to contain and eventually reduce the territory controlled by the EI. The rise and fall of the Islamic State also sparked important debates about the causes of and appropriate responses to violent Islamist extremism, as well as how to deal with the humanitarian and security consequences of its expansion.

Annexes[modifier | modifier le wikicode]

References[modifier | modifier le wikicode]