« Sources of International Law » : différence entre les versions

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= La typologie des sources du droit international =
= The typology of sources of international law =


[[Fichier:STATUT DE LA COUR INTERNATIONALE DE JUSTICE - article 38.png|vignette|centré|700px|[http://www.un.org/fr/documents/icjstatute/pdf/icjstatute.pdf Statut de la Cour Internationale de Justice] - Article 38]]
[[Fichier:STATUT DE LA COUR INTERNATIONALE DE JUSTICE - article 38.png|vignette|centré|700px|[http://www.un.org/fr/documents/icjstatute/pdf/icjstatute.pdf Statut de la Cour Internationale de Justice] - Article 38]]


Une source de droit est un vieux terme utilisé à partir de la réélaboration du droit romain au Moyen-Âge. Ce sont les lieux où l’on peut trouver le droit applicable pour son volet passif. Le droit se trouve dans les sources du droit comme les différents codes ou l’on peut trouver du droit. Tandis que le volet actif dit que les sources sont les mécanismes de production juridique, il y a des voies à travers lesquelles le droit est produit, ainsi la législation de l’État à travers le parlement et l’ensemble de ses procédures font que le processus par lequel le droit est fait est aussi une source de droit.
A source of law is an old term used from the reworking of Roman law in the Middle Ages. These are the places where the applicable law for its passive component can be found. The right can be found in the sources of the law, such as the various codes where one can find the right. While the active component says that the sources are the mechanisms of legal production, there are ways through which the law is produced, so the legislation of the state through the parliament and all its procedures make the process by which the law is done is also a source of law.


== Quelles sont les sources du droit international ? ==
== What are the sources of international law? ==
Réfléchissons au fait qu’en droit international il n’y a pas d’autorités supérieures, car chaque État est souverain nous permettant d’aboutir à la conclusion que les sources du droit international relèvent de l’accord et de la coutume. Ces deux sources sont basées sur le fait que les sujets de droit coopèrent pour faire la règle de droit qui les liera.
Let us think about the fact that in international law there are no higher authorities, because each State is sovereign, allowing us to reach the conclusion that the sources of international law are covered by agreement and custom. Both sources are based on the fact that the subjects of law cooperate to make the rule of law binding on them.


*'''Accord'''
*'''Agreement'''
Un accord est ce qui est le plus compatible avec la souveraineté, car elle relève d’une manifestation réciproque d’une volonté à être lié pour bénéficier de ses règles. C’est un exercice de souveraineté que de se décider à se soumettre à un traité.
An agreement is the most compatible with sovereignty because it is a reciprocal manifestation of a willingness to be bound to benefit from its rules. It is an exercise of sovereignty to decide to submit to a treaty.


*'''La coutume'''
*'''The custom'''
Conclure un accord est un acte de pratique, mais au-delà de cela, il est possible de pratiquer d’autres choses de manière régulière parce que considérées comme utile et devant valoir en droit. Depuis longtemps, les États ont admis l’immunité juridictionnelle devant les tribunaux, c’est-à-dire qu’un individu ne peut citer les actes d’un État devant les actes d’un autre État. Le droit coutumier est également quelque chose qui peut se pratiquer dans une société paritaire, car chacun pratique et ensuite on constate des convergences qui peuvent se résumer en règle de droit.
Making an agreement is an act of practice, but beyond that, it is possible to practice other things on a regular basis because they are considered useful and must be enforced in law. For a long time, States have recognized jurisdictional immunity before the courts, i. e., an individual cannot cite the acts of one State before the acts of another State.  Customary law is also something that can be practiced in a parity society, because each one practices and then there is convergence that can be summed up as a rule of law.
 
La législation suppose un supérieur qui peut édicter une loi à un inférieur, en droit international personne n’a de pouvoir législatif, personne ne peut obliger les États à s’y conformer. Le droit international est une science qui pense sa propre violation.
Legislation presupposes a superior who can enact a law at a lower level, in international law no one has legislative power, no one can compel States to comply with it.  International law is a science that thinks its own violation.
 
== The main sources ==
They make it possible to function within the framework of sovereign states that are not subject to a senior executive. The regulation is found in Article 38 of the Statute of the International Court of Justice, which is the oldest jurisdiction for the settlement of interstate disputes. This court, which has been in existence since 1921, can and must deal with disputes under international law. In 1945, it was considered useful to explicitly state international law and list its sources.
# '''Agreements / Treaties''';
# The '''general customary law''', which is therefore universal and binding on all States;
# The '''general principles of law''' recognized by "civilized nations".
These sources are the main ones, as they can be directly applied to a particular case to give it a legal solution.
 
A State asks for a legal opinion: it is necessary to deal with a legal issue such as delimiting the continental shelf between the DRC and Angola. It is possible to rely directly on a treaty, as it is a source of law applicable between the two States, but also on customary law by referring to the general practice of delimitation. On the other hand, if doctrine and jurisprudence are used as auxiliary means, the fact that they are auxiliary sources means that one cannot rely directly on doctrine or jurisprudence to base a legal solution.
 
== Auxiliary means ==
States are the "legislators", the doctrine is not lawful, but it can be useful, because those who have written fundamental books have examined the practice and provide practical tools for interpreting applicable rules. The same is true of jurisprudence, contrary to common law, the foregoing, in international law, does not do justice. It is not possible to rely on jurisprudence or arbitral awards, it is possible to consult the arbitration, because the lawyer of the time will have set out legal rules, but an arbitrator only allows the dispute between the two States that have referred it to him. It is only if we are convinced and if this has not changed since the time of arbitration that we can apply a jurisprudence.
 
It is clear that the applicable sentence of the time based on a treaty that is not applicable now cannot be applied. Doctrine and jurisprudence are consulted only in the sense that they can contribute something.
 
If the parties to the proceedings agree, the court may also judge in fairness. This means that in some cases the court may judge by not applying international law, but fairness, i.e. what the sense of justice suggests to it in an individual case. For a court of justice or any operator, the power to decide or propose things in fairness cannot be abrogated.
 
Fairness means a change in the rule of law. This is only possible if the parties agree to do so. The Court has been allowed to play an additional role when the strict application of the law is not considered by the parties to be appropriate for resolving their disputes.
 
It is not said that Article 38 must necessarily be exhaustive. We must distinguish between limiting and illustrative provisions. Actually, it's illustrative except that at the same time it's a little bit exhaustive/limitative, because all the important gears are mentioned and you can't invoke others. This is not exhaustive in the sense that there cannot be other specific sources.
 
== Other sources ==
Broadly speaking, Article 38 is exhaustive, but in detail it is not. Other sources are less important, however. The special custom is not mentioned, Article 38 (b) contains a general provision, but there are regional customs not covered by the status that do exist. For example, the International Court of Justice has recognized that there are rights and duties between India and Portugal to run along the coast to the Portuguese enclaves.
 
Secondary sources are also not indicated. If a treaty establishes the power of a certain body to impose binding conditions on states, such as the UN Security Council's case of the UN Charter of the United Nations, what is here is a particular source of law, it is a source of law, because it contains legally binding and enforceable standards.[[Fichier:CHARTE DES NATIONS UNIES - article 41 et 42.png|vignette|center|700px|[https://www.un.org/fr/documents/charter/pdf/charter.pdf Charte des Nations Unies] - [https://www.un.org/fr/documents/charter/chap7.shtml Chapitre VII : Action en cas de menace contre la paix, de rupture de la paix et d'acte d'agression - articles 41 et 42]]]
 
These are derived standards adopted under the Charter of the United Nations, it is treaty law, secondary law also known as "derived". A particular standard can only be dealt with in a specific case that will apply and sanction in a particular case. This is a relatively common phenomenon, but not contemplated, as it falls within the framework of treaty law.
 
In conclusion, there are some minor, derived, and sometimes non-core sources that have not been conducted in Article 38, making the type of provision non-exhaustive in a sense. Reference may be made to Article 38 of the ICJ Statute for an overview of these sources.
 
= The question of the hierarchy between sources =
There could be a lot of talk about it. The question of hierarchy is whether we have superiority and inferiority in the sources of international law. The answer is no, it is fairly easy to understand why it is negative.
 
The hierarchy of sources is fundamentally a matter of democratic legitimacy. The constituent with the greatest democratic legitimacy either because the combined chambers vote or the people have to vote; the ordinary right is already less, etc.. It is understandable that in this type of state organization, it reflects an order.
 
It is the States that legislate and always they do. The treaty is an act of ratification stemming from reciprocal wishes. There is no reason to give the will of one State greater weight than another, all States are on an equal footing, all sources are coordinated and have the same degree of prominence.
 
A collision problem cannot be solved based on a hierarchy of sources that do not exist. For example, if the article of a convention X and contrary to a customary rule Y, one cannot invoke the argument of the hierarchy of sources, each is at the same level as the others.
 
== How do we resolve a conflict between norms? ==
In the above example, the collision is between two norms: between an article and a customary rule. We therefore have here a collision between two standards and not between two sources, it is not at the content level, it is Article X against Rule Y. Article X is a conventional norm and rule Y is a customary norm, i. e. an injunction or organizational rule. It is on this level that the collision between two standards will have to be resolved through the rules on the collision of standards.
 
There are essentially two:
*'''rule LEX SPECIALIS''' : the most special law derogates from the more general rule,"lex specialis derogat legis generalis". This means that the most special rule takes precedence over the general rule. It is quite logical, because it is quite intelligent to think that States wanted the most detailed rule to take precedence, because they have considered the function of this more specific rule. For example, universal investment standards serve as an illustration: if two States decide on a bilateral convention, it makes perfect sense to say that between the two States that have concluded the convention, it has priority over the more general rules. Both states have adopted the treaty because they do not agree with the general rules.
 
*'''rule LEX POSTERIOR''' : « lex posterior derogat legi priori »,the later law derogates from the earlier law. The rule makes perfect sense, because if we have a multilaterally concluded 1958 law of the sea treaty and another one in 1982, and now we have States that are party to the 1958 Convention and at the same time to the 1982 Convention. The posteriority rule, because the most recent rule was intended to normalize a more recent situation. If these States have concluded only the 1958 Treaty, only this rule will apply until both States are parties to the 1982 Convention
 
== Knowing when two rules are in conflict and what rules to apply ==
It is a question of substance and interpretation; we must interpret the standards and see if there is a conflict between them. The presumption rule is that there are no conflicts between the standards. If the problem with interpretation cannot be solved at this time, there is a conflict. The application of the rule depends on the case at hand, as both rules may draw in the same direction. There may be a case where they draw in different directions where the oldest rule is the most special rule and the newest general rule. There are maxims in the maxims to try to harmonize.
 
It's a complicated question, because there is nothing mechanical, it's a question of interpretation and conventions that requires the lawyer's support to solve the problem.
*First, we have a hierarchy that even exists at the source level within international organizations.
It would already be necessary to show that domestic law was in line with public international law. The domestic law of international organizations is international law. On the formal aspect, the law of international organizations derives from an international treaty; the law deriving from a treaty must be of the same nature as a treaty that carries it.
 
In international organizations, there is a hierarchy of sources, as there is exactly within states. In States, there is the constituent and the legislature that are not placed on an equal footing, but placed hierarchically in a subordinate relationship, so the constitution is higher than simple legislation.
 
In international organizations, the founding treaty is the founding treaty, all decisions taken must be in conformity with the founding treaty. States adopting resolutions must do so in accordance with the constituent treaty, otherwise it is a null resolution.
 
Internally, it is the secretariat with the Secretary General that refers to the executive of the organization. It also adopts rules such as, for example, the Staff Regulations. These rules are inferior to the constitutional treaty, but also to the texts adopted by the General Assembly. If the meeting orders the secretary to issue a rule, he or she is bound to carry out what the senior complainant body says.
 
Thus there is an organization as in domestic law, the constitution, the texts adopted in the general assembly and then the texts adopted by the secretariat which incarnates the executive. The hierarchy, however, is not similar to domestic law because it is stricter, in domestic law the constitution does not simply override ordinary law. There are, if necessary, procedures for invalidating the law if you have a constitutional court, as is the case, for example, in Germany. Legislation passed by parliament in Switzerland may be unconstitutional, but it is not repealed and remains in force. Municipal law may sometimes prevail over cantonal law.
 
There is a hierarchy between the various texts, which sometimes translates into a strict hierarchy, sometimes it is an indicative hierarchy as in some internal legal systems where there is no sanction mechanism.
*Second, the doctrine perceives another hierarchy that refers to the phenomenon of normative hierarchy.
In Article 103 of the Charter of the United Nations, this provision reads as follows:"In the event of a conflict between the obligations of the Members of the United Nations under this Charter and their obligations under any other international agreement, the former shall prevail". This provision, if we take its text, indicates that for members of the United Nations, when they have obligations under the Charter, for example to implement Security Council sanctions, and they come into conflict with a treaty other than the Charter, such as a trade treaty; then the former will prevail.
 
Charter obligations are superior to other treaties. The provisions of the Charter are superior to the provisions of the other agreement which contains lower obligations. However, it is a conflict rule, but not a priority rule exactly like lex speciali or lex posterior.
 
There is something like a desire for hierarchy, the obligations of the Charter are considered to be higher than those contained in other treaties. The aim in 1945 was to protect, above all, the functions of the United Nations in peacekeeping and the Security Council.
 
The Security Council enacts sanctions against State B because it believes that it threatens peace and calls on UN members to implement sanctions. Without Article 103, the trade treaty would be applied because it would be the lex speciali and the superior rule.
 
There have been no real hierarchies in international law because states are always equal to themselves and when they legislate there is no reason to privilege a piece of legislation. Conflicts must be resolved on a case-by-case basis in accordance with interpretative principles.
 
= The Treaties =
Treaties are a very important area of international law, because we work in a subject with fundamentally written texts, it is like the law for domestic law. For customary law it requires specialists, because it is unwritten law.
 
There are a whole series of advantages of agreements over custom, but we will mention two. The benefits of custom are exactly the opposite of those of treaties.
 
First and foremost, the advantage is legal certainty. Foreign policy will fluctuate according to the circumstances and interests involved. Foreign policy is an area in which the positions of states are constantly changing. However, there are issues that need to be laid down by rules that provide some legal certainty for the future, for example with regard to investments. If a State wishes to attract investors, it is interested in providing them with a framework that does not depend on domestic law, which can be changed at any time. By adopting treaties that cannot be unilaterally amended, legal certainty is created. It may also be to delimit a territory between what is a State A and a State B. We can go further, in the case of immunities, States have a certain interest in knowing that they cannot be brought before a court, as this would cause them considerable harm. There are old rules on immunity that have now been codified. So there is a collective interest in having some security against attacks from all sides that could be subordinate to one court of another.
 
All these subjects require a certain legal regulation in order to be sufficiently sure that they must be written.
 
The Treaties alone allow for a detailed regime. Customary law is a good way to determine the main lines of action. If we want to create a specific regime or an international organization with special functions, we cannot do this on the basis of customary law, we can only do it on the basis of the law of treaties. If we want to do humanitarian law, the rules must be codified to apply them, because the military are not lawyers. Codification of the Treaties is necessary. As, therefore, international society has become increasingly important and States wish to have legal certainty for a certain period of time, and since international society is becoming increasingly complex and requires increasingly specific regimes, this explains why treaties have taken an increasingly important place.
 
Today we do not know exactly how many treaties have been concluded. For treaties registered with the League of Nations or the United Nations, the figure is about 60,000. The United Nations Treaty Section estimates that there are approximately 40,000 unregistered treaties. So there would be about 100,000 treaties in force around the world. Many are technical points, protocols added with technical vocabulary. There are only a few hundred treaties that are really important for international political life.
 
This is not an insignificant figure and it is not easy to manage this number of treaties at the universal level. Especially since there are 5 official languages in the United Nations.
 
== Definition ==
We have somewhat varied terminology for international agreements. This terminology is relevant, on the one hand, because each word has its own meaning, but, on the other hand, it does not have its own meaning, because each legal regime is not identical.
 
We have different words: agreement, treaty, convention, covenant, pact, protocol, concordat or even minutes. On the one hand, these differences in terminology do not have any legal effects because all these different texts mentioned are all agreements and it is the same law of treaties and international agreements that applies to them. Thus terminology is not necessarily relevant. Each of these agreements is applicable independently of the name. What is important is to verify that it is an agreement within the meaning of international law.


== Les sources principales ==
However, we would have every right to wonder if the same legal regime applies. If we have different terminologies it is because the different words make each of these words have their own meaning<ref>OECD Nuclear Energy Agency - [http://www.oecd-nea.org/law/nlbfr/documents/203_233_Accordsbilaterauxetmultilateraux.pdf Accords bilatéraux et multilatéraux]</ref> :
Elles permettent de fonctionner dans le cadre d’États souverains non-soumis à un cadre supérieur. On retrouve la règlementation dans l’article 38 du Statut de la Cour Internationale de Justice qui est la plus vieille juridiction pour les règlements des différends interétatiques. Cette juridiction qui existe depuis 1921 peut et doit juger les différends en vertu du droit international. En 1945, on a estimé utile de dire explicitement le droit international à savoir et d’énumérer ses sources.
* '''Agreement''': to cover any treaty text or even what is not a text if they are verbal.
#Les '''accords''' / '''traités''' ;
* '''Treaty''': used for written texts in the proper sense of the word, what is oral is an agreement.
#Le '''droit coutumier''' général donc universel qui est appelé à lier tous les États ;
* '''Convention''': used for multilateral treaties; a multilateral convention is a contradiction. A convention is an open treaty because it is multilateral.
#Les '''principes généraux''' du droit reconnus par les « nations civilisées ».
* '''Covenant''': written treaty, but the term pact is intended to emphasize the particular importance attached to the text. These are fundamental texts adopted with increased solemnity, such as the Covenant of the League of Nations.


Ces sources sont principales, car elles peuvent être directement appliquées à un cas d’espèce pour lui donner une solution juridique.
* '''Protocol''': it is a treaty, but by that we mean a treaty attached to an earlier treaty that modifies the earlier treaty on certain points. In IHL, it is said that the two additional protocols to the 1949 Geneva Convention are complementary to the Geneva Convention, which it amends in some respects and supplements in others.
'''Concordat: normally reserved for the agreements of the Holy See by historical tradition.'''
Un État demande de faire un avis de droit : il faut traiter une question juridique comme par exemple délimiter le plateau continental entre la RDC et l’Angola. Il est possible de se fonder directement sur un traité, car c’est une source de droit applicable entre les deux États, mais aussi sur le droit coutumier en se référant à la pratique générale sur la délimitation. En revanche, si comme moyen auxiliaire on utilise la doctrine et la jurisprudence, le fait que ce soit des sources auxiliaires signifie qu’on ne peut se fonder directement sur la doctrine ou la jurisprudence pour fonder une solution juridique.
*'''Procès-verbal''': sign the origin of the agreement, this means that there were discussions and that a record was drawn up. It shows the origin of the agreement, basically, these are summaries of a negotiation signed and therefore enhanced in an agreement.
In law, every word counts and nothing is interchangeable or almost interchangeable.


== Moyens auxiliaires ==
The legal regime, on the other hand, is the same, but there are slight distinctions. The vocabulary does not provide differences in treatment, but indicates the nuances in the type of text.
Les États sont les « législateurs », la doctrine ne fait pas droit, mais elle peut être utile, car ceux qui ont écrit des livres fondamentaux ont examiné la pratique et donnent des outils pratiques pour interpréter des règles applicables. Il en va de même pour la jurisprudence, contrairement au common law, le précèdent, en droit international, ne fait pas droit. On ne peut se fonder sur des jurisprudences ou des sentences arbitrales, il est possible de consulter l’arbitrage, car le juriste de l’époque aura exposé de règles juridiques, mais un arbitre ne fait droit qu’au litige entre les deux États qui l’ont saisi. Ce n’est qu’on est convaincu et si cela n’a pas changé depuis l’époque de l’arbitrage que l’on peut appliquer une jurisprudence.
Il est évident qu’on ne peut appliquer la sentence applicable de l’époque fondée sur un traité qui n’est pas applicable maintenant. On consulte la doctrine et la jurisprudence que dans le sens où elles peuvent apporter quelque chose.
Si les partis à l’instance sont d’accord, la cour pourra juger aussi en équité. Cela signifie que dans certains cas la cour peut juger en n’appliquant pas le droit international, mais l’équité c’est-à-dire ce que lui suggère le sentiment de justice dans un cas individuel. Pour une cour de justice ou un opérateur quelconque, on ne peut s’abroger le pouvoir de trancher ou de proposer les choses en équité.
Trancher en équité signifie la modification de l’état du droit. Cela n’est possible que si les partis le demandent d’un commun accord. On a permis à la Cour de jouer un rôle supplémentaire quand l’application du droit strict n’est pas considérée par les parties comme idoine pour régler leurs différends.
Il n’est pas dit que l’article 38 doit être nécessairement exhaustif. Nous devons distinguer les dispositions limitatives et les dispositions illustratives. À vrai dire, c’est illustratif sauf qu’en même temps c’est un petit peu exhaustif/limitatif, car tous les rouages importants sont mentionnés et on ne peut en invoquer d’autres. Ce n’est pas exhaustif dans le sens où il ne peut y avoir d’autres sources particulières.


== Autres sources ==
There are four building blocks, four "check points" to see if a given text constitutes an agreement in the sense of international law; these four elements are cumulative, meaning that the existence of the four must be verified. If one of them is lacking, we are faced with a text that may be of a treaty nature, but it is not an agreement within the meaning of public international law:
Sur les grandes lignes, l’article 38 est exhaustif, mais dans le détail cela ne l’est pas. D’autres sources sont moins importantes cependant. La coutume spéciale n’est pas mentionnée, l’article 38 b) contient une disposition générale, mais, il existe des coutumes régionales non couvertes pas le statut qui pourtant existent. La Cour Internationale de Justice a reconnu par exemple qu’il y avait des droits et des devoirs entre l’Inde et le Portugal pour longer la côte jusqu’aux enclaves portugaises.
#'''There must be concordant wishes''': an agreement is always based on a convergence agreement between the various parties. The subjects, in principle, must agree on something, there must be a minimum of common denominators. If, on the other hand, agreement cannot be reached on any point because the differences continue to the end, then we are dealing with dissent. This point is self-evident, but it should not be forgotten, particularly with regard to oral agreements, and it is exactly the same in domestic law.
#'''The conclusion of an agreement on international law requires a subject of international law''': an authority vested with the legal personality of international law. It is quite natural that the agreements of a given legal order should be concluded by subjects of that legal order. The subjects of international law are an area that has already been addressed; it is States, but especially others that can conclude international agreements under public international law. The only subject of international law so limited in its powers that it cannot conclude treaties is the individual we are. The individual may enjoy certain rights under international law. It may also be subject to certain obligations. However, the individual can only exercise his or her human rights, which are engraved as much as the criminal obligations imposed on him or her, he or she is not a political subject with autonomy of action and cannot therefore conclude international agreements. When companies or individuals enter into a concession contract with a concession State, an investor enters into a contract with another treaty State that is binding but not based on international law. The parties will make a choice of law by choosing a legal order other than international law. The parties can of course choose to submit this contract under the principles of international law because they have called it, but spontaneously this agreement is outside international law.
# '''An agreement in the sense of international law must produce legal effects, also known as "legal effects"'''; if it does not produce legal effects, it is not an agreement in the sense of legally binding. Of course, agreements under international law are voluntary under the law. Here this is not the case, there may be certain agreements between States; they are not agreements, but concerted non-Convention acts. We are told that this is a concerted act, but it is unconventional in the sense that it is not binding. We are also talking about political agreements and the "gentleman agreement". A whole series of examples of such agreements are, for example, the final act of the Helsinki Accords of 1905, from which the OSCE is emerging. The final act of the Helsinki conference is made as a treaty, but it is not a treaty because states do not want to bind themselves legally, they want to assume political obligations. This means that States believe that these obligations should remain in the realm of politics and that, in the event of a violation, legal mechanisms such as liability should not be implemented; States are not obliged to conclude treaties, but rather engage on a purely political level.
#'''The agreement must be governed by public international law''': in order for it to be an agreement, the law that governs that agreement must be public international law. We have, for example, a whole series of agreements between governments that are legally binding and have legal effects concluded by States. The first three conditions are met, however, but they are not international agreements in the legal sense, because the applicable law is a different law than that of the international order; this may be international trade law or Swiss law. States do it because there are areas that are not political. A state can sell an aircraft, a ship or paper to another state, to exchange an airplane a treaty can be concluded, but it is not worth it because it has solemnity. If States so wish, they may conclude agreements by choosing another legal system that is not international law.
   
   
Les sources secondaires ne sont pas non plus indiquées. Si un traité instaure à un certain organe le pouvoir d’instaurer des conditions contraignantes à des États comme le cas du Conseil de Sécurité de l’ONU de la Charte des Nation-Unies, ce qui est ici est une source de droit particulier, c’est une source de droit, car elle contient des normes juridiquement contraignantes et applicables.
These are the four conditions of general international law. This refers to the general rules on the existence of agreements. However, there may be special rules. The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties is the codification of the law of treaties. If we have treaties or an agreement, we can ask ourselves legal questions about this recurring agreement is important. For example, the International Law Commission has proposed to draft a convention that contains all the information on treaties. The Vienna Convention is the law of treaties, but applies only to certain treaties because it governs the life of certain treaties.


[[Fichier:CHARTE DES NATIONS UNIES - article 41 et 42.png|vignette|center|700px|[https://www.un.org/fr/documents/charter/pdf/charter.pdf Charte des Nations Unies] - [https://www.un.org/fr/documents/charter/chap7.shtml Chapitre VII : Action en cas de menace contre la paix, de rupture de la paix et d'acte d'agression - articles 41 et 42]]]
In the Vienna Convention, we are in the field of treaties and this applies only to texts, only to written agreements. By this alone, we can have divergences between general law and particular definitions contained, for example, in the Vienna Convention. This difference means that an agreement within the meaning of general law makes it possible to distinguish between agreements. On the other hand, in order to be able to apply the Vienna Convention, the treaty in question must meet the conditions of that Convention, otherwise it will not be applied to it. However, customary law is applicable because it is covered by an agreement under international law.


Ce sont des normes dérivées adoptées en vertu de la Charte des Nations-Unies, c’est du droit conventionnel, du droit secondaire dit aussi « dérivé ». Une norme particulière ne peut être traitée que dans un cas concret qui s’appliquera et sanctionnera dans un cas particulier. C’est un phénomène relativement fréquent, mais qui n’est pas envisagé, car il relève du cadre du droit des traités.
There is an articulation between customary law which is general, but if you have special law, customary law becomes a lex speciali.
Pour conclure, il y a certaines sources mineures, dérivées, parfois non centrales qui n’ont pas été conduites dans l’article 38 faisant dans un sens la disposition de type non exhaustif. On peut se référer à l’article 38 du statut de la CIJ afin d’avoir un aperçu de ces sources.


= La question de la hiérarchie entre les sources =
The Vienna Convention applies to treaties. In article 2 of the 1969 Vienna Convention, the term "treaty" is defined as meaning an international agreement concluded in writing between States and governed by international law, whether it is contained in a single instrument or in two or more related instruments, and, whatever its particular denomination.
On pourrait disserter beaucoup sur la question. La question de la hiérarchie est de savoir si nous avons des rapports de supériorité et d‘infériorité dans les sources du droit international. La réponse est négative, il est assez facile de comprendre pourquoi elle est négative.
La hiérarchie des sources est fondamentalement une question de légitimité démocratique. Le constituant à la plus grande légitimité démocratique soit parce que les chambres réunies votent ou le peuple doit voter ; le droit ordinaire est déjà moindre, etc. On comprend que dans ce type d’organisation étatique, elle reflète un ordre.
Ce sont les États qui légifèrent et toujours eux. Le traité relève d’un acte de ratification provenant de volontés réciproques. Il n’y a pas de raisons de donner à la volonté d’un État un poids supérieur un autre, tous les États sont sur un pied d’égalité, toutes les sources sont coordonnées et ont le même degré d’éminence.
On ne peut résoudre un problème de collision en se fondant sur une hiérarchie des sources qui n’existent pas. Par exemple, si l’article d’une convention X et contraire à une règle coutumière Y, on ne peut invoquer l’argument de la hiérarchie des sources, chacune est au même plan que les autres.


== Comment fait-on pour résoudre un conflit entre normes ? ==
There are two elements that stand out and stand out. This Convention shall therefore only apply to agreements concluded in writing, otherwise it shall not apply as well as to an oral agreement. Thus, the Vienna Convention is more restrictive than general law. In other words, in order to be able to apply the Vienna Convention, four conditions are required:
Dans l’exemple précèdent, la collision est entre deux normes : entre un article et une règle coutumière. Nous avons donc ici une collision entre deux normes et non pas entre deux sources, ce n’est pas au niveau des contenus, c’est l’article X contre la règle Y. L’article X est une norme conventionnelle et la règle Y est une norme coutumière, c’est-à-dire une injonction ou une règle d’organisation. C’est sur ce plan que la collision entre deux normes va devoir être résolue à travers les règles sur la collision des normes.
# an agreement
# written
Il en existe essentiellement deux :
# concluded between States
# but above all it must have been ratified by the Contracting States. For example, an investment treaty will only be valid in the context of the Vienna Convention if the contracting parties have ratified it.
The second Vienna Convention of 1986 was concluded to govern treaties concluded between States and international organizations and treaties concluded between international organizations. The 1986 Convention concerns treaties between States and international organizations, or States between States, or international organizations between international organizations. For example, the treaty between Switzerland and the United Nations on the headquarters of the United Nations in Geneva.


*'''règle LEXSPECIALIS''' : la loi la plus spéciale déroge à la règle plus générale, « lex specialis derogat legis generalis ». Cela signifie que la règle la plus spéciale l’emporte sur la règle générale. C’est assez logique, car il est tout à fait intelligent de penser que les États aient voulu que la règle la plus détaillée ait priorité, car ils ont réfléchi à la fonction de cette règle plus spécifique. Par exemple, les normes sur les investissements universels nous servent d’illustration : si deux États décident d’une convention bilatérale, il est tout à fait logique de dire qu’entre les deux États qui ont conclu la convention, elle ait la priorité sur les règles plus générales. Les deux États ont adopté le traité parce que les règles générales ne leur conviennent pas.
The 1986 Convention has not yet entered into force because it has not yet received sufficient ratifications. For agreements between States, the 1969 Convention is applied, while for international organizations, the 1986 Convention is applied, but since it has not entered into force, customary law is applied.


*'''règle LEXPOSTERIOR''' : « lex posterior derogat legi priori », la loi postérieure déroge la loi antérieure. La règle fait parfaitement sens, car si nous avons un traité de 1958 sur le droit de la mer conclu multilatéralement et un autre en 1982, et maintenant nous avons des États faisant partie à la convention de 1958 et en même temps à la convention de 1982. La règle postérieure à règle sur l’antériorité, car la règle la plus récente a voulu normaliser une situation plus récente. Si ces États ont conclu seulement le traité de 1958, seule cette règle s’appliquera tant que les deux États ne font pas partie à la convention de 1982.
We are doing all of this because the legal regime is potentially different. In customary law, these may not be the same rules, but at the same time, the situation is quite simple as in IHL. In the treaties, we are fortunate because they are the same rules, that is, if we take customary law or one of the conventions in general terms, we have the same rules.


== Savoir quand deux règles sont en conflit et savoir quelle règle appliquer ==
The 1969 Convention photographed the practice of States while the 1986 Convention was aligned with the 1969 Convention. It is always important to determine which title applies what. It is always necessary to ascertain whether it can be applied either as a rule of customary law or as a convention between States. The substantive aspects of treaty law lead to the same rules, which makes the task easier.
C‘est une question d’espèce et d’interprétation, il faut interpréter les normes et voir s’il y a conflit entre elles. La règle de présomption est qu’il n’y a pas de conflits entre les normes. Si on ne peut pallier le problème avec l’interprétation à ce moment, il y a un conflit. L’application de la règle dépend de l’espèce, car les deux règles peuvent tirer dans le même sens. Il peut y avoir un cas où elles tirent dans des sens différents où la règle plus ancienne est la règle la plus spéciale et la règle nouvelle la plus générale. Il y a des maximes dans les maximes pour essayer d’harmoniser.
C’est une question compliquée, car il n’y a rien de mécanique, c’est une question d’interprétation et de conventions qui nécessite l’appui du juriste pour dénouer la problématique.


*'''Premièrement, nous avons une hiérarchie qui existe même au niveau des sources au sein des organisations internationales'''.
This is a happy circumstance in treaty law, but it is not always the case. The customary case is not fully aligned.
Il faudrait déjà montrer que le droit interne est assorti au droit international public. Le droit interne des organisations internationales est du droit international. Sur l’aspect formel, le droit des organisations internationales dérive d’un traité international ; le droit qui dérive d’un traité doit être de même nature qu’un traité qui le porte.
Dans les organisations internationales, il y a une hiérarchie des sources comme exactement au sein des États. Dans les États, il y a la constituante et le législatif qui ne sont pas placés sur un pied d’égalité, mais placés hiérarchiquement sur un rapport de subordination, ainsi la constitution est plus élevée que la législation simple.
Dans les organisations internationales, le traité constitutif est le traité fondateur, toutes les décisions prises doivent être en conformité avec le traité fondateur. Les États adoptants des résolutions doivent le faire en conformité au traité constitutif dans le cas contraire, c’est une résolution nulle.
Au niveau interne, c’est le secrétariat avec le secrétaire général qui renvoie à l’exécutif de l’organisation. Il adopte également des règles comme, par exemple, le règlement du personnel. Ces règles sont inférieures au traité constitutif, mais également aux textes qu’aura adoptés l’assemblée générale. Si l’assemblée ordonne au secrétaire d’éditer une règle, il est tenu d’exécuter ce que dit l’organe plaignant supérieur.
Ainsi il y a une organisation comme en droit interne, la constitution, les textes adoptés en assemblée générale puis les textes adoptés par le secrétariat qui incarne l’exécutif. La hiérarchie n’est cependant pas similaire au droit interne, car elle est plus stricte, en droit interne la constitution ne l’emporte pas simplement sur du droit ordinaire. Il y a, le cas échéant, des procédures d’invalidation de la loi si on a un tribunal constitutionnel comme c’est le cas, par exemple, en Allemagne. Une loi adoptée par le parlement en Suisse peut être contraire à la constitution, mais elle n’est pas abrogée, elle reste en vigueur. Le droit communal peut parfois l’emporter sur le droit cantonal.
Il y a une hiérarchie entre les différents textes qui se traduit parfois comme une hiérarchie stricte, parfois c’est une hiérarchie plutôt indicative comme dans certains ordres juridiques internes où il n’y a pas de mécanisme de sanction.


*'''Deuxièmement,la doctrine perçoit une autre hiérarchie qui renvoie au phénomène de hiérarchie normative'''.
We now know what a treaty and an agreement is, but there is often an impression among philistines that a treaty must always be very solemn and formalistic, that a treaty must be concluded with lengthy procedures. Ritualization is an important treaty to mark solemnity because it is politically useful.
Dans l’article 103 de la charte des Nations-Unies, cette disposition se lit comme suit : « En cas de conflit entre les obligations des Membres des Nations-Unies en vertu de la présente Charte et leurs obligations en vertu de tout autre accord international, les premières prévaudront.». Cette disposition, si nous prenons son texte, indique que, pour les membres des Nations-Unies, lorsqu’ils ont des obligations en vertu de la Charte, par exemple de mettre en œuvre des sanctions du Conseil de Sécurité, et qu’elles entrent en conflit avec un autre traité que la Charte comme, par exemple, un traité de commerce ; alors les premières prévaudront.
Les obligations en vertu de la Charte sont supérieures aux autres traités. Les disposions de la Charte sont supérieures aux dispositions de l’autre accord qui contient des obligations inférieures. Cependant c’est une règle de conflit, mais pas de priorité exactement comme la lex speciali ou la lex posterior.
Il y a quelque chose comme une velléité de hiérarchie, les obligations de la Charte sont considérées comme supérieures à celle contenue dans d’autres traités. Il s’agissait en 1945 de protéger avant tout les fonctions des Nations-Unies en matière de maintien de la paix et du Conseil de Sécurité.
Le Conseil de Sécurité édicte des sanctions contre l’État B parce qu’il estime qu’il menace la paix et il demande que les membres de Nations-Unies appliquent les sanctions. Hors sans l’article 103 on appliquerait le traité de commerce parce qu’il serait la lex speciali et la règle supérieure.
Il n’y a eu de vraies hiérarchies en droit international parce que les États sont toujours égaux à eux-mêmes et quand ils légifèrent il n’y a pas de raisons de privilégier une pièce législative. Il faut résoudre les conflits au cas par cas en fonction des principes interprétatifs.


= Les traités =
However, the law of treaties does not provide any rule in this regard, which is the will of States. Treaty law is fully flexible on questions of form. The law of treaties is sovereign and adult.
Les traités sont un domaine très important du droit international, car nous travaillons dans une matière avec fondamentalement des textes écrits, c’est comme la loi pour le droit interne. Pour la coutume il faut des spécialistes, car c’est du droit non-écrit.
Il y a toute une série d’avantages des accords par rapport à la coutume, mais nous allons en mentionner deux. Les avantages de la coutume sont exactement opposés à ceux des traités.
En tout premier lieu, l’avantage est la sécurité juridique. La politique étrangère est amenée à fluctuer en fonction des circonstances et des intérêts en cause. Le domaine de la politique étrangère est un domaine dans lequel les positions des États sont amenées à varier constamment. Cependant, il y a des questions qui doivent être fixées par des règles qui assurent une certaine sécurité juridique pour l’avenir par exemple en ce qui concerne les investissements. Si un État souhaite attirer les investisseurs, il est intéressé par leur fournir un cadre qui ne dépend pas du droit interne qui peut être modifié à n’importe quel moment. En adoptant des traités qui ne peuvent être unilatéralement modifiés, on crée une sécurité juridique. Cela peut être aussi pour délimiter un territoire entre ce qui relève d’un État A et d’un État B. Nous pouvons aller plus loin, dans le cas des immunités, les États ont un certain intérêt à savoir qu’ils ne pourront être amenés devant un tribunal, car cela leur amènerait un préjudice considérable. Il y a des règles anciennes sur l’immunité qui ont été maintenant codifiées. Ainsi il y a un intérêt collectif à avoir une certaine sécurité contre des attaques pouvant venir de tout bord et qui pourraient être subordonnées à un tribunal d’un autre.
Toutes ces matières requièrent un certain règlement juridique pour être suffisamment sûr qu’il faille les écrire.
Les traités permettent à eux seuls de prévoir un régime détaillé. Le droit coutumier est bon moyen pour déterminer les grands axes. Si on veut un régime spécifique ou créer une organisation internationale avec des fonctions particulières on ne peut faire cela sur la base du droit coutumier, on peut le faire que sur la base du droit des traités. Si on veut faire du droit humanitaire, il faut codifier les règles pour les appliquer, car les militaires ne sont pas des juristes. Il est nécessaire de recourir à la codification, des traités. Comme, donc, la société internationale à de plus en plus de matière et les États souhaitent avoir une sécurité juridique pour un certain temps, et, qui, de plus que la société internationale devient de plus en plus complexe et nécessite des régimes de plus en plus particuliers, tout cela explique que les traités ont pris une place de plus en plus importante.
Aujourd’hui, nous ne savons pas exactement combien de traités ont été conclus. C’est donc une matière de spéculation que de savoir combien de traités sont en vigueur dans le monde.Pour les traités enregistrés à la Société des Nations ou aux Nation-Unies, le chiffre est à peu près de 60000. La section des traités des Nations-Unies estime qu’il y a environ 40000 traités non enregistrés. Ainsi, il y aurait environ 100000 traités en vigueur dans le monde. Beaucoup sont des points techniques, des protocoles ajoutés avec un vocabulaire technique. Il n’y a que quelques centaines de traités réellement importants pour la vie politique internationale.
Ce n’est pas un chiffre négligeable et il n’est pas facile de gérer ce nombre de traités au niveau universel. D’autant plus qu’il y a 5 langues officielles aux Nation-Unies.
== Définition ==
Nous avons une terminologie un peu variée pour désigner les accords internationaux. Cette terminologie est pertinente d’un côté parce que chaque mot a son sens, mais d’un autre côté elle n’a pas son sens, car chaque régime juridique n’est pas identique.
Nous avons des mots différents : accord, traité, convention, pacte, protocole, concordat ou encore procès-verbal. D’un côté, ces différences de terminologie n’ont pas d’effets juridiques parce que tous ces différents textes mentionnés sont tous des accords et c’est le même droit des traités et des accords internationaux qui s’applique à eux. Ainsi la terminologie n’est pas forcement pertinent. Chacune de ces conventions est applicable indépendante du nom. Ce qui est important est de vérifier que ce soit un accord au sens du droit international.
Toutefois, nous serions en bon droit de nous demander si c’est le même régime juridique qui s’applique. Si on a des terminologies différentes c’est parce que les mots différents font que chacun de ces mots ont leur signification propre<ref>OECD Nuclear Energy Agency - [http://www.oecd-nea.org/law/nlbfr/documents/203_233_Accordsbilaterauxetmultilateraux.pdf Accords bilatéraux et multilatéraux]</ref> :
*'''Accord''' : pour couvrir tout texte conventionnel quelconque voire même ce qui n’est pas un texte s’ils sont verbaux.
* '''Traité''' : utilisé pour les textes écrits au sens propre du terme, ce qui est oral est un accord.
*'''Convention''' : utilisé pour des traités multilatéraux ; une convention multilatérale est une contradiction. Une convention est un traité ouvert parce qu’il est multilatéral.
*'''Pacte''' : traité écrit, mais par le terme pacte, on vise à mettre en exergue l’importance particulière attachée au texte. Ce sont des textes fondamentaux adoptés avec une solennité accrue comme le Pacte de la Société des Nations.
*'''Protocole''' : c’est un traité, mais on entend par là un traité rattaché à un traité précèdent qui modifie le traité précèdent sur certains points. Dans le DIH, on dit que les deux protocoles additionnels à la Convention de Genève de 1949 sont un complément à la convention de Genève qu’elle modifie sur certains points et complète par d’autres.
*'''Concordat''' : normalement réservé aux accords du Saint-Siège par tradition historique.
*'''Procès-verbal''' : signal l’origine de l’accord, cela signifie qu’il y a eu des discussions est qu’un procès-verbal a été rédigé. Il montre l’origine de l’accord, au fond, ce sont des résumés d’une négociation signée et donc rehaussée dans un accord.
En droit, chaque mot compte et rien n’est interchangeable ou presque.
Le régime juridique, en revanche, est le même, cependant il y a des distinctions légères. Le vocabulaire n’apporte pas de différences de traitement, mais indique les nuances dans le type de texte.
Il y a quatre éléments constitutifs, quatre points « à checker » pour voir si un texte déterminé constitue un accord dans le sens du droit international ; ces quatre éléments sont cumulatifs, ce qui signifia qu’on doit vérifier l’existence des quatre. Si l’un d’entre eux fait défaut, nous sommes confrontés à un texte qui peut être de nature conventionnelle, mais ce n’est pas un accord au sens du droit international public :
#'''Il doit y avoir des volontés concordantes''' : un accord est toujours basé sur un accord de convergence de volontés entre les différentes parties. Il faut que les sujets, en principe, tombent d’accord sur quelque chose, il faut un minimum de dénominateurs communs. Si, en revanche, l’accord ne peut être obtenu sur aucun point parce que les divergences continuent jusqu’à la fin, alors nous avons affaire à un dissentiment. Ce point est évident, mais il ne faut pas l’oublier notamment pour ce qui est des accords oraux et il en va exactement de la même en droit interne.
#'''Pour conclure un accord de droit international, il faut un sujet de droit international''' :une autorité revêtue de la personnalité juridique de droit international. Il est assez naturel que les accords d’un ordre juridique donné soient conclus par des sujets de cet ordre juridique là. Les sujets du droit international sont un domaine déjà abordé, ce sont les États, mais notamment d’autres qui peuvent conclure des accords internationaux en vertu du droit international public. Le seul sujet du droit international tellement limité dans ses pouvoirs qu’il ne peut conclure des traités est l’individu que nous sommes. L’individu peut jouir de certains droits en vertu du droit international. Il peut aussi se voir imposé certaines obligations. Cependant, l’individu ne peut exercer que ses droits de l’homme qu’on lui donne et qui sont gravés autant que des obligations pénales qu’on lui impose,il n’est pas un sujet politique avec une autonomie d’action et ne peut dès lors conclure des accords internationaux. Lorsque les entreprises ou des individus physiques concluent un contrat de concession avec un État de concession, on conclut en tant qu’investisseur un contrat avec un autre État conventionnel et contraignant, mais non pas basé sur le droit international. Les parties vont faire un choix de droit en choisissant un ordre juridique autre que le droit international. Les parties peuvent évidemment choisir de soumettre ce contrat en vertu des principes du droit international parce qu’ils l’ont appelé, mais spontanément cet accord est en dehors du droit international.
# '''Un accord au sens du droit international doit produire des effets de droit dit aussi « effets juridiques »''' ; s’il n’en produit pas c’est que ce n’est pas un accord dans le sens de juridiquement contraignant. Évidemment, les accords en vertu du droit international sont volontairement en vertu du droit. Ici ce n’est pas le cas, il peut y avoir certaines ententes entre des États, ce ne sont pas des accords, mais des actes concertés non conventionnels. On nous signale qu’il s’agit d’un acte concerté, mais qui est non-conventionnel dans le sens qu’il ne lie pas. On parle également d’accords politiques ainsi que de « gentleman agreement ». Toute une série d’exemples de tels accords est par exemple l’acte final des accords d’Helsinki de 1905 dont est issue l’OSCE. L’acte final de la conférence d’Helsinki est fait comme un traité, mais ce n’est pas un traité parce que les états ne souhaitent pas se lier juridiquement, ils souhaitent assumer des obligations politiques. Cela signifie que les États estiment que ces obligations doivent rester dans le domaine du politique et qu’en cas de violation les mécanismes juridiques tels que la responsabilité ne doivent pas être mis en œuvre ; les États ne sont pas obligés de conclure des traités, mais ils s’engagent sur un plan purement politique.
#'''L’accord doit être gouverné par le droit international public''' : afin que ce soit un accord, le droit qui gouverne cet accord doit être le droit international public. Nous avons, par exemple, toute une série d’accords entre gouvernements qui sont juridiquement contraignants ayant des effets de droit conclu par des États. Les trois premières conditions sont réunies pourtant il ne s’agit pas d’accords internationaux au sens juridique, car le droit applicable est un autre que celui de l’ordre international ; cela peut être le droit commercial international ou le droit suisse. Les États le font parce qu’il y a des domaines qui ne sont pas politiques. Un État peut vendre à un autre État un avion, un navire ou du papier, pour échanger un avion on peut conclure un traité, mais cela n’en vaut pas la peine, car cela a une solennité. Si les États le souhaitent, ils peuvent conclure des accords en choisissant un autre ordre juridique qui ne soient pas le droit international.
Ce sont les quatre conditions du droit international général. On entend par là les règles générales sur l’existence des accords. Cependant, il peut y avoir des règles particulières. La Convention de Vienne sur le droit des traités est la codification du droit des traités. Si nous avons des traités ou un accord, nous pouvons nous poser des questions juridiques sur cet accord récurrents est importantes. Ainsi, la commission du droit international a proposé d’élaborer une convention qui contient toutes les informations autour des traités. La Convention de Vienne est le droit des traités, mais ne s’applique qu’à certains traités, car il régit la vie de certains traités.
Dans la Convention de Vienne, nous sommes dans le domaine des traités et qui ne s’applique qu’aux textes, qu’aux accords écrits. Rien que par cela, nous pouvons avoir des divergences entre le droit général et des définitions particulières contenues comme, par exemple, dans la Convention de Vienne. Cette différence signifie qu’un accord au sens du droit général permet de distinguer les accords. En revanche pour pouvoir appliquer la Convention de Vienne, il faut que le traité en cause remplisse les conditions de cette convention sinon elle ne lui est pas appliquée. Cependant, le droit coutumier est applicable, car il relève d’un accord en vertu du droit international.
Il existe une articulation entre le droit coutumier qui est général, mais si on a du droit particulier le droit coutumier devient une lex speciali.
La Convention de Vienne s’applique aux traités. Dans l’article 2 de la Convention de Vienne de 1969 sont définie des expressions - L’expression « traité » s’entend d’un accord international conclu par écrit entre États et régi par le droit international, qu’il soit consigné dans un instrument unique ou dans deux ou plusieurs instruments connexes, et, quelle que soit sa dénomination particulière.-
Il y a deux éléments qui sautent aux yeux et qui se différencient. Cette convention ne régit dès lors que les accords conclus par écrit sinon elle ne s’applique pas ainsi qu’à un accord oral. Ainsi la Convention de Vienne est plus restrictive que le droit général. En d’autres termes, pour pouvoir appliquer la Convention de Vienne, il faut quatre conditions :
# '''un accord'''
#qui soit écrit
# conclu entre États
# mais avant tout elle doit avoir été ratifiée par les États contractants'''. Par exemple un traité sur les investissements ne sera valable dans le contexte de la Convention de Vienne que si les contractants l’ont ratifiée.'''


La deuxième Convention de Vienne de 1986 a été conclue pour régir les traités conclus entre des États et des organisations internationales et des traités conclus entre organisations internationales. La convention de 1986 concerne les traités entre États et organisations internationales, ou États entre États, ou organisations internationales entre organisations internationales. Par exemple, le traité conclu entre la Suisse et les Nations-Unies quant au siège des Nations-Unies à Genève.
In the Aegean Continental Shelf case brought before the Court of Justice in 1978, the legal question is whether a treaty can be concluded in a press release. There is a very special condition for bringing a case before the International Court of Justice; it requires the consent of all the parties involved, an agreement, a consent. The question is whether a joint press release of the two ministers could be an agreement in the sense of international law because if it was an agreement it could have founded the competence of the agreement; it was said that if the ministers could not reach an agreement the court could be seized. Therefore, the content of this agreement was a consent, but in order for the court's jurisdiction then to have been given, it had to be verified whether this press release was a joint agreement. Only after a legally binding agreement can the Court's clemency be founded.
La Convention de 1986 n’est pas encore entrée en vigueur parce qu’elle n’a pas encore reçu le nombre de ratifications suffisant. Pour les accords entre États, on applique la Convention de 1969 tandis que pour les organisations internationales, on applique la Convention de 1986, mais comme elle n’est pas entrée en vigueur, on applique le droit coutumier.
Si nous faisons tout cela, c’est parce que le régime juridique est potentiellement différent. En droit coutumier, ce ne sont peut-être pas les mêmes règles, mais en même temps, la situation est assez simple comme en DIH. Dans les traités, nous sommes chanceux, car ce sont les mêmes règles, c’est-à-dire que si on prend le droit coutumier ou l’une des conventions dans les grandes lignes, nous avons de règles identiques.
La convention de 1969 a photographié la pratique des États tandis que la convention de 1986 s’est alignée sur celle de 1969. Il est toujours important de déterminer à quel titre s’applique quoi. Il faut toujours vérifier à quel titre on peut l’appliquer soit en tant que règle du droit coutumier ou comme une convention entre États. Sur le fond en ce qui concerne le droit des traités, on aboutit aux mêmes règles, ce qui facilite la tâche.
C’est une circonstance heureuse dans le droit des traités, mais ce n’est pas toujours le cas. Le cas coutumier n’est pas entièrement aligné.
Nous savons maintenant ce qu’est un traité et un accord, mais il y a souvent une impression chez les philistins qu’un traité doit toujours être très solennel et formaliste, que l’on conclut un traité avec des procédures longues. La ritualisation relève des traités importants pour marquer la solennité parce que c’est politiquement utile.
Cependant, le droit des traités ne prévoit aucune règle à cet égard, ce qui compte est la volonté des États. Le droit des traités est totalement souple sur les questions de forme. Le droit des traités est souverain et adulte.


Dans l’[http://fr.wikipedia.org/wiki/Contentieux_gr%C3%A9co-turc_en_mer_%C3%89g%C3%A9e affaire du plateau continental de la mer Égée] portée devant la cour de justice en 1978, la question juridique est de savoir si un traité peut être conclu dans le cadre d’un communiqué de presse. Il y a une condition très particulière pour porter un procès devant la Cour Internationale de Justice ; il faut le consentement de toutes les parties en présence, il faut un accord, un consentement. La question est de savoir si un communiqué de presse conjoint des deux ministres pouvait être un accord au sens du droit international parce que s’il était un accord il aurait pu fonder la compétence de l’accord ; il était dit que si les ministres ne pouvaient trouver d’accord la cour pouvait être saisie. Dès lors, le contenu de cet accord était un consentement, mais pour que la compétence de la cour puis se être donnée, il fallait vérifier si ce communiqué de presse était un accord conjoint. Ce n’est qu’après un accord juridiquement contraignant qu’on peut fonder la clémence de la Cour.
In 1978, the Court responded in an orthodox manner by saying that there is no reason to believe that a joint press release could be a perfect international agreement. The Court did not need to go any further because it felt that there was no commitment in the agreement to accept the Court's jurisdiction, there was only an agreement to consider going to the Court in a subsequent agreement. To sum up, a joint press release can be an agreement.


En 1978, la Cour a répondu d’une manière orthodoxe en disant qu’il n’y a aucun motif de penser qu’un communiqué de presse conjoint puisse parfaitement être un accord international. La Cour n’eut besoin d’aller plus loin parce qu’elle a estimé qu’il n’y avait pas dans l’accord un engagement d’accepter la juridiction de la Cour, il y avait seulement un accord d’envisager à aller à la Cour dans un accord ultérieur. Pour résumer, un communiqué de presse conjoint peut parfaitement être un accord.
In the case of territorial delimitation between Qatar and Bahrain<ref>[http://www.persee.fr/web/revues/home/prescript/article/afdi_0066-3085_2001_num_47_1_3660 Decaux Emmanuel. Affaire de la délimitation maritime et des questions territoriales entre Qatar et Bahrein, Fond (arrêt du 16 mars 2001 Qatar c. Bahrein). In: Annuaire français de droit international, volume 47, 2001. pp. 177-240].</ref>, the same question was posed almost exactly in the same way. This was a signed record of negotiation. Saudi Arabia had been there to do the good offices of mediation and had also sent a secretary to govern the minutes. Following the discussions, the foreign ministers signed the minutes. In 1993, the Court considered that the minutes signed by the Ministers of Foreign Affairs were informal but valid treaties, and that the content was such that the Court could be involved in the matter.


Dans l’[http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/87/7028.pdf affaire de délimitation territoriale entre le Qatar et le Bahreïn]<ref>[http://www.persee.fr/web/revues/home/prescript/article/afdi_0066-3085_2001_num_47_1_3660 Decaux Emmanuel. Affaire de la délimitation maritime et des questions territoriales entre Qatar et Bahrein, Fond (arrêt du 16 mars 2001 Qatar c. Bahrein). In: Annuaire français de droit international, volume 47, 2001. pp. 177-240].</ref>, la même question s’est reposée presque exactement dans les mêmes modalités. Il s’agissait d’un procès-verbal de négociation signé. Les deux États avaient négocié sur des questions de délimitation.L’Arabie Saoudite avait été là pour faire les bons offices de la médiation est avait aussi envoyé un secrétaire afin de régie les procès-verbaux. Suite aux discussions, les ministres des Affaires étrangères avaient signé les procès-verbaux. En 1993, la Cour a estimé que les procès-verbaux signés par les ministres des Affaires étrangères sont des traités informels, mais valides, d’autre part elle a estimé que le contenu était tel que la Cour pouvait s’impliquer sur le sujet.
A treaty can be treated in a totally informal manner. Only whether States were willing to conclude a legally binding instrument or whether a text could be interpreted as meaning that they had accepted a legally binding agreement will be verified.


Un traité peut être traité de manière totalement informelle. On vérifiera seulement si les États avaient la volonté de conclure un instrument juridiquement contraignant ou si on peut interpréter un texte comme signifiant qu’ils ont accepté un accord juridiquement contraignant.
As Minister of Foreign Affairs, you have to be careful what you sign. Formalism is not necessary, it's a discretionary question, we leave the choice to the States.
Quand on est ministre des Affaires étrangères, il faut faire attention à ce qu’on signe. Le formalisme n’est pas nécessaire, c’est une question discrétionnaire, on laisse le choix aux États.


== Conclusion ==
== Conclusion ==
Dans la conclusion des traités, il y a toute une série de questions purement politique comme la conduite des négociations prévoyant des règles-cadres, très éloignée du détail de la négociation, il s’agit de maintenir l’utilité de la négociation. C’est une question que l’on doit laisser à la politique.
In the conclusion of treaties, there are a whole series of purely political issues, such as the conduct of negotiations involving framework rules, which are far removed from the details of the negotiation, the aim is to maintain the usefulness of the negotiation. This is a question that should be left to politics.
 
Il y a toute une question pratique concernant la conclusion des traités. Il y a une première question de grande importance à savoir qui peut négocier un traité.
There is a whole practical question concerning the conclusion of treaties. There is a first and very important question of who can negotiate a treaty.
 
==== Negotiation and signature ====
Treaties are generally negotiated, there are always preliminary discussions even for a small treaty signed during a dinner. There are very different situations between multilateral treaties and bilateral treaties negotiated at a minimum.
 
There is always the question of who can conclude, who can negotiate and sign the text, what is at stake is legal certainty; we must see and determine the authorities. The issue is governed by international law, but is partially left to domestic law. That is to say, international law contains certain rules; otherwise it is left to domestic law.
 
Persons designated by international law as such, who still have the power to conclude a treaty for a State by signature, are mentioned in Article 7 §2 a. of the Vienna Convention vested in the full powers: "Heads of State, Heads of Government and Ministers of Foreign Affairs, for all acts relating to the conclusion of a treaty".
 
This means that the head of state is traditionally the person entitled to conclude treaties, the head of government who can be described as prime minister and the Minister of Foreign Affairs can always bind the state.
 
Thus the Permanent Court in 1933 had a special case concerning Eastern Greenland: there was an agreement between Norway and Denmark through a simple agreement reached by the Foreign Ministers. The Court held that this agreement bound Norway because its Minister of Foreign Affairs was empowered to make commitments for its State.
 
As for other persons, as a general rule, the first paragraph of article 7 reverts to the first paragraph, those other persons can only negotiate for a State if they are given full powers. If Switzerland decides to send someone to negotiate a treaty for Switzerland, a formal letter must indicate that a person has the right to represent Switzerland at the conference showing that he or she is the representative of the State that can sign the agreement on the basis of what has been authorised to him or her under the full powers, these powers must also be notified to the other parties.


==== Négociation et signature ====
Three persons are still authorized and a fourth person may be authorized by a letter of full authority.
Les traités sont généralement négociés, il y a toujours des discussions préalables même pour un petit traité signé lors d’un diner. Il y a des situations très différentes entre des traités multilatéraux et des traités bilatéraux négocié un minimum.
Il se pose toujours la question de savoir qui peut conclure, c’est négocier et signer le texte, il en va de la sécurité juridique ; il faut voir et déterminer les personnes autorités. La question est régie par le droit international, mais s’en remet partiellement au droit interne. C’est-à-dire que le droit international contient certaines règles, pour le reste il s’en remet au droit interne.
Les personnes que le droit international désigne comme tel, ayant toujours le pouvoir de conclure un traité pour un État par une signature sont mentionnés à l’article 7 §2 a. de la Convention de Vienne dévolue aux pleins pouvoirs : « Les chefs d’État, les chefs de gouvernement et les ministres des Affaires étrangères, pour tous les actes relatifs à la conclusion d’un traité »
Cela signifie que le chef de l’État est traditionnellement la personne habilitée à conclure des traités, le chef de gouvernement que l’on peut qualifié de Premier ministre ainsi que le ministre des Affaires étrangères peuvent toujours engager l’État.
 
C’est ainsi que la Cour Permanente en 1933 eut une affaire particulière concernant le Groenland oriental : il y eut un accord entre la Norvège et le Danemark à travers un simple accord conclu par les ministres des Affaires étrangères. La Cour a estimé que cet accord lié la Norvège parce que son ministre des affaires étrangères était habilité à prendre des engagements pour son État.
Quant aux autres personnes, en règle générale, on retombe dans le premier paragraphe de l’article 7, ces autres personnes ne peuvent négocier pour un État que si on leur confère les pleins pouvoirs. Si la Suisse décide d’envoyer quelqu’un négocier un traité pour la Suisse, une lettre selon des formes doit signifier qu’une personne a le droit de représenter la Suisse dans le cadre de la conférence démontrant qu’il est le représentant de l’État pouvant dès lors signer l’accord en vertu de ce qui lui a été autorisé en vertu des pleins pouvoirs, ces pleins pouvoirs doivent aussi être notifiés aux autres parties.
Trois personnes sont toujours habilitées et un quatrième peut être autorisé par une lettre de plein pouvoir.
Il y a encore une évolution, la Cour a dit ; cela correspond à une pratique de plus en plus courante, dans le droit international, les ministres de ressort ont le droit de conclure des traités dans leur domaine de compétence. Par exemple, le ministre de l’Environnement va dans des conférences pour l’environnement et signe des accords pour son État. C’est une évolution récente qui pose toute une série de problèmes juridiques. Dans le cas des affaires armées entre le Congo et le Rouanda, au paragraphe 47 de l’arrêt de 2006, est expliqué l’élargissement de la pratique et dans quel cas les ministres de ressort peuvent conclure des traités, il est habilité à négocier et à signer.


[[Fichier:Convention de Vienne sur le droit des traités de 1969 - article 7.png|vignette|center|700px|[http://legal.un.org/ilc/texts/instruments/francais/traites/1_1_1969_francais.pdf Convention de Vienne sur le droit des traités de 1969] - [http://www.admin.ch/opc/fr/classified-compilation/19690099/index.html#a7 article 7]]]
There is one more development, the Court has said; it is an increasingly common practice, in international law, that the ministers in charge have the right to conclude treaties in their area of competence. For example, the Minister of the Environment goes to environmental conferences and signs agreements for his state. This is a recent development that poses a series of legal problems. In the case of the armed cases between the Congo and Rouanda, paragraph 47 of the 2006 ruling explains the broadening of the practice and in which cases the ministers in charge may conclude treaties, it is empowered to negotiate and sign.[[Fichier:Convention de Vienne sur le droit des traités de 1969 - article 7.png|vignette|center|700px|[http://legal.un.org/ilc/texts/instruments/francais/traites/1_1_1969_francais.pdf Convention de Vienne sur le droit des traités de 1969] - [http://www.admin.ch/opc/fr/classified-compilation/19690099/index.html#a7 article 7]]]


==== Adoption ====
==== Adoption ====
Dans les négociations bilatérales, il n’y a pas de règles prescrites, il y a une souplesse totale. Ce seront les personnes déléguées ou les ministres qui signeront le traité. Dans le cas d’un traité multilatéral, c’est beaucoup plus complexe. Un texte négocié dans le cadre d’une organisation internationale ou d’une conférence, on peut avoir jusqu’à 190 États dans une telle conférence, dans ce cas ce qui est important est d’authentifier le texte adopté.
In bilateral negotiations, there are no prescribed rules, there is total flexibility. Delegates or ministers will sign the treaty. In the case of a multilateral treaty, it is much more complex. A text negotiated in the framework of an international organization or a conference, one can have up to 190 States in such a conference, in this case what is important is to authenticate the adopted text.
 
Lorsqu’on est deux, on peut voir sur quoi on travaille. Dans le cas d’une conférence internationale où circulent des milliers de textes avec des amendements jusqu’à la dernière minute, on comprend bien qu’il est capital d’authentifier le texte.
When there's two of us, we can see what we're working on. In the case of an international conference where thousands of texts circulate with amendments up to the last minute, it is clear that it is essential to authenticate the text.
 
On procède à l’adoption du texte, cela veut dire que lorsqu’on est arrivé à un accord, que les compromis sont faits, on met le texte au vote. Le président va vérifier si la majorité requise est atteinte, souvent c’est la règle des deux tiers ou de la majorité simple. Si la majorité est atteinte, le texte est adopté, mais c’est à partir de maintenant que plus personne ne peut l’argumenter.
We proceed to the adoption of the text, which means that when an agreement has been reached and compromises have been reached, the text is put to the vote. The president will check whether the required majority is reached, often it is the rule of two-thirds or a simple majority. If the majority is reached, the text is adopted, but it is from now on that no one can argue it.
 
Les délégations passent devant le président pour parapher le texte afin de l’authentifier. Le président a le texte original paraphé page par page par les délégations pour signifier que toutes les pages ont été vues. Sur la dernière page, le délégué signe, parfois elle peut être différée si le ministre doit signer et qu’il n’est pas présent. À ce moment le texte est adopté et authentifié. Dès lors, la négociation est finie, le texte ne peut plus être modifié.
Delegations go before the President to initial the text in order to authenticate it. The Chair had the original text initialled page by page by delegations to indicate that all pages had been viewed. On the last page, the delegate signs, sometimes it may be deferred if the Minister has to sign and is not present. At this point the text is adopted and authenticated. Negotiation is now complete and the text can no longer be changed.
 
Lorsque le texte est signé, cela a certains effets juridiques. La signature a certains effets juridiques conférant un statut juridique au texte alors qu’avant elle n’est qu’un projet.Avec l’adoption, cela devient un texte conventionnel, mais la signature rehausse son statut, car certains effets juridiques s’en suivront.
When the text is signed, it has certain legal effects. With adoption, this becomes a treaty text, but the signature enhances its status, as some legal effects will follow.
 
Il y en a notamment deux. Ce qui est le plus important est qu’il y ait un effet inexistant. Le texte signé ne lie pas les États, il n’est ni en vigueur et en même temps l’État n’a pas accepté à être lié par le texte, la signature ne rend pas le texte contraignant. Exceptionnellement, la signature lie les États que si le traité est conclu dans le cas d’une procédure dite « simplifiée » ou courte. À vrai dire, ce n’est pas seulement une signature, mais une signature et une ratification en même temps. Les États se sont accordés sur ne pas ratifier séparément le traité, mais de le ratifier uni actum, ainsi la signature vaut ratification.
There are two in particular. Most importantly, there is a non-existent effect. The signed text is not binding on States, it is not in force and at the same time the State has not accepted to be bound by the text, the signature does not make the text binding. Exceptionally, signature is binding on States only if the treaty is concluded in the case of a so-called "simplified" or short procedure. In fact, it is not just a signature, but a signature and ratification at the same time. States agreed not to ratify the treaty separately, but to ratify it uni actum, so signature is ratification.
 
Cela n’est pratiquement jamais le cas, mais plus d’une fois dans le cadre de traités bilatéraux lorsque les ministres peuvent engager directement leurs États, cela vise à ne pas accumuler les actes pour rien.
This is hardly ever the case, but more than once in bilateral treaties where ministers can directly engage their states, this is not to accumulate acts for nothing.
 
Dans les conventions multilatérales c’est plus solennel, la ratification est plus tard, la signature ne lie pas. La signature simple : quel est son effet juridique ?
In multilateral conventions it is more solemn, ratification is later, the signature is not binding. The simple signature: what is its legal effect?


# avec '''la signature, les dispositions transitoires entrent immédiatement en vigueur''' :au moment où le traité est signé, les dispositions contenues dans les clauses finales et qui attraits au processus de la mise en œuvre de la convention entre en vigueur. En 1998, un traité est conclu sur la Cour Pénal Internationale à Rome – il est évident qu’on ne va pas attendre que le traité entre en vigueur pour s’interroger sur sa création. Les mesures préparatoires sont prévues dans les dispositions transitoires, elles mènent à la ratification à moins qu’elles n’en stipulent explicitement elles sont applicable au moment de la signature. Si on a signé, on a signalé qu’on a une disposition favorable envers la convention.
# '''with signature, the transitional provisions enter into force immediately''': when the treaty is signed, the provisions contained in the final clauses which are attractive to the process of implementing the convention enter into force. In 1998, a treaty was concluded on the International Criminal Court in Rome - it is clear that we will not wait until the treaty enters into force to question its creation. Preparatory measures are provided for in the transitional provisions and lead to ratification unless they explicitly state otherwise, they are applicable at the time of signature. If we signed, we were told that we have a favourable provision for the convention.
   
   
# le deuxième effet est juridiquement beaucoup plus complexe renvoyant à l’article 18 de la Convention de Vienne. Il prévoit que lorsqu’on signe un traité, en tant que signataire, '''on a l’obligation de ne pas vider le traité de son objet et de son but avant qu’il entre en vigueur'''. Il est impossible de faire des actes qui le sabordent le vidant de son sens. Par exemple, on conclut un traité entre l’état A et B en vertu duquel les deux États s’engagent à réduire les droits de douane sur les tomates de 50% entrant en vigueur en janvier 2014. L’État A se dit, le 31 décembre je vais doubler mes tarifs douaniers pour que lors de l’entrée en vigueur du traité, les tarifs douaniers n’aient pas changés, alors que l’état B, de bonne foi, va diviser par deux ses droits de douane signifiants qu’il y eut un comportement de mauvaise foi de A. Ainsi, le traité est vidé se portée. Cependant, il peut être difficile de déterminer ce que l’article 18 établit et ce qu’il n’établit pas.
# the second effect is legally much more complex, referring to article 18 of the Vienna Convention. It provides that when a treaty is signed, as a signatory, '''there is an obligation not to empty the treaty of its object and purpose before it enters into force'''. It is impossible to do acts that sabotage the void of meaning. For example, a treaty is concluded between State A and State B under which the two states undertake to reduce customs duties on tomatoes by 50%, which will enter into force in January 2014. State A says to itself, on December 31st, I will double my customs tariffs so that when the treaty came into force, the customs tariffs have not changed, while state B, in good faith, will halve its customs duties, meaning that there was bad faith behaviour by A. Thus, the treaty is emptied. However, it may be difficult to determine what Article 18 establishes and what it does not.
   
   
[[Fichier:Convention de Vienne sur le droit des traités de 1969 - article 18.png|vignette|center|700px|[http://legal.un.org/ilc/texts/instruments/francais/traites/1_1_1969_francais.pdf Convention de Vienne sur le droit des traités de 1969] - [http://www.admin.ch/opc/fr/classified-compilation/19690099/index.html#a18 article 18]]]
[[Fichier:Convention de Vienne sur le droit des traités de 1969 - article 18.png|vignette|center|700px|[http://legal.un.org/ilc/texts/instruments/francais/traites/1_1_1969_francais.pdf Convention de Vienne sur le droit des traités de 1969] - [http://www.admin.ch/opc/fr/classified-compilation/19690099/index.html#a18 article 18]]]


=== Ratification ===
=== Ratification ===
Le traité signé ne lie pas les parties et encore moins ne met-il en vigueur. Dans les articles 11 et suivants de la Convention de Vienne de 1969, la ratification est le consentement à être définitivement lié par le traité.
The signed treaty is not binding on the parties, let alone giving effect to it. In articles 11 et seq. of the 1969 Vienna Convention, ratification is the consent to be definitively bound by the treaty.
 
Puisque la ratification ne coïncide pas nécessairement avec la signature, cela veut donc dire qu’un État a un certain temps pour réfléchir s’il veut être lié ou non par ce traité. S’il le souhaite, il va le ratifier.
Since ratification does not necessarily coincide with signature, this means that a State has time to consider whether or not it wants to be bound by the treaty. If he wishes, he will ratify it.
 
Il y a un temps de réflexion ; les États qui négocient savent à quoi s’en tenir. Le temps de réflexion vient des institutions démocratiques en provenance du droit interne. À l’époque des rois, la signature valait ratification. Avec l’avènement des régimes républicains, la situation a changé. Dès lors, c’est l’exécutif qui négocie et ratifie le traité. Si donc tout le processus de conclusion du traité jusqu’au choix d’être partie à ce traité est dans les mains de l’exécutif, cela voudrait dire que l’exécutif pourrait prendre des décisions de très grande importance pour la vie nationale sans que l’organe démocratiquement élu et représentant le peuple n’aurait son mot à dire.
There is a time for reflection; the negotiating States know what to do with it. The time for reflection comes from the democratic institutions of domestic law. At the time of the kings, the signature was worth ratification. With the advent of Republican regimes, the situation has changed. It is therefore the executive branch that negotiates and ratifies the treaty. If, therefore, the entire process of concluding the treaty up to and including the choice to become a party to that treaty is in the hands of the executive branch, it would mean that the executive branch could take decisions of great importance for national life without the democratically elected body representing the people having any say.
 
Tous les États républicains et en tout premier lieu les États-Unis d’Amérique ont à chaque fois demandée qu’ils puissent signer et référer, décider plus tard s’ils désirent être liés, car il faut consulter avant. Le législateur doit donner le « feu vert ». On signe act referendum. Voilà la raison du temps de réflexion. Chez les États le souci est la participation démocratique ; c’est un souci de droit interne.
All the Republican states, and first and foremost the United States of America, have each time requested that they should be able to sign and refer, decide later on whether or not they want to be bound, because it is necessary to consult beforehand. The legislator must give the "green light". We sign act referendum. That is the reason for the time for reflection. The concern of States is democratic participation; it is a concern of domestic law.
 
La ratification du point de vue du droit international renvoie aux articles [http://www.admin.ch/opc/fr/classified-compilation/19690099/index.html#a11 11], [http://www.admin.ch/opc/fr/classified-compilation/19690099/index.html#a12 12], [http://www.admin.ch/opc/fr/classified-compilation/19690099/index.html#a13 13] et [http://www.admin.ch/opc/fr/classified-compilation/19690099/index.html#a14 14] de la Convention de Vienne. La ratification est le consentement définitif à être lié, mais la ratification du point de vue du droit international est une lettre qu’envoi l’exécutif, quelqu’un au ministère des Affaires étrangères va envoyer une lettre au dépositaire du traité qui est le fonctionnaire élu par les états contractants pour gérer le traité. La ratification s’exprime donc par une lettre envoyée au dépositaire qui dit qu’après en avoir référé au niveau interne, l’État X consent à être lié définitivement au traité.
Ratification from the standpoint of international law refers to articles [http://www.admin.ch/opc/fr/classified-compilation/19690099/index.html#a11 11], [http://www.admin.ch/opc/fr/classified-compilation/19690099/index.html#a12 12], [http://www.admin.ch/opc/fr/classified-compilation/19690099/index.html#a13 13] and [http://www.admin.ch/opc/fr/classified-compilation/19690099/index.html#a14 14] of the Vienna Convention. Ratification is the final consent to be bound, but ratification from the standpoint of international law is a letter sent by the executive branch, someone at the Department of Foreign Affairs will send a letter to the treaty depositary who is the official elected by the contracting states to manage the treaty. Ratification therefore takes the form of a letter sent to the depositary stating that, after referring to it domestically, State X consents to be bound by the treaty.


[[Fichier:Convention de Vienne sur le droit des traités de 1969 - article 11.png|vignette|center|700px|[http://legal.un.org/ilc/texts/instruments/francais/traites/1_1_1969_francais.pdf Convention de Vienne sur le droit des traités de 1969] - [http://www.admin.ch/opc/fr/classified-compilation/19690099/index.html#a11 article 11]]]
[[Fichier:Convention de Vienne sur le droit des traités de 1969 - article 11.png|vignette|center|700px|[http://legal.un.org/ilc/texts/instruments/francais/traites/1_1_1969_francais.pdf Convention de Vienne sur le droit des traités de 1969] - [http://www.admin.ch/opc/fr/classified-compilation/19690099/index.html#a11 article 11]]]
Ligne 267 : Ligne 259 :
[[Fichier:Convention de Vienne sur le droit des traités de 1969 - article 14.png|vignette|center|700px|[http://legal.un.org/ilc/texts/instruments/francais/traites/1_1_1969_francais.pdf Convention de Vienne sur le droit des traités de 1969] - [http://www.admin.ch/opc/fr/classified-compilation/19690099/index.html#a14 article 14]]]
[[Fichier:Convention de Vienne sur le droit des traités de 1969 - article 14.png|vignette|center|700px|[http://legal.un.org/ilc/texts/instruments/francais/traites/1_1_1969_francais.pdf Convention de Vienne sur le droit des traités de 1969] - [http://www.admin.ch/opc/fr/classified-compilation/19690099/index.html#a14 article 14]]]
    
    
On croit souvent que c’est le parlement qui ratifie un traité, ce qui n’est peut-être pas faux du point de vue droit constitutionnel. En fait le parlement autorise la ratification.
It is often believed that it is parliament that ratifies a treaty, which is perhaps not wrong from the constitutional law point of view. In fact, Parliament authorizes ratification.
 
For example, we ratify a treaty and sign it marking the end of the negotiation procedure. Then the negotiators disperse. International law has nothing to say, it is a matter of domestic law. Assume that the fictitious treaty signed, the negotiator takes it with him and enters State X. The State provides that the text must be submitted to parliament so that it can debate and decide whether the treaty is good for the State or not. The text was discussed and the vote was taken. If Parliament considers that the treaty is sufficiently good by majority vote, then Parliament has given the "green light" for the executive to ratify it. In virtually no state in the world, the executive is obliged to ratify when parliament has said "yes".
 
The executive still has a margin of decision. If an impromptu event occurs, the executive can slow down ratification and wait. Therefore, Parliament does not ratify the treaty from the point of view of international law, it authorises it. Constitutional law uses the term "ratification" in a different way. If the parliament or people do not authorise ratification, then the executive is obliged not to ratify and will notify the depositary that it will not be obliged to be a party to the treaty because it has not succeeded in obtaining parliamentary approval.
 
The time for reflection is a matter that depends on domestic law; if parliamentary approval is not required, it can be ratified at the time of signature, which is called the "short conclusion procedure". This avoids uncertainty, buoyancy, the risk of adopting treaties and the risk of waiting decades for states to ratify treaties to become obsolete and ruinous.
 
Still, it is incumbent on democracy and the separation of powers to allow time for reflection. If domestic law directly authorizes ratification, it makes things easier. However, this is the case for the vast majority of treaties, because they concern subordinate and technical conditions,"treaties on trifles", minor objects of importance. Such treaties can be concluded even in Switzerland or they can be concluded directly.
 
What if the executive ratifies if it did not have to?
 
For example, the text is submitted to parliament, which does not authorize ratification and the executive still ratifies, or if the parliament says "yes" and the executive ratifies, but in reality there was no quorum required for the vote. It is a question of treaty validity.[[Fichier:Convention de Vienne sur le droit des traités de 1969 - article 46.png|vignette|center|700px|[http://legal.un.org/ilc/texts/instruments/francais/traites/1_1_1969_francais.pdf Convention de Vienne sur le droit des traités de 1969] - [http://www.admin.ch/opc/fr/classified-compilation/19690099/index.html#a46 article 46]]]
   
   
Par exemple on ratifie un traité et on le signe marquant la fin de la procédure de négociation. Ensuite les négociateurs se dispersent. Vient la phase des consultations interne, le droit international n’a rien à dire, c’est une question de droit interne. Admettons que le traité fictif signé, le négociateur le prend avec lui et rentre dans l’État X. L’État prévoit que le texte doit être soumis au parlement pour que celui-ci débatte et déicide si le traité est bon pour l’État ou non. Le texte est discuté et on passe au vote. Si le parlement estime que le traité est suffisamment bon par un vote majoritaire, alors le parlement a donné le « feu vert » pour que l’exécutif le ratifie. Dans pratiquement aucun État du monde, l’exécutif est obligé de ratifier quand le parlement a dit « oui ».
We distinguish between ratification and accession to a treaty also known as "accession to a treaty". What is the meaning of this distinction?
 
L’exécutif a toujours une marge de décision. Si un évènement impromptu survient, l’exécutif peut freiner la ratification et attendre. Par conséquent, le parlement ne ratifie pas le traité du point de vue du droit international, il l’autorise. Le droit constitutionnel utilise le terme « ratification » de manière différente. Si le parlement ou le peuple n’autorise pas la ratification, à ce moment-là l’exécutif est tenu de ne pas ratifier et va notifier au dépositaire qu’il ne sera tenu d’être partie au traité parce qu’il n’a pas réussi à obtenir l’approbation parlementaire.
The result of both is the same, it is always the definitive consent to be bound by the treaty. The result is therefore that the acceding or ratifying State is bound by the treaty. Since the distinction is not downstream, it must be upstream. The lawyer often has a reason to distinguish the word.
 
Le temps de réflexion est une question qui dépend du droit interne ; si l’approbation parlementaire n’est pas nécessaire, on peut ratifier au moment de la signature qui s’appelle la « procédure de conclusion courte ». Ainsi on évite l’incertitude, les flottements, le risque d’adopter des traités et attendre des dizaines d’années pour que les États ratifient rendant les traités obsolètes et ruineux.
The distinction is who is entitled to do an act or otherwise. Ratification is reserved for States that have participated in the negotiation of the treaty. Ratification is a right for them, a State that has participated in the negotiation can become a party to the treaty, it is not obliged to become a party to the treaty, but has a right to ratify it even 20 years later. On the other hand, States which have not participated in the negotiation, third States, may become party to the Convention on the terms which the Treaty will make them. Bilateral treaties are in principle closed, even multilateral conventions are more or less open. The North Atlantic Treaty is not as open as that, we have to look at the treaty itself, which will say under what conditions another state can accede to the treaty. If there is no clarification, it means that accession is subject to the consent of all other parties to the treaty.
 
Toujours est-il que c’est incombé à la démocratie et à la séparation des pouvoirs que revient le temps de réflexion. Si le droit interne autorise directement à ratifier, cela facilite les choses. Cependant c’est le cas de la très grande majorité des traités, car ils concernent des conditions subalternes et techniques, des « traités sur des bagatelles », des objets d’importance mineure. Ce genre de traités peut être conclu y compris en Suisse ou ils peuvent être conclus directement.
This becomes an option only if the treaty grants it. Thereafter, it becomes a State bound by the Treaty, without accession, there is no distinction.
Quid si l’exécutif ratifie s’il n’avait pas du ?
Par exemple on soumet le texte au parlement qui n’autorise pas la ratification et l’exécutif ratifie quand même ou encore si le parlement dit « oui » et l’exécutif ratifie, mais en réalité il n’y avait pas le quorum nécessaire lors du vote. C’est une question de validité du traité.


[[Fichier:Convention de Vienne sur le droit des traités de 1969 - article 46.png|vignette|center|700px|[http://legal.un.org/ilc/texts/instruments/francais/traites/1_1_1969_francais.pdf Convention de Vienne sur le droit des traités de 1969] - [http://www.admin.ch/opc/fr/classified-compilation/19690099/index.html#a46 article 46]]]
We assure you that the treaty has been fortunate, it has been ratified. Now, it's about when it's going to come into effect, sending backà l’article 24 de la convention de Vienne de 1969.[[Fichier:Convention de Vienne sur le droit des traités de 1969 - article 24.png|vignette|center|700px|[http://legal.un.org/ilc/texts/instruments/francais/traites/1_1_1969_francais.pdf Convention de Vienne sur le droit des traités de 1969] - [http://www.admin.ch/opc/fr/classified-compilation/19690099/index.html#a24 article 24]]]
Nous distinguons entre la ratification et l’adhésion à un traité dit aussi l’ « accession à un traité ». Quel est le sens de cette distinction ?
Le résultat des deux est le même, c’est à chaque fois le consentement définitif par ailleurs à être lié par le traité. Le résultat est donc que l’État qui adhère ou qui ratifie est lié par le traité. Puisque ce n’est pas en aval que se situe la distinction elle doit se situer en amont. Le juriste a souvent un motif pour distinguer le mot.
La distinction est de savoir qui a titre à faire un acte ou autre. La ratification est réservée aux États ayant participé à la négociation du traité. La ratification constitue pour eux un droit, un État qui a participé à la négociation peut devenir partie au traité, il n’est pas obligé de le devenir, mais a un droit à le ratifier même 20 ans après. En revanche les États qui n’ont pas participé à la négociation, les États tiers, peuvent devenir partie à la convention aux conditions que le traité leur fera. Les traités bilatéraux sont en principe fermés, même des conventions multilatérales sont plus ou moins ouvertes. Le Traité de l’Atlantique Nord n’est pas aussi ouvert que cela, il faut regarder dans le traité lui-même qui va dire dans quelles conditions un autre État peut accéder ou adhérer au traité. S’il n’y a pas de précisions, cela signifie que l’adhésion est soumise au consentement de toutes les autres parties au traité.
Cela devient une faculté que si le traité lui accorde. Par la suite, il devient un État lié par le traité, sans adhésion, il n’y a pas de distinction.
Nous assurons que le traité a été fortuné, il est ratifié. Maintenant, il s’agit de voir quand il va entrer en vigueur renvoyant à l’article 24 de la convention de Vienne de 1969.


[[Fichier:Convention de Vienne sur le droit des traités de 1969 - article 24.png|vignette|center|700px|[http://legal.un.org/ilc/texts/instruments/francais/traites/1_1_1969_francais.pdf Convention de Vienne sur le droit des traités de 1969] - [http://www.admin.ch/opc/fr/classified-compilation/19690099/index.html#a24 article 24]]]
=== Entry into force ===
A treaty does not enter into force once it has been ratified. With the second ratification, the treaty can enter into force when there are two parties, but if it is intended to bind all the States of the world, the issue is different. In the final provisions are explained when the treaty enters into force.


=== Entrée en vigueur ===
In bilateral treaties, these clauses are generally forgotten, but if there are no specific clauses, it is considered that it is at the time of the second ratification that the treaty enters into force when the instruments of ratification are exchanged.
Un traité n’entre pas en vigueur dès qu’il a été ratifié. Avec la deuxième ratification, le traité peut entrer en vigueur lorsqu’il y a deux parties, mais s’il a vocation à lier tous les États du monde, la question est autre. Dans les disposions finales sont expliqué quand le traité entre en vigueur.
Dans les traités bilatéraux, on oublie généralement ces clauses, mais s’il n’y a pas de clauses particulières, on estime que c’est au moment de la deuxième ratification que le traité entre en vigueur lors de l’échange des instruments de ratification.
Pour les conventions multilatérales ouvertes, celles qui ont vocation à avoir beaucoup d’États parties, la règle s’est peu à peu cristallisée dans les temps modernes d’avoir 60 ratifications plus un certain laps de temps applicabilité. C’est au moment de la soixantième ratification plus le premier du mois suivant.


[[Fichier:Convention de Vienne sur le droit des traités de 1969 - article 84.png|vignette|center|700px|[http://legal.un.org/ilc/texts/instruments/francais/traites/1_1_1969_francais.pdf Convention de Vienne sur le droit des traités de 1969] - [http://www.admin.ch/opc/fr/classified-compilation/19690099/index.html#a84 article 84]]]
For open multilateral conventions, those that are intended to have many States parties, the rule has gradually crystallized in modern times to have 60 ratifications plus a certain period of applicability. It is at the time of the sixtieth ratification plus the first of the following month.[[Fichier:Convention de Vienne sur le droit des traités de 1969 - article 84.png|vignette|center|700px|[http://legal.un.org/ilc/texts/instruments/francais/traites/1_1_1969_francais.pdf Convention de Vienne sur le droit des traités de 1969] - [http://www.admin.ch/opc/fr/classified-compilation/19690099/index.html#a84 article 84]]]


Il y a une autre possibilité qui est de faire entrer en vigueur le traité provisoirement c’est-à- dire qu’on l’a signé et qu’on attend sa ratification. Si on estime que cela est fâcheux parce que le traité est urgent et qu’on a intérêt à le faire entrer en vigueur tout de suite, d’ailleurs l’article 25 prévoit que cela peut se faire.
There is another possibility of bringing the treaty into force provisionally, that is, it has been signed and is awaiting ratification. If it is considered unfortunate because the treaty is urgent and it is in our interest to bring it into force immediately, Article 25 provides that this can be done.
   
   
[[Fichier:Convention de Vienne sur le droit des traités de 1969 - article 25.png|vignette|center|700px|[http://legal.un.org/ilc/texts/instruments/francais/traites/1_1_1969_francais.pdf Convention de Vienne sur le droit des traités de 1969] - [http://www.admin.ch/opc/fr/classified-compilation/19690099/index.html#a25 article 25]]]
[[Fichier:Convention de Vienne sur le droit des traités de 1969 - article 25.png|vignette|center|700px|[http://legal.un.org/ilc/texts/instruments/francais/traites/1_1_1969_francais.pdf Convention de Vienne sur le droit des traités de 1969] - [http://www.admin.ch/opc/fr/classified-compilation/19690099/index.html#a25 article 25]]]
   
   
Il peut y avoir un accord partiel provisoire du traité ou quelques États s’accordent entre eux afin d’appliquer une partie du traité seulement. Tout tourne toujours autour de l’accord des États en cette matière. Si on ne ratifie pas, il y a des difficultés comme celle de revenir sur de dispositions créées alors qu’elles avaient été faites en conformité au droit.
There may be a provisional partial agreement of the treaty or some States agree among themselves to apply only part of the treaty. Everything always revolves around the agreement of the States on this matter. If we do not ratify, there are difficulties such as the difficulty of going back on provisions created when they were made in accordance with the law.
 
L’article 102 de la Charte des Nations-Unis est applicable à tous les États membres prévoyant que lorsqu’un traité est convenu et entré en vigueur, les États signataires ont obligation de l’enregistrer au service des traités des Nations-Unies à New York. Comme on publie les lois au niveau interne, on les publie au niveau international.
Article 102 of the Charter of the United Nations is applicable to all Member States providing that when a treaty has been agreed and entered into force, the signatory States shall be obliged to register it in the United Nations Treaty Service in New York. Since laws are published domestically, they are published internationally.




[[Fichier:CHARTE DES NATIONS UNIES - article 102.png|vignette|center|700px|[https://www.un.org/fr/documents/charter/pdf/charter.pdf Charte des Nations Unies] - [https://www.un.org/fr/documents/charter/chap16.shtml Chapitre XVI : Dispositions diverses - article 102]]]
[[Fichier:CHARTE DES NATIONS UNIES - article 102.png|vignette|center|700px|[https://www.un.org/fr/documents/charter/pdf/charter.pdf Charte des Nations Unies] - [https://www.un.org/fr/documents/charter/chap16.shtml Chapitre XVI : Dispositions diverses - article 102]]]
   
   
En dernier lieu, les traités ne s’appliquent pas rétroactivement, ils s’appliquent aux faits, aux circonstances et aux évènements qui ont lieu à partir du moment de sa conclusion. Ils ne s’appliquent pas aux faits et circonstances antérieurs à son entrée en vigueur.
Finally, treaties do not apply retroactively; they apply to facts, circumstances and events that occur after the treaty has been concluded. They shall not apply to facts and circumstances prior to its entry into force.
 
L’entrée en vigueur peut dépendre. La convention entre en vigueur à la date indiquée déterminée dans la clause ; pour les États y accédant plus tard, le traité entre en vigueur à une date ultérieure.
Entry into force may depend on. The Convention shall enter into force on the date specified in the clause; for States acceding to it at a later date, the treaty shall enter into force at a later date.
 
Non-retroactivity must be determined on the basis of the entry into force for each State. This is not a peremptory rule, because States can agree, but must regulate this decision. They must expressly say or wish to do so in such a way that it can be said in the interpretation that there was a willingness on the part of States to apply a convention retroactively. In some areas of international law, rules cannot be applied retroactively.  


La non-rétroactivité doit se déterminer en fonction de l’entrée en vigueur pour chaque État. Ce n’est pas une règle impérative, car les États peuvent s’accorder, mais doivent règlementer cette décision. Ils doivent expressément le dire ou le vouloir de manière à ce qu’on puisse dire dans l’interprétation qu’il y eut une volonté de la part des États d’appliquer une convention rétroactivement. Dans certaines matières du droit international, on ne peut appliquer des règles rétroactivement. Nullum crimen sine lege, c’est un acte de garantie.
Finally, there is no question of non-retroactivity for customary law. Retroactivity is a matter of treaty law. Customary law, from the moment the rule is established, applies to all States. It is not retroactive, but binding on all States. Events prior to the birth of the customary rule are not taken into account. There is only one critical date, the rule covers all events from birth.
Enfin, il n’y a pas de question de non-rétroactivité pour le droit coutumier. La rétroactivité est une question de droit conventionnel. Le droit coutumier, à partir du moment où la règle est établie, s’applique à tous les États. Elle ne rétroagit pas, mais lie tous les États. Les évènements antérieurs à la naissance de la règle coutumière ne sont pas tenus en compte. Il n’y a qu’une seule date critique, la règle couvre tous les évènements à partir de sa naissance.


== Le réserves en droit international public ==
== Reservations ==
C’est une spécificité des traités internationaux, il n’y a rien de comparable dans les contrats du droit interne. On trouve les règles sur les réserves dans les articles 19 à 23 de la Convention de Vienne sur le droit des traités. Par la suite la commission du droit international a planché sur la question, cela a abouti à l’adoption d’un texte non-contraignant ou la commission rappelle les règles en matière de réserve.
This is a specificity of international treaties, there is nothing comparable in domestic law contracts. The rules on reservations can be found in articles 19 to 23 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties. Subsequently, the International Law Commission worked on the issue, which led to the adoption of a non-binding text or the Commission recalls the rules on reservations.
   
   
[[Fichier:Convention de Vienne sur le droit des traités de 1969 - article 19.png|vignette|center|700px|[http://legal.un.org/ilc/texts/instruments/francais/traites/1_1_1969_francais.pdf Convention de Vienne sur le droit des traités de 1969] - [http://www.admin.ch/opc/fr/classified-compilation/19690099/index.html#a19 article 19]]]
[[Fichier:Convention de Vienne sur le droit des traités de 1969 - article 19.png|vignette|center|700px|[http://legal.un.org/ilc/texts/instruments/francais/traites/1_1_1969_francais.pdf Convention de Vienne sur le droit des traités de 1969] - [http://www.admin.ch/opc/fr/classified-compilation/19690099/index.html#a19 article 19]]]
Ligne 336 : Ligne 322 :
[[Fichier:Convention de Vienne sur le droit des traités de 1969 - article 23.png|vignette|center|700px|[http://legal.un.org/ilc/texts/instruments/francais/traites/1_1_1969_francais.pdf Convention de Vienne sur le droit des traités de 1969] - [http://www.admin.ch/opc/fr/classified-compilation/19690099/index.html#a23 article 23]]]
[[Fichier:Convention de Vienne sur le droit des traités de 1969 - article 23.png|vignette|center|700px|[http://legal.un.org/ilc/texts/instruments/francais/traites/1_1_1969_francais.pdf Convention de Vienne sur le droit des traités de 1969] - [http://www.admin.ch/opc/fr/classified-compilation/19690099/index.html#a23 article 23]]]
   
   
Le problème des réserves est un problème tout simple relevant du consentement possible. Il y a des traités où il n’est pas difficile de savoir qui doit y consentir. Dans le cas d’un traité bilatéral, il est évident qu’il faille un consentement mutuel. Trouver un dénominateur commun entre 194 États est ardu, voire « diabolique ».
The problem of reservations is a simple matter of possible consent. There are treaties where it is not difficult to know who must consent. In the case of a bilateral treaty, it is clear that mutual consent is necessary. Finding a common denominator between 194 states is difficult, even "diabolical".
 
On peut donc négocier, mais après on arrivera à un moment où rien ne va plus, car on pourra toujours remettre en cause. Maintenant se pose la question de certains États non-satisfaits, quelques-uns seront radicalement en désaccord. Il y a des États qui vont dire que le compromis auquel nous sommes arrivés et acceptable mais il y a quelques articles même pas essentiels qui sont un problème énorme qui pourrait être par exemple contraire au droit constitutionnel ou un problème politique.
So we can negotiate, but then we will arrive at a time when nothing goes wrong, because we can always question it. Now there is the question of some dissatisfied states, some will disagree radically. There are States that will say that the compromise we have arrived at and acceptable, but there are a few articles that are not even essential, which are a huge problem that could be contrary to constitutional law or a political problem, for example.
 
=== The question arises as to what to do with States that say they could ratify only if they could make an exception? ===
The problem is to find a consensus between protecting the integrity of the treaty or promoting the universality of the treaty.
 
If one is in favour of the integrity of the treaty, the treaty as such cannot be subject to reservations. If, on the other hand, the universality of the treaty is favoured, it is impossible to agree on everything. The idea was to ensure greater ratification by releasing ballast on articles, especially since States could withdraw their reservations afterwards.
 
Before the Second World War, the universal rule was that of the integrity of treaties, we accepted all or nothing, we could make a reservation only if all States agreed. After 1945, the rule was to favour the universality of treaties by admitting reservations. Today, the general rule is to be able to make reservations to conventions.
 
It is generally said that these must be multilateral and not bilateral conventions. Practice, however, shows that reservations have taken place in bilateral treaties. What can be said is that it is certain that reservations apply to multilateral treaties. In a multilateral treaty, agreement must be reached.
 
The second important thing to know is that reservations must be made at the latest at the time of signature or ratification. At the time of ratification and accession, one gives one's final consent to be bound by the treaty, other contractors must know what one is obliged to do and what one is not. A State that no longer wishes to implement a particular article would mean that the convention would no longer be binding on States overriding the adage pacta sunt servanda. In the case of reservations, other participants may object. That does not mean that we cannot make reserves later. This is the case if there is an agreement between all States, there is no reason why it is prohibited.
 
 
=== What is a reservation? ===
In order to know this, one must go to the definition of the terms used in Article 2 §1 (d) of the Vienna Convention: Reservation "means a unilateral declaration, whatever its wording or designation, made by a State when it signs, ratifies, accepts, approves or accedes to a treaty, whereby it purports to exclude or modify the legal effect of certain provisions of the treaty in their application to that State.
 
The reserve is distinguished by the following elements:
* It is a unilateral declaration; each State, when ratifying or acceding to the treaty, can at the same time formulate a reservation.
* The reservation is formulated at that time in the formulation of ratification sent to the depositary, which will notify it including the reservation to the other High Contracting States, including the signatories.
* The purpose and effect of the reservation is to exclude or modify the legal effect, so provision X or Y will not apply according to the terms written in the treaty. The substance of these provisions is being changed; it will not apply in the substance of the treaty; it can either exclude the application of this provision to it or slightly modify an article in its own respect, since it assures part of the obligations, but accepts another. The treaty will not apply in the same way as if the reservation had not been made.
Interpretative declarations, which States often make when ratifying or acceding to a treaty. In principle, these are declarations that are not intended to modify the substance of the treaty or to seek ratification so that the State can make known its understanding of the convention or make political declarations. The true interpretative declaration is to say how the provision is understood.
 
In theory, it is clear that the interpretative declaration merely casts a certain light on the article, but remains the same, although States sometimes play with it, they make disguised reservations, do not dare to make open reservations either for legal or political reasons. Sometimes interpretative declarations are reservations. It must be said that it is not the label that counts, it is not because the State is going to send its position in the form of a reservation or an interpretative declaration. The question is sometimes subtle, depending on the interpretation of the text by the State, but also on the interpretation of the text of the treaty. If it bites on the substance, it's a reserve.
 
=== When are reservations eligible? ===
The current regime provided for by the 1969 Vienna Convention in articles 19 to 23 is a liberal regime under which a State may make as many reservations as it wishes, there is the presumption and freedom to make reservations. There is no formal limit, it is a common sense limit, if a State has too many problems with a treaty it will not ratify it.
 
There are, however, some rules on the admissibility of reservations and in particular some of them are covered by treaty law and others by general international law.
 
By conventional law, we mean that, on the basis of a convention, we want to know whether we want to make reservations. The first thing to do to avoid the issue is to say that the treaty itself may have provisions on the issue to be followed; the contracting parties have been able to make provision. If in the Treaty there is nothing, in other Treaties there are things; we must follow them:
* '''treaties which completely prohibit reservations''': the Contracting Parties considered that the integrity of the treaty weighed more heavily than the universality of ratification. Interpretative declarations, but not reservations, can be made.
* '''prohibition of reservations on certain provisions''': this will define a hard core of the most important provisions on which reservations cannot be made. Reservations are prohibited on certain articles, a contrario, they are allowed on the other provisions. Negotiators are of the opinion that certain articles are essential to the convention. For example, article 12 of the 1958 Geneva Convention on the Continental Shelf.
* '''Reservations are permissible for certain articles''', i. e. reservations are prohibited on all other provisions. This latter version is generally more subtle, the convention is more locked.
* '''provisions which prohibit certain materially defined reservations''': reservations having certain qualities such as, for example, in the former Human Rights Convention to article 64, which prohibits reservations of a general nature that are considered non-intelligible. There are conventions which prohibit certain types of reservations, particularly those that are not specific.
We are authorized to make reservations that are authorized by the treaty. This is the rule of consent and willingness.
 
Irrespective of what the parties had intended, and particularly in treaties such as the Vienna Convention, States could make reservations in principle unlimited. There is a problem with the general law: States can make reservations as they wish. That is why there are limits to reservations in general law:
*r'''elative limits (Article 20 § 2 and § 3)''': in institutional treaties, it is difficult to make reservations, for example, the United Nations, as an institution must operate according to equal rules for all.
*'''limit of the object and purpose of the treaty as provided for in article 19 of the Vienna Convention letter c)''': it is not an easy or straightforward application, since one can legitimately have different views on the object and purpose of the treaty.But what is easily understandable is that in a multi-party treaty which contains many provisions, not all of them are of equal importance, some are eminent and others are secondary provisions of an administrative or other subordinate nature; it is not possible to place reservations on articles essential to the proper functioning of the convention while reservations on secondary provisions are permitted. Deciding what is relevant to the object or purpose is sometimes obvious and sometimes not easy. We can have quite legitimately divergent views.
 
The case that is legally very clear is the "Shariah" type of reservations, also known as "reservations of internal tradition". A Djibouti reservation to the Convention on the Rights of the Child in 1989 states that " [The Government of the Republic of Djibouti will not consider itself] bound by provisions or articles incompatible with its religion and traditional values".
 
This reservation is of a general nature and does not relate to a specific provision, it potentially concerns all the provisions of the treaty, and moreover, it is of an absolutely indeterminate nature, since no one other than Djibouti knows its religion and traditions, which means that Djibouti does not have to assume any obligation. This is not inconsistent with any convention; we reserve the right to apply or not to apply a provision on the basis of tradition and religion, which only Djibouti knows. This is incompatible with the adage pacta sunt servanda, reserving the application of an agreement is contrary to the object and purpose of any contractual commitment. In that case, it would simply have been necessary not to ratify the Convention. In fact, a whole series of States have made an objection to this reservation.
 
=== Why do these States ratify when they have problems with this type of convention? ===
The problem is not legal in this respect, it is that these human rights conventions have become so much a religion for Western countries that everyone has to ratify them. This somewhat unfortunate situation leads these states to ratify this convention, because it is politically necessary. In reality, they cannot apply these conventions contrary to their internal traditions. It's politically sensitive, but not legally.
 
Another case is a delicate one, the reservations made by the socialist states in the late 1940s and early 1950s with regard to the 1948 genocide convention. This reservation concerns Article IX, in the event of a dispute concerning the interpretation or application of this Convention, each State Party to this Convention is a party to disputes concerning another State may bring the dispute before the International Court of Justice. It is an arbitration clause that allows in the event of a dispute to bring it before the International Court of Justice.
 
The Socialist Republics agreed to sign the convention, but not to recognize the international tribunal. The communist countries never had the majority of judges in court is no chance to impose their vision of international relations. For these States, it was out of the question to submit to the court. At the same time, these States absolutely wanted to become party to it for the same political reasons as in the previous example. It was vital to be bound by the Convention, but not by Article IX.


=== Se pose la question de savoir que faire des États qui disent qu’ils pourraient ratifier que s’ils pouvaient faire une exception ? ===
=== Is it contrary to the object and purpose? ===
Le problème est de trouver un consensus entre protéger l’intégrité du traité ou privilégier l’universalité du traité.
For socialist states, what counts in the convention is the substantial conditions and repression of genocide. The object and purpose are therefore linked to genocide and the substantive provisions of the Convention.
Si on est pour l’intégrité du traité, le traité en tant que tel ne peut être soumis à des réserves. Si en revanche on privilégie l’universalité du traité, il est impossible de mettre tous les États en accord sur tout. L’idée est d’en assurer une ratification plus importante en lâchant du lest sur des articles d’autant plus que les États peuvent retirer leurs réserves par la suite.
Avant la Deuxième guerre mondiale la règle universelle était celle de l’intégrité des traités, on acceptait tout ou rien, on pouvait faire une réserve que si tous les États étaient d’accord. Après 1945, la règle est de privilégier l’universalité des traités en admettant les réserves. Aujourd’hui, la règle générale est de pouvoir faire des réserves aux conventions.
On dit généralement que ce doit être des conventions multilatérales et non bilatérales. La pratique, cependant, montre que des réserves ont eu lieu dans des traités bilatéraux. Ce qu’on peut dire est qu’il est sûr que les réserves s’appliquent aux traités multilatéraux. Dans un traité multilatéral, on doit tomber d’accord.
La deuxième chose importante à savoir est que les réserves doivent être au plus tard faites au moment de la signature ou de la ratification. Au moment de la ratification et de l’adhésion, on donne son consentement définitif à être lié par le traité, les autres contractants doivent savoir à quoi on est obligé et à quoi on n’est pas obligé. Un État qui ne voudrait plus exécuter tel ou tel article ferait que la convention ne lierait plus les États outrepassant l’adage pacta sunt servanda. Dans le cas de réserves, les autres participants peuvent objecter. Cela ne veut pas dire qu’on ne peut pas faire de réserves plus tard. C’est le cas de s’il y a un accord entre tous les États, aucun motif ne l’interdit.


=== Qu’est-ce qu’une réserve ? ===
=== Does Article IX appeal to the procedure? ===
Pour le savoir, il faut aller à la définition des termes employés à l’article 2 §1d) de la Convention de Vienne : « L’expression « réserve » s’entend d’une déclaration unilatérale, quel que soit son libellé ou sa désignation,faite par un État quand il signe, ratifie, accepte ou approuve un traité ou y adhère, par laquelle il vise à exclure ou à modifier l’effet juridique de certaines dispositions du traité dans leur application à cet État».
This is a non-essential procedural issue.


On voit que la réserve se distingue par les éléments suivants :
The Westerners in the late 1940s argued that the convention against genocide was not a convention against others, it was not limited to designating a crime and organising repression. There was a provision in the convention that allowed the convention to be applied. This convention by virtue of Article IX is not a paper rag convention. The guarantee clause in Article IX is essential to the realisation of the object and purpose of the Convention.
* C’est une '''déclaration unilatérale''', chaque État lorsqu’il ratifie accède ou adhère au traité peut formuler en même temps une réserve.  
* La réserve est formulée à ce moment-là dans '''la formulation de ratification envoyée au dépositaire qui va le notifier y compris la réserve aux autres États haut-contractants y compris les signataires'''.
*'''Le but et l’effet de la réserve sont d’exclure ou de modifier l’effet juridique'''.Ainsi la disposition X ou Y ne va pas s’appliquer selon les termes écrits dans le traité. On modifie la substance de ces dispositions.'''Elle ne s’appliquera pas dans la teneur qu’elle a dans le traité''', on peut soit exclure l’application de cette disposition à son égard soit modifier légèrement un article à son propre égard puisqu’on assure une partie des obligations, mais on en accepte une autre. Le traité ne s’appliquera pas de la même manière que si on n’avait pas fait la réserve.


Les déclarations interprétatives que les États ne se privent pas si souvent de faire lorsqu’ils ratifient ou adhèrent à un traité. Ce sont en principe des déclarations qui n’ont pas pour but de modifier la substance du traité ou de saisir la ratification pour que l’État fasse connaitre la manière dont il comprend la convention ou faire des déclarations politiques. La vraie déclaration interprétative est de dire comment on comprend la disposition.
The two arguments are plausible, the choice between the two is not obvious; for a long time there was uncertainty about the admissibility of the Soviet reserve and the effects to be attached to it.
En théorie, il est clair, la déclaration interprétative se borne à projeter une certaine lumière sur l’article, mais reste identique, cependant les États parfois jouent, ils font de réserves déguisées, n’osent pas faire de réserves ouvertes soit pour des raisons juridiques ou politiques. Parfois les déclarations interprétatives sont de réserves. Il faut dire que ce n’est pas le label qui compte, ce n’est pas parce que l’État va envoyer sa prise de position sous forme de réserve ou de déclaration interprétative. Il faut à chaque fois interpréter les traités ; la question est parfois subtile, cela dépend de l’interprétation du texte par l’État, mais aussi de l’interprétation du texte du traité. Si cela mord sur la substance, c’est une réserve.
=== Quand est-ce que les réserves sont admissibles ? ===
Le régime actuel prévu par la Convention de Vienne de 1969 aux articles 19 à 23 est un régime libéral en vertu duquel un État peut faire autant de réserves qu’il le souhaite, il y a la présomption et la liberté de faire des réserves. Il n’y a pas une limite formelle, c’est une limite de bon sens, si un État a trop de problèmes avec un traité il ne va pas le ratifier.
Il y a tout de même certaines règles sur l’admissibilité des réserves et notamment quelques-unes qui relèvent du droit conventionnel et d’autres du droit international général.
Par droit conventionnel, on veut dire qu’à partir d’une convention on veut savoir si on veut faire des réserves. La première chose à faire pour éluder la question est de se dire que le traité lui-même a peut-être des dispositions sur la question que l’on doit suivre ; les parties contractantes ont pu prévoir. Si dans le traité il n’y a rien, dans d’autres traités il y a les choses ; il faut les suivre :


*'''traités qui interdisent complètement les réserves''' : les parties contractantes ont estimé que l’intégrité du traité pesait plus lourd que l’universalité de la ratification. Cela a été le cas par exemple de la convention sur le droit de la mer de 1982 à l’article 309 ou encore certaines conventions humanitaires comme la convention de Paris 1993 sur les armes chimiques à l’article 22, mais encore dans le cas des traités institutionnels.On peut faire des déclarations interprétatives, mais non pas des réserves.
The issue had meanwhile been resolved, as other States had formulated the same reservation and that practice had become widespread. Thus, for Westerners, this reserve is not so bad, the practice is that this reserve is admissible. The Court still applies this reservation.


*'''l’interdiction de réserves sur certaines dispositions''' : on va ainsi définir un noyau dur des dispositions les plus importantes sur lesquelles on ne peut faire de réserves. Les réserves sont interdites sur certains articles,a contrario, elles sont admises sur les autres dispositions. Les négociateurs sont estimés que certains articles sont essentiels à la convention. Par exemple l’article12 de la convention de Genève sur le plateau continental de 1958.
=== In summary, what happens if there is disagreement about the acceptability and validity of the reservation? ===
First of all, it will be necessary to ascertain whether there are agreements and whether there are objections to the reservation. If there is no objection to the reservation and States expressly accept it, then this means that reservations to those States do not pose any problems. We can therefore proceed as if the reservation were valid even if it is not true.


*'''dispositions qui autorisent des réserves sur certaines dispositions''' : les réserves sont admises pour certains articles ce qui revient à dire qu’a contrario les réserves sont interdites sur toutes les autres dispositions. Cette dernière version est généralement plus subtile, la convention est d’avantage verrouillée.  
If we have objections, we have a potential dispute. At that time, we do not know how to apply the treaty. As long as there is no particular problem, we move forward and the dispute can be dormant. As long as there are no disputes, it is not very important to know whether the reservation to article IX is valid or not. However, we won't be able to test it, because we don't have a case. If we have a case, we have a dispute about the applicability of the convention; we will have to engage in procedures for the peaceful settlement of disputes.


*'''dispositions qui interdisent certaines réserves matériellement définies''' : des réserves ayant certaines qualités comme, par exemple, dans l’ancienne convention des Droits de l’Homme à l’article 64 qui interdit les réserves de caractère général qui sont estimés non-intelligibles. Il y a des conventions qui interdisent certains types de réserves et notamment celles qui ne sont pas spécifiques.  
Finally, the effects. The setbacks are decided on the basis of the treaty and, if not, on the basis of Articles 19 and 20 of the Vienna Convention.


Nous sommes autorisés à faire des réserves qui sont autorisées par le traité. C’est la règle en la matière de consentement et de volonté.
Assuming we have valid reservations, what are their effects?
Indépendamment de ce que les parties ont voulu et notamment dans les traités comme la Convention de Vienne, les États peuvent faire des réserves en principe illimitées. Il y a un problème qui est celui du droit général, les États peuvent faire des réserves comme ils le souhaitent. C’est la raison pour laquelle il y a des limites aux réserves dans le droit général :
*'''limites relatives''' (article 20 § 2 et §3) : dans les traités institutionnels, il est difficile de faire des réserves, les Nations-Unies, par exemple, en tant qu’institution doit fonctionner selon des règles égales pour tous.
*'''limite de l’objet et du but du traité tel que prévu dans l’article 19 de la Convention de Vienne lettre c)''': elle n’est pas d’une application facile ou aisée, car on peut légitimement avoir des vues différentes sur l‘objet et le but du traité.Mais ce qui est facilement compréhensible est que dans un traité multipartite qui contient beaucoup de dispositions, toutes ne sont pas de la même importance,quelques-unes sont éminentes et d’autres sont des dispositions secondaires de type administratives ou d’une autre manière subordonnés ; il n’est pas possible de mettre des réserves sur les articles essentiels au bon fonctionnement de la convention alors que les réserves sur les dispositions secondaires sont admises. Décider de ce qui relevé de l’objet ou du but est parfois évident et parfois n’est pas simple. On peut avoir des vues divergentes de façon tout à fait légitime.


Le cas qui est juridiquement très clair sont les réserves de type « charia » dites aussi « réserves de tradition interne ». Une réserve de Djibouti à la convention relative aux droits de l’enfant en 1989 stipule que « [Le Gouvernement de la République de Djibouti ne se considérera pas] liée par les dispositions ou articles incompatibles avec sa religion, et ses valeurs traditionnelles ».
The general effect of the reservation is to fragment the treaty into a bundle of bilateral relations. Contrary to the option that exists, there is in reality a plurality of treaties according to the reservations and the reactions of other States to those reservations, so the treaty is fragmented according to bilateral relations. Thus it will apply differently depending on the States parties to the treaty. We have to look at the reports of each state, there are potentially many relations.
Cette réserve est de type général et ne porte pas sur une disposition déterminée, elle porte potentiellement sur toutes les dispositions du traité, en plus, elle est de nature absolument indéterminée, car personne d’autre que Djibouti ne connait sa religion et ses traditions ce qui signifie que Djibouti n’a à assumer aucune obligation. Ce n’est incompatible avec aucune convention, on se réserve le droit d’appliquer ou de ne pas appliquer une disposition en invoquant la tradition et la religion que seul Djibouti connaît. C’est incompatible avec l’adage pacta sunt servanda, se réserver l’application d’une convention est contraire à l’objet et au but de tout engagement conventionnel. Dans ce cas il eut fallu tout simplement de ne pas ratifier la convention. D’ailleurs, toute une série d’États a fait une objection à cette réserve.  


A silent state that does not react, in this case if the situation were not regulated there would be legal certainty that would last too long. According to Article 20 §5, after one year silence is considered acceptance; it is a legal fiction, acceptance is imputed to the silent state. A State that does not wish to accept a reservation, if it does not object, after a certain period of time has elapsed, will be understood that it has accepted. After 12 months the position will be clear. During the twelve months, the situation is in abeyance.
=== Pourquoi ces États ratifient-ils alors qu’ils ont des problèmes avec ce type de convention ? ===
Le problème n’est pas juridique à cet égard, c’est que ces conventions de droits de l‘Homme sont devenues tellement une religion pour les pays occidentaux que tout le monde doit les ratifier. Cette situation quelque peu fâcheuse amène ces États à ratifier cette convention, car c’est politiquement nécessaire. En réalité ils ne peuvent appliquer ces conventions contraires à leurs traditions internes. C’est politiquement délicat, mais pas juridiquement.
Un autre cas est délicat, aux réserves faites par les États socialistes à la fin des années 1940 et début 1950 pour ce qui est de la convention du génocide de 1948. Cette réserve porte sur l’article IX, en cas de litige sur l’interprétation ou l’application de la présente convention, chacun des États partie à cette convention est partie aux différends sur un autre État pourra porter ce différend devant la Cour Internationale de Justice. C’est une clause compromissoire qui permet en cas de litige de le mener devant la Cour Internationale de Justice.
Les Républiques socialistes ont accepté de signer la convention, mais pas de reconnaitre le tribunal international. Les pays communistes n’avaient jamais la majorité des juges à la cour est aucune chance d’imposer leur vision des relations internationales. Pour ces États, il était hors de question de se soumettre à la cour. En même temps ces États voulaient absolument en devenir partie pour les mêmes raisons politiques que dans l’exemple précèdent. Il était vital d’être lié à la convention, mais pas à l’article IX.
=== Est-ce contraire à l’objet et au but ? ===
Pour les États socialistes, ce qui compte dans la convention est les conditions substantielles et la répression du génocide. L’objet et le but sont donc liés au génocide et aux dispositions matérielles de la convention.


=== L’article IX attrait-il à la procédure ? ===
=== Assuming we have valid reservations, what are their effects? ===
C‘est une question procédurale non-essentielle.
The general effect of the reservation is to fragment the treaty into a bundle of bilateral relations. Contrary to the option that exists, there is in reality a plurality of treaties according to the reservations and the reactions of other States to those reservations, so the treaty is fragmented according to bilateral relations. Thus it will apply differently depending on the States parties to the treaty. We have to look at the reports of each state, there are potentially many relations.
Les Occidentaux à la fin des années 1940 argumentaient que la convention contre le génocide n’était pas une convention contre les autres, elle ne se bornait pas à désigner un crime et organiser une répression. Il y avait une disposition dans la convention qui permettait d’appliquer la convention. Cette convention par le fait de l’article IX n’est pas une convention de chiffon de papier. La clause de garantie de l’article IX est essentielle à la réalisation de l’objet et du but de la convention.
Les deux argumentations sont plausibles, choisir entre les deux n’est pas évident ; pendant longtemps il restait une incertitude sur l’admissibilité de la réserve soviétique et sur les effets à lui rattacher.
La question est entre temps résolue, car d’autres États ont formulé la même réserve si bien que cette pratique s’est généralisée. Ainsi, pour les Occidentaux, cette réserve n’est pas si mauvaise, la pratique est celle que cette réserve est admissible. Toujours est-il que la Cour applique cette réserve.


=== Pour résumer, que se passe-t-il s’il y a un désaccord sur l’acceptabilité et la validité de la réserve ? ===
A silent state that does not react, in this case if the situation were not regulated there would be legal certainty that would last too long. According to Article 20 §5, after one year silence is considered acceptance; it is a legal fiction, acceptance is imputed to the silent state. A State that does not wish to accept a reservation, if it does not object, after a certain period of time has elapsed, will be understood that it has accepted. After 12 months the position will be clear. During the twelve months, the situation is in abeyance.[[Fichier:Convention de Vienne sur le droit des traités de 1969 - article 20.png|vignette|center|700px|[http://legal.un.org/ilc/texts/instruments/francais/traites/1_1_1969_francais.pdf Convention de Vienne sur le droit des traités de 1969] - [http://www.admin.ch/opc/fr/classified-compilation/19690099/index.html#a20 article 20]]]
Il faudra tout d’abord constater s’il y a des accords et regarder s‘il y a des objections à la réserve. S’il n’y a pas d’objection à la réserve et que les États acceptent expressément alors cela signifie que les réserves vis-à-vis de ces États-là ne posent pas de problèmes. On peut dès lors procéder comme si la réserve était valide même si ce n’est pas vrai.
Si on a des objections, on a potentiellement un différend. À ce moment, on ne sait comment appliquer le traité. Tant qu’il ne se pose pas un problème particulier, on va de l’avant et le différend peut être dormant. Tant qu’il n’y a pas de disputes, il importe assez peu de savoir si la réserve sur l’article IX est valide ou pas. Cependant, on ne pourra le tester, car on n’a pas de cas. Si on a un cas, on a un litige sur l’applicabilité de la convention ; il faudra s’engager dans des procédures de règlement pacifique des différends.
En dernier lieu, les effets. Les reverses se décident en fonction du traité et sinon en fonction de l’article 19 et 20 de la Convention de Vienne.
À supposer qu’on a des réserves qui sont valides quels sont leurs effets ?
L’effet général de la réserve est de fragmenter le traité en un faisceau de relations bilatérales. Contrairement à l’option qu’il existe, il y a en réalité une pluralité de traités en fonction des réserves et des réactions des autres États à ces réserves, dès lors le traité est fragmenté en fonction des relations bilatérales. Ainsi il s’appliquera différemment en fonction des États parties au traité. Il faut voir les rapports de chaque État, il y a potentiellement beaucoup de relations.
Un État silencieux qui ne réagit pas, dans ce cas si la situation n’était pas règlementée il y aurait une sécurité juridique qui perdurait trop longtemps. Selon l’article 20 §5, après une année le silence vaut acceptation ; c’est une fiction juridique, l’acceptation est imputée à l‘État silencieux. Un État qui ne souhaite pas accepter une réserve, s’il n’objecte pas, après l’écoulement d’un certain délai, il sera compris qu’il a accepté. Après 12 mois la position sera claire. Pendant les douze mois, la situation est en suspens.
 
=== À supposer qu’on a des réserves qui sont valides quels sont leurs effets ? ===
L’effet général de la réserve est de fragmenter le traité en un faisceau de relations bilatérales. Contrairement à l’option qu’il existe, il y a en réalité une pluralité de traités en fonction des réserves et des réactions des autres États à ces réserves, dès lors le traité est fragmenté en fonction des relations bilatérales. Ainsi il s’appliquera différemment en fonction des États parties au traité. Il faut voir les rapports de chaque État, il y a potentiellement beaucoup de relations.
Un État silencieux qui ne réagit pas, dans ce cas si la situation n’était pas règlementée il y aurait une sécurité juridique qui perdurait trop longtemps. Selon l’article 20 §5, après une année le silence vaut acceptation ; c’est une fiction juridique, l’acceptation est imputée à l‘État silencieux. Un État qui ne souhaite pas accepter une réserve, s’il n’objecte pas, après l’écoulement d’un certain délai, il sera compris qu’il a accepté. Après 12 mois la position sera claire. Pendant les douze mois, la situation est en suspens.
[[Fichier:Convention de Vienne sur le droit des traités de 1969 - article 20.png|vignette|center|700px|[http://legal.un.org/ilc/texts/instruments/francais/traites/1_1_1969_francais.pdf Convention de Vienne sur le droit des traités de 1969] - [http://www.admin.ch/opc/fr/classified-compilation/19690099/index.html#a20 article 20]]]


=== S’il y a une objection à une réserve qu’elle est l’effet de la réserve ? ===
=== If there is an objection to a reservation that it is the effect of the reservation? ===


Il y a deux distinctions à faire qui sont superposées :
Il y a deux distinctions à faire qui sont superposées :


1)  c’est une option donnée par la Convention de Vienne et par la pratique à l’État objectant :s’il est dit qu’on ne veut appliquer telle réserve à tel article et qu’un État objecte ; il faut faire un choix :
1)  it is an option given by the Vienna Convention and by practice to the objecting State: if it is stated that a reservation is not intended to be applied to a particular article and that a State objects, a choice must be made:
*'''objection simple''' : veut-on appliquer les dispositions de la convention sur lesquels il n’y a pas de différend ? On objecte à la réserve ce qui entraine la conséquence que la réserve à l’article ne sera pas applicable. Cependant, s’il n’y a pas de divergence d’opinions, on ne s’oppose pas à la mise en vigueur du traité.  
* '''simple objection''': do we want to apply the provisions of the convention on which there is no dispute? The reservation is opposed to the reservation, which entails the consequence that the reservation to the article will not be applicable. However, if there is no difference of opinion, we are not opposed to implementing the treaty.
*'''objection radicale''' : l’article est tellement important qu’un État refuse d’appliquer la convention entre lui et le réservataire. Tant que la disposition est maintenue, on refuse d’appliquer la convention, rien ne sera appliqué.
* '''Radical objection''': the article was so important that a State refused to apply the agreement between it and the reserving State. As long as the provision is retained, the convention will not be enforced.
The effect of an objection will be, depending on the circumstances, to allow the treaty to apply except in the case of an objection to a reservation, or that a provision of the treaty will not be applicable from then on, there will be no treaty relationship between the States wishing to make the reservation and the objecting State.
 
2)  Is it the same thing, because the result is the same? The reason for the result is different. There is disagreement on the application of the reservation, in this case there is no agreement and therefore no treaty relations. In both cases the article will not apply, on the one hand, because there will be no agreement on how to apply it and, on the other hand, because the reservation has been accepted. If a reservation modifies an article, this is no longer true, because the situations differ. Among the States that have accepted the reservation, the article is applied as amended; if an objection has been made, the article will not apply at all. The article cannot be applied with and without reservation. In case of disagreement the article will not apply at all. It is therefore only when the reservation excludes a provision and the objection is simple that the same result can be achieved, but by different means. Treaties may apply differently, but do not affect relations between other States without any specificity.


L’effet de l’objection sera selon les cas de laisser appliquer le traité sauf la réserve objectée, soit qu’une disposition du traité ne sera applicable dès lors il n’y aura aucun rapport conventionnel entre les États voulant faire la réserve et celui objectant.  
== Validity ==
This is the scope of articles 46 to 53 of the Vienna Convention.


2)  cette distinction est moins importante, '''quelle est la différence entre la situation juridique de celui qui a accepté la réserve et celle d’une objection simple ?Est-ce la même chose, car le résultat est le même ? La raison pour laquelle on arrive au résultat est différente. Il y a un dissentiment sur l’application de la réserve, dans ce cas il n’y a pas d’accord et donc pas de relations conventionnelles. Dans les deux cas l’article ne s’appliquera pas d’une part parce qu’on ne sera pas d’accord sur comment l’appliquer et d’autre part parce qu’on a accepté la réserve. Si une réserve modifie un article, ce n’est plus vrai, car les situations diffèrent. Entre les États qui ont accepté la réserve, l’article est appliqué tel que modifié ; si on a objecté, l’article ne s’appliquera pas du tout. On ne peut appliquer l’article avec et sans la réserve. En cas de désaccord l’article ne s’appliquera pas du tout. Ce n’est donc que lorsque la réserve exclut une disposition et que l’objection est simple qu’on arrive au même résultat, mais selon des moyens différents. Les traités peuvent s’appliquer différemment, mais n’affectent pas les relations entre les autres États sans aucune spécificité.'''
A treaty may be concluded in accordance with the necessary procedures, but does not tell us whether the treaty is valid, as there may be particular grounds and circumstances that may invalidate or nullify the treaty. If, for example, you have to sign a contract because someone is pointing a revolver at the temple, it would be surprising to be bound by the contract as an extreme constraint, it would be normal for it to be invalidated or considered null and void because of the constraint.


== Validité ==
In international law there are grounds for a treaty to be invalidated. It is a new branch, until World War II there were no provisions on the invalidity or nullity of a treaty, because international law was either violence or violence itself was not prohibited. In this context, it would have been quite unusual to draw up grounds for the invalidity of a treaty, since the violence was lawful and a treaty concluded under coercion was therefore lawful. Since violence is conceded, the treaty cannot be invalidated. Moreover, at the time the peace treaties were essentially important instruments, foundations of legal orders such as the Treaty of Westphalia which founded the modern European order in 1648 or the Vienna Agreements of 1815 or the Treaty of Versailles of 1919. A state forced to sign a peace treaty does so under duress, and if it is said that they are not valid, all treaties are called into question, it is impossible to concede this. If we say that treaties concluded under coercion are valid, then we will not seek its nullity or invalidity because they are valid. It is considered that the principle of pacta sunt servanda is so fundamental that opening the loophole to plead the invalidity of treaties is tantamount to opening the Pandora's box.
C’est le domaine des articles 46 à 53 de la Convention de Vienne.
 
This has changed with the law of the United Nations Charter where the use of force has been completely reconsidered; logically, in the sense that treaties concluded under coercion cannot be considered valid. There is a whole vision to see things on crucial points in modern international law with a much more positive vision. The trace is section II of Part 5 of the Vienna Convention, article 46 et seq.
Un traité peut être conclu selon les procédures nécessaires, mais ne nous dit pas si le traité est valide, car il peut exister des motifs et des circonstances particulières qui peuvent invalider le traité ou le rendre nul. Si par exemple on doit signer un contrat parce que quelqu’un pointe un revolver sur la tempe, il serait étonnât d’être tenu par le contrat sous forme de contrainte extrême, il serait normal qu’il soit invalidé ou considéré nul à cause de la contrainte.
 
=== What are the rules? ===
En droit international il y a des motifs qui font qu’un traité peut être invalidé. C’est une branche nouvelle, jusqu’à la Seconde guerre mondialen il n’y avait de dispositions sur l’invalidité ou la nullité d’un traité, car le droit international était celui de la violence ou la violence elle-même n’était pas interdite. Dans ce contexte il aurait été assez singulier d’élaborer des motifs de nullité d’un traité, car la violence était licite et un traité conclu sous la coercition été dès lors licite. Puisque la violence est concédée, on ne peut invalider le traité. Qui plus est, à l‘époque les traités de paix étaient des instruments essentiellement importants, des fondements des ordres juridiques comme le traité de Westphalie qui a fondé l’ordre moderne européen en 1648 ou les accords de Vienne de 1815 ou le traité de Versailles de 1919. Un État forcé de signer un traité de paix le fait sous la contrainte, si on dit qu’ils ne sont pas valides on remet en cause tous les traités, il est impossible de concéder cela. Si on dit que les traités conclus sous la coercition sont valides alors on ne va pas chercher sa nullité ou son invalidité puisqu’ils sont valides. On considère que le principe pacta sunt servanda est tellement fondamental qu’ouvrir la brèche de plaider l’invalidité des traités revient à ouvrir la boite de pandore.
Cela a changé avec le droit de la Charte des Nations-Unies où l’utilisation de la force a été complètement reconsidérée ; en toute logique, dans le sens où les traités conclus sous la coercition ne peuvent ne pas être considérés valides. Il y a toute une vision de voir les choses sur des points capitaux dans le droit international moderne avec une vision beaucoup plus positive. La trace est la section II de la partie 5 de la Convention de Vienne article 46 et suivants.
=== Quelles sont les règles ? ===


1) La première règle à considérer est que '''les motifs d’invalidation ou de nullité d’un traité, donc l’invalidité d’un traité, ne peut reposer que sur des motifs limitativement énumérés dans la Convention de Vienne'''. Ce n’est donc qu’en se fondant sur un motif reconnu dans la Convention de Vienne ou reconnu dans le droit international coutumier pour les États non liés par la Convention de Vienne qu’il est possible de plaider l’invalidité d’un traité, c’est l’objet de l’article 42 et en particulier du §1.  
1) The first rule to be considered is that the grounds for invalidation or nullity of a treaty, i. e. the invalidity of a treaty, can only be based on grounds that are limitatively enumerated in the Vienna Convention. It is therefore only on the basis of a ground recognised in the Vienna Convention or recognized in customary international law for States not bound by the Vienna Convention that it is possible to plead invalidity of a treaty, this is the subject of Article 42 and in particular §1.  


[[Fichier:Convention de Vienne sur le droit des traités de 1969 - article 42.png|vignette|center|700px|[http://legal.un.org/ilc/texts/instruments/francais/traites/1_1_1969_francais.pdf Convention de Vienne sur le droit des traités de 1969] - [http://www.admin.ch/opc/fr/classified-compilation/19690099/index.html#a42 article 42]]]
[[Fichier:Convention de Vienne sur le droit des traités de 1969 - article 42.png|vignette|center|700px|[http://legal.un.org/ilc/texts/instruments/francais/traites/1_1_1969_francais.pdf Convention de Vienne sur le droit des traités de 1969] - [http://www.admin.ch/opc/fr/classified-compilation/19690099/index.html#a42 article 42]]]
   
   
Cela n’exclut pas que le droit coutumier développe d’autres motifs, mais il faudrait à ce moment-là que la pratique internationale et l’opinion juridique des États l’abolissent. Depuis 1969 la pratique des États n’a pas créé d’autres motifs d’invalidation.  
This does not preclude customary law from developing other grounds, but it should be abolished by international practice and the legal opinion of States. Since 1969, State practice has not created other grounds for invalidation.  


2) Deuxièmement'''quels sont les motifs pour invalider un traité ? Ils sont exposés aux articles 46 et suivants portant sur les ratifications irrégulières, il s’agit de la violation de droit interne sur la conclusion des traités. Concrètement il s’agit que lorsqu’un traité est conclu il y a toute une procédure à passer, à chacun de ces pas des erreurs peuvent survenir. Supposons qu’un traité ait été conclu est que le droit interne prévoit que le parlement doit donner son approbation pour qu’il soit ratifier or l’exécutif n’a pas consulté le parlement en méconnaissance du droit interne. Les seules dispositions du droit interne pertinentes sont celles concernant la procédure de conclusion des traités. L’article 46 ne concerne pas la compatibilité du droit interne avec les règles matérielles, mais uniquement si les dispositions sur la conclusion du traité sont pertinentes, c’est uniquement si des erreurs ont été commises sur les dispositions formelles qui permettent d’invoquer l’application de l’article 46.'''
2) Second, what are the grounds for invalidating a treaty? They are set out in articles 46 et seq. on irregular ratifications, which is the violation of domestic law on the conclusion of treaties. In practical terms, this means that when a treaty is concluded there is a whole procedure to go through, errors can occur in each of these steps. Suppose a treaty was concluded is that domestic law provides that the parliament must give its approval for it to be ratified or the executive did not consult the parliament in disregard of domestic law. The only relevant provisions of domestic law are those concerning the procedure for the conclusion of treaties. Article 46 does not concern the compatibility of domestic law with substantive rules, but only if the provisions on the conclusion of the treaty are relevant, it is only if errors have been made in the formal provisions which allow the application of Article 46 to be invoked.


[[Fichier:Convention de Vienne sur le droit des traités de 1969 - article 46.png|vignette|center|700px|[http://legal.un.org/ilc/texts/instruments/francais/traites/1_1_1969_francais.pdf Convention de Vienne sur le droit des traités de 1969] - [http://www.admin.ch/opc/fr/classified-compilation/19690099/index.html#a46 article 46]]]
[[Fichier:Convention de Vienne sur le droit des traités de 1969 - article 46.png|vignette|center|700px|[http://legal.un.org/ilc/texts/instruments/francais/traites/1_1_1969_francais.pdf Convention de Vienne sur le droit des traités de 1969] - [http://www.admin.ch/opc/fr/classified-compilation/19690099/index.html#a46 article 46]]]
   
   
L’article 46 est formulé de manière négative ce qui veut dire qu’un État ne peut invoquer l’erreur qu’il a commise dans la procédure d’élaboration d’un traité. En d’autres termes, la violation du droit interne ne peut pas être évoquée, il faut en supporter la conséquence sans que les autres parties contractantes n’en payent les frais.
Article 46 is worded negatively, which means that a State cannot invoke the error it has made in the procedure for drawing up a treaty. In other words, the violation of domestic law cannot be invoked, it is necessary to bear the consequences without the other contracting parties paying the costs.
 
Cependant il y a une porte de sortie. L’article 46 donne les critères. Ce sont deux conditions cumulatives, la règle doit être d’une importance fondamentale pour invalider un traité conclu, avec d’autres traités il faut que la disposition violée soit d’importance majeure. Il faut d’autre part que cette violation ait été manifeste pour les autres contractants. Le critère du manifeste est la protection de la confiance légitime des autres États. C’est seulement s’ils devaient savoir que l’autre État ne pouvait pas ratifier le traité de la manière dont il l’a fait, ils auraient dû savoir qu’il y a une erreur dans le processus pour que le traité soit invalidé. On maintient la stabilité du traité parce que cela engage les autres contractants qui n’ont pas à avoir à connaître le droit interne des États non-contractants.
However, there is a way out. Section 46 sets out the criteria. These are two cumulative conditions, the rule must be of fundamental importance to invalidate a treaty concluded, with other treaties the violated provision must be of major importance. On the other hand, this violation must have been manifest for the other contractors. The manifest criterion is the protection of the legitimate expectations of other States. It is only if they had to know that the other state could not ratify the treaty in the way it did, they should have known that there was a mistake in the process for the treaty to be invalidated. The stability of the treaty is maintained because it commits other contractors who do not need to know the domestic law of non-Contracting States.
 
La convention parle d’ « objectivement évident » pour tout État, on peut ajouter « subjectivement évident ». Des États qui ont des relations rapprochées se connaissent bien ; par conséquent dans le cas de traités bilatéraux l’article 46 pourrait connaître une interprétation un peu plus relâchée.
The convention speaks of "objectively obvious" for any State, one can add "subjectively obvious". States that have close relations know each other well; therefore, in the case of bilateral treaties, Article 46 could be interpreted somewhat looser.
 
Nous allons parler de l’arbitrage entre la Guinée-Bissau et le Sénégal publié dans le recueil des sentences applicables volume XX page 121 et suivantes. Il y a entre ces deux États un accord datant de 1960, un traité international de 1960 entre la France et le Portugal à l’époque les puissances coloniales. Cet accord portait sur la frontière maritime et les États étaient en litige sur la frontière maritime. Or il y avait eu un problème lors de la conclusion de ce traité. En effet, normalement ce traité aurait dû être soumis au parlement au Portugal or il ne l’a pas été puisqu’il a été ratifié directement à travers Salazar.
We will talk about the arbitration between Guinea-Bissau and Senegal published in the book of awards applicable volume XX page 121 and following. There is an agreement between these two states dating back to 1960, an international treaty of 1960 between France and Portugal at the time the colonial powers. The agreement covered the maritime border and States were in dispute over the maritime border. There was a problem when this treaty was signed. Indeed, normally this treaty should have been submitted to the Parliament in Portugal, but it was not, as it was ratified directly through Salazar.


=== Applicabilité de l’article 46 ? ===
=== Applicability of Article 46? ===


La Convention de Vienne ne s’applique pas rétroactivement, elle est entrée en vigueur en 1980 ; le tribunal arbitral a estimé que l’article 46 relevait du droit coutumier en 1960. Donc ce droit coutumier était applicable au traité.  
The Vienna Convention does not apply retroactively; it entered into force in 1980; the arbitral tribunal found that article 46 was customary law in 1960. So this customary law was applicable to the treaty.  




=== Est-ce une disputions d’une importance fondamentale ? ===
=== Is this a debate of fundamental importance? ===


Oui, assurément c’est une disposition de grande importance, pour les États à l’accession territoriale est un sujet sensible.  
Yes, it is certainly a very important provision, for States with territorial accession is a sensitive subject.  


   
   
=== Est-ce une violation manifeste ? ===
=== Is this a manifest violation? ===


Le tribunal dit non ce n’était pas manifeste ; la pratique constitutionnelle du Portugal à l’époque était de court-circuiter le parlement. La France pouvait se fier de bonne foi que ce traité était ratifié de manière régulière non pas selon les formes formelles applicables, mais selon la pratique de l’époque. Cela correspondait à la pratique habituelle du Portugal à l’époque, la France ne pouvait pas percevoir cette subtilité, le traité est donc applicable.  
The court said no it was not obvious; Portugal's constitutional practice at the time was to bypass parliament. France could rely in good faith that this treaty was ratified regularly, not in the formal forms applicable, but in accordance with the practice of the time. This was Portugal's usual practice at the time, France could not perceive this subtlety, and the treaty is therefore applicable.  


   
   
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[[Fichier:Convention de Vienne sur le droit des traités de 1969 - article 48.png|vignette|center|700px|[http://legal.un.org/ilc/texts/instruments/francais/traites/1_1_1969_francais.pdf Convention de Vienne sur le droit des traités de 1969] - [http://www.admin.ch/opc/fr/classified-compilation/19690099/index.html#a48 article 48]]]
[[Fichier:Convention de Vienne sur le droit des traités de 1969 - article 48.png|vignette|center|700px|[http://legal.un.org/ilc/texts/instruments/francais/traites/1_1_1969_francais.pdf Convention de Vienne sur le droit des traités de 1969] - [http://www.admin.ch/opc/fr/classified-compilation/19690099/index.html#a48 article 48]]]


L’article 48 porte sur l’erreur, c’est un cas rare ou plutôt fréquent uniquement dans un contexte particulier du droit international. C’est une erreur essentielle sur un fait fondamental au moment de la conclusion des traités. On a conclu les traités sur une représentation erronée sur un fait essentiel du traité. En droit interne, on peut aussi invalider des contrats pour des erreurs essentielles. Il y a une situation dans laquelle les erreurs ne sont pas rares qui sont les cartes géographiques. Il arrive plus d’une fois que les cartes soient annexées à un traité, on va décrire la frontière dans le traité et dire que sur la carte ou le croquis la frontière est directement dessinée sur le terrain et la carte fait partie du traité. Il n’arrive pas si rarement qu’on se soit trompé sur la manière de dessiner les frontières sur les cartes ou les différentes configurations géographiques.
Article 48 deals with error, which is a rare or rather frequent occurrence only in a particular context of international law. This is an essential error on a fundamental fact at the time of concluding the treaties. Treaties were concluded on misrepresentation of an essential fact of the treaty. In domestic law, contracts can also be invalidated for essential errors. There is a situation in which errors are not uncommon in geographical maps. It happens more than once that the maps are appended to a treaty, one will describe the border in the treaty and say that on the map or sketch the border is drawn directly on the ground and the map is part of the treaty. It is not so rare that we have made mistakes about how to draw boundaries on maps or different geographical configurations.


[[Fichier:Convention de Vienne sur le droit des traités de 1969 - article 49.png|vignette|center|700px|[http://legal.un.org/ilc/texts/instruments/francais/traites/1_1_1969_francais.pdf Convention de Vienne sur le droit des traités de 1969] - [http://www.admin.ch/opc/fr/classified-compilation/19690099/index.html#a49 article 249]]]
[[Fichier:Convention de Vienne sur le droit des traités de 1969 - article 49.png|vignette|center|700px|[http://legal.un.org/ilc/texts/instruments/francais/traites/1_1_1969_francais.pdf Convention de Vienne sur le droit des traités de 1969] - [http://www.admin.ch/opc/fr/classified-compilation/19690099/index.html#a49 article 249]]]
   
   
L’article 49 porte sur le dol, c’est l’erreur induite volontairement, cela revient à tromper. C’est un motif très fréquent d’invalidation des contrats en droit interne, mais qui n’existe pas en droit international. Il faut retourner à des époques lointaines pour trouver des cas de dol ; les États ne sont pas crédules. C’est une discussion intellectuellement nécessaire, mais en pratique rarement utilisée.
Article 49 deals with fraud, that is deliberate error, that is misleading. This is a very common ground for invalidation of contracts in domestic law, but does not exist in international law. We must go back to distant eras to find cases of fraud; states are not credulous. This is an intellectually necessary discussion, but in practice rarely used.


[[Fichier:Convention de Vienne sur le droit des traités de 1969 - article 50.png|vignette|center|700px|[http://legal.un.org/ilc/texts/instruments/francais/traites/1_1_1969_francais.pdf Convention de Vienne sur le droit des traités de 1969] - [http://www.admin.ch/opc/fr/classified-compilation/19690099/index.html#a50 article 50]]]
[[Fichier:Convention de Vienne sur le droit des traités de 1969 - article 50.png|vignette|center|700px|[http://legal.un.org/ilc/texts/instruments/francais/traites/1_1_1969_francais.pdf Convention de Vienne sur le droit des traités de 1969] - [http://www.admin.ch/opc/fr/classified-compilation/19690099/index.html#a50 article 50]]]


L’article 50 n’est pas non plus fréquent heureusement. C’est la corruption d’un représentant d’un État, l’expression du consentement d’un État a été obtenue par la corruption de son représentant, mais encore il s’agit de cas relativement rares, car le représentant peut rarement directement lier l’État. C’est un motif qu’on insère plus pour être complet.
Article 50 is also fortunately not a frequent occurrence. Corruption is the bribery of a representative of a State, the expression of a State's consent has been obtained through the bribery of its representative, but these are still relatively rare cases, as the representative can rarely directly bind the State. It is a motive that we insert more to be complete.


[[Fichier:Convention de Vienne sur le droit des traités de 1969 - article 51.png|vignette|center|700px|[http://legal.un.org/ilc/texts/instruments/francais/traites/1_1_1969_francais.pdf Convention de Vienne sur le droit des traités de 1969] - [http://www.admin.ch/opc/fr/classified-compilation/19690099/index.html#a51 article 51]]]
[[Fichier:Convention de Vienne sur le droit des traités de 1969 - article 51.png|vignette|center|700px|[http://legal.un.org/ilc/texts/instruments/francais/traites/1_1_1969_francais.pdf Convention de Vienne sur le droit des traités de 1969] - [http://www.admin.ch/opc/fr/classified-compilation/19690099/index.html#a51 article 51]]]
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[[Fichier:Convention de Vienne sur le droit des traités de 1969 - article 52.png|vignette|center|700px|[http://legal.un.org/ilc/texts/instruments/francais/traites/1_1_1969_francais.pdf Convention de Vienne sur le droit des traités de 1969] - [http://www.admin.ch/opc/fr/classified-compilation/19690099/index.html#a52 article 52]]]
[[Fichier:Convention de Vienne sur le droit des traités de 1969 - article 52.png|vignette|center|700px|[http://legal.un.org/ilc/texts/instruments/francais/traites/1_1_1969_francais.pdf Convention de Vienne sur le droit des traités de 1969] - [http://www.admin.ch/opc/fr/classified-compilation/19690099/index.html#a52 article 52]]]
   
   
Les articles [http://www.admin.ch/opc/fr/classified-compilation/19690099/index.html#a51 51] et [http://www.admin.ch/opc/fr/classified-compilation/19690099/index.html#a52 52] sur la contrainte et la coercition sont des articles de grande importance. On remarque qu’il y a deux dispositions ; l’article 51 est la coercition exercée sur un représentant d’un État lorsqu’il est habilité à l‘engager, et l’article 52 est la coercition d’un État à signer sous menace de l’utilisation de la force. Normalement un représentant de l’État ne peut engager seul et directement un État. Ce qui peut arriver plus souvent est la menace du recours à la force physique. Ces articles portent donc sur la contrainte.
Articles [http://www.admin.ch/opc/fr/classified-compilation/19690099/index.html#a51 51] and [http://www.admin.ch/opc/fr/classified-compilation/19690099/index.html#a52 52] on coercion are articles of great importance. It should be noted that there are two provisions: Article 51 is the coercion exerted on a representative of a State when he or she is entitled to commit it, and Article 52 is the coercion of a State to sign under threat of the use of force. Normally a representative of the State cannot engage a State alone and directly. What can happen more often is the threat of physical force. These articles therefore deal with coercion.


=== Qu’est-ce qu’une coercition au sens de l’article 52 ? ===
=== What is coercion within the meaning of Article 52? ===
C’est celui de la force armée, le renvoi est ici opéré à la Charte des Nations-Unies est en particulier à l’article 2 § 4.
It is that of the armed force, the reference is made here to the Charter of the United Nations is in particular to Article 2 § 4.
   
   
[[Fichier:CHARTE DES NATIONS UNIES - article 2.png|vignette|center|700px|[https://www.un.org/fr/documents/charter/pdf/charter.pdf Charte des Nations Unies] - [https://www.un.org/fr/documents/charter/chap1.shtml Chapitre I : Buts et principes - article 2]]]
[[Fichier:CHARTE DES NATIONS UNIES - article 2.png|vignette|center|700px|[https://www.un.org/fr/documents/charter/pdf/charter.pdf Charte des Nations Unies] - [https://www.un.org/fr/documents/charter/chap1.shtml Chapitre I : Buts et principes - article 2]]]


La Convention de Vienne se réfère à la Charte. La Charte traite de la force armée, mais n’est pas couverte la coercition économique ou autre. Elle peut constituer selon les cas une intervention dans les affaires intérieures, mais une telle intervention n’aboutit pas à l’invalidation du traité. La solution retenue est bonne, invalider les traités est extrêmement sérieux et doit être réservé à des cas flagrants. Admettre la coercition économique est ouvrir la porte à des degrés. La politique étrangère est faite de coercitions ; vouloir incorporer tous ces jeux-là et permettre d’invoquer des pressions économiques est une porte qu’on n’a pas voulu ouvrir à Vienne ne menant pas à l’invalidation d’un traité.
The Vienna Convention refers to the Charter. The Charter deals with armed force, but does not cover economic or other coercion. It may constitute an intervention in internal affairs depending on the circumstances, but such an intervention does not lead to the invalidation of the Treaty. The solution chosen is good, invalidating the treaties is extremely serious and must be reserved for flagrant cases. Admitting economic coercion is opening the door to degrees. Foreign policy is made up of coercion; wanting to incorporate all these games and allow economic pressures to be invoked is a door that was not opened in Vienna and did not lead to the invalidation of a treaty.
 
In reality, coercive treaties will be treated as null and void only when the United Nations and the law of force are relatively strong and well. When important States begin to use this means to have treaties signed and ratified, this, of course, is clearly harmful to provisions such as articles 51 and 52. In the case of peace treaties such as Dayton's, we accept that this is not a prohibited coercion, because it is in the nature of the state not to have much choice in signing the peace treaty. It is forbidden to take advantage of its predominant position to extort advantages, if in a peace treaty it is provided for an annexation of territories this would be considered as a form of coercion contrary to Article 52. It is incumbent upon the organs of the United Nations to lend strength to these arrangements.
 
Article 53 is the domain of ius cogens also known as imperative law. The ius cogens is a concept that has been the subject of much debate, the great question of international law. Here we are in the law of treaties, Article 53 relates to the lawfulness of the object itself. Here we are at the other end of the spectrum, the point is the lawfulness of the object.
 
=== Can a treaty relate to any object? ===
If any object is lawful then any treaty is lawful, because the object is indifferent.
 
The doctrine of ius cogens is the denial of this principle, it is considered in article 53 that there are certain illicit objects, so that the treaty is null and void when it relates to such intrinsically illicit objects. The dispute continues over the definition of these humanitarian and compassionate items. Thus, there are peremptory norms that cannot be derogated from by a treaty.
 
To sum up, the ius cogens is a question of the lawfulness of the treaty's content, there are certain objects that make the treaty null and void, in legal terms it seems that there are certain international standards that are imperative, which means that they cannot be derogated from by special agreements. Customary law normally weakens before treaty law. General law may be derogated from by a particular law. The ius cogens blocks the operation of this rule, one can no longer derogate from the general rule of customary law because this rule is imperative, it cannot be replaced by another. If a rule prohibits genocide and it is imperative ius cogens, if a treaty is intended to derogate from that rule, the treaty will be null and void. If the rule had not been mandatory, the treaty would have applied as a matter of priority. This is why Article 53 is included in the chapter on the invalidity of the Treaty.[[Fichier:Convention de Vienne sur le droit des traités de 1969 - article 53.png|vignette|center|700px|[http://legal.un.org/ilc/texts/instruments/francais/traites/1_1_1969_francais.pdf Convention de Vienne sur le droit des traités de 1969] - [http://www.admin.ch/opc/fr/classified-compilation/19690099/index.html#a53 article 53]]]
   
   
En réalité les traités conclus sous coercition vont être traités comme étant nul que lorsque les Nation-Unies et le droit de la force sont relativement forts et se portent bien. Lorsque des États importants commencent à recourir à ce moyen pour faire signer et ratifier les traités, cela, évidemment, porte un dommage tout à fait certain à des dispositions comme elles des articles 51 et 52. Dans le cas de traités de paix comme celui de Dayton, on accepte que ce ne soit pas une coercition interdite, car c’est dans la nature que l’État n’ait pas beaucoup de choix de signer le traité de paix. Est interdit de profiter de sa position de prédominance pour extorquer des avantages, si dans un traité de paix on prévoit une annexion de territoires cela serait considéré comme une forme de coercition contraire à l’article 52. Il incombe aux organes des Nations-Unies de prêter force à ces disposions.
The wording of the various provisions differs. Sometimes we are told how in article 48 a State can invoke an error or loosen itself from it; there are other terms such as in article 52 is "null and void", or in article 53 is "null and void".
 
L’article 53 est le domaine du ius cogens dit aussi droit impératif. Le ius cogens est un concept qui a fait couler beaucoup d’encre, c’est la grande question du droit international. Ici nous sommes dans le droit des traités, l’article 53 a trait à la licéité de l’objet lui-même. Ici nous sommes à l’autre bout du spectre, le point est la licéité de l’objet.
There is clearly a difference between absolute nullity and relative nullity, also called annulability.
 
=== What about this absolute nullity / relative nullity distinction? ===
The grounds of relative nullity are grounds which are in the particular interest of a State, a State may, when it finds a ground for annulment of the treaty, invoke the ground for annulment of the treaty or not invoke it in order to maintain the treaty. He may invoke it if his personal interest has been prejudiced. Once you realize the misrepresentation, you can repudiate the treaty, you can also decide that it is convenient for your own interests.
 
The State has the choice, the right gives it a mere power to invalidate only if and only if its interests have been affected.
 
In Articles 51,52 and 53 of the Vienna Convention, these are matters of collective interest, which is why nullity is here absolute, which means that the legal order considers this treaty to be null and void, for the legal order this treaty does not exist.


=== Est-ce qu’un traité peut porter sur n’importe quel objet ? ===
It would be surprising to say that a treaty that organizes the slave trade until challenged by a contractor would be in force and valid.
Si n’importe quel objet est licite alors n’importe quel traité est licite, car l’objet est indifférent.
La doctrine du ius cogens est la négation de ce principe, on estime dans l’article 53 qu’il y a certains objets illicites si bien que le traité est nul lorsqu’il porte sur des tels objets intrinsèquement illicites. La dispute continue sur la définition de ces objets relevants d’ordre humanitaire. Ainsi il y a des normes impératives qui ne peuvent être dérogées par un traité.
Pour résumer le ius cogens est une question de licéité du contenu du traité, certains objets font que le traité serait nul, en terme juridique on dirait qu’il y a certaines normes internationales qui ont un caractère impératif ce qui signifie qu’on ne peut y déroger par des accords particuliers. Normalement le droit coutumier fléchit devant le droit conventionnel. Le droit général peut être dérogé par une loi particulière. Le ius cogens bloque l’opération de cette règle, on ne peut plus déroger à la règle générale du droit coutumier parce que cette règle est impérative, elle ne peut être remplacée par une autre. Si une règle interdit le génocide et qu’elle a un caractère impératif ius cogens, si un traité vise à déroger à cette règle, le traité sera nul. Si la règle n’avait pas été impérative, le traité se serait appliqué prioritairement. C’est la raison pour laquelle l’article 53 figure dans le chapitre sur la nullité du traité.


[[Fichier:Convention de Vienne sur le droit des traités de 1969 - article 53.png|vignette|center|700px|[http://legal.un.org/ilc/texts/instruments/francais/traites/1_1_1969_francais.pdf Convention de Vienne sur le droit des traités de 1969] - [http://www.admin.ch/opc/fr/classified-compilation/19690099/index.html#a53 article 53]]]
There is another problem in the question of the validity of treaties, which is that of divisibility in Article 34.
La formulation des différentes dispositions diffère. Parfois on nous dit comment dans l’article 48 un État peut invoquer une erreur ou se délier de celui-ci ; il y a d’autres expressions comme dans l’article 52 est « nul tout traité », ou dans le 53 est « nul tout traité ».
Il y a manifestement une différence entre la nullité absolue et la nullité relative appelée aussi l’annulabilité.


=== Quid de cette distinction nullité absolue / nullité relative ? ===
In some cases, a reason for invalidating a treaty may concern only part of it or even only one provision. The question arises as to whether the invalidation of the treaty can lead to the invalidation of only a part of the treaty while safeguarding the rest of the treaty, that is the question of divisibility.
Les motifs de nullité relative sont des motifs qui se situent dans l’intérêt particulier d’un État, un État peut lorsqu’il constate un motif d’annuler le traité, il peut invoquer le motif pour annuler le traité ou ne pas l’invoquer pour maintenir le traité. Il peut l’invoquer si son intérêt personnel a été lésé. Une fois qu’on se rend compte de la fausse représentation, on peut répudier le traité, on peut aussi en décider que cela est arrangeant pour ses propres intérêts.
L’État a le choix, le droit lui octroie une simple faculté d’invalider que si se sont et seulement si ses intérêts ont été affectés.
Dans les articles 51, 52 et 53 de la Convention de Vienne, il s’agit de questions d’intérêt collectif, c’est la raison pour laquelle la nullité est ici absolue ce qui veut dire que l’ordre juridique considère ce traité comme étant non avenu, pour l’ordre juridique ce traité n’existe pas.
Il serait est étonnent de dire qu’un traité qui organise la traite d’esclave tant qu’il n’a pas été contesté par un contractant serait en vigueur et valide.
Il y a un autre problème dans la question de validité des traités qui est celle de la divisibilité à l’article 34.
Il peut arriver qu’une raison d’invalider un traité ne porte que sur une partie de celui-ci voire même sur une seule disposition. La question se pose de savoir si l’invalidation du traité peut aboutir à l’invalidation de seulement une partie du traité tout en sauvegardant le reste du traité, c’est la question de la divisibilité.


=== Peut-on diviser ou non ? ===
=== Can we split or not? ===


Les réponses sont données à l’article 44.  
Answers are given in Article 44.  


[[Fichier:Convention de Vienne sur le droit des traités de 1969 - article 44.png|vignette|center|700px|[http://legal.un.org/ilc/texts/instruments/francais/traites/1_1_1969_francais.pdf Convention de Vienne sur le droit des traités de 1969] - [http://www.admin.ch/opc/fr/classified-compilation/19690099/index.html#a44 article 44]]]
[[Fichier:Convention de Vienne sur le droit des traités de 1969 - article 44.png|vignette|center|700px|[http://legal.un.org/ilc/texts/instruments/francais/traites/1_1_1969_francais.pdf Convention de Vienne sur le droit des traités de 1969] - [http://www.admin.ch/opc/fr/classified-compilation/19690099/index.html#a44 article 44]]]


La règle générale est que la divisibilité n’est établie que sous certaines conditions restrictives. On veut bien sauvegarder les traités, mais on ne présume qu’ils soient divisibles sauf si certaines conditions sont réunies, elles sont énoncées au §3 de l’article 44.
The general rule is that divisibility is only established under certain restrictive conditions. The treaties are to be safeguarded, but it is not assumed that they are divisible unless certain conditions are met, they are set out in §3 of Article 44.
 
The main issue is whether the treaty can be reasonably maintained without the clauses that constitute the cause of invalidation, if in other words there is not an imbalance, because a treaty is normally equilibrium, that is precisely why divisibility is not allowed.[[Fichier:Convention de Vienne sur le droit des traités de 1969 - article 45.png|vignette|center|700px|[http://legal.un.org/ilc/texts/instruments/francais/traites/1_1_1969_francais.pdf Convention de Vienne sur le droit des traités de 1969] - [http://www.admin.ch/opc/fr/classified-compilation/19690099/index.html#a45 article 45]]]
   
   
L’essentiel porte sur la question de savoir si le traité peut être maintenu raisonnablement sans les clauses qui viennent à marquer la cause de l’invalidation, si en d’autres termes il n’y a pas un déséquilibre, car un traité est normalement relevant d’un équilibre, c’est justement la raison pour laquelle la divisibilité n’est pas admise.
Article 45, a party loses the right to invoke a ground of relative nullity or a ground for terminating or suspending the application of a treaty if, after learning of the ground for invalidity of the treaty, it continues to apply it.
 
Paragraph b, if a cause of invalidation referring to article 48 is knowingly established and is not invoked as continuing to apply it, then the treaty is deemed to have been acquiesced in. This is a reasonable period of time in which to react, as high contractors need to know what to do at a given point in time. Article 45 applies only to annulable treaties.[[Fichier:Convention de Vienne sur le droit des traités de 1969 - article 48.png|vignette|center|700px|[http://legal.un.org/ilc/texts/instruments/francais/traites/1_1_1969_francais.pdf Convention de Vienne sur le droit des traités de 1969] - [http://www.admin.ch/opc/fr/classified-compilation/19690099/index.html#a48 article 48]]]
   
   
[[Fichier:Convention de Vienne sur le droit des traités de 1969 - article 45.png|vignette|center|700px|[http://legal.un.org/ilc/texts/instruments/francais/traites/1_1_1969_francais.pdf Convention de Vienne sur le droit des traités de 1969] - [http://www.admin.ch/opc/fr/classified-compilation/19690099/index.html#a45 article 45]]]
Only the state is supposed to know if it discovered its mistake. It can happen that you don't know when a mistake has been discovered. However, we are mistaken.
 
Usually these motives appear in diplomatic correspondence, and it is at this point that we realize that we have made a mistake. As long as no one stands up to a mirror, you can't see that you've made a mistake; diplomatic correspondence allows you to see when you discover a cause of voidability.
 
For Article 44, it is the same thing: the indivisibility of a treaty can only be established when the treaty is voidable. In the case of treaties that are absolutely void under articles 51,52 and 53, there is nothing to be saved, nullity is for the entire treaty, parties who want to defy public policy by challenging article 44 § 5 are punished, or indivisibility is not allowed.
 
== Third countries ==
Third States are all States that are not party to a treaty, which means that they have not ratified or acceded to it, in other words, that are not legally bound by the treaty.
 
A party to the treaty is a State bound by the treaty, third States are all those outside the treaty.
 
The question is what is their legal status vis-à-vis the treaty to which they are not a party?
 
If they become a party, the issue no longer arises because they are no longer third States, there are also treaties where there is no third State for universal conventions such as the Geneva Convention on International Humanitarian Law, which is almost universal.
 
These rules are found in sections 34, 35, 36, 37 and 38.[[Fichier:Convention de Vienne sur le droit des traités de 1969 - article 34.png|vignette|center|700px|[http://legal.un.org/ilc/texts/instruments/francais/traites/1_1_1969_francais.pdf Convention de Vienne sur le droit des traités de 1969] - [http://www.admin.ch/opc/fr/classified-compilation/19690099/index.html#a34 article 34]]]
   
   
L’article 45, une partie perd le droit d’invoquer une cause de nullité relative ou un motif d’y mettre fin ou de suspendre l’application d’un traité si après avoir pris connaissance du motif d’invalidité du traité il continue à l’appliquer.
The principle is self-evident that treaties are binding only on States parties." Commitment "means that treaties confer rights only on the parties and impose obligations only on the parties.
Le paragraphe b, si on est en connaissance d’une cause d’invalidation renvoyant à l’article 48 et qu’on ne l’invoque pas continuant à l’appliquer alors on considère qu’on a acquiescé le traité. C’est un délai raisonnable requis pour réagir, car les hauts-contractants doivent savoir à quoi s’en tenir à un moment donné. L’article 45 ne vaut que pour les traités annulables.


[[Fichier:Convention de Vienne sur le droit des traités de 1969 - article 48.png|vignette|center|700px|[http://legal.un.org/ilc/texts/instruments/francais/traites/1_1_1969_francais.pdf Convention de Vienne sur le droit des traités de 1969] - [http://www.admin.ch/opc/fr/classified-compilation/19690099/index.html#a48 article 48]]]
The third State being outside the Treaty cannot be subject to any obligation in relation to a treaty which is for it res inter alios acta i.e. something done by others, but it cannot also benefit from rights in relation to a treaty.
Seul l’État est censé savoir s’il a découvert son erreur. Cela peut arriver qu’on ne sache pas quand une erreur a été découverte. Cependant on se trompe.
Généralement ces motifs apparaissent dans la correspondance diplomatique, c’est à ce moment qu’on se rend compte qu’on a commis une erreur. Tant que personne n’oppose un miroir, on ne peut voir le fait d’avoir commis une erreur ; une correspondance diplomatique permet de voir le moment où l’on découvre une cause d‘annulabilité.
Pour l’article 44, c’est la même chose, l’indivisibilité d’un traité n’a lieu d’être que lorsque le traité est annulable. Pour les traités absolument nuls aux articles 51, 52, 53, il n’y a rien à sauver, la nullité est pour l’ensemble du traité, on puni en quelque sorte les parties qui ont voulu défier l’ordre public renvoyant à l’article 44 § 5 ou l’indivisibilité n’est pas admise.


== États tiers ==
This is what we call the relative effect of treaties, which is similar to the relative effect of contracts in domestic law. This is not to say that treaties concluded by States do not have indirect effects on other States, such as a treaty forging a military alliance and forcing States to build counter-allies, but rather domino effects. Alliance treaties do not bind, confer rights or impose obligations on the third State. The Treaty neither benefits nor applies to third parties.
Les États tiers sont tous les États qui ne sont pas partie à un traité, cela veut dire qu’ils n’ont pas ratifié ce traité ou qui n’y ont pas adhéré, en d’autres termes qui ne sont pas juridiquement liés par le traité.
Une partie au traité est un État lié par le traité, les États tiers sont tous ceux en dehors du traité.
La question est de savoir quel est leur statut juridique vis-à-vis du traité duquel ils ne sont pas partie ?
S’ils deviennent partie la question ne se pose plus, car ils ne sont plus États tiers, il y a aussi des traités où il n’y a pas d’État tiers pour les conventions universelles comme la convention de Genève sur le droit international humanitaire qui est quasi universel.
Ces règles se trouvent aux articles 34, 35, 36, 37 et 38.


[[Fichier:Convention de Vienne sur le droit des traités de 1969 - article 34.png|vignette|center|700px|[http://legal.un.org/ilc/texts/instruments/francais/traites/1_1_1969_francais.pdf Convention de Vienne sur le droit des traités de 1969] - [http://www.admin.ch/opc/fr/classified-compilation/19690099/index.html#a34 article 34]]]
However, there are exceptions to this rule. The principle is clear, but the exceptions merit comment. They are found in sections 35 and 36.[[Fichier:Convention de Vienne sur le droit des traités de 1969 - article 35.png|vignette|center|700px|[http://legal.un.org/ilc/texts/instruments/francais/traites/1_1_1969_francais.pdf Convention de Vienne sur le droit des traités de 1969] - [http://www.admin.ch/opc/fr/classified-compilation/19690099/index.html#a35 article 35]]]
Le principe est tout à fait évident à savoir que les traités n’engagent que les États parties. « N’engage » veut dire que les traités ne confèrent des droits que pour les parties et n’imposent des obligations qu’aux parties.
L’État tiers étant en dehors du traité ne peut se voir imposer aucune obligation par rapport à un traité qui est pour lui res inter alios acta c’est-à-dire une chose faite par d’autres, mais il ne peut pas non plus bénéficier de droits par rapport à un traité.
C’est ce que nous appelons l’effet relatif des traités qui est similaire à l’effet relatif des contrats en droit interne. Cela ne veut pas dire que des traités conclus par des États n’ont pas d’effets indirects sur d’autres États comme un traité amenant à former une alliance militaire poussant des États à construire des contre-alliances, ce sont des effets dominos. Les traités d’alliance ne lient pas l’État tiers, ne lui confère pas des droits et en lui pose pas d’obligations. Le traité ni ne bénéficie ni ne s’applique aux tiers.
Toutefois il y a des exceptions à cette règle. Le principe est clair, mais les exceptions méritent commentaire. On les trouve aux articles 35 et 36.
[[Fichier:Convention de Vienne sur le droit des traités de 1969 - article 35.png|vignette|center|700px|[http://legal.un.org/ilc/texts/instruments/francais/traites/1_1_1969_francais.pdf Convention de Vienne sur le droit des traités de 1969] - [http://www.admin.ch/opc/fr/classified-compilation/19690099/index.html#a35 article 35]]]


[[Fichier:Convention de Vienne sur le droit des traités de 1969 - article 36.png|vignette|center|700px|[http://legal.un.org/ilc/texts/instruments/francais/traites/1_1_1969_francais.pdf Convention de Vienne sur le droit des traités de 1969] - [http://www.admin.ch/opc/fr/classified-compilation/19690099/index.html#a36 article 36]]]
[[Fichier:Convention de Vienne sur le droit des traités de 1969 - article 36.png|vignette|center|700px|[http://legal.un.org/ilc/texts/instruments/francais/traites/1_1_1969_francais.pdf Convention de Vienne sur le droit des traités de 1969] - [http://www.admin.ch/opc/fr/classified-compilation/19690099/index.html#a36 article 36]]]
   
   
Ces exceptions sont toutes basées sur la technique de l’accord collatéral ce que les juristes appellent un accord collatéral. Un accord collatéral est un accord qui vient s’ajouter au traité.
These exceptions are all based on the collateral agreement technique, what lawyers call a collateral agreement. A collateral agreement is an agreement in addition to the treaty.
 
Nous avons un traité entre plusieurs parties sur la gestion d’un canal maritime. Maintenant nous voulons soit imposer une obligation soit conférer un droit à un tiers ; la technique de l’accord collatéral signifie que si la partie tierce accepte l’obligation, alors elle sera applicable à l’État tiers, cependant cette partie ne devient pas partie et liée par l’ensemble du traité,l’accord collatéral ne porte que sur le consentement de jouir à un accord déterminé ou de voir la partie tierce jouir d’une obligation. Si la partie tierce accepte les droits et les obligations, ils deviendront applicables par le traité, cela nécessite le consentement.
We have a multi-party treaty on the management of a shipping canal. Now we want to either impose an obligation or confer a right on a third party; the collateral agreement technique means that if the third party accepts the obligation, then it will be applicable to the third State, but that party does not become a party and bound by the treaty as a whole, the collateral agreement relates only to the consent to enjoy a particular agreement or to have the third party enjoy an obligation. If the third party accepts the rights and obligations, they will become applicable by treaty, requiring consent.
 
La Convention de Vienne qui est rationnelle distingue les obligations des droits, deux dispositions différentes aux articles 35 et 36.
The Vienna Convention, which is rational, distinguishes between rights obligations, two different provisions in articles 35 and 36.
 
L’article 35 a trait aux obligations que les parties d’un traité essaient d’imposer à un État tiers, la Convention de Vienne la prévoit, cette catégorie est prévue, mais dans des conditions très strictes, car l’acceptation d’un État tiers par rapport à l’obligation qu’on cherche à lui imposer doit être expressément faite et faite par écrit.
Article 35 deals with the obligations that the parties to a treaty try to impose on a third State, the Vienna Convention provides for it, this category is provided for, but under very strict conditions, since acceptance of a third State in relation to the obligation sought to be imposed on it must be expressly made and made in writing.
 
On estime que c’est tellement inhabituel qu’un État souverain prestigieux accepte sans contrepartie une obligation, juste une charge sans avoir un bénéfice collatéral, c’est tellement exorbitant qu’on veut bien l’accepter, mais on veut s’assurer qu’il le veuille vraiment.
We believe that it is so unusual that a prestigious sovereign state accepts an obligation without consideration, just a charge without having a collateral benefit, it is so exorbitant that we are willing to accept it, but we want to make sure that it really wants it.
 
L’article 36 traite des droits, on essaie de conférer un droit à un État tiers, c’est la stipulation pour autrui du droit français. Ici la Convention de Vienne est beaucoup plus souple, il faut le consentement d’un État à savoir l’État collatéral, mais dans ce cas son consentement est présumé.
Article 36 deals with rights, one tries to confer a right on a third State, it is the stipulation for others of French law. Here the Vienna Convention is much more flexible, requiring the consent of a State, namely the collateral State, but in this case its consent is presumed.
 
Ce qu’il faut pour qu’un droit s’applique à un État tiers, il faut que les parties au traité aient eu l’intention de conférer un droit subjectif et il faut que ce droit soit accepté par l’État tiers, mais l’acceptation se présume si l’État tiers ne dit pas expressément qu’il n’en veut pas.
What is required for a right to apply to a third State is that the parties to the treaty must have intended to confer a subjective right and that right must be accepted by the third State, but acceptance is presumed if the third State does not expressly state that it does not want it.
 
On présume que les États veulent avoir un avantage sans contrepartie, on ne leur met pas de difficultés sur leur chemin, on présume que les États acceptent les avantages parce que cela est une donnée de la réalité, les individus acceptent des avantages sans contrepartie de charge.
We assume that States want to have an advantage without compensation, we don't put any difficulties in their path, we assume that States accept the benefits because it is a fact of life, individuals accept benefits without compensation.
 
Il n’est pas rare que des droits soient conférés à un État tiers comme c’est le cas dans l’article 35 § 5 de la Charte des Nations-Unies qui prévoit que tout État peut mener à l’Assemblée générale des Nations-Unies ou au Conseil de Sécurité un différend qui pourrait remettre en cause la sécurité internationale ; un non-membre peut porter un différend à l’intention des organes sociaux des Nations-Unies même s’il ne fait pas partie des Nations-Unies. S’ils le font c’est qu’ils veulent bien se prévaloir de l’article 35 § 2.
It is not uncommon for rights to be conferred on a third State, as is the case in Article 35 § 5 of the United Nations Charter, which provides that any State may lead to the United Nations General Assembly or the Security Council in the event of a dispute which could jeopardise international security; a non-member may bring a dispute to the attention of the social organs of the United Nations even if it is not a member of the United Nations. If they do so, they are willing to avail themselves of Article 35 § 2.


[[Fichier:CHARTE DES NATIONS UNIES - article 35.png|vignette|center|700px|[https://www.un.org/fr/documents/charter/pdf/charter.pdf Charte des Nations Unies] - [https://www.un.org/fr/documents/charter/chap6.shtml Chapitre VI : Règlement pacifique des différends - article 35]]]
[[Fichier:CHARTE DES NATIONS UNIES - article 35.png|vignette|center|700px|[https://www.un.org/fr/documents/charter/pdf/charter.pdf Charte des Nations Unies] - [https://www.un.org/fr/documents/charter/chap6.shtml Chapitre VI : Règlement pacifique des différends - article 35]]]
   
   
Après les guerres napoléoniennes face une France affaiblie, les puissances réunies en congrès à Vienne avaient obtenu que la ville de Genève devait être désenclavée,alors on a établi une zone franche ou il y avait des avantages douaniers pour la Suisse lorsqu’elle importait des marchandises de l’arrière-pays. La Suisse n’était pas partie à l’acte final de la conférence de Vienne, les puissances ont imposé à la France cette charge sur son territoire.
After the Napoleonic wars against a weakened France, the powers gathered in congress in Vienna had obtained that the city of Geneva should be opened up, so a free zone was established or there were customs advantages for Switzerland when it imported goods from the hinterland. Switzerland was not a party to the final act of the Vienna conference, and the powers imposed this burden on France.


== Interprétation ==
== Interpretation ==
L’interprétation est une fonction absolument capitale. Lorsqu’on conclut un traité c’est pour l’appliquer, or appliquer un traité suppose de l’avoir compris et de savoir ce qu’il y a lieu de faire supposant qu’on ait une intelligence c’est-à-dire une compréhension des dispositions. Cela suppose une interprétation des dispositions notamment lorsque des doutes peuvent surgir sur le véritable sens et la véritable portée de ces dispositions.
Interpretation is an absolutely crucial function. When a treaty is entered into for the purpose of applying it, and applying a treaty presupposes having understood it and knowing what needs to be done, assuming that one has intelligence, that is, an understanding of the provisions. This presupposes an interpretation of the provisions, particularly when doubts may arise as to the true meaning and scope of these provisions.
La matière est également régie par la Convention de Vienne aux articles 31, 32 et 33.


[[Fichier:Convention de Vienne sur le droit des traités de 1969 - article 31.png|vignette|center|700px|[http://legal.un.org/ilc/texts/instruments/francais/traites/1_1_1969_francais.pdf Convention de Vienne sur le droit des traités de 1969] - [http://www.admin.ch/opc/fr/classified-compilation/19690099/index.html#a31 article 31]]]
Matters are also governed by the Vienna Convention in articles 31, 32 and 33.[[Fichier:Convention de Vienne sur le droit des traités de 1969 - article 31.png|vignette|center|700px|[http://legal.un.org/ilc/texts/instruments/francais/traites/1_1_1969_francais.pdf Convention de Vienne sur le droit des traités de 1969] - [http://www.admin.ch/opc/fr/classified-compilation/19690099/index.html#a31 article 31]]]


[[Fichier:Convention de Vienne sur le droit des traités de 1969 - article 32.png|vignette|center|700px|[http://legal.un.org/ilc/texts/instruments/francais/traites/1_1_1969_francais.pdf Convention de Vienne sur le droit des traités de 1969] - [http://www.admin.ch/opc/fr/classified-compilation/19690099/index.html#a32 article 32]]]
[[Fichier:Convention de Vienne sur le droit des traités de 1969 - article 32.png|vignette|center|700px|[http://legal.un.org/ilc/texts/instruments/francais/traites/1_1_1969_francais.pdf Convention de Vienne sur le droit des traités de 1969] - [http://www.admin.ch/opc/fr/classified-compilation/19690099/index.html#a32 article 32]]]
    
    
L’article 31 contient la règle générale, l’article 32 certains moyens complémentaires d’interprétation, et l’article 33 a trait au problème des traités plurilingues.  
Article 31 contains the general rule, Article 32 contains certain additional means of interpretation and Article 33 deals with the problem of multilingual treaties.  


[[Fichier:Convention de Vienne sur le droit des traités de 1969 - article 33.png|vignette|center|700px|[http://legal.un.org/ilc/texts/instruments/francais/traites/1_1_1969_francais.pdf Convention de Vienne sur le droit des traités de 1969] - [http://www.admin.ch/opc/fr/classified-compilation/19690099/index.html#a33 article 33]]]
[[Fichier:Convention de Vienne sur le droit des traités de 1969 - article 33.png|vignette|center|700px|[http://legal.un.org/ilc/texts/instruments/francais/traites/1_1_1969_francais.pdf Convention de Vienne sur le droit des traités de 1969] - [http://www.admin.ch/opc/fr/classified-compilation/19690099/index.html#a33 article 33]]]
    
    
L’article 33 ne touche qu’aux traités adoptés dans plusieurs langues authentiques, il ne concerne pas le cas ou le cas a été conclu dans une seule langue authentique, dans ce cas le traité n’est conclu que dans une seule langue authentique qui est la seule qui fait foi, cela est précisé dans les dispositions finales du traité.
Article 33 relates only to treaties adopted in more than one authentic language, it does not concern cases where the case has been concluded in only one authentic language, in which case the treaty is concluded in only one authentic language which is the only authentic language, as specified in the final provisions of the treaty.
 
Si on a plusieurs langues authentiques, on peut avoir des divergences d’interprétations. La Charte des Nations-Unies à cinq langues authentiques, des divergences peuvent apparaitre. L’article 33 explique quels sont les principes à appliquer dans ce cas. Toutefois la disposition est un peu problématique, car la pratique est plus riche.
If you have several authentic languages, you may have different interpretations. The United Nations Charter has five authentic languages, divergences may appear. Article 33 explains the principles to be applied in this case. However, the provision is somewhat problematic because the practice is richer.
 
=== What is interpretation? What does it mean to interpret? ===
This is a fairly typical function for the lawyer, because their work consists largely of understanding and interpreting texts.
 
The text takes on its true meaning and reveals only real problems in the face of concrete problems. The real problems will only be encountered in the application, we are going to have quite unexpected cases that will appear and raise questions, so we have to face this situation that requires interpretation.
 
In this case, interpretation is an operation of the mind that seeks to determine the legal meaning of a provision.
 
=== What are the concepts and rules of treaty interpretation? ===
The first thing to know is the meaning of some concepts:
 
*we call '''authentic interpretation''',
the interpretation emanating from all parties to the treaty. It may indeed happen that the treaty once concluded gives rise to doubts as to the meaning of certain provisions that appear, the parties to the treaty exchange views on them and determine the meaning of a provision. Thus, the parties determine how the provision is to be interpreted and, on the other hand, an interpretation can lead to agreement added to the treaty.
 
The parties act in concert and are the masters of the treaty, as they can modify it they can interpret it and say the correct interpretation. If all parties agree, then this interpretation is binding on the judge.
*By extension, it is called an '''almost authentic interpretation''',
the interpretation of a treaty by a large majority of the treaty, but not unanimously shared; this interpretation is not binding on the judge, but may be inspired by it if a generally accepted interpretation exists and can be determined.
 
* '''Self-interpretation''',
it should not be forgotten that the interpretation is first and foremost that of the text to which the subject has subscribed. When we conclude a contract in writing and want to perform it, it is relatively obvious that we ourselves will first interpret it as a consequence of understanding the contract.
 
Self-interpretation is the interpretation by each of the subjects in contrast to authentic interpretation, here each party individually interprets the treaty in the way it is interpreted according to its interests and prejudices. 99% of the cases of interpretations are self-interpretation and self-interpretation.
 
The only difference with domestic law is that in domestic law there is the guarantee of a judge who can deliver his authoritarian interpretation. In international law, because of sovereignty, we do not have a judge's guarantee, nor do we easily come to a judicial interpretation. If for disputes in domestic law interpretation is the rule, in international law it is the exception.
 
=== What exactly are we interpreting? Are we interpreting the text of the treaty above all, or are we looking first and foremost for the will of the parties? ===
For a long time it was a controversial issue, the two do not necessarily or frequently oppose each other.
 
The text is normally the best expression of the parties' will, the text and the will ideally meet. However, the text sometimes does not perfectly reflect the will of the treaties.
 
The opinion of jurists differed, some were in favour of the text even if it did not reflect the real will of the parties; they argued with legal certainty, the will hidden in the internal forces once it is not sufficiently manifested then it is not tangible enough to stick to it.
 
The text is much more certain, we can read it; the States that become party to the treaty later on knew that the text was not the interpretations.


=== Qu’est-ce que l’interprétation ? Que signifie interpréter ? ===
Other jurists felt that prioritizing the text over the real will is ultimately giving priority to the means over the end. The end is the will, since a treaty is the consent of the parties and what they wanted to do is to pervert the order of things rather than give more weight to what is the basis and purpose of the treaty.
C’est une fonction assez typique pour le juriste, car leur travail consiste en grande partie à comprendre des textes et à les interpréter.
Le texte ne prend son véritable sens et ne révèle que de véritables problèmes qu’en face de problèmes concrets. Les véritables problèmes ne vont être rencontrés que dans l’application, on va avoir des cas tout à fait inattendus qui vont apparaitre est soulever des interrogations, dès lors il faut faire face à cette situation nécessitant l’interprétation.
Dans ce cas, l’interprétation est une opération de l’esprit qui cherche à déterminer le sens juridique d’une disposition.


=== Quels sont les concepts et les règles en matière d’interprétation des traités ? ===
The Vienna Convention decided in favour of the text. All the means which recall the will of the parties have been relegated to Article 31 and its last paragraph as in the preparatory work, i. e. the debates at the conclusion of the treaty, this was decided in the process of interpretation of the Vienna Convention in Article 32. Complementary means of interpretation are not a primary means which is the text.
La première chose à savoir est le sens de quelques concepts :


*nous appelons '''interprétation authentique''',
The reason for the Vienna Convention is legal certainty. The drafters of the Vienna Convention were aware that in international law there was no need for a judge to rule on the provisions.
l’interprétation qui émane de toutes les parties au traité. Il peut en effet arriver que le traité une fois conclu suscite des doutes quant au sens de certaines dispositions qui apparaissent, les parties au traité échangent dessus et déterminent le sens d’une disposition. Ainsi les parties déterminent la manière d’interpréter la disposition, d’autre part une interprétation peut mener à un accord greffé au traité.


Les parties agissent de concert et sont les maitres du traité, comme ils peuvent le modifier ils peuvent l’interpréter et dire l’interprétation correcte. Si toutes les parties se sont accordées, alors cette interprétation lie le juge.
A judge is an impartial and independent person who is capable of giving an objective meaning to the provision, in international cases it is self-interpretation which will prevail; the writers' fear was that if one relied on a will not specified in the text one opens the way to a manipulation of the treaty by the strongest.


*On appelle par extension une '''interprétation quasi authentique''',
Any liberty in relation to the text always means that the strongest can do as he wishes, the treaty is the one that constrains the most, because the most powerful cannot reinvent the text, it directs at a certain point.
une interprétation d’un traité par une grande majorité du traité, mais non pas unanimement partagée ; cette interprétation ne lie pas le juge, mais il risque de s’en inspirer si jamais une interprétation généralement acceptée existe et puisse être déterminée.


* '''L’auto-interprétation'''(self-interprétation),
il ne faut pas oublier que l’interprétation est tout d’abord celle que le sujet donne lui-même au texte auquel il a souscrit. Lorsqu’on conclut un contrat par écrit et qu’on veut l’exécuter, il est relativement évident qu’on va d’abord nous-mêmes l’interpréter agissant en conséquence de la compréhension du contrat.
L’auto-interprétation est l’interprétation par chacun des sujets à l’opposé de l’interprétation authentique, ici chaque partie individuellement interprète le traité de la manière dont elle l’entend en fonction de ses intérêts et de ses préjugés. 99% des cas d’interprétations sont des cas d’auto-interprétation et où on en reste à l’auto-interprétation.
La seule différence avec le droit interne est qu’en droit interne on a la garantie d’un juge qui pourra délivrer son interprétation autoritaire. En droit international à cause de la souveraineté on n’a pas la garantie d’un juge, on n’aboutit pas facilement à une interprétation judiciaire. Si pour les différends en droit interne l‘interprétation est la règle, en droit international c’est l’exception.
=== Qu’est-ce que nous interprétons exactement ? Interprétons-nous surtout le texte du traité ou recherchons-nous avant tout la volonté des parties ? ===
Ce fut longtemps une question controversée, les deux ne s’opposent pas ni nécessairement ni fréquemment.
Le texte est normalement la meilleure expression de la volonté des parties, le texte et la volonté idéalement se rejoignent. Cependant il arrive que le texte ne reflète pas parfaitement la volonté des traités.
L’avis de juristes a divergé, certains étaient en faveur du texte même s’il ne reflète pas la volonté réelle des parties ; ils argumentaient avec la sécurité juridique, la volonté cachée dans les forces intérieures une fois qu’elle n’est pas suffisamment manifestée alors elle n’est pas suffisamment tangible pour qu’on puisse s’en tenir à elle.
Le texte est beaucoup plus sûr, on peut le lire ; les États qui deviennent partie plus tard au traité ne connaissaient que le texte est non pas les interprétations.
D’autres juristes ont estimé que privilégier le texte sur la volonté réelle est en définitive donner la priorité aux moyens sur la fin. La fin est la volonté puisqu’un traité est le consentement des parties et ce qu’ils ont voulu qui le portent, ce serait pervertir l’ordre des choses que de donner plus de poids au moyen sur ce qui est le fondement et le but du traité.
La Convention de Vienne a fait son choix en faveur du texte. Tous les moyens qui rappellent la volonté des parties ont été relégués à l‘article 31 et à son dernier paragraphe comme dans les travaux préparatoires c’est-à-dire les débats lors de la conclusion du traité, cela a été décidé dans le processus d’interprétation de la Convention de Vienne dans l’article 32. Les moyens complémentaires d’interprétations ne sont pas un moyen primaire qui est le texte.
La motivation de la Convention de Vienne est la sécurité juridique. Les rédacteurs de la Convention de Vienne étaient conscients qu’en droit international on a pas nécessaire un juge pour statuer sur les dispositions.
Un juge est une personne impartiale est indépendante qui est capable de donner un sens objectif à la disposition, dans les affaires internationales c‘est l’auto-interprétation qui prévaudra ; la peur des rédacteurs était que si on s’en remettait à une volonté non-précisée dans le texte on ouvre la voie à une manipulation du traité par les plus forts.
Toute liberté par rapport au texte signifie toujours que le plus fort pourra faire comme il le souhaite, le traité est celui qui contraint le plus, car le plus puissant ne peut réinventer le texte, il dirige à un certain point.
Par conséquent, le plus sûr est le texte, comme dans les affaires internationales il y a beaucoup de fluctuations, d’incertitudes, de luttes de pouvoir et d’auto-interprétation, on a estimé que le texte été beaucoup plus sûr.
Par conséquent, le plus sûr est le texte, comme dans les affaires internationales il y a beaucoup de fluctuations, d’incertitudes, de luttes de pouvoir et d’auto-interprétation, on a estimé que le texte été beaucoup plus sûr.
   
   
Selon Beckett « le recours à la volonté commune des parties est irréaliste dans la mesure où « il est presque certain que le différend portera sur un élément n’ayant pas été imaginé par [les parties] »<ref>Comme l’a déjà fait remarquer Eric Beckett, le recours à la volonté commune des parties est  irréaliste dans la mesure où « il est presque certain que le différend portera sur un élément  n’ayant pas été imaginé par [les parties] » : « Observations des membres de la Commission sur le  rapport de M. Lauterpacht », 43 :1 A.I.D.I. (1950) 435, aux pp. 437-438</ref>.
According to Beckett, "the use of the parties' common will is unrealistic inasmuch as" it is almost certain that the dispute will involve an element which [the parties] have not imagined ".<ref>Comme l’a déjà fait remarquer Eric Beckett, le recours à la volonté commune des parties est  irréaliste dans la mesure où « il est presque certain que le différend portera sur un élément  n’ayant pas été imaginé par [les parties] » : « Observations des membres de la Commission sur le  rapport de M. Lauterpacht », 43 :1 A.I.D.I. (1950) 435, aux pp. 437-438</ref>.


=== Comment interprète-t-on un traité ? ===
=== How is a treaty interpreted? ===


La règle principale est contenue dans l’article 31 §1.  
The main rule is contained in Article 31 §1.  


[[Fichier:Convention de Vienne sur le droit des traités de 1969 - article 31.png|vignette|center|700px|[http://legal.un.org/ilc/texts/instruments/francais/traites/1_1_1969_francais.pdf Convention de Vienne sur le droit des traités de 1969] - [http://www.admin.ch/opc/fr/classified-compilation/19690099/index.html#a31 article 31]]]
[[Fichier:Convention de Vienne sur le droit des traités de 1969 - article 31.png|vignette|center|700px|[http://legal.un.org/ilc/texts/instruments/francais/traites/1_1_1969_francais.pdf Convention de Vienne sur le droit des traités de 1969] - [http://www.admin.ch/opc/fr/classified-compilation/19690099/index.html#a31 article 31]]]
    
    
Il y a quatre éléments dans cette formule, quatre éléments alternatifs, quatre approches qui permettent de mieux appréhender le sens d’une disposition :
There are four elements in this formula, four alternative elements, four approaches that give a better understanding of the meaning of a provision:
*la '''bonne foi'''
* good faith;
*le '''sens ordinaire'''
* ordinary meaning;
*le '''contexte'''
* the context;
*'''l’objet et le but'''
* object and purpose.
Interpretation is a matter of flexibility, of flexibility, it's art, that's why the right interpreter is not only a good lawyer, but also someone who has experience in legal matters with practical experience because it's only then that he can give intelligence to these elements and propose an interpretation in full knowledge of the facts.


L’interprétation est une affaire de souplesse, de flexibilité, c’est art, c’est la raison pour laquelle le bon interprète est non seulement bon juriste, mais encore quelqu’un qui a de l’expérience dans les affaires juridiques ayant l’expérience de la vie pratique parce que c’est seulement alors qu’il peut donner une intelligence à ces éléments et proposer une interprétation en connaissance véritable de cause.
What makes the difference in the quality of an interpretation is the ability to capture the entire legal environment of the problem and to integrate a subtle interpretation between firmness and flexibility. It is an art that one acquires little by little in one's life as a lawyer.
 
Ce qui fait la différence de la qualité d’une interprétation est la capacité de capter tout l’environnement juridique du problème et d’intégrer une interprétation subtile entre fermeté et souplesse. C’est un art que l’on acquiert que peu à peu dans sa vie de juriste.
These different elements are not separated from each other, but interact. Interpretation is a matter of weighting. It is therefore a matter of integrating all the elements that must act together in a given case, of using them in such a way that they can be used consistently, and of counterpointing them.
 
Ces différents éléments ne sont pas séparés l’un de l’autre, mais interagissent. L’interprétation est une affaire de pondération. C’est donc intégrer tous les éléments qui doivent agir de concert dans un cas donné, il faut les instrumentaliser de telle manière à ce qu’on puisse les utiliser de manière cohérente, il faut faire du contrepoint.
==== Ordinary meaning also means natural meaning ====
Lawyers of all kinds on the continent use the term "grammatical interpretation", which means interpretation according to the text. The interpretation according to the ordinary meaning of the text is also the grammatical interpretation in the Latin sense of the term, i. e. verbs, syntax and signs.


==== Sens ordinaire dit aussi sens naturel ====
The ordinary meaning of the text to which the Vienna Convention attached the greatest importance is not an absolute meaning of the terms, it cannot be said that such a word necessarily has an ordinary meaning, but it can sometimes be said in the context, it is the most reasonable sense, the one that surprises the least, the most usual in a given context. They will be interpreted according to these ordinary meanings.
Les juristes de tout ordre utilisent sur le continent le terme « interprétation grammaticale », cela signifie l’interprétation selon le texte. L’interprétation selon le sens ordinaire du texte est aussi l’interprétation grammaticale au sens latin du terme à savoir les verbes, la syntaxe et les signes.
Le sens ordinaire du texte auquel la Convention de Vienne a attaché la plus grande importance n’est pas un sens absolu des termes on ne peut dire que tel mot a nécessairement un sens ordinaire, mais on peut le dire parfois dans le contexte, c’est le sens le plus raisonnable, celui qui surprend le moins, le plus usuel dans un contexte donné. C’est selon ces sens ordinaires qu’on les interprètera.


'''Pourquoi le privilégie-t-on ?'''
'''Why is it preferred?'''


C’est une question d’extériorisation de la volonté et de la sécurité juridique, on ne veut pas surprendre des parties à entendre des sens. Un sens spécial n’est pas exclu, celui qui s’écarte de l’utilisation ordinaire est un sens qui est susceptible de surprendre, un tel sens ne doit pas lier sauf si on l’a vraiment voulu renvoyant au §4 de l’article 31.
It is a question of externalizing the will and legal certainty, we don't want to surprise the parties by hearing senses. A special meaning is not excluded, that which deviates from ordinary use is a meaning which is likely to surprise, such a meaning should not bind unless it is really intended to refer to §4 of Article 31.


[[Fichier:Convention de Vienne sur le droit des traités de 1969 - article 31.png|vignette|center|700px|[http://legal.un.org/ilc/texts/instruments/francais/traites/1_1_1969_francais.pdf Convention de Vienne sur le droit des traités de 1969] - [http://www.admin.ch/opc/fr/classified-compilation/19690099/index.html#a31 article 31]]]
[[Fichier:Convention de Vienne sur le droit des traités de 1969 - article 31.png|vignette|center|700px|[http://legal.un.org/ilc/texts/instruments/francais/traites/1_1_1969_francais.pdf Convention de Vienne sur le droit des traités de 1969] - [http://www.admin.ch/opc/fr/classified-compilation/19690099/index.html#a31 article 31]]]
    
    
Ainsi le sens spécial ou particulier est seulement si les parties voulaient s’écarter du sens ordinaire. On peut denier le sens ordinaire que dans le contexte de savoir ce que les parties auraient dû comprendre ou pu comprendre dans le contexte, ce qu’on peut comprendre de bonne foi.
Thus, the special or particular meaning is only if the parties wanted to deviate from the ordinary meaning. One can deny the ordinary meaning that in the context of knowing what the parties should or could have understood in the context, what can be understood in good faith.
 
Dans l’arrêt sur le Groenland oriental relevant d’une dispute entre le Danemark et la Norvège ; l’affaire a été portée devant la Cour Permanente de Justice internationale qui a rendu son arrêt en 1933<ref>COUR PERMANENTE DE JUSTICE INTERNATIONALE - Série A/B -  Arrêts, Ordonnances et Avis Consultatifs - FASCICULE No 53 -  [http://www.icj-cij.org/pcij/serie_AB/AB_53/01_Groenland_Oriental_Arret.pdf STATUT JURIDIQUE DU GROËNLAND  ORIENTAL]  -  ARRÊT DU 5 AVRIL 1933 - XXVIme SESSION</ref>.
In the Eastern Greenland judgment in a dispute between Denmark and Norway, the case was referred to the Permanent Court of International Justice, which delivered its judgment in 1933.<ref>COUR PERMANENTE DE JUSTICE INTERNATIONALE - Série A/B -  Arrêts, Ordonnances et Avis Consultatifs - FASCICULE No 53 -  [http://www.icj-cij.org/pcij/serie_AB/AB_53/01_Groenland_Oriental_Arret.pdf STATUT JURIDIQUE DU GROËNLAND  ORIENTAL]  -  ARRÊT DU 5 AVRIL 1933 - XXVIme SESSION</ref>.
 
Lors des plaidoiries il avait été prétendu par la Norvège que certaines conventions applicables en parlant du Groenland voulaient en réalité dire seulement une partie du Groenland à savoir le Groenland oriental. La Norvège argumentait que bien que ces conventions utilisent le terme Groenland, il voulait signifier seulement une partie de ce continent.
In the pleadings it had been argued by Norway that some of the conventions applicable to Greenland actually meant only part of Greenland, namely East Greenland. Norway argued that although these conventions use the term Greenland, it meant only part of this continent.
 
La Cour Permanente rétorque avant la Convention de Vienne série A barre numéro 53 page 52 que le « sens naturel de ce terme est son sens géographique tel qui ressort des cartes, si la Norvège soutient que ces traités utilisent le mot Groenland dans un sens spécial c’est à elle de la démontrer » ; toutefois le Groenland ne l’a pas démontré.
The Permanent Court replied before the Vienna Convention, Series A bar 53 page 52 that "the natural meaning of this term is its geographical meaning as it appears from the maps, if Norway maintains that these treaties use the word Greenland in a special sense it is up to it to demonstrate it"; however, Greenland has not demonstrated this.
 
Le sens ordinaire a le but de préserver le sens essentiel. Si les parties avaient voulu traiter du Groenland oriental, elles auraient traité du Groenland oriental. Cependant, il n’est pas exclu qu’on s’exprime de manière imparfaite, mais cela ne sera pas pris en compte en vertu de la règle du sens ordinaire.
The ordinary meaning is meant to preserve the essential meaning. If the parties had wanted to deal with East Greenland, they would have dealt with East Greenland. However, it is not excluded that imperfect expression may occur, but this will not be taken into account under the ordinary meaning rule.
 
Si les parties intéressées peuvent montrer que lorsque ce traité a été conclu que les parties entendaient un sens spécial alors il prévaudrait, mais seulement lorsque l’ensemble des parties était d’accord de donner au Groenland un sens spécial au moment de la conclusion de ce traité.
If the interested parties can show that when this treaty was concluded that the parties understood a special meaning then it would prevail, but only when all the parties agreed to give Greenland a special meaning at the time of the conclusion of this treaty.
 
==== Context ====
This is also referred to as systematic interpretation, meaning that it is interpreted in the system as a whole, i. e. in context.
 
Context is an equally essential and intuitive rule. If we look for the meaning of a word contained in a convention, we will not immediately look at the word and ignore everything else, we will do the opposite. First we will look at the sentence in which the word is inserted, the paragraph, the layout, the section, etc., and try to see if the systematic aspect of things can shed light. Context can sometimes make it possible to shed significant light on the meaning of a word.
 
=== Good faith ===
It is an interesting element, good faith essentially means two things; first of all, a temperament to know that one must privilege the reasonable sense rather than an excessively literal meaning, which is similar to the ordinary sense, because one seeks the most reasonable meaning in the context. The reasonable meaning of words requires good faith, so ordinary sense and good faith join and oppose an excessively literal meaning. The terms should not be taken in absolute terms, but in context.
 
Good faith also has a more specific meaning because it adds something specific. Good faith sometimes requires repudiating interpretations that attach themselves to the letter in order to repudiate the spirit. In Corinthians 3:6 says "the letter kills, but the spirit gives life".
 
Sometimes there are interpretations compatible with the text.
 
Reported by Vatel and Grotius, the Spartans had concluded an armistice with another Greek people in which it was written that for 30 days there would be the silence of arms. After the thirtieth day during the night the Spartans attacked. Confronted with the armistice agreement, they argued that the agreement had been honoured because it was for 30 days, not 30 days and 30 nights. This interpretation respects a literal meaning.
 
Obviously that was not the meaning of the terms, it was understandable to everyone by virtue of good faith.
 
The Germans had argued at the world premiere that in war law, the 1914 declaration of The Hague prohibited projectiles containing asphyxiating gases, as they had used cylinders that was not prohibited.
 
==== Object and purpose ====
These are two different things, the object of the treaty is the subject matter subject to regulation; the object of the treaty is the purpose for which it is intended.
 
By way of example, the object of the treaty can be maritime navigation, because there are uses, consecrated terms, practices, if we know these uses and practices, i. e. the object of regulation, we are able to interpret much better.
 
The aim is the purpose, the will of the legislator. It has always been interpreted in the sense of purpose. The purpose is always an indication of how to interpret.


==== Contexte ====
This is also called the teleological interpretation referring to the word "telo" in Greek (τέλος) which means "the purpose" so it is an interpretation in finality or in Latin a interpretation in ratio legis.
On appelle cela aussi l’interprétation systématique, cela signifie qu’on interprète dans le système d’ensemble c’est-à-dire dans le contexte.
Le contexte est une règle tout aussi essentielle et intuitive. Si on cherche le sens d’un mot contenu dans une convention, on ne va pas immédiatement regarder le mot et ignorer tout le reste, on va faire le contraire. D’abord on va regarder la phrase dans lequel le mot est inséré, le paragraphe, la disposition, la section, etc. ; et on va essayer de voir si l’aspect systématique des choses peut jeter de la lumière. Le contexte permet parfois d’éclairer significativement le sens d’un mot.  


=== Bonne foi ===
For example, in the case of certain United Nations expenditures, an advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice dated 1952, a question was raised as to whether the United Nations could conduct peacekeeping operations. Can the United Nations organize peacekeeping operations; nothing is certain, but the Charter has been interpreted in a flexible way; the arguments were to say that the purpose of the United Nations Charter was to maintain peace; the United Nations must be a means of inventing other means of maintaining peace, otherwise it will not be able to pursue the primary purpose of the Charter, which is to ensure international security.
C’est un élément intéressent, la bonne foi signifie essentiellement deux choses ; tout d’abord un tempérament à savoir qu’il faut privilégier le sens raisonnable plutôt qu’un sens excessivement littéral, cela rejoint le sens ordinaire, car on cherche le sens le plus raisonnable dans le contexte. Le sens raisonnable des mots requiert la bonne foi donc le sense ordinaire et la bonne foi rejoignent et s’opposent à un sens trop excessivement littéral. Il ne faut pas prendre les termes dans l’absolu, mais dans le raisonnable du contexte.
La bonne foi a aussi un sens plus spécifique, car elle ajoute quelque chose de spécifique. La bonne foi requiert parfois de répudier des interprétations qui s’attachent à la lettre pour répudier l’esprit. Dans les Corinthiens 3:6 est dit « la lettre tue, mais l’esprit donne vie »<ref>2ème Lettre de Paul aux Corinthiens : chapitre 3 verset 6 - 2 Corinthiens 3:6 - [http://djep.hd.free.fr/LaReferenceBiblique/?Livre=47&Chap=3&Vers=6 La Reference Biblique]</ref>.
Il y a parfois des interprétations compatibles avec le texte.
Rapportés par Vatel et Grotius, les spartiates avaient conclu un armistice avec un autre peuple grec dans lequel il était écrit que pendant 30 jours il y aurait le silence des armes. Après le trentième jour pendant la nuit les spartiates ont attaqué. Confrontés à l’accord d’armistice, ils ont argué que l‘accord avait été respecté, car l’accord avait été conclu pour 30 jours et non pas 30 jours et 30 nuits. Cette interprétation respecte un sens littéral.
Évidemment ce n’était pas le sens des termes, cela était compréhensible par tout un chacun en vertu de la bonne foi.
Les Allemands avaient argumenté lors de la première mondiale qu’en matière de droit de la guerre, la déclaration de 1914 de La Haye interdisait des projectiles contenant des gaz asphyxiants, comme ils avaient utilisé des cylindres cela n’était pas prohibé.


By this example, we know that teleological interpretation is often a supporting interpretation, it is not an autonomous argumentation, because it provides additional support by providing teleological arguments. If we stick to the goal, we can rewrite a whole text.
==== Objet et le but ====
Ce sont deux choses différentes, l’objet du traité est la matière soumise à règlementation ; le but du traité est la finalité poursuivie.
Par l’exemple, l’objet du traité peut être la navigation maritime, car il y a des usages, des termes consacrés, des pratiques, si on connait ces usages et ces pratiques à savoir l‘objet de la règlementation on arrive à interpréter beaucoup mieux.
Le but est la finalité, la volonté du législateur. On a toujours interprété dans le sens de la finalité. La finalité est toujours une indication sur la manière d’interpréter.
On appelle cela également l’interprétation téléologique renvoyant au mot « telo » en grec ( τέλος ) qui signifie « le but » donc c’est une interprétation en finalité ou en latin une interprétation en ratio legis.
Par exemple dans l’affaire de certaines dépenses des Nations-Unies, un avis consultatif de la Cour Internationale de Justice date 1952, une question fut de savoir si les Nations-Unies pouvaient mener des opérations de maintien de la paix<ref>Flory Maurice. L'Organisation des Nations Unies et les opérations de maintien de la paix. In: Annuaire français de droit international, volume 11, 1965. pp. 446-468.  doi : 10.3406/afdi.1965.1830 url : http://www.persee.fr/web/revues/home/prescript/article/afdi_0066-3085_1965_num_11_1_1830</ref>. Est-ce que les Nations-Unies peuvent organiser des opérations de maintien de la paix ; à cela rien n’est sûr, mais on a pu interpréter la Charte de manière souple ; les arguments étaient de dire que le but de la Charte des Nations-Unies était de maintenir la paix, les Nations-Unies doivent être un moyen d’inventer d’autres moyens de maintenir la paix sinon elles ne pourront poursuivre le but premier de la Charte qui est d’assurer la sécurité internationale.
Par cette exemple nous savons que l’interprétation téléologique est souvent une interprétation en appui, ce n’est pas une argumentation autonome, car on apporte un support supplémentaire en apportant des arguments téléologiques. Si on s’en tient seulement au but on peut réécrire tout un texte.


==== Il y a des maximes d’interprétation ====
==== There are maxims of interpretation ====
*'''interprétation conforme au droit international''' : cela veut dire que dans le doute on interprète de manière conforme de manière à ce qu’il n’y ait pas de conflit entre les normes. Ce principe s’applique principalement en droit interne, on va appliquer le droit interne de manière à ce qu’il soit en conformité avec les obligations internationales. C’est raisonnable, car le juge évite que l’État viole ses obligations internationales.Cette règle existe aussi en droit international comme récemment la jurisprudence de la Cour européenne des Droits de l’Homme ou les sanctions du Conseil de Sécurité contre des personnes individuelles soupçonnées de terrorisme.  
* interpretation in accordance with international law: this means that in case of doubt one interprets in a consistent manner so that there is no conflict between norms. This principle applies mainly in domestic law; domestic law will be applied in such a way that it is in conformity with international obligations. This rule also exists in international law, as has recently been the case law of the European Court of Human Rights or the Security Council's sanctions against individuals suspected of terrorism.
* useful effect: it is better for things to live than to perish; it is a rule in case of doubt, if one can interpret things in a way that is interpretative, but also in an interpretative way, because two interpretations are compatible with the text, however there is doubt. We can and must make our choice in favour of interpretation A if it turns out that interpretation A guarantees a meaning to the terms in question while interpretation B deprives it of any effect. For example, in a treaty we have a word X, by interpreting it as A it makes a difference in the application of the provision; if we apply interpretation B the word no longer has any meaning; in this case we will not assume that interpretation B is correct.
* contrario argumentation
* argument by analogy
* argumenta fortiori
* similar argument
These are arguments that can be used as strong arguments in legal arguments when interpreting a provision.


*'''effet utile''' : il y vaut mieux que les choses vivent plutôt qu’elles ne périssent ;c’est une règle en cas de doute, si on peut interpréter d’une manière A un terme, mais aussi d’une manière B on a un choix interprétatif, car deux interprétations sont compatibles avec le texte toutefois il y a un doute. On peut et on doit opérer notre choix en faveur de l’interprétation A s’il se trouve que l’interprétation A garantisse un sens aux termes en question alors que l’interprétation B la prive de tout effet. Par exemple dans un traité on a un mot X, en l’interprétant de la façon A il apporte une différence dans l’application de la disposition ; si on applique l’interprétation B le mot n’a plus aucun sens ; dans ce cas on ne présumera pas que l’interprétation B est la bonne.  
For example, let's say that in domestic law we go to a lawn on which there is a sign saying that it is forbidden to walk on the lawn. You think you can't walk on the lawn, but you see someone walking into the lawn biking. So we tell him that he can't go in, he retorts that he doesn't walk, but rides his bike.


*'''argumenta contrario'''
It is a question of interpretation; if we interpret this on the other hand, it means that the legislator wanted to prohibit only one thing, he does not want us to walk on it. If this is the purpose of the rule then going by car on the lawn is not a problem; conversely, if walking is forbidden then anything else is allowed.


*'''argumentpar analogie'''
If we interpret it differently, it is only a question of protecting the lawn, the legislator has not been very intelligent in specifying only "walk". At this moment one interprets by analogy and a fortiori, if it is forbidden to walk on the lawn then by analogy it is forbidden to cycle on it and a fortiori, because in view of the goal which is to preserve the lawn to walk on it the abyss to 10% and to go to cycle on it the damage to 30%.


*'''argumenta fortiori'''
This example shows that if the subject matter is understood differently, the same will be true for argumentation, because it is not possible to interpret it mechanically, the arguments occur in legal argumentation, they never give a solution, they must be understood in the sense of the text.


*'''argument du même genre'''
== End of treaties ==
Treaties are made to last, which is why in antiquity they were engraved in stones, but they are human works that do not last forever.


Ce sont des arguments qu’on peut utiliser comme arguments forts dans l’argumentation juridique lorsqu’on interprète une disposition.
There are moments and events leading to the termination of treaties.
Par exemple, admettons qu’en droit interne on va vers une pelouse sur laquelle il y a un panneau disant qu’il est interdit de marcher sur la pelouse. On se dit qu’on ne peut marcher sur la pelouse cependant on voit quelqu’un qui pénètre sur la pelouse faisant du vélo. Alors on lui dit qu’il ne peut y entrer, il rétorque qu’il ne marche pas, mais fait du vélo.
Il s’agit d’interpréter ; si on interprète cela a contrario cela veut donc dire que le législateur a voulu interdire seulement une chose, il ne veut pas qu’on marche dessus. Si tel est le but de la règle alors aller en voiture sur la pelouse ne pose pas problème ; a contrario si marcher est interdit alors toute autre chose est permise.
Si on l’interprète différemment il s’agit seulement de protéger le gazon, le législateur n’a pas été très intelligent en ne spécifiant que « marcher ». À ce moment on interprète par analogie et par a fortiori, s’il est interdit de marcher sur la gazon alors par analogie il est interdit de faire du vélo dessus et a fortiori, car en regard du but qui est de préserver le gazon marcher dessus l’abime à 10% et aller à vélo dessus le dommage à 30%.
Cet exemple montre que si on comprend différemment l’objet, il en sera de même pour l’argumentation, car on ne peut pas mécaniquement interpréter, les arguments adviennent dans l’argumentation juridique, ils ne donnent jamais une solution, il faut les comprendre en saisissent le sens du texte.


== Fin des traités ==
These provisions are found in Articles 42 et seq.[[Fichier:Convention de Vienne sur le droit des traités de 1969 - article 42.png|vignette|center|700px|[http://legal.un.org/ilc/texts/instruments/francais/traites/1_1_1969_francais.pdf Convention de Vienne sur le droit des traités de 1969] - [http://www.admin.ch/opc/fr/classified-compilation/19690099/index.html#a42 article 42]]]
Les traités sont faits pour durer, c’est la raison pour laquelle dans l’antiquité on les gravait dans les pierres ; ce sont cependant des œuvres humaines qui ne durent éternellement.
Il y a des moments et des évènements produisant la terminaison de traités.
Ces dispositions se trouvent aux articles 42 et suivants.
[[Fichier:Convention de Vienne sur le droit des traités de 1969 - article 42.png|vignette|center|700px|[http://legal.un.org/ilc/texts/instruments/francais/traites/1_1_1969_francais.pdf Convention de Vienne sur le droit des traités de 1969] - [http://www.admin.ch/opc/fr/classified-compilation/19690099/index.html#a42 article 42]]]


[[Fichier:Convention de Vienne sur le droit des traités de 1969 - article 43.png|vignette|center|700px|[http://legal.un.org/ilc/texts/instruments/francais/traites/1_1_1969_francais.pdf Convention de Vienne sur le droit des traités de 1969] - [http://www.admin.ch/opc/fr/classified-compilation/19690099/index.html#a43 article 43]]]
[[Fichier:Convention de Vienne sur le droit des traités de 1969 - article 43.png|vignette|center|700px|[http://legal.un.org/ilc/texts/instruments/francais/traites/1_1_1969_francais.pdf Convention de Vienne sur le droit des traités de 1969] - [http://www.admin.ch/opc/fr/classified-compilation/19690099/index.html#a43 article 43]]]
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[[Fichier:Convention de Vienne sur le droit des traités de 1969 - article 45.png|vignette|center|700px|[http://legal.un.org/ilc/texts/instruments/francais/traites/1_1_1969_francais.pdf Convention de Vienne sur le droit des traités de 1969] - [http://www.admin.ch/opc/fr/classified-compilation/19690099/index.html#a45 article 45]]]
   
   
Au second paragraphe de l’article 42 est dit que « l’extinction d’un traité, sa dénonciation ou le retrait d’une partie ne peuvent avoir lieu qu’en application des dispositions du traité ou de la présente Convention. La même règle vaut pour la suspension de l’application d’un traité »
The second paragraph of Article 42 states that "the termination of a treaty, its denunciation or the withdrawal of a party may take place only in accordance with the provisions of the treaty or this Convention. The same rule applies to the suspension of the application of a treaty."
 
Cela signifie qu’on ne peut plaider la terminaison d’un traité que pour un motif reconnu dans la Convention de Vienne ou alors pour des motifs prévus dans le traité lui-même.
This means that the termination of a treaty can only be pleaded for a reason recognised in the Vienna Convention or for reasons provided for in the treaty itself.
 
On ne souhaite pas laisser aux États la possibilité d’inventer d’autres motifs de terminer un traité parce que c’est une matière sensible, si un État pourrait plaider la terminaison d’un traité par ses inventions cela irait à l’encontre du principe pacta sund servenda. En droit international le traité joue le rôle de la loi.
We do not wish to give States the possibility of inventing other grounds for terminating a treaty because it is a sensitive matter; if a State could plead termination of a treaty by its inventions, it would be contrary to the pacta sund servenda principle. In international law, the treaty plays the role of the law.
 
Les motifs qui permettent de terminer un traité peuvent être classés selon des critères différents : le critère le plus simple et le plus fondé est celui de distinguer selon des motifs d’extinctions subjectifs et des motifs d’extinctions objectifs.
The reasons for completing a treaty can be classified according to different criteria: the simplest and most justified criterion is that of distinguishing between subjective and objective grounds for extinguishment.
Ces deux termes ont toujours le même sens dans la science juridique. Lorsqu’on fait état de considérations subjectives on vise toujours quelque chose ayant à voir avec la volonté, est subjectif ce qui est volontaire, dans le cas des traités il y a certains motifs afin de terminer un traité qui découlent de la volonté des parties. Les critères objectifs sont indépendants de la volonté des parties, ici se sont des motifs d’extinctions basés sur des circonstances extérieures et non pas basés sur la volonté des parties.
Dans l’article 42 §2 on utilise des termes différents : extinction, dénonciation ou retrait. Il y a donc trois termes :
*'''extinction''' :terminaison du traité, il n’est plus à partir d’un certain moment, il est éteint.
*'''dénonciation et retrait''' : moyen de terminer un traité vis-à-vis de certaines parties du traité. Le traité continu à exister, simplement il ne liera plus certaines parties, le champ d’application personnel du traité se sera restreint.


Dans les deux cas, il y a la cessation de l’application du traité pour certains États et voilà pourquoi la Convention de Vienne règlemente ces termes ensemble ; les problèmes juridiques sont les mêmes ; le danger pour le principe de stabilité des traités est le même.
These two terms always have the same meaning in legal science. When subjective considerations are mentioned, one always aims at something having to do with the will, subjective is what is voluntary, in the case of treaties there are certain motives for terminating a treaty that flow from the will of the parties. The objective criteria are independent of the will of the parties, here are grounds for extinctions based on external circumstances and not based on the will of the parties.


*Les '''motifs subjectifs''' liés à la volonté des parties contractantes :
Article 42 §2 uses different terms: termination, denunciation or withdrawal. So there are three terms:
La grande majorité de ces motifs sont résumés à l’article 54. Il est possible d’avoir un consentement exprès des parties consistant à terminer un traité antérieur. Ce consentement exprès peut prendre la forme d’un accord abrogatoire c’est-à-dire que l'on conclut un accord entre États disant qu’un traité antérieur spécifié n’est plus en vigueur à partir d’une certaine date ; cet accord exprès peut prendre la forme d’un nouveau traité sur la matière d’un autre traité explicité dans le préambule du nouveau traité.  
* '''extinction''': termination of the treaty, it is no longer at a certain point in time, it is extinguished.
* '''denunciation and withdrawal''': means of terminating a treaty vis-à-vis certain parts of the treaty. The treaty continues to exist, simply it will no longer bind certain parties, the personal scope of the treaty will have been narrowed.
In both cases, there is the cessation of the application of the treaty for certain States and that is why the Vienna Convention regulates these terms together; the legal problems are the same; the danger to the principle of stability of treaties is the same.
* '''Subjective reasons linked to the will of the contracting parties''':
The vast majority of these grounds are summarized in section 54. It is possible to have express consent of the parties to terminate an earlier treaty. This express consent may take the form of an abrogatory agreement, i. e. an agreement between States that a specified earlier treaty is no longer in force from a certain date; this express agreement may take the form of a new treaty on the subject matter of another treaty as set out in the preamble of the new treaty.  
   
   
[[Fichier:Convention de Vienne sur le droit des traités de 1969 - article 54.png|vignette|center|700px|[http://legal.un.org/ilc/texts/instruments/francais/traites/1_1_1969_francais.pdf Convention de Vienne sur le droit des traités de 1969] - [http://www.admin.ch/opc/fr/classified-compilation/19690099/index.html#a54 article 54]]]
[[Fichier:Convention de Vienne sur le droit des traités de 1969 - article 54.png|vignette|center|700px|[http://legal.un.org/ilc/texts/instruments/francais/traites/1_1_1969_francais.pdf Convention de Vienne sur le droit des traités de 1969] - [http://www.admin.ch/opc/fr/classified-compilation/19690099/index.html#a54 article 54]]]
   
   


Le nouveau traité sur le canal de Panama de 1977 remplace le traité de 1903, l’abrogation de l’ancien est ici insérée dans le nouveau traité, mais le nouveau traité règlemente la matière, il remplace l’ancien.
The new Panama Canal Treaty of 1977 replaces the 1903 treaty, the abrogation of the old one is inserted in the new treaty, but the new treaty regulates the matter, it replaces the old one. It is also possible to have express consent to terminate an old treaty informally, i.e. without entering into a new agreement, i.e. without abrogatory or replacement.
Il est aussi possible d’avoir un consentement exprès de terminer un ancien traité donné de manière informelle c’est-à-dire sans conclusion d’un nouvel accord, c’est-à-dire ni abrogatoire ou de replacement.
 
In 1946, the Assembly of the League of Nations met for the last time, taking the decision to dissolve the society with effect from the next day. A resolution by the Assembly to dissolve the League of Nations was legally tantamount to terminating the League of Nations pact. The League of Nations pact is terminated by an informal agreement.
En 1946, l’assemblée de la Société des Nations s’est réunie une dernière fois prenant la décision de dissoudre la société avec effet à partir du jour prochain. Une résolution décision de l’assemblée de dissoudre la Société des Nations revenait juridiquement à mettre un terme au pacte de la Société de Nations. Il y a une terminaison du pacte de la Société des Nations par un accord informel.
 
Sometimes there may be implicit consent not to continue the application of an old treaty. Some of the old Russia's trade treaties were not continued after the Bolshevik revolution, since Russia has radically changed putting an end to the application of liberal economic agreements, especially with Japan, it is an implicit consent to end the treaty.
Parfois, on peut avoir un consentement implicite de ne pas continuer l’application d’un ancien traité. Quelques traités commerciaux de l’ancienne Russie n’ont pas été continués après la révolution bolchevique puisque la Russie a profondément changée mettant fin à l’application d’accords économiques libéraux notamment avec le Japon, c’est un consentent implicite de mettre un terme au traité.
 
The resolutory clauses fall under Article 54 is a clause inserted in the treaty intended by the parties that says that after a certain period of time has elapsed or when a certain event occurs, the treaty must cease to be in force. Sometimes a treaty is concluded with limited temporality and can be renewed. This means that the treaty is in force for the specified period of time and if it is not renewed, the treaty ceases to apply at the end of the specified date.
Les clauses résolutoires relèvent de l’article 54 est une clause insérée dans le traité voulu par les parties qui dit qu’après l’écoulement d’un certain laps de temps ou alors à la survenance d’un certain évènement le traité doit cesser d’être en vigueur. Il arrive que l'onconclue un traité avec une temporalité limitée et qui peut être renouvelé. Ce signifie que le traité est en vigueur pour la période indiquée et que s’il n’est pas renouvelé le traité cesse de s’appliquer à la fin de la date prévue.
 
Some treaties say that if certain events occur, the treaty must cease to apply, as is the case with alliances.
Certains traités disent que si certains évènements surviennent, le traité doit cesser de s’appliquer comme c’est le cas notamment des alliances.


Rappelons que dénonciation (« withdraw ») d’un traité veut dire retrait d’une partie au traité.
It should be remembered that withdrawing from a treaty means withdrawing a party to the treaty.


== Peut-on dénoncer un traité ? ==
== Can a treaty be denounced? ==


[[Fichier:Convention de Vienne sur le droit des traités de 1969 - article 55.png|vignette|center|700px|[http://legal.un.org/ilc/texts/instruments/francais/traites/1_1_1969_francais.pdf Convention de Vienne sur le droit des traités de 1969] - [http://www.admin.ch/opc/fr/classified-compilation/19690099/index.html#a55 article 55]]]
[[Fichier:Convention de Vienne sur le droit des traités de 1969 - article 55.png|vignette|center|700px|[http://legal.un.org/ilc/texts/instruments/francais/traites/1_1_1969_francais.pdf Convention de Vienne sur le droit des traités de 1969] - [http://www.admin.ch/opc/fr/classified-compilation/19690099/index.html#a55 article 55]]]
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[[Fichier:Convention de Vienne sur le droit des traités de 1969 - article 56.png|vignette|center|700px|[http://legal.un.org/ilc/texts/instruments/francais/traites/1_1_1969_francais.pdf Convention de Vienne sur le droit des traités de 1969] - [http://www.admin.ch/opc/fr/classified-compilation/19690099/index.html#a56 article 56]]]


Les réponses sont données aux articles 55 et 56 de la Convention de Vienne ; les principes sont :
Answers are given in articles 55 and 56 of the Vienna Convention; the principles are:
#'''Un traité qui ne prévoit rien sur sa dénonciation''' c’est-à-dire qu’il n’a pas de clauses de dénonciation insérées dans son texte est considéré, sauf quelques exemples, ne pas être dénonçable. Le principe est qu’un traité n’est pas dénonçable par un État partie. L’analogie avec les contrats ne fonctionne pas, car les traités sont le substitut de la loi ; on ne négocie pas durant plusieurs années des traités pour concevoir à chaque État la possibilité de dénoncer le traité lorsque cela lui y prend. Un traité qui n’est pas dénonçable n’est pas éternel, on peut toujours modifier un traité, on peut conclure des accords particuliers qui ont priorité sur le traité général voir procéder une modification avec toutes les autres parties au traité.
#'''A treaty which makes no provision for denunciation''', i. e. it does not have denunciation clauses inserted in its text, is considered, except for a few examples, not to be denounceable. The principle is that a treaty cannot be denounced by a State party. The analogy with contracts does not work, because treaties are the substitute for the law; treaties are not negotiated for several years to give each State the possibility of denouncing the treaty when it does so. A treaty that is not denunciable is not eternal, one can always modify a treaty, one can conclude special agreements that have priority over the general treaty, or even make an amendment with all the other parties to the treaty.
#'''La dénonciation est permise si le traité lui-même la prévoit et la permet'''.Les traités peuvent donc contenir une clause couverte par la volonté des parties selon laquelle les États partie au traité peuvent les dénoncer sous certaines conditions comme, par exemple, le traité sur l’espace extrastratosphérique de 1976 à l’article 16 qui prévoit qu’il peut être dénoncé selon certaines conditions. Toute une série de traités a des clauses de ce type qui peuvent être appliquées et faire valoir de négociation. Pour les traités entre la Suisse et l’Union Européenne, la Suisse a insérée une clause de négociation en fonction de certaines circonstances.
#'''Denunciation is permitted if the treaty itself provides for and permits denunciation'''. Treaties may therefore contain a clause covered by the will of the parties according to which States parties to the treaty may denounce them under certain conditions, such as, for example, the 1976 Outer Space Treaty in article 16, which provides that it may be denounced under certain conditions. A whole series of treaties have clauses of this kind that can be applied and enforceable through negotiation. For treaties between Switzerland and the European Union, Switzerland has inserted a negotiation clause depending on certain circumstances.
#'''Si le traité est silencieux sur la faculté de dénonciation, s’il ne contient pas de clauses de dénonciation, il y a des exceptions qui résultent de l’article 56'''.Il y a deux exceptions :
#'''If the Treaty is silent on the possibility of denunciation, if it does not contain denunciation clauses, there are exceptions resulting from Article 56'''. There are two exceptions:
*'''s’il y a une intention implicite de permettre la dénonciation d’un traité celle-ci peut être exercée''', c’est-à-dire que les parties au traité au moment de la conclusion du traité ont par la suite accepté une dénonciation, mais ne l’on pas écrite dans le traité ; si on peut prouver une telle intention on peut jouir d’un pouvoir de dénonciation. C’est le cas de la Charte des Nations-Unies, il est établi qu’un État peut dénoncer la Charte des Nations-Unies, selon l’article 108 de la Charte des Nations-Unies une résolution peut être imposée à un État membre. À San Francisco a été dit qu’une dénonciation est permise, mais cela n’a pas été écrit suite à l’expérience de la Société des Nations qui avait une clause de dénonciation ; toutes les puissances dictatoriales ont quitté la Société des Nations afin d’être libres de leurs actes.
*'''if there is an implicit intention to permit the denunciation of a treaty, it may be exercised''', i. e. the parties to the treaty at the time of the conclusion of the treaty have subsequently accepted an denunciation, but have not written it in the treaty; if such an intention can be proved, a denunciation power may be enjoyed. This is the case of the Charter of the United Nations, it is established that a State may denounce the Charter of the United Nations, according to Article 108 of the Charter of the United Nations a resolution may be imposed on a Member State. In San Francisco was said that denunciation is allowed, but this was not written following the experience of the League of Nations which had a denunciation clause; all dictatorial powers left the League of Nations in order to be free from their acts.
*'''la dénonciation est admise si comme dit dans l’article 54 de la Convention de Vienne la nature est voulue que les parties admettent la dénonciation'''. Certains traités sont tellement fluctuants par la nature même qu’on ne peut imaginer que les États ne veuillent pas permettre d’en sortir. L’exemple classique est les alliances qui sont basées sur une série de critères d’affinités politiques qui donnent un sens à l’alliance. Un changement de régime peut changer le sens d’une alliance et donc la nature du traité est telle qu’elle justifie une dénonciation. En cas de doutes on ne peut assumer la dénonciation puisque le principe général est qu’un traité qui ne prévoit pas la dénonciation n’est pas dénonçable,l’interprétation est stricte.
*'''denunciation is permissible if, as stated in article 54 of the Vienna Convention, it is intended that the parties should admit denunciation'''. Some treaties are so fluctuating in nature that it is hard to imagine that States would not want to allow them to leave. The classic example is alliances, which are based on a series of political affinity criteria that give meaning to the alliance. A change of regime can change the meaning of an alliance and therefore the nature of the treaty is such that it justifies denunciation. In case of doubt, denunciation cannot be assumed since the general principle is that a treaty which does not provide for denunciation is not denunciation, the interpretation is strict.
   
   
La dénonciation ne met pas un terme au traité, simplement l’État se retire, cependant dans le cas d’un traité bilatéral la dénonciation met un terme au traité, toutefois cela est possible dans le cas d’une convention multilatérale; dans la convention contre le génocide de 1948, il y a dans l’article 15 un quorum de 16 États, si une dénonciation devait faire en sorte qu’on sort du quorum, dès lors le traité cesse de s’appliquer. Si la Suisse dénonce les accords bilatéraux avec l’Union Européenne alors ils cesseraient d’exister.
Denunciation does not put an end to the treaty, simply the State withdraws, but in the case of a bilateral treaty denunciation puts an end to the treaty, however this is possible in the case of a multilateral convention; in the case of the 1948 convention against genocide, there is in article 15 a quorum of 16 States, if denunciation were to result in a withdrawal from the quorum, the treaty ceases to apply. If Switzerland denounces the bilateral agreements with the European Union then they would cease to exist.
   
   
*'''Motifs objectifs'''prévus par le droit qui ne dépendent pas de la volonté des parties :
*'''Objective reasons''' provided by law which do not depend on the will of the parties:
Il y a potentiellement toute une série de motifs objectifs comme, par exemple, l’article 61 qui vise les cas d’impossibilités matérielles d’exécutions. Il arrive dans certains cas que l'on conclue un traité sur un objet qu’on ne peut plus réaliser comme, par exemple, une ile qui est cédée à un État étranger, mais qui est engloutie par la mer, dans ce cas l’objet même du traité disparaît.
There are potentially a whole range of objective grounds, such as, for example, Article 61, which deals with material impossibilities of executions. In some cases, a treaty may be concluded on an object that can no longer be realized, such as an island that is ceded to a foreign State but is swallowed up by the sea, in which case the very object of the treaty disappears.


[[Fichier:Convention de Vienne sur le droit des traités de 1969 - article 61.png|vignette|center|700px|[http://legal.un.org/ilc/texts/instruments/francais/traites/1_1_1969_francais.pdf Convention de Vienne sur le droit des traités de 1969] - [http://www.admin.ch/opc/fr/classified-compilation/19690099/index.html#a61 article 61]]]
[[Fichier:Convention de Vienne sur le droit des traités de 1969 - article 61.png|vignette|center|700px|[http://legal.un.org/ilc/texts/instruments/francais/traites/1_1_1969_francais.pdf Convention de Vienne sur le droit des traités de 1969] - [http://www.admin.ch/opc/fr/classified-compilation/19690099/index.html#a61 article 61]]]


En droit interne, c’est beaucoup plus fréquent, en droit international c’est plutôt rare, c’est pourquoi c’est un motif qui n’a pas lieu d’être particulièrement discuté.
In domestic law, this is much more frequent, in international law it is rather rare, and therefore it is a ground that does not need to be particularly discussed.
 
Les conflits armés suspendent et très rarement terminent certains traités, la Convention de Vienne ne la règlemente pas particulièrement, car cela ne relève pas du droit de la paix et du droit de la guerre. La succession d’États est aussi un motif de la terminaison d’un traité.
Armed conflict suspends and very rarely terminates certain treaties; the Vienna Convention does not regulate it particularly, as this is not covered by the law of peace and the law of war. Succession of States is also a reason for terminating a treaty.
Deux motifs se trouvent à l’article 60 de la Convention de Vienne qui traite de l’extinction du traité suite à sa violation et l’article 62 qui est le changement fondamental de circonstance.


[[Fichier:Convention de Vienne sur le droit des traités de 1969 - article 60.png|vignette|center|700px|[http://legal.un.org/ilc/texts/instruments/francais/traites/1_1_1969_francais.pdf Convention de Vienne sur le droit des traités de 1969] - [http://www.admin.ch/opc/fr/classified-compilation/19690099/index.html#a60 article 60]]]
Two grounds are found in article 60 of the Vienna Convention, which deals with the termination of the treaty following its violation, and article 62, which is the fundamental change of circumstance.[[Fichier:Convention de Vienne sur le droit des traités de 1969 - article 60.png|vignette|center|700px|[http://legal.un.org/ilc/texts/instruments/francais/traites/1_1_1969_francais.pdf Convention de Vienne sur le droit des traités de 1969] - [http://www.admin.ch/opc/fr/classified-compilation/19690099/index.html#a60 article 60]]]


[[Fichier:Convention de Vienne sur le droit des traités de 1969 - article 62.png|vignette|center|700px|[http://legal.un.org/ilc/texts/instruments/francais/traites/1_1_1969_francais.pdf Convention de Vienne sur le droit des traités de 1969] - [http://www.admin.ch/opc/fr/classified-compilation/19690099/index.html#a62 article 62]]]
[[Fichier:Convention de Vienne sur le droit des traités de 1969 - article 62.png|vignette|center|700px|[http://legal.un.org/ilc/texts/instruments/francais/traites/1_1_1969_francais.pdf Convention de Vienne sur le droit des traités de 1969] - [http://www.admin.ch/opc/fr/classified-compilation/19690099/index.html#a62 article 62]]]
   
   
À l’article 60 il s’agit du cas d’un traité violé par une partie, est-ce que l’autre partie doit continuer à l’exécuter ?
In Article 60, it is the case of a treaty violated by one party, must the other party continue to execute it?
 
As long as the treaty is not suspended, that is the case. The question is precisely whether the violation cannot give the injured State the right to suspend or terminate a treaty. In other words, the breach may possibly be grounds for suspending or in some cases terminating a treaty.
 
This will be appropriate for reasons of practice and fairness: the injured state is recognized to do something.
 
The title of section 60 isT''ermination or suspension of the operation of a treatyas a consequence of its breach''. There is a rather rich practice.
 
== What is the applicable regime? ==
 
First, it should be noted that article 60 is based on a fundamental distinction between a substantial breach of a treaty and a mere breach of a treaty. There are two types of violation:
* material: serious breach
* simple: violation that is not a violation
A material breach gives rise to certain rights.
 
Substantial "is not a legal term, it is a term that must be defined, there must be a definition otherwise we would not understand anything and it is found in §3, it is" a rejection of the treaty not authorized by this Convention; or the violation of a provision essential to the achievement of the object or purpose of the treaty ".
 
The repudiation of the treaty is a total rejection, one does not apply the treaty, it is obvious that it is difficult to find a more serious violation than that of not applying anything.
 
In the event of a material breach, there are certain options, in other words, if the breach is material, the treaty may be suspended or terminated under certain conditions.
 
If the breach is not substantial, it is a less material provision, and the injured party was not given the opportunity to terminate the treaty. In the case of a non-substantial violation one is rejected in the field of State responsibility, i.e. the international responsibility of States by seeking reparations or otherwise; the injured State must seek reparation, but cannot use the context to terminate the treaty.
 
The Convention tries to protect the treaty either from a small violation or to prevent abuse.
 
In the case of bilateral and multilateral treaties, what can be done is slightly different. That is why the Convention distinguishes between the two cases.
 
In the case of bilateral treaties, in the event of a substantial breach, the Convention recognizes that the other State party which is automatically the injured party either to suspend or terminate the treaty if the breach relates to a specific object of suspension or termination with effect ex nunc, i. e. without retroactivity, is not in the area of treaty validity. There is the procedure laid down in Article 65 which must be followed. It is a relative means for the aggrieved party to terminate the treaty, because it is a stronger means than finding without a judge.[[Fichier:Convention de Vienne sur le droit des traités de 1969 - article 65.png|vignette|center|700px|[http://legal.un.org/ilc/texts/instruments/francais/traites/1_1_1969_francais.pdf Convention de Vienne sur le droit des traités de 1969] - [http://www.admin.ch/opc/fr/classified-compilation/19690099/index.html#a65 article 65]]]
   
   
Tant que le traité n’est pas suspendu est terminé c’est le cas. La question est précisément celle de savoir si la violation ne peut donner un droit à l’État lésé de suspendre ou de terminer un traité. En d’autres termes la violation peut éventuellement être un motif de suspendre ou dans certains cas de terminer un traité.
For multilateral treaties, it is more complex because there are more situations. Thus, the Vienna Convention distinguishes three possible scenarios:
   
   
Cela sera indiqué pour des raisons de pratique et d’équité : on reconnait à l’État lésé de faire quelque chose.
1) Article 60, paragraph 2 (a), what States parties to the treaty may do except the violator: If we have all concluded a treaty, is that one party violates the treaty; if everyone agrees, either the treaty may be suspended or terminated in whole or in part, either with respect to the violator or between all parties.
   
*the first case would be to say "he violated the substance of the treaty", we will simply exclude the rapist from the treaty.
Le titre de l’article 60 est EXTINCTION D’UN TRAITÉ OU SUSPENSION DE SON APPLICATION COMME CONSÉQUENCE DE SA VIOLATION. Il y a une pratique assez riche.
*it may be decided to stop, because the violating State may have become aware of problems inherent in the treaty, in which case it may be possible to exercise the power to terminate the treaty by consensus.
 
2) the case of the part that has been especially affected or affected
 
The first question that arises is: what does it mean to be a party specifically harmed by the violation?
 
In some multilateral treaties, we have situations in which different States parties to the convention can be distinguished by the violation of the Convention. In the case of a multilateral treaty on extradition, i.e. mutual assistance in criminal matters, there is a case where extradition must be "implemented by State A vis-à-vis State B". Assuming that the accused person is not surrendered, then all parties are affected because the breach affects trust, there is legitimate fear about the scope and life of the treaty; however, only one party is specifically affected. The Vienna Convention confers certain rights on the affected State: these rights are far below the rights that the Convention grants to States acting by mutual agreement under letter (a).
 
What can the specially affected part do?
 
There is the possibility of invoking the substantial breach only to suspend the treaty and not to terminate the treaty in whole or in part and only with respect to the violating State.
 
In other words, what can be done as a specially affected party is that the treaty can be suspended with respect to the violator in order to put both states on an equal footing only with respect to the violator.
 
We see a considerable difference: it cannot end the treaty, but only suspend it. One should always consider unilateral allegation. The convention considers that when all other parties act in concert, the risk is practically nil. On the other hand, the party especially affected is all by itself, one cannot know the truth of its allegations. This would open the door to abuse, which is why the substantial breach is quite sufficient.
3) the third case is Article 60 (c), they are integral treaties, treaties that are not bilateral with any party not specifically affected.
 
A multilateral extradition treaty is nothing more than the sum of an extradition treaty. The multilateral treaty can be divided into a multilateral treaty, exactly by [n*(n-1]/2
 
Let us take a treaty on demilitarisation or denuclearisation of a certain region in the case of peaceful denuclearisation. All States undertake not to introduce nuclear weapons into a given area in a region. If a State inserts a nuclear weapon, there is not a specially affected State, all of them are specifically affected.
 
It is an objective situation that changes things. This is the typical example of a treaty whose structure is different from a bilateralisable treaty.
 
Each State Party outside the violator; each party may declare suspension of the treaty and only suspension of the treaty in whole or in part vis-à-vis all other parties to the treaty.
 
What changes is that all states are especially affected and basically all can suspend the treaty. What also changes is that the treaty is suspended from all others, including the violator.
 
As each State can do individually, there is no more than suspension.
 
Two exceptions should be mentioned.
 
In paragraph 4 are the provisions which, in the treaties, are to be applied in cases of violations or in cases which include the violation of the treaty, such as, for example, the provision on the settlement of disputes stating what can and must be done in the case of a dispute over the application or interpretation of this Convention. It is said that each party can bring a case before the Court of Justice, which is an attractive clause for dispute resolution.
 
One party says "you violated the treaty" while the other denies; it would be absurd if in this case the clause referring to the International Court of Justice saying that this clause was suspended following the termination of the treaty were not applied.
 
It is much more logical to say that the powers given to the State to terminate or suspend a treaty have been inserted in the final provisions; therefore, the clause giving jurisdiction to the International Court of Justice is not suspended, paragraph 4 is applied.
 
Paragraphs 1 to 3 of Article 60 on the consequences of a material breach of a treaty apply only in the case of material breaches.
 
The Geneva Conventions on the protection of persons in the event of armed conflict or certain human rights treaties, for example, cannot be suspended or terminated because they are treaties protecting third parties. Since these are not bilateral benefits of States, it is not permitted to suspend or terminate treaties.
 
There are certain standards where we cannot measure ourselves according to the principle of reciprocity, reciprocity does not apply in these areas even if it is a great principle.
 
Clause 62 deals with the fundamental change of circumstances, i. e., the treaty is concluded at a given time on the basis of certain circumstances, facts or events. After the treaties have been concluded, there is a radical change in circumstances, for example, an economic treaty is concluded on the basis of an exchange based on fixed to floating exchange rates.
 
Can we consider that the treaty is over? This is a complex and debated issue, but never since 1969 has this provision been successfully implemented.
 
This provision says "a change of circumstances cannot be invoked to terminate a treaty"; things always change. This principle is that a change in circumstances does not count as grounds for terminating a treaty, but there are exceptions that are cumulative conditions:
*the circumstances at issue must have existed at the time of the conclusion of the treaty and the parties must have given their consent to be bound by the treaty solely with respect to the existence of those circumstances. Circumstances exist at the time of ratification of a treaty between two States depending on circumstances, but which change fundamentally thereafter; an imbalance often arises unfairly.
*the change of circumstances must not have been foreseen by the parties.


== Quel est le régime applicable en la matière ? ==
= The custom =
It is quite specific that a society, especially the international society, should be governed by customary law. We are not accustomed to customary law, because in domestic law it has a subordinate and marginal role.


Notons tout d’abord que l’article 60 est basé sur une distinction fondamentale sur la '''violation substantielle d’un traité''' et la '''violation simple d’un traité'''. Il y a deux types de violation :
This is not the case in international law, where there are no legislators and laws in the formal sense, except for treaties, so there is a right emerging from practice and precedents, i. e. States find ways to deal with things that serve more or less everyone, creating a minimum of legal certainty that gradually leads to the alignment of States with practice.
*substantielle : violation grave
*simple : violation qui ne l’est pas


Une violation substantielle donne lieu à certains droits.
For a long time international law has been fundamentally customary, and it is only recently that we have a series of multilateral conventions worthy of the name. This is a recent phenomenon, previously the common law of customary law.


« Substantielle » n’est pas un terme juridique, c’est un terme qui doit être défini, il faut une définition sinon nous ne comprendrions rien et elle se trouve au §3, c’est « un rejet du traité non autorisé par la présente Convention; ou la violation d’une disposition essentielle pour la réalisation de l’objet ou du but du traité ».
A few comments are helpful:
La répudiation du traité est le rejet en bloc, on n’applique pas le traité, il est évident qu’on ne peut difficilement une violation plus grave que celle de ne rien appliquer.
En cas de violation substantielle il y a certaines facultés, en d’autres termes, si la violation est substantielle on peut sous certaines conditions suspendre ou terminer le traité.
Si la violation n‘est pas substantielle, c’est une disposition qui est de moindre importance, on n’a pas voulu concéder à la partie lésée la possibilité de terminer le traité. Dans le cas d’une violation non-substantielle on est rejeté dans le domaine de la responsabilité des États, c’est-à-dire la responsabilité internationale des États en demandant des réparations ou autre ; l’État lésé doit demander une réparation, mais ne peut utiliser le contexte pour terminer le traité.
La Convention tente de protéger le traité soit d’une petite violation soit pour ne pas permettre des abus.
Dans le cas de traités bilatéraux et multilatéraux, ce qu’on peut faire diffère légèrement. Voilà donc pourquoi la convention distingue les deux cas.
Pour les traités bilatéraux en cas de violation substantielle, la convention reconnaît à l’autre État partie qui est automatiquement la partie lésée soit de suspendre, soit de terminer le traité si la violation porte sur un objet déterminé de suspendre ou de terminer le traité avec effet ex nunc c’est-à-dire sans rétroactivité, nous ne sommes pas ici dans le domaine de la validité des traités. Il y à la procédure prévue dans l’article 65 qui doit être suivie. C’est un moyen relatif qui est accordé à la partie lésée de terminer le traité, car c’est un moyen plus fort que de constater sans un juge.


[[Fichier:Convention de Vienne sur le droit des traités de 1969 - article 65.png|vignette|center|700px|[http://legal.un.org/ilc/texts/instruments/francais/traites/1_1_1969_francais.pdf Convention de Vienne sur le droit des traités de 1969] - [http://www.admin.ch/opc/fr/classified-compilation/19690099/index.html#a65 article 65]]]
First, in treaties, the essential thing for States is to have legal certainty and stability, which is why the violation of treaties is not prohibited except for human rights treaties. Violations are rare because States seek security so that they can count on what others will do.
Pour les traités multilatéraux, c’est plus complexe parce qu’il y a plus de situations. Ainsi la Convention de Vienne distingue trois cas de figures :
1) lettre a) §2 de l’article 60, '''ce que les États parties au traité peuvent faire sauf le violateur''' :
Si nous avons tous conclu un traité, est qu’une partie viole le traité ; si tout le monde est d’accord soit on peut suspendre ou terminer le traité en tout ou en partie soit vis-à-vis du violateur soit entre toutes les parties.
*le premier cas de figure serait de dire« il a violé la substance du traité », on va simplement exclure du traité le violeur.
*on peut décider d’arrêter, car l’État violateur a peut-être pris conscience de problèmes intrinsèques au traité, dans ce cas on peut suite à un consensus exercer le pouvoir de terminer le traité.


2) cas de la '''partie spécialement atteinte ou affectée'''
In customary law, we don't really seek stability, because it moves much more often, a right stemming from the practice moves regularly. We are looking for flexibility, the international society is moving and evolving at an increasingly rapid pace over the last two or three hundred years; there are new conditions, the conventions are very difficult to modify, if we do not have a unanimous agreement we are each time in front of a mountain.
La première question qui surgit est : '''que veut dire partie spécialement atteinte par la violation ?'''


Nous avons dans certains traités multilatéraux des situations qui permettent de distinguer différents État parties à la convention par la violation de la Convention. Dans le cas d’un traité multilatéral d’extradition c’est-à-dire d’entraide pénale, il y a un cas ou l’extradition doit être « mise en œuvre par l’État A vis-à-vis de l’État B ». Admettons que la personne incriminée ne soit pas livrée, alors toutes les parties sont affectées parce que la violation affecte la confiance, il y a légitiment une certaine peur sur la portée et la vie du traité; toutefois une seule partie est spécialement atteinte. C’est donc vis-à-vis de cet État qui est l’État affecté : la Convention de Vienne lui accorde certains droits : ces droits sont bien en deçà des droits que la Convention accorde aux États agissant d’un commun accord selon les prévisions de la lettre a).
The conventions do not guarantee flexibility; we need a safety valve so that the law stays close to the facts of international society and follows the contours of reality.


Que peut faire la partie spécialement affectée ?
If we add the sources, we have both the cluster of stability and the pole of flexibility interacting.
Il y a la possibilité d’invoquer la violation substantielle seulement pour suspendre le traité et non pas terminer en tout ou en partie et seulement vis-à-vis de l’État violateur.
En d’autres termes, ce qu’on peut faire en tant que partie spécialement affectée est qu’on peut suspendre le traité à l’égard du violateur afin de placer les deux États sur un pied d’égalité uniquement à l’égard du violateur.
On voit une différence considérable, elle ne peut terminer le traité, mais seulement le suspendre. Il faut toujours songer à l’allégation unilatérale. La convention estime que lorsque toutes les autres parties agissent de concert le risque est quasi nul. En revanche, la partie spécialement affectée est toute seule, on ne peut savoir la véracité de ses allégations. Cela ouvrirait la porte aux abus, c’est pourquoi la violation substantielle est tout à fait suffisante.


Secondly, the second point is to provide general international law. The general law is almost exclusively customary law, the treaty law of general law.


3)  le troisième cas de figure est la lettre c) de l’article 60, ce sont des '''traités intégraux''',ce sont des traités qui ne sont pas bilatéraux avec aucune partie non spécialement affectée.  
== What is meant by "general law"? ==
It is a right that applies to all States regardless of everything else, it is in that sense where the law is general or common, a treaty will never apply to any other party than those that have ratified the treaty; customary law applies to all States of the world, it is a rule that applies to all at the same time.


Un traité multilatéral d’extradition n’est rien d’autre que la somme de n traité d’extradition. On peut scinder le traité multilatéral en un traités multilatéraux, exactement en  [n*(n-1]/2
This indicates the residual function of custom: when analysing a problem in international law, the first thing to do is to check whether there are applicable treaties or particular law. Once it has been ascertained whether there is no particular law, applicable treaty, acquiescence or diplomatic note, it is not that there is no applied law, but it automatically reverts to general international law.


Prenons un traité de démilitarisation ou de dénucléarisation d’une certaine région dans le cas d’une dénucléarisation pacifique. Tous les États s’engagent à ne pas introduire une arme nucléaire dans une aire déterminée dans une région. Si un État insère une arme nucléaire, il n’y a pas un État spécialement affecté, tous sont spécialement affectés.
If there are no rules with priority according to the lex speiciali rule, one falls back into general law. Customary law provides a residual basis if there is no specific rule to be adopted for certain situations that avoid a number of loopholes.
C’est une situation objective qui change la donne. Voilà l’exemple type d’un traité dont la structure est différente d’un traité bilateralisable.
Chaque État partie en dehors du violateur ; chaque partie peut déclarer la suspension du traité et uniquement la suspension du traité en tout ou en partie vis-à-vis de toutes les autres parties au traité.
Ce qui change est que tous les États sont spécialement affectés et au fond tous peuvent suspendre le traité. Ce qui change également est qu’on suspend le traité vis-à-vis de tous les autres y compris le violateur.
Comme chaque État peut le faire individuellement, on ne concède pas plus que la suspension.
Deux exceptions sont à mentionner.
Au paragraphe 4 sont les dispositions qui, dans les traités, doivent être appliquées dans les cas de violations ou dans les cas parmi lesquels figure la violation du traité comme, par exemple ,la disposition sur le règlement des différends disant ce qui peut et doit être fait dans le cas d’un litige sur l’application ou l’interprétation de la présente convention. Il est dit que chaque partie peut saisir la Cour de Justice, c’est une clause attrayante à la résolution des différends.
Une partie dit « tu as violé le traité » tandis que l’autre nie ; il serait absurde que dans ce cas on n’applique pas la clause qui saisit la Cour International de Justice disant que cette clause a été suspendue suite à la terminaison du traité.
Il est beaucoup plus logique de dire que les compétences données à l’État pour terminer ou suspendre un traité aient été insérées dans les disposions finales ; donc la clause qui prête la compétence de la Cour Internationale de Justice n’est pas suspend, on applique le paragraphe 4.
Les paragraphes allant de 1 à 3 de l’article 60 sur les conséquences de la violation substantielle d’un traité ne s’appliquent que dans le cas de violations substantielles.
On ne peut suspendre ou terminer par exemple les conventions de Genève sur la protection des personnes en cas de conflit armé ou certain traités de droit de l’Homme, car ce sont des traités protecteurs de tierces personnes. Comme il ne s’agit pas d’avantages bilatéraux des États on ne permet pas qu’il y ait suspension ou terminaison des traités.
Il y a certaines normes où on ne peut se mesurer selon le principe de réciprocité, la réciprocité ne vaut pas dans ces domaines même si c’est un grand principe.
La disposition 62 a trait au changent fondamental de circonstances c’est-à-dire que l'onconclut le traité à un moment donné sur la base de certaines circonstances, faits ou évènements. Après que les traités ont été conclus, on a un changement de circonstances se transformant radicalement, par exemple on conclut un traité économique sur la base d’un échange fondé sur les changes fixes passant à des changes flottants.
Peut-on considérer que le traité est terminé ? C’est une question complexe et discutée, mais jamais, depuis 1969, cette disposions n’a pu être appliquée avec succès.
Cette disposition dit « un changement de circonstances ne peut être invoqué pour terminer un traité » ; les choses changent toujours. Ce principe est que le changement de circonstances ne vaut pas comme motif de terminer un traité, toutefois il y a des exceptions qui sont des conditions cumulatives :
*il faut que les circonstances en cause aient existé au moment de la conclusion du traité et que les parties aient donné leur consentement à être liées par le traité uniquement à l’égard de l’existence de ces circonstances. Des circonstances existent au moment de la ratification d’un traité entre deux États en fonction de circonstance, mais qui changent fondamentalement par la suite ; un déséquilibre s’installe souvent de manière inéquitable.
*il faut que le changement de circonstances n’ait pas été prévu par les parties.


= La coutume =
Customary law may not provide rules, but it has a gap-filling function that is left by the particular law, as it is always residually applicable.
C’est assez spécifique qu’une société, notamment la société internationale, soit régie par le droit coutumier. Nous ne sommes pas accoutumés au droit coutumier, car en droit interne il a un rôle subordonné et marginal.
Il n’en va pas ainsi en droit international où il n’y a pas de législateur et de lois au sens formel sauf les traités, par conséquent il y a un droit qui émerge de la pratique et des précédents c’est-à-dire que les États trouvent des moyens de traiter les choses qui sert plus ou moins tout le monde qui crée un minimum de sécurité juridique amenant peu à peu à l’alignement des États sur la pratique.
Pendant longtemps le droit international a été fondamentalement coutumier, ce n’est que récemment qu’on a une série de conventions multilatérales dignes de ce nom. C’est un phénomène est récent, auparavant le doit commun été du droit coutumier.
Quelques remarques apparaissent utiles :
Premièrement, dans les traités l’essentiel pour les États est d’avoir la sécurité juridique et la stabilité, c’est la raison pour laquelle la violation des traités n’est pas rependue sauf pour les traités de droits de l’Homme. Les violations sont rares, car les États recherchent la sécurité afin de pouvoir tabler sur ce que vont faire les autres.
Dans le droit coutumier, on ne cherche pas vraiment la stabilité, car il bouge beaucoup plus souvent, un droit issu de la pratique bouge régulièrement. On cherche la flexibilité, la société internationale bouge et évolue à une vitesse de plus en plus grande depuis deux ou trois cents ans ; il y a des conditions nouvelles, les conventions sont très difficiles à modifier, si on n’a pas un accord unanime on est à chaque fois devant une montagne.
Les conventions ne garantissent pas la flexibilité, il faut une soupape de sécurité afin que le droit reste près des faits de la société internationale et épouse les contours du réel.
Si on additionne les sources, on a à la fois le pôle de stabilité et le pôle de flexibilité en interaction.
Ensuite, la deuxième remarque est de fournir le droit commun dit aussi droit international général. On a comme droit général pratiquement que du droit coutumier, le droit conventionnel véritablement du droit général.
== Qu’entend-on par « droit général » ? ==
C’est un droit qui s’applique à tous les États indépendamment de tout le reste, c’est dans ce sens ou le droit est général ou commun, un traité ne va jamais s’appliquer à une autre partie que celles qui ont ratifié le traité ; le droit coutumier s‘applique à tous les États du monde, c’est une règle valable pour tous en même temps.
Cela indique la fonction résiduelle de la coutume : lorsqu’on analyse un problème en droit international, la première chose à faire est de vérifier s’il y a des traités applicables ou du droit particulier. Une fois vérifié s’il n’y a pas de droit particulier, de traité applicable, d’acquiescement ou une note diplomatique, ce n’est pas qu’il n’y a pas de droit appliqué, mais on retombe automatique dans le droit international général.
S’il n’y a pas de règles ayant la priorité selon la règle lex speiciali on retombe dans le droit général. Le droit coutumier assure d’un socle résiduel si on ne trouve de règle particulière à adopter en fonction de certaines situations évitant un certain nombre de lacunes.
Le droit coutumier peut ne pas prévoir de règles, mais il a une fonction de comblement de lacune que laisse le droit particulier, car il est toujours résiduellement applicable.


== Qu’est-ce que la coutume ? ==
== What is custom? ==


On utilise toujours pour définir ce concept une équation simple : on dit que le doit coutumier est fait de deux éléments, c’est la « doctrine des deux éléments » :
A simple equation is always used to define this concept: the customary must is said to be made up of two elements, it is the "doctrine of both elements":
*pratique
*pratical
*opinio juris
*opinio juris


 
The custom would be the conjunction of a practice and a juris, i.e. an opinion on the law; both of these elements are cumulative, requiring a practice and a subjective consideration.
La coutume serait la conjonction d’une pratique et d’une opinio juris c’est-à-dire une opinion sur le droit ; l’un et l’autre de ces éléments sont cumulatifs, il faut une pratique et une considération subjective.
   
   
{{Début cadre}}
{{Début cadre}}
      
      
Coutume = pratique + opinio juris
Custom = practice + opinio juris
    
    
{{Fin cadre}}
{{Fin cadre}}
   
   


=== Pratique : élément objectif ===
=== Practice: objective element ===
La pratique de qui ?
Whose practice?
 
La règle générale est de dire que c’est la pratique étatique qui compte, car le droit international coutumier et constitué fondamentalement de la pratique des États, les autres sujets ont une voix bien moindre.
The general rule is that it is state practice that counts, because customary international law is basically the practice of states, the other subjects have a much lesser voice.
 
Dans les États il est accepté aujourd’hui que tous les organes de l’État puissent contribuer à la pratique constituant la coutume. Auparavant on disait parfois que c’était seulement la pratique du chef de l’État et du ministre des Affaires étrangères qui comptait, mais cela est totalement dépassé.
In States it is now accepted that all organs of the State can contribute to customary practice. Previously it was sometimes said that it was only the practice of the Head of State and the Minister of Foreign Affairs that mattered, but it is completely outdated. It is mainly state practice that matters, but it is not the only one, however it is the most important, because the last word always belongs to the states.
C’est surtout la pratique étatique qui compte, mais ce n’est pas la seule, cependant c’est la plus importante, car le dernier mot appartient toujours aux États.
 
In humanitarian matters, the ICRC's practice has a certain weight, but does not bind States; the practice of the United Nations on peacekeeping operations is a fundamental practice for the legal framework of peacekeeping operations; the rules on peacekeeping operations have been formatted in a very significant way by the various secretaries-general of the United Nations. It is the Secretary-General who lays down the rules and therefore the various secretaries of the United Nations have contributed to a practice on peacekeeping operations that has led to a practice accepted by States.
En matière humanitaire la pratique du CICR a un certain poids, mais ne lie pas les États, la pratique des Nations-Unies sur les opérations de maintien de la paix est une pratique fondamentale pour encadrer juridiquement les opérations de maintien de la paix ; les règles sur les opérations de maintien de la paix ont été formatées de manière tout à fait significative par les différents secrétaires généraux des Nations-Unies. C’est le secrétaire général qui édicte les règles et donc les différents secrétaires des Nations-Unies ont contribué à une pratique sur les opérations de maintien de la paix qui ont abouti à une pratique acceptée par les États.
 
   
What is the quality of the practice? What is a practice?
Quelle est la qualité que la pratique doit présenter ? Qu’est-ce qu’une pratique ?
 
This is a question of the intrinsic quality of the acts. It will always be said that the practice consists of three elements:
C’est ici une question de la qualité intrinsèque des actes. On dira toujours que la pratique est constituée de trois éléments :
*constancy
*constance
*uniformity
*uniformité
*generality
*généralité
 
A practice must, in other words, be consistent and uniform and general in order for a rule of customary law to emerge as a general international rule.
 
By practice, we mean either act or omission, a practice can also consist of an act i. e. a "do" or an "omission", i. e. a "nondoctor".
 
There are a whole series of negative customs based on omission.
 
In the law of the sea, the rule that a territorial State in which a foreign ship anchors cannot prosecute crimes on the ship has gradually emerged, this is reserved for the flag State. The territorial State shall refrain from initiating proceedings under its criminal authorities.
 
However, a ship entering a State's port enters the territory and yet States do not prosecute, as they have found that they leave this to the flag State; it is essentially a flag State case that is valid only for crimes not having an impact on the territorial State. It is an omission that has given rise to a customary rule of abstention.
 
The purpose of the rule is an omission and this practice was based on abstention.
 
Second, it is considered that the practice may consist of physical acts or verbal acts; this means that the practice is either physical acts such as the arrest of a vessel claiming jurisdiction to arrest a vessel, but the practice is also verbal, i. e. declarations, for example to the United Nations General Assembly, which is a State practice.
 
A declaration is not only a matter of juris) but also of practice.
 
A final remark relates to the frequency of practice, which requires consistency, uniformity and generality; cases may be different.
 
Cases of diplomatic or state immunity are very common in domestic courts, almost every day a court will recognize immunity to a foreign state. This means that perhaps hundreds of precedents cannot be very numerous, because others may go in a different direction.
 
There are cases where there is very little practice, because the opportunities lack practice; the precedent depends very much on the circumstances being inserted in a principle of relativity.
 
Angaria is traditionally the requisitioning of a foreign ship for public service; the last precedent is a Chilean precedent of 1955.
 
The conditions for practicing angaria are so exceptional that there are perhaps three cases in a century; if in the three cases where the situation arises one does the same then it prevails as a practice.
*'''constancy '''
It is a temporal element, it is the continuity of the practice in time, in fact, almost conceptually one cannot speak of a practice unless something repeats itself in time. A practice implies a succession of relatively similar acts.
 
If time is an indispensable criterion for a practice for conceptual reasons, it must be said that the constant criterion had its moment of glory in the past, whereas now it has failed in much smaller categories.
 
In the 19th century, it was rightly said that a custom was based on a long tradition or prolonged practice with the characteristic of antiquity. Trade between states was very rudimentary.
 
The reality today is that there is no requirement to participate in time; on the contrary, it is said that time can be short for the formation of a custom if the practice is uniform and consistent. We do not want to prevent States as legislators from adopting a practice; everything becomes a question of the quality of the practice if it is sufficiently uniform, followed, frequent; that is enough.
 
The International Court of Justice explained it in 1969 in the 1969 North Sea Continental Shelf cases, which can be found on page 43 of the 1969 Compendium.<ref>RECUEIL DES ARRETS, AVIS CONSULTATIFS ET ORDONNANCES -  [http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/51/5535.pdf AFFAIRES DU PLATEAU CONTINENTAL  DE LA MER DU NORD  (RÉPUBLIQUE FEDERALE D'ALLEMAGNE/DANEMARK); RÉPUBLIQUE FÉDÉRALE D'ALLEMAGNE/PAYS-BAS)] - arrêt du 20 février 1969</ref><ref>Résumés des arrêts, avis consultatifs et ordonnances de la Cour internationale de Justice Document non officiel - [http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/52/5562.pdf AFFAIRES DU PLATEAU CONTINENTAL DE LA MER DU NORD,  Arrêt du 20 février 1969]</ref>.
 
An example of a custom that has grown rapidly because it responded to the interests of States is that of the exclusive economic zone; maritime States have a coastal frontage, inland waters, a territorial sea and a possible continuous zone and an exclusive economic zone that extends to 2,000 coastal sailors.
 
It was officially launched in 1974 by Kenya, in 1985 the International Court of Justice in the case of the continental shelf between Libya and Malta<ref>COUR INTERNATIONALE DE JUSTICE  RECUEIL DES ARRÊTS, AVIS CONSULTATIFS ET ORDONNANCES - [http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/68/6415.pdf AFFAIRE DU PLATEAU CONTINENTAL (JAMAHIRIYA ARABE LIBYENNE/MALTE)] - ARRÊT DU 3 JUIN 1985</ref> explained that the practice was already customary. 1974 is the immediate starting point, probably towards the late 1970s - late 1980s it had become a practice because almost all states had declared an exclusive economic zone.
 
However, consistency is a quite relative element in the formation of custom.
*'''uniformity'''
Substantive criterion or condition, for there to be a practice that could give rise to a customary norm, the relevant acts must be sufficiently similar. In other words, every time a problem has arisen, the same thing has been done; in the area of convergence a rule is potentially established. Whenever there was a problem with a diplomat, there was a recognition of diplomatic immunity because he represents a foreign head of state.
 
If every time the problem has arisen we have done different things, then we do not have a practice, because it assumes a similarity. The International Court of Justice in the 1950 Diplomatic Right of Asylum case granted the Peruvian embassy a fleeing revolutionary; the International Court of Justice held that there was no special custom granted to Latin American countries on embassies.
 
In the 1950 Compendium at page 77, the Court concluded that the Latin American countries had done different things each time to ensure that these acts were sufficiently uniform, the Court spoke of fluctuation, disparity or even political motives.
*'''generality'''
The practice must be general and this makes perfect sense, for it is only if it is general that a standard of general international law can be produced. A general standard applies to all subjects of international law, i.e. all States; for a standard to be binding on all States of the world, a general practice is needed, for it would be tempting if a minority were to practice something, then all States would be bound by what a minority does.
 
"General" does not mean "unanimous "; there is virtually no practice that we can call frankly and completely" unanimous "except in a few rare cases, notably that of immunities.
 
The custom is not an agreement, however, the doctrine explains that the simple majority is not enough either, because we do not see how a simple majority could bind other States, because States are sovereign, they are not supposed to be subject to a majority. It is more or less concluded that a significant majority of States are needed.
 
If we approach the issue from a quantitative point of view, it is unsatisfactory, because it does not reflect reality, what is actually happening in this generality criterion is that a majority of States are practicing something, if a new problem arises and we do not know what to do, then the first ones confronted with this problem imagine practicable, useful, timely solutions, other States follow; So there are a number of States that practice and it is growing. What matters is not to count up to a certain number, but it is the reaction of the other States affected by this practice.
 
These states basically have two possibilities:
#object, because they find that this rule is not good and at this time the customary rule cannot be established because it is not generalized.
#if the other States affected by this growing practice do not object, there is more or less quickly a general practice in the absence of an objection.
 
The objection is the crucial element, it is a negative element, we look at objections. If we have a bloc of States that formulates an objection, there can be no customary rule if beyond a bloc there are dissenting voices in different blocs; then we can say that the customary rule has not been established.
 
The generality of the practice is measured by the States that practise and do not oppose it; the fundamental element is the absence of opposition.
 
It is stated in the books that objection and protest is a crucial element in law because it prevents customary rules from forming that prevent subjective situations from arising, and the State can protest against this fact. The objection to the virtue of preventing a situation from happening including the formation of a customary rule.
 
The International Court has invented the argument of particularly representative States whose adherence to the practice in question would be particularly important. This criterion is sometimes and sometimes not justified.
 
=== Opinio juris: subjective element ===
The element of theopinio juris est subjectif, It is an opinion, a voluntary projection, a representation when practice is a material fact.
 
This subjective element relates to practice, acts and omissions in practice. The essence of l’opinio juris is that the State which practices or fails to do the acts of interest to us considers that it is for legal reasons that it acts as it acts. The State practices and may do so for legal reasons, either because it considers that a legal norm has already been created or if it considers that customary law has not yet been formed; this practice it does or adheres to is a practice it legally recommends, and it is the practice it intends to adopt on the element in question.


Une pratique doit être, en d’autres termes, constante et uniforme et générale pour qu’une règle de droit coutumier en tant que règle internationale générale naisse.
The opinio juris has been justified by a negative function, because there is a whole series of practices in international life that are quite constant, but which are not legal practices, they are mere usages.
Par pratique on entend indifféremment acte ou omission, une pratique peut aussi consister en un acte c’est-à-dire un « faire » qu’à une omission c’est-à-dire un « non-faire ».
Il y a toute une série de coutumes négatives fondées sur une omission.
Dans le droit de la mer il a émergé peu à peu la règle selon laquelle un État territorial dans lequel un navire étranger pose l’ancre ne peut poursuivre les crimes sur le navire, cela est réservé à l’État du pavillon. L’État territorial s’abstient de lancer des poursuites en vertu de ses autorités pénales.
Toutefois un navire qui entre dans le port d’un État entre sur le territoire et pourtant les États ne poursuivent pas, car ils ont estimé qu’ils laissent cela à l‘État du pavillon ; c’est au fond une affaire de l’État du pavillon valant que pour les crimes n’ayant pas de répercussions sur l’État territorial. C’est une omission qui a donné lieu à une règle coutumière d’abstentions.
L’objet de la règle est une omission et cette pratique a été basée sur une abstention.
Ensuite on considère que la pratique peut être constituée d’actes physiques ou d’actes verbaux ; cela veut donc dire que la pratique est soit des actes physiques comme l’arrestation d’un navire faisant valoir un acte de juridiction afin d’arrêter un navire, mais la pratique est aussi verbale c’est-à-dire des déclarations par exemple à l’Assemblée générale des Nations-Unies qui est une pratique des États.
Une déclaration n’est pas uniquement une question d’opinio juris mais aussi de pratique.
Une dernière remarque a trait à la fréquence de la pratique, il faut de la constance, de l’uniformité et de la généralité ; les cas peuvent être différents.
Les cas d’immunité diplomatique ou de l‘État sont des choses très fréquentes dans les tribunaux internes, presque tous les jours un tribunal va reconnaitre l’immunité à un État étranger. Ce qui veut dire que peut être des centaines de précédents ne peuvent être très nombreux, car d’autres peuvent aller dans un autre sens.
Il y a des cas où il y a très peu de pratique, car les occasions manquent de pratiquer ; le précèdent dépend beaucoup des circonstances étant insérées dans un principe de relativité.
L’angarie est traditionnellement le fait de réquisitionner un navire étranger au service public ; le dernier précèdent est un précèdent Chilien de 1955.
Les conditions pour pratiquer l’angarie sont tellement exceptionnelles qu’il y a peut-être trois cas dans un siècle ; si dans les trois cas où la situation se présente on fait la même chose alors cela prévaut comme pratique.


A use is something that is done for non-legal reasons. There is a whole series of acts that are invariably done, but where States are not convinced to act according to the law, but according to political freedom.


*'''constance '''
The opinio juris is a question of opinion non-juris that States leave outside the law.
C’est un élément temporel il s’agit de la continuité de la pratique dans le temps, en effet, presque conceptuellement on ne peut parler d’une pratique sauf si quelque chose se répète dans le temps. Une pratique suppose une succession d’actes relativement similaires.
Si le temps est un critère indispensable à une pratique pour des raisons conceptuelles, il faut dire que le critère de constante avait son heure de gloire dans le passé alors que maintenant il a échoué dans des catégories bien plus modestes.
Au XIXème siècle on disait à juste titre qu’une coutume était basée sur une longue tradition ou une pratique prolongée ayant la caractéristique de la vétusté. Les échanges entre les États étaient fort rudimentaires.
La réalité est celle aujourd’hui qu’on ne demande rien de participer au temps, on dit au contraire que le temps peut être bref pour la formation d’une coutume si la pratique est uniforme et conforme. On ne veut pas empêcher les États en tant que législateur d’adopter une pratique ; tout devient une question de qualité de la pratique si elle est suffisamment uniforme, suivie, fréquente ; cela suffit.
La Cour Internationale de Justice l’a expliquée en 1969 dans les affaires du plateau continental de la mer du nord de 1969 que l’on retrouve à la page 43 du recueil de 1969<ref>RECUEIL DES ARRETS, AVIS CONSULTATIFS ET ORDONNANCES -  [http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/51/5535.pdf AFFAIRES DU PLATEAU CONTINENTAL  DE LA MER DU NORD  (RÉPUBLIQUE FEDERALE D'ALLEMAGNE/DANEMARK);  RÉPUBLIQUE FÉDÉRALE D'ALLEMAGNE/PAYS-BAS)] - arrêt du 20 février 1969</ref><ref>Résumés des arrêts, avis consultatifs et ordonnances de la Cour internationale de Justice Document non officiel - [http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/52/5562.pdf AFFAIRES DU PLATEAU CONTINENTAL DE LA MER DU NORD,  Arrêt du 20 février 1969]</ref>.
Un exemple d’une coutume qui a grandi rapidement parce qu’elle répondait aux intérêts des États est celle de la zone économique exclusive ; les États maritimes ont une façade côtière, des eaux intérieures, une mer territoriale et une éventuelle zone continue et une zone économique exclusive qui s’étend jusqu’à 2000 marins des côtes.
Elle a été officiellement lancée en 1974 par le Kenya, en 1985 la Cour Internationale de Justice dans l’[http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/68/6415.pdf affaire du plateau continental opposant la Libye à Malte]<ref>COUR INTERNATIONALE DE JUSTICE  RECUEIL DES ARRÊTS,  AVIS CONSULTATIFS ET ORDONNANCES - [http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/68/6415.pdf AFFAIRE DU PLATEAU CONTINENTAL (JAMAHIRIYA ARABE LIBYENNE/MALTE)] - ARRÊT DU 3 JUIN 1985</ref> a expliqué que la pratique était déjà coutumière. 1974 est le point de départ immédiat, probablement vers la fin des années 1970 - fin des années 1980 c’était devenu une pratique parce que presque tous les États avaient déclarés une zone économique exclusive.
Toutefois la constance est un élément tout à fait relatif dans la formation de la coutume.


*'''uniformité'''
The International Court of Justice has eloquently recalled in the North Sea continental shelf cases: "not only must the acts in question represent a consistent practice, but they must also testify, by their nature or the manner in which they are carried out, to the conviction that this practice is made compulsory by the existence of a rule of law. The need for such a conviction, i.Perhe. the existence of a subjective element, is implicit in the very notion of opinio juris sive necessitatis. Interested States must therefore feel that they are complying with what amounts to a legal obligation. Neither the frequency nor even the habituality of the acts is sufficient. There are many international acts, in the field of protocol for example, which are almost invariably accomplished, but are motivated by mere considerations of courtesy, expediency or tradition and not by the feeling of a legal obligation ".
Critère ou condition matérielle, pour qu’il y ait une pratique susceptible de donner lieu à une norme coutumière il faut que les actes pertinents relèvent une similitude suffisante. En d‘autres termes à chaque fois qu’un problème s’est posé on a fait la même chose ; dans le domaine de convergence s’établit potentiellement une règle. Chaque fois qu’il y eut un problème avec un diplomate, il y a eu un reconnaisse de l’immunité diplomatique, car il représente un chef d’État étranger.
Si à chaque fois que le problème s’est posé on a fait des choses différentes, alors on n’a pas une pratique, car elle suppose une similarité. La Cour International de Justice dans l’affaire du droit d’asile diplomatique de 1950 octroyé à l’ambassade Pérou un révolutionnaire ayant pris la fuite ; la Cour Internationale de Justice a considéré qu’il n’y avait pas une coutume spéciale octroyée aux pays latino-américains sur les ambassades.
Dans le recueil de 1950 à la page 77, la Cour conclue que les pays latino-américains ont fait des choses à chaque fois différente pour que ces actes aient une uniformité suffisante, la Cour a parlée de fluctuation, de disparité ou en encore de motifs politiques.


*'''généralité'''
In these acts, which are not motivated by a legal consideration, the scope of these acts remains simple usages which are non-binding grounds.
La pratique doit être générale et cela est tout à fait logique, car c’est seulement si elle est générale qu’on peut produire une norme de droit international général. Une norme générale s’applique à tous les sujets de droit international soit tous les États ; pour qu’une norme lie tous les États du monde, il faut une pratique générale, car il serait tentant que si une minorité pratique quelque chose alors l’ensemble des États soient liés par ce que fait une minorité.
« Générale » ne signifie pas « unanime » ; il n’y a pratiquement aucune pratique que nous puissions appeler franchement et complètement « unanime » sauf quelques cas rares notamment celui des immunités.
La coutume n’est pas un accord, toutefois la doctrine explique que la simple majorité ne suffit pas non plus, car on ne voit pas comment une simple majorité pourrait lier les autres États, car les États sont souverains, ils ne sont pas censés être soumis à une majorité. On conclut plus ou moins qu’il faille une majorité significative des États.
Si on approche la question du point de vue quantitatif c’est insatisfaisant, car cela ne reflète pas la réalité, ce qui se passe en réalité dans ce critère de généralité est qu’une majorité d’États pratique quelque chose, si un problème nouveau surgit et qu’on ne sait quoi faire alors les premiers confrontés à ce problème imaginent des solutions praticables, utiles, opportunes, d’autres États suivent ; dès lors il y a un certain nombre d’États qui pratiquent et elle grandit. Ce qui compte n’est pas de compter jusqu’à un certain nombre, mais c’est la réaction des autres États affectés par cette pratique.
Ces États on fondamentalement deux possibilités :
#objecter, car ils trouvent que cette règle n’est pas bonne et à ce moment la règle coutumière ne peut s’établir puisqu’elle n’est pas généralisée.
#si les autres États affectés par cette pratique croissante ne s’y opposent pas, il y a plus ou moins rapidement une pratique générale à défaut d’objection.


L’objection est l’élément capital, c‘est un élément négatif, on regarde les objections. Si on a un bloc d’États qui formule une objection, il ne peut y avoir de règle coutumière si au-delà d’un bloc il y a des voix discordantes dans différents bloques ; alors on peut dire que la règle coutumière ne s’est pas établie.
If a warship is encountered on the high seas there is a salutation ceremony, if a ship does not engage in the ceremony it will simply be considered rude.
La généralité de la pratique se mesure aux États qui pratiquent et qui ne s’y opposent pas, l’élément fondamental est l’absence d’opposition.
On lit dans les livres que l’objection et la protestation est un élément capital en droit, car il empêche les règles coutumières de se former empêchant que des situations subjectives se forment, l’État peut protester contre ce fait. L’objection à la vertu d’empêcher une situation de se passer y compris la formation d’une règle coutumière.
La Cour Internationale a inventé l’argument des États particulièrement représentatifs dont l’adhésion à la pratique en cause serait particulièrement importante. Ce critère est justifié parfois et parfois non.


=== Opinio juris : élément subjectif ===
The opinio juris is above all there to discard the practices that States would do with the conviction that is outside the law.
L’élément de l’opinio juris est subjectif, c’est une opinion, une projection volontaire, une représentation alors que la pratique est un fait matériel.
Cet élément subjectif porte sur la pratique, les actes et les omissions faites dans la pratique. L’essentiel de l’opinio juris est que l’État qui pratique ou qui omet de faire les actes qui nous intéressent considère que c’est pour des raisons juridiques qu’il agit comme il agit. L’État pratique et il peut le faire pour des motifs juridiques soit parce qu’il estime qu’une norme juridique a déjà été créée soit s’il considère que le droit coutumier n’a pas encore été formé ; cette pratique qu’il fait ou à laquelle il adhère est une pratique qu’il recommande du point de vue juridique, c’est la pratique qu’il compte adopter sur l’élément dont il s’agit.
L’opinio juris a été justifiée par une fonction négative, car il y a toute une série de pratiques dans la vie internationale qui sont tout à fait constante, mais qui ne sont pas des pratiques juridiques, ce sont de simples usages.
Un usage est quelque chose que l’on fait pour des raisons non-juridiques. Il y a toute une série d’actes faits invariablement, mais où les États n’ont pas la conviction d’agir en fonction du droit, mais en fonction d’une liberté politique.
L’opinio juris est question d’opinion non-juris que les États laissent en dehors du droit.
La Cour Internationale de Justice a rappelé avec brio dans les affaires du plateau continental de la mer du nord : « non seulement les actes considérés doivent représenter une pratique constante, mais en outre ils doivent témoigner, par leur nature ou la manière dont ils sont accomplis, de la conviction que cette pratique est rendue obligatoire par l’existence d’une règle de droit. La nécessité de pareille conviction, c’est-à-dire l’existence d’un élément subjectif, est implicite dans la notion même d’opinio juris sive necessitatis. Les États intéressés doivent donc avoir le sentiment de se conformer à ce qui équivaut à une obligation juridique. Ni la fréquence ni même le caractère habituel des actes ne suffisent. Il existe nombre d’actes internationaux, dans le domaine du protocole par exemple, qui sont accomplis presque invariablement, mais sont motivés par de simples considérations de courtoisie, d’opportunité ou de tradition et non par le sentiment d’une obligation juridique.»
Dans ces actes non motivés par une considération de droit on reste dans le domaine de simples usages qui sont des motifs non contraignants.
Si on croise un navire de guerre en haute mer il y a un cérémonial de salutation, si un navire ne s’engage pas dans le cérémonial il sera simplement considéré comme malpoli.
L’opinio juris est surtout là pour écarter les pratiques que les États ferraient avec la conviction qui est en dehors du droit.
Il existe des matières en droit international où la coutume est définie plus par l’opinio juris que par la pratique. Il y a des matières où l’opinio juris devient positive devenant le critère principal notamment dans le domaine des droits de l’homme et les domaines humanitaires comme les actes tortures, car il y a trop d’actes de tortures. Si on suit la pratique il n’y aurait pas d’interdiction de torture, on prend cependant les États au mot plutôt qu’aux actes, c’est-à-dire prendre par l’opinio juris.


== Quelle est la relation entre les traités et la coutume ? ==
There are matters in international law where custom is more defined by the opinio juris than by practice. There are materials wherel’opinio juris has become the main criterion, particularly in the field of human rights and humanitarian fields such as torture, since there are too many acts of torture. If we follow the practice, there would be no prohibition of torture, but we take States by word rather than by deeds, that is to say the opinio juris.
Cette relation est multiple est riche. Les traités peuvent soit dans l’ensemble soit selon les normes qu’ils contiennent se positionner par rapport au droit coutumier de trois façons :
*un traité peut-être déclaratif du droit coutumier.
*un traité peut être constitutif d’une norme coutumière.
*un traité peut cristalliser le droit coutumier.


:1. '''traité déclaratif du droit coutumier '''
== What is the relationship between treaties and custom? ==
This relationship is multiple and rich. Treaties can either as a whole, or according to the norms they contain, position themselves in relation to customary law in three ways:
* a treaty may be declarative of customary law.
* a treaty may constitute a customary norm.
* a treaty can crystallize customary law.
:1. '''treaty declaring customary law'''


C’est là l’objet de convention de codification, un traité décrit ce qui existe déjà en droit coutumier. On écrit les coutumes que l’on va codifier, le traité n’invente rien d’essentiel, il retranscrit par écrit le droit coutumier. Très largement, le traité et la coutume sont alignés en tout cas au moment où le traité est adopté ; le traité reflète le droit coutumier, les deux disent la même chose. Toutefois le droit coutumier continu à évoluer au contraire du traité ; le traité à la fonction de déclarer la coutume.
This is the object of a codification agreement, a treaty that describes what already exists in customary law. We write the customs that we will codify, the treaty does not invent anything essential, it transcribes customary law in writing. To a very large extent, the treaty and custom are in any case aligned at the time the treaty is adopted; the treaty reflects customary law, both of which say the same thing. However, customary law continues to evolve in contrast to the treaty; the treaty has the function of declaring custom.


:2. '''traité constitutif'''
:2. '''founding treaty'''


Traité qui innove, il ne codifie pas des règles coutumière existantes, ce sont des règles crées qui vont devenir des règles coutumières. La règle 54 du protocole additionnel premier était une règle constitutive d’une coutume de la convention de Genève.
A treaty that innovates, it does not codify existing customary rules, but rather created rules that will become customary rules. Rule 54 of Additional Protocol I was a customary rule of the Geneva Convention.


[[Fichier:Protocole additionnel aux Conventions de  Genève du 12 août 1949 relatif à la protection des victimes des conflits  armés internationaux (Protocole I) - article 54.png|vignette|center|700px|[http://www.icrc.org/applic/ihl/dih.nsf/Treaty.xsp?documentId=CBEC955A2CE7E0D4C12563140043ACA5&action=openDocument Protocole additionnel aux Conventions de Genève du 12 août 1949 relatif à la protection des victimes des conflits armés internationaux (Protocole I), 8 juin] - [http://www.icrc.org/applic/ihl/dih.nsf/Article.xsp?action=openDocument&documentId=E4883643B99CBC22C12563BD002C2524 article 54]]]
[[Fichier:Protocole additionnel aux Conventions de  Genève du 12 août 1949 relatif à la protection des victimes des conflits  armés internationaux (Protocole I) - article 54.png|vignette|center|700px|[http://www.icrc.org/applic/ihl/dih.nsf/Treaty.xsp?documentId=CBEC955A2CE7E0D4C12563140043ACA5&action=openDocument Protocole additionnel aux Conventions de Genève du 12 août 1949 relatif à la protection des victimes des conflits armés internationaux (Protocole I), 8 juin] - [http://www.icrc.org/applic/ihl/dih.nsf/Article.xsp?action=openDocument&documentId=E4883643B99CBC22C12563BD002C2524 article 54]]]




:3. '''cristallisation d’une coutume par un traité'''  
:3. '''crystallization of a custom by a treaty'''  
 
It's a rarer hypothesis. We have a customary practice that is already relatively well-fed, but there is doubt as to whether the previous practice has already been established as a customary rule.
 
There is a conference at which States meet to discuss the subject of a treaty to which they accede massively. The last step between the practice and its customary character is considered to have been taken at the time of codification of the treaty; the treaty confirms the customary rule.
 
A custom was defined in the convention governing outer space at the time of the launch of Sputnik. At the 1967 Conference, the Convention on Outer Space was adopted and decided that it should become a customary rule.
 
== What is the persistent objector? ==
It is explained to us that sometimes, on the basis of some explicit precedents that a State which has objected to the formation of a new custom, once the customary rule is established and continues to object, it is sometimes said that the new customary norm will not apply to the persistent objector as long as it maintains the objection.
 
One must be careful, because customary rules are dealt with in formation, if one accepts the doctrine of the persistent objector, one can ensure that the custom is not applicable to the objector.
 
A State may not be able to accept a new customary rule because of its constitution, by objecting to the custom it could during the transitional period in order to change the constitution against the application of this custom otherwise it could violate its constitution.
 
For Professor Kolb, there is a great deal of doubt about this rule, as it does not apply for the simple reason that a state is not going to say that it is a persistent objector. It is therefore unclear whether this criterion applies.
 
== New states ==
There are some States that are born at a given moment and wonder whether it is their position on the previous customary rules.
 
What about the previous customary rule?
 
The new State is born in international law as it was at the time of its birth and is therefore bound by all the customary rules it finds at the time of its birth. It is impossible that each time a new State is born, it should be able to question the generality of the customary rule.
 
In the case of decolonization, many States are born with a different ideology, practising differently from the old States, by practicing a opinio juris that will change the custom. If a sufficiently large number of States practice a new rule, then the old custom disappears in favour of a new practice. It is because they are part of the system that they can change the custom.
 
== The regional custom ==
There are also regional customs, i. e. special customs that bind only a few States in the world, but not all of them. The regional term is not necessarily relevant, because States are not necessarily neighbours, they can be from all over the world. The criterion may be neighbourhood, cultural or religious.
 
Regional or particular customs may extend to a custom practised in up to two States; the peculiarity may extend to a minimum.
 
A custom allowed Portugal to join its enclaves, particularly that of Goa in India. The International Court accepted a trilateral custom between France, Spain and Andorra. Since Andorra does not have prisons to imprison long sentences, convicts can be imprisoned in French and Spanish prisons. The Court accepted that a trilateral custom was the legal basis for detention in France.
 
The custom may be reduced to a few States; the particular custom always derogates from the general custom. If the States in question practiced the same thing as the others, then there would be a universal custom, regional custom would appear in the light of the general custom binding only those States which practise expressly only regional practice. However, a State shall not be presumed to have a regional custom, but shall be universal; however, by way of derogation, special custom is only practised between the States concerned.
 
= General principles of law =
The general principles of law are recognized by civilized nations in Article 38 §1 letter c) of the Statute of the International Court of Justice.
 
We distinguish between the general principles of law recognized by civilized nations and the general principles of international law.
 
== General principles of international law ==
They are principles, i. e. rules of great importance and generality that already exist in international law, and they are important rules of international law that are called "principles of international law" such as certain rules such as the principle of non-use of force or the principle of self-determination of peoples, or the principle of consent in the law of treaties, but also the principle of good faith.
 
A whole series of proposals of general importance and therefore referred to as the general principles of international law. With regard to its importance and scope of application of the principle of non-use of force, we can see that this rule has a higher density and a higher importance than other rules, they are points of reference in the legal order.
 
These are international rules of customary law.
 
== General principles of law ==
Article 38 §1 (c) did not simply recall the general principles of international law. By the general principles recognized by civilized nations we wanted to do something else, namely to extend the domain of sources.
 
To understand, we must go back to the 1920s; the writers' fear was that if we applied the main source of Article 38, we might sometimes have no legal answer; moreover, in 1920 there were very few multilateral treaties, we had just had the League of Nations pact.
 
Customary law in 1920?!
 
Perhaps, but, first of all, it is a custom of an ancient culture, it takes time to establish an undisputed custom, there is the element of time, but also a need for convergence in the international community.
 
There is a risk that the legal operator will not find applicable rules. At this point, if we leave it at that, it means that the judge must either reject a flaw or say that he cannot decide in law. States therefore remain free to act as they see fit.
 
The drafters considered it useful to insert another source which is the general principles.
 
In the absence of other rules, the legal operator can, because he is a lawyer, turn to domestic legal systems and see if he can find a common rule within domestic legal systems. We should see whether in the major legal systems there is a common rule, i.e. in each of these legal systems there is a more or less similar rule, which is why it is called a principle rather than a rule.
 
In the main lines of thought, i. e. that everything that goes up converges and that moreover, it can be transposed by analogy into international law, then it can be applied as a general principle of the law recognized by civilized nations.
 
It is a subject in which analogies are drawn from domestic law to fill the gaps in customary law. It is a way of legislating. It is the technique of analogy that makes it a general principle of law.
 
== Case of limitation on discharge ==
This is the time limit after which a claim can no longer be asserted. There was a case between Venezuela and Italy in the Gentini case. There was an arbitration by an Italian-Venezuelan Free Arbitration Commission in which Italy claimed compensation for an Italian national who suffered damage in Venezuela as a result of the Venezuelan State. Italy acts within the framework of diplomatic protection.
 
The problem was that Italy had brought this claim before the arbitral tribunal some 30 years after the facts. The arbitral tribunal considered whether there was a limitation period. There was no arbitration agreement. The arbitration commission turned its attention to domestic legal systems and found everywhere a principle of prescription for discharge, believing that this principle existed in international law and that it should be applied. The applicable time limit was to be the reasonable time. The legal question was whether Italy had justifiable reasons to wait for the International Court to stipulate that the deadline had been exceeded.
 
== Case of indirect evidence ==
Can we prove something indirectly, in other words, in a circumstantial way?
 
Circumstantial evidence is indirect evidence, we cannot prove a fact directly. This was the case in the Corfu Strait case in 1949 before the International Court of Justice. The United Kingdom accuses Albania of knowing that there were mines in Albanian territorial waters without warning the international community.
 
Proving that Albania knew the location of these mines is the legal question. How can we prove that Albania knew knowing that the United Kingdom had no way of knowing directly?
 
Therefore, the United Kingdom could only prove knowledge of Albania by circumstantial evidence, there is a bundle of evidence which tends to prove knowledge of Albania.
 
The question is whether indirect evidence is admitted under international law? Can a State be condemned on the basis of indirect evidence? How do we determine that?


C’est une hypothèse plus rare. Nous avons une pratique coutumière déjà relativement bien nourrie, mais il y a un doute sur le fait de savoir si la pratique antérieure s’est déjà constituée en règle coutumière.
There were no well-established practices, the Court went through general principles of law, questioned whether it could transpose this rule to the international trial and questioned whether it could be transposed.
 
Survient une conférence où les États se rencontrent pour discuter sur la matière adoptant par la suite un traité auquel ils adhèrent massivement. On considère que le dernier pas qui sépare la pratique de son caractère coutumier a été franchi au moment de la codification du traité ; le traité confirme la règle coutumière.
== Penal trials of the 1900s ==
When international criminal law was booming, but not yet sufficiently developed, it became clear what constitutes rape under international law. Rape was nowhere defined and the question arose as to what constituted rape.
Dans la convention régissant l’espace extra-atmosphérique au moment où on a lancé Spoutnik, on a défini une coutume. Lors de la conférence de 1967 a été adopté la Convention sur l’Espace extra-atmosphérique décidant qu’il devienne une règle coutumière.
 
In the tribunal of the former Yugoslavia in 1997, in order to determine how far the norm of rape can be determined, the tribunal ended up in domestic legal systems.
 
It was therefore by turning to domestic legal systems, considering points of convergence and proceeding by analogy that the court was able to escape.
 
= Soft law and the resolutions of international organisations =
 
What is soft law and how does it fit into the source system? What are the qualified acts of soft law?
 
There are a variety of categories, but in particular the following three categories:
 
== Resolution of international organizations when not dealing with binding resolutions ==
The term resolution is a generic term. All the acts adopted by the organs of international organizations are resolutions, some resolutions are binding, others are called decisions, others are not binding, they are recommendations.
 
Political agreements are also soft law, and the reports of certain international bodies are often referred to as soft law.
 
Why is soft law adopted? Why has soft law become ever more important since 1940?
 
First of all the number of States, there is a constantly increasing number of States in the international community; the more States with different ideologies, the more difficult it is to find a common denominator in order to conclude hard law.
 
If States do not commit themselves legally, it is easier to find an agreement between them because they will be less resistant to the necessary concessions.
 
There is great mobility of international issues after 1945.
 
For immediate situations it is easier to achieve soft law standards in the first place because they are easier to adopt and can be easily changed.
 
From a legal point of view, what is the usefulness of these soft law standards?
 
Contrary to what some people believe there is a great hunger for norms in international relations, a whole series of actors are asking for norms, want points of reference and guidelines because the world has become complex, we cannot reinvent the world ourselves every time; we must base ourselves on a model is a practice.
 
Soft law very quickly makes it possible to produce standards, fill gaps and satisfy hunger.
 
== Soft law standards are sometimes useful in the preparation of conventional standards ==
Soft law prepares hard law. In drafting the 1966 Outer Space Convention<ref>[http://www.un.org/fr/documents/view_doc.asp?symbol=A/RES/2222%20(XXI) Traité sur les principes régissant les activités des États en matière d'exploration et d'utilisation de l'espace extra-atmosphérique, y compris la Lune et les autres corps célestes] (19 décembre 1966)</ref>, soft law has been a means to achieve hard law.
 
Soft law is based on democratisation, in treaties only states are entitled to be party to the treaty, they are made by and for states; NGOs can try to get into the game, but their status is unenviable.
 
In the soft law we involve a whole other set of actors, this makes it easier to elaborate norms and standards with all the components of international society. It's something that is valued. In standards of conduct, many things can be proposed and many actors involved.
 
What difficulties did soft law pose?
 
There are a whole series of problems; first of all, we have a tendency to interfere with sources, we no longer know if we are in the soft law or in the hard law, and States have a whole lot of ambiguity studied. Sometimes the absence of real agreements is masked by using soft law instruments rather than disappointing observers that the conference has failed, so a resolution or model of soft law rules is produced, masking the fact that there has been no consensus and that there is a certain status in international law, but not defined.
 
Soft law is sometimes not very credible, because soft law is sometimes non-binding and the problem is that the public does not differentiate between soft law and hard law. There is a tendency to discredit international law.


== Qu’est-ce que l’objecteur persistant ? ==
Soft law does not commit to a concrete attitude and can make one agree to let go, creating ill-considered or even utopian norms, satisfying certain pressures, because it is not serious. We do things that we don't really have the means to implement.
On nous explique que parfois sur quelques précédents explicités qu’un État qui aurait objecté contre la formation d’une coutume nouvelle, une fois que la règle coutumière est établie et qu’il continu à objecter, on dit parfois que la norme coutumière nouvelle ne s’appliquera pas à l’objecteur persistantes tant qu’il maintient l’objection.
Il faut faire attention, car on traite de règles coutumières en formation, si on accepte la doctrine de l’objecteur persistant on peut faire en sorte que la coutume ne soit pas applicable à l’objecteur.
Il se peut qu’un État ne puisse accepter une règle coutumière nouvelle à cause de sa constitution, en objectant à la coutume il pourrait pendant le temps transitoire afin de modifier la constitution se maintenir contre l’application de cette coutume autrement il pourrait violer sa constitution.
Pour le professeur Kolb on a beaucoup de doutes sur cette règle, car elle ne s’applique pour la simple raison qu’un État ne va dire qu’il est un objecteur persistant. Il est donc incertain que ce critère s’applique.


== États nouveaux ==
In legal life, it's a little more pointed.
Il y a des États qui naissent à un moment donné et se pose la question de savoir qu’elle est leur position sur les règles coutumière précédentes.
Quid de la règle coutumière précédente ?
L’État nouveau nait dans le droit international tel qu’il est au moment de sa naissance est par conséquent il est lié par toutes les règles coutumières qu’il trouve au moment de sa naissance. Il est impossible qu’à chaque fois qu’un nouvel État naisse qu’il puisse remettre en cause la généralité de la règle coutumière.
Dans le cas de la décolonisation, beaucoup d’États naissent avec une idéologie différente, en pratiquant différemment des anciens États, en faisant pratiquer une opinio juris différente vont faire infléchir la coutume. Si un suffisamment grand nombre d’États pratique une nouvelle règle alors l’ancienne coutume disparaît au profit d’une nouvelle pratique. C’est parce qu’ils sont parties au système qu’ils peuvent infléchir la coutume.


What are the legal effects of soft law standards?


== La coutume régionale ==
They may have some effects, but it depends on the standard and the specific case.
Il existe aussi des coutumes régionales, c’est-à-dire des coutumes particulières qui ne lient que quelques États du monde, mais pas tous. Le terme régional n’est pas nécessairement pertinent, car les États ne sont pas nécessairement voisins, ils peuvent être de par le monde. Le critère peut être de voisinage, culturel ou encore religieux.
La coutume régionale ou particulière peut aller jusqu'à une coutume pratiquée jusqu’à deux États ; la particularité peut aller jusqu’au minimum.
Une coutume permettait au Portugal de rejoindre ses enclaves et notamment celle de Goa en Inde. La Cour internationale admettait une coutume trilatérale entre la France, l‘Espagne et Andorre. Andorre n’ayant pas de prisons pour emprisonner des peines de longues durées, les condamnés peuvent être emprisonnés dans des prisons françaises et espagnoles. La Cour a admis qu’une coutume trilatérale constituait ici la base légale pour la détention en France.
La coutume peut se réduire à quelques États ; la coutume particulière déroge toujours à la coutume générale. Si les États en cause pratiquaient la même chose que les autres alors on aurait une coutume universelle, la coutume régionale apparait en contrejour de la coutume générale ne liant que les États qui ne pratiquent expressément que la pratique régionale. Toutefois on ne présumera pas un État à une coutume régionale, mais universelle, cependant de manière dérogatoire la coutume particulière ne se pratique qu’entre les États concernés.


= Les principes généraux de droit =
In the context of a non-binding resolution of an international organization that is non-binding, what are its effects?
Les principes généraux de droit sont reconnus par les nations civilisées à l’article 38 §1 lettre c) du statut de la Cour Internationale de Justice.
Nous distinguons les principes généraux de droit reconnu par les nations civilisés des principes généraux du droit international.


== Principes généraux du droit international ==
First of all it can give rise to an agreement, at this point the recommendation of the soft law becomes hard law; for example, a resolution can be accepted by States or certain States which at that time grants it binding force through the agreement concluded.
Ce sont des principes, c’est-à-dire des règles d’une grande importance et de grandes généralités qui existent déjà originellement en droit international, ce sont des règles importantes de droit international qu’on appelle les « principes du droit international » comme certaines règles dont le principe de non-recours à la force ou du principe d’autodétermination des peuples ou encore le principe de consentement dans le droit des traités, mais aussi le principe de la bonne foi.
Toute une série de propositions d’une importance générale et qu’on appelle pour cette raison les principes généraux du droit international. Vis-à-vis de son importance et de son champ d’application du principe du non-recours à la force, on voit que cette règle à une densité et une importance supérieure en comparaison à d’autres règles, ce sont des points de repère de l’ordre juridique.
Ce sont des règles internationales qui relèvent du droit coutumier.
== Principes généraux de droit ==
Dans l’article 38 §1 c) on n’a pas voulu rappeler simplement les principes généraux du droit international. Par les principes généraux reconnus par les nations civilisées on a voulu faire autre chose à savoir étendre le domaine des sources.
Pour comprendre, il faut revenir dans les années 1920 ; la peur des rédacteurs était que si on appliquait la source principale de l’article 38 on risquait parfois de ne pas avoir de réponse juridique, d’ailleurs en 1920 il y avait très peu de traités multilatéraux, on venait d’avoir le pacte de la Société des Nations.
Droit coutumier en 1920 ?!
Peut-être, mais tout d’abord c’est une coutume d’une ancienne culture, cela prend du temps pour que s’établisse une coutume incontestée, il y a l’élément de temps, mais aussi une nécessité de convergence dans la communauté internationale.
On risque d’avoir le cas où l’opérateur juridique ne va pas trouver de règles applicables. À ce moment, si on en reste là, cela signifie que le juge doit soit rejeter une lacune soit dire qu’il ne peut décider en droit. Dès lors les États restent libres d’agir comme bon leur semble.
Les rédacteurs ont estimé utile d’insérer une autre source qui est les principes généraux.
En l’absence d’autres règles, l’opérateur juridique peut parce qu’il est juriste se retourner vers les ordres juridiques internes et regarder s’il ne trouve pas une règle commune à l’intérieur des systèmes juridiques internes. Il faudrait voir si dans les grands systèmes juridiques on trouve une règle commune c’est-à-dire que dans chacun de ces ordres juridiques on a une règle plus ou moins similaire, c’est pourquoi on appelle cela un principe plutôt qu’une règle.
Dans les lignes principales c’est-à-dire que tout ce qui monte converge et qu’en plus elle se prête à être transposée par analogie en droit international alors on peut l’appliquer en tant que principe général du droit reconnu par les nations civilisées.
C’est une matière ou on fait des analogies tirées à partir du droit interne pour combler les lacunes du droit coutumier. C’est une manière de légiférer. C’est la technique de l’analogie qui fait que c’est un principe général de droit.


== Cas de la prescription libératoire ==
By virtue of an agreement concluded by four powers claiming to respect the conditions of their agreement, it becomes binding.
C’est le délai après lequel on ne peut plus faire valoir de réclamation. Il y eut un cas entre le Venezuela et l’Italie dans l’affaire Gentini. Il y eut un arbitrage d’une commission libre arbitrale italo-vénézuélienne dans laquelle l‘Italie réclamait une réparation pour un ressortissant italien qui a subi un dommage au Venezuela du fait de l’État vénézuélien. L’Italie agit dans le cadre de la protection diplomatique.
Le problème était que l’Italie avait porté cette réclamation devant le tribunal arbitral une trentaine d’années après les faits. Le tribunal arbitral s’est demandé s’il y avait prescription. Il n’y avait pas de convention arbitrale en la matière. La commission arbitrale s‘est retournée vers les ordres juridiques internes et a trouvé partout un principe de prescription libératoire estimant que ce principe existait en droit international et qu’il devait être appliqué. Le délai applicable devait être le délai raisonnable. La question juridique était de savoir si l’Italie avait des raisons justifiables d’attendre tout ce temps la Cour Internationale stipulant que le délai avait été dépassé.
== Cas de la preuve indirect ==
Pouvons-nous prouver quelque chose de manière indirecte autrement dit de manier circonstancielle ?
La preuve circonstancielle est une preuve indirecte, on n’arrive pas à prouver un fait directement. C’était le cas dans l’affaire du détroit de Corfou en 1949 devant la Cour Internationale de Justice. Le Royaume-Uni accuse l’Albanie de savoir que des mines se trouvaient dans les eaux territoriales albanaises sans en avertir la communauté internationale.
Prouver que l’Albanie connaissait l’emplacement de ces mines est la question juridique. Comment prouver que l’Albanie savait sachant le Royaume-Uni n’avait aucun moyen de le savoir directement ?
Dès lors, le Royaume-Uni ne pouvait prouver la connaissance de l’Albanie que par des preuves circonstancielles, il y a un faisceau de preuves qui tendent à prouver la connaissance de l’Albanie.
La question est de savoir si la preuve indirecte est admise en droit international ? Peut-on condamner un État à partir d’une preuve indirecte ? Comment déterminer la chose ?
Il n’y avait pas de pratiques biens établis, la Cour est passée par des principes généraux de droit, elle s’est interrogée en plus de savoir s’il elle pouvait transposer cette règle au procès international.


== Procès pénaux des années 1900 ==
There may be recommendations that influence customary law, i. e., soft law influences the development of customary law. The resolution of the United Nations General Assembly on Outer Space 1962 of the year 1963<ref>[http://www.un.org/fr/documents/view_doc.asp?symbol=A/RES/1962%20(XVIII) Déclaration des principes juridiques régissant les activités des États en matière d'exploration et d'utilisation de l'espace extra-atmosphérique] (13 décembre 1963)</ref> was an important landmark on the road to the customary rules of outer space, but it was a General Assembly resolution. Sometimes the soft law is used more precisely to determine the juris.
Lorsque le droit pénal international était en plein essor, mais pas encore suffisamment développé s’est constitué de savoir ce qu’était un viol en droit international. Le viol n’était défini nulle part et la question se posait de savoir de quoi se constituait un viol.
Dans le tribunal de l’ex-Yougoslavie en 1997, afin de déterminer jusqu’où on peut déterminer la norme du viol le tribunal s’est retrouvé vers les ordres juridiques internes.
C’est donc en se retournant vers les ordres juridiques internes, en considérant des points de convergences et en procédant par analogie que le tribunal a pu s’en sortir.


= Le « soft law » et les résolutions d’organisations internationales =
== Soft law can be used to interpret hard law ==
There may be doubts about the interpretation of a conventional standard, so soft law may be considered.


Qu’est-ce que le soft law et comment s’insère-t-il dans le système des sources ? Quels sont les actes qualifiés de soft law ?
It is possible to have the national legislator who uses the soft law as a model to adopt internal standards, or to legislate. The Federal Council has done this very often since the asylum problem came up in the Federal Council. The Federal Council has taken the soft law into account when calibrating the law.
Il y a toute une série de catégories, mais notamment les trois catégories suivantes :
== Résolution d’organisations internationales quand il ne s’agit pas de résolutions contraignantes ==
Le terme de résolution est un terme générique. Tous les actes qu’adoptent les organes des organisations internationales sont des résolutions, certaines résolutions sont contraignantes on les appelle des décisions d’autre ne sont pas contraignantes ce sont des recommandations.
Les accords politiques sont également du soft law, on qualifie aussi volontiers de soft law les rapports de certains organes internationaux.
Pour quelles raisons adopte-t-on du soft law ? Pour quelles raisons le soft law a-t-il toujours plus d’importance depuis 1940 ?
Tout d’abord le nombre d’États, il y a un nombre d’États constamment croissant dans la communauté internationale; plus on a d’États aux idéologies différentes plus il est difficile de trouver un dénominateur commun afin de conclure du hard law.
Si les États ne s’engagent pas juridiquement on peut plus facilement trouver une entente entre eux, car ils vont moins résister aux concessions nécessaires.
Il y a une grande mobilité des questions internationales après 1945.
Pour les situations immédiates il est plus facile d’aboutir en premier lieu à des normes de soft law car elles sont plus faciles à faire adopter et aisément changeables.


Soft law can have a permissive effect: when there is a resolution recommending a certain conduct, taken under the constituent instrument, it allows all Member States to adopt the recommended attitude and if they do so they are not at risk of putting their international responsibility for an unlawful act into play, because the State has the right to follow the recommendation and the other Member State must be given the possibility to act.


Du point de vue juridique, quelle est l’utilité de ces normes de soft law ?
There are sometimes related to the soft law obligations to take account of information. In Article 19 §6 of the Constitution of the International Labour Organisation<ref>[http://www.ilo.org/dyn/normlex/fr/f?p=1000:62:0::NO:62:P62_LIST_ENTRIE_ID:2453907:NO Constitution de l'OIT] - [http://www.ilo.org/dyn/normlex/fr/f?p=1000:62:0::NO:62:P62_LIST_ENTRIE_ID:2453907:NO#A19 Article 19.6]</ref>, there is a rule that member States of the organization must take into account the recommendations of the Labour Conference by submitting them to national bodies and informing the International Labour Organization of the follow-up. On the recommendation of procedural obligations, this is a case of soft law, to which are added aspects of hard law under the paragraph cited. Very often soft law works much better than hard law.
Contrairement à ce que croient certains il y a une grande faim de normes dans les relations internationales, toute une série d’acteurs demande des normes, veulent des points de repères, d’orientations parce que le monde est devenu complexe, on ne peut à chaque fois réinventer le monde soi-même ; il faut se fonder sur un modèle est une pratique.
Le soft law permet très vite de produire des normes, de remplir des lacunes et d’assouvir ses faims.
== Les normes de soft law sont parfois utiles dans la préparation de normes conventionnelles ==
Le soft law prépare le hard law. Dans la rédaction de la convention sur l’espace extra-atmosphérique de 1966<ref>[http://www.un.org/fr/documents/view_doc.asp?symbol=A/RES/2222%20(XXI) Traité sur les principes régissant les activités des États en matière d'exploration et d'utilisation de l'espace extra-atmosphérique, y compris la Lune et les autres corps célestes] (19 décembre 1966)</ref> le soft law a été un moyen de parvenir à du hard law.
Le soft law est basé sur une démocratisation, dans les traités seuls les États sont habilités à être partie au traité, ils sont fait par et pour les États ; les ONG peuvent essayer de rentrer dans le jeu, mais leur statut est peu enviable.
Dans le soft law on fait participer toute une autre série d’acteurs, cela permet d’élaborer des normes plus facilement et standards avec toutes les composantes de la société internationale. C’est quelque chose qui est prisé. Dans des normes de conduite on peut proposer beaucoup de choses et engager nombreux acteurs.
Quelles sont les difficultés que le soft law n’a pas manqué de susciter ?
Il y a toute une série de problèmes ; tout d’abord on a une tendance au brouillage des sources, on ne sait plus si on est dans le soft law ou dans le hard law, les États entretiennent toute une ambiguïté étudiée. Parfois on masque l’absence d’accords réelle en recourant à des instruments de soft law plutôt que de décevoir les observateurs que la conférence a échoués alors on produit une résolution ou un modèle de règles non contraignantes masquant le fait qu’il n’y a pas eu de consensus et qu’il y a un certain statut en droit international, mais pas défini.
Le soft law est parfois peu crédible, car le soft law est parfois non-contraignant et le problème étant que le public ne fait aucune différenciation entre du soft law et du hard law. On tend à jeter un certain discrédit au droit international.
Le soft law n’engage pas à une attitude concrète et peut faire que l'onconsent à se laisser aller créant des normes mal réfléchies, voire utopiques, satisfaisant certaines pressions, car ce n’est pas grave. On fait des choses qu’on n’a pas vraiment les moyens de mettre en œuvre.
Dans la vie juridique, c’est un peu plus pointu.
Quels effets les normes de soft law peuvent avoir en droit ?
Elles peuvent avoir certains effets, mais cela dépend de la norme et du cas concret.
Dans le cadre d’une résolution non-contraignante d’une organisation internationale qui est non-contraignante quels sont ses effets ?
Tout d’abord elle peut donner lieu à un accord, à ce moment la recommandation du soft law devient du hard law ; par exemple une résolution peut être acceptée par les États ou certains États qui à ce moment lui accorde une force contraignant à travers l’accord conclu.
Par le fait d’un accord conclu par quatre puissances se réclamant de respecter les conditions de leur accord, dès lors il devient contraignant.
Il peut y avoir des recommandations qui influent sur le droit coutumier c’est-à-dire que le soft law influe sur le développement du droit coutumier. La résolution de l’Assemblée générale des Nations-Unies sur l’espace extra-atmosphérique de 1962 de l’année de 1963<ref>[http://www.un.org/fr/documents/view_doc.asp?symbol=A/RES/1962%20(XVIII) Déclaration des principes juridiques régissant les activités des États en matière d'exploration et d'utilisation de l'espace extra-atmosphérique] (13 décembre 1963)</ref> a été une borne importante sur le chemin des règles coutumières de l’espace extra-atmosphérique, or c’était une résolution de l’Assemblée générale. Parfois le soft law sert plus précisément à la détermination de l’opinio juris.


== On peut utiliser le soft law pour interpréter du hard law ==
Il se peut qu’on ait des doutes sur l’interprétation d’une norme conventionnelle alors on peut prendre en considération du soft law.
Il possible d’avoir le législateur national qui s’inspire du soft law pour adopter des normes internes, soit pour légiférer. C’est ce qu’a fait très souvent le Conseil fédéral depuis qu’il se débat avec le problème de l’asile. Le Conseil fédéral a tenu compte du soft law pour calibrer la loi.
Le soft law peut avoir un effet permissif : lorsqu’on a une résolution qui recommande une certaine conduite, prise en vertu de l’instrument constitutif, cela permet à tous les États membres d’adopter l’attitude recommandée et s’ils le font ils ne risquent pas de mettre en jeu leur responsabilité internationale pour un fait illicite, car l’État a le droit de suivre la recommandation et l’autre État membre doit subir la faculté d’agir.
Il y a parfois lié à du soft law des obligations de prise en compte d’informations. Dans l’article 19 §6 de la constitution de l’Organisation internationale du Travail<ref>[http://www.ilo.org/dyn/normlex/fr/f?p=1000:62:0::NO:62:P62_LIST_ENTRIE_ID:2453907:NO Constitution de l'OIT] - [http://www.ilo.org/dyn/normlex/fr/f?p=1000:62:0::NO:62:P62_LIST_ENTRIE_ID:2453907:NO#A19 Article 19.6]</ref>, il y a la règle selon laquelle les États membres de l’organisation doivent prendre en compte les recommandations de la Conférence du Travail en les soumettant aux organes nationaux et en informant l’Organisation internationale du Travail du suivit. Sur la recommandation se greffent des obligations de procédures, c’est un cas de soft law où se greffent des aspects de hard law en vertu du paragraphe cité. Très souvent le soft law fonctionne beaucoup mieux que le hard law.


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'''Constitution de l’Organisation  internationale du Travail'''
'''Constitution de l’Organisation  internationale du Travail'''

Version actuelle datée du 13 février 2018 à 01:07

Sources of International Law
Professeur(s) Robert Kolb
Cours International Public Law

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The typology of sources of international law[modifier | modifier le wikicode]

Statut de la Cour Internationale de Justice - Article 38

A source of law is an old term used from the reworking of Roman law in the Middle Ages. These are the places where the applicable law for its passive component can be found. The right can be found in the sources of the law, such as the various codes where one can find the right. While the active component says that the sources are the mechanisms of legal production, there are ways through which the law is produced, so the legislation of the state through the parliament and all its procedures make the process by which the law is done is also a source of law.

What are the sources of international law?[modifier | modifier le wikicode]

Let us think about the fact that in international law there are no higher authorities, because each State is sovereign, allowing us to reach the conclusion that the sources of international law are covered by agreement and custom. Both sources are based on the fact that the subjects of law cooperate to make the rule of law binding on them.

  • Agreement

An agreement is the most compatible with sovereignty because it is a reciprocal manifestation of a willingness to be bound to benefit from its rules. It is an exercise of sovereignty to decide to submit to a treaty.

  • The custom

Making an agreement is an act of practice, but beyond that, it is possible to practice other things on a regular basis because they are considered useful and must be enforced in law. For a long time, States have recognized jurisdictional immunity before the courts, i. e., an individual cannot cite the acts of one State before the acts of another State.  Customary law is also something that can be practiced in a parity society, because each one practices and then there is convergence that can be summed up as a rule of law.

Legislation presupposes a superior who can enact a law at a lower level, in international law no one has legislative power, no one can compel States to comply with it.  International law is a science that thinks its own violation.

The main sources[modifier | modifier le wikicode]

They make it possible to function within the framework of sovereign states that are not subject to a senior executive. The regulation is found in Article 38 of the Statute of the International Court of Justice, which is the oldest jurisdiction for the settlement of interstate disputes. This court, which has been in existence since 1921, can and must deal with disputes under international law. In 1945, it was considered useful to explicitly state international law and list its sources.

  1. Agreements / Treaties;
  2. The general customary law, which is therefore universal and binding on all States;
  3. The general principles of law recognized by "civilized nations".

These sources are the main ones, as they can be directly applied to a particular case to give it a legal solution.

A State asks for a legal opinion: it is necessary to deal with a legal issue such as delimiting the continental shelf between the DRC and Angola. It is possible to rely directly on a treaty, as it is a source of law applicable between the two States, but also on customary law by referring to the general practice of delimitation. On the other hand, if doctrine and jurisprudence are used as auxiliary means, the fact that they are auxiliary sources means that one cannot rely directly on doctrine or jurisprudence to base a legal solution.

Auxiliary means[modifier | modifier le wikicode]

States are the "legislators", the doctrine is not lawful, but it can be useful, because those who have written fundamental books have examined the practice and provide practical tools for interpreting applicable rules. The same is true of jurisprudence, contrary to common law, the foregoing, in international law, does not do justice. It is not possible to rely on jurisprudence or arbitral awards, it is possible to consult the arbitration, because the lawyer of the time will have set out legal rules, but an arbitrator only allows the dispute between the two States that have referred it to him. It is only if we are convinced and if this has not changed since the time of arbitration that we can apply a jurisprudence.

It is clear that the applicable sentence of the time based on a treaty that is not applicable now cannot be applied. Doctrine and jurisprudence are consulted only in the sense that they can contribute something.

If the parties to the proceedings agree, the court may also judge in fairness. This means that in some cases the court may judge by not applying international law, but fairness, i.e. what the sense of justice suggests to it in an individual case. For a court of justice or any operator, the power to decide or propose things in fairness cannot be abrogated.

Fairness means a change in the rule of law. This is only possible if the parties agree to do so. The Court has been allowed to play an additional role when the strict application of the law is not considered by the parties to be appropriate for resolving their disputes.

It is not said that Article 38 must necessarily be exhaustive. We must distinguish between limiting and illustrative provisions. Actually, it's illustrative except that at the same time it's a little bit exhaustive/limitative, because all the important gears are mentioned and you can't invoke others. This is not exhaustive in the sense that there cannot be other specific sources.

Other sources[modifier | modifier le wikicode]

Broadly speaking, Article 38 is exhaustive, but in detail it is not. Other sources are less important, however. The special custom is not mentioned, Article 38 (b) contains a general provision, but there are regional customs not covered by the status that do exist. For example, the International Court of Justice has recognized that there are rights and duties between India and Portugal to run along the coast to the Portuguese enclaves.

Secondary sources are also not indicated. If a treaty establishes the power of a certain body to impose binding conditions on states, such as the UN Security Council's case of the UN Charter of the United Nations, what is here is a particular source of law, it is a source of law, because it contains legally binding and enforceable standards.

Charte des Nations Unies - Chapitre VII : Action en cas de menace contre la paix, de rupture de la paix et d'acte d'agression - articles 41 et 42

These are derived standards adopted under the Charter of the United Nations, it is treaty law, secondary law also known as "derived". A particular standard can only be dealt with in a specific case that will apply and sanction in a particular case. This is a relatively common phenomenon, but not contemplated, as it falls within the framework of treaty law.

In conclusion, there are some minor, derived, and sometimes non-core sources that have not been conducted in Article 38, making the type of provision non-exhaustive in a sense. Reference may be made to Article 38 of the ICJ Statute for an overview of these sources.

The question of the hierarchy between sources[modifier | modifier le wikicode]

There could be a lot of talk about it. The question of hierarchy is whether we have superiority and inferiority in the sources of international law. The answer is no, it is fairly easy to understand why it is negative.

The hierarchy of sources is fundamentally a matter of democratic legitimacy. The constituent with the greatest democratic legitimacy either because the combined chambers vote or the people have to vote; the ordinary right is already less, etc.. It is understandable that in this type of state organization, it reflects an order.

It is the States that legislate and always they do. The treaty is an act of ratification stemming from reciprocal wishes. There is no reason to give the will of one State greater weight than another, all States are on an equal footing, all sources are coordinated and have the same degree of prominence.

A collision problem cannot be solved based on a hierarchy of sources that do not exist. For example, if the article of a convention X and contrary to a customary rule Y, one cannot invoke the argument of the hierarchy of sources, each is at the same level as the others.

How do we resolve a conflict between norms?[modifier | modifier le wikicode]

In the above example, the collision is between two norms: between an article and a customary rule. We therefore have here a collision between two standards and not between two sources, it is not at the content level, it is Article X against Rule Y. Article X is a conventional norm and rule Y is a customary norm, i. e. an injunction or organizational rule. It is on this level that the collision between two standards will have to be resolved through the rules on the collision of standards.

There are essentially two:

  • rule LEX SPECIALIS : the most special law derogates from the more general rule,"lex specialis derogat legis generalis". This means that the most special rule takes precedence over the general rule. It is quite logical, because it is quite intelligent to think that States wanted the most detailed rule to take precedence, because they have considered the function of this more specific rule. For example, universal investment standards serve as an illustration: if two States decide on a bilateral convention, it makes perfect sense to say that between the two States that have concluded the convention, it has priority over the more general rules. Both states have adopted the treaty because they do not agree with the general rules.
  • rule LEX POSTERIOR : « lex posterior derogat legi priori »,the later law derogates from the earlier law. The rule makes perfect sense, because if we have a multilaterally concluded 1958 law of the sea treaty and another one in 1982, and now we have States that are party to the 1958 Convention and at the same time to the 1982 Convention. The posteriority rule, because the most recent rule was intended to normalize a more recent situation. If these States have concluded only the 1958 Treaty, only this rule will apply until both States are parties to the 1982 Convention

Knowing when two rules are in conflict and what rules to apply[modifier | modifier le wikicode]

It is a question of substance and interpretation; we must interpret the standards and see if there is a conflict between them. The presumption rule is that there are no conflicts between the standards. If the problem with interpretation cannot be solved at this time, there is a conflict. The application of the rule depends on the case at hand, as both rules may draw in the same direction. There may be a case where they draw in different directions where the oldest rule is the most special rule and the newest general rule. There are maxims in the maxims to try to harmonize.

It's a complicated question, because there is nothing mechanical, it's a question of interpretation and conventions that requires the lawyer's support to solve the problem.

  • First, we have a hierarchy that even exists at the source level within international organizations.

It would already be necessary to show that domestic law was in line with public international law. The domestic law of international organizations is international law. On the formal aspect, the law of international organizations derives from an international treaty; the law deriving from a treaty must be of the same nature as a treaty that carries it.

In international organizations, there is a hierarchy of sources, as there is exactly within states. In States, there is the constituent and the legislature that are not placed on an equal footing, but placed hierarchically in a subordinate relationship, so the constitution is higher than simple legislation.

In international organizations, the founding treaty is the founding treaty, all decisions taken must be in conformity with the founding treaty. States adopting resolutions must do so in accordance with the constituent treaty, otherwise it is a null resolution.

Internally, it is the secretariat with the Secretary General that refers to the executive of the organization. It also adopts rules such as, for example, the Staff Regulations. These rules are inferior to the constitutional treaty, but also to the texts adopted by the General Assembly. If the meeting orders the secretary to issue a rule, he or she is bound to carry out what the senior complainant body says.

Thus there is an organization as in domestic law, the constitution, the texts adopted in the general assembly and then the texts adopted by the secretariat which incarnates the executive. The hierarchy, however, is not similar to domestic law because it is stricter, in domestic law the constitution does not simply override ordinary law. There are, if necessary, procedures for invalidating the law if you have a constitutional court, as is the case, for example, in Germany. Legislation passed by parliament in Switzerland may be unconstitutional, but it is not repealed and remains in force. Municipal law may sometimes prevail over cantonal law.

There is a hierarchy between the various texts, which sometimes translates into a strict hierarchy, sometimes it is an indicative hierarchy as in some internal legal systems where there is no sanction mechanism.

  • Second, the doctrine perceives another hierarchy that refers to the phenomenon of normative hierarchy.

In Article 103 of the Charter of the United Nations, this provision reads as follows:"In the event of a conflict between the obligations of the Members of the United Nations under this Charter and their obligations under any other international agreement, the former shall prevail". This provision, if we take its text, indicates that for members of the United Nations, when they have obligations under the Charter, for example to implement Security Council sanctions, and they come into conflict with a treaty other than the Charter, such as a trade treaty; then the former will prevail.

Charter obligations are superior to other treaties. The provisions of the Charter are superior to the provisions of the other agreement which contains lower obligations. However, it is a conflict rule, but not a priority rule exactly like lex speciali or lex posterior.

There is something like a desire for hierarchy, the obligations of the Charter are considered to be higher than those contained in other treaties. The aim in 1945 was to protect, above all, the functions of the United Nations in peacekeeping and the Security Council.

The Security Council enacts sanctions against State B because it believes that it threatens peace and calls on UN members to implement sanctions. Without Article 103, the trade treaty would be applied because it would be the lex speciali and the superior rule.

There have been no real hierarchies in international law because states are always equal to themselves and when they legislate there is no reason to privilege a piece of legislation. Conflicts must be resolved on a case-by-case basis in accordance with interpretative principles.

The Treaties[modifier | modifier le wikicode]

Treaties are a very important area of international law, because we work in a subject with fundamentally written texts, it is like the law for domestic law. For customary law it requires specialists, because it is unwritten law.

There are a whole series of advantages of agreements over custom, but we will mention two. The benefits of custom are exactly the opposite of those of treaties.

First and foremost, the advantage is legal certainty. Foreign policy will fluctuate according to the circumstances and interests involved. Foreign policy is an area in which the positions of states are constantly changing. However, there are issues that need to be laid down by rules that provide some legal certainty for the future, for example with regard to investments. If a State wishes to attract investors, it is interested in providing them with a framework that does not depend on domestic law, which can be changed at any time. By adopting treaties that cannot be unilaterally amended, legal certainty is created. It may also be to delimit a territory between what is a State A and a State B. We can go further, in the case of immunities, States have a certain interest in knowing that they cannot be brought before a court, as this would cause them considerable harm. There are old rules on immunity that have now been codified. So there is a collective interest in having some security against attacks from all sides that could be subordinate to one court of another.

All these subjects require a certain legal regulation in order to be sufficiently sure that they must be written.

The Treaties alone allow for a detailed regime. Customary law is a good way to determine the main lines of action. If we want to create a specific regime or an international organization with special functions, we cannot do this on the basis of customary law, we can only do it on the basis of the law of treaties. If we want to do humanitarian law, the rules must be codified to apply them, because the military are not lawyers. Codification of the Treaties is necessary. As, therefore, international society has become increasingly important and States wish to have legal certainty for a certain period of time, and since international society is becoming increasingly complex and requires increasingly specific regimes, this explains why treaties have taken an increasingly important place.

Today we do not know exactly how many treaties have been concluded. For treaties registered with the League of Nations or the United Nations, the figure is about 60,000. The United Nations Treaty Section estimates that there are approximately 40,000 unregistered treaties. So there would be about 100,000 treaties in force around the world. Many are technical points, protocols added with technical vocabulary. There are only a few hundred treaties that are really important for international political life.

This is not an insignificant figure and it is not easy to manage this number of treaties at the universal level. Especially since there are 5 official languages in the United Nations.

Definition[modifier | modifier le wikicode]

We have somewhat varied terminology for international agreements. This terminology is relevant, on the one hand, because each word has its own meaning, but, on the other hand, it does not have its own meaning, because each legal regime is not identical.

We have different words: agreement, treaty, convention, covenant, pact, protocol, concordat or even minutes. On the one hand, these differences in terminology do not have any legal effects because all these different texts mentioned are all agreements and it is the same law of treaties and international agreements that applies to them. Thus terminology is not necessarily relevant. Each of these agreements is applicable independently of the name. What is important is to verify that it is an agreement within the meaning of international law.

However, we would have every right to wonder if the same legal regime applies. If we have different terminologies it is because the different words make each of these words have their own meaning[1] :

  • Agreement: to cover any treaty text or even what is not a text if they are verbal.
  • Treaty: used for written texts in the proper sense of the word, what is oral is an agreement.
  • Convention: used for multilateral treaties; a multilateral convention is a contradiction. A convention is an open treaty because it is multilateral.
  • Covenant: written treaty, but the term pact is intended to emphasize the particular importance attached to the text. These are fundamental texts adopted with increased solemnity, such as the Covenant of the League of Nations.
  • Protocol: it is a treaty, but by that we mean a treaty attached to an earlier treaty that modifies the earlier treaty on certain points. In IHL, it is said that the two additional protocols to the 1949 Geneva Convention are complementary to the Geneva Convention, which it amends in some respects and supplements in others.

Concordat: normally reserved for the agreements of the Holy See by historical tradition.

  • Procès-verbal: sign the origin of the agreement, this means that there were discussions and that a record was drawn up. It shows the origin of the agreement, basically, these are summaries of a negotiation signed and therefore enhanced in an agreement.

In law, every word counts and nothing is interchangeable or almost interchangeable.

The legal regime, on the other hand, is the same, but there are slight distinctions. The vocabulary does not provide differences in treatment, but indicates the nuances in the type of text.

There are four building blocks, four "check points" to see if a given text constitutes an agreement in the sense of international law; these four elements are cumulative, meaning that the existence of the four must be verified. If one of them is lacking, we are faced with a text that may be of a treaty nature, but it is not an agreement within the meaning of public international law:

  1. There must be concordant wishes: an agreement is always based on a convergence agreement between the various parties. The subjects, in principle, must agree on something, there must be a minimum of common denominators. If, on the other hand, agreement cannot be reached on any point because the differences continue to the end, then we are dealing with dissent. This point is self-evident, but it should not be forgotten, particularly with regard to oral agreements, and it is exactly the same in domestic law.
  2. The conclusion of an agreement on international law requires a subject of international law: an authority vested with the legal personality of international law. It is quite natural that the agreements of a given legal order should be concluded by subjects of that legal order. The subjects of international law are an area that has already been addressed; it is States, but especially others that can conclude international agreements under public international law. The only subject of international law so limited in its powers that it cannot conclude treaties is the individual we are. The individual may enjoy certain rights under international law. It may also be subject to certain obligations. However, the individual can only exercise his or her human rights, which are engraved as much as the criminal obligations imposed on him or her, he or she is not a political subject with autonomy of action and cannot therefore conclude international agreements. When companies or individuals enter into a concession contract with a concession State, an investor enters into a contract with another treaty State that is binding but not based on international law. The parties will make a choice of law by choosing a legal order other than international law. The parties can of course choose to submit this contract under the principles of international law because they have called it, but spontaneously this agreement is outside international law.
  3. An agreement in the sense of international law must produce legal effects, also known as "legal effects"; if it does not produce legal effects, it is not an agreement in the sense of legally binding. Of course, agreements under international law are voluntary under the law. Here this is not the case, there may be certain agreements between States; they are not agreements, but concerted non-Convention acts. We are told that this is a concerted act, but it is unconventional in the sense that it is not binding. We are also talking about political agreements and the "gentleman agreement". A whole series of examples of such agreements are, for example, the final act of the Helsinki Accords of 1905, from which the OSCE is emerging. The final act of the Helsinki conference is made as a treaty, but it is not a treaty because states do not want to bind themselves legally, they want to assume political obligations. This means that States believe that these obligations should remain in the realm of politics and that, in the event of a violation, legal mechanisms such as liability should not be implemented; States are not obliged to conclude treaties, but rather engage on a purely political level.
  4. The agreement must be governed by public international law: in order for it to be an agreement, the law that governs that agreement must be public international law. We have, for example, a whole series of agreements between governments that are legally binding and have legal effects concluded by States. The first three conditions are met, however, but they are not international agreements in the legal sense, because the applicable law is a different law than that of the international order; this may be international trade law or Swiss law. States do it because there are areas that are not political. A state can sell an aircraft, a ship or paper to another state, to exchange an airplane a treaty can be concluded, but it is not worth it because it has solemnity. If States so wish, they may conclude agreements by choosing another legal system that is not international law.

These are the four conditions of general international law. This refers to the general rules on the existence of agreements. However, there may be special rules. The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties is the codification of the law of treaties. If we have treaties or an agreement, we can ask ourselves legal questions about this recurring agreement is important. For example, the International Law Commission has proposed to draft a convention that contains all the information on treaties. The Vienna Convention is the law of treaties, but applies only to certain treaties because it governs the life of certain treaties.

In the Vienna Convention, we are in the field of treaties and this applies only to texts, only to written agreements. By this alone, we can have divergences between general law and particular definitions contained, for example, in the Vienna Convention. This difference means that an agreement within the meaning of general law makes it possible to distinguish between agreements. On the other hand, in order to be able to apply the Vienna Convention, the treaty in question must meet the conditions of that Convention, otherwise it will not be applied to it. However, customary law is applicable because it is covered by an agreement under international law.

There is an articulation between customary law which is general, but if you have special law, customary law becomes a lex speciali.

The Vienna Convention applies to treaties. In article 2 of the 1969 Vienna Convention, the term "treaty" is defined as meaning an international agreement concluded in writing between States and governed by international law, whether it is contained in a single instrument or in two or more related instruments, and, whatever its particular denomination.

There are two elements that stand out and stand out. This Convention shall therefore only apply to agreements concluded in writing, otherwise it shall not apply as well as to an oral agreement. Thus, the Vienna Convention is more restrictive than general law. In other words, in order to be able to apply the Vienna Convention, four conditions are required:

  1. an agreement
  2. written
  3. concluded between States
  4. but above all it must have been ratified by the Contracting States. For example, an investment treaty will only be valid in the context of the Vienna Convention if the contracting parties have ratified it.

The second Vienna Convention of 1986 was concluded to govern treaties concluded between States and international organizations and treaties concluded between international organizations. The 1986 Convention concerns treaties between States and international organizations, or States between States, or international organizations between international organizations. For example, the treaty between Switzerland and the United Nations on the headquarters of the United Nations in Geneva.

The 1986 Convention has not yet entered into force because it has not yet received sufficient ratifications. For agreements between States, the 1969 Convention is applied, while for international organizations, the 1986 Convention is applied, but since it has not entered into force, customary law is applied.

We are doing all of this because the legal regime is potentially different. In customary law, these may not be the same rules, but at the same time, the situation is quite simple as in IHL. In the treaties, we are fortunate because they are the same rules, that is, if we take customary law or one of the conventions in general terms, we have the same rules.

The 1969 Convention photographed the practice of States while the 1986 Convention was aligned with the 1969 Convention. It is always important to determine which title applies what. It is always necessary to ascertain whether it can be applied either as a rule of customary law or as a convention between States. The substantive aspects of treaty law lead to the same rules, which makes the task easier.

This is a happy circumstance in treaty law, but it is not always the case. The customary case is not fully aligned.

We now know what a treaty and an agreement is, but there is often an impression among philistines that a treaty must always be very solemn and formalistic, that a treaty must be concluded with lengthy procedures. Ritualization is an important treaty to mark solemnity because it is politically useful.

However, the law of treaties does not provide any rule in this regard, which is the will of States. Treaty law is fully flexible on questions of form. The law of treaties is sovereign and adult.

In the Aegean Continental Shelf case brought before the Court of Justice in 1978, the legal question is whether a treaty can be concluded in a press release. There is a very special condition for bringing a case before the International Court of Justice; it requires the consent of all the parties involved, an agreement, a consent. The question is whether a joint press release of the two ministers could be an agreement in the sense of international law because if it was an agreement it could have founded the competence of the agreement; it was said that if the ministers could not reach an agreement the court could be seized. Therefore, the content of this agreement was a consent, but in order for the court's jurisdiction then to have been given, it had to be verified whether this press release was a joint agreement. Only after a legally binding agreement can the Court's clemency be founded.

In 1978, the Court responded in an orthodox manner by saying that there is no reason to believe that a joint press release could be a perfect international agreement. The Court did not need to go any further because it felt that there was no commitment in the agreement to accept the Court's jurisdiction, there was only an agreement to consider going to the Court in a subsequent agreement. To sum up, a joint press release can be an agreement.

In the case of territorial delimitation between Qatar and Bahrain[2], the same question was posed almost exactly in the same way. This was a signed record of negotiation. Saudi Arabia had been there to do the good offices of mediation and had also sent a secretary to govern the minutes. Following the discussions, the foreign ministers signed the minutes. In 1993, the Court considered that the minutes signed by the Ministers of Foreign Affairs were informal but valid treaties, and that the content was such that the Court could be involved in the matter.

A treaty can be treated in a totally informal manner. Only whether States were willing to conclude a legally binding instrument or whether a text could be interpreted as meaning that they had accepted a legally binding agreement will be verified.

As Minister of Foreign Affairs, you have to be careful what you sign. Formalism is not necessary, it's a discretionary question, we leave the choice to the States.

Conclusion[modifier | modifier le wikicode]

In the conclusion of treaties, there are a whole series of purely political issues, such as the conduct of negotiations involving framework rules, which are far removed from the details of the negotiation, the aim is to maintain the usefulness of the negotiation. This is a question that should be left to politics.

There is a whole practical question concerning the conclusion of treaties. There is a first and very important question of who can negotiate a treaty.

Negotiation and signature[modifier | modifier le wikicode]

Treaties are generally negotiated, there are always preliminary discussions even for a small treaty signed during a dinner. There are very different situations between multilateral treaties and bilateral treaties negotiated at a minimum.

There is always the question of who can conclude, who can negotiate and sign the text, what is at stake is legal certainty; we must see and determine the authorities. The issue is governed by international law, but is partially left to domestic law. That is to say, international law contains certain rules; otherwise it is left to domestic law.

Persons designated by international law as such, who still have the power to conclude a treaty for a State by signature, are mentioned in Article 7 §2 a. of the Vienna Convention vested in the full powers: "Heads of State, Heads of Government and Ministers of Foreign Affairs, for all acts relating to the conclusion of a treaty".

This means that the head of state is traditionally the person entitled to conclude treaties, the head of government who can be described as prime minister and the Minister of Foreign Affairs can always bind the state.

Thus the Permanent Court in 1933 had a special case concerning Eastern Greenland: there was an agreement between Norway and Denmark through a simple agreement reached by the Foreign Ministers. The Court held that this agreement bound Norway because its Minister of Foreign Affairs was empowered to make commitments for its State.

As for other persons, as a general rule, the first paragraph of article 7 reverts to the first paragraph, those other persons can only negotiate for a State if they are given full powers. If Switzerland decides to send someone to negotiate a treaty for Switzerland, a formal letter must indicate that a person has the right to represent Switzerland at the conference showing that he or she is the representative of the State that can sign the agreement on the basis of what has been authorised to him or her under the full powers, these powers must also be notified to the other parties.

Three persons are still authorized and a fourth person may be authorized by a letter of full authority.

There is one more development, the Court has said; it is an increasingly common practice, in international law, that the ministers in charge have the right to conclude treaties in their area of competence. For example, the Minister of the Environment goes to environmental conferences and signs agreements for his state. This is a recent development that poses a series of legal problems. In the case of the armed cases between the Congo and Rouanda, paragraph 47 of the 2006 ruling explains the broadening of the practice and in which cases the ministers in charge may conclude treaties, it is empowered to negotiate and sign.

Convention de Vienne sur le droit des traités de 1969 - article 7

Adoption[modifier | modifier le wikicode]

In bilateral negotiations, there are no prescribed rules, there is total flexibility. Delegates or ministers will sign the treaty. In the case of a multilateral treaty, it is much more complex. A text negotiated in the framework of an international organization or a conference, one can have up to 190 States in such a conference, in this case what is important is to authenticate the adopted text.

When there's two of us, we can see what we're working on. In the case of an international conference where thousands of texts circulate with amendments up to the last minute, it is clear that it is essential to authenticate the text.

We proceed to the adoption of the text, which means that when an agreement has been reached and compromises have been reached, the text is put to the vote. The president will check whether the required majority is reached, often it is the rule of two-thirds or a simple majority. If the majority is reached, the text is adopted, but it is from now on that no one can argue it.

Delegations go before the President to initial the text in order to authenticate it. The Chair had the original text initialled page by page by delegations to indicate that all pages had been viewed. On the last page, the delegate signs, sometimes it may be deferred if the Minister has to sign and is not present. At this point the text is adopted and authenticated. Negotiation is now complete and the text can no longer be changed.

When the text is signed, it has certain legal effects. With adoption, this becomes a treaty text, but the signature enhances its status, as some legal effects will follow.

There are two in particular. Most importantly, there is a non-existent effect. The signed text is not binding on States, it is not in force and at the same time the State has not accepted to be bound by the text, the signature does not make the text binding. Exceptionally, signature is binding on States only if the treaty is concluded in the case of a so-called "simplified" or short procedure. In fact, it is not just a signature, but a signature and ratification at the same time. States agreed not to ratify the treaty separately, but to ratify it uni actum, so signature is ratification.

This is hardly ever the case, but more than once in bilateral treaties where ministers can directly engage their states, this is not to accumulate acts for nothing.

In multilateral conventions it is more solemn, ratification is later, the signature is not binding. The simple signature: what is its legal effect?

  1. with signature, the transitional provisions enter into force immediately: when the treaty is signed, the provisions contained in the final clauses which are attractive to the process of implementing the convention enter into force. In 1998, a treaty was concluded on the International Criminal Court in Rome - it is clear that we will not wait until the treaty enters into force to question its creation. Preparatory measures are provided for in the transitional provisions and lead to ratification unless they explicitly state otherwise, they are applicable at the time of signature. If we signed, we were told that we have a favourable provision for the convention.
  1. the second effect is legally much more complex, referring to article 18 of the Vienna Convention. It provides that when a treaty is signed, as a signatory, there is an obligation not to empty the treaty of its object and purpose before it enters into force. It is impossible to do acts that sabotage the void of meaning. For example, a treaty is concluded between State A and State B under which the two states undertake to reduce customs duties on tomatoes by 50%, which will enter into force in January 2014. State A says to itself, on December 31st, I will double my customs tariffs so that when the treaty came into force, the customs tariffs have not changed, while state B, in good faith, will halve its customs duties, meaning that there was bad faith behaviour by A. Thus, the treaty is emptied. However, it may be difficult to determine what Article 18 establishes and what it does not.
Convention de Vienne sur le droit des traités de 1969 - article 18

Ratification[modifier | modifier le wikicode]

The signed treaty is not binding on the parties, let alone giving effect to it. In articles 11 et seq. of the 1969 Vienna Convention, ratification is the consent to be definitively bound by the treaty.

Since ratification does not necessarily coincide with signature, this means that a State has time to consider whether or not it wants to be bound by the treaty. If he wishes, he will ratify it.

There is a time for reflection; the negotiating States know what to do with it. The time for reflection comes from the democratic institutions of domestic law. At the time of the kings, the signature was worth ratification. With the advent of Republican regimes, the situation has changed. It is therefore the executive branch that negotiates and ratifies the treaty. If, therefore, the entire process of concluding the treaty up to and including the choice to become a party to that treaty is in the hands of the executive branch, it would mean that the executive branch could take decisions of great importance for national life without the democratically elected body representing the people having any say.

All the Republican states, and first and foremost the United States of America, have each time requested that they should be able to sign and refer, decide later on whether or not they want to be bound, because it is necessary to consult beforehand. The legislator must give the "green light". We sign act referendum. That is the reason for the time for reflection. The concern of States is democratic participation; it is a concern of domestic law.

Ratification from the standpoint of international law refers to articles 11, 12, 13 and 14 of the Vienna Convention. Ratification is the final consent to be bound, but ratification from the standpoint of international law is a letter sent by the executive branch, someone at the Department of Foreign Affairs will send a letter to the treaty depositary who is the official elected by the contracting states to manage the treaty. Ratification therefore takes the form of a letter sent to the depositary stating that, after referring to it domestically, State X consents to be bound by the treaty.

Convention de Vienne sur le droit des traités de 1969 - article 11
Convention de Vienne sur le droit des traités de 1969 - article 12
Convention de Vienne sur le droit des traités de 1969 - article 13
Convention de Vienne sur le droit des traités de 1969 - article 14

It is often believed that it is parliament that ratifies a treaty, which is perhaps not wrong from the constitutional law point of view. In fact, Parliament authorizes ratification.

For example, we ratify a treaty and sign it marking the end of the negotiation procedure. Then the negotiators disperse. International law has nothing to say, it is a matter of domestic law. Assume that the fictitious treaty signed, the negotiator takes it with him and enters State X. The State provides that the text must be submitted to parliament so that it can debate and decide whether the treaty is good for the State or not. The text was discussed and the vote was taken. If Parliament considers that the treaty is sufficiently good by majority vote, then Parliament has given the "green light" for the executive to ratify it. In virtually no state in the world, the executive is obliged to ratify when parliament has said "yes".

The executive still has a margin of decision. If an impromptu event occurs, the executive can slow down ratification and wait. Therefore, Parliament does not ratify the treaty from the point of view of international law, it authorises it. Constitutional law uses the term "ratification" in a different way. If the parliament or people do not authorise ratification, then the executive is obliged not to ratify and will notify the depositary that it will not be obliged to be a party to the treaty because it has not succeeded in obtaining parliamentary approval.

The time for reflection is a matter that depends on domestic law; if parliamentary approval is not required, it can be ratified at the time of signature, which is called the "short conclusion procedure". This avoids uncertainty, buoyancy, the risk of adopting treaties and the risk of waiting decades for states to ratify treaties to become obsolete and ruinous.

Still, it is incumbent on democracy and the separation of powers to allow time for reflection. If domestic law directly authorizes ratification, it makes things easier. However, this is the case for the vast majority of treaties, because they concern subordinate and technical conditions,"treaties on trifles", minor objects of importance. Such treaties can be concluded even in Switzerland or they can be concluded directly.

What if the executive ratifies if it did not have to?

For example, the text is submitted to parliament, which does not authorize ratification and the executive still ratifies, or if the parliament says "yes" and the executive ratifies, but in reality there was no quorum required for the vote. It is a question of treaty validity.

Convention de Vienne sur le droit des traités de 1969 - article 46

We distinguish between ratification and accession to a treaty also known as "accession to a treaty". What is the meaning of this distinction?

The result of both is the same, it is always the definitive consent to be bound by the treaty. The result is therefore that the acceding or ratifying State is bound by the treaty. Since the distinction is not downstream, it must be upstream. The lawyer often has a reason to distinguish the word.

The distinction is who is entitled to do an act or otherwise. Ratification is reserved for States that have participated in the negotiation of the treaty. Ratification is a right for them, a State that has participated in the negotiation can become a party to the treaty, it is not obliged to become a party to the treaty, but has a right to ratify it even 20 years later. On the other hand, States which have not participated in the negotiation, third States, may become party to the Convention on the terms which the Treaty will make them. Bilateral treaties are in principle closed, even multilateral conventions are more or less open. The North Atlantic Treaty is not as open as that, we have to look at the treaty itself, which will say under what conditions another state can accede to the treaty. If there is no clarification, it means that accession is subject to the consent of all other parties to the treaty.

This becomes an option only if the treaty grants it. Thereafter, it becomes a State bound by the Treaty, without accession, there is no distinction.

We assure you that the treaty has been fortunate, it has been ratified. Now, it's about when it's going to come into effect, sending backà l’article 24 de la convention de Vienne de 1969.

Convention de Vienne sur le droit des traités de 1969 - article 24

Entry into force[modifier | modifier le wikicode]

A treaty does not enter into force once it has been ratified. With the second ratification, the treaty can enter into force when there are two parties, but if it is intended to bind all the States of the world, the issue is different. In the final provisions are explained when the treaty enters into force.

In bilateral treaties, these clauses are generally forgotten, but if there are no specific clauses, it is considered that it is at the time of the second ratification that the treaty enters into force when the instruments of ratification are exchanged.

For open multilateral conventions, those that are intended to have many States parties, the rule has gradually crystallized in modern times to have 60 ratifications plus a certain period of applicability. It is at the time of the sixtieth ratification plus the first of the following month.

Convention de Vienne sur le droit des traités de 1969 - article 84

There is another possibility of bringing the treaty into force provisionally, that is, it has been signed and is awaiting ratification. If it is considered unfortunate because the treaty is urgent and it is in our interest to bring it into force immediately, Article 25 provides that this can be done.

Convention de Vienne sur le droit des traités de 1969 - article 25

There may be a provisional partial agreement of the treaty or some States agree among themselves to apply only part of the treaty. Everything always revolves around the agreement of the States on this matter. If we do not ratify, there are difficulties such as the difficulty of going back on provisions created when they were made in accordance with the law.

Article 102 of the Charter of the United Nations is applicable to all Member States providing that when a treaty has been agreed and entered into force, the signatory States shall be obliged to register it in the United Nations Treaty Service in New York. Since laws are published domestically, they are published internationally.


Charte des Nations Unies - Chapitre XVI : Dispositions diverses - article 102

Finally, treaties do not apply retroactively; they apply to facts, circumstances and events that occur after the treaty has been concluded. They shall not apply to facts and circumstances prior to its entry into force.

Entry into force may depend on. The Convention shall enter into force on the date specified in the clause; for States acceding to it at a later date, the treaty shall enter into force at a later date.

Non-retroactivity must be determined on the basis of the entry into force for each State. This is not a peremptory rule, because States can agree, but must regulate this decision. They must expressly say or wish to do so in such a way that it can be said in the interpretation that there was a willingness on the part of States to apply a convention retroactively. In some areas of international law, rules cannot be applied retroactively.

Finally, there is no question of non-retroactivity for customary law. Retroactivity is a matter of treaty law. Customary law, from the moment the rule is established, applies to all States. It is not retroactive, but binding on all States. Events prior to the birth of the customary rule are not taken into account. There is only one critical date, the rule covers all events from birth.

Reservations[modifier | modifier le wikicode]

This is a specificity of international treaties, there is nothing comparable in domestic law contracts. The rules on reservations can be found in articles 19 to 23 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties. Subsequently, the International Law Commission worked on the issue, which led to the adoption of a non-binding text or the Commission recalls the rules on reservations.

Convention de Vienne sur le droit des traités de 1969 - article 19
Convention de Vienne sur le droit des traités de 1969 - article 20
Convention de Vienne sur le droit des traités de 1969 - article 21
Convention de Vienne sur le droit des traités de 1969 - article 22
Convention de Vienne sur le droit des traités de 1969 - article 23

The problem of reservations is a simple matter of possible consent. There are treaties where it is not difficult to know who must consent. In the case of a bilateral treaty, it is clear that mutual consent is necessary. Finding a common denominator between 194 states is difficult, even "diabolical".

So we can negotiate, but then we will arrive at a time when nothing goes wrong, because we can always question it. Now there is the question of some dissatisfied states, some will disagree radically. There are States that will say that the compromise we have arrived at and acceptable, but there are a few articles that are not even essential, which are a huge problem that could be contrary to constitutional law or a political problem, for example.

The question arises as to what to do with States that say they could ratify only if they could make an exception?[modifier | modifier le wikicode]

The problem is to find a consensus between protecting the integrity of the treaty or promoting the universality of the treaty.

If one is in favour of the integrity of the treaty, the treaty as such cannot be subject to reservations. If, on the other hand, the universality of the treaty is favoured, it is impossible to agree on everything. The idea was to ensure greater ratification by releasing ballast on articles, especially since States could withdraw their reservations afterwards.

Before the Second World War, the universal rule was that of the integrity of treaties, we accepted all or nothing, we could make a reservation only if all States agreed. After 1945, the rule was to favour the universality of treaties by admitting reservations. Today, the general rule is to be able to make reservations to conventions.

It is generally said that these must be multilateral and not bilateral conventions. Practice, however, shows that reservations have taken place in bilateral treaties. What can be said is that it is certain that reservations apply to multilateral treaties. In a multilateral treaty, agreement must be reached.

The second important thing to know is that reservations must be made at the latest at the time of signature or ratification. At the time of ratification and accession, one gives one's final consent to be bound by the treaty, other contractors must know what one is obliged to do and what one is not. A State that no longer wishes to implement a particular article would mean that the convention would no longer be binding on States overriding the adage pacta sunt servanda. In the case of reservations, other participants may object. That does not mean that we cannot make reserves later. This is the case if there is an agreement between all States, there is no reason why it is prohibited.


What is a reservation?[modifier | modifier le wikicode]

In order to know this, one must go to the definition of the terms used in Article 2 §1 (d) of the Vienna Convention: Reservation "means a unilateral declaration, whatever its wording or designation, made by a State when it signs, ratifies, accepts, approves or accedes to a treaty, whereby it purports to exclude or modify the legal effect of certain provisions of the treaty in their application to that State.

The reserve is distinguished by the following elements:

  • It is a unilateral declaration; each State, when ratifying or acceding to the treaty, can at the same time formulate a reservation.
  • The reservation is formulated at that time in the formulation of ratification sent to the depositary, which will notify it including the reservation to the other High Contracting States, including the signatories.
  • The purpose and effect of the reservation is to exclude or modify the legal effect, so provision X or Y will not apply according to the terms written in the treaty. The substance of these provisions is being changed; it will not apply in the substance of the treaty; it can either exclude the application of this provision to it or slightly modify an article in its own respect, since it assures part of the obligations, but accepts another. The treaty will not apply in the same way as if the reservation had not been made.

Interpretative declarations, which States often make when ratifying or acceding to a treaty. In principle, these are declarations that are not intended to modify the substance of the treaty or to seek ratification so that the State can make known its understanding of the convention or make political declarations. The true interpretative declaration is to say how the provision is understood.

In theory, it is clear that the interpretative declaration merely casts a certain light on the article, but remains the same, although States sometimes play with it, they make disguised reservations, do not dare to make open reservations either for legal or political reasons. Sometimes interpretative declarations are reservations. It must be said that it is not the label that counts, it is not because the State is going to send its position in the form of a reservation or an interpretative declaration. The question is sometimes subtle, depending on the interpretation of the text by the State, but also on the interpretation of the text of the treaty. If it bites on the substance, it's a reserve.

When are reservations eligible?[modifier | modifier le wikicode]

The current regime provided for by the 1969 Vienna Convention in articles 19 to 23 is a liberal regime under which a State may make as many reservations as it wishes, there is the presumption and freedom to make reservations. There is no formal limit, it is a common sense limit, if a State has too many problems with a treaty it will not ratify it.

There are, however, some rules on the admissibility of reservations and in particular some of them are covered by treaty law and others by general international law.

By conventional law, we mean that, on the basis of a convention, we want to know whether we want to make reservations. The first thing to do to avoid the issue is to say that the treaty itself may have provisions on the issue to be followed; the contracting parties have been able to make provision. If in the Treaty there is nothing, in other Treaties there are things; we must follow them:

  • treaties which completely prohibit reservations: the Contracting Parties considered that the integrity of the treaty weighed more heavily than the universality of ratification. Interpretative declarations, but not reservations, can be made.
  • prohibition of reservations on certain provisions: this will define a hard core of the most important provisions on which reservations cannot be made. Reservations are prohibited on certain articles, a contrario, they are allowed on the other provisions. Negotiators are of the opinion that certain articles are essential to the convention. For example, article 12 of the 1958 Geneva Convention on the Continental Shelf.
  • Reservations are permissible for certain articles, i. e. reservations are prohibited on all other provisions. This latter version is generally more subtle, the convention is more locked.
  • provisions which prohibit certain materially defined reservations: reservations having certain qualities such as, for example, in the former Human Rights Convention to article 64, which prohibits reservations of a general nature that are considered non-intelligible. There are conventions which prohibit certain types of reservations, particularly those that are not specific.

We are authorized to make reservations that are authorized by the treaty. This is the rule of consent and willingness.

Irrespective of what the parties had intended, and particularly in treaties such as the Vienna Convention, States could make reservations in principle unlimited. There is a problem with the general law: States can make reservations as they wish. That is why there are limits to reservations in general law:

  • relative limits (Article 20 § 2 and § 3): in institutional treaties, it is difficult to make reservations, for example, the United Nations, as an institution must operate according to equal rules for all.
  • limit of the object and purpose of the treaty as provided for in article 19 of the Vienna Convention letter c): it is not an easy or straightforward application, since one can legitimately have different views on the object and purpose of the treaty.But what is easily understandable is that in a multi-party treaty which contains many provisions, not all of them are of equal importance, some are eminent and others are secondary provisions of an administrative or other subordinate nature; it is not possible to place reservations on articles essential to the proper functioning of the convention while reservations on secondary provisions are permitted. Deciding what is relevant to the object or purpose is sometimes obvious and sometimes not easy. We can have quite legitimately divergent views.

The case that is legally very clear is the "Shariah" type of reservations, also known as "reservations of internal tradition". A Djibouti reservation to the Convention on the Rights of the Child in 1989 states that " [The Government of the Republic of Djibouti will not consider itself] bound by provisions or articles incompatible with its religion and traditional values".

This reservation is of a general nature and does not relate to a specific provision, it potentially concerns all the provisions of the treaty, and moreover, it is of an absolutely indeterminate nature, since no one other than Djibouti knows its religion and traditions, which means that Djibouti does not have to assume any obligation. This is not inconsistent with any convention; we reserve the right to apply or not to apply a provision on the basis of tradition and religion, which only Djibouti knows. This is incompatible with the adage pacta sunt servanda, reserving the application of an agreement is contrary to the object and purpose of any contractual commitment. In that case, it would simply have been necessary not to ratify the Convention. In fact, a whole series of States have made an objection to this reservation.

Why do these States ratify when they have problems with this type of convention?[modifier | modifier le wikicode]

The problem is not legal in this respect, it is that these human rights conventions have become so much a religion for Western countries that everyone has to ratify them. This somewhat unfortunate situation leads these states to ratify this convention, because it is politically necessary. In reality, they cannot apply these conventions contrary to their internal traditions. It's politically sensitive, but not legally.

Another case is a delicate one, the reservations made by the socialist states in the late 1940s and early 1950s with regard to the 1948 genocide convention. This reservation concerns Article IX, in the event of a dispute concerning the interpretation or application of this Convention, each State Party to this Convention is a party to disputes concerning another State may bring the dispute before the International Court of Justice. It is an arbitration clause that allows in the event of a dispute to bring it before the International Court of Justice.

The Socialist Republics agreed to sign the convention, but not to recognize the international tribunal. The communist countries never had the majority of judges in court is no chance to impose their vision of international relations. For these States, it was out of the question to submit to the court. At the same time, these States absolutely wanted to become party to it for the same political reasons as in the previous example. It was vital to be bound by the Convention, but not by Article IX.

Is it contrary to the object and purpose?[modifier | modifier le wikicode]

For socialist states, what counts in the convention is the substantial conditions and repression of genocide. The object and purpose are therefore linked to genocide and the substantive provisions of the Convention.

Does Article IX appeal to the procedure?[modifier | modifier le wikicode]

This is a non-essential procedural issue.

The Westerners in the late 1940s argued that the convention against genocide was not a convention against others, it was not limited to designating a crime and organising repression. There was a provision in the convention that allowed the convention to be applied. This convention by virtue of Article IX is not a paper rag convention. The guarantee clause in Article IX is essential to the realisation of the object and purpose of the Convention.

The two arguments are plausible, the choice between the two is not obvious; for a long time there was uncertainty about the admissibility of the Soviet reserve and the effects to be attached to it.

The issue had meanwhile been resolved, as other States had formulated the same reservation and that practice had become widespread. Thus, for Westerners, this reserve is not so bad, the practice is that this reserve is admissible. The Court still applies this reservation.

In summary, what happens if there is disagreement about the acceptability and validity of the reservation?[modifier | modifier le wikicode]

First of all, it will be necessary to ascertain whether there are agreements and whether there are objections to the reservation. If there is no objection to the reservation and States expressly accept it, then this means that reservations to those States do not pose any problems. We can therefore proceed as if the reservation were valid even if it is not true.

If we have objections, we have a potential dispute. At that time, we do not know how to apply the treaty. As long as there is no particular problem, we move forward and the dispute can be dormant. As long as there are no disputes, it is not very important to know whether the reservation to article IX is valid or not. However, we won't be able to test it, because we don't have a case. If we have a case, we have a dispute about the applicability of the convention; we will have to engage in procedures for the peaceful settlement of disputes.

Finally, the effects. The setbacks are decided on the basis of the treaty and, if not, on the basis of Articles 19 and 20 of the Vienna Convention.

Assuming we have valid reservations, what are their effects?

The general effect of the reservation is to fragment the treaty into a bundle of bilateral relations. Contrary to the option that exists, there is in reality a plurality of treaties according to the reservations and the reactions of other States to those reservations, so the treaty is fragmented according to bilateral relations. Thus it will apply differently depending on the States parties to the treaty. We have to look at the reports of each state, there are potentially many relations.

A silent state that does not react, in this case if the situation were not regulated there would be legal certainty that would last too long. According to Article 20 §5, after one year silence is considered acceptance; it is a legal fiction, acceptance is imputed to the silent state. A State that does not wish to accept a reservation, if it does not object, after a certain period of time has elapsed, will be understood that it has accepted. After 12 months the position will be clear. During the twelve months, the situation is in abeyance.

Assuming we have valid reservations, what are their effects?[modifier | modifier le wikicode]

The general effect of the reservation is to fragment the treaty into a bundle of bilateral relations. Contrary to the option that exists, there is in reality a plurality of treaties according to the reservations and the reactions of other States to those reservations, so the treaty is fragmented according to bilateral relations. Thus it will apply differently depending on the States parties to the treaty. We have to look at the reports of each state, there are potentially many relations.

A silent state that does not react, in this case if the situation were not regulated there would be legal certainty that would last too long. According to Article 20 §5, after one year silence is considered acceptance; it is a legal fiction, acceptance is imputed to the silent state. A State that does not wish to accept a reservation, if it does not object, after a certain period of time has elapsed, will be understood that it has accepted. After 12 months the position will be clear. During the twelve months, the situation is in abeyance.

Convention de Vienne sur le droit des traités de 1969 - article 20

If there is an objection to a reservation that it is the effect of the reservation?[modifier | modifier le wikicode]

Il y a deux distinctions à faire qui sont superposées :

1) it is an option given by the Vienna Convention and by practice to the objecting State: if it is stated that a reservation is not intended to be applied to a particular article and that a State objects, a choice must be made:

  • simple objection: do we want to apply the provisions of the convention on which there is no dispute? The reservation is opposed to the reservation, which entails the consequence that the reservation to the article will not be applicable. However, if there is no difference of opinion, we are not opposed to implementing the treaty.
  • Radical objection: the article was so important that a State refused to apply the agreement between it and the reserving State. As long as the provision is retained, the convention will not be enforced.

The effect of an objection will be, depending on the circumstances, to allow the treaty to apply except in the case of an objection to a reservation, or that a provision of the treaty will not be applicable from then on, there will be no treaty relationship between the States wishing to make the reservation and the objecting State.

2) Is it the same thing, because the result is the same? The reason for the result is different. There is disagreement on the application of the reservation, in this case there is no agreement and therefore no treaty relations. In both cases the article will not apply, on the one hand, because there will be no agreement on how to apply it and, on the other hand, because the reservation has been accepted. If a reservation modifies an article, this is no longer true, because the situations differ. Among the States that have accepted the reservation, the article is applied as amended; if an objection has been made, the article will not apply at all. The article cannot be applied with and without reservation. In case of disagreement the article will not apply at all. It is therefore only when the reservation excludes a provision and the objection is simple that the same result can be achieved, but by different means. Treaties may apply differently, but do not affect relations between other States without any specificity.

Validity[modifier | modifier le wikicode]

This is the scope of articles 46 to 53 of the Vienna Convention.

A treaty may be concluded in accordance with the necessary procedures, but does not tell us whether the treaty is valid, as there may be particular grounds and circumstances that may invalidate or nullify the treaty. If, for example, you have to sign a contract because someone is pointing a revolver at the temple, it would be surprising to be bound by the contract as an extreme constraint, it would be normal for it to be invalidated or considered null and void because of the constraint.

In international law there are grounds for a treaty to be invalidated. It is a new branch, until World War II there were no provisions on the invalidity or nullity of a treaty, because international law was either violence or violence itself was not prohibited. In this context, it would have been quite unusual to draw up grounds for the invalidity of a treaty, since the violence was lawful and a treaty concluded under coercion was therefore lawful. Since violence is conceded, the treaty cannot be invalidated. Moreover, at the time the peace treaties were essentially important instruments, foundations of legal orders such as the Treaty of Westphalia which founded the modern European order in 1648 or the Vienna Agreements of 1815 or the Treaty of Versailles of 1919. A state forced to sign a peace treaty does so under duress, and if it is said that they are not valid, all treaties are called into question, it is impossible to concede this. If we say that treaties concluded under coercion are valid, then we will not seek its nullity or invalidity because they are valid. It is considered that the principle of pacta sunt servanda is so fundamental that opening the loophole to plead the invalidity of treaties is tantamount to opening the Pandora's box.

This has changed with the law of the United Nations Charter where the use of force has been completely reconsidered; logically, in the sense that treaties concluded under coercion cannot be considered valid. There is a whole vision to see things on crucial points in modern international law with a much more positive vision. The trace is section II of Part 5 of the Vienna Convention, article 46 et seq.

What are the rules?[modifier | modifier le wikicode]

1) The first rule to be considered is that the grounds for invalidation or nullity of a treaty, i. e. the invalidity of a treaty, can only be based on grounds that are limitatively enumerated in the Vienna Convention. It is therefore only on the basis of a ground recognised in the Vienna Convention or recognized in customary international law for States not bound by the Vienna Convention that it is possible to plead invalidity of a treaty, this is the subject of Article 42 and in particular §1.

Convention de Vienne sur le droit des traités de 1969 - article 42

This does not preclude customary law from developing other grounds, but it should be abolished by international practice and the legal opinion of States. Since 1969, State practice has not created other grounds for invalidation.

2) Second, what are the grounds for invalidating a treaty? They are set out in articles 46 et seq. on irregular ratifications, which is the violation of domestic law on the conclusion of treaties. In practical terms, this means that when a treaty is concluded there is a whole procedure to go through, errors can occur in each of these steps. Suppose a treaty was concluded is that domestic law provides that the parliament must give its approval for it to be ratified or the executive did not consult the parliament in disregard of domestic law. The only relevant provisions of domestic law are those concerning the procedure for the conclusion of treaties. Article 46 does not concern the compatibility of domestic law with substantive rules, but only if the provisions on the conclusion of the treaty are relevant, it is only if errors have been made in the formal provisions which allow the application of Article 46 to be invoked.

Convention de Vienne sur le droit des traités de 1969 - article 46

Article 46 is worded negatively, which means that a State cannot invoke the error it has made in the procedure for drawing up a treaty. In other words, the violation of domestic law cannot be invoked, it is necessary to bear the consequences without the other contracting parties paying the costs.

However, there is a way out. Section 46 sets out the criteria. These are two cumulative conditions, the rule must be of fundamental importance to invalidate a treaty concluded, with other treaties the violated provision must be of major importance. On the other hand, this violation must have been manifest for the other contractors. The manifest criterion is the protection of the legitimate expectations of other States. It is only if they had to know that the other state could not ratify the treaty in the way it did, they should have known that there was a mistake in the process for the treaty to be invalidated. The stability of the treaty is maintained because it commits other contractors who do not need to know the domestic law of non-Contracting States.

The convention speaks of "objectively obvious" for any State, one can add "subjectively obvious". States that have close relations know each other well; therefore, in the case of bilateral treaties, Article 46 could be interpreted somewhat looser.

We will talk about the arbitration between Guinea-Bissau and Senegal published in the book of awards applicable volume XX page 121 and following. There is an agreement between these two states dating back to 1960, an international treaty of 1960 between France and Portugal at the time the colonial powers. The agreement covered the maritime border and States were in dispute over the maritime border. There was a problem when this treaty was signed. Indeed, normally this treaty should have been submitted to the Parliament in Portugal, but it was not, as it was ratified directly through Salazar.

Applicability of Article 46?[modifier | modifier le wikicode]

The Vienna Convention does not apply retroactively; it entered into force in 1980; the arbitral tribunal found that article 46 was customary law in 1960. So this customary law was applicable to the treaty.


Is this a debate of fundamental importance?[modifier | modifier le wikicode]

Yes, it is certainly a very important provision, for States with territorial accession is a sensitive subject.


Is this a manifest violation?[modifier | modifier le wikicode]

The court said no it was not obvious; Portugal's constitutional practice at the time was to bypass parliament. France could rely in good faith that this treaty was ratified regularly, not in the formal forms applicable, but in accordance with the practice of the time. This was Portugal's usual practice at the time, France could not perceive this subtlety, and the treaty is therefore applicable.


Convention de Vienne sur le droit des traités de 1969 - article 47
Convention de Vienne sur le droit des traités de 1969 - article 48

Article 48 deals with error, which is a rare or rather frequent occurrence only in a particular context of international law. This is an essential error on a fundamental fact at the time of concluding the treaties. Treaties were concluded on misrepresentation of an essential fact of the treaty. In domestic law, contracts can also be invalidated for essential errors. There is a situation in which errors are not uncommon in geographical maps. It happens more than once that the maps are appended to a treaty, one will describe the border in the treaty and say that on the map or sketch the border is drawn directly on the ground and the map is part of the treaty. It is not so rare that we have made mistakes about how to draw boundaries on maps or different geographical configurations.

Convention de Vienne sur le droit des traités de 1969 - article 249

Article 49 deals with fraud, that is deliberate error, that is misleading. This is a very common ground for invalidation of contracts in domestic law, but does not exist in international law. We must go back to distant eras to find cases of fraud; states are not credulous. This is an intellectually necessary discussion, but in practice rarely used.

Convention de Vienne sur le droit des traités de 1969 - article 50

Article 50 is also fortunately not a frequent occurrence. Corruption is the bribery of a representative of a State, the expression of a State's consent has been obtained through the bribery of its representative, but these are still relatively rare cases, as the representative can rarely directly bind the State. It is a motive that we insert more to be complete.

Convention de Vienne sur le droit des traités de 1969 - article 51
Convention de Vienne sur le droit des traités de 1969 - article 52

Articles 51 and 52 on coercion are articles of great importance. It should be noted that there are two provisions: Article 51 is the coercion exerted on a representative of a State when he or she is entitled to commit it, and Article 52 is the coercion of a State to sign under threat of the use of force. Normally a representative of the State cannot engage a State alone and directly. What can happen more often is the threat of physical force. These articles therefore deal with coercion.

What is coercion within the meaning of Article 52?[modifier | modifier le wikicode]

It is that of the armed force, the reference is made here to the Charter of the United Nations is in particular to Article 2 § 4.

Charte des Nations Unies - Chapitre I : Buts et principes - article 2

The Vienna Convention refers to the Charter. The Charter deals with armed force, but does not cover economic or other coercion. It may constitute an intervention in internal affairs depending on the circumstances, but such an intervention does not lead to the invalidation of the Treaty. The solution chosen is good, invalidating the treaties is extremely serious and must be reserved for flagrant cases. Admitting economic coercion is opening the door to degrees. Foreign policy is made up of coercion; wanting to incorporate all these games and allow economic pressures to be invoked is a door that was not opened in Vienna and did not lead to the invalidation of a treaty.

In reality, coercive treaties will be treated as null and void only when the United Nations and the law of force are relatively strong and well. When important States begin to use this means to have treaties signed and ratified, this, of course, is clearly harmful to provisions such as articles 51 and 52. In the case of peace treaties such as Dayton's, we accept that this is not a prohibited coercion, because it is in the nature of the state not to have much choice in signing the peace treaty. It is forbidden to take advantage of its predominant position to extort advantages, if in a peace treaty it is provided for an annexation of territories this would be considered as a form of coercion contrary to Article 52. It is incumbent upon the organs of the United Nations to lend strength to these arrangements.

Article 53 is the domain of ius cogens also known as imperative law. The ius cogens is a concept that has been the subject of much debate, the great question of international law. Here we are in the law of treaties, Article 53 relates to the lawfulness of the object itself. Here we are at the other end of the spectrum, the point is the lawfulness of the object.

Can a treaty relate to any object?[modifier | modifier le wikicode]

If any object is lawful then any treaty is lawful, because the object is indifferent.

The doctrine of ius cogens is the denial of this principle, it is considered in article 53 that there are certain illicit objects, so that the treaty is null and void when it relates to such intrinsically illicit objects. The dispute continues over the definition of these humanitarian and compassionate items. Thus, there are peremptory norms that cannot be derogated from by a treaty.

To sum up, the ius cogens is a question of the lawfulness of the treaty's content, there are certain objects that make the treaty null and void, in legal terms it seems that there are certain international standards that are imperative, which means that they cannot be derogated from by special agreements. Customary law normally weakens before treaty law. General law may be derogated from by a particular law. The ius cogens blocks the operation of this rule, one can no longer derogate from the general rule of customary law because this rule is imperative, it cannot be replaced by another. If a rule prohibits genocide and it is imperative ius cogens, if a treaty is intended to derogate from that rule, the treaty will be null and void. If the rule had not been mandatory, the treaty would have applied as a matter of priority. This is why Article 53 is included in the chapter on the invalidity of the Treaty.

Convention de Vienne sur le droit des traités de 1969 - article 53

The wording of the various provisions differs. Sometimes we are told how in article 48 a State can invoke an error or loosen itself from it; there are other terms such as in article 52 is "null and void", or in article 53 is "null and void".

There is clearly a difference between absolute nullity and relative nullity, also called annulability.

What about this absolute nullity / relative nullity distinction?[modifier | modifier le wikicode]

The grounds of relative nullity are grounds which are in the particular interest of a State, a State may, when it finds a ground for annulment of the treaty, invoke the ground for annulment of the treaty or not invoke it in order to maintain the treaty. He may invoke it if his personal interest has been prejudiced. Once you realize the misrepresentation, you can repudiate the treaty, you can also decide that it is convenient for your own interests.

The State has the choice, the right gives it a mere power to invalidate only if and only if its interests have been affected.

In Articles 51,52 and 53 of the Vienna Convention, these are matters of collective interest, which is why nullity is here absolute, which means that the legal order considers this treaty to be null and void, for the legal order this treaty does not exist.

It would be surprising to say that a treaty that organizes the slave trade until challenged by a contractor would be in force and valid.

There is another problem in the question of the validity of treaties, which is that of divisibility in Article 34.

In some cases, a reason for invalidating a treaty may concern only part of it or even only one provision. The question arises as to whether the invalidation of the treaty can lead to the invalidation of only a part of the treaty while safeguarding the rest of the treaty, that is the question of divisibility.

Can we split or not?[modifier | modifier le wikicode]

Answers are given in Article 44.

Convention de Vienne sur le droit des traités de 1969 - article 44

The general rule is that divisibility is only established under certain restrictive conditions. The treaties are to be safeguarded, but it is not assumed that they are divisible unless certain conditions are met, they are set out in §3 of Article 44.

The main issue is whether the treaty can be reasonably maintained without the clauses that constitute the cause of invalidation, if in other words there is not an imbalance, because a treaty is normally equilibrium, that is precisely why divisibility is not allowed.

Convention de Vienne sur le droit des traités de 1969 - article 45

Article 45, a party loses the right to invoke a ground of relative nullity or a ground for terminating or suspending the application of a treaty if, after learning of the ground for invalidity of the treaty, it continues to apply it.

Paragraph b, if a cause of invalidation referring to article 48 is knowingly established and is not invoked as continuing to apply it, then the treaty is deemed to have been acquiesced in. This is a reasonable period of time in which to react, as high contractors need to know what to do at a given point in time. Article 45 applies only to annulable treaties.

Convention de Vienne sur le droit des traités de 1969 - article 48

Only the state is supposed to know if it discovered its mistake. It can happen that you don't know when a mistake has been discovered. However, we are mistaken.

Usually these motives appear in diplomatic correspondence, and it is at this point that we realize that we have made a mistake. As long as no one stands up to a mirror, you can't see that you've made a mistake; diplomatic correspondence allows you to see when you discover a cause of voidability.

For Article 44, it is the same thing: the indivisibility of a treaty can only be established when the treaty is voidable. In the case of treaties that are absolutely void under articles 51,52 and 53, there is nothing to be saved, nullity is for the entire treaty, parties who want to defy public policy by challenging article 44 § 5 are punished, or indivisibility is not allowed.

Third countries[modifier | modifier le wikicode]

Third States are all States that are not party to a treaty, which means that they have not ratified or acceded to it, in other words, that are not legally bound by the treaty.

A party to the treaty is a State bound by the treaty, third States are all those outside the treaty.

The question is what is their legal status vis-à-vis the treaty to which they are not a party?

If they become a party, the issue no longer arises because they are no longer third States, there are also treaties where there is no third State for universal conventions such as the Geneva Convention on International Humanitarian Law, which is almost universal.

These rules are found in sections 34, 35, 36, 37 and 38.

Convention de Vienne sur le droit des traités de 1969 - article 34

The principle is self-evident that treaties are binding only on States parties." Commitment "means that treaties confer rights only on the parties and impose obligations only on the parties.

The third State being outside the Treaty cannot be subject to any obligation in relation to a treaty which is for it res inter alios acta i.e. something done by others, but it cannot also benefit from rights in relation to a treaty.

This is what we call the relative effect of treaties, which is similar to the relative effect of contracts in domestic law. This is not to say that treaties concluded by States do not have indirect effects on other States, such as a treaty forging a military alliance and forcing States to build counter-allies, but rather domino effects. Alliance treaties do not bind, confer rights or impose obligations on the third State. The Treaty neither benefits nor applies to third parties.

However, there are exceptions to this rule. The principle is clear, but the exceptions merit comment. They are found in sections 35 and 36.

Convention de Vienne sur le droit des traités de 1969 - article 35
Convention de Vienne sur le droit des traités de 1969 - article 36

These exceptions are all based on the collateral agreement technique, what lawyers call a collateral agreement. A collateral agreement is an agreement in addition to the treaty.

We have a multi-party treaty on the management of a shipping canal. Now we want to either impose an obligation or confer a right on a third party; the collateral agreement technique means that if the third party accepts the obligation, then it will be applicable to the third State, but that party does not become a party and bound by the treaty as a whole, the collateral agreement relates only to the consent to enjoy a particular agreement or to have the third party enjoy an obligation. If the third party accepts the rights and obligations, they will become applicable by treaty, requiring consent.

The Vienna Convention, which is rational, distinguishes between rights obligations, two different provisions in articles 35 and 36.

Article 35 deals with the obligations that the parties to a treaty try to impose on a third State, the Vienna Convention provides for it, this category is provided for, but under very strict conditions, since acceptance of a third State in relation to the obligation sought to be imposed on it must be expressly made and made in writing.

We believe that it is so unusual that a prestigious sovereign state accepts an obligation without consideration, just a charge without having a collateral benefit, it is so exorbitant that we are willing to accept it, but we want to make sure that it really wants it.

Article 36 deals with rights, one tries to confer a right on a third State, it is the stipulation for others of French law. Here the Vienna Convention is much more flexible, requiring the consent of a State, namely the collateral State, but in this case its consent is presumed.

What is required for a right to apply to a third State is that the parties to the treaty must have intended to confer a subjective right and that right must be accepted by the third State, but acceptance is presumed if the third State does not expressly state that it does not want it.

We assume that States want to have an advantage without compensation, we don't put any difficulties in their path, we assume that States accept the benefits because it is a fact of life, individuals accept benefits without compensation.

It is not uncommon for rights to be conferred on a third State, as is the case in Article 35 § 5 of the United Nations Charter, which provides that any State may lead to the United Nations General Assembly or the Security Council in the event of a dispute which could jeopardise international security; a non-member may bring a dispute to the attention of the social organs of the United Nations even if it is not a member of the United Nations. If they do so, they are willing to avail themselves of Article 35 § 2.

Charte des Nations Unies - Chapitre VI : Règlement pacifique des différends - article 35

After the Napoleonic wars against a weakened France, the powers gathered in congress in Vienna had obtained that the city of Geneva should be opened up, so a free zone was established or there were customs advantages for Switzerland when it imported goods from the hinterland. Switzerland was not a party to the final act of the Vienna conference, and the powers imposed this burden on France.

Interpretation[modifier | modifier le wikicode]

Interpretation is an absolutely crucial function. When a treaty is entered into for the purpose of applying it, and applying a treaty presupposes having understood it and knowing what needs to be done, assuming that one has intelligence, that is, an understanding of the provisions. This presupposes an interpretation of the provisions, particularly when doubts may arise as to the true meaning and scope of these provisions.

Matters are also governed by the Vienna Convention in articles 31, 32 and 33.

Convention de Vienne sur le droit des traités de 1969 - article 31
Convention de Vienne sur le droit des traités de 1969 - article 32

Article 31 contains the general rule, Article 32 contains certain additional means of interpretation and Article 33 deals with the problem of multilingual treaties.

Convention de Vienne sur le droit des traités de 1969 - article 33

Article 33 relates only to treaties adopted in more than one authentic language, it does not concern cases where the case has been concluded in only one authentic language, in which case the treaty is concluded in only one authentic language which is the only authentic language, as specified in the final provisions of the treaty.

If you have several authentic languages, you may have different interpretations. The United Nations Charter has five authentic languages, divergences may appear. Article 33 explains the principles to be applied in this case. However, the provision is somewhat problematic because the practice is richer.

What is interpretation? What does it mean to interpret?[modifier | modifier le wikicode]

This is a fairly typical function for the lawyer, because their work consists largely of understanding and interpreting texts.

The text takes on its true meaning and reveals only real problems in the face of concrete problems. The real problems will only be encountered in the application, we are going to have quite unexpected cases that will appear and raise questions, so we have to face this situation that requires interpretation.

In this case, interpretation is an operation of the mind that seeks to determine the legal meaning of a provision.

What are the concepts and rules of treaty interpretation?[modifier | modifier le wikicode]

The first thing to know is the meaning of some concepts:

  • we call authentic interpretation,

the interpretation emanating from all parties to the treaty. It may indeed happen that the treaty once concluded gives rise to doubts as to the meaning of certain provisions that appear, the parties to the treaty exchange views on them and determine the meaning of a provision. Thus, the parties determine how the provision is to be interpreted and, on the other hand, an interpretation can lead to agreement added to the treaty.

The parties act in concert and are the masters of the treaty, as they can modify it they can interpret it and say the correct interpretation. If all parties agree, then this interpretation is binding on the judge.

  • By extension, it is called an almost authentic interpretation,

the interpretation of a treaty by a large majority of the treaty, but not unanimously shared; this interpretation is not binding on the judge, but may be inspired by it if a generally accepted interpretation exists and can be determined.

  • Self-interpretation,

it should not be forgotten that the interpretation is first and foremost that of the text to which the subject has subscribed. When we conclude a contract in writing and want to perform it, it is relatively obvious that we ourselves will first interpret it as a consequence of understanding the contract.

Self-interpretation is the interpretation by each of the subjects in contrast to authentic interpretation, here each party individually interprets the treaty in the way it is interpreted according to its interests and prejudices. 99% of the cases of interpretations are self-interpretation and self-interpretation.

The only difference with domestic law is that in domestic law there is the guarantee of a judge who can deliver his authoritarian interpretation. In international law, because of sovereignty, we do not have a judge's guarantee, nor do we easily come to a judicial interpretation. If for disputes in domestic law interpretation is the rule, in international law it is the exception.

What exactly are we interpreting? Are we interpreting the text of the treaty above all, or are we looking first and foremost for the will of the parties?[modifier | modifier le wikicode]

For a long time it was a controversial issue, the two do not necessarily or frequently oppose each other.

The text is normally the best expression of the parties' will, the text and the will ideally meet. However, the text sometimes does not perfectly reflect the will of the treaties.

The opinion of jurists differed, some were in favour of the text even if it did not reflect the real will of the parties; they argued with legal certainty, the will hidden in the internal forces once it is not sufficiently manifested then it is not tangible enough to stick to it.

The text is much more certain, we can read it; the States that become party to the treaty later on knew that the text was not the interpretations.

Other jurists felt that prioritizing the text over the real will is ultimately giving priority to the means over the end. The end is the will, since a treaty is the consent of the parties and what they wanted to do is to pervert the order of things rather than give more weight to what is the basis and purpose of the treaty.

The Vienna Convention decided in favour of the text. All the means which recall the will of the parties have been relegated to Article 31 and its last paragraph as in the preparatory work, i. e. the debates at the conclusion of the treaty, this was decided in the process of interpretation of the Vienna Convention in Article 32. Complementary means of interpretation are not a primary means which is the text.

The reason for the Vienna Convention is legal certainty. The drafters of the Vienna Convention were aware that in international law there was no need for a judge to rule on the provisions.

A judge is an impartial and independent person who is capable of giving an objective meaning to the provision, in international cases it is self-interpretation which will prevail; the writers' fear was that if one relied on a will not specified in the text one opens the way to a manipulation of the treaty by the strongest.

Any liberty in relation to the text always means that the strongest can do as he wishes, the treaty is the one that constrains the most, because the most powerful cannot reinvent the text, it directs at a certain point.

Par conséquent, le plus sûr est le texte, comme dans les affaires internationales il y a beaucoup de fluctuations, d’incertitudes, de luttes de pouvoir et d’auto-interprétation, on a estimé que le texte été beaucoup plus sûr.

According to Beckett, "the use of the parties' common will is unrealistic inasmuch as" it is almost certain that the dispute will involve an element which [the parties] have not imagined ".[3].

How is a treaty interpreted?[modifier | modifier le wikicode]

The main rule is contained in Article 31 §1.

Convention de Vienne sur le droit des traités de 1969 - article 31

There are four elements in this formula, four alternative elements, four approaches that give a better understanding of the meaning of a provision:

  • good faith;
  • ordinary meaning;
  • the context;
  • object and purpose.

Interpretation is a matter of flexibility, of flexibility, it's art, that's why the right interpreter is not only a good lawyer, but also someone who has experience in legal matters with practical experience because it's only then that he can give intelligence to these elements and propose an interpretation in full knowledge of the facts.

What makes the difference in the quality of an interpretation is the ability to capture the entire legal environment of the problem and to integrate a subtle interpretation between firmness and flexibility. It is an art that one acquires little by little in one's life as a lawyer.

These different elements are not separated from each other, but interact. Interpretation is a matter of weighting. It is therefore a matter of integrating all the elements that must act together in a given case, of using them in such a way that they can be used consistently, and of counterpointing them.

Ordinary meaning also means natural meaning[modifier | modifier le wikicode]

Lawyers of all kinds on the continent use the term "grammatical interpretation", which means interpretation according to the text. The interpretation according to the ordinary meaning of the text is also the grammatical interpretation in the Latin sense of the term, i. e. verbs, syntax and signs.

The ordinary meaning of the text to which the Vienna Convention attached the greatest importance is not an absolute meaning of the terms, it cannot be said that such a word necessarily has an ordinary meaning, but it can sometimes be said in the context, it is the most reasonable sense, the one that surprises the least, the most usual in a given context. They will be interpreted according to these ordinary meanings.

Why is it preferred?

It is a question of externalizing the will and legal certainty, we don't want to surprise the parties by hearing senses. A special meaning is not excluded, that which deviates from ordinary use is a meaning which is likely to surprise, such a meaning should not bind unless it is really intended to refer to §4 of Article 31.

Convention de Vienne sur le droit des traités de 1969 - article 31

Thus, the special or particular meaning is only if the parties wanted to deviate from the ordinary meaning. One can deny the ordinary meaning that in the context of knowing what the parties should or could have understood in the context, what can be understood in good faith.

In the Eastern Greenland judgment in a dispute between Denmark and Norway, the case was referred to the Permanent Court of International Justice, which delivered its judgment in 1933.[4].

In the pleadings it had been argued by Norway that some of the conventions applicable to Greenland actually meant only part of Greenland, namely East Greenland. Norway argued that although these conventions use the term Greenland, it meant only part of this continent.

The Permanent Court replied before the Vienna Convention, Series A bar 53 page 52 that "the natural meaning of this term is its geographical meaning as it appears from the maps, if Norway maintains that these treaties use the word Greenland in a special sense it is up to it to demonstrate it"; however, Greenland has not demonstrated this.

The ordinary meaning is meant to preserve the essential meaning. If the parties had wanted to deal with East Greenland, they would have dealt with East Greenland. However, it is not excluded that imperfect expression may occur, but this will not be taken into account under the ordinary meaning rule.

If the interested parties can show that when this treaty was concluded that the parties understood a special meaning then it would prevail, but only when all the parties agreed to give Greenland a special meaning at the time of the conclusion of this treaty.

Context[modifier | modifier le wikicode]

This is also referred to as systematic interpretation, meaning that it is interpreted in the system as a whole, i. e. in context.

Context is an equally essential and intuitive rule. If we look for the meaning of a word contained in a convention, we will not immediately look at the word and ignore everything else, we will do the opposite. First we will look at the sentence in which the word is inserted, the paragraph, the layout, the section, etc., and try to see if the systematic aspect of things can shed light. Context can sometimes make it possible to shed significant light on the meaning of a word.

Good faith[modifier | modifier le wikicode]

It is an interesting element, good faith essentially means two things; first of all, a temperament to know that one must privilege the reasonable sense rather than an excessively literal meaning, which is similar to the ordinary sense, because one seeks the most reasonable meaning in the context. The reasonable meaning of words requires good faith, so ordinary sense and good faith join and oppose an excessively literal meaning. The terms should not be taken in absolute terms, but in context.

Good faith also has a more specific meaning because it adds something specific. Good faith sometimes requires repudiating interpretations that attach themselves to the letter in order to repudiate the spirit. In Corinthians 3:6 says "the letter kills, but the spirit gives life".

Sometimes there are interpretations compatible with the text.

Reported by Vatel and Grotius, the Spartans had concluded an armistice with another Greek people in which it was written that for 30 days there would be the silence of arms. After the thirtieth day during the night the Spartans attacked. Confronted with the armistice agreement, they argued that the agreement had been honoured because it was for 30 days, not 30 days and 30 nights. This interpretation respects a literal meaning.

Obviously that was not the meaning of the terms, it was understandable to everyone by virtue of good faith.

The Germans had argued at the world premiere that in war law, the 1914 declaration of The Hague prohibited projectiles containing asphyxiating gases, as they had used cylinders that was not prohibited.

Object and purpose[modifier | modifier le wikicode]

These are two different things, the object of the treaty is the subject matter subject to regulation; the object of the treaty is the purpose for which it is intended.

By way of example, the object of the treaty can be maritime navigation, because there are uses, consecrated terms, practices, if we know these uses and practices, i. e. the object of regulation, we are able to interpret much better.

The aim is the purpose, the will of the legislator. It has always been interpreted in the sense of purpose. The purpose is always an indication of how to interpret.

This is also called the teleological interpretation referring to the word "telo" in Greek (τέλος) which means "the purpose" so it is an interpretation in finality or in Latin a interpretation in ratio legis.

For example, in the case of certain United Nations expenditures, an advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice dated 1952, a question was raised as to whether the United Nations could conduct peacekeeping operations. Can the United Nations organize peacekeeping operations; nothing is certain, but the Charter has been interpreted in a flexible way; the arguments were to say that the purpose of the United Nations Charter was to maintain peace; the United Nations must be a means of inventing other means of maintaining peace, otherwise it will not be able to pursue the primary purpose of the Charter, which is to ensure international security.

By this example, we know that teleological interpretation is often a supporting interpretation, it is not an autonomous argumentation, because it provides additional support by providing teleological arguments. If we stick to the goal, we can rewrite a whole text.

There are maxims of interpretation[modifier | modifier le wikicode]

  • interpretation in accordance with international law: this means that in case of doubt one interprets in a consistent manner so that there is no conflict between norms. This principle applies mainly in domestic law; domestic law will be applied in such a way that it is in conformity with international obligations. This rule also exists in international law, as has recently been the case law of the European Court of Human Rights or the Security Council's sanctions against individuals suspected of terrorism.
  • useful effect: it is better for things to live than to perish; it is a rule in case of doubt, if one can interpret things in a way that is interpretative, but also in an interpretative way, because two interpretations are compatible with the text, however there is doubt. We can and must make our choice in favour of interpretation A if it turns out that interpretation A guarantees a meaning to the terms in question while interpretation B deprives it of any effect. For example, in a treaty we have a word X, by interpreting it as A it makes a difference in the application of the provision; if we apply interpretation B the word no longer has any meaning; in this case we will not assume that interpretation B is correct.
  • contrario argumentation
  • argument by analogy
  • argumenta fortiori
  • similar argument

These are arguments that can be used as strong arguments in legal arguments when interpreting a provision.

For example, let's say that in domestic law we go to a lawn on which there is a sign saying that it is forbidden to walk on the lawn. You think you can't walk on the lawn, but you see someone walking into the lawn biking. So we tell him that he can't go in, he retorts that he doesn't walk, but rides his bike.

It is a question of interpretation; if we interpret this on the other hand, it means that the legislator wanted to prohibit only one thing, he does not want us to walk on it. If this is the purpose of the rule then going by car on the lawn is not a problem; conversely, if walking is forbidden then anything else is allowed.

If we interpret it differently, it is only a question of protecting the lawn, the legislator has not been very intelligent in specifying only "walk". At this moment one interprets by analogy and a fortiori, if it is forbidden to walk on the lawn then by analogy it is forbidden to cycle on it and a fortiori, because in view of the goal which is to preserve the lawn to walk on it the abyss to 10% and to go to cycle on it the damage to 30%.

This example shows that if the subject matter is understood differently, the same will be true for argumentation, because it is not possible to interpret it mechanically, the arguments occur in legal argumentation, they never give a solution, they must be understood in the sense of the text.

End of treaties[modifier | modifier le wikicode]

Treaties are made to last, which is why in antiquity they were engraved in stones, but they are human works that do not last forever.

There are moments and events leading to the termination of treaties.

These provisions are found in Articles 42 et seq.

Convention de Vienne sur le droit des traités de 1969 - article 42
Convention de Vienne sur le droit des traités de 1969 - article 43
Convention de Vienne sur le droit des traités de 1969 - article 44
Convention de Vienne sur le droit des traités de 1969 - article 45

The second paragraph of Article 42 states that "the termination of a treaty, its denunciation or the withdrawal of a party may take place only in accordance with the provisions of the treaty or this Convention. The same rule applies to the suspension of the application of a treaty."

This means that the termination of a treaty can only be pleaded for a reason recognised in the Vienna Convention or for reasons provided for in the treaty itself.

We do not wish to give States the possibility of inventing other grounds for terminating a treaty because it is a sensitive matter; if a State could plead termination of a treaty by its inventions, it would be contrary to the pacta sund servenda principle. In international law, the treaty plays the role of the law.

The reasons for completing a treaty can be classified according to different criteria: the simplest and most justified criterion is that of distinguishing between subjective and objective grounds for extinguishment.

These two terms always have the same meaning in legal science. When subjective considerations are mentioned, one always aims at something having to do with the will, subjective is what is voluntary, in the case of treaties there are certain motives for terminating a treaty that flow from the will of the parties. The objective criteria are independent of the will of the parties, here are grounds for extinctions based on external circumstances and not based on the will of the parties.

Article 42 §2 uses different terms: termination, denunciation or withdrawal. So there are three terms:

  • extinction: termination of the treaty, it is no longer at a certain point in time, it is extinguished.
  • denunciation and withdrawal: means of terminating a treaty vis-à-vis certain parts of the treaty. The treaty continues to exist, simply it will no longer bind certain parties, the personal scope of the treaty will have been narrowed.

In both cases, there is the cessation of the application of the treaty for certain States and that is why the Vienna Convention regulates these terms together; the legal problems are the same; the danger to the principle of stability of treaties is the same.

  • Subjective reasons linked to the will of the contracting parties:

The vast majority of these grounds are summarized in section 54. It is possible to have express consent of the parties to terminate an earlier treaty. This express consent may take the form of an abrogatory agreement, i. e. an agreement between States that a specified earlier treaty is no longer in force from a certain date; this express agreement may take the form of a new treaty on the subject matter of another treaty as set out in the preamble of the new treaty.

Convention de Vienne sur le droit des traités de 1969 - article 54


The new Panama Canal Treaty of 1977 replaces the 1903 treaty, the abrogation of the old one is inserted in the new treaty, but the new treaty regulates the matter, it replaces the old one. It is also possible to have express consent to terminate an old treaty informally, i.e. without entering into a new agreement, i.e. without abrogatory or replacement.

In 1946, the Assembly of the League of Nations met for the last time, taking the decision to dissolve the society with effect from the next day. A resolution by the Assembly to dissolve the League of Nations was legally tantamount to terminating the League of Nations pact. The League of Nations pact is terminated by an informal agreement.

Sometimes there may be implicit consent not to continue the application of an old treaty. Some of the old Russia's trade treaties were not continued after the Bolshevik revolution, since Russia has radically changed putting an end to the application of liberal economic agreements, especially with Japan, it is an implicit consent to end the treaty.

The resolutory clauses fall under Article 54 is a clause inserted in the treaty intended by the parties that says that after a certain period of time has elapsed or when a certain event occurs, the treaty must cease to be in force. Sometimes a treaty is concluded with limited temporality and can be renewed. This means that the treaty is in force for the specified period of time and if it is not renewed, the treaty ceases to apply at the end of the specified date.

Some treaties say that if certain events occur, the treaty must cease to apply, as is the case with alliances.

It should be remembered that withdrawing from a treaty means withdrawing a party to the treaty.

Can a treaty be denounced?[modifier | modifier le wikicode]

Convention de Vienne sur le droit des traités de 1969 - article 55
Convention de Vienne sur le droit des traités de 1969 - article 56

Answers are given in articles 55 and 56 of the Vienna Convention; the principles are:

  1. A treaty which makes no provision for denunciation, i. e. it does not have denunciation clauses inserted in its text, is considered, except for a few examples, not to be denounceable. The principle is that a treaty cannot be denounced by a State party. The analogy with contracts does not work, because treaties are the substitute for the law; treaties are not negotiated for several years to give each State the possibility of denouncing the treaty when it does so. A treaty that is not denunciable is not eternal, one can always modify a treaty, one can conclude special agreements that have priority over the general treaty, or even make an amendment with all the other parties to the treaty.
  2. Denunciation is permitted if the treaty itself provides for and permits denunciation. Treaties may therefore contain a clause covered by the will of the parties according to which States parties to the treaty may denounce them under certain conditions, such as, for example, the 1976 Outer Space Treaty in article 16, which provides that it may be denounced under certain conditions. A whole series of treaties have clauses of this kind that can be applied and enforceable through negotiation. For treaties between Switzerland and the European Union, Switzerland has inserted a negotiation clause depending on certain circumstances.
  3. If the Treaty is silent on the possibility of denunciation, if it does not contain denunciation clauses, there are exceptions resulting from Article 56. There are two exceptions:
  • if there is an implicit intention to permit the denunciation of a treaty, it may be exercised, i. e. the parties to the treaty at the time of the conclusion of the treaty have subsequently accepted an denunciation, but have not written it in the treaty; if such an intention can be proved, a denunciation power may be enjoyed. This is the case of the Charter of the United Nations, it is established that a State may denounce the Charter of the United Nations, according to Article 108 of the Charter of the United Nations a resolution may be imposed on a Member State. In San Francisco was said that denunciation is allowed, but this was not written following the experience of the League of Nations which had a denunciation clause; all dictatorial powers left the League of Nations in order to be free from their acts.
  • denunciation is permissible if, as stated in article 54 of the Vienna Convention, it is intended that the parties should admit denunciation. Some treaties are so fluctuating in nature that it is hard to imagine that States would not want to allow them to leave. The classic example is alliances, which are based on a series of political affinity criteria that give meaning to the alliance. A change of regime can change the meaning of an alliance and therefore the nature of the treaty is such that it justifies denunciation. In case of doubt, denunciation cannot be assumed since the general principle is that a treaty which does not provide for denunciation is not denunciation, the interpretation is strict.

Denunciation does not put an end to the treaty, simply the State withdraws, but in the case of a bilateral treaty denunciation puts an end to the treaty, however this is possible in the case of a multilateral convention; in the case of the 1948 convention against genocide, there is in article 15 a quorum of 16 States, if denunciation were to result in a withdrawal from the quorum, the treaty ceases to apply. If Switzerland denounces the bilateral agreements with the European Union then they would cease to exist.

  • Objective reasons provided by law which do not depend on the will of the parties:

There are potentially a whole range of objective grounds, such as, for example, Article 61, which deals with material impossibilities of executions. In some cases, a treaty may be concluded on an object that can no longer be realized, such as an island that is ceded to a foreign State but is swallowed up by the sea, in which case the very object of the treaty disappears.

Convention de Vienne sur le droit des traités de 1969 - article 61

In domestic law, this is much more frequent, in international law it is rather rare, and therefore it is a ground that does not need to be particularly discussed.

Armed conflict suspends and very rarely terminates certain treaties; the Vienna Convention does not regulate it particularly, as this is not covered by the law of peace and the law of war. Succession of States is also a reason for terminating a treaty.

Two grounds are found in article 60 of the Vienna Convention, which deals with the termination of the treaty following its violation, and article 62, which is the fundamental change of circumstance.

Convention de Vienne sur le droit des traités de 1969 - article 60
Convention de Vienne sur le droit des traités de 1969 - article 62

In Article 60, it is the case of a treaty violated by one party, must the other party continue to execute it?

As long as the treaty is not suspended, that is the case. The question is precisely whether the violation cannot give the injured State the right to suspend or terminate a treaty. In other words, the breach may possibly be grounds for suspending or in some cases terminating a treaty.

This will be appropriate for reasons of practice and fairness: the injured state is recognized to do something.

The title of section 60 isTermination or suspension of the operation of a treatyas a consequence of its breach. There is a rather rich practice.

What is the applicable regime?[modifier | modifier le wikicode]

First, it should be noted that article 60 is based on a fundamental distinction between a substantial breach of a treaty and a mere breach of a treaty. There are two types of violation:

  • material: serious breach
  • simple: violation that is not a violation

A material breach gives rise to certain rights.

Substantial "is not a legal term, it is a term that must be defined, there must be a definition otherwise we would not understand anything and it is found in §3, it is" a rejection of the treaty not authorized by this Convention; or the violation of a provision essential to the achievement of the object or purpose of the treaty ".

The repudiation of the treaty is a total rejection, one does not apply the treaty, it is obvious that it is difficult to find a more serious violation than that of not applying anything.

In the event of a material breach, there are certain options, in other words, if the breach is material, the treaty may be suspended or terminated under certain conditions.

If the breach is not substantial, it is a less material provision, and the injured party was not given the opportunity to terminate the treaty. In the case of a non-substantial violation one is rejected in the field of State responsibility, i.e. the international responsibility of States by seeking reparations or otherwise; the injured State must seek reparation, but cannot use the context to terminate the treaty.

The Convention tries to protect the treaty either from a small violation or to prevent abuse.

In the case of bilateral and multilateral treaties, what can be done is slightly different. That is why the Convention distinguishes between the two cases.

In the case of bilateral treaties, in the event of a substantial breach, the Convention recognizes that the other State party which is automatically the injured party either to suspend or terminate the treaty if the breach relates to a specific object of suspension or termination with effect ex nunc, i. e. without retroactivity, is not in the area of treaty validity. There is the procedure laid down in Article 65 which must be followed. It is a relative means for the aggrieved party to terminate the treaty, because it is a stronger means than finding without a judge.

Convention de Vienne sur le droit des traités de 1969 - article 65

For multilateral treaties, it is more complex because there are more situations. Thus, the Vienna Convention distinguishes three possible scenarios:

1) Article 60, paragraph 2 (a), what States parties to the treaty may do except the violator: If we have all concluded a treaty, is that one party violates the treaty; if everyone agrees, either the treaty may be suspended or terminated in whole or in part, either with respect to the violator or between all parties.

  • the first case would be to say "he violated the substance of the treaty", we will simply exclude the rapist from the treaty.
  • it may be decided to stop, because the violating State may have become aware of problems inherent in the treaty, in which case it may be possible to exercise the power to terminate the treaty by consensus.

2) the case of the part that has been especially affected or affected

The first question that arises is: what does it mean to be a party specifically harmed by the violation?

In some multilateral treaties, we have situations in which different States parties to the convention can be distinguished by the violation of the Convention. In the case of a multilateral treaty on extradition, i.e. mutual assistance in criminal matters, there is a case where extradition must be "implemented by State A vis-à-vis State B". Assuming that the accused person is not surrendered, then all parties are affected because the breach affects trust, there is legitimate fear about the scope and life of the treaty; however, only one party is specifically affected. The Vienna Convention confers certain rights on the affected State: these rights are far below the rights that the Convention grants to States acting by mutual agreement under letter (a).

What can the specially affected part do?

There is the possibility of invoking the substantial breach only to suspend the treaty and not to terminate the treaty in whole or in part and only with respect to the violating State.

In other words, what can be done as a specially affected party is that the treaty can be suspended with respect to the violator in order to put both states on an equal footing only with respect to the violator.

We see a considerable difference: it cannot end the treaty, but only suspend it. One should always consider unilateral allegation. The convention considers that when all other parties act in concert, the risk is practically nil. On the other hand, the party especially affected is all by itself, one cannot know the truth of its allegations. This would open the door to abuse, which is why the substantial breach is quite sufficient. 3) the third case is Article 60 (c), they are integral treaties, treaties that are not bilateral with any party not specifically affected.

A multilateral extradition treaty is nothing more than the sum of an extradition treaty. The multilateral treaty can be divided into a multilateral treaty, exactly by [n*(n-1]/2

Let us take a treaty on demilitarisation or denuclearisation of a certain region in the case of peaceful denuclearisation. All States undertake not to introduce nuclear weapons into a given area in a region. If a State inserts a nuclear weapon, there is not a specially affected State, all of them are specifically affected.

It is an objective situation that changes things. This is the typical example of a treaty whose structure is different from a bilateralisable treaty.

Each State Party outside the violator; each party may declare suspension of the treaty and only suspension of the treaty in whole or in part vis-à-vis all other parties to the treaty.

What changes is that all states are especially affected and basically all can suspend the treaty. What also changes is that the treaty is suspended from all others, including the violator.

As each State can do individually, there is no more than suspension.

Two exceptions should be mentioned.

In paragraph 4 are the provisions which, in the treaties, are to be applied in cases of violations or in cases which include the violation of the treaty, such as, for example, the provision on the settlement of disputes stating what can and must be done in the case of a dispute over the application or interpretation of this Convention. It is said that each party can bring a case before the Court of Justice, which is an attractive clause for dispute resolution.

One party says "you violated the treaty" while the other denies; it would be absurd if in this case the clause referring to the International Court of Justice saying that this clause was suspended following the termination of the treaty were not applied.

It is much more logical to say that the powers given to the State to terminate or suspend a treaty have been inserted in the final provisions; therefore, the clause giving jurisdiction to the International Court of Justice is not suspended, paragraph 4 is applied.

Paragraphs 1 to 3 of Article 60 on the consequences of a material breach of a treaty apply only in the case of material breaches.

The Geneva Conventions on the protection of persons in the event of armed conflict or certain human rights treaties, for example, cannot be suspended or terminated because they are treaties protecting third parties. Since these are not bilateral benefits of States, it is not permitted to suspend or terminate treaties.

There are certain standards where we cannot measure ourselves according to the principle of reciprocity, reciprocity does not apply in these areas even if it is a great principle.

Clause 62 deals with the fundamental change of circumstances, i. e., the treaty is concluded at a given time on the basis of certain circumstances, facts or events. After the treaties have been concluded, there is a radical change in circumstances, for example, an economic treaty is concluded on the basis of an exchange based on fixed to floating exchange rates.

Can we consider that the treaty is over? This is a complex and debated issue, but never since 1969 has this provision been successfully implemented.

This provision says "a change of circumstances cannot be invoked to terminate a treaty"; things always change. This principle is that a change in circumstances does not count as grounds for terminating a treaty, but there are exceptions that are cumulative conditions:

  • the circumstances at issue must have existed at the time of the conclusion of the treaty and the parties must have given their consent to be bound by the treaty solely with respect to the existence of those circumstances. Circumstances exist at the time of ratification of a treaty between two States depending on circumstances, but which change fundamentally thereafter; an imbalance often arises unfairly.
  • the change of circumstances must not have been foreseen by the parties.

The custom[modifier | modifier le wikicode]

It is quite specific that a society, especially the international society, should be governed by customary law. We are not accustomed to customary law, because in domestic law it has a subordinate and marginal role.

This is not the case in international law, where there are no legislators and laws in the formal sense, except for treaties, so there is a right emerging from practice and precedents, i. e. States find ways to deal with things that serve more or less everyone, creating a minimum of legal certainty that gradually leads to the alignment of States with practice.

For a long time international law has been fundamentally customary, and it is only recently that we have a series of multilateral conventions worthy of the name. This is a recent phenomenon, previously the common law of customary law.

A few comments are helpful:

First, in treaties, the essential thing for States is to have legal certainty and stability, which is why the violation of treaties is not prohibited except for human rights treaties. Violations are rare because States seek security so that they can count on what others will do.

In customary law, we don't really seek stability, because it moves much more often, a right stemming from the practice moves regularly. We are looking for flexibility, the international society is moving and evolving at an increasingly rapid pace over the last two or three hundred years; there are new conditions, the conventions are very difficult to modify, if we do not have a unanimous agreement we are each time in front of a mountain.

The conventions do not guarantee flexibility; we need a safety valve so that the law stays close to the facts of international society and follows the contours of reality.

If we add the sources, we have both the cluster of stability and the pole of flexibility interacting.

Secondly, the second point is to provide general international law. The general law is almost exclusively customary law, the treaty law of general law.

What is meant by "general law"?[modifier | modifier le wikicode]

It is a right that applies to all States regardless of everything else, it is in that sense where the law is general or common, a treaty will never apply to any other party than those that have ratified the treaty; customary law applies to all States of the world, it is a rule that applies to all at the same time.

This indicates the residual function of custom: when analysing a problem in international law, the first thing to do is to check whether there are applicable treaties or particular law. Once it has been ascertained whether there is no particular law, applicable treaty, acquiescence or diplomatic note, it is not that there is no applied law, but it automatically reverts to general international law.

If there are no rules with priority according to the lex speiciali rule, one falls back into general law. Customary law provides a residual basis if there is no specific rule to be adopted for certain situations that avoid a number of loopholes.

Customary law may not provide rules, but it has a gap-filling function that is left by the particular law, as it is always residually applicable.

What is custom?[modifier | modifier le wikicode]

A simple equation is always used to define this concept: the customary must is said to be made up of two elements, it is the "doctrine of both elements":

  • pratical
  • opinio juris

The custom would be the conjunction of a practice and a juris, i.e. an opinion on the law; both of these elements are cumulative, requiring a practice and a subjective consideration.

Custom = practice + opinio juris


Practice: objective element[modifier | modifier le wikicode]

Whose practice?

The general rule is that it is state practice that counts, because customary international law is basically the practice of states, the other subjects have a much lesser voice.

In States it is now accepted that all organs of the State can contribute to customary practice. Previously it was sometimes said that it was only the practice of the Head of State and the Minister of Foreign Affairs that mattered, but it is completely outdated. It is mainly state practice that matters, but it is not the only one, however it is the most important, because the last word always belongs to the states.

In humanitarian matters, the ICRC's practice has a certain weight, but does not bind States; the practice of the United Nations on peacekeeping operations is a fundamental practice for the legal framework of peacekeeping operations; the rules on peacekeeping operations have been formatted in a very significant way by the various secretaries-general of the United Nations. It is the Secretary-General who lays down the rules and therefore the various secretaries of the United Nations have contributed to a practice on peacekeeping operations that has led to a practice accepted by States.

What is the quality of the practice? What is a practice?

This is a question of the intrinsic quality of the acts. It will always be said that the practice consists of three elements:

  • constancy
  • uniformity
  • generality

A practice must, in other words, be consistent and uniform and general in order for a rule of customary law to emerge as a general international rule.

By practice, we mean either act or omission, a practice can also consist of an act i. e. a "do" or an "omission", i. e. a "nondoctor".

There are a whole series of negative customs based on omission.

In the law of the sea, the rule that a territorial State in which a foreign ship anchors cannot prosecute crimes on the ship has gradually emerged, this is reserved for the flag State. The territorial State shall refrain from initiating proceedings under its criminal authorities.

However, a ship entering a State's port enters the territory and yet States do not prosecute, as they have found that they leave this to the flag State; it is essentially a flag State case that is valid only for crimes not having an impact on the territorial State. It is an omission that has given rise to a customary rule of abstention.

The purpose of the rule is an omission and this practice was based on abstention.

Second, it is considered that the practice may consist of physical acts or verbal acts; this means that the practice is either physical acts such as the arrest of a vessel claiming jurisdiction to arrest a vessel, but the practice is also verbal, i. e. declarations, for example to the United Nations General Assembly, which is a State practice.

A declaration is not only a matter of juris) but also of practice.

A final remark relates to the frequency of practice, which requires consistency, uniformity and generality; cases may be different.

Cases of diplomatic or state immunity are very common in domestic courts, almost every day a court will recognize immunity to a foreign state. This means that perhaps hundreds of precedents cannot be very numerous, because others may go in a different direction.

There are cases where there is very little practice, because the opportunities lack practice; the precedent depends very much on the circumstances being inserted in a principle of relativity.

Angaria is traditionally the requisitioning of a foreign ship for public service; the last precedent is a Chilean precedent of 1955.

The conditions for practicing angaria are so exceptional that there are perhaps three cases in a century; if in the three cases where the situation arises one does the same then it prevails as a practice.

  • constancy

It is a temporal element, it is the continuity of the practice in time, in fact, almost conceptually one cannot speak of a practice unless something repeats itself in time. A practice implies a succession of relatively similar acts.

If time is an indispensable criterion for a practice for conceptual reasons, it must be said that the constant criterion had its moment of glory in the past, whereas now it has failed in much smaller categories.

In the 19th century, it was rightly said that a custom was based on a long tradition or prolonged practice with the characteristic of antiquity. Trade between states was very rudimentary.

The reality today is that there is no requirement to participate in time; on the contrary, it is said that time can be short for the formation of a custom if the practice is uniform and consistent. We do not want to prevent States as legislators from adopting a practice; everything becomes a question of the quality of the practice if it is sufficiently uniform, followed, frequent; that is enough.

The International Court of Justice explained it in 1969 in the 1969 North Sea Continental Shelf cases, which can be found on page 43 of the 1969 Compendium.[5][6].

An example of a custom that has grown rapidly because it responded to the interests of States is that of the exclusive economic zone; maritime States have a coastal frontage, inland waters, a territorial sea and a possible continuous zone and an exclusive economic zone that extends to 2,000 coastal sailors.

It was officially launched in 1974 by Kenya, in 1985 the International Court of Justice in the case of the continental shelf between Libya and Malta[7] explained that the practice was already customary. 1974 is the immediate starting point, probably towards the late 1970s - late 1980s it had become a practice because almost all states had declared an exclusive economic zone.

However, consistency is a quite relative element in the formation of custom.

  • uniformity

Substantive criterion or condition, for there to be a practice that could give rise to a customary norm, the relevant acts must be sufficiently similar. In other words, every time a problem has arisen, the same thing has been done; in the area of convergence a rule is potentially established. Whenever there was a problem with a diplomat, there was a recognition of diplomatic immunity because he represents a foreign head of state.

If every time the problem has arisen we have done different things, then we do not have a practice, because it assumes a similarity. The International Court of Justice in the 1950 Diplomatic Right of Asylum case granted the Peruvian embassy a fleeing revolutionary; the International Court of Justice held that there was no special custom granted to Latin American countries on embassies.

In the 1950 Compendium at page 77, the Court concluded that the Latin American countries had done different things each time to ensure that these acts were sufficiently uniform, the Court spoke of fluctuation, disparity or even political motives.

  • generality

The practice must be general and this makes perfect sense, for it is only if it is general that a standard of general international law can be produced. A general standard applies to all subjects of international law, i.e. all States; for a standard to be binding on all States of the world, a general practice is needed, for it would be tempting if a minority were to practice something, then all States would be bound by what a minority does.

"General" does not mean "unanimous "; there is virtually no practice that we can call frankly and completely" unanimous "except in a few rare cases, notably that of immunities.

The custom is not an agreement, however, the doctrine explains that the simple majority is not enough either, because we do not see how a simple majority could bind other States, because States are sovereign, they are not supposed to be subject to a majority. It is more or less concluded that a significant majority of States are needed.

If we approach the issue from a quantitative point of view, it is unsatisfactory, because it does not reflect reality, what is actually happening in this generality criterion is that a majority of States are practicing something, if a new problem arises and we do not know what to do, then the first ones confronted with this problem imagine practicable, useful, timely solutions, other States follow; So there are a number of States that practice and it is growing. What matters is not to count up to a certain number, but it is the reaction of the other States affected by this practice.

These states basically have two possibilities:

  1. object, because they find that this rule is not good and at this time the customary rule cannot be established because it is not generalized.
  2. if the other States affected by this growing practice do not object, there is more or less quickly a general practice in the absence of an objection.

The objection is the crucial element, it is a negative element, we look at objections. If we have a bloc of States that formulates an objection, there can be no customary rule if beyond a bloc there are dissenting voices in different blocs; then we can say that the customary rule has not been established.

The generality of the practice is measured by the States that practise and do not oppose it; the fundamental element is the absence of opposition.

It is stated in the books that objection and protest is a crucial element in law because it prevents customary rules from forming that prevent subjective situations from arising, and the State can protest against this fact. The objection to the virtue of preventing a situation from happening including the formation of a customary rule.

The International Court has invented the argument of particularly representative States whose adherence to the practice in question would be particularly important. This criterion is sometimes and sometimes not justified.

Opinio juris: subjective element[modifier | modifier le wikicode]

The element of theopinio juris est subjectif, It is an opinion, a voluntary projection, a representation when practice is a material fact.

This subjective element relates to practice, acts and omissions in practice. The essence of l’opinio juris is that the State which practices or fails to do the acts of interest to us considers that it is for legal reasons that it acts as it acts. The State practices and may do so for legal reasons, either because it considers that a legal norm has already been created or if it considers that customary law has not yet been formed; this practice it does or adheres to is a practice it legally recommends, and it is the practice it intends to adopt on the element in question.

The opinio juris has been justified by a negative function, because there is a whole series of practices in international life that are quite constant, but which are not legal practices, they are mere usages.

A use is something that is done for non-legal reasons. There is a whole series of acts that are invariably done, but where States are not convinced to act according to the law, but according to political freedom.

The opinio juris is a question of opinion non-juris that States leave outside the law.

The International Court of Justice has eloquently recalled in the North Sea continental shelf cases: "not only must the acts in question represent a consistent practice, but they must also testify, by their nature or the manner in which they are carried out, to the conviction that this practice is made compulsory by the existence of a rule of law. The need for such a conviction, i.Perhe. the existence of a subjective element, is implicit in the very notion of opinio juris sive necessitatis. Interested States must therefore feel that they are complying with what amounts to a legal obligation. Neither the frequency nor even the habituality of the acts is sufficient. There are many international acts, in the field of protocol for example, which are almost invariably accomplished, but are motivated by mere considerations of courtesy, expediency or tradition and not by the feeling of a legal obligation ".

In these acts, which are not motivated by a legal consideration, the scope of these acts remains simple usages which are non-binding grounds.

If a warship is encountered on the high seas there is a salutation ceremony, if a ship does not engage in the ceremony it will simply be considered rude.

The opinio juris is above all there to discard the practices that States would do with the conviction that is outside the law.

There are matters in international law where custom is more defined by the opinio juris than by practice. There are materials wherel’opinio juris has become the main criterion, particularly in the field of human rights and humanitarian fields such as torture, since there are too many acts of torture. If we follow the practice, there would be no prohibition of torture, but we take States by word rather than by deeds, that is to say the opinio juris.

What is the relationship between treaties and custom?[modifier | modifier le wikicode]

This relationship is multiple and rich. Treaties can either as a whole, or according to the norms they contain, position themselves in relation to customary law in three ways:

  • a treaty may be declarative of customary law.
  • a treaty may constitute a customary norm.
  • a treaty can crystallize customary law.
1. treaty declaring customary law

This is the object of a codification agreement, a treaty that describes what already exists in customary law. We write the customs that we will codify, the treaty does not invent anything essential, it transcribes customary law in writing. To a very large extent, the treaty and custom are in any case aligned at the time the treaty is adopted; the treaty reflects customary law, both of which say the same thing. However, customary law continues to evolve in contrast to the treaty; the treaty has the function of declaring custom.

2. founding treaty

A treaty that innovates, it does not codify existing customary rules, but rather created rules that will become customary rules. Rule 54 of Additional Protocol I was a customary rule of the Geneva Convention.

Protocole additionnel aux Conventions de Genève du 12 août 1949 relatif à la protection des victimes des conflits armés internationaux (Protocole I), 8 juin - article 54


3. crystallization of a custom by a treaty

It's a rarer hypothesis. We have a customary practice that is already relatively well-fed, but there is doubt as to whether the previous practice has already been established as a customary rule.

There is a conference at which States meet to discuss the subject of a treaty to which they accede massively. The last step between the practice and its customary character is considered to have been taken at the time of codification of the treaty; the treaty confirms the customary rule.

A custom was defined in the convention governing outer space at the time of the launch of Sputnik. At the 1967 Conference, the Convention on Outer Space was adopted and decided that it should become a customary rule.

What is the persistent objector?[modifier | modifier le wikicode]

It is explained to us that sometimes, on the basis of some explicit precedents that a State which has objected to the formation of a new custom, once the customary rule is established and continues to object, it is sometimes said that the new customary norm will not apply to the persistent objector as long as it maintains the objection.

One must be careful, because customary rules are dealt with in formation, if one accepts the doctrine of the persistent objector, one can ensure that the custom is not applicable to the objector.

A State may not be able to accept a new customary rule because of its constitution, by objecting to the custom it could during the transitional period in order to change the constitution against the application of this custom otherwise it could violate its constitution.

For Professor Kolb, there is a great deal of doubt about this rule, as it does not apply for the simple reason that a state is not going to say that it is a persistent objector. It is therefore unclear whether this criterion applies.

New states[modifier | modifier le wikicode]

There are some States that are born at a given moment and wonder whether it is their position on the previous customary rules.

What about the previous customary rule?

The new State is born in international law as it was at the time of its birth and is therefore bound by all the customary rules it finds at the time of its birth. It is impossible that each time a new State is born, it should be able to question the generality of the customary rule.

In the case of decolonization, many States are born with a different ideology, practising differently from the old States, by practicing a opinio juris that will change the custom. If a sufficiently large number of States practice a new rule, then the old custom disappears in favour of a new practice. It is because they are part of the system that they can change the custom.

The regional custom[modifier | modifier le wikicode]

There are also regional customs, i. e. special customs that bind only a few States in the world, but not all of them. The regional term is not necessarily relevant, because States are not necessarily neighbours, they can be from all over the world. The criterion may be neighbourhood, cultural or religious.

Regional or particular customs may extend to a custom practised in up to two States; the peculiarity may extend to a minimum.

A custom allowed Portugal to join its enclaves, particularly that of Goa in India. The International Court accepted a trilateral custom between France, Spain and Andorra. Since Andorra does not have prisons to imprison long sentences, convicts can be imprisoned in French and Spanish prisons. The Court accepted that a trilateral custom was the legal basis for detention in France.

The custom may be reduced to a few States; the particular custom always derogates from the general custom. If the States in question practiced the same thing as the others, then there would be a universal custom, regional custom would appear in the light of the general custom binding only those States which practise expressly only regional practice. However, a State shall not be presumed to have a regional custom, but shall be universal; however, by way of derogation, special custom is only practised between the States concerned.

General principles of law[modifier | modifier le wikicode]

The general principles of law are recognized by civilized nations in Article 38 §1 letter c) of the Statute of the International Court of Justice.

We distinguish between the general principles of law recognized by civilized nations and the general principles of international law.

General principles of international law[modifier | modifier le wikicode]

They are principles, i. e. rules of great importance and generality that already exist in international law, and they are important rules of international law that are called "principles of international law" such as certain rules such as the principle of non-use of force or the principle of self-determination of peoples, or the principle of consent in the law of treaties, but also the principle of good faith.

A whole series of proposals of general importance and therefore referred to as the general principles of international law. With regard to its importance and scope of application of the principle of non-use of force, we can see that this rule has a higher density and a higher importance than other rules, they are points of reference in the legal order.

These are international rules of customary law.

General principles of law[modifier | modifier le wikicode]

Article 38 §1 (c) did not simply recall the general principles of international law. By the general principles recognized by civilized nations we wanted to do something else, namely to extend the domain of sources.

To understand, we must go back to the 1920s; the writers' fear was that if we applied the main source of Article 38, we might sometimes have no legal answer; moreover, in 1920 there were very few multilateral treaties, we had just had the League of Nations pact.

Customary law in 1920?!

Perhaps, but, first of all, it is a custom of an ancient culture, it takes time to establish an undisputed custom, there is the element of time, but also a need for convergence in the international community.

There is a risk that the legal operator will not find applicable rules. At this point, if we leave it at that, it means that the judge must either reject a flaw or say that he cannot decide in law. States therefore remain free to act as they see fit.

The drafters considered it useful to insert another source which is the general principles.

In the absence of other rules, the legal operator can, because he is a lawyer, turn to domestic legal systems and see if he can find a common rule within domestic legal systems. We should see whether in the major legal systems there is a common rule, i.e. in each of these legal systems there is a more or less similar rule, which is why it is called a principle rather than a rule.

In the main lines of thought, i. e. that everything that goes up converges and that moreover, it can be transposed by analogy into international law, then it can be applied as a general principle of the law recognized by civilized nations.

It is a subject in which analogies are drawn from domestic law to fill the gaps in customary law. It is a way of legislating. It is the technique of analogy that makes it a general principle of law.

Case of limitation on discharge[modifier | modifier le wikicode]

This is the time limit after which a claim can no longer be asserted. There was a case between Venezuela and Italy in the Gentini case. There was an arbitration by an Italian-Venezuelan Free Arbitration Commission in which Italy claimed compensation for an Italian national who suffered damage in Venezuela as a result of the Venezuelan State. Italy acts within the framework of diplomatic protection.

The problem was that Italy had brought this claim before the arbitral tribunal some 30 years after the facts. The arbitral tribunal considered whether there was a limitation period. There was no arbitration agreement. The arbitration commission turned its attention to domestic legal systems and found everywhere a principle of prescription for discharge, believing that this principle existed in international law and that it should be applied. The applicable time limit was to be the reasonable time. The legal question was whether Italy had justifiable reasons to wait for the International Court to stipulate that the deadline had been exceeded.

Case of indirect evidence[modifier | modifier le wikicode]

Can we prove something indirectly, in other words, in a circumstantial way?

Circumstantial evidence is indirect evidence, we cannot prove a fact directly. This was the case in the Corfu Strait case in 1949 before the International Court of Justice. The United Kingdom accuses Albania of knowing that there were mines in Albanian territorial waters without warning the international community.

Proving that Albania knew the location of these mines is the legal question. How can we prove that Albania knew knowing that the United Kingdom had no way of knowing directly?

Therefore, the United Kingdom could only prove knowledge of Albania by circumstantial evidence, there is a bundle of evidence which tends to prove knowledge of Albania.

The question is whether indirect evidence is admitted under international law? Can a State be condemned on the basis of indirect evidence? How do we determine that?

There were no well-established practices, the Court went through general principles of law, questioned whether it could transpose this rule to the international trial and questioned whether it could be transposed.

Penal trials of the 1900s[modifier | modifier le wikicode]

When international criminal law was booming, but not yet sufficiently developed, it became clear what constitutes rape under international law. Rape was nowhere defined and the question arose as to what constituted rape.

In the tribunal of the former Yugoslavia in 1997, in order to determine how far the norm of rape can be determined, the tribunal ended up in domestic legal systems.

It was therefore by turning to domestic legal systems, considering points of convergence and proceeding by analogy that the court was able to escape.

Soft law and the resolutions of international organisations[modifier | modifier le wikicode]

What is soft law and how does it fit into the source system? What are the qualified acts of soft law?

There are a variety of categories, but in particular the following three categories:

Resolution of international organizations when not dealing with binding resolutions[modifier | modifier le wikicode]

The term resolution is a generic term. All the acts adopted by the organs of international organizations are resolutions, some resolutions are binding, others are called decisions, others are not binding, they are recommendations.

Political agreements are also soft law, and the reports of certain international bodies are often referred to as soft law.

Why is soft law adopted? Why has soft law become ever more important since 1940?

First of all the number of States, there is a constantly increasing number of States in the international community; the more States with different ideologies, the more difficult it is to find a common denominator in order to conclude hard law.

If States do not commit themselves legally, it is easier to find an agreement between them because they will be less resistant to the necessary concessions.

There is great mobility of international issues after 1945.

For immediate situations it is easier to achieve soft law standards in the first place because they are easier to adopt and can be easily changed.

From a legal point of view, what is the usefulness of these soft law standards?

Contrary to what some people believe there is a great hunger for norms in international relations, a whole series of actors are asking for norms, want points of reference and guidelines because the world has become complex, we cannot reinvent the world ourselves every time; we must base ourselves on a model is a practice.

Soft law very quickly makes it possible to produce standards, fill gaps and satisfy hunger.

Soft law standards are sometimes useful in the preparation of conventional standards[modifier | modifier le wikicode]

Soft law prepares hard law. In drafting the 1966 Outer Space Convention[8], soft law has been a means to achieve hard law.

Soft law is based on democratisation, in treaties only states are entitled to be party to the treaty, they are made by and for states; NGOs can try to get into the game, but their status is unenviable.

In the soft law we involve a whole other set of actors, this makes it easier to elaborate norms and standards with all the components of international society. It's something that is valued. In standards of conduct, many things can be proposed and many actors involved.

What difficulties did soft law pose?

There are a whole series of problems; first of all, we have a tendency to interfere with sources, we no longer know if we are in the soft law or in the hard law, and States have a whole lot of ambiguity studied. Sometimes the absence of real agreements is masked by using soft law instruments rather than disappointing observers that the conference has failed, so a resolution or model of soft law rules is produced, masking the fact that there has been no consensus and that there is a certain status in international law, but not defined.

Soft law is sometimes not very credible, because soft law is sometimes non-binding and the problem is that the public does not differentiate between soft law and hard law. There is a tendency to discredit international law.

Soft law does not commit to a concrete attitude and can make one agree to let go, creating ill-considered or even utopian norms, satisfying certain pressures, because it is not serious. We do things that we don't really have the means to implement.

In legal life, it's a little more pointed.

What are the legal effects of soft law standards?

They may have some effects, but it depends on the standard and the specific case.

In the context of a non-binding resolution of an international organization that is non-binding, what are its effects?

First of all it can give rise to an agreement, at this point the recommendation of the soft law becomes hard law; for example, a resolution can be accepted by States or certain States which at that time grants it binding force through the agreement concluded.

By virtue of an agreement concluded by four powers claiming to respect the conditions of their agreement, it becomes binding.

There may be recommendations that influence customary law, i. e., soft law influences the development of customary law. The resolution of the United Nations General Assembly on Outer Space 1962 of the year 1963[9] was an important landmark on the road to the customary rules of outer space, but it was a General Assembly resolution. Sometimes the soft law is used more precisely to determine the juris.

Soft law can be used to interpret hard law[modifier | modifier le wikicode]

There may be doubts about the interpretation of a conventional standard, so soft law may be considered.

It is possible to have the national legislator who uses the soft law as a model to adopt internal standards, or to legislate. The Federal Council has done this very often since the asylum problem came up in the Federal Council. The Federal Council has taken the soft law into account when calibrating the law.

Soft law can have a permissive effect: when there is a resolution recommending a certain conduct, taken under the constituent instrument, it allows all Member States to adopt the recommended attitude and if they do so they are not at risk of putting their international responsibility for an unlawful act into play, because the State has the right to follow the recommendation and the other Member State must be given the possibility to act.

There are sometimes related to the soft law obligations to take account of information. In Article 19 §6 of the Constitution of the International Labour Organisation[10], there is a rule that member States of the organization must take into account the recommendations of the Labour Conference by submitting them to national bodies and informing the International Labour Organization of the follow-up. On the recommendation of procedural obligations, this is a case of soft law, to which are added aspects of hard law under the paragraph cited. Very often soft law works much better than hard law.


Constitution de l’Organisation internationale du Travail

Article 19

6 S’il s’agit d’une recommandation:

a) la recommandation sera communiquée à tous les Membres pour examen, en vue de lui faire porter effet sous forme de loi nationale ou autrement;

b) chacun des Membres s’engage à soumettre, dans le délai d’un an à partir de la clôture de la session de la Conférence (ou, si par suite de circonstances exceptionnelles, il est impossible de procéder dans le délai d’un an, dès qu’il sera possible, mais jamais plus de dix-huit mois après la clôture de la session de la Conférence), la recommandation à l’autorité ou aux autorités dans la compétence desquelles rentre la matière, en vue de la transformer en loi ou de prendre des mesures d’un autre ordre;

c) les Membres informeront le Directeur général du Bureau international du Travail des mesures prises, en vertu du présent article, pour soumettre la recommandation à l’autorité ou aux autorités compétentes, en lui communiquant tous renseignements sur l’autorité ou les autorités considérées comme compétentes et sur les décisions de celles-ci;

d) sauf l’obligation de soumettre la recommandation à l’autorité ou aux autorités compétentes, les Membres ne seront soumis à aucune autre obligation, si ce n’est qu’ils devront faire rapport au Directeur général du Bureau international du Travail, à des périodes appropriées, selon ce que décidera le Conseil d’administration, sur l’état de leur législation et sur leur pratique concernant la question qui fait l’objet de la recommandation, en précisant dans quelle mesure l’on a donné suite ou l’on se propose de donner suite à toutes dispositions de la recommandation et en indiquant les modifications de ces dispositions qui semblent ou pourront sembler nécessaires pour leur permettre de l’adopter ou de l’appliquer

Annexes[modifier | modifier le wikicode]

References[modifier | modifier le wikicode]

  1. ↑ OECD Nuclear Energy Agency - Accords bilatéraux et multilatéraux
  2. ↑ Decaux Emmanuel. Affaire de la délimitation maritime et des questions territoriales entre Qatar et Bahrein, Fond (arrêt du 16 mars 2001 Qatar c. Bahrein). In: Annuaire français de droit international, volume 47, 2001. pp. 177-240.
  3. ↑ Comme l’a déjà fait remarquer Eric Beckett, le recours à la volonté commune des parties est irréaliste dans la mesure où « il est presque certain que le différend portera sur un élément n’ayant pas été imaginé par [les parties] » : « Observations des membres de la Commission sur le rapport de M. Lauterpacht », 43 :1 A.I.D.I. (1950) 435, aux pp. 437-438
  4. ↑ COUR PERMANENTE DE JUSTICE INTERNATIONALE - Série A/B - Arrêts, Ordonnances et Avis Consultatifs - FASCICULE No 53 - STATUT JURIDIQUE DU GROËNLAND ORIENTAL - ARRÊT DU 5 AVRIL 1933 - XXVIme SESSION
  5. ↑ RECUEIL DES ARRETS, AVIS CONSULTATIFS ET ORDONNANCES - AFFAIRES DU PLATEAU CONTINENTAL DE LA MER DU NORD (RÉPUBLIQUE FEDERALE D'ALLEMAGNE/DANEMARK); RÉPUBLIQUE FÉDÉRALE D'ALLEMAGNE/PAYS-BAS) - arrêt du 20 février 1969
  6. ↑ Résumés des arrêts, avis consultatifs et ordonnances de la Cour internationale de Justice Document non officiel - AFFAIRES DU PLATEAU CONTINENTAL DE LA MER DU NORD, Arrêt du 20 février 1969
  7. ↑ COUR INTERNATIONALE DE JUSTICE RECUEIL DES ARRÊTS, AVIS CONSULTATIFS ET ORDONNANCES - AFFAIRE DU PLATEAU CONTINENTAL (JAMAHIRIYA ARABE LIBYENNE/MALTE) - ARRÊT DU 3 JUIN 1985
  8. ↑ Traité sur les principes régissant les activités des États en matière d'exploration et d'utilisation de l'espace extra-atmosphérique, y compris la Lune et les autres corps célestes (19 décembre 1966)
  9. ↑ Déclaration des principes juridiques régissant les activités des États en matière d'exploration et d'utilisation de l'espace extra-atmosphérique (13 décembre 1963)
  10. ↑ Constitution de l'OIT - Article 19.6
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