Privatizuota prievarta: nuo samdinių iki privačių karinių bendrovių
Professeur(s) |
Stephan Davidshofer[1][2][3] Christian Olsson[4][5][6] |
---|---|
Enregistrement | 2014, 2015 |
Cours | Political Violence and Security Practices |
Lectures
- Politinis smurtas ir praktika saugumo srityje
- Šiuolaikinio karo gimimas: karo kūrimas ir valstybės kūrimas iš Vakarų perspektyvos
- Karo ir smurto transformacijos Europoje
- Karas už Vakarų ribų: ar šiuolaikinė valstybė yra Vakarų išradimas?
- Kas yra nevalstybinis smurtas? Afganistano konflikto atvejis
- Intervencija: Iš naujo išrasti karą?
- Saugumo specialistai: biurokratizacija, institucionalizacija, profesionalizacija ir diferenciacija
- Šiuolaikinės saugumo praktikos transformacija: tarp karo ir globalios policijos?
- Šiuolaikinės saugumo praktikos transformacija: rizikos logika
- Privatizuota prievarta: nuo samdinių iki privačių karinių bendrovių
- Žvalgyba ir stebėjimas
Apskritai privatizavimo klausimas nuolat sukasi apie valstybės sąvoką. Privatizavimas yra pagrindinis šiuolaikinės visuomenės klausimas ir mūsų kasdienio gyvenimo dalis. Ilgą laiką, kai kalbėjome apie saugumą, susidarė įspūdis, kad tai paskutinis išskirtinės valstybės monopolijos bastionas, buvo lengviau liberalizuoti telekomunikacijų sektorių nei smurto sritį. Ilgą laiką smurto monopolis buvo esminė Vakarų valstybių struktūros dalis. Viena iš esminių priežasčių, kodėl Vakaruose turime funkcionuojančias valstybes, yra ta, kad veikė mechanizmas, kurį Tilly vadina "karo kūrimas - valstybės kūrimas", kai smurto monopolis leido kurti valstybes. Monopolijos naikinimas per privatizaciją yra esminis dalykas. Kalbant apie smurto privatizavimą, valstybės smurto valdymo monopolio erozija yra tai, kas dar visai neseniai nebuvo duota. Šiandien į šį klausimą reikia žvelgti per šios monopolijos kvestionavimo prizmę, atsižvelgiant į praktiką ir privačias įmones.
Kai kalbame apie saugumo specialistus, intuityviai turime omenyje žmones, dirbančius viešajame sektoriuje. Susidaro įspūdis, kad kalbame apie viešuosius subjektus, tačiau prieš pradedant vertinti saugumo operatorius ir subjektus iš perspektyvos, saugumas visada buvo nebūtinai tik viešasis, kai subjektai tiesiogiai neatstovavo viešajai tarnybai, kaip, pavyzdžiui, privačių detektyvų atveju. Nuo XX a. septintojo dešimtmečio šių veikėjų buvimas mūsų visuomenėje paspartėjo. Vykdomos labai įvairios užduotys, kurios nebūtinai yra tarpusavyje susijusios.
Terminas privačios karinės ir saugos bendrovės (PSŠS) yra labiausiai susijęs su privačių saugos bendrovių reguliavimo klausimais. Privačių karinių bendrovių (angl. private military companies, PMCs) yra labai įvairių. Deividas Šileris (David Shearer) siūlo jas klasifikuoti pagal atskiras praktikas:
- konsultacijos;
- logistiką: pavyzdžiui, nagrinėsime tik valgyklas karinėse bazėse;
- eksperimentinė veikla: ji išlieka gana marga.
Skirtumas tarp logistikos ir operacijų nebūtinai yra aiškus. Irake 2003 m. būti sunkvežimio vairuotoju galėjo būti veikla, kuri labai dažnai buvo susijusi su kovomis. Situacija nėra visiškai aiški, ribos vis labiau nyksta.
Daugiausia dėmesio skirsime "operatyviniams logistikos centrams", dalyvaujantiems gana karinio pobūdžio išorės karinėse operacijose, pradedant taikos operacijomis ir baigiant NATO operacijomis bei JAV karinėmis intervencijomis. Mus domins įvairūs klientai - nuo NVO iki tarptautinių organizacijų, privačių bendrovių, pačių kariškių ir užsienio reikalų pareigūnų, kad užtikrintume ambasadų saugumą. Logistikos srityje šiuo metu Afganistane dirba privačių bendrovių darbuotojai, tiesiogiai dirbantys ministerijoms. Tai gana neskaidri sritis, tačiau valstybė išlaiko kontrolės teisę.
Viena iš pirmųjų modernių veikiančių PMC yra Pietų Afrikos bendrovė "Executive Outcomes". Įmonę "Executive Outcomes" XX a. dešimtojo dešimtmečio pradžioje sukūrė buvę Pietų Afrikos Respublikos specialiųjų pajėgų kariai, dalyvavę pasienio konflikte su Namibija ir susiję su apartheido režimo išlikimu, kurie, pasitelkę savo patirtį, sukūrė įmonę. Jų veiklos sritis daugiausia buvo Angoloje, užtikrinant platformas ir tiesiogiai dalyvaujant kovose. Kur matome, kad jų veikla nėra tik operatyvinių kovotojų veikla ir kad Angolos vyriausybė negali atsiskaityti pinigais, o atsiskaitė kasybos teisėmis. Reikėtų pažymėti, kad "Executive Outcomes" buvo didesnio konsorciumo, į kurį įėjo ir kasybos pramonė, dalis. Tai naujos galimybės buvusiems kariškiams per privatųjį sektorių.
Tokio tipo privačios bendrovės atstovauja XX a. dešimtojo dešimtmečio pradžioje atsiradusiam reiškiniui, kai buvę kariškiai užsiėmė samdinių veikla. Kai prievartos naudojimą reguliuoja rinka, mes turime kitokią praktiką, palyginti su monopoline klasikinės fizinės prievartos praktika?
CACI ir TITAN dalyvavimas Abu Graibo skandale 2004 m. leidžia susidaryti įspūdį apie PMC veiklos mastą ir įvairovę. Du iš šiame skandale dalyvavusių asmenų dirbo privačiose bendrovėse, o tai rodo, kad kankinimo praktika gali būti perduota privačioms bendrovėms. Šių privačių bendrovių dislokavimo teisinė sistema ir vienas iš saugumo kozirių.
Speeches on Private Military Companies (PMCs) and their limitations
The transnationalist discourse
Behind this discourse is the image of the erosion of the state and the end of the state monopoly on legitimate violence. The importance of this issue is reflected in the role that the state is supposed to play. Does the advent, multiplication and success of these private companies put an end to the state monopoly on legitimate violence? In The Rise and Decline of the State published in 1999, Martin van Creveld estimates that until the 1970s, the idea of a legitimate monopoly was more or less functional and that this monopoly is now disappearing in favour of market logic. Already, in light of what we have seen from a historical point of view, Weber's monopoly is not a total truth formula either, being a fiction and even a recent phenomenon.
This erosion is doubtful because the main customer of these companies is the states, especially the American state. Not only are the United States the primary customer of these companies, but also the major employees of the companies are former military or police officers who have themselves been trained in state armies. Contrary to what Martin van Creveld postulates, we are not at the end of the state monopoly, but we are instead dealing with changes to the monopoly.
In order to deepen this complexity of the stakes surrounding the privatization of military coercion put forward by the transnationalist thesis which aims to minimize the role of the State, we will examine three dimensions of the privatization of military coercion and the role that this raises in relation to the State:
- The ownership of coercive resources: the question is whether they are public or private. The answer is that we are faced with privatization because any private security company uses its own resources.
- Armed forces and weapons allocation: that is to say who will decide on the allocation of certain weapons and the deployment of armed forces if we are in a privatization logic. The question is whether this privatization is economic in a market logic or is it by authorization. There's a mixture of the two. Unlike the first question, there may be cases where ownership is public, but the allocation is economic. With the program lend and lease in the 1940s, the U.S. government made a loan in the form of military equipment to Britain and the USSR. It is not just anyone who decides, and there is also a political logic. As far as the allocation is concerned, we are in a mixture of economic logic by authorization involving the mediation of a law enforcement agency at a given time.
- This is the basis for decision-making about the use of force: even if the state will set rules, on the ground things are not going to be really clear about the rules of engagement. We enter a fuzzy terrain where we do not know how actors that we do not necessarily control are going to have room for manoeuvre. Companies, unlike states, have their own rules of operation with their own directives raising other problems. On the very central issue of the use of force, with the PMCs we enter a grey zone creating spaces where they can make decisions more freely than the military because the chains of command are distended.
The question that arises is the regulation of PMCs. War in general was a means of regulating violence. In a private logic where the market is supposed to impose its rules, the question of regulation is quite representative of this vagueness. There are two types of process, on the one hand:
- agreements between States, these States impose binding regulations and legal frameworks to regulate the framework in which these companies operate. An interesting initiative is the Montreux process. Since 2008, this process has been the culmination of discussions initiated in Switzerland with the ICRC, including 17 states that have agreed to regulate these activities and, in particular, to ensure that they comply with humanitarian law. At the same time, this Montreux process aims to establish a code of conduct to develop "good practices". In a logic of market logic, we are in a change of rationality, entering into a logic of self-regulation as is the case with fair trade. This refers to the social responsibility of players, which calls for the ethical dimension of market regulation. Most of the States associated with the Montreux Process, which aims both to have non-binding international regulation and to develop a code of conduct, are not inclined to address this issue within the framework of the UN.
- companies are not opposed to this self-regulatory logic. An International Stability Operations Association treaty is a grouping of private military companies that aims to establish a code of good conduct with the idea of presenting private military companies for one day meeting the standards of UN peacekeeping operations, particularly in the 1990s.
The Realist interpretation
The advantage of the realistic approach is to have anhistorical analyses that quickly address the issue of PMCs as a state-supported phenomenon that can be seen as a "high politics" instrument. Behind these companies, there are States that have decided to entrust these missions to private companies. In international relations, non-state actors are not very interesting for realists, since private actors have never had any influence on political decisions and remain proxies for the State. This thesis applies not only to PMCs, but also to terrorist movements, i. e. a state must be found behind any group.
Realistic interpretation has limitations since, by disqualifying private or state actors, one cannot see the impact they might have on decision-making themselves, while many cases call into question the reading of MMPs that do not call into question the very functioning of the state. The realistic thesis is not able to see how much influence private military companies can have on the lobbying mechanism. We have actors who will move from one to the other and who will influence decision-making or even the development of operations by this indistinction. There is also a revolving-doors phenomenon where the distinction between private and public actors is not clear, with some people going back and forth between bureaucracies, governments and private companies.
Causes and consequences
We are going to discuss some of the elements that have already been mentioned. We will look in more detail at the question of replacing a public, inter-state logic articulated around the monopoly of the legitimate violence of the State by asking ourselves the question of the economic causes. Do we really have a security market that was set up after the end of the Cold War and it is extremely reductive to see this because there is a political logic behind it? We must remember the economic functioning.
As far as supply is concerned, there are certain phenomena which may lead us to believe that there is the emergence of a real supply with a reduction in the armies with the end of the Cold War. There is a shift from conscription armies to professional armies and the idea that we will now reap the dividends of peace and therefore there are fewer soldiers. There are a lot of military offers coming out of it, with military personnel no longer working or available for a private security market.
![](/images/thumb/d/d7/Conflits_arm%C3%A9s_et_interventions_de_paix_en_2006.jpg/300px-Conflits_arm%C3%A9s_et_interventions_de_paix_en_2006.jpg)
Just because there is less money and fewer armies does not mean that there are no new challenges. The end of the Cold War led to the multiplication of infra-state conflicts with a demand for intervention. The UN and NATO will be much more active in the end of the Cold War in terms of intervention and there is still a strong demand for troops. There is a Somali syndrome, which means that during the intervention in Somalia, there was a multinational intervention and UN investment with a high demand for international troops, but also with Rwanda and Bosnia, which meant that some Western states did not necessarily want their soldiers to die in peacekeeping operations. In terms of demand, there is also the fact that Western countries do not necessarily want to join peacekeeping operations in the 1990s. Beginning in the 1990s, a demand arose from the disaffection of Western countries for peacekeeping operations. Today, the overwhelming majority of the troops involved in peacekeeping operations come from India and Bangladesh. There is also a cost logic behind this logic, since these soldiers also cost less.
There is a real demand with the multiplication of African conflicts and Koffi Annan questioned the UN's ability to mobilize resources.
A paradox emerges. As much as European countries' military spending has fallen, in terms of the world's largest military budget, the US budget since the end of the Cold War has risen exponentially and steadily.
The U.S. military did not grow up, but are exploded budgeta with private military companies. In 1991, the share of private contactors was 1%, in 2003 10% and in 2009, the number of private companies was higher than the number of US troops in Iraq. The budget is increasing, but the number of troops deployed on the ground is not increasing.
Now, we have to think about other causes because it is not just the post-Cold War and peace dividend logic that made it necessary to call on private contactors because we had fewer soldiers. By making fictional politics, we can see that at the time, with the path we were heading towards, the idea was to say to ourselves that in order to settle the solutions at the global level, we need inclusive multilateral solutions. There were optimistic theories of a more just world where multilateral decision-making translated into the development of multilateral institutions. This is not only through the United Nations, but also through the OSCE, the European Union, which will conduct crisis management operations from 2003 onwards. The idea of multilateralism has been very much at the forefront and was seen as a credible option. One could have imagined that the consequences of 9/11 in terms of the international community could have been studied within the framework of a multilateral intervention.
What could explain why governments will increasingly resort to private companies? In the operation of many states, this began in Britain and the United States in the 1970s, and a new way of managing the state was developed, which found that bureaucracies were too slow, cumbersome, and not effective enough to have a dynamic society. This is called[New Public Management]]. There was a widespread idea that tasks would be outsourced or assigned to private actors that would allow for more efficient bureaucracy. The U.S. military will make use of many subcontractors especially for logistics. Another factor is that the professionalization of armies has taken people away from them to perform subordinate tasks. This is a neoliberal turn of events that aims to reduce the size of the state and even the armies have been affected by this phenomenon. It is important to put that in perspective.
In short, it allows us to question the market argument which is a circular argument since it is said that it is the market logic that will generate the market, it is a presupposed rationality that we will apply to a phenomenon. Finally, the cause of the market explanation is totally circular. There are practical questions, but there is clearly a more political will to move towards more neoliberal public policies. This phenomenon is linked to the transformation of the State into a logic of redeployment and different functioning. The American state remains important even though the decision-making process has changed.
The SMPs are part of a legal no-mans's land in Iraq with Order 17 of the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA). The employees of these companies were not subject to Iraqi law, it is an extremely grey area. Since 2007, employees of these companies have been subject to the United States Unified Military Justice Code. In Afghanistan, former President Karzai wanted to regulate the presence of private military companies by making them subject to Afghan law. The reaction of these companies was to threaten the merger to break their contract because this clause was not included. There is no taking over of local judicial systems, their status is weak because they are not military. Despite the fact that they were tried to be associated with a military code, de facto, this highlights the fact that there was very little control and no punishment for abuse.
SMPs in Practice: The Effects of the Relationship Between Politics and Security Professionals
How does this phenomenon of privatization affect relations between the different actors and professions involved? Continuity between state and private actors must be discussed in a network analysis. These networks are cross-sectional beyond the private - public distinction. These networks do not unilaterally weaken state actors, but they certainly transform power relations within states.
Politicians and ministerial bureaucracies
With regard to the transformation of practices, we will look at a series of practical cases of how the arrival of PMCs will transform the relationship between certain actors.
In 2003, during the intervention in Iraq, there was a disagreement within the Pentagon between civilians and the military, namely the issue of neo-conservatives and military privatization in the context of military opposition to military operations abroad. The military was not very enthusiastic about the war in Iraq. A 2002 report said that the military felt that sending troops to Iraq was not complicated, but in terms of management it was very complicated when the neo-conservatives were in favour of intervention. In this type of opposition, with the advent of PMC actor, how does this lead to a transformation. The fact that PMCs are a viable solution is going to make it give more options for civilians, making the military less important. Civil bureaucracy had more options.
One case is the way politicians bypass their allies with the example of counter-narcotics in Afghanistan. The call for a private company has bypassed a traditional allied political issue. What privatization can change is also to bypass the parliamentary opposition. Plan Colombia was part of the continuity against drug trafficking in Colombia. The multi-phased plan aimed to tackle drug cultivation, which weakened the guerrillas on the ground by eradicating coca cultivation. Congress was not "for" fearing that an escalation operation would be launched. The Clinton administration has made extensive use of private companies, particularly to eradicate coca cultivation.
One way of describing the relationship between departmental bureaucracies and the MPS is the principle of "plausible denial". In 2007, the "Nissour Square shooting" took place. Black Water employees who were supposed to protect a diplomatic convoy and were forced to shoot into the crowd killing about 20 people. The plausible denial is that the U.S. secretary of state at the time could not plausibly say that he did not really control these people, that even though they gave them instructions, shooting in the crowd was not the total responsibility of the Americans. It remains unclear how this company interprets the American directives. The term "plausible denial" is often used to illustrate the room for manoeuvre that can be left by appealing to military societies.
Military and intelligence services
Their work has been largely transformed by private companies. For the military, there is the obvious advantage of focusing on the essential missions of the army. The advantage of delegation to PMCs for the military is that they can focus on core missions in a limited troop-staffing context, which increases the tooth-to-tail ratio. For the military, there is an advantage that in an army relatively small in number of men, if the less glorious tasks are left to private companies, one focuses more on the essential aspects of the milestone activity.
But the military sometimes loses certain prerogatives because many things have been outsourced. Leaving some prerogatives aside means that the military can also lose quite significant prerogatives. The fact that the resources available are private means that, within the bureaucracy, other aspects dedicated to the military will benefit private companies. Today, the CIA does not need to use military means to make a targeted strike in Afghanistan that reduces military prerogatives. The military has less control over logistical aspects, leaving more room for manoeuvre for other actors.
Vietos elitas
Didėjantis PMC buvimas valstybėje iš naujo apibrėžia ir keičia santykius su politika. Karo nuniokotose besivystančiose šalyse, tokiose kaip Afganistanas ar Irakas, vietos elitas gali būti suinteresuotas tik ekonominiais interesais. Afganistane PMC vietos elitui yra grynai ekonominis interesas. Sumokėti kai kurioms milicijoms vietoje ir suteikti joms galimybę tapti PMC, galiausiai darant įtaką vietos žaidimui. Jei režimas nori turėti Afganistano valstybinį viešojo saugumo aparatą, daugelis sukarintų grupuočių gali laikyti PMC kaip ardomąsias pajėgas. Matome, kaip saugumo privatizavimas gali turėti įtakos pačiam valstybės kūrimo procesui ir valstybės monopolio savo teritorijoje įgijimui. Pranešama, kad Nelegalių ginkluotų grupuočių išformavimas (DIAG) nesugebėjo nuginkluoti šių sukarintų grupuočių, pašalindamas jas iš valstybės kūrimo Afganistane po 2001 m. lygties.
Išvada
Tarp valstybės ir karo verslininkų egzistuoja simbiozės logika. Vietoj to vyksta transformacija valstybės viduje, nebūtinai kvestionuojant pačią valstybę, nes jokia logika neišvengia valstybės. Socialinė istorinė perspektyva leidžia pamatyti, kad privatizacija nėra kažkas naujo, kad XIX a. egzistavo tam tikra skliausteliuose esanti valstybė, daranti įtaką smurto monopolio įgyvendinimui, nors galima sakyti, kad šis monopolis niekada nebuvo visiškas. Dabar galbūt stebime šios skliausteliu pabaigos pabaigą, matytume sugrįžimą. Kodėl šis reiškinys grįžta? Reikėtų skirti stipresnes ir silpnesnes valstybes, t. y. ne visos valstybės yra vienodos privatizuojant smurto monopolį. Privatizavimas, jei jis tampa įmanomas ir daugiausia ateina iš šiaurinės valstybės, turėtų imperinę priežastį, šiaurinei valstybei būtų mažiau rimta privatizuoti dalį savo saugumo aparato, nes ji gali sau tai leisti. Tai įmanoma kai kuriose valstybėse, o privatizacija turi pasekmių kitose valstybėse.
Bibliografija
Nuorodos
- ↑ [Davidshofer | University of Geneva] - Academia.edu
- ↑ Publications de Stephan Davidshofer | Cairn.info
- ↑ Davidshofer, Stephan. “La Gestion De Crise Européenne Ou Quand L'Europe Rencontre La Sécurité : Modalités Pratiques Et Symboliques D'une Autonomisation.” Http://Www.theses.fr/, Paris, Institut D'études Politiques, 1 Jan. 2009
- ↑ Page personnelle de Christian Olsson sur le site de l'Université Libre de Bruxelles
- ↑ Page de Christian Olsson sur Academia.edu
- ↑ Profile Linkedin de Christian Olsson
- ↑ http://cartographie.sciences-po.fr/cartotheque/51C_conflits_armes_2006.jpg