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|[[Introduction to Political Science]]
|[[Introduction to Political Science]]
|[[La pensée sociale d'Émile Durkheim et Pierre Bourdieu]] ● [[Aux origines de la chute de la République de Weimar]] ● [[La pensée sociale de Max Weber et Vilfredo Pareto]] ● [[La notion de « concept » en sciences-sociales]] ● [[Histoire de la discipline de la science politique : théories et conceptions]] ● [[Marxisme et Structuralisme]] ● [[Fonctionnalisme et Systémisme]] ● [[Interactionnisme et Constructivisme]] ● [[Les théories de l’anthropologie politique]] ● [[Le débat des trois I : intérêts, institutions et idées]] ● [[La théorie du choix rationnel et l'analyse des intérêts en science politique]] ● [[Approche analytique des institutions en science politique]] ● [[L'étude des idées et idéologies dans la science politique]] ● [[Les théories de la guerre en science politique]] ● [[La Guerre : conceptions et évolutions]] ● [[La raison d’État]] ● [[État, souveraineté, mondialisation, gouvernance multiniveaux]] ● [[Les théories de la violence en science politique]] ● [[Welfare State et biopouvoir]] ● [[Analyse des régimes démocratiques et des processus de démocratisation]] ● [[Systèmes Électoraux : Mécanismes, Enjeux et Conséquences]] ● [[Le système de gouvernement des démocraties]] ● [[Morphologie des contestations]] ● [[L’action dans la théorie politique]] ● [[Introduction à la politique suisse]] ● [[Introduction au comportement politique]] ● [[Analyse des Politiques Publiques : définition et cycle d'une politique publique]] ● [[Analyse des Politiques Publiques : mise à l'agenda et formulation]] ● [[Analyse des Politiques Publiques : mise en œuvre et évaluation]] ● [[Introduction à la sous-discipline des relations internationales]]
|[[Intellectual legacy of Émile Durkheim and Pierre Bourdieu in social theory]] ● [[The origins of the fall of the Weimar Republic]] ● [[Intellectual legacy of Max Weber and Vilfredo Pareto in social theory]] ● [[The notion of "concept" in social sciences]] ● [[History of the discipline of political science: theories and concepts]] ● [[Marxism and Structuralism]] ● [[Functionalism and Systemism]] ● [[Interactionism and Constructivism]] ● [[The theories of political anthropology]] ● [[The three I's debate: interests, institutions and ideas]] ● [[Rational choice theory and the analysis of interests in political science]] ● [[An analytical approach to institutions in political science]] ● [[The study of ideas and ideologies in political science]] ● [[Theories of war in political science]] ● [[The War: Concepts and Evolutions]] ● [[The reason of State]] ● [[State, sovereignty, globalization and multi-level governance]] ● [[Theories of violence in political science‎‎]] ● [[Welfare State and Biopower]] ● [[Analysis of democratic regimes and democratisation processes]] ● [[Electoral Systems: Mechanisms, Issues and Consequences]] ● [[The system of government in democracies]] ● [[Morphology of contestations]] ● [[Action in Political Theory]] ● [[Introduction to Swiss politics]] ● [[Introduction to political behaviour]] ● [[Public Policy Analysis: Definition and cycle of public policy]] ● [[Public Policy Analysis: agenda setting and formulation]] ● [[Public Policy Analysis: Implementation and Evaluation]] ● [[Introduction to the sub-discipline of international relations]] ● [[Introduction to Political Theory]]  
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In Switzerland, religious affiliations have historically played a significant role in defining voting behaviour. In the Catholic cantons, there was a clear dichotomy between those who assiduously practised their religion and those who were more secular. Although most people in these cantons considered themselves to be Catholic, the difference in religious practice often translated into distinct voting choices. The religiously observant tended to support the Christian Democratic Party (PDC), while the secular tended to vote for the Radical Liberal Party. Of course, this was not an absolute rule, but a general trend. In the non-Catholic cantons, the division was different, between Catholics and Protestants. Catholics tended to support the CVP, while Protestants were more inclined to support the Radical Party or the Socialist Party, and more recently the Union Démocratique du Centre (UDC).
In Switzerland, religious affiliations have historically played a significant role in defining voting behaviour. In the Catholic cantons, there was a clear dichotomy between those who assiduously practised their religion and those who were more secular. Although most people in these cantons considered themselves to be Catholic, the difference in religious practice often translated into distinct voting choices. The religiously observant tended to support the Christian Democratic Party (PDC), while the secular tended to vote for the Radical Liberal Party. Of course, this was not an absolute rule, but a general trend. In the non-Catholic cantons, the division was different, between Catholics and Protestants. Catholics tended to support the CVP, while Protestants were more inclined to support the Radical Party or the Socialist Party, and more recently the Union Démocratique du Centre (UDC).


== Le Modèle Psychosociologique ==
== The Psychosociological Model ==
{{Article détaillé|Les modèles explicatifs du vote{{!}}Modèle psychosociologique}}


La deuxième grande école d'explication du vote, aussi connue sous le nom de modèle de Michigan, a été développée par l'Université de Michigan, qui a réalisé les premiers sondages d'opinion à l'échelle nationale aux États-Unis. Ce modèle est né d'une enquête approfondie sur le comportement électoral des Américains, qui a fourni de nouvelles perspectives sur la manière dont les individus prennent leurs décisions électorales. Contrairement à Lazarsfeld qui a basé ses recherches sur un seul comté dans l'Ohio, l'Université du Michigan a élargi son champ d'étude en menant les premières enquêtes d'opinion scientifiques sur les élections présidentielles à l'échelle nationale. Ces efforts ont ensuite conduit à la création du projet des études électorales américaines, qui est toujours supervisé par l'Université du Michigan à ce jour. Ce projet a permis de collecter des données précieuses sur les tendances électorales à travers tout le pays, offrant une vision beaucoup plus large des dynamiques électorales aux États-Unis.  
The second major school of explanation of voting, also known as the Michigan model, was developed by the University of Michigan, which conducted the first nationwide opinion polls in the United States. The model grew out of an in-depth investigation into the voting behaviour of Americans, which provided new insights into how individuals make their electoral decisions. Unlike Lazarsfeld, who based his research on a single county in Ohio, the University of Michigan broadened its field of study by conducting the first scientific opinion surveys on presidential elections on a national scale. These efforts then led to the creation of the American Election Studies Project, which the University of Michigan still oversees to this day. This project has collected valuable data on electoral trends across the country, providing a much broader view of electoral dynamics in the United States.  


L'école de Michigan considère l'identification partisane, qui est le sentiment d'un individu d'être proche ou aligné avec un certain parti politique, comme le facteur déterminant du comportement électoral. Cette approche se distingue nettement de l'école de Columbia, qui met l'accent sur les facteurs sociodémographiques. Selon l'école de Michigan, il est plus important de comprendre les orientations psychosociologiques individuelles de chaque électeur que de se concentrer sur le groupe social ou démographique auquel il appartient. L'identification partisane représente un lien psychologique entre l'électeur et le parti politique. Il peut s'agir d'une identification forte, où l'électeur se sent profondément aligné avec un parti particulier, ou d'une identification plus faible, où l'électeur se sent généralement en accord avec un parti mais est ouvert à d'autres options. Cette identification est influencée par une variété de facteurs, y compris les croyances et les valeurs personnelles de l'électeur, ses expériences passées, son environnement social et sa perception des partis politiques.  
The Michigan school considers partisan identification, which is an individual's feeling of being close to or aligned with a certain political party, to be the determining factor in electoral behaviour. This approach differs markedly from the Columbia school, which focuses on socio-demographic factors. According to the Michigan school, it is more important to understand the individual psychosociological orientations of each voter than to focus on the social or demographic group to which they belong. Partisan identification represents a psychological link between the voter and the political party. It can be a strong identification, where the voter feels deeply aligned with a particular party, or a weaker identification, where the voter generally feels in agreement with a party but is open to other options. This identification is influenced by a variety of factors, including the voter's personal beliefs and values, past experiences, social environment and perception of political parties.  


L'identification partisane, selon l'école de Michigan, est comprise comme un attachement affectif à un parti politique. Cet attachement n'est pas nécessairement basé sur des politiques spécifiques ou des positions idéologiques, mais plutôt sur un sentiment d'appartenance et d'alignement avec l'image et les valeurs générales que le parti représente. Cela signifie que l'identification partisane peut être résiliente, même si un individu n'est pas en accord avec chaque position politique ou chaque candidat du parti. Ce sentiment d'appartenance peut être influencé par une variété de facteurs, y compris la socialisation politique (par exemple, si les parents s'identifient fortement à un parti, l'enfant peut aussi le faire), l'adhésion à des groupes sociaux ou démographiques spécifiques alignés avec le parti, ou les perceptions et expériences personnelles de l'individu. De plus, cette identification partisane peut jouer un rôle clé dans le processus de prise de décision lors d'une élection. Les électeurs peuvent utiliser leur identification partisane comme un "raccourci" pour évaluer les candidats et les enjeux, se fiant à leur affiliation partisane pour les guider dans le vote. Cela peut également conduire à une plus grande stabilité dans le comportement électoral, car les individus sont susceptibles de voter pour le même parti à travers différentes élections.  
Partisan identification, according to the Michigan school, is understood as an affective attachment to a political party. This attachment is not necessarily based on specific policies or ideological positions, but rather on a feeling of belonging and alignment with the image and general values that the party represents. This means that partisan identification can be resilient, even if an individual does not agree with every policy position or candidate of the party. This sense of belonging can be influenced by a variety of factors, including political socialisation (for example, if parents identify strongly with a party, the child may too), membership of specific social or demographic groups aligned with the party, or the individual's personal perceptions and experiences. Moreover, this partisan identification can play a key role in the decision-making process during an election. Voters may use their partisan identification as a 'short cut' to evaluate candidates and issues, relying on their partisan affiliation to guide them in voting. This can also lead to greater stability in voting behaviour, as individuals are likely to vote for the same party across different elections.  


Selon l'École de Michigan, l'identification partisane est fortement influencée par la socialisation politique familiale. En d'autres termes, les préférences politiques des parents peuvent être transmises aux enfants, ce qui peut entraîner une identification partisane précoce qui reste relativement stable tout au long de la vie. La socialisation politique au sein de la famille peut inclure des conversations politiques, la participation aux élections en famille, ou simplement l'exposition aux opinions politiques des parents. Ces expériences peuvent amener les enfants à s'identifier à un parti politique spécifique et à adopter des valeurs et des croyances politiques similaires à celles de leurs parents. Cependant, il est important de noter que bien que l'identification partisane soit souvent stable, elle n'est pas immuable. Les individus peuvent changer d'identification partisane en réponse à des changements majeurs dans la politique ou dans leur vie personnelle, bien que ces changements soient généralement moins fréquents que la stabilité. En outre, certains facteurs tels que l'éducation, les expériences professionnelles et la participation à des groupes sociaux en dehors de la famille peuvent également influencer l'identification partisane.
According to the Michigan School, partisan identification is strongly influenced by family political socialisation. In other words, parents' political preferences can be passed on to their children, which can lead to early partisan identification that remains relatively stable throughout life. Political socialisation within the family can include political conversations, participation in family elections, or simply exposure to parents' political views. These experiences can lead children to identify with a specific political party and to adopt values and political beliefs similar to those of their parents. However, it is important to note that although party identification is often stable, it is not immutable. Individuals can change their partisan identification in response to major changes in politics or in their personal lives, although these changes are generally less frequent than stability. In addition, factors such as education, work experience and participation in social groups outside the family can also influence partisan identification.


Le modèle de Michigan met un fort accent sur la stabilité des préférences politiques, notamment grâce à l'identification partisane. Ce lien fort et souvent durable avec un parti politique spécifique est censé influencer les comportements de vote tout au long de la vie d'un individu. Selon ce modèle, une fois qu'une personne s'est identifiée à un parti politique, cette identification tend à influencer non seulement pour qui elle vote, mais aussi comment elle interprète les informations politiques et comment elle perçoit les candidats et les enjeux politiques. Par exemple, une personne qui s'identifie fortement à un parti politique peut être plus susceptible d'accorder du crédit aux positions de ce parti et de ses candidats, même lorsqu'elle est confrontée à des informations contradictoires.  
The Michigan model places great emphasis on the stability of political preferences, particularly through partisan identification. This strong and often lasting bond with a specific political party is supposed to influence voting behaviour throughout an individual's life. According to this model, once a person has identified with a political party, this identification tends to influence not only who they vote for, but also how they interpret political information and how they perceive candidates and political issues. For example, a person who identifies strongly with a political party may be more likely to give credence to the positions of that party and its candidates, even when confronted with contradictory information.  


Dans le modèle de Michigan, l'identification partisane joue un rôle central dans le comportement électoral. Il est perçu comme un "raccourci cognitif" ou une "heuristique", ce qui signifie qu'il aide les électeurs à simplifier le processus de prise de décision dans le contexte politique souvent complexe et surchargé d'informations. En d'autres termes, une fois qu'une personne s'identifie à un parti, elle n'a pas nécessairement besoin de passer beaucoup de temps à analyser chaque position politique, chaque candidat ou chaque question à l'ordre du jour. Au lieu de cela, l'identification partisane fournit un cadre simplifié qui guide les préférences et les décisions politiques de l'individu. L'identification partisane peut affecter non seulement le choix de vote, mais aussi la façon dont les individus perçoivent et interprètent les informations politiques. Par exemple, les individus peuvent avoir tendance à interpréter les informations de manière à renforcer leurs croyances existantes et à soutenir leur parti préféré. Cette tendance est souvent appelée "biais de confirmation".
In Michigan's model, partisan identification plays a central role in electoral behaviour. It is seen as a "cognitive shortcut" or "heuristic", meaning that it helps voters to simplify the decision-making process in the often complex and information-overloaded political context. In other words, once a person identifies with a party, they don't necessarily need to spend a lot of time analysing every political position, every candidate or every issue on the agenda. Instead, partisan identification provides a simplified framework that guides the individual's political preferences and decisions. Partisan identification can affect not only the choice of vote, but also the way in which individuals perceive and interpret political information. For example, individuals may tend to interpret information in a way that reinforces their existing beliefs and supports their preferred party. This tendency is often referred to as "confirmation bias".


L'identification partisane agit comme un filtre ou un raccourci d'information (aussi appelé "heuristique") qui aide les individus à naviguer dans l'océan complexe d'informations politiques. En raison du manque de temps, de ressources, ou tout simplement de l'énorme quantité d'informations à traiter, tous les électeurs ne peuvent pas être constamment informés et faire une évaluation détaillée de chaque question politique. C'est ici que l'identification partisane entre en jeu. Par exemple, si un individu s'identifie comme démocrate ou républicain, il est probable qu'il adoptera les points de vue et les positions politiques qui sont généralement associés à ce parti, même s'il ne comprend pas entièrement les détails de chaque question. De même, un individu peut utiliser son identification partisane pour évaluer de nouvelles informations politiques, en acceptant plus facilement les informations qui sont conformes à la ligne de son parti et en rejetant celles qui ne le sont pas. Ce n'est pas forcément une mauvaise chose - ces raccourcis peuvent être très utiles pour aider à faire face à la complexité de la politique moderne. Cependant, ils peuvent aussi parfois conduire à des erreurs ou à des biais de jugement, en faisant ignorer des informations importantes ou en enfermant l'électeur dans des bulles d'information qui renforcent ses croyances existantes.
Partisan identification acts as an information filter or shortcut (also known as a "heuristic") that helps individuals navigate through the complex ocean of political information. Due to lack of time, resources, or simply the sheer volume of information to be processed, not all voters can be constantly informed and make a detailed assessment of every political issue. This is where partisan identification comes in. For example, if an individual identifies themselves as a Democrat or Republican, they are likely to adopt the viewpoints and policy positions that are generally associated with that party, even if they do not fully understand the details of each issue. Similarly, an individual may use their partisan identification to evaluate new political information, more readily accepting information that is consistent with their party line and rejecting information that is not. This is not necessarily a bad thing - these shortcuts can be very useful in helping to cope with the complexity of modern politics. However, they can also sometimes lead to errors or biases in judgement, by causing important information to be ignored or by trapping voters in information bubbles that reinforce their existing beliefs.


Bien que l'identification partisane soit la clé de voûte du modèle de Michigan, d'autres variables sont également prises en compte. Le modèle de Michigan distingue les influences à long terme (telles que l'identification partisane) des influences à court terme (telles que les perceptions des candidats et les enjeux politiques actuels) sur le comportement de vote. L'identification partisane, qui est le facteur clé du modèle de Michigan, est considérée comme une influence à long terme car elle est généralement acquise tôt dans la vie et reste relativement stable au fil du temps. Comme nous l'avons mentionné précédemment, elle est transmise de génération en génération par le biais de la socialisation politique, et elle guide le comportement électoral des individus tout au long de leur vie. D'autre part, les perceptions des candidats et les enjeux politiques actuels sont des influences à court terme. Ces facteurs peuvent changer au cours d'une campagne électorale et influencer le choix d'un électeur à un moment donné. Par exemple, une controverse entourant un candidat ou une question politique urgente peut faire fluctuer les intentions de vote. Cependant, bien que ces facteurs à court terme puissent influencer le comportement de vote, le modèle de Michigan soutient que l'identification partisane reste l'influence la plus forte. Les facteurs à court terme peuvent modifier le choix d'un électeur, mais ils le font généralement dans le cadre de son identification partisane. Par exemple, un électeur peut être plus susceptible de changer d'avis sur un candidat ou un enjeu politique s'il est déjà faiblement attaché à son parti.
Although partisan identification is the keystone of Michigan's model, other variables are also taken into account. Michigan's model distinguishes between long-term influences (such as partisan identification) and short-term influences (such as perceptions of candidates and current political issues) on voting behaviour. Partisan identification, which is the key factor in Michigan's model, is considered a long-term influence because it is generally acquired early in life and remains relatively stable over time. As mentioned earlier, it is transmitted from generation to generation through political socialisation, and it guides the electoral behaviour of individuals throughout their lives. On the other hand, perceptions of candidates and current political issues are short-term influences. These factors can change over the course of an election campaign and influence a voter's choice at a given time. For example, a controversy surrounding a candidate or a pressing political issue may cause voting intentions to fluctuate. However, although these short-term factors can influence voting behaviour, the Michigan model maintains that partisan identification remains the strongest influence. Short-term factors can modify a voter's choice, but they generally do so within the framework of his or her partisan identification. For example, a voter may be more likely to change his mind about a candidate or a political issue if he is already weakly attached to his party.


Le modèle de Michigan présente l'identification partisane comme le facteur prédominant influençant le comportement électoral, avec les attitudes sur des questions spécifiques ou des candidats servant de facteurs secondaires qui peuvent entraîner des variations à court terme. Cela ne signifie pas que les attitudes sur les questions spécifiques ou les candidats ne sont pas importantes, mais plutôt que dans la plupart des cas, elles sont éclipsées par l'identification partisane. Par exemple, un électeur qui s'identifie fortement à un parti est susceptible de continuer à voter pour ce parti même si certaines de ses positions sur des questions spécifiques ou ses candidats ne correspondent pas parfaitement à ses préférences personnelles. Cependant, si l'écart entre les préférences de l'électeur et celles de son parti devient trop grand, ou si un enjeu particulier devient extrêmement important pour lui, il est possible que cet électeur choisisse de voter contre son parti habituel. C'est ce qui est généralement considéré comme l'exception à la règle de la stabilité de l'identification partisane. En somme, le modèle de Michigan met l'accent sur la continuité et la stabilité dans le comportement électoral, tout en reconnaissant que des changements peuvent se produire en raison d'événements spécifiques ou de l'évolution des attitudes des électeurs sur des questions ou des candidats spécifiques.
Michigan's model presents partisan identification as the predominant factor influencing voting behaviour, with attitudes on specific issues or candidates serving as secondary factors that may lead to short-term variations. This is not to say that attitudes on specific issues or candidates are not important, but rather that in most cases they are overshadowed by partisan identification. For example, a voter who strongly identifies with a party is likely to continue to vote for that party even if some of its positions on specific issues or candidates do not perfectly match his or her personal preferences. However, if the gap between the voter's preferences and those of his or her party becomes too great, or if a particular issue becomes extremely important to him or her, it is possible that the voter will choose to vote against his or her usual party. This is generally considered to be the exception to the rule of stable party identification. In sum, the Michigan model emphasises continuity and stability in voting behaviour, while recognising that changes may occur as a result of specific events or changes in voters' attitudes to specific issues or candidates.


== Le Modèle du Choix Rationnel ==
== The Rational Choice Model
{{Article détaillé|L’acteur rationnel}}


L'École du choix rationnel, aussi connue sous le nom de théorie du choix rationnel, est étroitement associée à Anthony Downs, qui a développé beaucoup de ses idées fondamentales alors qu'il travaillait à l'Université de Rochester. Downs a publié "An Economic Theory of Democracy" en 1957, où il a présenté un modèle économique du comportement politique. Selon lui, tout comme les consommateurs sur un marché, les électeurs et les partis politiques prennent des décisions rationnelles en fonction de leurs intérêts. Les électeurs voteraient pour le parti ou le candidat qui maximiserait leurs bénéfices (par exemple, en adoptant des politiques qui correspondent le mieux à leurs préférences), et les partis politiques se positionneraient de manière à attirer le plus grand nombre d'électeurs possible.   
The Rational Choice School, also known as Rational Choice Theory, is closely associated with Anthony Downs, who developed many of its fundamental ideas while working at the University of Rochester. Downs published "An Economic Theory of Democracy" in 1957, in which he presented an economic model of political behaviour. According to him, just like consumers in a market, voters and political parties make rational decisions based on their interests. Voters would vote for the party or candidate that would maximise their benefits (for example, by adopting policies that best matched their preferences), and political parties would position themselves to attract as many voters as possible.   


Cette approche a été largement adoptée et développée dans les sciences politiques et économiques, et a conduit à de nombreuses recherches sur le comportement électoral, la formation des partis politiques, la prise de décision politique et d'autres aspects de la politique. C'est un modèle très différent de ceux proposés par les Écoles de Columbia et de Michigan, car il ne se concentre pas sur des facteurs socio-démographiques ou psychologiques, mais sur des décisions rationnelles basées sur l'intérêt personnel.
This approach has been widely adopted and developed in political science and economics, and has led to much research into electoral behaviour, political party formation, political decision-making and other aspects of politics. It is a very different model from those proposed by the Columbia and Michigan Schools, as it does not focus on socio-demographic or psychological factors, but on rational decisions based on self-interest.


La théorie du choix rationnel d'Anthony Downs a eu une influence considérable non seulement sur la science politique, mais aussi sur d'autres domaines des sciences sociales. L'idée centrale est que les individus agissent de manière rationnelle pour maximiser leurs propres intérêts. En d'autres termes, ils font des choix en fonction de ce qu'ils estiment être le meilleur pour eux. Dans son livre "An Economic Theory of Democracy", Downs a appliqué cette théorie au comportement électoral, soutenant que les électeurs votent pour le parti ou le candidat qui, selon eux, apportera le plus de bénéfices. Les partis politiques, à leur tour, cherchent à maximiser leur soutien en adaptant leurs politiques pour plaire à la majorité des électeurs. Cependant, la théorie du choix rationnel a également été utilisée pour analyser une multitude d'autres comportements et institutions politiques. Par exemple, elle a été utilisée pour étudier la formation de coalitions gouvernementales, le fonctionnement des bureaucraties, la création de règles et de réglementations, et bien plus encore.
Anthony Downs' rational choice theory has had a considerable influence not only on political science, but also on other areas of the social sciences. The central idea is that individuals act rationally to maximise their own interests. In other words, they make choices based on what they believe is best for them. In his book "An Economic Theory of Democracy", Downs applied this theory to electoral behaviour, arguing that voters vote for the party or candidate they believe will bring the most benefits. Political parties, in turn, seek to maximise their support by tailoring their policies to appeal to the majority of voters. However, rational choice theory has also been used to analyse a multitude of other political behaviours and institutions. For example, it has been used to study the formation of government coalitions, the functioning of bureaucracies, the creation of rules and regulations, and much more.


Dans le modèle de l'École du choix rationnel, ce n'est pas le profil de l'électeur qui détermine son vote, mais plutôt ses propres évaluations des candidats ou des partis politiques en fonction de ses intérêts personnels. Les électeurs sont considérés comme des agents rationnels qui votent pour maximiser leur utilité, c'est-à-dire qu'ils choisissent le candidat ou le parti qui, selon eux, est le plus susceptible de promouvoir leurs intérêts. Ainsi, au lieu de se concentrer sur les caractéristiques démographiques ou les attitudes psychosociologiques, l'École du choix rationnel s'intéresse à la manière dont les électeurs évaluent les partis et les candidats en fonction de leurs propres intérêts. Cela pourrait impliquer une évaluation de leurs politiques, de leur performance passée, de leur probabilité de succès, et d'autres facteurs. L'École du choix rationnel introduit également la notion d'électeur calculateur. Dans ce modèle, l'électeur est considéré comme une personne qui pèse le pour et le contre de chaque option avant de faire son choix. Cela signifie que le vote n'est pas nécessairement une décision émotionnelle ou irrationnelle, mais plutôt le résultat d'un calcul rationnel des avantages et des inconvénients de chaque option.
In the Rational Choice School model, it is not the voter's profile that determines their vote, but rather their own assessments of the candidates or political parties based on their personal interests. Voters are seen as rational agents who vote to maximise their utility, i.e. they choose the candidate or party they believe is most likely to promote their interests. Thus, rather than focusing on demographic characteristics or psycho-sociological attitudes, the Rational Choice School is interested in how voters evaluate parties and candidates in terms of their own interests. This might involve an assessment of their policies, past performance, likelihood of success, and other factors. The Rational Choice School also introduces the notion of the calculating voter. In this model, the voter is seen as a person who weighs up the pros and cons of each option before making a choice. This means that voting is not necessarily an emotional or irrational decision, but rather the result of a rational calculation of the advantages and disadvantages of each option.


Le modèle du choix rationnel, contrairement aux modèles de Columbia et de Michigan, se concentre sur la prise de décision individuelle plutôt que sur les facteurs socio-démographiques ou psychologiques. Selon ce modèle, le comportement électoral n'est pas nécessairement prédéterminé, mais est plutôt le résultat de calculs de coûts-bénéfices réalisés par l'individu. Dans cette perspective, les électeurs sont perçus comme des acteurs rationnels qui évaluent les coûts et les avantages de chaque option avant de prendre leur décision. C'est ce qu'on appelle l'approche "utilitariste" du vote. Les individus analysent les différentes options de vote disponibles et choisissent celle qui, selon eux, maximisera leur utilité ou leur satisfaction. Cela signifie que le vote n'est pas nécessairement lié à l'identité sociale ou psychologique de l'individu, mais est plutôt le résultat d'un processus de prise de décision rationnelle. Dans ce modèle, comprendre le comportement de vote nécessite de comprendre les calculs de coûts-bénéfices que chaque individu effectue. Ce processus peut varier considérablement d'un individu à l'autre, rendant le comportement de vote moins prévisible que dans les modèles de Columbia ou de Michigan.  
The rational choice model, unlike the Columbia and Michigan models, focuses on individual decision-making rather than on socio-demographic or psychological factors. According to this model, electoral behaviour is not necessarily predetermined, but is rather the result of cost-benefit calculations made by the individual. From this perspective, voters are seen as rational actors who weigh up each option's costs and benefits before deciding. This is known as the "utilitarian" approach to voting. Individuals analyse the different voting options available and choose the one they believe will maximise their utility or satisfaction. This means that voting is not necessarily linked to an individual's social or psychological identity, but is rather the result of a rational decision-making process. In this model, understanding voting behaviour requires an understanding of the cost-benefit calculations that each individual makes. This process can vary considerably from one individual to another, making voting behaviour less predictable than in the Columbia or Michigan models.  


L'école du choix rationnel postule que les électeurs effectuent un calcul coûts-bénéfices avant de prendre une décision de vote. Les bénéfices peuvent être perçus comme l'ensemble des avantages que l'électeur attend d'un parti ou d'un candidat. Cela peut inclure des politiques spécifiques qui sont bénéfiques pour l'électeur, ou des valeurs et des principes que l'électeur partage avec le parti ou le candidat. Les coûts, quant à eux, peuvent être perçus comme tout ce qu'un électeur pourrait perdre en votant pour un parti ou un candidat spécifique. Cela peut inclure des politiques qui sont préjudiciables à l'électeur, ou un désaccord avec les valeurs ou les principes du parti ou du candidat. Les coûts peuvent également comprendre le temps et l'énergie nécessaires pour s'informer sur les partis et les candidats, ainsi que pour aller voter. L'électeur, en tant qu'homopoliticus dans ce modèle, est donc supposé agir de manière rationnelle, cherchant à maximiser son utilité en minimisant les coûts et en maximisant les bénéfices de son vote. C'est une application de la logique de l'homo economicus, l'individu rationnel dans le domaine économique, à la sphère politique. Il est important de noter que cette approche suppose que les individus sont capables de faire des calculs coûts-bénéfices précis et de prendre des décisions rationnelles sur la base de ces calculs, une hypothèse qui peut être contestée.  
The rational choice school postulates that voters carry out a cost-benefit calculation before making a voting decision. Benefits can be seen as the set of advantages that the voter expects from a party or candidate. This may include specific policies that are beneficial to the voter, or values and principles that the voter shares with the party or candidate. Costs, on the other hand, can be seen as anything a voter might lose by voting for a specific party or candidate. This may include policies that are detrimental to the voter, or disagreement with the values or principles of the party or candidate. Costs can also include the time and energy required to find out about parties and candidates, and to go out and vote. The voter, as homopoliticus in this model, is therefore assumed to act rationally, seeking to maximise his utility by minimising the costs and maximising the benefits of his vote. This is an application of the logic of homo economicus, the rational individual in the economic sphere, to the political sphere. It is important to note that this approach assumes that individuals are capable of making precise cost-benefit calculations and taking rational decisions on the basis of these calculations, an assumption that can be challenged.  


L'école du choix rationnel repose sur plusieurs postulats clés, parmi lesquels :  
The rational choice school is based on several key assumptions, including :  


* Les électeurs connaissent leurs propres préférences : Selon ce postulat, chaque électeur a une compréhension claire et précise de ses propres intérêts et valeurs. Pour faire des choix éclairés, les électeurs sont supposés rechercher activement des informations et évaluer les différentes options politiques disponibles.
* Voters know their own preferences: According to this postulate, each voter has a clear and precise understanding of his or her own interests and values. To make informed choices, voters are assumed to seek information and evaluate the different policy options available actively.
* Les électeurs sont capables de calculer les coûts et les bénéfices : Ce postulat suppose que chaque électeur est capable d'identifier et d'évaluer les coûts et les bénéfices associés à chaque option de vote. De plus, il suppose que les électeurs sont capables de faire des calculs rationnels pour déterminer quelle option maximise leur utilité.
* Voters are able to calculate costs and benefits: This postulate assumes that each voter is able to identify and evaluate the costs and benefits associated with each voting option. It also assumes that voters are capable of making rational calculations to determine which option maximises their utility.
* Les électeurs sont autonomes dans leur prise de décision : Selon ce postulat, les décisions de vote des électeurs sont principalement influencées par leurs propres calculs rationnels, plutôt que par des influences extérieures. Les électeurs ne sont pas supposés être influencés de manière significative par la propagande des partis politiques, le contexte social ou culturel, les pressions familiales ou les préjugés personnels.
* Voters are autonomous in their decision-making: According to this postulate, voters' voting decisions are primarily influenced by their own rational calculations, rather than by external influences. Voters are not assumed to be significantly influenced by political party propaganda, social or cultural context, family pressures or personal prejudices.


Ces postulats représentent un idéal de comportement électoral rationnel. Cependant, ils sont souvent critiqués pour leur manque de réalisme. En réalité, de nombreux électeurs peuvent manquer de temps, de ressources ou de compétences pour rechercher des informations et effectuer des calculs coûts-bénéfices complexes. De plus, il est clair que l'environnement social, culturel et familial peut avoir une influence significative sur le comportement de vote.
These assumptions represent an ideal of rational electoral behaviour. However, they are often criticised for being unrealistic. In reality, many voters may lack the time, resources or skills to research information and make complex cost-benefit calculations. Furthermore, it is clear that the social, cultural and family environment can have a significant influence on voting behaviour.


= Limitations des Modèles Classiques d'Explication du Vote =
= Limitations of Traditional Explanatory Voting Models =
Ces trois modèles, bien qu'ayant de nombreuses limites et imperfections, constituent un fondement essentiel dans l'étude du comportement politique. Il existe une abondante littérature dédiée à leur critique, leur modification et leur correction. Ainsi, malgré leurs défauts, ces modèles sont incontournables dans l'analyse du comportement électoral, et constituent le point de départ à partir duquel on peut commencer à penser de manière plus approfondie en utilisant des modèles plus récents et plus sophistiqués.  
Although these three models have many limitations and imperfections, they form an essential foundation for the study of political behaviour. There is an abundant literature devoted to their criticism, modification and correction. Thus, despite their shortcomings, these models are indispensable in the analysis of electoral behaviour, and constitute the starting point from which we can begin to think more deeply using more recent and more sophisticated models.  


Quelles sont les lacunes de ces modèles classiques ? Il y en a plusieurs et nous allons nous concentrer sur les principales.
What are the shortcomings of these classic models? There are several, and we will concentrate on the main ones.


=== Affaiblissement des Facteurs Explicatifs Centraux ===
=== Weakening of Central Explanatory Factors ===
De manière empirique, les recherches menées dans les années 1970, 1980 et 1990 n'ont pas réellement confirmé l'importance significative des facteurs sociologiques et psychosociologiques dans la détermination du comportement électoral. Les hypothèses avancées par l'École de Columbia et l'École de Michigan, qui postulaient qu'il était possible d'expliquer de manière précise le vote d'un individu en se basant sur ses caractéristiques sociales et son identification partisane, n'ont pas été soutenues par ces études. Le pouvoir explicatif de ces modèles s'est avéré limité. Bien qu'ils puissent apporter quelques éclaircissements, leur portée reste modeste.  
Empirically, the research carried out in the 1970s, 1980s and 1990s did not really confirm the significant importance of sociological and psychosociological factors in determining electoral behaviour. The hypotheses put forward by the Columbia School and the Michigan School, which postulated that it was possible to explain an individual's vote accurately on the basis of his or her social characteristics and partisan identification, were not supported by these studies. The explanatory power of these models proved limited. Although they may shed some light, their scope remains modest.  


Ces modèles n'ont pas été aussi performants qu'attendu et ont tendance à perdre en efficacité au fil des années et des décennies. La raison principale de cette diminution de performance réside dans le déclin historique des facteurs explicatifs centraux aux modèles. Par exemple, l'importance de la classe sociale et de la religion dans la détermination du comportement électoral, des facteurs clés dans le modèle de Columbia, a diminué avec le temps. De même, l'importance de l'identification partisane, qui est le pivot du modèle de Michigan, a également connu un déclin. En d'autres termes, les éléments fondamentaux de ces modèles ont perdu en pertinence au fil du temps, réduisant leur capacité à expliquer de manière précise le comportement électoral.
These models have not performed as well as expected and have tended to lose effectiveness over the years and decades. The main reason for this decline in performance lies in the historical decline in the explanatory factors central to the models. For example, the importance of social class and religion in determining electoral behaviour, key factors in the Columbia model, has declined over time. Similarly, the importance of partisan identification, which is central to the Michigan model, has also declined. In other words, the fundamental elements of these models have lost relevance over time, reducing their ability to accurately explain electoral behaviour.


Le déclin de ces facteurs explicatifs du vote peut être attribué à des changements significatifs au sein de la société, comme la transformation de la structure sociale. La société a évolué d'une prédominance du secteur primaire à une dominance des secteurs secondaire et tertiaire. Ce changement de tissu social a eu d'importantes conséquences politiques. La tertiarisation de l'économie a profondément impacté le comportement électoral. Le secteur primaire a rétréci, tout comme le secteur secondaire, et les liens historiques entre, par exemple, la classe ouvrière et certains partis, généralement de gauche, se sont affaiblis. De plus, l'augmentation de la mobilité géographique a conduit à une plus grande mixité sociale et culturelle. Cette diversification a également contribué à affaiblir les liens traditionnels entre certains groupes et partis politiques. Ainsi, les liens qui étaient autrefois prédictifs du comportement électoral sont devenus moins puissants avec le temps, réduisant la précision des modèles de Columbia et de Michigan. Dans l'ensemble, on a observé une diminution des loyautés associées à la classe sociale et à la religion, ainsi qu'une diminution de l'identification à des partis politiques spécifiques. Cette évolution a rendu plus difficile la prédiction du comportement électoral basée uniquement sur ces facteurs, ce qui a eu un impact sur l'efficacité des modèles de Columbia et de Michigan.  
The decline in these explanatory factors for voting can be attributed to significant changes in society, such as the transformation of the social structure. Society has evolved from a predominance of the primary sector to a dominance of the secondary and tertiary sectors. This change in the social fabric has had major political consequences. The tertiarisation of the economy has had a profound impact on electoral behaviour. The primary sector has shrunk, as has the secondary sector, and the historical links between, for example, the working class and certain parties, generally on the left, have weakened. In addition, increased geographical mobility has led to a greater social and cultural mix. This diversification has also helped to weaken the traditional links between certain groups and political parties. As a result, the links that were once predictive of electoral behaviour have become less powerful over time, reducing the accuracy of the Columbia and Michigan models. Overall, there was a decline in the loyalties associated with social class and religion, as well as a decline in identification with specific political parties. This development made it more difficult to predict electoral behaviour based solely on these factors, which had an impact on the effectiveness of the Columbia and Michigan models.


=== Évolution de l'Éducation et son Impact sur le Vote ===
=== The Evolution of Education and its Impact on Voting ===
Le deuxième facteur ayant contribué à l'affaiblissement de ces facteurs explicatifs majeurs est le développement de l'éducation. Ce phénomène, parfois qualifié de "révolution de l'éducation", se réfère à l'augmentation considérable du niveau d'éducation dans les sociétés occidentales. Cette évolution a favorisé une plus grande indépendance de pensée et une plus grande autonomie dans la prise de décisions de vote, rendant les électeurs moins captifs et moins liés à leurs affiliations traditionnelles.
The second factor that has contributed to the weakening of these major explanatory factors is the development of education. This phenomenon, sometimes referred to as the "education revolution", refers to the considerable increase in the level of education in Western societies. This has led to greater independence of thought and greater autonomy in voting decisions, making voters less captive and less tied to their traditional affiliations.


L'expansion de l'éducation a profondément transformé les sociétés occidentales dans la seconde moitié du XXe siècle. Cela s'est traduit par une augmentation significative du nombre de personnes ayant accès à l'enseignement secondaire et supérieur. Par conséquent, une part plus importante de la population a acquis des compétences en matière de pensée critique et d'analyse indépendante. Cette "révolution de l'éducation" a eu des conséquences majeures sur le comportement politique et électoral. Dans le cadre du processus de vote, cela signifie que les électeurs sont devenus plus autonomes dans leur prise de décision. Plutôt que de s'appuyer uniquement sur des affiliations traditionnelles, telles que la classe sociale, la religion ou l'identification partisane, ils sont désormais plus susceptibles d'examiner de manière critique les propositions des différents partis politiques et de prendre leurs propres décisions. Cela ne signifie pas nécessairement qu'ils rejetteront systématiquement les positions de leur classe sociale, de leur communauté religieuse ou de leur parti politique préféré, mais plutôt qu'ils ne les suivront pas aveuglément. Ils sont plus susceptibles de peser les avantages et les inconvénients de chaque option et de voter en fonction de ce qu'ils estiment être dans leur meilleur intérêt ou dans l'intérêt de la société en général.
The expansion of education profoundly transformed Western societies in the second half of the twentieth century. This led to a significant increase in the number of people with access to secondary and higher education. As a result, a larger proportion of the population has acquired skills in critical thinking and independent analysis. This "education revolution" has had a major impact on political and electoral behaviour. In terms of the voting process, it means that voters have become more autonomous in their decision-making. Rather than relying solely on traditional affiliations, such as social class, religion or party identification, they are now more likely to critically examine the proposals of different political parties and make their own decisions. This does not necessarily mean that they will systematically reject the positions of their social class, religious community or preferred political party, but rather that they will not blindly follow them. They are more likely to weigh up the advantages and disadvantages of each option and to vote according to what they feel is in their best interests or in the interests of society as a whole.


L'accroissement du niveau d'éducation au sein des sociétés occidentales a conduit à une évolution importante du comportement électoral. En effet, les électeurs, grâce à leur capacité accrue d'analyse et de critique, ont pu se défaire, en partie, de l'influence des organisations, des groupes sociaux ou des partis politiques sur leurs décisions de vote. Cela a généré un électorat plus indépendant et autonome dans ses choix. Toutefois, cette indépendance accrue a également entraîné une plus grande volatilité dans le comportement électoral. En d'autres termes, les électeurs sont désormais plus susceptibles de changer de parti d'une élection à l'autre. Ce phénomène contraste avec les comportements de vote plus stables observés dans le passé, lorsque le vote était plus fortement influencé par des facteurs tels que la classe sociale, la religion ou l'identification partisane. Cette volatilité accrue peut être perçue comme un signe de dynamisme au sein de l'électorat, reflétant une capacité accrue à évaluer et à réagir aux propositions des partis politiques et à l'évolution des conditions sociales, économiques et politiques. Cependant, elle peut également rendre les résultats électoraux plus imprévisibles et les majorités gouvernementales plus instables.
The rise in the level of education in Western societies has led to a significant change in electoral behaviour. Thanks to their greater capacity for analysis and criticism, voters have been able to free themselves, in part, from the influence of organisations, social groups or political parties on their voting decisions. This has led to a more independent electorate with autonomous choices. However, this increased independence has also led to greater volatility in voting behaviour. In other words, voters are now more likely to change parties from one election to the next. This contrasts with the more stable voting behaviour observed in the past, when voting was more strongly influenced by factors such as social class, religion or party identification. This increased volatility can be seen as a sign of dynamism within the electorate, reflecting an increased ability to assess and react to political party proposals and changing social, economic and political conditions. However, it can also make election results more unpredictable and government majorities more unstable.


Ainsi, l'évolution de l'éducation a contribué à l'érosion de l'influence des facteurs sociologiques et psychosociologiques traditionnels sur le comportement de vote. À leur place, des facteurs plus complexes et nuancés, tels que les convictions politiques individuelles, les préoccupations spécifiques et les évaluations des performances des partis politiques et de leurs candidats, jouent un rôle plus important. Cela rend le comportement de vote plus dynamique et moins prévisible sur la base des seuls facteurs sociodémographiques.
For example, developments in education have contributed to the erosion of the influence of traditional sociological and psychosociological factors on voting behaviour. In their place, more complex and nuanced factors, such as individual political convictions, specific concerns and evaluations of the performance of political parties and their candidates, are playing a greater role. This makes voting behaviour more dynamic and less predictable on the basis of socio-demographic factors alone.


=== Influence Croissante des Médias Audiovisuels sur le Vote ===
=== Growing influence of the audiovisual media on voting ===
Le troisième facteur clé qui a profondément modifié le comportement électoral est l'ascension des médias audiovisuels, d'abord avec la télévision, et plus récemment avec les médias numériques. Cette évolution a radicalement transformé la nature des campagnes électorales et des processus de votation. Dans ce nouvel environnement médiatique, les électeurs sont moins sous l'influence directe des organisations comme les partis politiques. Ils sont désormais plus exposés et réceptifs à ce qui est diffusé dans les médias, que ce soit par la couverture médiatique des événements politiques, les publicités politiques ou les informations et discussions sur les réseaux sociaux. Cela donne lieu à une nouvelle dynamique dans laquelle les médias jouent un rôle crucial dans la formation de l'opinion publique et l'orientation du vote. Ces changements ont rendu les électeurs plus autonomes dans leur prise de décision, mais aussi plus sensibles aux fluctuations de l'opinion publique telles qu'elles sont reflétées et amplifiées par les médias. Ces transformations rendent le comportement électoral plus complexe à anticiper et à analyser, car elles introduisent de nouveaux facteurs variables et dynamiques qui interagissent de manière complexe avec les facteurs traditionnels tels que la classe sociale, la religion ou l'identification partisane.  
The third key factor that has profoundly altered electoral behaviour is the rise of the audiovisual media, first with television and more recently with digital media. This development has radically transformed the nature of election campaigns and voting processes. In this new media environment, voters are less under the direct influence of organisations such as political parties. They are now more exposed and receptive to what is broadcast in the media, whether through coverage of political events, political advertising or news and discussions on social networks. This is giving rise to a new dynamic in which the media play a crucial role in shaping public opinion and directing voting. These changes have made voters more autonomous in their decision-making, but also more sensitive to fluctuations in public opinion as reflected and amplified by the media. These transformations make electoral behaviour more complex to anticipate and analyse, as they introduce new variable and dynamic factors that interact in complex ways with traditional factors such as social class, religion or party identification.  


En résumé, les partis politiques jouent désormais un rôle moins prédominant dans la communication politique, tandis que les médias et les campagnes politiques, avec leurs impacts à court terme, ont gagné en importance. Les modèles traditionnels, tels que ceux de l'École de Columbia et de l'École de Michigan, mettaient l'accent sur la stabilité du comportement électoral, liant le vote à des facteurs à long terme tels que l'appartenance sociale ou l'identification partisane. Cependant, avec les changements sociétaux, nous voyons que les facteurs à court terme jouent un rôle de plus en plus significatif dans le comportement électoral. Cela ne signifie pas que les facteurs à long terme ont perdu toute leur importance, mais plutôt que leur impact relatif a diminué par rapport aux influences à court terme. De ce fait, l'électorat est devenu plus volatile et les préférences de vote peuvent changer plus rapidement en réponse à des événements spécifiques ou des campagnes médiatiques intensives.
In short, political parties now play a less predominant role in political communication, while the media and political campaigns, with their short-term impact, have gained in importance. Traditional models, such as those of the Columbia School and the Michigan School, emphasised the stability of electoral behaviour, linking voting to long-term factors such as social affiliation or partisan identification. However, with societal changes, we see that short-term factors play an increasingly significant role in electoral behaviour. This does not mean that long-term factors have lost all their importance, but rather that their relative impact has diminished compared to short-term influences. As a result, the electorate has become more volatile and voting preferences can change more rapidly in response to specific events or intensive media campaigns.


=== Conception Simplifiée de l'Électorat dans les Modèles Classiques ===
=== Simplified Electorate Design in Classical Models ===
Un autre défaut des modèles classiques d'explication du vote est leur simplification excessive de l'électorat. En effet, ces modèles, bien que prenant en compte les différences individuelles d'un point de vue sociodémographique et parfois psychosociologique, considèrent l'électorat comme homogène. Ils ne tiennent pas compte de l'idée que les individus peuvent varier grandement dans leur relation à la politique. Cela signifie qu'ils ne prennent pas suffisamment en compte la diversité des attitudes politiques, des niveaux d'intérêt pour la politique, des niveaux d'engagement ou de participation politiques, ou encore des modes de consommation de l'information politique. Les individus peuvent être très actifs politiquement, totalement indifférents, ou se situer à n'importe quel point entre ces deux extrêmes. Ils peuvent également être fortement influencés par certains types d'information ou de sources d'information, et moins par d'autres.
Another shortcoming of traditional models to explain voting is their oversimplification of the electorate. Although these models take account of individual differences from a socio-demographic and sometimes psycho-sociological point of view, they consider the electorate to be homogeneous. They do not take into account the idea that individuals can vary greatly in their relationship to politics. This means that they do not take sufficient account of the diversity of political attitudes, levels of interest in politics, levels of political involvement or participation, or patterns of consumption of political information. Individuals can be very politically active, totally indifferent, or anywhere in between. They may also be strongly influenced by certain types of information or sources of information, and less so by others.


Les citoyens présentent des différences marquées dans leur relation à la politique, qui peuvent être particulièrement notables en ce qui concerne leur intérêt pour la politique et leur compétence politique. Il existe une grande variété de niveaux d'engagement : certains citoyens sont extrêmement intéressés par la politique, au point de s'y engager et d'en faire leur carrière, tandis que d'autres se désintéressent totalement de la politique. De même, le niveau de compétence politique varie considérablement. Certains citoyens ont une connaissance approfondie de la politique, comprennent les enjeux, sont informés et maîtrisent les sujets politiques, tandis que d'autres manquent de compétences cognitives ou de motivation pour s'informer, et n'ont donc pas les connaissances nécessaires pour une participation éclairée au vote. L'intérêt pour la politique joue un rôle déterminant dans l'attention accordée à la politique et influence la participation politique. En effet, ceux qui sont intéressés par la politique sont plus susceptibles de participer, tandis que ceux qui ne le sont pas sont plus susceptibles de s'abstenir. Ainsi, la motivation et l'intérêt pour la politique conditionnent non seulement l'attention accordée aux messages politiques, mais aussi le degré de participation politique.
There are marked differences between citizens in their relationship to politics, which may be particularly noticeable in terms of their interest in politics and their political competence. There is a wide range of levels of commitment: some citizens are extremely interested in politics, to the point of committing themselves to it and making a career of it, while others are completely disinterested in politics. Similarly, the level of political competence varies considerably. Some citizens have an in-depth knowledge of politics, understand what is at stake, are well-informed and have a good grasp of political issues, while others lack the cognitive skills or motivation to inform themselves, and therefore do not have the knowledge needed to take part in an informed vote. Interest in politics plays a decisive role in the attention paid to politics and influences political participation. Indeed, those who are interested in politics are more likely to participate, while those who are not are more likely to abstain. Motivation and interest in politics therefore condition not only the attention paid to political messages, but also the degree of political participation.


La compétence politique joue également un rôle crucial en conditionnant la capacité des individus à intégrer et à comprendre les messages véhiculés dans l'espace public. Imaginons une campagne d'information bien conçue, avec des arguments clairs venant de la droite comme de la gauche, alimentant des débats riches et instructifs. Si les individus n'ont pas les compétences nécessaires pour comprendre, intérioriser et assimiler ces informations, ces campagnes ne vont pas influencer leur opinion et ne contribueront pas à la formation de leur jugement. En revanche, les personnes ayant une certaine compétence politique seront plus à même de prendre en compte ces informations. Elles seront capables de peser le pour et le contre, essayant de se forger une opinion sur la base des informations qui sont partagées dans l'espace public. Cette capacité à traiter et à comprendre l'information politique est donc essentielle pour une participation politique éclairée et active.
Political skills also play a crucial role in determining people's ability to integrate and understand the messages conveyed in the public arena. Imagine a well-designed information campaign, with clear arguments from both the right and the left, fuelling rich and informative debates. If people do not have the necessary skills to understand, internalise and assimilate this information, these campaigns will not influence their opinion and will not contribute to the formation of their judgement. On the other hand, people with a degree of political competence will be better able to take this information on board. They will be able to weigh up the pros and cons, trying to form an opinion on the basis of the information that is shared in the public arena. This ability to process and understand political information is therefore essential for informed and active political participation.


Il est essentiel de noter que l'intérêt pour la politique et la compétence politique, autrement dit, un facteur de motivation et un facteur cognitif, vont conditionner et jouer un rôle crucial dans le processus de formation des opinions des individus. Ce sont ces deux éléments - l'intérêt et la compétence - qui sont devenus des considérations importantes dans l'analyse du comportement électoral. Aujourd'hui, l'approche a changé et les modèles de comportement électoral ne supposent plus un électorat homogène. On essaie plutôt de prendre en compte la diversité et l'hétérogénéité de l'électorat. C'est une reconnaissance du fait que chaque individu a sa propre combinaison unique d'intérêt et de compétence politique, ce qui influence son comportement en matière de vote.  
It is essential to note that interest in politics and political competence, in other words, a motivational factor and a cognitive factor, will condition and play a crucial role in the process of forming people's opinions. It is these two elements - interest and competence - that have become important considerations in the analysis of electoral behaviour. Today, the approach has changed and models of electoral behaviour no longer assume a homogeneous electorate. Instead, we try to take into account the diversity and heterogeneity of the electorate. This is a recognition that each individual has their own unique combination of interest and political competence, which influences their voting behaviour.


=== Focalisation Excessive sur les Individus dans l'Analyse du Vote ===
=== Excessive Focus on Individuals in Voting Analysis ===
La dernière lacune des modèles classiques, et particulièrement apparente dans l'école du choix rationnel, est l'accent excessif mis sur l'individu. L'école du choix rationnel incarne de manière exemplaire cette focalisation sur l'individu, puisqu'elle postule que l'individu effectue son calcul coûts-bénéfices indépendamment du contexte et de toute influence extérieure. L'individu est placé au centre de ce processus : il collecte des informations, évalue le parti qui lui rapportera le plus et celui qui lui coûtera le plus, et sur cette base, il fait son choix. Un exemple typique de ce processus serait de déterminer quel parti est le plus proche de soi sur une échelle gauche-droite et de voter pour ce parti en fonction de ses intérêts, mais toujours indépendamment du contexte. C'est un modèle qui considère l'individu comme un acteur isolé et autonome dans son processus de décision de vote, sans prendre en compte les diverses influences environnementales et sociales qui pourraient aussi jouer un rôle dans cette décision.  
The final shortcoming of classical models, and one that is particularly apparent in the rational choice school, is the excessive emphasis placed on the individual. The rational choice school is an exemplary example of this focus on the individual, since it postulates that the individual carries out his cost-benefit calculation independently of the context and any external influence. The individual is placed at the centre of this process: he gathers information, evaluates which party will bring him the most benefits and which will cost him the most, and on this basis makes his choice. A typical example of this process would be to determine which party is closest to you on a left-right scale and to vote for that party according to your interests, but always independently of the context. It is a model that considers the individual as an isolated and autonomous actor in the process of deciding how to vote, without taking into account the various environmental and social influences that could also play a role in this decision.  


La critique adressée à ces modèles traditionnels, et particulièrement à l'école du choix rationnel, repose sur une focalisation excessive sur les électeurs et leurs caractéristiques individuelles, au détriment d'une considération insuffisante du contexte dans lequel ces individus forment leurs opinions politiques. Cela signifie que ces modèles ne prennent pas suffisamment en compte l'environnement social, économique, culturel et politique dans lequel les électeurs vivent et qui influence significativement leurs attitudes et leurs comportements électoraux.
The criticism levelled at these traditional models, and particularly at the rational choice school, is based on an excessive focus on voters and their individual characteristics, to the detriment of insufficient consideration of the context in which these individuals form their political opinions. This means that these models do not take sufficient account of the social, economic, cultural and political environment in which voters live and which significantly influences their attitudes and electoral behaviour.


La critique en question s'applique surtout à l'école du choix rationnel, mais elle concerne également les écoles de Columbia et de Michigan. Pour l'école de Columbia, même si l'individu est supposé voter en fonction des caractéristiques du groupe social auquel il appartient, le groupe en lui-même n'est pas véritablement pris en compte. Il est plutôt reflété uniquement à travers les caractéristiques individuelles de l'électeur, par exemple si celui-ci est ouvrier, s'il est catholique, etc. La position sociale de l'électeur et l'influence des institutions collectives, comme les syndicats pour les travailleurs, ne sont pas suffisamment considérées dans ce modèle. En d'autres termes, ces modèles ne prennent pas pleinement en compte le rôle du contexte social et institutionnel dans lequel l'électeur se situe, et qui peut significativement influencer son comportement de vote.  
The criticism in question applies mainly to the rational choice school, but also concerns the Columbia and Michigan schools. For the Columbia school, although individuals are supposed to vote according to the characteristics of the social group to which they belong, the group itself is not really taken into account. Instead, it is reflected solely through the individual characteristics of the voter, for example whether he or she is a blue-collar worker, Catholic, etc. The social position of the voter and the influence of collective institutions, such as trade unions for workers, are not sufficiently taken into account in this model. In other words, these models do not take full account of the role of the social and institutional context in which the voter finds himself, and which can significantly influence his voting behaviour.  


Même le modèle de Columbia, qui est pourtant un modèle sociologique et qui positionne l'individu au sein de son groupe social, n'a pas pris suffisamment en compte l'importance du rôle joué par le groupe en lui-même. Ce qui est surtout pris en compte sont les caractéristiques sociales de l'individu, plutôt que celles du groupe dans lequel il s'inscrit. Cependant, les opinions individuelles ne se développent pas dans un vide politique, mais au contraire dans un contexte institutionnel et politique spécifique. Ce contexte précis a le potentiel d'influencer de manière significative la façon dont une personne forme ses opinions. Autrement dit, le cadre social, culturel et institutionnel dans lequel un individu évolue joue un rôle déterminant dans la construction de ses idées et de ses comportements politiques.  
Even the Columbia model, which is a sociological model that positions the individual within his or her social group, does not take sufficient account of the importance of the role played by the group itself. What is mainly taken into account are the social characteristics of the individual, rather than those of the group to which he belongs. However, individual opinions do not develop in a political vacuum, but rather in a specific institutional and political context. This specific context has the potential to significantly influence the way in which an individual forms his or her opinions. In other words, the social, cultural and institutional framework in which an individual evolves plays a decisive role in shaping his or her political ideas and behaviour.


Les deux éléments clés du contexte que l'on peut mentionner sont l'offre politique et la campagne électorale.
The two key elements of the context that can be mentioned are the political offer and the electoral campaign.


L''''offre politique''' : L'offre et la demande politiques, deux termes souvent utilisés en science politique pour comprendre le comportement électoral.
Political supply: Political supply and demand, two terms often used in political science to understand electoral behaviour.
* Political supply refers to the different choices available to voters, including political parties, candidates, political programmes, ideologies and political agendas. This offer can vary considerably from one context to another, thus influencing the way in which individuals make their voting decisions. For example, if the political offer does not represent a wide range of political ideologies or does not offer satisfactory solutions to the problems voters are concerned about, this can lead to electoral disengagement, protest through blank or invalid voting, or a shift in the vote towards less traditional parties.
* Political demand, on the other hand, refers to voters' preferences, values, expectations and needs. These characteristics are influenced by a variety of factors, including socio-demographics (age, gender, level of education, occupation), psychology (attitudes, values, emotions) and context (economic situation, current political issues, etc.).


* L'offre politique concerne les différents choix disponibles pour les électeurs, notamment les partis politiques, les candidats, les programmes politiques, les idéologies et les agendas politiques. Cette offre peut varier considérablement d'un contexte à l'autre, influençant ainsi la façon dont les individus prennent leurs décisions de vote. Par exemple, si l'offre politique ne représente pas un large éventail d'idéologies politiques ou ne propose pas de solutions satisfaisantes aux problèmes préoccupants les électeurs, cela peut conduire à un désengagement électoral, à une protestation par le vote blanc ou nul, ou à un report de vote vers des partis moins traditionnels.
In this context, political parties and candidates seek to shape their offer to best meet voter demand. Where there is a match between political supply and demand, we generally see higher levels of electoral commitment. On the other hand, when the political offer is out of step with voter demand, this can lead to dissatisfaction, disengagement or electoral volatility. A thorough understanding of these two concepts is therefore essential for analysing and understanding electoral behaviour.
* La demande politique, quant à elle, se réfère aux préférences, aux valeurs, aux attentes et aux besoins des électeurs. Ces caractéristiques sont influencées par divers facteurs, notamment sociodémographiques (âge, sexe, niveau d'éducation, profession), psychologiques (attitudes, valeurs, émotions) et contextuels (situation économique, enjeux politiques du moment, etc.).


Dans ce contexte, les partis politiques et les candidats cherchent à façonner leur offre pour répondre au mieux à la demande des électeurs. Lorsqu'il y a une adéquation entre l'offre et la demande politiques, on observe généralement un engagement électoral plus élevé. En revanche, lorsque l'offre politique est en décalage avec la demande des électeurs, cela peut entraîner une insatisfaction, un désengagement ou une volatilité électorale. Ainsi, une compréhension approfondie de ces deux concepts est essentielle pour analyser et comprendre le comportement électoral.
The electoral campaign: Electoral campaigns have taken on considerable importance in shaping electoral opinion. In addition to socio-demographic and ideological factors, the messages and information disseminated during an election campaign can significantly influence voters' voting decisions. These short-term influences can include a variety of factors, such as :


La '''campagne électorale''' :  Les campagnes électorales ont pris une importance considérable dans la formation de l'opinion électorale. En plus des facteurs sociodémographiques et idéologiques, les messages et les informations diffusés lors d'une campagne électorale peuvent influencer de manière significative les décisions de vote des électeurs. Ces influences de court terme peuvent inclure divers facteurs, tels que :
* Public debates on key political issues.
* Media coverage of candidates and political parties.
* Political advertising campaigns.
* Candidates' speeches and policy positions.
* Current events and crises during the campaign.
* Polls and election forecasts.


* Les débats publics sur des questions politiques clés.
All these factors can have an impact on how voters perceive candidates and political parties, and therefore influence their voting decisions. In addition, voting volatility, i.e. the propensity of voters to change their political allegiance from one election to the next, has increased in many countries, suggesting that short-term influences, such as election campaigns, can have a significant impact on voting behaviour.
* La couverture médiatique des candidats et des partis politiques.
* Les campagnes de publicité politique.
* Les discours et les positions politiques des candidats.
* Les événements actuels et les crises qui se produisent pendant la campagne.
* Les sondages et les prévisions électorales.


Tous ces facteurs peuvent avoir un impact sur la façon dont les électeurs perçoivent les candidats et les partis politiques, et donc influencer leurs décisions de vote. En outre, la volatilité du vote, c'est-à-dire la propension des électeurs à changer leur allégeance politique d'une élection à l'autre, a augmenté dans de nombreux pays, ce qui suggère que les influences de court terme, telles que les campagnes électorales, peuvent avoir un impact significatif sur le comportement électoral.
Both are integral parts of the context in which individuals form their opinions and make their voting decisions. Consequently, it is essential to take them into account when analysing electoral behaviour.


Ces deux éléments sont des parties intégrantes du contexte dans lequel les individus forment leur opinion et prennent leur décision de vote. Par conséquent, il est essentiel de les prendre en compte lors de l'analyse du comportement électoral.
= Recent developments in electoral research =
Researchers have sought to improve the accuracy of traditional electoral models by incorporating new explanatory elements. These elements attempt to take into account the evolution of modern societies and the new dynamics that influence electoral behaviour. These new factors include :


= Développements Récents dans la Recherche Électorale =
* Changing social cleavages: In modern societies, social cleavages are no longer limited to distinctions of class or religion. Other cleavages, such as level of education, ethnic origin, gender, age, sexual orientation, place of residence (urban/rural), etc., have gained in importance.
Les chercheurs ont cherché à améliorer la précision des modèles électoraux classiques en y intégrant de nouveaux éléments explicatifs. Ces éléments tentent de prendre en compte l'évolution des sociétés modernes et les nouvelles dynamiques qui influencent le comportement électoral. Parmi ces nouveaux facteurs, on peut citer :
* The evolution of political issues: The political issues that attract voters' interest have evolved. Issues such as the environment, immigration, nationalism, minority rights, etc., have gained in importance.
* The influence of the media and new technologies: The impact of traditional and social media on electoral behaviour has become a major area of research. These media can influence voters' opinions, their perception of candidates and parties, and even their electoral participation.
* The role of emotions in politics: Researchers have begun to take account of the role of emotions in politics. Feelings such as fear, anger, hope, enthusiasm, etc., can influence people's electoral behaviour.
* The personalisation of politics: The personality and image of candidates have become important factors in voters' choices. Voters may be more inclined to vote for a candidate on the basis of his or her personality or public image than on the basis of his or her policies or party affiliation.


* L'évolution des clivages sociaux : Dans les sociétés modernes, les clivages sociaux ne se limitent plus aux distinctions de classe ou de religion. D'autres clivages, tels que le niveau d'éducation, l'origine ethnique, le genre, l'âge, l'orientation sexuelle, le lieu de résidence (urbain/rural), etc., ont gagné en importance.
These new approaches do not supplant traditional models, but complement and enrich them. They recognise that electoral behaviour is complex and multifactorial, and that it is influenced by a multitude of factors that evolve over time and in context.
* L'évolution des questions politiques : Les questions politiques qui suscitent l'intérêt des électeurs ont évolué. Des questions telles que l'environnement, l'immigration, le nationalisme, les droits des minorités, etc., ont gagné en importance.
* L'influence des médias et des nouvelles technologies : L'impact des médias traditionnels et des médias sociaux sur le comportement électoral est devenu un domaine de recherche majeur. Ces médias peuvent influencer l'opinion des électeurs, leur perception des candidats et des partis, et même leur participation électorale.
* Le rôle des émotions en politique : Les chercheurs ont commencé à prendre en compte le rôle des émotions dans la politique. Les sentiments tels que la peur, la colère, l'espoir, l'enthousiasme, etc., peuvent influencer le comportement électoral des individus.
* La personnalisation de la politique : La personnalité et l'image des candidats sont devenues des facteurs importants dans le choix des électeurs. Les électeurs peuvent être plus enclins à voter pour un candidat sur la base de sa personnalité ou de son image publique plutôt que sur la base de ses politiques ou de son affiliation partisane.


Ces nouvelles approches ne supplantent pas les modèles classiques, mais les complètent et les enrichissent. Elles reconnaissent que le comportement électoral est complexe et multifactoriel, et qu'il est influencé par une multitude de facteurs qui évoluent avec le temps et le contexte.
== Taking the Context into Account in Voting Analysis ==
The institutional context, in particular the electoral system, plays a crucial role in voting behaviour. The type of electoral system, whether majoritarian, proportional or a mixture of the two, has a significant impact on voters' voting strategies, as well as on the tactics of political parties. In a majoritarian system, where the candidate or party with the most votes wins all the seats in a constituency, voters may have to vote strategically to avoid 'wasting' their vote. They may decide to vote for a candidate or party that is more likely to win, even if it is not their first choice. Similarly, political parties can choose to concentrate on certain constituencies where they believe they have a better chance of winning seats. On the other hand, in a proportional system, where seats are allocated according to the percentage of votes received by each party, voters have more freedom to vote according to their true preferences, because they know that their vote will contribute to winning a seat, even for a small party. Similarly, political parties can afford to field candidates in a variety of constituencies, as each vote counts towards the allocation of seats. Thus, the institutional context is an essential factor to consider when analysing electoral behaviour, as it shapes the incentives and strategies of voters and political parties.


== Prise en Compte du Contexte dans l'Analyse du Vote ==
The polarisation of the political system is another contextual element that influences voting behaviour. In a highly polarised system, where political parties propose markedly different policies and take opposing positions on various issues, voters have a wider range of choices. This diversity can stimulate political engagement and make it easier for voters to make decisions, as clear distinctions between parties can make it more obvious who to vote for. Conversely, in a consensual political system where there are few ideological or political differences between parties, voters may find it more difficult to distinguish between parties and decide who to vote for. This lack of differentiation can reduce political engagement and increase voter uncertainty or indecision. Polarisation can also affect the dynamics of election campaigns. In a polarised environment, parties may run more confrontational and issue-based campaigns, which in turn may influence how voters perceive parties and make their choices. In short, the degree of polarisation in a political system can have significant implications for electoral behaviour.
Le contexte institutionnel, notamment le système électoral, joue un rôle crucial dans le comportement de vote. Le type de système électoral, qu'il soit majoritaire, proportionnel ou un mixte des deux, a un impact significatif sur les stratégies de vote des électeurs, ainsi que sur les tactiques des partis politiques. Dans un système majoritaire, où le candidat ou le parti avec le plus de votes remporte la totalité des sièges dans une circonscription, les électeurs peuvent être amenés à voter stratégiquement pour éviter le "gaspillage" de leur vote. Ils peuvent ainsi décider de voter pour un candidat ou un parti qui a plus de chances de gagner, même s'il ne représente pas leur premier choix. De même, les partis politiques peuvent choisir de se concentrer sur certaines circonscriptions où ils pensent avoir plus de chances de remporter des sièges. En revanche, dans un système proportionnel, où les sièges sont répartis en fonction du pourcentage de votes reçus par chaque parti, les électeurs ont plus de liberté pour voter selon leurs véritables préférences, car ils savent que leur vote contribuera à l'obtention d'un siège, même pour un petit parti. De même, les partis politiques peuvent se permettre de présenter des candidats dans une variété de circonscriptions, car chaque vote compte pour l'attribution des sièges. Ainsi, le contexte institutionnel est un facteur essentiel à considérer lors de l'analyse du comportement électoral, car il façonne les incitations et les stratégies des électeurs et des partis politiques.


La polarisation du système politique est un autre élément contextuel qui influence le comportement de vote. Dans un système fortement polarisé, où les partis politiques proposent des politiques nettement différentes et prennent des positions opposées sur divers enjeux, les électeurs ont une gamme plus large de choix. Cette diversité peut stimuler l'engagement politique et faciliter la prise de décision des électeurs, car les distinctions claires entre les partis peuvent rendre plus évident pour qui voter. Inversement, dans un système politique consensuel où il y a peu de différences idéologiques ou politiques entre les partis, les électeurs peuvent avoir plus de mal à distinguer les partis et à décider pour qui voter. Ce manque de différenciation peut réduire l'engagement politique et augmenter l'incertitude ou l'indécision des électeurs. En outre, la polarisation peut également affecter la dynamique des campagnes électorales. Dans un environnement polarisé, les partis peuvent mener des campagnes plus conflictuelles et axées sur les enjeux, ce qui peut à son tour influencer la manière dont les électeurs perçoivent les partis et font leur choix. En somme, le degré de polarisation d'un système politique peut avoir des implications significatives pour le comportement électoral.
The fragmentation of the party system is another crucial contextual aspect that can influence voting behaviour. Fragmentation refers to the number of significant political parties in a political system. In a highly fragmented party system, where there are many political parties, all of which have a reasonable chance of winning seats or exerting influence, voters have a greater variety of choices. This can lead to a more nuanced representation of voters' political views and preferences. However, it can also make the political landscape more complex and harder for voters to navigate. Conversely, in a less fragmented party system, typically characterised by one or two dominant parties, voter choice is more limited. While this can make electoral choice simpler, it can also lead to less complete political representation or dissatisfaction among voters who feel inadequately represented by the options available. Fragmentation of the party system can also influence the dynamics of the election campaign and party strategy. For example, in a highly fragmented system, parties may be more inclined to form alliances or coalitions and target specific segments of the electorate.


La fragmentation du système de parti est un autre aspect contextuel crucial qui peut influencer le comportement de vote. La fragmentation fait référence au nombre de partis politiques significatifs dans un système politique. Dans un système de parti fortement fragmenté, où il y a de nombreux partis politiques qui ont tous une chance raisonnable de gagner des sièges ou d'exercer une influence, les électeurs ont une plus grande variété de choix. Cela peut permettre une représentation plus nuancée des opinions politiques et des préférences des électeurs. Cependant, cela peut également rendre le paysage politique plus complexe et plus difficile à naviguer pour les électeurs. Inversement, dans un système de parti moins fragmenté, généralement caractérisé par un ou deux partis dominants, le choix des électeurs est plus limité. Alors que cela peut rendre le choix électoral plus simple, il peut aussi conduire à une représentation politique moins complète ou à une insatisfaction des électeurs qui se sentent mal représentés par les options disponibles. La fragmentation du système de parti peut également influencer la dynamique de la campagne électorale et la stratégie des partis. Par exemple, dans un système hautement fragmenté, les partis peuvent être plus enclins à former des alliances ou des coalitions et à cibler des segments spécifiques de l'électorat.
The election campaign and media coverage are two crucial factors influencing voting behaviour. They are particularly relevant in modern models of electoral research. The election campaign itself is a time when parties and candidates present their positions on various issues, try to convince voters of their competence and the relevance of their proposals, and often criticise their opponents. The election campaign is therefore a time of potentially strong influence on voters' opinions, both in terms of their assessment of candidates and parties and their sense of commitment to the political process. The media play an important role in conveying information about the campaign to voters. They are responsible for covering candidate statements, political debates, polls, controversies and campaign incidents. The way in which the media cover the campaign can influence voters' perceptions of the relevance, credibility and attractiveness of different candidates and parties. In addition, the media can also influence voters' perceptions of important campaign issues. For example, if the media focus heavily on certain issues, such as the economy or immigration, voters may perceive these issues as more important than others, which can influence their voting behaviour. Overall, the election campaign and media coverage are two key contextual factors that can have a significant influence on voters' opinion formation and voting behaviour.


La campagne électorale et la couverture médiatique sont deux facteurs cruciaux qui influencent le comportement de vote. Elles sont particulièrement pertinentes dans les modèles modernes de recherche électorale. La campagne électorale elle-même est un moment où les partis et les candidats présentent leurs positions sur diverses questions, tentent de convaincre les électeurs de leur compétence et de la pertinence de leurs propositions, et critiquent souvent leurs adversaires. La campagne électorale est donc un moment de forte influence potentielle sur l'opinion des électeurs, à la fois en ce qui concerne leur évaluation des candidats et des partis et leur sentiment d'engagement envers le processus politique. Les médias jouent un rôle important dans la transmission des informations sur la campagne aux électeurs. Ils sont responsables de la couverture des déclarations des candidats, des débats politiques, des sondages, des controverses et des incidents de campagne. La manière dont les médias couvrent la campagne peut influencer la perception qu'ont les électeurs de la pertinence, de la crédibilité et de l'attractivité des différents candidats et partis. En outre, les médias peuvent également influencer la manière dont les électeurs perçoivent les questions importantes de la campagne. Par exemple, si les médias se concentrent fortement sur certaines questions, comme l'économie ou l'immigration, les électeurs peuvent percevoir ces questions comme étant plus importantes que d'autres, ce qui peut influencer leur comportement de vote. Dans l'ensemble, la campagne électorale et la couverture médiatique sont deux facteurs contextuels clés qui peuvent avoir une influence significative sur la formation de l'opinion des électeurs et sur leur comportement de vote.
== Recognition of the heterogeneity of the electorate ==
Modern models of electoral research take account of the heterogeneity of the electorate, which represents a significant departure from traditional models that assumed the relative homogeneity of voters. Today, it is widely recognised that the electorate is diverse and varied, with very different levels of interest and political competence among individuals.  


== Reconnaissance de l'Hétérogénéité de l'Électorat ==
Interest in politics is a key factor that can influence an individual's voting behaviour. Voters with a strong interest in politics are likely to be more engaged in the political process, to follow election campaigns closely, to inform themselves about candidates and parties, and to participate actively in voting. On the other hand, those with little interest in politics may be less engaged and less likely to vote. Political competence is another important factor. Voters with a good knowledge of politics and a clear understanding of the issues are better able to process complex political information and evaluate candidates and parties on the basis of well-informed criteria. Those who are less politically literate may find it more difficult to understand and evaluate political information, which may affect their voting behaviour.
Dans les modèles modernes de la recherche électorale, on tient compte de l'hétérogénéité de l'électorat, ce qui représente une rupture significative par rapport aux modèles classiques qui supposaient une homogénéité relative des électeurs. Aujourd'hui, il est largement reconnu que l'électorat est divers et varié, avec des niveaux d'intérêt et de compétence politique très différents parmi les individus.  


L'intérêt pour la politique est un facteur clé qui peut influencer le comportement de vote d'un individu. Les électeurs qui sont fortement intéressés par la politique sont susceptibles de s'engager davantage dans le processus politique, de suivre de près les campagnes électorales, de s'informer sur les candidats et les partis, et de participer activement au vote. En revanche, ceux qui ont peu d'intérêt pour la politique peuvent être moins engagés et moins susceptibles de voter. La compétence politique est un autre facteur important. Les électeurs qui ont une bonne connaissance de la politique et une compréhension claire des enjeux sont plus à même de traiter les informations politiques complexes et d'évaluer les candidats et les partis sur la base de critères bien informés. Ceux qui ont moins de compétences politiques peuvent avoir plus de difficulté à comprendre et à évaluer les informations politiques, ce qui peut affecter leur comportement de vote.
Political psychology is an interdisciplinary field of study that examines how individual psychological processes, as well as personality traits, influence politics at an individual and collective level. In particular, it studies how individuals form their political opinions, how they make political decisions, and how their values, attitudes and personality traits influence their political behaviour. It examines a wide range of topics, from political attitudes and perceptions to the formation of political identities and the effects of emotions on political behaviour. For example, political psychology can study how fears or security concerns can influence attitudes towards immigration policies, or how an individual's core values, such as equality or freedom, can shape their political alignment.


La psychologie politique est un champ d'étude interdisciplinaire qui examine comment les processus psychologiques individuels, ainsi que les traits de personnalité, influencent la politique au niveau individuel et collectif. Elle étudie notamment comment les individus forment leurs opinions politiques, comment ils prennent des décisions politiques, et comment leurs valeurs, leurs attitudes et leurs traits de personnalité influencent leur comportement politique. Elle se penche sur un large éventail de sujets, allant des attitudes et des perceptions politiques à la formation des identités politiques, en passant par les effets des émotions sur le comportement politique. Par exemple, la psychologie politique peut étudier comment les peurs ou les préoccupations de sécurité peuvent influencer les attitudes envers les politiques d'immigration, ou comment les valeurs fondamentales d'un individu, comme l'égalité ou la liberté, peuvent façonner son alignement politique.
Political psychology is also interested in the influence of cognitive biases on political decision-making. For example, it can examine how biases such as the confirmation effect (the tendency to seek out and interpret information that confirms our existing beliefs) can influence political opinions. By focusing on the underlying psychological mechanisms, political psychology offers a unique perspective on politics and voting behaviour, complementing more traditional approaches in political science that focus on factors such as party affiliations, ideologies or socio-demographic factors.


La psychologie politique s'intéresse également à l'influence des biais cognitifs sur la prise de décision politique. Par exemple, elle peut examiner comment des biais comme l'effet de confirmation (la tendance à chercher et à interpréter des informations qui confirment nos croyances existantes) peuvent influencer les opinions politiques. En mettant l'accent sur les mécanismes psychologiques sous-jacents, la psychologie politique offre une perspective unique sur la politique et le comportement de vote, complétant ainsi les approches plus traditionnelles de la science politique qui se concentrent sur des facteurs tels que les affiliations partisanes, les idéologies ou les facteurs sociodémographiques.
The idea that issue voting has become more important in recent decades is increasingly accepted in the field of political science. Issue voting refers to voting behaviour based on specific issues or problems ("issues") that voters consider important. Rather than basing their vote solely on overall political ideologies or party affiliations, many voters are now more likely to vote on the basis of particular positions on specific issues, such as the economy, the environment, public health, immigration, and so on. Voters may also base their vote on their perception of the competence of a party or candidate to manage these issues. For example, a voter may decide to vote for a certain party because they perceive it to be the most competent to manage an economic crisis or to implement effective environmental policies. This shift towards more issue-based voting can be attributed to a number of factors. It may be due to increased access to information, which allows voters to be more informed and engaged on specific issues. It may also be linked to the erosion of traditional party loyalties, the increasing individualisation of politics and polarisation around specific issues. Nevertheless, even though issue voting has become more common, political ideologies and party affiliations continue to play a significant role in voting behaviour.


L'idée que le vote d'enjeu est devenu plus important dans les récentes décennies est de plus en plus acceptée dans le domaine de la science politique. Le vote d'enjeu se réfère au comportement de vote basé sur des questions spécifiques ou des problèmes (les "enjeux") que les électeurs considèrent comme importants. Plutôt que de se baser uniquement sur des idéologies politiques globales ou des affiliations de partis, de nombreux électeurs sont désormais plus susceptibles de voter sur la base de positions particulières sur des enjeux spécifiques, comme l'économie, l'environnement, la santé publique, l'immigration, etc. Les électeurs peuvent aussi baser leur vote sur leur perception de la compétence d'un parti ou d'un candidat pour gérer ces enjeux. Par exemple, un électeur peut décider de voter pour un certain parti parce qu'il le perçoit comme étant le plus compétent pour gérer une crise économique ou pour mettre en œuvre des politiques environnementales efficaces. Ce changement vers un vote plus centré sur les enjeux peut être attribué à plusieurs facteurs. Cela peut être dû à l'augmentation de l'accès à l'information, qui permet aux électeurs d'être plus informés et plus engagés sur des questions spécifiques. Cela peut également être lié à l'érosion des loyautés partisanes traditionnelles, à l'individualisation croissante de la politique et à la polarisation autour de certains enjeux spécifiques. Néanmoins, même si le vote d'enjeu est devenu plus courant, les idéologies politiques et les affiliations de partis continuent de jouer un rôle significatif dans le comportement de vote.
The situation in Switzerland is a good illustration of how the issue vote can play a major role in elections. The Swiss People's Party (SVP), which is known for its tough stance on immigration, has managed to attract a large number of voters who see immigration as a major issue. The UDC has succeeded in building a reputation as a party that actively addresses the issue of immigration, proposing restrictive policies and highlighting the issue in its election campaigns. For many voters, the SVP is seen as the most competent party to deal with the issue of immigration, which partly explains its electoral success. This shows that, in certain contexts, specific issues can become central to the political debate and strongly influence voter behaviour. Parties that are able to position themselves effectively on these issues and convince voters of their competence can therefore enjoy a significant advantage at the ballot box.


La situation en Suisse illustre bien comment le vote d'enjeu peut jouer un rôle majeur dans les élections. L'Union Démocratique du Centre (UDC), qui est connue pour ses positions dures sur l'immigration, a réussi à attirer un grand nombre d'électeurs qui considèrent l'immigration comme un enjeu majeur. L'UDC a réussi à construire une réputation de parti qui s'occupe activement de la question de l'immigration, en proposant des politiques restrictives et en mettant en avant cet enjeu dans ses campagnes électorales. Pour de nombreux électeurs, l'UDC est ainsi perçue comme le parti le plus compétent pour gérer l'enjeu de l'immigration, ce qui explique en partie son succès électoral. Cela montre que, dans certains contextes, des enjeux spécifiques peuvent devenir centraux dans le débat politique et influencer fortement le comportement des électeurs. Les partis qui sont capables de se positionner efficacement sur ces enjeux et de convaincre les électeurs de leur compétence peuvent ainsi bénéficier d'un avantage significatif dans les urnes.
== Methodological innovations in the study of voting behaviour ==
Multilevel explanatory models, also known as hierarchical models, represent a major methodological advance in the study of electoral behaviour. These models take into account the different scales of influence on the behaviour of individuals, from the local context to the national context, via the individual context. For example, a multilevel model could analyse the effect of individual characteristics such as age, gender, education and ethnicity on voting behaviour, while also taking into account the role of the local and national socio-economic context, the characteristics of the party system and the political offer. In this way, multilevel models can help us understand how influences at different levels interact to shape voting behaviour. These models offer considerable flexibility and allow complex data to be analysed in a more accurate and nuanced way. They have been used to study a range of political phenomena, including voting behaviour, political participation, political attitudes and many others. Thus, the use of hierarchical or explanatory multilevel models represents a significant innovation in voting behaviour research, allowing for a more comprehensive and nuanced understanding of the factors that influence voting.


== Innovations Méthodologiques dans l'Étude du Comportement de Vote ==
Statistical models are generally referred to as multilevel or hierarchical models. They are designed to take account of the inherent complexity of social data, which often comprises nested or hierarchical structures.
Les modèles explicatifs multiniveaux, également connus sous le nom de modèles hiérarchiques, représentent une avancée méthodologique majeure dans l'étude du comportement électoral. Ces modèles prennent en compte les différentes échelles d'influence sur le comportement des individus, du contexte local au contexte national, en passant par le contexte individuel. Par exemple, un modèle multiniveau pourrait analyser l'effet de caractéristiques individuelles telles que l'âge, le sexe, l'éducation et l'appartenance ethnique sur le comportement électoral, tout en prenant également en compte le rôle du contexte socio-économique local et national, des caractéristiques du système de parti et de l'offre politique. De cette façon, les modèles multiniveaux peuvent nous aider à comprendre comment les influences à différents niveaux interagissent pour façonner le comportement électoral. Ces modèles offrent une flexibilité considérable et permettent d'analyser des données complexes de manière plus précise et nuancée. Ils ont été utilisés pour étudier une gamme de phénomènes politiques, y compris le comportement électoral, la participation politique, les attitudes politiques et bien d'autres. Ainsi, le recours aux modèles hiérarchiques ou explicatifs multiniveaux constitue une innovation significative dans la recherche sur le comportement électoral, permettant une compréhension plus complète et nuancée des facteurs qui influencent le vote.


Les modèles statistiques sont généralement appelés modèles multiniveaux ou modèles hiérarchiques. Ils sont conçus pour prendre en compte la complexité inhérente aux données sociales, qui comportent souvent des structures imbriquées ou hiérarchisées.
In the context of electoral behaviour research, these models can be used to examine simultaneously the effect of individual characteristics (such as age, gender, education, political beliefs, etc.) and the effect of context (for example, the electoral system, the political offer, the electoral campaign, etc.) on an individual's vote choice. These models can also be used to study the interactions between individual and contextual factors. For example, they can be used to examine whether the effect of education on the choice of vote varies according to the political context in which an individual finds himself. By simultaneously taking into account individual and contextual factors, as well as their interactions, multilevel models offer a richer and more complete perspective on the formation of electoral choice. They can help reveal complex dynamics that might be missed by analyses that consider individual and contextual factors separately.


Dans le contexte de la recherche sur le comportement électoral, ces modèles peuvent être utilisés pour examiner simultanément l'effet des caractéristiques individuelles (telles que l'âge, le sexe, l'éducation, les croyances politiques, etc.) et l'effet du contexte (par exemple, le système électoral, l'offre politique, la campagne électorale, etc.) sur le choix de vote d'un individu. Ces modèles permettent également d'étudier les interactions entre les facteurs individuels et contextuels. Par exemple, ils peuvent être utilisés pour examiner si l'effet de l'éducation sur le choix de vote varie en fonction du contexte politique dans lequel un individu se trouve. En prenant en compte simultanément les facteurs individuels et contextuels, ainsi que leurs interactions, les modèles multiniveaux offrent une perspective plus riche et plus complète de la formation du choix électoral. Ils peuvent aider à révéler des dynamiques complexes qui pourraient être manquées par des analyses qui considèrent les facteurs individuels et contextuels séparément.
For example, the researchers attempt to illustrate that the impact of Catholic identity on electoral behaviour can vary according to the voter's religious environment. In other words, the influence of Catholic identity on voting could be more or less significant depending on whether the individual lives in a predominantly Catholic canton or in a canton with religious diversity. The underlying idea is therefore to integrate both individual factors, such as religious identity, and contextual factors, such as the religious composition of the canton, into the analysis of voting behaviour.


Par exemple, les chercheurs tentent d'illustrer que l'impact de l'identité catholique sur le comportement électoral peut varier en fonction de l'environnement religieux de l'électeur. Autrement dit, l'influence de l'identité catholique sur le vote pourrait être plus ou moins significative selon que l'individu vit dans un canton principalement catholique ou dans un canton avec une diversité religieuse. L'idée sous-jacente est donc d'intégrer à la fois des facteurs individuels, comme l'identité religieuse, et des facteurs contextuels, comme la composition religieuse du canton, dans l'analyse du comportement électoral.
This example is a good illustration of how multilevel models can help reveal complex dynamics in electoral behaviour. In this case, they allow us to see how the impact of religious affiliation on voting choice can vary according to the religious context of the place where the individual lives. This means that the effect of religious affiliation on voting behaviour may be different in a context where most people share the same religion (a Catholic canton, for example) compared with a context where people have different religions (a religiously mixed canton). This may be due to a number of factors. For example, in a predominantly Catholic canton, Catholic individuals may feel more comfortable expressing their religious values in their vote. On the other hand, in a religiously mixed canton, Catholic individuals may be more likely to vote on the basis of other considerations, such as political ideology or economic issues. This is an excellent example of how multilevel models can help us understand the interactions between individual and contextual factors in shaping voting behaviour.


Cet exemple illustre bien comment les modèles multiniveaux peuvent aider à révéler des dynamiques complexes dans le comportement électoral. Dans ce cas, ils permettent de voir comment l'impact de l'appartenance religieuse sur le choix de vote peut varier en fonction du contexte religieux de l'endroit où vit l'individu. Cela signifie que l'effet de l'appartenance religieuse sur le comportement de vote peut être différent dans un contexte où la plupart des gens partagent la même religion (un canton catholique, par exemple) comparé à un contexte où les gens ont différentes religions (un canton religieusement mixte). Cela peut être dû à plusieurs facteurs. Par exemple, dans un canton majoritairement catholique, les individus catholiques peuvent se sentir plus à l'aise pour exprimer leurs valeurs religieuses dans leur vote. D'autre part, dans un canton religieusement mixte, les individus catholiques peuvent être plus susceptibles de voter sur la base d'autres considérations, comme l'idéologie politique ou les questions économiques. C'est un excellent exemple de la manière dont les modèles multiniveaux peuvent nous aider à comprendre les interactions entre les facteurs individuels et contextuels dans la formation du comportement de vote.
= Case Studies: Analysis of Voting Behaviour =


= Études de Cas : Analyse du Comportement de Vote =
== Case Study 1: Explaining the SVP vote ==
 
This study analyses the composition of the SVP electorate and how this composition has changed over time.  
== Étude de Cas 1 : Explication du Vote pour l'UDC ==
Cette étude analyse la composition de l’électorat UDC et l’évolution de cette composition au cours du temps.  


[[Fichier:Sciarini Exemple 1 explication du vote UDC 1.png|vignette|center|500px|Source: Oesch et Rennwald 2010]]
[[Fichier:Sciarini Exemple 1 explication du vote UDC 1.png|vignette|center|500px|Source: Oesch et Rennwald 2010]]


Le graphique de gauche, qui représente la proportion des électeurs par classe ayant voté pour le Parti socialiste en 2007 (en pourcentage), illustre la composition de l'électorat du Parti socialiste suite aux élections fédérales de 2007. Ces résultats sont basés sur une enquête d'opinion réalisée après ces élections. Comme nous l'avons mentionné précédemment, les études SELECT, qui ont été menées après chaque élection fédérale depuis 1995, fournissent un ensemble de données précieux sur le comportement des électeurs au niveau national en Suisse.  
The graph on the left, which shows the proportion of voters by class who voted for the Socialist Party in 2007 (in percentage terms), illustrates the composition of the Socialist Party electorate following the 2007 federal elections. These results are based on an opinion survey carried out after the elections. As mentioned earlier, SELECT surveys, which have been conducted after every federal election since 1995, provide a valuable set of data on voter behaviour at national level in Switzerland.  


En 2007, le Parti socialiste a obtenu environ 20% des voix, ce qui correspond également à son score moyen. En observant les différentes catégories socioprofessionnelles, on peut voir la différence entre ce score moyen et la proportion des voix obtenues dans chaque catégorie. Cela permet d'identifier quels segments de la population sont plus enclins à voter pour le Parti socialiste, et quels segments sont moins susceptibles de le faire.  
In 2007, the Socialist Party won around 20% of the vote, which is also its average score. By looking at the different socio-professional categories, we can see the difference between this average score and the proportion of votes obtained in each category. This makes it possible to identify which segments of the population are more likely to vote for the Socialist Party, and which segments are less likely to do so.


En se référant à la dernière ligne, on peut observer qu'une catégorie socioprofessionnelle en particulier a voté massivement pour le PS : les spécialistes socioculturels. Alors que le score moyen du PS est de 20%, il atteint 34% parmi cette catégorie, soit une augmentation de quatorze points de pourcentage. Les spécialistes socioculturels, parfois qualifiés de "nouvelle classe moyenne", regroupent les salariés actifs dans les secteurs de la santé, du social, de l'éducation, de la culture, ainsi que des médias. Il s'agit d'une tranche de la classe moyenne supérieure qui s'est fortement développée en nombre. On pourrait les désigner de manière un peu triviale comme les "bobo", pour "bourgeois bohèmes". Ces individus disposent de ressources relativement conséquentes, mais adhèrent aux valeurs de redistribution de la gauche. Alors que le modèle du choix rationnel les prédisposerait à voter à droite compte tenu de leur situation socioéconomique avantageuse, ils ont tendance à soutenir les programmes de gauche par solidarité sociétale et par adhésion à d'autres valeurs de la gauche comme l'ouverture internationale et la solidarité.
Referring to the last line, we can see that one socio-professional category in particular voted massively for the SP: socio-cultural specialists. While the SP's average score was 20%, it reached 34% among this category, an increase of fourteen percentage points. Socio-cultural specialists, sometimes referred to as the "new middle class", include employees working in the health, social, education, culture and media sectors. This is a segment of the upper middle class that has grown significantly in number. We could refer to them somewhat trivially as "bobo", for "bohemian bourgeois". These individuals have relatively substantial resources, but adhere to the redistributive values of the Left. While the rational choice model would predispose them to vote right because of their advantageous socio-economic situation, they tend to support left-wing programmes out of societal solidarity and adherence to other left-wing values such as international openness and solidarity.


Toutes les autres catégories socioprofessionnelles semblent être en dessous de la moyenne des scores du Parti socialiste, y compris les groupes désignés ici comme les "travailleurs de la production", les "travailleurs des services" et les "employés de bureau". Ces derniers seraient ce que l'on désignait auparavant comme les ouvriers. Les travailleurs de la production sont typiquement des personnes actives dans l'industrie, effectuant des tâches répétitives et disposant de peu d'autonomie dans leur travail. Ces individus ont tendance à voter pour le Parti socialiste moins fréquemment que la moyenne.   
All other socio-professional categories appear to be below the average Socialist Party score, including the groups referred to here as "production workers", "service workers" and "office workers". The latter would be what used to be referred to as blue-collar workers. Production workers are typically people working in industry, performing repetitive tasks and having little autonomy in their work. These individuals tend to vote for the Socialist Party less frequently than the average.   


La tendance observée indique que les travailleurs de la production, souvent engagés dans des rôles industriels exigeant des tâches répétitives et offrant peu d'autonomie, ont une propension moindre à voter pour le Parti socialiste. Plusieurs facteurs peuvent expliquer ce phénomène.  
The trend observed indicates that production workers, often engaged in industrial roles requiring repetitive tasks and offering little autonomy, have a lower propensity to vote for the Socialist Party. Several factors may explain this phenomenon.


D'abord, le secteur industriel a subi des transformations considérables au cours des dernières décennies, marquées par une automatisation croissante et une délocalisation de la production vers des régions à faible coût de main-d'œuvre. Ces changements ont souvent conduit à une insécurité d'emploi accrue et à un sentiment d'abandon parmi ces travailleurs, qui pourraient se sentir moins représentés par un parti traditionnellement associé à la défense des droits des travailleurs.
Firstly, the industrial sector has undergone considerable change in recent decades, marked by increasing automation and the relocation of production to low-labour-cost regions. These changes have often led to increased job insecurity and a sense of abandonment among these workers, who may feel less represented by a party traditionally associated with the defence of workers' rights.


De plus, la nature de la classe ouvrière a également évolué. Aujourd'hui, elle comprend un éventail beaucoup plus large de professions et de niveaux de compétences que par le passé. Ce groupe diversifié peut avoir des préférences politiques plus diversifiées et ne pas se sentir uniformément attiré par le Parti socialiste. Ensuite, l'émergence de problèmes sociaux tels que l'immigration et l'identité nationale a également contribué à modifier le paysage politique. Dans certains cas, ces questions ont éclipsé les problèmes économiques traditionnels sur l'agenda politique, ce qui a amené certains travailleurs de la production à se tourner vers des partis de droite ou populistes qui promettent de résoudre ces problèmes. Enfin, l'évolution du discours politique et des priorités du Parti socialiste peut également avoir joué un rôle. Comme indiqué précédemment, le Parti socialiste semble avoir réussi à attirer une proportion importante de "spécialistes socioculturels", un groupe qui possède souvent un niveau d'éducation supérieur et des valeurs plus libérales. Par conséquent, le Parti socialiste peut avoir orienté une partie de sa rhétorique et de son programme pour plaire à ce groupe, éventuellement au détriment de son appel traditionnel auprès des travailleurs de la production.
Moreover, the nature of the working class has also changed. Today it includes a much wider range of occupations and skill levels than in the past. This diverse group may have more diverse political preferences and may not feel uniformly attracted to the Socialist Party. Secondly, the emergence of social issues such as immigration and national identity has also helped to change the political landscape. In some cases, these issues have eclipsed traditional economic problems on the political agenda, leading some production workers to turn to right-wing or populist parties that promise to solve these problems. Finally, the changing political discourse and priorities of the Socialist Party may also have played a role. As noted above, the Socialist Party appears to have succeeded in attracting a significant proportion of 'socio-cultural specialists', a group that often has higher levels of education and more liberal values. As a result, the Socialist Party may have geared some of its rhetoric and programme to appeal to this group, possibly to the detriment of its traditional appeal to production workers.


L'UDC (Union Démocratique du Centre), lors des élections de 2007, a obtenu 28% des voix, un résultat remarquable qui cependant varie grandement selon les catégories socioprofessionnelles. Dans ce contexte, on pourrait affirmer que le modèle de Columbia, qui met l'accent sur les variables sociologiques telles que la classe sociale et l'appartenance à un groupe pour expliquer le comportement électoral, conserve une certaine pertinence. En effet, le score de l'UDC reflète probablement l'influence des facteurs socioprofessionnels sur le comportement de vote. Ce parti a réussi à séduire une diversité de groupes sociaux, reflétant un certain nombre de préoccupations diverses - de l'immigration à l'économie, en passant par la souveraineté nationale. Les variations significatives dans le soutien électoral de l'UDC entre les différentes catégories socioprofessionnelles soulignent l'importance de la position sociale des individus dans la formation de leurs préférences politiques. Cela dit, la force de l'UDC en 2007 ne signifie pas que le modèle de Columbia fournit une explication exhaustive ou définitive du comportement électoral. D'autres facteurs, tels que les préoccupations politiques à court terme, les perceptions des enjeux et des candidats, ainsi que l'effet de la campagne électorale, peuvent également jouer un rôle important. Par ailleurs, les idées et les valeurs individuelles peuvent aussi interagir avec la classe sociale pour influencer les choix électoraux. Bien que le modèle de Columbia puisse encore fournir des informations précieuses sur le vote pour l'UDC en 2007, il est nécessaire de considérer une gamme plus large de facteurs pour comprendre pleinement le comportement électoral.  
In the 2007 elections, the UDC (Union Démocratique du Centre) obtained 28% of the vote, a remarkable result that nevertheless varies greatly according to socio-professional category. In this context, it could be argued that the Columbia model, which focuses on sociological variables such as social class and group membership to explain electoral behaviour, retains some relevance. Indeed, the SVP's score probably reflects the influence of socio-professional factors on voting behaviour. This party has succeeded in appealing to a variety of social groups, reflecting a number of different concerns - from immigration to the economy to national sovereignty. The significant variations in the SVP's electoral support between different socio-professional categories underline the importance of people's social position in shaping their political preferences. That said, the strength of the SVP in 2007 does not mean that the Columbia model provides an exhaustive or definitive explanation of electoral behaviour. Other factors, such as short-term political concerns, perceptions of the issues and candidates, and the effect of the election campaign, may also play an important role. Moreover, individual ideas and values may also interact with social class to influence electoral choices. While the Columbia model can still provide valuable insights into voting for the SVP in 2007, it is necessary to consider a wider range of factors to fully understand voting behaviour.  


Le principal soutien de l'UDC lors des élections de 2007 provenait des "petits indépendants", comprenant les agriculteurs, les commerçants, les artisans, et autres travailleurs indépendants qui ne dirigent pas de grandes entreprises. Parfois qualifiés d'"ancienne classe moyenne", ces individus ont massivement soutenu l'UDC. En fait, près de la moitié (44%) des petits indépendants ont voté pour l'UDC, un pourcentage significativement plus élevé que le score général du parti qui était de 28%. Il semble que les petits indépendants se soient identifiés aux positions de l'UDC sur des questions telles que la souveraineté nationale, l'immigration, et peut-être aussi l'autonomie économique. Leur soutien souligne comment la position socio-économique d'un individu et son appartenance à une catégorie professionnelle spécifique peuvent influencer ses préférences politiques. Cependant, il est essentiel de noter que ces individus constituent un des deux bastions majeurs de l'UDC, ce qui suggère que le soutien au parti est distribué de manière diverse et complexe à travers la société suisse.
The SVP's main support in the 2007 elections came from the 'small self-employed', comprising farmers, shopkeepers, craftsmen and other self-employed people who do not run large businesses. Sometimes referred to as the "old middle class", these individuals overwhelmingly supported the SVP. In fact, almost half (44%) of the small self-employed voted for the SVP, a significantly higher percentage than the party's overall score of 28%. It seems that small independents identified with SVP positions on issues such as national sovereignty, immigration, and perhaps also economic autonomy. Their support highlights how an individual's socio-economic position and membership of a specific occupational category can influence their political preferences. However, it is essential to note that these individuals constitute one of the SVP's two major strongholds, suggesting that support for the party is distributed in a diverse and complex way across Swiss society.


L'UDC trouve également un fort soutien parmi les travailleurs de la production et des services. Malgré le positionnement de l'UDC en tant que parti de droite sur l'échiquier politique, qui n'est généralement pas associé à la défense des intérêts des travailleurs, elle a réussi à obtenir environ 40% de votes de cette catégorie de travailleurs en 2007, dépassant son score général de 28%. Il est possible de se demander pourquoi une proportion si élevée de travailleurs a choisi de voter pour l'UDC, alors que certains syndicalistes pourraient soutenir que l'UDC ne protège pas suffisamment les travailleurs. Par exemple, on pourrait argumenter que l'UDC ne défend pas les travailleurs contre la concurrence de la main-d'œuvre étrangère, sauf indirectement en prônant des politiques de fermeture des frontières. Cependant, le succès de l'UDC auprès des travailleurs pourrait ne pas être principalement lié à son programme économique. Au lieu de cela, il semble plus plausible que ce soit son programme culturel qui attire ces électeurs. L'UDC plaide pour la fermeture des frontières dans une perspective culturelle, en défendant les traditions et en prônant une certaine fermeture à l'international. Cette position, principalement motivée par des considérations culturelles, identitaires et historiques plutôt qu'économiques, pourrait expliquer la popularité de l'UDC auprès des travailleurs de la production et des services.
The SVP also finds strong support among production and service workers. Despite the SVP's positioning as a right-wing party on the political spectrum, which is not generally associated with defending the interests of workers, it managed to win around 40% of the vote from this category of workers in 2007, exceeding its overall score of 28%. One might ask why such a high proportion of workers chose to vote for the SVP, while some trade unionists might argue that the SVP does not sufficiently protect workers. For example, it could be argued that the SVP does not defend workers against competition from foreign labour, except indirectly by advocating closed-border policies. However, the SVP's success with workers may not be primarily linked to its economic programme. Instead, it seems more plausible that it is its cultural agenda that attracts these voters. The SVP advocates closing borders from a cultural perspective, defending traditions and advocating a certain international closure. This position, which is mainly motivated by cultural, identity and historical considerations rather than economic ones, could explain the SVP's popularity among production and service workers.


Dans une perspective bidimensionnelle de l'espace politique, on peut observer que le succès de l'UDC est largement attribuable à sa position sur l'axe tradition-ouverture plutôt qu'à sa position sur l'axe économique. Sur cet axe, l'UDC ne se différencie pas vraiment du Parti libéral-radical (PLR). Il s'agit là d'une illustration du clivage gagnant-perdant. Dans cette perspective, l'UDC et le PLR peuvent être vus comme représentant les "gagnants" du système actuel en matière économique, en défendant des politiques libérales et pro-marché. Cependant, l'UDC se distingue sur l'axe tradition-ouverture en prenant des positions plus fermées et traditionnelles. Cela signifie que de nombreux électeurs peuvent être attirés par l'UDC non pas à cause de ses positions économiques, qui sont similaires à celles du PLR, mais plutôt à cause de ses positions sur des questions culturelles et identitaires. Cela peut expliquer pourquoi l'UDC a pu attirer une proportion élevée de votes de la part de groupes tels que les travailleurs de la production et des services, qui peuvent se sentir plus menacés par l'ouverture culturelle et sociétale.
From a two-dimensional perspective of political space, we can see that the SVP's success is largely attributable to its position on the tradition-openness axis rather than its position on the economic axis. On this axis, the SVP does not really differ from the Liberal-Radical Party (PLR). This is an illustration of the win-lose divide. From this perspective, the UDC and PLR can be seen as representing the 'winners' in the current economic system, defending liberal and pro-market policies. However, the SVP distinguishes itself on the tradition-openness axis by taking more closed and traditional positions. This means that many voters may be attracted to the SVP not because of its economic positions, which are similar to those of the FDP, but rather because of its positions on cultural and identity issues. This may explain why the SVP has been able to attract a high proportion of votes from groups such as production and service workers, who may feel more threatened by cultural and societal openness.


Pour résumer, on pourrait dire que ceux qui se sentent "gagnants" de l'ouverture internationale et de la mondialisation sont souvent les spécialistes socioculturels, tandis que les "perdants" perçus sont ceux qui craignent cette ouverture. Ces derniers craignent non seulement une concurrence économique accrue, mais aussi des changements culturels et identitaires. Ces groupes comprennent les petits indépendants, ainsi que les travailleurs de la production et des services. Dans le même temps, l'UDC obtient des scores nettement inférieurs parmi les spécialistes ethniques et socioculturels. C'est en quelque sorte l'effet inverse de ce que l'on observe pour le Parti socialiste. Ces groupes sont souvent plus ouverts à l'international et plus enclins à embrasser la diversité culturelle, ce qui se reflète dans leur tendance à voter pour des partis plus à gauche, comme le Parti socialiste, plutôt que pour des partis plus à droite comme l'UDC.
To sum up, it could be said that those who feel like 'winners' from international openness and globalisation are often the socio-cultural specialists, while the perceived 'losers' are those who fear this openness. The latter fear not only increased economic competition, but also changes in culture and identity. These groups include the small self-employed, as well as production and service workers. At the same time, the SVP scored significantly lower among ethnic and socio-cultural specialists. In a way, this is the opposite effect of what we observe for the Socialist Party. These groups are often more internationally minded and more inclined to embrace cultural diversity, which is reflected in their tendency to vote for more left-wing parties such as the Socialist Party rather than more right-wing parties such as the SVP.


Le clivage de classe joue toujours un rôle crucial dans le comportement électoral, mais sa nature a évolué au fil du temps. Traditionnellement, ce clivage était perçu comme une opposition entre les ouvriers et le patronat, reflétant les idées de Marx sur le conflit entre le travail et le capital. Pendant une longue période dans l'histoire européenne, nous avons vu une nette divergence de vote entre ces deux groupes, les ouvriers se penchant généralement vers les partis de gauche et le patronat soutenant plutôt les partis de droite. Cependant, ce clivage traditionnel a changé avec le temps et la dynamique du conflit de classe s'est complexifiée. Il ne s'agit plus uniquement d'une opposition entre le travail et le capital, mais plutôt d'une multitude de clivages sociaux, économiques et culturels qui interagissent de manière complexe. Par exemple, comme nous l'avons mentionné plus tôt, des groupes tels que les petits indépendants et les travailleurs de la production et des services ont tendance à soutenir l'UDC, un parti de droite, non pas nécessairement à cause de leurs positions économiques, mais en raison de leurs préoccupations culturelles et identitaires. Cela montre que, même si le clivage de classe reste un facteur important, il doit être analysé en conjonction avec d'autres dimensions sociopolitiques pour comprendre pleinement le comportement électoral contemporain.
The class divide still plays a crucial role in voting behaviour, but its nature has changed over time. Traditionally, this divide was seen as workers versus employers, reflecting Marx's ideas of the conflict between labour and capital. For a long period in European history, we saw a clear divergence in voting between these two groups, with workers generally leaning towards left-wing parties and employers tending to support right-wing parties. However, this traditional divide has changed over time and the dynamics of class conflict have become more complex. It is no longer just an opposition between labour and capital, but rather a multitude of social, economic and cultural cleavages which interact in complex ways. For example, as we mentioned earlier, groups such as the small self-employed and production and service workers tend to support the right-wing SVP, not necessarily because of their economic positions, but because of their cultural and identity concerns. This shows that, although the class divide remains an important factor, it needs to be analysed in conjunction with other socio-political dimensions to fully understand contemporary electoral behaviour.


Dans de nombreux pays y compris la Suisse, nous avons assisté à un changement dans la manière dont les clivages de classe se manifestent dans le comportement électoral. Ce phénomène est souvent décrit comme un désalignement et un réalignement des électeurs par rapport aux partis politiques. Concrètement, nous avons vu une tendance où les électeurs issus des milieux populaires, qui étaient historiquement alignés avec les partis de gauche, ont commencé à se déplacer vers les partis populistes de droite. Ce mouvement a été observé non seulement en Suisse, mais aussi dans d'autres pays comme la France, l'Autriche, les Pays-Bas et les pays scandinaves. Il existe plusieurs explications possibles à ce phénomène. Certaines personnes suggèrent que ces électeurs sont de plus en plus préoccupés par les questions d'identité culturelle et de souveraineté nationale, des thèmes souvent mis en avant par les partis populistes de droite. D'autres soutiennent que ces électeurs se sentent délaissés par les partis de gauche traditionnels, qui ont tendance à se concentrer davantage sur les questions sociales et économiques. Quelle que soit la raison exacte, il est clair que le paysage politique est en train de changer et que le clivage de classe traditionnel ne peut plus expliquer à lui seul le comportement électoral. Les chercheurs en science politique doivent donc prendre en compte ces nouvelles dynamiques lorsqu'ils analysent les tendances électorales actuelles.
In many countries, including Switzerland, we have seen a shift in the way class divisions manifest themselves in electoral behaviour. This phenomenon is often described as a misalignment and realignment of voters in relation to political parties. In concrete terms, we have seen a trend where voters from working-class backgrounds, who were historically aligned with left-wing parties, have begun to move towards populist right-wing parties. This movement has been observed not only in Switzerland, but also in other countries such as France, Austria, the Netherlands and the Scandinavian countries. There are several possible explanations for this phenomenon. Some suggest that these voters are increasingly concerned about issues of cultural identity and national sovereignty, themes often highlighted by right-wing populist parties. Others argue that these voters feel let down by traditional left-wing parties, which tend to focus more on social and economic issues. Whatever the exact reason, it is clear that the political landscape is changing and that the traditional class divide can no longer explain electoral behaviour on its own. Political scientists must therefore take these new dynamics into account when analysing current electoral trends.


Dans tous ces pays, il est observable qu'un basculement a eu lieu au cours des années 1980 et 1990, avec une proportion significative de travailleurs qui, traditionnellement, votaient pour la gauche, orientant désormais leur vote vers la droite populiste. Il est important de préciser que ce phénomène ne concerne pas tous les travailleurs, mais une part importante d'entre eux. Parallèlement à ce mouvement, nous avons assisté à un renforcement des spécialistes socioculturels, ou la nouvelle classe moyenne, comme bastion du vote de gauche. Ce phénomène se caractérise par des individus avec une situation socioéconomique relativement aisée, qui malgré leur position, tendent à soutenir des idéaux redistributifs et des valeurs généralement associées à la gauche, comme l'ouverture internationale et la solidarité. Cette transformation du paysage électoral est un constat puissant qui se vérifie aussi bien en Suisse que dans d'autres pays. Cette évolution a une incidence profonde sur la politique de ces pays, et elle nécessite une compréhension détaillée pour pouvoir correctement interpréter les tendances électorales actuelles.[[Fichier:Sciarini Exemple 1 explication du vote UDC 2.png|vignette|center|400px|Source: Oesch et Rennwald 2010]]
In all these countries, it can be observed that a shift took place during the 1980s and 1990s, with a significant proportion of workers who traditionally voted for the left now shifting their vote towards the populist right. It is important to point out that this phenomenon does not concern all workers, but a significant proportion of them. In parallel with this movement, we have seen a strengthening of the socio-cultural specialists, or the new middle class, as a bastion of the left-wing vote. This phenomenon is characterised by individuals with a relatively well-off socio-economic situation, who despite their position, tend to support redistributive ideals and values generally associated with the left, such as international openness and solidarity. This transformation of the electoral landscape is a powerful finding that is as true in Switzerland as it is in other countries. It has a profound impact on politics in these countries, and requires a detailed understanding if current electoral trends are to be properly interpreted.[[Fichier:Sciarini Exemple 1 explication du vote UDC 2.png|vignette|center|400px|Source: Oesch et Rennwald 2010]]


Le graphique dépeint l'évolution du vote pour l'UDC (Union Démocratique du Centre) entre 1995 et 2007 au sein des classes populaires. En 1995, entre 15% et 20% des travailleurs de services, de la production et des employés de bureau votaient pour l'UDC. Cependant, sur une période d'environ une décennie, nous constatons une augmentation significative de ce chiffre, atteignant des pourcentages de 35% à 40% des votes provenant des travailleurs. Il convient de noter que l'UDC a vu une augmentation de son soutien dans tous les segments de l'électorat au cours des vingt dernières années. Cependant, l'augmentation la plus marquée a été observée parmi l'électorat populaire. Ce phénomène illustre la reformulation du clivage de classe que nous avons discutée précédemment, montrant un changement majeur dans les tendances de vote de ces groupes au fil du temps.
The graph shows how the vote for the UDC (Union Démocratique du Centre) among the working classes evolved between 1995 and 2007. In 1995, between 15% and 20% of service, production and office workers voted SVP. However, over a period of around a decade, we have seen a significant increase in this figure, reaching percentages of 35% to 40% of the working-class vote. It is worth noting that the SVP has seen an increase in support across all segments of the electorate over the last twenty years. However, the most marked increase has been among the working-class electorate. This illustrates the reformulation of the class divide that we discussed earlier, showing a major shift in the voting patterns of these groups over time.


Le clivage de classe demeure pertinent dans le comportement électoral, cependant, sa nature a profondément évolué. Il s'est restructuré en raison de mouvements de désalignement et de réalignement entre les différentes classes sociales et les partis politiques. Le terme "désalignement" se réfère par exemple au phénomène de distanciation progressive des travailleurs par rapport au Parti socialiste ou à la gauche en général, tandis que "réalignement" fait référence à leur attrait croissant pour des partis comme l'UDC. Ce processus de transition des allégeances partisanes en fonction des classes sociales a conduit à un changement dans la nature du clivage de classe. Aujourd'hui, nous parlons d'un "nouveau clivage de classe", qui oppose d'un côté les "gagnants" de la mondialisation, comme les cadres supérieurs et la nouvelle classe moyenne, et de l'autre, ceux qui sont perçus - ou se perçoivent eux-mêmes - comme les "perdants" de la mondialisation. Ces derniers comprennent les classes populaires et l'ancienne classe moyenne, constituée de petits indépendants tels que les artisans, les agriculteurs ou les commerçants.
The class divide remains relevant to voting behaviour, but its nature has changed profoundly. It has been restructured by movements of misalignment and realignment between different social classes and political parties. The term 'misalignment' refers, for example, to the phenomenon of workers gradually distancing themselves from the Socialist Party or the left in general, while 'realignment' refers to their growing attraction to parties such as the SVP. This process of shifting party allegiances along class lines has led to a change in the nature of the class divide. Today, we speak of a 'new class divide', which pits the 'winners' of globalisation, such as senior executives and the new middle class, against those who are perceived - or perceive themselves - as the 'losers' of globalisation. The latter include the working classes and the old middle class, made up of small self-employed people such as craftsmen, farmers and shopkeepers.


Le tableau met en évidence l'évolution du vote pour l'UDC au sein de différentes catégories de classes moyennes. Il présente trois segments des classes populaires : les employés de bureau (représentés en gris), les employés de services (en pointillés) et les travailleurs de la production (en noir). Pour ces trois catégories, on note une augmentation significative du pourcentage de personnes qui ont voté pour l'UDC. Bien que l'UDC ait gagné du terrain dans toutes les strates de la population, c'est particulièrement vrai pour les classes populaires.  
The table shows how voting for the SVP has evolved among different categories of middle class. It shows three segments of the working classes: office workers (shown in grey), service workers (dotted line) and production workers (black). In all three categories, there was a significant increase in the percentage of people who voted SVP. Although the SVP gained ground in all strata of the population, this is particularly true for the working classes.


Ce graphique est une simple disposition d’électeurs sur un espace à deux dimensions.  
This graph is a simple arrangement of voters on a two-dimensional space.[[Fichier:Sciarini Exemple 1 explication du vote UDC 3.png|vignette|center|400px|Source: Oesch et Rennwald 2010b: 276]]


[[Fichier:Sciarini Exemple 1 explication du vote UDC 3.png|vignette|center|400px|Source: Oesch et Rennwald 2010b: 276]]
The horizontal axis reflects a socio-economic dimension which can be interpreted as being in favour of 'more state' or 'more market'. This dimension is derived from two main questions asked in opinion polls.  


L'axe horizontal reflète une dimension socio-économique qui peut être interprétée comme étant en faveur de "plus d'État" ou de "plus de marché". Cette dimension est dérivée de deux questions principales posées lors des sondages d'opinion.  
* The first question concerns social spending: are respondents in favour of an increase or decrease in social spending by the Confederation? This can help determine whether a person is more socially inclined (in favour of more government) or more liberally inclined (in favour of more market).
* The second question relates to the taxation of high incomes: are respondents for or against an increase in taxation on high incomes? This question measures attitudes towards the redistribution of wealth, which is another way of assessing whether a person is more inclined towards state or market policies.


* La première question concerne les dépenses sociales : est-ce que les personnes interrogées sont en faveur d'une augmentation ou d'une diminution des dépenses sociales de la confédération ? Cela peut aider à déterminer si une personne a une inclinaison plus sociale (en faveur de plus d'État) ou libérale (en faveur de plus de marché).
By combining the answers to these two questions, we can get a rough idea of a person's position on the socio-economic axis. This socio-economic dimension classifies individuals according to their preferences for the redistribution of wealth by the state. If a person is 'in favour of spending' and 'in favour of raising taxes', i.e. supports increased social spending and higher taxation of high incomes, this can be interpreted as left-wing values. These people generally support greater redistribution of wealth by the state, which can mean more public services, more generous social programmes and greater income equality. Conversely, if a person is 'against spending' and 'against raising taxes', i.e. is against increased social spending and higher taxation of high earners, this can be interpreted as right-wing values. These people tend to support less state intervention in the economy, preferring to let the market operate freely. They generally support lower taxes and less redistribution of wealth by the state. This socio-economic dimension is therefore a useful way of understanding where people stand on the political spectrum when it comes to economic issues.
* La deuxième question se rapporte à la taxation des hauts revenus : les répondants sont-ils pour ou contre une augmentation de la taxation sur les hauts revenus ? Cette question permet de mesurer les attitudes envers la redistribution des richesses, ce qui est une autre façon d'évaluer si une personne est plus orientée vers les politiques de l'État ou du marché.


En combinant les réponses à ces deux questions, on peut obtenir une idée approximative de la position d'une personne sur l'axe socio-économique. Cette dimension socio-économique classifie les individus en fonction de leurs préférences en matière de redistribution des richesses par l'État. Si une personne est "favorable aux dépenses" et "favorable à augmenter les impôts", c'est-à-dire qu'elle soutient une augmentation des dépenses sociales et une taxation plus élevée des hauts revenus, on peut interpréter cela comme des valeurs de gauche. Ces personnes soutiennent généralement une plus grande redistribution des richesses par l'État, ce qui peut se traduire par plus de services publics, des programmes sociaux plus généreux, et une plus grande égalité de revenus. À l'inverse, si une personne est "défavorable aux dépenses" et "défavorable à augmenter les impôts", c'est-à-dire qu'elle est contre une augmentation des dépenses sociales et contre une taxation plus élevée des hauts revenus, on peut interpréter cela comme des valeurs de droite. Ces personnes tendent à soutenir une moindre intervention de l'État dans l'économie, préférant laisser le marché fonctionner librement. Ils soutiennent généralement des taxes plus basses et moins de redistribution des richesses par l'État. Cette dimension socio-économique est donc un moyen utile de comprendre où se situent les gens sur le spectre politique en ce qui concerne les questions économiques.
The vertical axis is more related to the cultural or identity dimension of politics, and this helps us to understand where people fall on the political spectrum when it comes to issues of nationality, national identity and immigration. If someone is "in favour of Switzerland joining the European Union" and "in favour of a Switzerland that gives equal opportunities to Swiss and foreigners", we can say that this person is higher up the axis, showing greater openness to foreign influence and participation. These individuals are generally more progressive on issues of identity and immigration, and may be more inclined to support policies of inclusion and diversity. Conversely, if a person is "in favour of a Switzerland that goes it alone" and "in favour of a Switzerland that favours the Swiss over foreigners", they can be said to be further down the axis, showing a more protectionist and nationalist stance. These individuals are generally more conservative on issues of identity and immigration, and may be more inclined to support policies that favour national citizens and limit immigration. These two axes - socio-economic and cultural/identitarian - can combine in different ways to form a wide range of policy positions. For example, someone could be economically conservative (favouring less redistribution) while being culturally progressive (favouring the inclusion of foreigners), or vice versa.


L'axe vertical est plus lié à la dimension culturelle ou identitaire de la politique, et cela nous aide à comprendre où les gens se situent sur le spectre politique en matière de questions liées à la nationalité, à l'identité nationale et à l'immigration. Si une personne est "favorable à l'adhésion de la Suisse à l'Union européenne" et "favorable à une Suisse qui donne les mêmes chances aux Suisses et aux étrangers", on peut dire que cette personne se situe plus haut sur l'axe, montrant une plus grande ouverture aux influences et à la participation étrangères. Ces individus sont généralement plus progressistes sur les questions d'identité et d'immigration, et peuvent être plus enclins à soutenir des politiques d'inclusion et de diversité. Inversement, si une personne est "favorable à une Suisse qui fait cavalier seul" et "favorable à une Suisse qui privilégie les Suisses par rapport aux étrangers", on peut dire qu'elle se situe plus bas sur l'axe, montrant une position plus protectionniste et nationaliste. Ces individus sont généralement plus conservateurs sur les questions d'identité et d'immigration, et peuvent être plus enclins à soutenir des politiques qui privilégient les citoyens nationaux et limitent l'immigration. Ces deux axes - socio-économique et culturel/identitaire - peuvent se combiner de diverses manières pour former un large éventail de positions politiques. Par exemple, quelqu'un pourrait être économiquement conservateur (favorisant moins de redistribution) tout en étant culturellement progressiste (favorisant l'inclusion des étrangers), ou vice versa.
By grouping these sub-groups by profession and political party, we can illustrate where these groups stand on the socio-economic axis (more state or more market) and the cultural/identitarian axis (international openness or national closure). When calculating the average position of each group, it is important to bear in mind that this is an average. This means that it represents a 'central' position around which individual responses vary. This explains why, despite significant differences in political attitudes within each group, the averages may appear relatively close to the centre of the graph. By analysing these averages, we can get a general idea of the dominant political attitudes within each sub-group of voters. However, it is also important to take into account the diversity of opinions within each group. For example, not all managers are economically conservative, and not all socio-cultural specialists are necessarily progressive on issues of identity and immigration.  


En regroupant ces sous-groupes par profession et par parti politique, on peut illustrer où ces groupes se situent sur l'axe socio-économique (plus d'État ou plus de marché) et l'axe culturel/identitaire (ouverture à l'international ou fermeture nationale). En calculant la position moyenne de chaque groupe, il est important de garder à l'esprit qu'il s'agit d'une moyenne. Cela signifie qu'elle représente une position "centrale" autour de laquelle les réponses individuelles varient. Cela explique pourquoi, malgré les différences significatives dans les attitudes politiques au sein de chaque groupe, les moyennes peuvent sembler relativement proches du centre du graphique. En analysant ces moyennes, on peut obtenir une idée générale des attitudes politiques dominantes au sein de chaque sous-groupe d'électeurs. Cependant, il est également important de prendre en compte la diversité des opinions au sein de chaque groupe. Par exemple, tous les managers ne sont pas économiquement conservateurs, et tous les spécialistes socioculturels ne sont pas nécessairement progressistes sur les questions d'identité et d'immigration.  
Using the average position to represent the political orientation of a group gives an overall view, but it can also mask a diversity of opinions within the same group. This may explain why, despite differences in individual opinions, these averages can sometimes lie close to the centre of the graph. For example, if we look at socio-cultural specialists who vote for the Socialist Party (SP) or the Union démocratique du centre (UDC), we can see that, despite their common professional affiliation, their average positions on these socio-economic and cultural/identity axes differ depending on which party they vote for. As for managers, some may be on the right, others on the left, and some may be more or less open or closed on the cultural/identity axis. Taking into account the average of their positions places them near the centre of the graph, reflecting a diversity of political opinions within this group. This kind of analysis highlights not only the political divergences between different occupational classes, but also the divergences within those classes. This is an important reminder that, although certain general trends can be observed, political attitudes are diverse and varied.


L'usage de la position moyenne pour représenter l'orientation politique d'un groupe donne une vue d'ensemble, mais elle peut aussi masquer une diversité d'opinions au sein du même groupe. Cela peut expliquer pourquoi, malgré les différences d'opinions individuelles, ces moyennes peuvent parfois se situer près du centre du graphique. Par exemple, en prenant en compte les spécialistes socioculturels qui votent pour le Parti socialiste (PS) ou l'Union démocratique du centre (UDC), nous pourrions voir que, malgré leur appartenance professionnelle commune, leurs positions moyennes sur ces axes socio-économiques et culturels/identitaires diffèrent en fonction du parti pour lequel ils votent. Quant aux managers, certains peuvent se situer à droite, d'autres à gauche, et certains peuvent être plus ou moins ouverts ou fermés sur l'axe culturel/identitaire. La prise en compte de la moyenne de leurs positions les place près du centre du graphique, reflétant une diversité d'opinions politiques au sein de ce groupe. Ce genre d'analyse met en évidence non seulement les divergences politiques entre les différentes classes professionnelles, mais aussi les divergences au sein de ces classes. C'est un rappel important que, même si certaines tendances générales peuvent être observées, les attitudes politiques sont diverses et variées.  
The Socialist Party (SP) appears to have a more ideologically diverse electoral base than the Swiss People's Party (SVP). This may suggest that the SP brings together a wider range of views on the economic scale (from redistribution to market preference) and on the scale of openness versus tradition. In contrast, the SVP seems to bring together voters with more similar values, mainly focused on defending traditions and a slight inclination towards right-wing economic policies. This may indicate that the SVP has a more homogeneous voter base that shares a common set of values. The difference between production workers who voted SVP and those who voted SP is also very interesting. It clearly demonstrates how differences in perception and values can divide the same socio-professional group. It also shows that political preferences are not necessarily determined by occupational class alone, but can also be influenced by other factors, such as personal beliefs, cultural identity and worldview.


Il semble que le Parti socialiste (PS) ait une base électorale plus diversifiée sur le plan idéologique par rapport à l'Union démocratique du centre (UDC). Cela peut suggérer que le PS regroupe un éventail plus large de vues sur l'échelle économique (de la redistribution à la préférence pour le marché) et sur l'échelle d'ouverture versus tradition. En revanche, l'UDC semble rassembler des électeurs aux valeurs plus similaires, principalement axées sur la défense des traditions et une légère inclination vers les politiques économiques de droite. Cela peut indiquer que l'UDC a une base électorale plus homogène qui partage un ensemble de valeurs communes. La différence entre les ouvriers de la production qui ont voté pour l'UDC par rapport à ceux qui ont voté pour le PS est également très intéressant. Il démontre bien comment les différences de perception et de valeurs peuvent diviser un même groupe socioprofessionnel. Il montre aussi que les préférences politiques ne sont pas nécessairement déterminées par la classe professionnelle seule, mais peuvent également être influencées par d'autres facteurs, tels que les croyances personnelles, l'identité culturelle et la vision du monde.
There is a common dilemma facing many political parties, particularly those on the traditional left such as the Socialist Party in Switzerland. These parties have historically supported working people and promoted economic redistribution and social equity. However, as economies and societies have evolved, they have also gained the support of more educated and liberal socio-cultural groups, who have different political preferences, particularly on the issues of immigration and international openness. This is therefore a delicate situation for the SP, as it has to strike a balance between these two groups of voters. If it turns too much towards one or the other, it risks losing the support of the other group. This is an important issue for the SP and other left-wing parties around the world, as they navigate this complex political environment. This dilemma is also linked to wider trends in many Western countries, where political preferences are less and less defined by economic class and more and more influenced by cultural and identity issues, such as openness to immigration and globalisation. This has led to a political realignment in which some workers have turned to populist right-wing parties, while more educated groups have supported left-wing parties.


Il existe un dilemme commun auquel sont confrontés de nombreux partis politiques, en particulier ceux de la gauche traditionnelle comme le Parti socialiste en Suisse. Ces partis ont historiquement soutenu les travailleurs et ont fait la promotion de la redistribution économique et de l'équité sociale. Cependant, avec l'évolution des économies et des sociétés, ils ont aussi gagné le soutien des groupes socioculturels plus éduqués et plus libéraux, qui ont des préférences politiques différentes, en particulier sur les questions de l'immigration et de l'ouverture internationale. Il s'agit donc d'une situation délicate pour le PS, car il doit trouver un équilibre entre ces deux groupes d'électeurs. S'il se tourne trop vers l'un ou l'autre, il risque de perdre le soutien de l'autre groupe. C'est un enjeu important pour le PS et d'autres partis de gauche à travers le monde, car ils naviguent dans cet environnement politique complexe. Ce dilemme est également lié à des tendances plus larges observées dans de nombreux pays occidentaux, où les préférences politiques sont de moins en moins définies par la classe économique et de plus en plus influencées par des questions culturelles et identitaires, comme l'ouverture à l'immigration et à la mondialisation. Cela a entraîné un réalignement politique dans lequel certains travailleurs se sont tournés vers des partis de droite populistes, tandis que les groupes plus éduqués ont soutenu des partis de gauche.
This tension between different factions of the electorate is a major challenge for the Socialist Party and other traditional left-wing parties around the world. If they take more liberal positions on issues such as immigration and European integration, they risk losing the support of workers and other groups who are more sceptical about these issues. On the other hand, if they adopt a tougher stance on these issues, they risk alienating the more educated and liberal voters who support these policies. The challenge for these parties is therefore to strike a balance between these different preferences. This may involve developing a message that appeals to both workers and more liberal voters, or finding ways to address the concerns of these groups on specific issues without alienating the other group. It's a difficult task, and there are no easy solutions. This dilemma is partly the result of wider changes in politics and society. Whereas economic class was once the main determinant of electoral behaviour, cultural and identity issues now play a much greater role. These trends, combined with globalisation and other economic changes, have made the political landscape more complex and created new challenges for traditional parties.


Cette tension entre les différentes factions de l'électorat est un défi majeur pour le Parti socialiste et d'autres partis de gauche traditionnels à travers le monde. S'ils prennent des positions plus libérales sur des questions comme l'immigration et l'intégration européenne, ils risquent de perdre le soutien des travailleurs et des autres groupes qui sont plus sceptiques à l'égard de ces questions. D'un autre côté, s'ils adoptent une position plus stricte sur ces questions, ils risquent d'aliéner les électeurs plus éduqués et plus libéraux qui soutiennent ces politiques. Le défi pour ces partis est donc de trouver un équilibre entre ces différentes préférences. Cela peut impliquer de développer un message qui fait appel à la fois aux travailleurs et aux électeurs plus libéraux, ou de trouver des moyens de répondre aux préoccupations de ces groupes sur des questions spécifiques sans aliéner l'autre groupe. C'est une tâche difficile, et il n'y a pas de solution facile. Ce dilemme est en partie le résultat de changements plus larges dans la politique et la société. Alors que la classe économique était autrefois le principal déterminant du comportement électoral, les questions culturelles et identitaires jouent désormais un rôle beaucoup plus important. Ces tendances, combinées à la mondialisation et à d'autres changements économiques, ont complexifié le paysage politique et créé de nouveaux défis pour les partis traditionnels.
The UDC (Union Démocratique du Centre) has succeeded in building a relatively homogeneous voter base around themes such as sovereignty, immigration and tradition. This is not an easy task, as parties can find themselves caught between different factions of their electoral base who have divergent views on these issues. The SVP has managed to maintain a relatively coherent voter base by focusing on issues that transcend traditional class divisions. For example, the issues of sovereignty, immigration and tradition are likely to be important to many voters, whether working or middle class. This suggests that the Swiss People's Party (SVP) has been able to attract a diverse voter base by focusing on issues that cut across traditional class or occupational lines. It is an important reminder that political affiliations are not only defined by economic issues, but can also be shaped by questions of national identity, sovereignty and migration policy. These issues can be particularly important in the context of globalisation and demographic change. In Switzerland, the SVP has been able to exploit these concerns to win the support of various groups of voters. Its insistence on independence, sovereignty, neutrality and a stricter migration policy seems to have struck a chord with many working and middle-class voters.


L'UDC (Union Démocratique du Centre) a réussi à construire une base d'électeurs relativement homogène autour de thèmes tels que la souveraineté, l'immigration et la tradition. Ce n'est pas une tâche facile, car, les partis peuvent se retrouver pris entre différentes factions de leur base électorale qui ont des vues divergentes sur ces questions. L'UDC a réussi à maintenir une base d'électeurs relativement cohérente en se concentrant sur des questions qui transcendent les divisions traditionnelles de classe. Par exemple, les questions de souveraineté, d'immigration et de tradition sont susceptibles d'être importantes pour de nombreux électeurs, qu'ils soient ouvriers ou issus de la classe moyenne. Cela suggère que l'Union Démocratique du Centre (UDC) a pu attirer une base électorale diverse en se concentrant sur des questions qui transcendent les lignes traditionnelles de classe ou de métier. C'est un rappel important que les affiliations politiques ne sont pas uniquement définies par des questions économiques, mais qu'elles peuvent aussi être façonnées par des questions d'identité nationale, de souveraineté et de politique migratoire. Ces questions peuvent revêtir une importance particulière dans le contexte de la mondialisation et des changements démographiques. En Suisse, l'UDC a pu exploiter ces préoccupations pour gagner le soutien de divers groupes d'électeurs. Son insistance sur l'indépendance, la souveraineté, la neutralité et une politique migratoire plus stricte semble avoir trouvé un écho auprès de nombreux électeurs, qu'ils soient ouvriers ou issus de la classe moyenne.  
As we can see, on the horizontal dimension, the Socialist Party doesn't have too many problems because the whole of its electorate is relatively homogeneous on this dimension, they are all aligned on -1 and -1.5 being all grouped almost on a vertical which means that on the questions of redistribution, the Socialist Party electorate is homogeneous. Workers because they are in favour of a redistributive policy that serves their interests, and socio-cultural specialists because they are prepared to make an effort to show solidarity with the less privileged classes.


Comme on le voit, sur la dimension horizontale, le PS n’a pas trop de soucis parce que l’ensemble de son électorat est relativement homogène sur cette dimension, ils sont tous alignés sur -1 et -1.5 étant tous regroupés presque sur une verticale ce qui veut dire que sur les questions de redistribution, l’électorat PS est homogène. Les ouvriers parce qu’ils sont favorables à une politique redistributive qui sert leurs intérêts et les spécialistes socioculturelles parce qu’ils sont prêts à faire l’effort de solidarité à l’égard des classes moins favorisées.
This highlights an important trend: within the Swiss Socialist Party (SP), there is strong cohesion on economic issues, particularly on redistribution. Working-class people are generally in favour of greater redistribution, because they can benefit directly from it. On the other hand, socio-cultural specialists, although generally better off, are also in favour of greater redistribution. This may be due to a variety of factors, including greater sensitivity to issues of social equity, a commitment to solidarity and a willingness to invest in quality public services. However, the SP faces a greater challenge on the axis of openness and closure, where there is a greater divergence of views between different segments of its electorate. This divergence could pose challenges for the SP in terms of maintaining the cohesion of the party base and formulating a clear and unified political message. Although this graph shows some cohesion within the SP on redistribution issues, this does not necessarily mean that all SP voters agree on the details of how redistribution should be implemented. For example, there may be differences of opinion on issues such as the appropriate level of taxation, the best way to deliver social services or the role of government in the economy.


Cela souligne une tendance importante : au sein du Parti socialiste (PS) suisse, il existe une forte cohésion en ce qui concerne les questions économiques, en particulier sur les questions de redistribution. Les ouvriers sont généralement en faveur d'une plus grande redistribution, car ils peuvent en bénéficier directement. Par ailleurs, les spécialistes socioculturels, bien qu'ils soient généralement plus aisés, sont également en faveur d'une plus grande redistribution. Cela peut être dû à une variété de facteurs, y compris une plus grande sensibilité aux questions d'équité sociale, un engagement envers la solidarité et une volonté d'investir dans des services publics de qualité. Cependant, le PS fait face à un défi plus grand sur l'axe de l'ouverture et de la fermeture, où il y a une plus grande divergence de vues entre les différents segments de son électorat. Cette divergence pourrait poser des défis pour le PS en termes de maintien de la cohésion de la base du parti et de formulation d'un message politique clair et unifié. Bien que ce graphique montre une certaine cohésion au sein du PS sur les questions de redistribution, cela ne signifie pas nécessairement que tous les électeurs du PS sont d'accord sur les détails de la manière dont la redistribution devrait être mise en œuvre. Par exemple, il peut y avoir des divergences d'opinion sur des questions telles que le niveau approprié de la fiscalité, la meilleure façon de fournir des services sociaux ou le rôle du gouvernement dans l'économie.  
Despite changes in social structure and economic transformation, social class remains an important factor in understanding electoral behaviour. However, the nature of this class divide has changed. In the past, the class divide could be described quite simply in terms of workers versus owners, or manual workers versus the middle and upper classes. However, economic and social transformations have made the class divide much more complex. For example, divisions can now be observed between workers in different industries, between the employed and the self-employed, and between those who benefit from globalisation and those who feel threatened by it. At the same time, it is important to note that the class divide cannot explain all aspects of electoral behaviour. Other factors, such as cultural values, attitudes towards immigration or the European Union, or views on gender and diversity issues, can also play an important role. In addition, electoral behaviour can be influenced by more contingent factors, such as the political issues of the day, the popularity of party leaders or political scandals.


Malgré les changements dans la structure sociale et les transformations économiques, la classe sociale reste un facteur important pour comprendre le comportement électoral. Cependant, la nature de ce clivage de classe a évolué. Dans le passé, le clivage de classe pouvait être décrit de manière assez simple en termes d'opposition entre les travailleurs et les propriétaires, ou entre les travailleurs manuels et les classes moyennes et supérieures. Cependant, les transformations économiques et sociales ont rendu ce clivage de classe beaucoup plus complexe. Par exemple, des divisions peuvent maintenant être observées entre les travailleurs de différentes industries, entre les travailleurs salariés et les travailleurs indépendants, et entre ceux qui bénéficient de la globalisation et ceux qui se sentent menacés par elle. En même temps, il est important de noter que le clivage de classe ne peut pas expliquer tous les aspects du comportement électoral. D'autres facteurs, tels que les valeurs culturelles, les attitudes envers l'immigration ou l'Union européenne, ou les opinions sur les questions de genre et de diversité, peuvent également jouer un rôle important. En outre, le comportement électoral peut être influencé par des facteurs plus contingents, tels que les questions politiques du moment, la popularité des dirigeants des partis ou les scandales politiques.
The political landscape has changed significantly in recent years, with the emergence of "socio-cultural specialists" as a key support group for the left. This is partly due to the values and concerns specific to this group. Socio-cultural specialists, who include professions such as teachers, social workers, health professionals, journalists and artists, are generally well educated and attach great importance to values such as equality, diversity, social justice and environmental sustainability. As a result, they are often in tune with the priorities and values of the left. At the same time, this group may also feel threatened by some of the current economic trends, such as the casualisation of work, wage stagnation, rising living costs, particularly housing, and growing inequality. These concerns may also make them more receptive to messages from the left on issues such as social protection, wealth redistribution and market regulation.


Le paysage politique a connu des changements importants ces dernières années, notamment avec l'émergence des "spécialistes socioculturels" comme un groupe de soutien clé pour la gauche. Cela s'explique en partie par les valeurs et les préoccupations propres à ce groupe. Les spécialistes socioculturels, qui comprennent des professions comme les enseignants, les travailleurs sociaux, les professionnels de la santé, les journalistes et les artistes, sont généralement bien éduqués et attachent une grande importance à des valeurs comme l'égalité, la diversité, la justice sociale et la durabilité environnementale. Par conséquent, ils sont souvent en phase avec les priorités et les valeurs de la gauche. En même temps, ce groupe peut également se sentir menacé par certaines des tendances économiques actuelles, comme la précarisation du travail, la stagnation des salaires, l'augmentation des coûts de la vie, en particulier du logement, et les inégalités croissantes. Ces préoccupations peuvent également les rendre plus réceptifs aux messages de la gauche sur des questions comme la protection sociale, la redistribution des richesses et la régulation des marchés.
The strengthening of the divide between the supposed winners and losers of globalisation has led to a significant transformation of the political landscape. The working classes and former middle classes, such as small entrepreneurs, craftsmen, shopkeepers and farmers, who may feel threatened or left behind by globalisation and economic change, have turned to parties like the SVP in Switzerland. These parties tend to advocate a more 'national' stance, defending traditions and a certain form of authoritarianism. This is a trend that can be observed not only in Switzerland, but also in other countries, where populist right-wing parties have succeeded in capturing a section of the electorate that feels threatened by economic and social change. These parties tend to focus on issues such as immigration, national sovereignty and the rejection of certain forms of international cooperation. That said, it is important to note that not all members of these groups necessarily share these views. As with any social category, there is a diversity of opinions and priorities within the working classes and the former middle class. At the same time, the 'open-tradition' dimension of the political divide has become increasingly important, reflecting differences of opinion not only on economic issues, but also on questions of cultural and social values. This has added another layer of complexity to contemporary politics.


Le renforcement du clivage entre les gagnants et les perdants supposés de la mondialisation a entraîné une transformation significative du paysage politique. Les classes populaires et l'ancienne classe moyenne, comme les petits entrepreneurs, les artisans, les commerçants et les agriculteurs, qui peuvent se sentir menacées ou laissées pour compte par la mondialisation et les changements économiques, se sont tournées vers des partis comme l'UDC en Suisse. Ces partis tendent à prôner une position plus "nationale", de défense des traditions et d'une certaine forme d'autoritarisme. C'est une tendance que l'on observe non seulement en Suisse, mais aussi dans d'autres pays, où des partis de droite populistes ont réussi à capter une partie de l'électorat qui se sent menacé par les changements économiques et sociaux. Ces partis tendent à mettre l'accent sur des questions comme l'immigration, la souveraineté nationale et le rejet de certaines formes de coopération internationale. Cela dit, il est important de noter que tous les membres de ces groupes ne partagent pas nécessairement ces vues. Comme pour toute catégorie sociale, il y a une diversité d'opinions et de priorités au sein des classes populaires et de l'ancienne classe moyenne. En même temps, la dimension "ouverte - tradition" du clivage politique est devenue de plus en plus importante, reflétant des divergences d'opinion non seulement sur des questions économiques, mais aussi sur des questions de valeurs culturelles et sociales. Cela a ajouté une autre couche de complexité à la politique contemporaine.
== Case Study 2: Analysing the success of the SVP ==
Issue voting is an approach to the analysis of electoral behaviour that focuses on how voters react to specific issues or questions, rather than on their membership of particular socio-economic groups. In the case of voting for the SVP or similar parties, issues may include questions such as immigration, national sovereignty, security, the defence of traditions, or opposition to European integration. These issues may have particular resonance with voters who feel threatened or left behind by economic and social change, regardless of their specific socio-economic position. This approach recognises that voters are able to make their own assessments of political issues and vote accordingly. It also suggests that voting behaviour can be influenced by political campaigns and media messages that emphasise certain issues over others.  


== Étude de Cas 2 : Analyse du Succès de l'UDC ==
Issue voting is based on the idea that voters make choices based on specific issues that are important to them, rather than on long-term loyalty to a particular political party or membership of a particular social class. The issues can vary significantly from one election to the next and can also vary according to the local, national or international context. They may include economic issues, such as taxation or public spending, social issues, such as immigration or minority rights, or environmental issues, such as climate change.
Le vote d'enjeu, ou "issue voting", est une approche de l'analyse du comportement électoral qui met l'accent sur la manière dont les électeurs réagissent à des questions ou des enjeux spécifiques, plutôt que sur leur appartenance à des groupes socio-économiques particuliers. Dans le cas du vote pour l'UDC ou d'autres partis semblables, les enjeux peuvent inclure des questions telles que l'immigration, la souveraineté nationale, la sécurité, la défense des traditions, ou l'opposition à l'intégration européenne. Ces enjeux peuvent avoir une résonance particulière auprès des électeurs qui se sentent menacés ou laissés pour compte par les changements économiques et sociaux, indépendamment de leur position socio-économique spécifique. Cette approche reconnaît que les électeurs sont capables de faire leurs propres évaluations des enjeux politiques et de voter en conséquence. Elle suggère également que le comportement électoral peut être influencé par des campagnes politiques et des messages médiatiques qui mettent l'accent sur certains enjeux plutôt que sur d'autres.  


Le vote d'enjeu repose sur l'idée que les électeurs font des choix basés sur des questions spécifiques qui sont importantes pour eux, plutôt que sur une fidélité à long terme à un parti politique particulier ou sur leur appartenance à une classe sociale spécifique. Les enjeux peuvent varier de manière significative d'une élection à l'autre et peuvent également varier en fonction du contexte local, national ou international. Ils peuvent inclure des questions économiques, comme la taxation ou la dépense publique, des questions sociales, comme l'immigration ou les droits des minorités, ou des questions environnementales, comme le changement climatique.
This approach seeks to understand which issues are most important to voters, how they position themselves in relation to these issues, and how these positions influence their vote. For example, a voter who considers immigration to be the most important issue facing his or her country is more likely to vote for a party that promises to restrict immigration. Researchers using this approach can use opinion surveys to gather information about voters' attitudes to various issues. They can then use this information to build models that predict electoral behaviour based on voters' positions on these issues. It is an approach that recognises that voting behaviour is dynamic and can change in response to current issues. It also recognises that voters are not simply passive recipients of political messages, but are capable of making their own assessments of the issues and taking decisions based on those assessments.


Dans cette approche, on cherche à comprendre quelles sont les questions qui sont les plus importantes pour les électeurs, comment ils se positionnent par rapport à ces questions, et comment ces positions influencent leur vote. Par exemple, un électeur qui considère que la question de l'immigration est le problème le plus important auquel son pays est confronté est plus susceptible de voter pour un parti qui promet de restreindre l'immigration. Les chercheurs qui utilisent cette approche peuvent utiliser des enquêtes d'opinion pour recueillir des informations sur les attitudes des électeurs à l'égard de divers enjeux. Ils peuvent ensuite utiliser ces informations pour construire des modèles qui prédisent le comportement électoral en fonction des positions des électeurs sur ces enjeux. C'est une approche qui reconnaît que le comportement électoral est dynamique et peut changer en réponse aux enjeux actuels. Elle reconnaît également que les électeurs ne sont pas simplement des récepteurs passifs de messages politiques, mais qu'ils sont capables de faire leurs propres évaluations des enjeux et de prendre des décisions en fonction de ces évaluations.
Voters can be influenced by immediate and current issues or problems that affect society. These issues can be very diverse and include economic issues (such as unemployment or inflation), social issues (such as minority rights or gender equality), political issues (such as corruption or government transparency), or environmental issues (such as climate change or pollution). It is important to note that the issues that are relevant in a specific election can vary considerably depending on the local, national and international context. For example, climate change may be a major issue in a country that is heavily affected by the effects of climate change, but not in another country where the problem is less urgent or visible. In addition, the issues may also vary according to the specific electorate. For example, young voters may be more concerned about education and employment issues, while older voters may be more concerned about retirement and healthcare issues. Thus, issue voting implies a more dynamic and flexible approach to politics, which recognises that voters' attitudes and concerns may change in response to changing conditions in society and the world.


Les électeurs peuvent être influencés par les questions ou problèmes immédiats et actuels qui touchent la société. Ces questions ou enjeux peuvent être très variés et inclure des questions économiques (comme le chômage ou l'inflation), sociales (comme les droits des minorités ou l'égalité des sexes), politiques (comme la corruption ou la transparence gouvernementale), ou environnementales (comme le changement climatique ou la pollution). Il est important de noter que les enjeux qui sont pertinents dans une élection spécifique peuvent varier considérablement en fonction du contexte local, national et international. Par exemple, la question du changement climatique peut être un enjeu majeur dans un pays qui est fortement touché par les effets du changement climatique, mais pas dans un autre pays où ce problème est moins urgent ou visible. En outre, les enjeux peuvent également varier en fonction de l'électorat spécifique. Par exemple, les jeunes électeurs peuvent être plus préoccupés par les questions d'éducation et d'emploi, tandis que les électeurs plus âgés peuvent être plus préoccupés par les questions de retraite et de soins de santé. Ainsi, le vote d'enjeu implique une approche plus dynamique et flexible de la politique, qui reconnaît que les attitudes et les préoccupations des électeurs peuvent changer en réponse aux conditions changeantes de la société et du monde.  
Election campaigns are often crucial moments for highlighting particular issues. Political parties and candidates often try to shape the public debate by focusing on specific issues that they believe are strengths for them or weaknesses for their opponents. By focusing on certain issues, they can succeed in changing the public discourse and directing voters' attention to those issues. This strategy can be particularly effective if voters perceive that the party or candidate has a strong, credible and attractive position on the issue in question. This is why political agenda-setting and strategic communication are essential elements of any successful election campaign. However, it should be noted that voters are not simply passive recipients of these messages. They actively evaluate and interpret this information in the light of their own values, experiences and priorities, which can also influence their voting behaviour.


Les campagnes électorales sont souvent des moments cruciaux pour mettre en avant des enjeux particuliers. Les partis politiques et les candidats tentent souvent de façonner le débat public en se concentrant sur des questions spécifiques qu'ils estiment être des atouts pour eux ou des faiblesses pour leurs adversaires. En mettant l'accent sur certains enjeux, ils peuvent réussir à modifier le discours public et à orienter l'attention des électeurs vers ces questions. Cette stratégie peut être particulièrement efficace si les électeurs perçoivent que le parti ou le candidat a une position forte, crédible et attrayante sur l'enjeu en question. C'est pourquoi la construction de l'agenda politique et la communication stratégique sont des éléments essentiels de toute campagne électorale réussie. Cependant, il convient de noter que les électeurs ne sont pas simplement des récepteurs passifs de ces messages. Ils évaluent et interprètent activement ces informations à la lumière de leurs propres valeurs, expériences et priorités, ce qui peut également influencer leur comportement de vote.
Issue voting highlights a dynamic aspect of voting behaviour. Rather than focusing solely on traditional party affiliations or class identities, this approach seeks to understand how voters react to specific issues and current political challenges. People's political preferences can change depending on the importance they attach to different issues at different times. For example, a person may generally vote for a particular party because of their beliefs on economic issues, but may choose to vote for another party in a specific election if they think that other party has a better approach on an issue that is particularly important to them at that time, such as the environment or public health. This may also explain why voters may sometimes appear to vote against their apparent economic interests if other issues or questions are more important to them. Similarly, voters may change their partisan preferences in response to major political events or crises. This perspective therefore offers a more flexible and responsive view of electoral behaviour, taking into account short-term influences as well as long-term partisan loyalties.


Le vote d'enjeu met en lumière un aspect dynamique du comportement électoral. Au lieu de se concentrer uniquement sur les affiliations partisanes traditionnelles ou les identités de classe, cette approche cherche à comprendre comment les électeurs réagissent à des questions spécifiques et à des enjeux politiques actuels. Les préférences politiques des individus peuvent changer en fonction de l'importance qu'ils accordent à différents enjeux à différents moments. Par exemple, une personne peut généralement voter pour un parti en particulier en raison de ses croyances sur des questions économiques, mais peut choisir de voter pour un autre parti lors d'une élection spécifique si elle pense que cet autre parti a une meilleure approche sur une question qui lui importe particulièrement à ce moment-là, comme l'environnement ou la santé publique. Cela peut également expliquer pourquoi les électeurs peuvent parfois sembler voter contre leurs intérêts économiques apparents si d'autres questions ou enjeux sont plus importants pour eux. De même, les électeurs peuvent modifier leurs préférences partisanes en réponse à des événements politiques majeurs ou à des crises. Cette perspective offre donc une vision plus flexible et réactive du comportement électoral, qui tient compte des influences à court terme ainsi que des loyautés partisanes à long terme.
=== Issue-based voting ===
 
=== Le Vote basé sur les Enjeux ===
   
   
Il y a deux grands types d’explications liées aux enjeux.
There are two main types of explanation linked to the issues at stake.


La première explication est directement dérivée d’un modèle de choix rationnel avec l’électeur qui vote de manière rationnelle faisant un calcul coût – bénéfice. L’idée est que les électeurs vont voter pour le parti qui sont le plus proche d’eux en matière d’enjeu. Les partis qui ont les préférences les plus similaires avec les électeurs sont ceux pour lesquels les électeurs vont voter.  Selon ce modèle, les électeurs sont considérés comme des consommateurs politiques qui font des choix de vote basés sur une évaluation des coûts et des avantages. Cela suppose que les électeurs sont bien informés, qu'ils comprennent leurs propres intérêts et qu'ils sont capables d'évaluer correctement les politiques proposées par les différents partis. Ils sont censés choisir le parti ou le candidat dont les positions sont les plus proches de leurs propres préférences ou convictions. Par exemple, un électeur qui estime que la protection de l'environnement est la question la plus importante pour lui cherchera à voter pour le parti ou le candidat qui propose les politiques environnementales les plus fortes ou les plus efficaces.  
The first explanation is derived directly from a rational choice model, with the voter voting rationally, making a cost-benefit calculation. The idea is that voters will vote for the party that is closest to them in terms of the issues at stake. The parties that have the most similar preferences to voters are the ones that voters will vote for. In this model, voters are seen as political consumers who make voting choices based on an assessment of costs and benefits. This assumes that voters are well informed, that they understand their own interests and that they are able to correctly evaluate the policies proposed by the different parties. They are expected to choose the party or candidate whose positions are closest to their own preferences or convictions. For example, a voter who feels that protecting the environment is the most important issue for him or her will seek to vote for the party or candidate that proposes the strongest or most effective environmental policies.


Si, par exemple, une personne est favorable à une limitation de l'immigration, il est probable qu'elle vote pour un parti qui soutient des politiques restrictives en matière d'immigration. Pour modéliser cette situation, on peut utiliser des échelles pour évaluer les positions des individus et des partis politiques sur divers enjeux. Une fois ces positions établies, il est alors possible de calculer une "distance" entre l'électeur et chaque parti en fonction de leurs positions respectives sur les enjeux. Ensuite, cette distance peut être utilisée pour estimer la probabilité qu'un électeur vote pour un certain parti, la probabilité étant généralement plus élevée pour les partis qui sont plus proches de l'électeur sur l'échelle des enjeux.  
If, for example, a person is in favour of limiting immigration, they are likely to vote for a party that supports restrictive immigration policies. To model this situation, scales can be used to assess the positions of individuals and political parties on various issues. Once these positions have been established, it is then possible to calculate a 'distance' between the voter and each party based on their respective positions on the issues. This distance can then be used to estimate the probability that a voter will vote for a certain party, with the probability generally being higher for parties that are closer to the voter on the scale of issues.


Dans ce modèle, les positions politiques sont représentées dans un espace multidimensionnel, où chaque dimension représente un enjeu politique (par exemple, l'immigration, l'économie, l'environnement, etc.). Les électeurs et les partis politiques sont placés dans cet espace en fonction de leurs positions sur ces enjeux. Ensuite, on suppose généralement que les électeurs vont voter pour le parti le plus proche d'eux dans cet espace, c'est-à-dire le parti dont les positions sur les différents enjeux sont les plus proches de leurs propres positions. Cela permet d'obtenir des prédictions quantitatives sur le comportement électoral. Par exemple, si un électeur se trouve à une certaine distance d'un parti sur l'échelle de l'immigration, on peut calculer la probabilité qu'il vote pour ce parti en se basant sur cette distance.  
In this model, political positions are represented in a multidimensional space, where each dimension represents a political issue (for example, immigration, the economy, the environment, etc.). Voters and political parties are placed in this space according to their positions on these issues. It is then generally assumed that voters will vote for the party closest to them in this space, i.e. the party whose positions on the various issues are closest to their own positions. This makes it possible to obtain quantitative predictions about electoral behaviour. For example, if a voter is at a certain distance from a party on the immigration scale, we can calculate the probability that he or she will vote for that party on the basis of that distance.


Le modèle de proximité est un concept majeur en théorie du choix électoral. Il postule que le comportement électoral d'un individu est largement influencé par la proximité entre ses propres vues politiques et celles d'un parti ou d'un candidat sur les enjeux qui sont importants pour cet électeur. En d'autres termes, selon le modèle de proximité, un électeur est plus susceptible de voter pour le parti ou le candidat dont les positions politiques sont les plus proches des siennes, sur les questions qu'il juge importantes. Cette "distance" entre l'électeur et le parti peut être mesurée sur divers enjeux ou dimensions politiques, comme l'économie, l'environnement, l'immigration, etc. Ainsi, plus un parti est "proche" des opinions personnelles de l'électeur sur des enjeux qui lui tiennent à cœur, plus la probabilité que cet électeur vote pour ce parti est élevée, selon le modèle de proximité.  
The proximity model is a major concept in electoral choice theory. It postulates that an individual's electoral behaviour is largely influenced by the proximity between his or her own political views and those of a party or candidate on the issues that are important to that voter. In other words, according to the proximity model, a voter is more likely to vote for the party or candidate whose political positions are closest to his or her own, on the issues he or she considers important. This 'distance' between the voter and the party can be measured on various issues or political dimensions, such as the economy, the environment, immigration, etc. Thus, the 'closer' a party is to the voter's personal views on issues that are important to them, the higher the probability that the voter will vote for that party, according to the proximity model.  


La deuxième hypothèse, étroitement liée à la première, est que les électeurs ont tendance à voter pour le parti qui est perçu comme étant le plus compétent ou le plus engagé sur l'enjeu qu'ils considèrent comme le plus important. C'est ce qu'on appelle le vote basé sur l'enjeu. Selon cette théorie, ce ne sont pas nécessairement les positions des électeurs et des partis sur différents enjeux qui sont décisives, mais plutôt la perception de quel enjeu est actuellement le plus important dans le pays, et quel parti est considéré comme étant le plus capable de gérer cet enjeu. Cela signifie que ce n'est pas tant la position des électeurs et des partis sur différents enjeux qui compte, mais plutôt l'identification de l'enjeu le plus crucial à un moment donné dans le pays. C'est aussi la question de savoir quel parti est associé à cet enjeu, quel parti a acquis au fil des années une réputation d'acteur actif et compétent sur cet enjeu, capable de le gérer et de trouver des solutions. Si cet enjeu devient particulièrement saillant parmi la population, le parti en question pourra en tirer un avantage électoral.  
The second hypothesis, which is closely linked to the first, is that voters tend to vote for the party that is perceived as being the most competent or the most committed on the issue that they consider to be the most important. This is known as issue-based voting. According to this theory, it is not necessarily the positions of voters and parties on different issues that are decisive, but rather the perception of which issue is currently the most important in the country, and which party is considered to be the most capable of managing that issue. This means that it is not so much the position of voters and parties on different issues that counts, but rather the identification of the most crucial issue at a given moment in the country. It is also a question of knowing which party is associated with this issue, which party has acquired a reputation over the years as an active and competent player on this issue, capable of managing it and finding solutions. If this issue becomes particularly salient among the population, the party in question will be able to draw electoral advantage from it.


Ce concept est connu sous le nom de "propriété de l'enjeu" ("issue ownership"). En effet, chaque parti essaie de développer sa réputation et ses compétences autour de certains enjeux spécifiques. Par exemple, pour les Verts, c'est le développement de leur réputation de compétence sur les questions environnementales. Pour les socialistes, il s'agit de mettre en avant leur compétence en matière de politique sociale et de redistribution. Pour le PLR, le but est de renforcer leur compétence en matière de politique économique. Quant à l'UDC, leur objectif est de développer des compétences en matière d'immigration, de sécurité et de politique européenne.
This concept is known as "issue ownership". Each party tries to develop its reputation and skills around specific issues. For example, for the Greens, it is the development of their reputation for competence on environmental issues. For the Socialists, the aim is to highlight their expertise in social policy and redistribution. For the PLR, the aim is to strengthen their expertise in economic policy. As for the UDC, their aim is to develop competence in immigration, security and European policy.


Le concept de "propriété de l'enjeu" ("issue ownership") est un aspect essentiel de la politique moderne et du positionnement stratégique des partis politiques. Il repose sur l'idée que chaque parti politique cherche à être associé à des enjeux spécifiques qui sont perçus comme étant importants pour les électeurs. L'idée est de créer une association mentale entre le parti et l'enjeu de telle sorte que lorsque les électeurs pensent à cet enjeu, ils pensent également au parti. Les Verts, par exemple, ont construit leur identité politique autour des questions environnementales. Ils ont cherché à se positionner comme les champions de l'environnement et de la durabilité, et ont fait des efforts pour s'assurer que ces questions soient associées à leur image de marque. En conséquence, les électeurs qui sont particulièrement préoccupés par les questions environnementales penseront probablement aux Verts lorsqu'ils voteront. Le Parti socialiste, d'autre part, a longtemps été associé à la défense des droits des travailleurs et à la redistribution des richesses. Ils ont cultivé une image de défenseurs des classes populaires et de promoteurs de l'égalité sociale. Ainsi, les électeurs qui sont préoccupés par les inégalités sociales et économiques, ou qui sont favorables à une politique de redistribution, sont plus susceptibles de voter pour le Parti socialiste. Le PLR, en revanche, a cherché à se positionner comme le parti de l'économie, mettant l'accent sur les questions de politique économique, de libéralisme et de libre marché. Les électeurs qui sont préoccupés par ces questions sont plus susceptibles de voter pour le PLR. Enfin, l'UDC s'est positionné comme le parti de l'immigration, de la sécurité et de la politique européenne. Les électeurs qui considèrent ces questions comme étant d'une importance particulière sont plus susceptibles de voter pour l'UDC.
The concept of "issue ownership" is an essential aspect of modern politics and the strategic positioning of political parties. It is based on the idea that each political party seeks to be associated with specific issues that are perceived to be important to voters. The idea is to create a mental association between the party and the issue so that when voters think of the issue, they also think of the party. The Greens, for example, have built their political identity around environmental issues. They have sought to position themselves as champions of the environment and sustainability, and have made efforts to ensure that these issues are associated with their brand image. As a result, voters who are particularly concerned about environmental issues are likely to think of the Greens when they vote. The Socialist Party, on the other hand, has long been associated with the defence of workers' rights and the redistribution of wealth. They have cultivated an image as defenders of the working classes and promoters of social equality. As a result, voters who are concerned about social and economic inequalities, or who favour a policy of redistribution, are more likely to vote for the Socialist Party. The PLR, on the other hand, has sought to position itself as the party of the economy, emphasising issues of economic policy, liberalism and free markets. Voters who are concerned about these issues are more likely to vote for the PLR. Finally, the SVP has positioned itself as the party of immigration, security and European policy. Voters who consider these issues to be of particular importance are more likely to vote for the SVP.


La réputation de compétence d'un parti politique sur un certain enjeu, ou sa "propriété de l'enjeu", est généralement stable et difficile à modifier. Cette stabilité découle de plusieurs facteurs. Premièrement, la réputation de compétence d'un parti sur un enjeu donné est souvent le résultat de longues années, voire de décennies, de travail et d'engagement sur cet enjeu. Un parti qui a régulièrement et constamment défendu une certaine position sur un enjeu, ou qui a fait de cet enjeu une partie centrale de son programme politique, a généralement réussi à convaincre les électeurs de sa compétence en la matière. Changer cette perception chez les électeurs prend du temps. Deuxièmement, les partis politiques sont généralement réticents à changer radicalement leur position sur un enjeu, car cela pourrait être perçu comme de l'opportunisme ou de l'inconstance, ce qui pourrait aliéner leur base d'électeurs. C'est pourquoi ils ont tendance à adhérer à des positions et des enjeux de longue date. Cependant, lorsque l'importance perçue d'un certain enjeu augmente parmi les électeurs - peut-être en raison d'événements d'actualité ou de changements sociaux ou économiques - un parti qui a une forte réputation de compétence sur cet enjeu peut en bénéficier électoralement. Par exemple, si l'enjeu de l'environnement devient soudainement beaucoup plus important pour les électeurs, il est probable que les partis écologistes verront leur soutien augmenter.
A political party's reputation for competence on a certain issue, or its "ownership of the issue", is generally stable and difficult to change. This stability stems from several factors. Firstly, a party's reputation for competence on a given issue is often the result of many years, even decades, of work and commitment on that issue. A party that has regularly and consistently defended a certain position on an issue, or that has made that issue a central part of its political programme, has generally succeeded in convincing voters of its competence in the matter. Changing voters' perceptions takes time. Secondly, political parties are generally reluctant to radically change their position on an issue, as this could be perceived as opportunism or fickleness, which could alienate their voter base. This is why they tend to adhere to long-held positions and issues. However, when the perceived importance of a certain issue increases among voters - perhaps due to current events or social or economic changes - a party with a strong reputation for competence on that issue may benefit electorally. For example, if the environment suddenly becomes a much more important issue for voters, it is likely that environmental parties will see their support increase.


En 2015, au cœur de la crise migratoire, le sujet de l'immigration et des réfugiés a dominé le débat politique en Suisse, tout comme dans de nombreux autres pays européens. Cela a profité à l'Union démocratique du centre (UDC), qui avait longtemps fait de la limitation de l'immigration un de ses principaux axes politiques. En raison de sa position ferme sur la question et de sa réputation de parti ayant des solutions, même si certaines personnes les considéraient comme simplistes, à la question de l'immigration, l'UDC a pu attirer un grand nombre d'électeurs préoccupés par la crise migratoire. Même sans une campagne électorale intense, l'UDC a réussi à faire valoir son point de vue, car le sujet était constamment présent dans l'actualité. Cela a probablement contribué à leur victoire électorale en octobre 2015.  
In 2015, at the height of the migration crisis, the subject of immigration and refugees dominated the political debate in Switzerland, as in many other European countries. This benefited the Swiss People's Party (SVP), which had long made limiting immigration one of its main political axes. Because of its firm stance on the issue and its reputation as a party with solutions, even if some people considered them simplistic, to the immigration question, the SVP was able to attract a large number of voters concerned about the migration crisis. Even without an intense election campaign, the SVP was able to make its point because the subject was constantly in the news. This probably contributed to their election victory in October 2015.[[Fichier:Sciarini 2015 vote enjeu 1.png|vignette|500px|center|Source: Nicolet and Sciarini (2010: 451)]]


[[Fichier:Sciarini 2015 vote enjeu 1.png|vignette|500px|center|Source: Nicolet and Sciarini (2010: 451)]]
This graph comes from a survey conducted after the 2007 Swiss federal elections. In this survey, we systematically followed a certain methodology. Firstly, we asked respondents to identify the most important problem facing Switzerland at the time. This was an open question, allowing people to answer freely. We then grouped these responses into different categories to facilitate analysis. We then asked a follow-up question: "In your opinion, which party is best placed to solve problem X that you have identified? This allowed us to understand which party voters associated with the ability to solve the specific problems they had identified. In another section of the questionnaire, we asked respondents which party they had voted for in the election. By combining these three pieces of information - the most important problem, the party considered most competent to solve that problem and the actual vote - we can understand how perceptions of problems and party competence influenced voting behaviour.


Ce graphique provient d'une enquête menée après les élections fédérales de 2007 en Suisse. Dans cette enquête, nous avons systématiquement suivi une certaine méthodologie. Premièrement, nous avons demandé aux répondants d'identifier le problème le plus important auquel la Suisse est confrontée à ce moment-. C'était une question ouverte, permettant aux gens de répondre librement. Par la suite, nous avons regroupé ces réponses en différentes catégories pour faciliter l'analyse. Ensuite, nous avons posé une question de suivi : "Selon vous, quel parti est le plus à même de résoudre le problème X que vous avez identifié ?". Cela nous a permis de comprendre quel parti les électeurs associaient à la capacité de résoudre les problèmes spécifiques qu'ils avaient identifiés. Dans une autre section du questionnaire, nous avons demandé aux répondants pour quel parti ils avaient voté lors des élections. En combinant ces trois éléments d'information - le problème le plus important, le parti considéré comme le plus compétent pour résoudre ce problème et le vote effectif - nous pouvons comprendre comment les perceptions des problèmes et des compétences du parti ont influencé le comportement de vote.
This graph includes all the people surveyed, i.e. 1,716 people. These individuals all took part in the elections and chose a party. On the first line of the table, we have broken down the answers to the first question, which was open-ended. For 35% of respondents, immigration, security and the integration of refugees were the most important issues. For 16%, it was the environment. For 31% of respondents, their main concern was the economy and the state of social security. If we add up these percentages, we don't reach 100%. The reason for this is simple: there are other important issues that respondents mentioned, but which are not included in this table.


Ce graphique comprend l'ensemble des personnes interrogées, soit 1716 personnes. Ces individus ont tous participé aux élections et ont choisi un parti. Sur la première ligne du tableau, nous avons réparti les réponses à la première question, qui était ouverte. Pour 35% des répondants, l'immigration, la sécurité et l'intégration des réfugiés étaient les problèmes les plus importants. Pour 16% des personnes, c'était l'environnement. Pour 31% des répondants, leur principale préoccupation concernait l'économie et l'état de la sécurité sociale. Si on additionne ces pourcentages, on n'atteint pas 100%. La raison en est simple : il y a d'autres problèmes importants que les répondants ont mentionnés, mais qui ne sont pas inclus dans ce tableau.  
The second row of the table focuses on the party that respondents feel is most competent to solve the problem they have identified. These percentages are calculated on the basis of those who responded. For example, of the 35% who identified 'immigration' as a major problem, a large proportion, 27%, indicated that the UDC (Union démocratique du centre) or the PS (Parti socialiste) were the most competent to solve it. More specifically, 75% of those who cited 'immigration' as a major problem felt that the SVP was best placed to tackle it. Finally, on the last line, we look at what these people actually voted for. For example, 17% of the 1,716 people who responded said that they voted for the SVP because they considered it to be the most competent party to deal with immigration, which is their main problem.


La deuxième ligne du tableau se concentre sur le parti que les répondants estiment le plus compétent pour résoudre le problème qu'ils ont identifié. Ces pourcentages sont calculés sur la base des personnes qui ont répondu. Par exemple, sur les 35% qui ont identifié "l'immigration" comme un problème majeur, une bonne partie, soit 27%, a indiqué que l'UDC (Union démocratique du centre) ou le PS (Parti socialiste) était le plus compétent pour le résoudre. Plus précisément, 75% des personnes qui ont cité "l'immigration" comme un problème majeur estiment que l'UDC est le plus compétent pour s'attaquer à ce problème. Enfin, sur la dernière ligne, nous examinons ce que ces personnes ont réellement voté. Par exemple, 17% des 1716 personnes qui ont répondu ont déclaré avoir voté pour l'UDC, car ils considèrent que ce parti est le plus compétent pour gérer l'immigration, qui est leur problème principal.  
These data do not necessarily provide direct evidence of a causal link between the problem identified, the perception of a party's competence to solve it, and the actual vote. However, they do indicate a correlation between these elements. More specifically, they show that the importance of the immigration issue and the perception of the SVP's competence to deal with it may have influenced the vote for the SVP. This does not mean that all those who identified immigration as a major issue and saw the SVP as competent to deal with it voted for the SVP, but it is likely that there is some tendency or influence in this direction.


Ces données ne fournissent pas nécessairement une preuve directe d'un lien de causalité entre le problème identifié, la perception de la compétence d'un parti pour le résoudre, et le vote réel. Cependant, elles indiquent une corrélation entre ces éléments. Plus précisément, elles montrent que l'importance de l'enjeu "immigration" et la perception de la compétence de l'UDC pour le traiter pourraient avoir influencé le vote en faveur de l'UDC. Cela ne signifie pas que tous ceux qui ont identifié l'immigration comme un problème majeur et ont considéré l'UDC comme compétent dans ce domaine ont voté pour l'UDC, mais il est probable qu'il existe une certaine tendance ou influence dans cette direction.
The Swiss People's Party (SVP), with its populist discourse and focus on issues such as immigration, national independence and security, has had a marked influence on Swiss politics over the past two decades. This has prompted a great deal of research and analysis, both nationally and internationally, to understand how and why the SVP has gained influence and how this has changed the Swiss political landscape. This research has examined various aspects, including the SVP's electoral strategies, its communication and rhetoric, and the wider socio-economic context in which it has managed to thrive.


L'Union Démocratique du Centre (UDC), avec son discours populiste et son accent sur des questions telles que l'immigration, l'indépendance nationale et la sécurité, a eu une influence marquée sur la politique suisse au cours des deux dernières décennies. Cela a suscité beaucoup de recherches et d'analyses, tant au niveau national qu'international, pour comprendre comment et pourquoi l'UDC a gagné en influence et comment cela a changé le paysage politique suisse. Ces recherches ont examiné divers aspects, notamment les stratégies électorales de l'UDC, sa communication et sa rhétorique, ainsi que le contexte socio-économique plus large dans lequel elle a réussi à prospérer.
=== Exploiting electoral potential ===
Firstly, socio-professional or class position has been identified as a key factor influencing the SVP vote. Certain social classes may feel more attracted to the SVP's discourse, particularly those who feel threatened by immigration or globalisation. Secondly, specific issues, such as immigration, play a major role. The SVP has succeeded in positioning itself as the party most competent to deal with the issues of immigration, security and national sovereignty. When these issues become salient in the public debate, the SVP benefits, as a significant proportion of voters perceive the party to be best placed to deal with them. These two factors, combined with other elements such as the party's effective communication and its skilful use of populist rhetoric, help to explain the SVP's rise and success in the Swiss political landscape. A third type of explanation refers to the party's strategies and the effects of these strategies in terms of mobilisation.


=== Exploitation du Potentiel Électoral ===
The SVP has used powerful mobilisation strategies to reach its electorate and encourage them to vote. Even if we do not analyse these strategies directly, we can observe their clear effects through election results and polling data. A crucial aspect of the SVP's success is its ability to galvanise and mobilise its electorate effectively. The impact of this mobilisation can be clearly seen in the increase in support for the SVP over the years, a testament to the effectiveness of their strategies. For example, the SVP has been able to generate enthusiasm among its voters by focusing on important and topical issues such as immigration and security, and by offering simple and straightforward solutions to these problems. In addition, the party has managed to maintain constant communication with its electorate, both during and outside election campaigns, thereby strengthening its support. While it is beyond the scope of this discussion to analyse the specific methods employed by the SVP to achieve this objective, it is clear that their ability to effectively mobilise their electorate has played a crucial role in their continued success.
Premièrement, la position socioprofessionnelle ou de classe a été identifiée comme un facteur clé influençant le vote pour l'UDC. Certaines classes sociales peuvent se sentir plus attirées par le discours de l'UDC, particulièrement celles qui se sentent menacées par l'immigration ou la mondialisation. Deuxièmement, les enjeux spécifiques, notamment l'immigration, jouent un rôle majeur. L'UDC a réussi à se positionner comme le parti le plus compétent pour gérer les questions d'immigration, de sécurité et de souveraineté nationale. Lorsque ces questions deviennent saillantes dans le débat public, l'UDC en bénéficie, car une part significative des électeurs perçoit ce parti comme le plus à même de traiter ces problématiques. Ces deux facteurs, combinés à d'autres éléments tels que la communication efficace du parti et son utilisation habile de la rhétorique populiste, contribuent à expliquer la montée et le succès de l'UDC dans le paysage politique suisse. Un troisième type d’explication fait référence aux stratégies du parti et aux effets de ces stratégies en termes de mobilisation.


L'UDC a su utiliser de puissantes stratégies de mobilisation pour toucher son électorat et l'encourager à voter. Même si nous n'analysons pas directement ces stratégies, nous pouvons observer leurs effets manifestes à travers les résultats des élections et les données des sondages. Un aspect crucial de la réussite de l'UDC réside dans sa capacité à galvaniser et mobiliser efficacement son électorat. L'impact de cette mobilisation peut être clairement observé dans l'augmentation du soutien pour l'UDC au fil des années, ce qui témoigne de l'efficacité de leurs stratégies. Par exemple, l'UDC a su susciter l'enthousiasme de ses électeurs en se concentrant sur des enjeux importants et actuels, tels que l'immigration et la sécurité, et en proposant des solutions simples et directes à ces problèmes. De plus, le parti a réussi à maintenir une communication constante avec son électorat, à la fois durant les campagnes électorales et en dehors, renforçant ainsi son soutien. Même si l'analyse des méthodes spécifiques employées par l'UDC pour atteindre cet objectif dépasse le cadre de cette discussion, il est clair que leur capacité à mobiliser efficacement leurs électeurs a joué un rôle crucial dans leur succès continu.
The question "which party did you vote for" is fundamental to understanding electoral trends. However, there are other methods of gathering information on political preferences that are not limited solely to the actual vote. For example, one approach is to ask participants to rate their degree of sympathy for different political parties on a scale of 1 to 10. This makes it possible to understand not only people's electoral choice, but also their ideological closeness to other parties. Another measure is to ask participants whether they consider themselves close to a particular party, even if they do not always vote for that party. This can reveal partisan affinities that do not necessarily translate into voting in elections. It is also possible to ask questions about participants' attitudes to specific political issues to determine their ideological alignment. For example, their views on issues such as immigration, the economy and the environment can indicate which party they are likely to lean towards. These approaches provide a more nuanced picture of partisan preferences, offering a richer and more complex understanding of electoral behaviour.  


La question « pour quel parti avez-vous voté » est fondamentale pour comprendre les tendances électorales. Cependant, il existe d'autres méthodes pour recueillir des informations sur les préférences politiques sans se limiter uniquement au vote réel. Par exemple, une approche consiste à demander aux participants de noter leur degré de sympathie pour différents partis politiques sur une échelle de 1 à 10. Cela permet de comprendre non seulement le choix électoral des personnes, mais aussi leur proximité idéologique avec les autres partis. Une autre mesure consiste à demander aux participants s'ils se considèrent proches d'un parti particulier, même s'ils ne votent pas toujours pour ce parti. Cela peut révéler des affinités partisanes qui ne se traduisent pas nécessairement par un vote lors des élections. Il est également possible de poser des questions sur les attitudes des participants à l'égard des questions politiques spécifiques pour déterminer leur alignement idéologique. Par exemple, leur opinion sur des questions telles que l'immigration, l'économie, l'environnement, peut indiquer vers quel parti ils sont susceptibles de pencher. Ces approches fournissent une image plus nuancée des préférences partisanes, offrant ainsi une compréhension plus riche et plus complexe des comportements électoraux.  
Focusing solely on an individual's electoral choice can limit our understanding of their overall political preferences. If someone says they voted for the SVP, this does not give us any information about their disposition towards other parties. For example, this person might also have been inclined to vote for the PLR, but ultimately chose the UDC. Similarly, someone who voted for the Greens might also have considered the Socialist Party as a viable option. Once they have declared that they voted for the Greens, we lose all information about their other potential preferences. This is why it is useful to use complementary measures to explore partisan preferences, as discussed above. By asking people to rate their sympathy for different parties on a scale, or to say whether they feel close to more than one party, we can get a fuller picture of their personal political landscape. This can help reveal nuances in their preferences and identify trends that are not immediately apparent through voting.


Le fait de se concentrer uniquement sur le choix électoral d'un individu peut limiter notre compréhension de ses préférences politiques globales. Si une personne dit qu'elle a voté pour l'UDC, cela ne nous donne pas d'informations sur sa disposition envers les autres partis. Par exemple, cette personne aurait pu être également encline à voter pour le PLR, mais a finalement choisi l'UDC. De la même façon, une personne qui a voté pour les Verts pourrait avoir également considéré le Parti Socialiste comme une option viable. Une fois qu'elle a déclaré avoir voté pour les Verts, nous perdons toute information sur ses autres préférences potentielles. C'est pourquoi il est utile d'utiliser des mesures complémentaires pour explorer les préférences partisanes, comme évoqué précédemment. En demandant aux gens d'évaluer leur sympathie pour différents partis sur une échelle, ou de dire s'ils se sentent proches de plus d'un parti, on peut obtenir une image plus complète de leur paysage politique personnel. Cela peut aider à révéler des nuances dans leurs préférences et à identifier des tendances qui ne sont pas immédiatement apparentes à travers le vote.
What we do is to use a method that asks questions about all the parties. This method is called the vote probability measure. In the survey, we propose a scale from 0 to 10, asking people to rate the probability that one day they would vote for a certain party. The same question is asked for all the main political parties, giving a comparative perspective. In this way, we have information not only on the party that the person has chosen, but also on the other parties that they have not chosen. This makes it possible to compare the parties in much more detail than the simple question of "electoral choice".


Ce que nous faisons est d'employer une méthode qui interroge sur tous les partis. Cette méthode est nommée la mesure de probabilité de vote. Dans l'enquête, nous proposons une échelle de 0 à 10, demandant aux gens d'évaluer la probabilité qu'un jour ils voteraient pour un certain parti. La même question est posée pour tous les principaux partis politiques, ce qui donne une perspective comparative. Ainsi, nous avons des informations non seulement sur le parti que la personne a choisi, mais aussi sur les autres partis qu'elle n'a pas choisis. Cela permet de comparer les partis de manière beaucoup plus détaillée que la simple question du "choix électoral".
After asking all the participants in the survey what their probability is of ever voting for the main parties present in their canton, for example, we can then calculate the average probability of voting for a specific party. It's fairly straightforward, and just involves summing and averaging the probabilities. We add up the scores of each respondent and divide by the total number of respondents. What we get is the average probability of voting for a party, which can be regarded as the party's electoral potential. This operation can be carried out for each party separately.


Après avoir demandé à tous les participants à l'enquête quelle est leur probabilité de voter un jour pour les principaux partis présents dans leur canton par exemple, nous pouvons alors calculer la probabilité moyenne de voter pour un parti spécifique. C'est assez simple, cela implique juste de sommer et de moyenner les probabilités. On additionne les scores de chaque répondant et on divise par le nombre total de répondants. Ce que nous obtenons, c'est la probabilité moyenne de voter pour un parti, ce qui peut être considéré comme le potentiel électoral du parti. Cette opération peut être réalisée pour chaque parti séparément.
Then, using this data, we can calculate what is known as the realisation rate or the rate of exploitation of the electoral potential. This is calculated by creating a simple ratio between a party's actual electoral strength, i.e. the percentage of votes it received, and its electoral potential, derived from the survey, which is the average probability of voting for that party. The ratio thus obtained provides a measure of the parties' ability to convert their electoral potential into real support.


Ensuite, en utilisant ces données, on peut calculer ce qu'on appelle le taux de concrétisation ou le taux d'exploitation du potentiel électoral. Ce calcul se fait en créant un simple ratio entre la force électorale réelle d'un parti, c'est-à-dire le pourcentage de voix que le parti a reçu, et son potentiel électoral, tiré de l'enquête, qui est la probabilité moyenne de voter pour ce parti. Le taux ainsi obtenu donne une mesure de la capacité des partis à transformer leur potentiel électoral en soutien réel.
=== Electoral Potential of Parties and Average Probability of Voting ===
 
Let's start with the electoral potential measured in the surveys, in other words the average probability of voting for one party or another.
=== Potentiel Électoral des Partis et Probabilité Moyenne de Vote ===
Commençons par le potentiel électoral mesuré dans les enquêtes, autrement dit la probabilité moyenne de voter pour l’un ou l’autre parti.


[[Fichier:Sciarini Exemple 2 potentiel électoral des partis 1.png|vignette|center|400px|Source: Données Selects (mes calculs (M. Sciarini), N=4064-4261)]]
[[Fichier:Sciarini Exemple 2 potentiel électoral des partis 1.png|vignette|center|400px|Source: Données Selects (mes calculs (M. Sciarini), N=4064-4261)]]


Ce graphique, basé sur des enquêtes réalisées à la suite des élections fédérales de 1995, 1999, 2003, 2007 et 2011, illustre la probabilité moyenne de voter pour chaque parti, c'est-à-dire le potentiel électoral de chaque parti. Il est évident que pour tous les partis, le potentiel électoral est beaucoup plus élevé que leur force électorale réelle.  
This graph, based on surveys carried out following the federal elections of 1995, 1999, 2003, 2007 and 2011, illustrates the average probability of voting for each party, in other words the electoral potential of each party. It is clear that for all the parties, their electoral potential is much higher than their actual electoral strength.  


Considérons l'exemple des Verts : ils ont un potentiel électoral de 44%, ce qui signifie qu'en moyenne, dans l'ensemble de l'échantillon, la probabilité qu'un individu vote pour les Verts est de 4,4 sur 10. En termes de pourcentage, cela représente 44%. Cependant, à la fin de 2015, les Verts n'obtiennent réellement que 7% ou 8% des votes. C'est l'exemple le plus flagrant de l'écart entre le potentiel électoral et la performance électorale effective d'un parti. Il est important de souligner que la large différence entre le potentiel électoral et les votes réels obtenus par les Verts peut être expliquée par deux facteurs. Le premier est que ce graphique prend en compte l'ensemble de l'électorat, y compris ceux qui ne votent pas. Parmi ceux-ci, nombreux sont les jeunes qui ont une préférence pour les Verts. L'attrait des Verts pour les jeunes gonfle donc leur potentiel électoral, mais ne se traduit pas en votes, car les jeunes ont tendance à voter moins souvent. Le second facteur est la concurrence entre les Verts et le Parti Socialiste. Ces deux partis se disputent une grande partie du même électorat potentiel, mais au bout du compte, les électeurs ont tendance à voter plus souvent pour le Parti Socialiste que pour les Verts.
Let's take the example of the Greens: they have an electoral potential of 44%, which means that on average, across the whole sample, the probability of an individual voting for the Greens is 4.4 out of 10. In percentage terms, this represents 44%. However, at the end of 2015, the Greens only really had 7% or 8% of the vote. This is the most glaring example of the gap between a party's electoral potential and its actual electoral performance. It is important to stress that the large difference between the electoral potential and the actual votes obtained by the Greens can be explained by two factors. The first is that this graph takes into account the entire electorate, including those who do not vote. Many of these are young people who have a preference for the Greens. The Greens' appeal to young people therefore boosts their electoral potential, but does not translate into votes, as young people tend to vote less often. The second factor is the competition between the Greens and the Socialist Party. These two parties compete for a large proportion of the same potential electorate, but in the end, voters tend to vote more often for the Socialist Party than for the Greens.


Il y a deux points importants à retenir. Tout d'abord, bien que le potentiel de vote soit nettement supérieur au vote effectif, les deux sont fortement corrélés. En effet, la corrélation entre le potentiel de vote et le vote effectif au niveau individuel est de 0,8 voire 0,9, ce qui montre une relation très étroite. Deuxièmement, bien que le potentiel de vote fluctue légèrement d'une enquête à l'autre, il ne change pas de manière significative. Il y a eu une certaine baisse du potentiel pour les socialistes, mais ils ont réussi à récupérer une partie de celui-ci en 2011. D'après ces mesures, les deux partis de gauche, les Verts et le Parti socialiste, ont le potentiel électoral le plus élevé.  
There are two important points to remember. Firstly, although potential voting is much higher than actual voting, the two are highly correlated. Indeed, the correlation between potential and actual voting at the individual level is 0.8 to 0.9, indicating a very close relationship. Secondly, although voting potential fluctuates slightly from one survey to the next, it does not change significantly. There was some decline in potential for the Socialists, but they managed to recover some of it in 2011. According to these measures, the two left-wing parties, the Greens and the Socialist Party, have the highest electoral potential.  


Le principal point à retenir de ce graphique concerne l'UDC. Comme on peut le voir, leur potentiel électoral est stable et relativement faible, ne dépassant jamais 40%. Cela signifie que le potentiel électoral de l'UDC est à la fois assez stable et parmi les plus faibles de tous les partis ici considérés, y compris les partis plus récents tels que le BBD et les Verts libéraux. Ce que nous pouvons conclure de cette analyse, c'est que la réussite de l'UDC ne peut pas être attribuée à une croissance de son potentiel électoral - en fait, ce potentiel est resté constant et a même légèrement diminué en 2011 par rapport à 2007. L'élément clé à retenir ici est que le potentiel de l'UDC ne s'est pas accru et reste relativement faible. C'est plutôt surprenant lorsqu'on compare cela à la trajectoire électorale ascendante marquée de l'UDC.
The main point to note from this graph concerns the SVP. As can be seen, their electoral potential is stable and relatively low, never exceeding 40%. This means that the SVP's electoral potential is both fairly stable and among the lowest of all the parties considered here, including newer parties such as the BBD and the Liberal Greens. What we can conclude from this analysis is that the SVP's success cannot be attributed to a growth in its electoral potential - in fact, this potential has remained constant and even decreased slightly in 2011 compared to 2007. The key point here is that the SVP's potential has not grown and remains relatively low. This is rather surprising when compared with the SVP's marked upward electoral trajectory.


=== Taux d'Exploitation du Potentiel Électoral ===
=== Electoral Potential Utilisation Rate ===
Ce graphique illustre le taux de concrétisation du potentiel. Autrement dit, c’est le ratio entre la force électorale et le potentiel du parti.
This graph illustrates the rate at which potential is realised. In other words, it is the ratio between the party's electoral strength and its potential.


[[Fichier:Sciarini Exemple 2 Taux de concrétisation exploitation 1.png|vignette|center|400px|*mes calculs = M. Sciarini]]
[[Fichier:Sciarini Exemple 2 Taux de concrétisation exploitation 1.png|vignette|center|400px|*mes calculs = M. Sciarini]]


Ce que nous observons ici est une augmentation significative et constante du taux de concrétisation de l'UDC. En 1995, 1999, 2003, et même en 2011, l'UDC a su améliorer presque systématiquement sa capacité à mobiliser son électorat potentiel. C'est cette capacité qui explique largement le succès de l'UDC. Il ne s'agit pas d'une augmentation de la popularité de l'UDC au sein de l'électorat - le parti demeure à peu près aussi populaire qu'il l'était il y a vingt ans, c'est-à-dire, pas très populaire. Cependant, les électeurs qui envisagent de voter pour l'UDC le font beaucoup plus souvent que pour les autres partis. Le taux de concrétisation des autres partis dépasse à peine les 40%, et même moins de 20% pour les Verts, ce qui contraste fortement avec ce que l'on observe pour l'UDC.  
What we are seeing here is a significant and steady increase in the SVP's success rate. In 1995, 1999, 2003 and even 2011, the SVP almost systematically improved its ability to mobilise its potential electorate. It is this ability that largely explains the SVP's success. This is not a question of an increase in the SVP's popularity among the electorate - the party remains about as popular as it was twenty years ago, which is to say, not very popular. However, voters who consider voting for the SVP do so much more often than for the other parties. The take-up rate for the other parties is just over 40%, and even less than 20% for the Greens, in stark contrast to the SVP.  


En effet, l'ascension de l'UDC au cours des deux dernières décennies peut principalement être attribuée à son habileté grandissante à mobiliser ses électeurs, bien que son électorat potentiel soit resté relativement constant. L'UDC semble avoir réussi à galvaniser ses "amis" pour qu'ils votent pour lui plus régulièrement ou en plus grand nombre, même si le nombre global de ses "amis" n'a pas augmenté. Il est clair que le parti a réussi à mobiliser efficacement son électorat potentiel et à le convertir en votes effectifs. Cela montre aussi l'importance de la mobilisation des électeurs dans la réussite d'un parti politique.
Indeed, the SVP's rise over the last two decades can be attributed primarily to its increasing ability to mobilise voters, although its potential electorate has remained relatively constant. The SVP seems to have succeeded in galvanising its 'friends' to vote for it more regularly or in greater numbers, even if the overall number of its 'friends' has not increased. Clearly, the party has succeeded in effectively mobilising its potential electorate and converting it into actual votes. This also shows the importance of voter mobilisation in the success of a political party.


=== Comparaison de l'Ouverture Électorale ===
=== Comparison of electoral openness ===


Ces dernières années, plusieurs pays en Europe ont connu une montée significative des partis populistes. Ce phénomène est souvent attribué à une variété de facteurs économiques, sociaux et politiques.
In recent years, several countries in Europe have seen a significant rise in populist parties. This phenomenon is often attributed to a variety of economic, social and political factors.


[[Fichier:Sciarini ouverture comparative élections au Parlement européen de 2014.png|400px|vignette|centré]]
[[Fichier:Sciarini ouverture comparative élections au Parlement européen de 2014.png|400px|vignette|centré]]


Ce tableau cherche à montrer les analogies qu’il y a entre les familles de parti. Il y a une tendance générale à travers l'Europe vers une montée du populisme, comme le montrent ces chiffres. Les partis populistes de droite ont gagné en popularité dans de nombreux pays, souvent en mettant l'accent sur des thèmes tels que l'immigration, le nationalisme et l'opposition à l'intégration européenne. Ces chiffres soulignent la montée du populisme à travers l'Europe, où de nombreux partis populistes de droite ont réussi à capter une part importante des votes. Voici un peu plus de contexte sur chacun de ces partis :
This table seeks to show the similarities between the party families. There is a general trend across Europe towards a rise in populism, as these figures show. Right-wing populist parties have grown in popularity in many countries, often focusing on issues such as immigration, nationalism and opposition to European integration. These figures underline the rise of populism across Europe, where many right-wing populist parties have managed to capture a significant share of the vote. Here is a little more background on each of these parties:


* Le Front National (FN) en France, maintenant connu sous le nom de Rassemblement National, est un parti d'extrême droite dirigé par Marine Le Pen. Il a remporté 25% des voix aux élections européennes de 2014. Le parti est surtout connu pour ses positions dures sur l'immigration et le nationalisme.
* The Front National (FN) in France, now known as Rassemblement National, is a far-right party led by Marine Le Pen. It won 25% of the vote in the 2014 European elections. The party is best known for its hardline positions on immigration and nationalism.
* Le Parti de la liberté en Autriche, dirigé par Heinz-Christian Strache à l'époque, a remporté 20% des voix aux élections européennes de 2014. Le parti s'est prononcé contre l'immigration et l'islam et a plaidé pour une Autriche souveraine.
* The Freedom Party in Austria, led by Heinz-Christian Strache at the time, won 20% of the vote in the 2014 European elections. The party spoke out against immigration and Islam and argued for a sovereign Austria.
* Le UKIP au Royaume-Uni a remporté 28% des voix aux élections européennes de 2014. Le parti, principalement connu pour son soutien à la sortie du Royaume-Uni de l'Union européenne (Brexit), a capitalisé sur le mécontentement à l'égard de l'UE et les préoccupations concernant l'immigration.
* UKIP in the UK won 28% of the vote in the 2014 European elections. The party, best known for its support for the UK's exit from the European Union (Brexit), capitalised on dissatisfaction with the EU and concerns about immigration.
* Le mouvement Cinq Étoiles en Italie a remporté 21% des voix aux élections européennes de 2014. Bien qu'il soit plus difficile à classer sur l'échelle politique traditionnelle, le parti s'est opposé à l'establishment politique et a soutenu des initiatives populistes telles que le revenu de base universel.
* Italy's Five Star movement won 21% of the vote in the 2014 European elections. Although harder to classify on the traditional political scale, the party has opposed the political establishment and supported populist initiatives such as universal basic income.
* Le Parti populaire danois a remporté 27% des voix aux élections européennes de 2014. Il a fait campagne sur des questions d'immigration et de souveraineté nationale.
* The Danish People's Party won 27% of the vote in the 2014 European elections. It campaigned on issues of immigration and national sovereignty.
* Le Parti pour la liberté aux Pays-Bas, dirigé par Geert Wilders, a remporté 13% des voix. Le parti est connu pour ses positions anti-islam et anti-immigration.
* The Party for Freedom in the Netherlands, led by Geert Wilders, won 13% of the vote. The party is known for its anti-Islam and anti-immigration stance.
* En Suède, le parti des Démocrates de Suède a remporté près de 10% des voix aux élections européennes de 2014. C'est un parti nationaliste de droite qui s'oppose à l'immigration et prône le conservatisme social.
* In Sweden, the Sweden Democrats won almost 10% of the vote in the 2014 European elections. It is a right-wing nationalist party that opposes immigration and advocates social conservatism.


Ces résultats témoignent de la montée du populisme de droite en Europe, avec des thèmes communs de l'opposition à l'immigration, de scepticisme à l'égard de l'UE et de rejet de l'establishment politique. La montée du populisme de droite et des partis politiques similaires à l'Union Démocratique du Centre (UDC) n'est pas un phénomène limité à la Suisse. Dans de nombreux pays européens, on observe une tendance similaire. Par exemple, en France, le Rassemblement National (anciennement Front National) a gagné en popularité au cours des dernières décennies. Ce parti, qui prône le nationalisme, l'anti-immigration et le scepticisme à l'égard de l'Union européenne, a connu un succès significatif dans les urnes. De même, en Autriche, le Parti de la liberté (FPÖ), qui partage de nombreuses caractéristiques avec l'UDC, a été un acteur majeur de la politique autrichienne au cours des dernières années. Il a fait partie du gouvernement de coalition de 2017 à 2019. Au Royaume-Uni, le UK Independence Party (UKIP) et plus récemment le Brexit Party ont remporté un soutien significatif avec un programme de rejet de l'Union européenne, de contrôle de l'immigration et de protection des intérêts britanniques. Tous ces partis ont réussi à mobiliser un électorat qui se sent délaissé par les partis traditionnels, et qui est préoccupé par des questions telles que l'immigration, la souveraineté nationale et la mondialisation. C'est un phénomène qui a des implications significatives pour la politique européenne et qui est susceptible de continuer à jouer un rôle important dans les années à venir.
These results testify to the rise of right-wing populism in Europe, with common themes of opposition to immigration, scepticism about the EU and rejection of the political establishment. The rise of right-wing populism and political parties similar to the Swiss People's Party (SVP) is not a phenomenon confined to Switzerland. A similar trend can be observed in many European countries. In France, for example, the Rassemblement National (formerly the Front National) has grown in popularity in recent decades. This party, which advocates nationalism, anti-immigration and scepticism towards the European Union, has enjoyed significant success at the ballot box. Similarly, in Austria, the Freedom Party (FPÖ), which shares many characteristics with the SVP, has been a major player in Austrian politics in recent years. It was part of the coalition government from 2017 to 2019. In the UK, the UK Independence Party (UKIP) and more recently the Brexit Party have won significant support with an agenda of rejecting the European Union, controlling immigration and protecting British interests. All these parties have succeeded in mobilising an electorate that feels let down by the traditional parties, and is concerned about issues such as immigration, national sovereignty and globalisation. This is a phenomenon that has significant implications for European politics and is likely to continue to play an important role in the years ahead.


[[Fichier:Sciarini 2015 ouverture comparative élections parlementaires nationale.png|400px|vignette|centré]]
[[Fichier:Sciarini 2015 ouverture comparative élections parlementaires nationale.png|400px|vignette|centré]]


Les résultats électoraux peuvent varier considérablement en fonction du type d'élection. Il y a plusieurs raisons à cela. Premièrement, il y a la question de la participation. En général, la participation aux élections européennes est nettement plus faible que celle aux élections nationales. Cela peut favoriser les partis politiques avec un électorat dévoué et motivé, comme c'est souvent le cas des partis populistes. Deuxièmement, les enjeux des élections peuvent jouer un rôle important. Les élections européennes portent souvent sur des questions de souveraineté nationale et d'intégration européenne, des thèmes qui sont au cœur de l'agenda des partis populistes. Par conséquent, ces partis peuvent avoir plus de succès aux élections européennes qu'aux élections nationales. Troisièmement, il y a le facteur du système électoral. Par exemple, en France, le système électoral pour les élections législatives est un scrutin majoritaire à deux tours, ce qui peut rendre plus difficile pour les partis minoritaires d'obtenir des sièges. Au contraire, les élections européennes sont organisées selon un système de représentation proportionnelle, ce qui favorise une plus grande diversité de partis. Ces facteurs, parmi d'autres, peuvent expliquer pourquoi un parti comme le Front National en France peut obtenir des résultats très différents d'une élection à l'autre..  
Election results can vary considerably depending on the type of election. There are several reasons for this. Firstly, there is the question of turnout. In general, turnout in European elections is much lower than in national elections. This can favour political parties with a dedicated and motivated electorate, as is often the case with populist parties. Secondly, the issues at stake in the elections can play an important role. European elections often focus on issues of national sovereignty and European integration, themes that are central to the agenda of populist parties. As a result, these parties may be more successful in European elections than in national ones. Thirdly, there is the factor of the electoral system. For example, in France, the electoral system for parliamentary elections is a two-round majority system, which can make it more difficult for minority parties to win seats. In contrast, European elections are organised according to a proportional representation system, which encourages a greater diversity of parties. These and other factors may explain why a party like the Front National in France can achieve very different results from one election to the next.  


Les élections européennes sont souvent considérées comme des élections de "deuxième ordre" car elles ont tendance à attirer moins d'attention et à avoir un taux de participation plus faible que les élections nationales majeures, comme les élections législatives ou présidentielles. En raison de cette perception, les électeurs peuvent être plus enclins à utiliser leur vote pour exprimer leur mécontentement à l'égard du gouvernement en place, au lieu de se concentrer sur les enjeux spécifiques de l'élection européenne. Cela peut souvent se traduire par un soutien accru pour les partis d'opposition ou les partis populistes, ce qui pourrait expliquer certaines des performances exceptionnelles du Front National et d'autres partis similaires lors des élections européennes. Cependant, bien qu'elles soient parfois perçues comme moins importantes, les élections européennes peuvent néanmoins avoir un impact significatif, notamment en influençant la composition du Parlement européen et en façonnant les politiques et les décisions à l'échelle de l'UE. Par conséquent, il est crucial de ne pas minimiser leur importance.
European elections are often seen as "second-order" elections because they tend to attract less attention and have a lower turnout than major national elections, such as parliamentary or presidential elections. As a result of this perception, voters may be more inclined to use their vote to express their dissatisfaction with the government of the day, rather than focusing on the specific issues at stake in the European election. This can often result in increased support for opposition or populist parties, which may explain some of the exceptional performances of the Front National and similar parties in European elections. However, although sometimes perceived as less important, European elections can nevertheless have a significant impact, not least in influencing the composition of the European Parliament and shaping policies and decisions at EU level. It is therefore crucial not to downplay their importance.


Les partis populistes ou "mécontents" peuvent bénéficier d'un soutien plus fort lors des élections de deuxième ordre, comme les élections européennes. Les électeurs peuvent être plus enclins à exprimer leur mécontentement envers le gouvernement en place ou à exprimer des points de vue plus radicaux qu'ils ne le feraient dans le cadre d'élections nationales majeures. Cependant, il est également important de noter que le succès de ces partis lors d'élections majeures nationales, avec les exemples du FPE en Autriche, du Cinque Stelle en Italie, et du Parti populaire au Danemark, montre qu'il s'agit d'un phénomène politique significatif qui va au-delà des seules élections de deuxième ordre. Cela peut être indicatif de sentiments plus larges de mécontentement, de frustration ou d'aliénation parmi certains segments de la population, qui peuvent être attirés par les discours et les politiques de ces partis. Il est donc essentiel pour les chercheurs, les décideurs politiques et les observateurs de prendre en compte ces tendances lorsqu'ils analysent le paysage politique actuel.
Populist or 'disaffected' parties may enjoy stronger support in second-order elections, such as the European elections. Voters may be more inclined to express dissatisfaction with the government of the day or to express more radical views than they would in major national elections. However, it is also important to note that the success of these parties in major national elections, with the examples of the FPE in Austria, the Cinque Stelle in Italy, and the People's Party in Denmark, shows that this is a significant political phenomenon that goes beyond second-order elections alone. It may be indicative of wider feelings of discontent, frustration or alienation among certain segments of the population, who may be attracted by the rhetoric and policies of these parties. It is therefore essential for researchers, policy-makers and observers to take these trends into account when analysing the current political landscape.


== Étude de Cas 3 : Influence du Sexe et de l'Âge sur la Participation Politique ==
== Case Study 3: The Influence of Gender and Age on Political Participation ==
L'analyse de la participation électorale est une autre facette de l'étude du comportement électoral. Dans l'ordre des choses, l'acte de participation précède le choix électoral. Par conséquent, il est crucial de comprendre en premier lieu les raisons pour lesquelles les électeurs décident ou non de se rendre aux urnes avant d'examiner leurs préférences de vote. De manière logique, l'objectif initial est de déchiffrer qui participe aux élections, qui s'abstient et pour quelles raisons, avant de s'intéresser aux partis ou candidats pour lesquels ils votent.
The analysis of electoral participation is another facet of the study of electoral behaviour. In the scheme of things, the act of participation precedes the electoral choice. Consequently, it is crucial to first understand the reasons why voters do or do not decide to go to the polls before examining their voting preferences. Logically, the initial objective is to decipher who participates in elections, who abstains and for what reasons, before looking at the parties or candidates they vote for.


=== Analyse comparative ===
=== Comparative analysis ===


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[[Fichier:Sciarini 2015 taux de participation aux élections et votations fédérales 1.png|400px|vignette]]


Ce premier graphique illustre l'évolution du taux de participation aux élections et aux votations fédérales en Suisse de 1919 à 2015. En d'autres termes, il représente le pourcentage de la population éligible qui a voté lors des élections et votations fédérales depuis la fin de la Première Guerre mondiale.
This first graph shows the trend in voter turnout at federal elections and votes in Switzerland from 1919 to 2015. In other words, it represents the percentage of the eligible population that has voted in federal elections and referenda since the end of the First World War.  
 
Le graphique montre une baisse significative de la participation à la fois aux élections (indiquées en rouge) et aux votations (indiquées en noir). Après la Première Guerre mondiale, la participation aux élections était de 80% mais a décliné constamment jusqu'à atteindre un creux de moins de 45% en 1995. Pour les votations, la participation était plus faible et plus variable, mais nous observons une tendance similaire entre les années 1940 et 1970, culminant à une participation moyenne de 40% à la fin des années 1970.
 
Pour les élections, le taux de participation correspond à celui de l'élection de l'année en cours. Par contre, pour les votations, le taux représente la moyenne de la participation sur l'ensemble des votations qui se sont déroulées durant une période de quatre ans. En Suisse, les votations fédérales ont lieu quatre fois par an. Ainsi, pour obtenir le taux de participation sur une période de quatre ans, il faut calculer la moyenne de participation durant cette période. C'est cette méthodologie qui permet de tracer et de comparer ces deux courbes.


On observe une tendance à la baisse de la participation électorale qui a atteint son point le plus bas dans les années 1990 pour les élections, puis une légère remontée depuis 1995, avec une stabilisation lors des trois derniers scrutins. Ainsi, pour l'élection du 18 octobre 2015, le taux de participation était d'environ 43,8%, similaire aux élections de 2011 et 2007 où il était un peu en dessous de 48%. Concernant les votations, le taux de participation se stabilise également autour de 43% lors des trois dernières périodes observées.
The graph shows a significant drop in turnout in both elections (shown in red) and votes (shown in black). After the First World War, turnout in elections was 80%, but declined steadily to a low of less than 45% in 1995. Voter turnout was lower and more variable, but we see a similar trend between the 1940s and 1970s, peaking at an average turnout of 40% in the late 1970s.


La participation électorale est un indicateur essentiel de l'engagement civique et de la santé démocratique d'une société. Une forte participation est généralement interprétée comme un signe de légitimité du gouvernement élu et de confiance dans le système politique. De même, une faible participation peut indiquer un mécontentement à l'égard des options politiques disponibles, une méfiance à l'égard du système politique, ou un manque d'intérêt pour la politique. Dans le contexte suisse, nous avons observé une tendance générale à la baisse de la participation électorale tout au long du XXe siècle, avec un point bas atteint dans les années 1990. Cette tendance peut être attribuée à un certain nombre de facteurs. L'un d'eux peut être le sentiment parmi certains électeurs que leurs voix n'ont pas d'impact significatif sur les résultats des élections. Cela peut être particulièrement le cas dans un système politique consensuel comme celui de la Suisse, où les principaux partis sont souvent amenés à gouverner ensemble dans des coalitions. En outre, les changements sociaux, tels que l'urbanisation et l'augmentation du temps de travail, peuvent également contribuer à la baisse de la participation électorale. Les individus peuvent se sentir déconnectés de leur communauté locale et donc moins enclins à participer au processus électoral. Cependant, depuis 1995, nous avons observé une légère augmentation de la participation électorale, suivie d'une stabilisation lors des trois derniers scrutins. Cela pourrait être interprété comme un signe de regain d'intérêt pour la politique, peut-être stimulé par des questions politiques d'importance nationale ou par des campagnes efficaces pour encourager la participation électorale. Par rapport aux élections, le taux de participation aux votations - où les citoyens sont appelés à se prononcer directement sur des questions spécifiques - a également connu une tendance à la baisse, mais s'est stabilisé autour de 43% lors des trois dernières périodes observées. Cela pourrait indiquer que, bien que la participation électorale ait diminué, l'engagement des citoyens à l'égard de questions politiques spécifiques reste relativement stable.  
For elections, the turnout rate corresponds to that of the current year's election. For referenda, on the other hand, the rate represents the average turnout over all referenda held over a four-year period. In Switzerland, federal referenda are held four times a year. So to obtain the turnout rate over a four-year period, we need to calculate the average turnout over that period. This is the methodology used to plot and compare the two curves.


L’image générale qui se dégage est une forte baisse de la participation et la question que l’on doit se poser est de savoir d’où vient cette forte baisse de la participation.  
We can see a downward trend in voter turnout, which reached its lowest point in the 1990s for elections, then a slight upturn since 1995, with a levelling off in the last three elections. For the election on 18 October 2015, the turnout rate was around 43.8%, similar to the 2011 and 2007 elections when it was just under 48%. Voter turnout has also stabilised at around 43% over the last three periods.


Nous allons nous concentrer sur deux facteurs qui peuvent nous aider à comprendre la participation politique qui sont deux facteurs qui permettent d’expliquer la participation et l’abstention, ce sont deux facteurs assez fondamentaux que sont le sexe et l’âge. Le sexe et l'âge sont deux facteurs déterminants lorsqu'il s'agit d'analyser le comportement électoral et la participation politique. Voici une analyse succincte de ces deux éléments :
Voter turnout is a key indicator of civic engagement and the democratic health of a society. A high turnout is generally interpreted as a sign of legitimacy of the elected government and confidence in the political system. Similarly, low turnout may indicate dissatisfaction with the political options available, distrust of the political system, or a lack of interest in politics. In the Swiss context, we have observed a general downward trend in voter turnout throughout the twentieth century, with a low point reached in the 1990s. This trend can be attributed to a number of factors. One may be the feeling among some voters that their votes do not have a significant impact on the outcome of elections. This may be particularly the case in a consensual political system such as Switzerland's, where the main parties often govern together in coalitions. In addition, social changes, such as urbanisation and longer working hours, can also contribute to a decline in voter turnout. Individuals may feel disconnected from their local community and therefore less inclined to participate in the electoral process. However, since 1995 we have seen a slight increase in voter turnout, followed by a levelling off in the last three elections. This could be interpreted as a sign of renewed interest in politics, perhaps stimulated by political issues of national importance or by effective campaigns to encourage voter turnout. Compared with elections, turnout in referenda - where citizens are asked to vote directly on specific issues - has also been on a downward trend, but has stabilised at around 43% over the last three periods observed. This could indicate that, although voter turnout has declined, citizens' engagement with specific political issues remains relatively stable.  


* Sexe : Historiquement, les différences de participation entre les sexes ont été significatives dans de nombreux pays, bien que cette tendance ait changé au fil du temps. Dans le passé, les hommes étaient généralement plus susceptibles de voter que les femmes, mais cette tendance s'est estompée dans de nombreux contextes, et dans certains pays, les femmes sont maintenant plus susceptibles de voter que les hommes. Cependant, il existe toujours des différences significatives dans le choix du parti ou les préférences politiques entre les hommes et les femmes.
The overall picture that emerges is one of a sharp fall in turnout, and the question that needs to be asked is where this sharp fall in turnout is coming from.
* Âge : La participation électorale varie souvent considérablement selon les groupes d'âge. En règle générale, les jeunes adultes sont moins susceptibles de voter que leurs aînés, bien que cette tendance puisse varier en fonction du contexte politique et de l'importance perçue de l'élection. Les personnes plus âgées ont généralement une plus grande expérience de la politique, une plus grande stabilité résidentielle et sont plus susceptibles d'avoir des liens avec des organisations communautaires ou politiques, ce qui peut les encourager à voter.


Ces deux facteurs peuvent se combiner de différentes façons pour influencer le comportement électoral. Par exemple, les jeunes femmes peuvent avoir des taux de participation différents de ceux des femmes plus âgées, ou des hommes du même âge. Il est important de considérer ces interactions lors de l'analyse de la participation électorale.[[Fichier:Sciarini 2015 taux de participation aux élections fédérales de 1995 à Genève.png|center|400px|vignette]]
We're going to focus on two factors that can help us understand political participation, two factors that help explain turnout and abstention, two fairly fundamental factors that are gender and age. Gender and age are two decisive factors when it comes to analysing electoral behaviour and political participation. Here is a brief analysis of these two factors:
* Gender: Historically, gender differences in turnout have been significant in many countries, although this trend has changed over time. In the past, men were generally more likely to vote than women, but this trend has faded in many contexts, and in some countries women are now more likely to vote than men. However, there are still significant differences in party choice or political preferences between men and women.
* Age: Voter turnout often varies considerably between age groups. As a general rule, younger adults are less likely to vote than their elders, although this may vary depending on the political context and the perceived importance of the election. Older people generally have more experience of politics, greater residential stability and are more likely to have links with community or political organisations, which may encourage them to vote.


Ces chiffres de participation aux élections fédérales spécifiques au canton de Genève sont particulièrement précieux pour une analyse détaillée des comportements électoraux. Le fait que ces données soient réelles, plutôt que basées sur des sondages ou des enquêtes, donne une image plus précise et fiable de la participation électorale. Depuis 1995, le canton de Genève a pris l'initiative de recueillir et d'archiver numériquement les données sur la participation de tous ses citoyens. Cela permet une observation directe de l'évolution de la participation électorale au fil du temps. Il serait intéressant d'examiner ces chiffres en détail pour identifier des tendances ou des changements dans le comportement des électeurs. On peut analyser ces données en fonction de divers facteurs tels que l'âge, le sexe, le lieu de résidence, la profession, le niveau d'éducation, etc. pour avoir une compréhension plus approfondie des facteurs qui influencent la participation électorale. Ces données pourraient également être utiles pour évaluer l'efficacité de diverses initiatives visant à augmenter la participation électorale.
These two factors can combine in different ways to influence voting behaviour. For example, young women may have different turnout rates to older women, or men of the same age. It is important to consider these interactions when analysing electoral participation.[[Fichier:Sciarini 2015 taux de participation aux élections fédérales de 1995 à Genève.png|center|400px|vignette]]


La courbe de participation représentée pour les élections fédérales de 1995 ressemble à un exemple classique, presque parfait, de ce à quoi on s'attendrait. Elle offre une représentation réaliste de la participation électorale dans la population. C'est une illustration vivante de la participation électorale en action, démontrant clairement comment elle varie selon différents groupes d'âge ou d'autres catégories démographiques. L'interprétation de cette courbe peut révéler des tendances importantes en matière de participation électorale. Par exemple, elle pourrait indiquer quels groupes d'âge sont les plus susceptibles de voter, ou quels segments de la population pourraient nécessiter davantage de sensibilisation ou d'éducation à l'importance du vote.  
These turnout figures for federal elections specific to the canton of Geneva are particularly valuable for a detailed analysis of voting behaviour. The fact that these data are real, rather than based on polls or surveys, gives a more accurate and reliable picture of voter turnout. Since 1995, the canton of Geneva has taken the initiative of collecting and digitally archiving data on the turnout of all its citizens. This allows direct observation of changes in voter turnout over time. It would be interesting to examine these figures in detail to identify trends or changes in voter behaviour. The data can be analysed according to various factors such as age, gender, place of residence, occupation, level of education, etc. to gain a more in-depth understanding of the factors influencing voter turnout. These data could also be useful for assessing the effectiveness of various initiatives aimed at increasing voter turnout.


Cette courbe est idéale pour démontrer la tendance de la participation électorale en fonction de l'âge. Au moment où les jeunes atteignent l'âge de 18 ans et acquièrent le droit de vote, on constate un pic de participation plus élevé que dans la tranche d'âge de 20 à 25 ans. Cette augmentation peut s'expliquer par l'enthousiasme de l'exercice d'un nouveau droit. La courbe montre ensuite une forme de "U". Le creux de la participation est situé entre 20 et 29 ans, après quoi la participation augmente presque linéairement avec l'âge jusqu'à atteindre un pic entre 65 et 69 ans. Au-delà de cet âge, la participation commence à diminuer assez considérablement. Cela montre une tendance intéressante selon laquelle les personnes d'âge moyen et les personnes âgées sont plus susceptibles de participer aux élections que les jeunes adultes. Cela peut s'expliquer par plusieurs facteurs, tels que l'augmentation de l'intérêt pour la politique avec l'âge, une plus grande stabilité dans la vie qui donne plus de temps pour la participation civique, ou une conscience accrue de l'importance du vote. À l'inverse, la baisse de la participation chez les personnes très âgées peut être attribuée à des facteurs tels que les problèmes de santé ou la difficulté d'accès aux bureaux de vote.  
The turnout curve shown for the 1995 federal election resembles a classic, almost perfect, example of what one would expect. It provides a realistic representation of voter turnout in the population. It is a vivid illustration of voter turnout in action, clearly demonstrating how it varies according to different age groups or other demographic categories. Interpreting this curve can reveal important trends in voter turnout. For example, it might indicate which age groups are most likely to vote, or which segments of the population might need more awareness-raising or education about the importance of voting.


[[Fichier:Sciarini 2015 taux de participation aux élections fédérales de 2015 à Genève.png|center|400px|vignette]]
This curve is ideal for demonstrating the trend in voter turnout as a function of age. When young people reach the age of 18 and acquire the right to vote, there is a higher peak in turnout than in the 20-25 age group. This increase can be explained by the excitement of exercising a new right. The curve then becomes U-shaped. The low point in participation is between the ages of 20 and 29, after which participation increases almost linearly with age, reaching a peak between the ages of 65 and 69. Beyond this age, participation begins to decline quite considerably. This shows an interesting trend whereby middle-aged and older people are more likely to participate in elections than younger adults. This may be explained by a number of factors, such as an increase in interest in politics with age, greater stability in life giving more time for civic participation, or a heightened awareness of the importance of voting. Conversely, the drop in turnout among the very elderly can be attributed to factors such as health problems or difficulty in accessing polling stations.[[Fichier:Sciarini 2015 taux de participation aux élections fédérales de 2015 à Genève.png|center|400px|vignette]]


Si nous réexaminons les mêmes données pour l'année 2015, nous observons une courbe similaire à celle de 1995, avec le même mouvement général. La chute initiale de la participation est cependant un peu moins prononcée, et le taux de participation ne tombe pas en dessous de celui des plus jeunes comme c'était le cas dans le graphique précédent. Cela est principalement dû à la manière dont les groupes d'âge ont été regroupés dans ce graphique : alors que dans le graphique précédent, nous avions des catégories d'âge allant jusqu'à 90 ans et plus, dans ce graphique, toutes les personnes âgées de 85 ans et plus sont regroupées dans une seule et même catégorie. Cela a pour effet de relever la moyenne du taux de participation, car il est généralement admis que les personnes âgées ont tendance à voter plus régulièrement que les groupes d'âge plus jeunes. Cependant, l'aspect général de la courbe reste le même, montrant une participation initialement élevée parmi les jeunes qui viennent d'acquérir le droit de vote, une baisse parmi les jeunes adultes, puis une augmentation constante avec l'âge jusqu'à un pic dans la vieillesse, avant de redescendre parmi les personnes très âgées.  
If we re-examine the same data for 2015, we see a curve similar to that for 1995, with the same general movement. However, the initial fall in participation is slightly less pronounced, and the participation rate does not fall below that of the youngest age group, as was the case in the previous graph. This is mainly due to the way in which the age groups have been grouped together in this chart: whereas in the previous chart we had age categories up to 90+, in this chart all people aged 85+ are grouped together in a single category. This has the effect of raising the average turnout, as it is generally accepted that older people tend to vote more regularly than younger age groups. However, the overall shape of the curve remains the same, showing an initially high turnout among young people who have just acquired the right to vote, a decline among young adults, then a steady increase with age to a peak in old age, before falling again among the very old.  


Une tendance intéressante se dégage de ces deux graphiques. Auparavant, le pic de participation était atteint entre 65 et 75 ans pour les hommes. Cependant, en 2015, le sommet de la participation a été atteint chez les hommes âgés de 75 à 79 ans et chez les femmes âgées de 70 à 74 ans. Il semble donc qu'il y ait une tendance à voter de plus en plus tard dans la vie, ce qui serait cohérent avec l'augmentation de l'espérance de vie. En vieillissant, les gens restent en meilleure santé et plus actifs, ce qui leur permet de rester engagés et de continuer à voter plus longtemps qu'auparavant. Cela suggère que l'âge a un impact significatif sur le taux de participation aux élections. Cela peut s'expliquer par le fait que les personnes âgées ont souvent plus de temps libre pour s'informer et s'engager dans le processus politique, et qu'elles sont également plus susceptibles de ressentir l'impact des politiques gouvernementales sur leur vie quotidienne. En outre, le vote est parfois perçu comme un devoir civique, un sentiment qui peut se renforcer avec l'âge.  
An interesting trend emerges from these two graphs. Previously, peak participation was reached between the ages of 65 and 75 for men. However, in 2015, peak participation was reached among men aged 75 to 79 and among women aged 70 to 74. So there seems to be a trend towards voting later and later in life, which would be consistent with increasing life expectancy. As people get older, they stay healthier and more active, which enables them to stay involved and continue voting for longer than before. This suggests that age has a significant impact on voter turnout. This may be because older people often have more free time to inform themselves and engage with the political process, and are also more likely to feel the impact of government policies on their daily lives. In addition, voting is sometimes perceived as a civic duty, a feeling that can increase with age.


Les graphiques montrent une tendance claire en ce qui concerne la différence de participation entre les sexes. Que ce soit en 1995 ou en 2015, les jeunes femmes ont tendance à participer plus que les jeunes hommes. Après l'âge de 20 à 24 ans, où les taux de participation des hommes et des femmes sont presque identiques, la différence de participation entre les sexes tend à augmenter avec l'âge. Cet écart est particulièrement prononcé chez les personnes les plus âgées. Par exemple, chez les personnes âgées de 85 à 89 ans, le taux de participation est d'environ 40% chez les femmes, contre plus de 30% chez les hommes. Chez les personnes de 85 ans et plus, l'écart est encore plus grand, avec un taux de participation de 40% chez les femmes contre plus de 55% chez les hommes. Il peut y avoir plusieurs explications à cette différence. Les femmes peuvent être plus susceptibles que les hommes de s'engager dans le processus politique et de voter. Il est également possible que les hommes soient plus susceptibles de s'abstenir de voter en raison de divers facteurs, tels que des perceptions négatives de la politique ou un manque de confiance dans le système politique. Il peut également y avoir des facteurs socioculturels à l'œuvre, avec des attitudes différentes envers le vote et la participation politique entre les sexes.  
The graphs show a clear trend in the difference in participation between the sexes. Whether in 1995 or 2015, young women tend to participate more than young men. After the age of 20 to 24, when participation rates for men and women are almost identical, the difference in participation between the sexes tends to increase with age. This difference is particularly pronounced among older people. For example, among people aged 85 to 89, the participation rate is around 40% for women, compared with over 30% for men. Among people aged 85 and over, the gap is even greater, with a participation rate of 40% among women compared with over 55% among men. There may be several explanations for this difference. Women may be more likely than men to engage in the political process and vote. It is also possible that men are more likely to abstain from voting due to various factors, such as negative perceptions of politics or a lack of confidence in the political system. There may also be socio-cultural factors at work, with different attitudes towards voting and political participation between the sexes.  


Ces graphiques montrent que l'âge et le sexe sont deux facteurs clés dans la participation électorale. Tandis que la différence de participation entre les hommes et les femmes est minime chez les jeunes électeurs, cet écart tend à augmenter avec l'âge. La participation électorale augmente généralement avec l'âge, un schéma qui se reflète chez les hommes et les femmes. Cependant, l'écart de participation entre les sexes s'élargit à mesure que les groupes d'âge augmentent. Cela peut suggérer que les facteurs socioculturels ou les conditions de vie, qui peuvent varier avec l'âge, jouent un rôle dans cette divergence. Il est également intéressant de noter que, bien que les taux de participation augmentent avec l'âge, ce n'est pas toujours le cas. Par exemple, chez les femmes, la participation tend à atteindre son sommet entre 70 et 74 ans, puis à diminuer légèrement. Cette analyse souligne l'importance de prendre en compte les deux facteurs - l'âge et le sexe - lors de l'étude des comportements électoraux. Il ne suffit pas de regarder l'un sans tenir compte de l'autre, car ils interagissent clairement pour influencer le taux de participation électorale.
These graphs show that age and gender are two key factors in electoral participation. While the difference in turnout between men and women is minimal among young voters, this gap tends to increase with age. Voter turnout generally increases with age, a pattern that is mirrored for both men and women. However, the gender gap in turnout widens as age groups increase. This may suggest that socio-cultural factors or living conditions, which can vary with age, play a role in this divergence. It is also interesting to note that, although participation rates increase with age, this is not always the case. For example, among women, participation tends to peak between the ages of 70 and 74 and then decline slightly. This analysis highlights the importance of taking both factors - age and gender - into account when studying voting behaviour. It is not enough to look at one without taking the other into account, as they clearly interact to influence voter turnout.


Nous allons maintenant essayer d’expliquer pourquoi il y a cette différence de participation en fonction de l’âge d’une part et en fonction du sexe d’autre part.
We will now try to explain why there is this difference in turnout as a function of age on the one hand and gender on the other.


=== Influence du Genre sur la Participation Politique ===
=== The Influence of Gender on Political Participation ===
Il y a d’abord des facteurs de type sociostructurel qui ont historiquement expliqué le différentiel de participation entre homme et femme.  
Firstly, there are socio-structural factors that have historically explained the difference in participation between men and women.  


Le premier facteur sociostructurel est la moindre intégration sociale et professionnelle de femmes. Cette théorie suggère qu'une intégration sociale et professionnelle accrue entraîne une plus grande participation politique. L'intégration sociale peut inclure un sentiment d'appartenance à une communauté, la capacité de comprendre et de participer à la vie sociale de cette communauté, et l'engagement dans des activités qui aident à renforcer les liens sociaux au sein de la communauté. L'intégration professionnelle, quant à elle, peut inclure des facteurs tels que l'emploi stable, l'accès à l'éducation et la formation, et la possibilité de progresser professionnellement. Le fait que les femmes étaient historiquement moins intégrées socialement et professionnellement que les hommes (en raison de facteurs tels que l'emploi du temps familial, les attentes sociétales et les inégalités professionnelles) aurait eu un impact sur leur engagement politique. Selon cette perspective, l'intégration sociale et professionnelle des femmes était limitée, ce qui pourrait expliquer en partie pourquoi elles étaient moins susceptibles de participer à la politique. C'est un point de vue qui met en évidence l'importance de l'égalité des genres dans tous les domaines de la vie, y compris dans le monde du travail et la vie sociale, afin de promouvoir une participation politique plus équilibrée.  
The first socio-structural factor is the lesser social and professional integration of women. This theory suggests that greater social and professional integration leads to greater political participation. Social integration can include a sense of belonging to a community, the ability to understand and participate in the social life of that community, and involvement in activities that help to strengthen social ties within the community. Professional integration, for its part, can include factors such as stable employment, access to education and training, and the opportunity to progress professionally. The fact that women have historically been less socially and professionally integrated than men (due to factors such as family time use, societal expectations and professional inequalities) would have had an impact on their political commitment. According to this perspective, women's social and professional integration was limited, which could partly explain why they were less likely to participate in politics. It is a view that highlights the importance of gender equality in all areas of life, including the world of work and social life, in order to promote more balanced political participation.


Il est vrai que les femmes ont une espérance de vie généralement plus longue que celle des hommes, ce qui signifie qu'elles sont plus susceptibles de se retrouver veuves à un certain moment de leur vie. L'isolement social qui peut découler du veuvage peut potentiellement limiter la participation politique. En effet, la perte du conjoint peut entraîner une réduction des interactions sociales et une diminution de l'exposition à diverses opinions politiques, deux facteurs qui peuvent à leur tour réduire l'intérêt et l'engagement envers la politique. De plus, les veuves peuvent également être confrontées à des difficultés économiques, ce qui pourrait les rendre moins susceptibles de participer activement à la vie politique. Ces facteurs socio-structurels pourraient expliquer pourquoi les femmes, et en particulier les femmes âgées, participent moins à la politique.
It is true that women generally have a longer life expectancy than men, which means that they are more likely to find themselves widowed at some point in their lives. The social isolation that can result from widowhood can potentially limit political participation. Indeed, the loss of a spouse can lead to a reduction in social interaction and exposure to a variety of political views, both of which in turn can reduce interest in and commitment to politics. In addition, widows may also face economic hardship, which could make them less likely to participate actively in political life. These socio-structural factors could explain why women, and older women in particular, participate less in politics.


En 2015, dans la catégorie des veufs, il y a 80% de femmes et 20% d’hommes. Dans la population, en général, il y a 51% de femmes et 49% d’hommes alors que dans le veuvage, il y a 80% de femmes et de 20% d’hommes. Cela explique en partie ce décrochage parce que le veuvage est un facteur puissant d’isolement social. Cette disparité, avec un nombre beaucoup plus élevé de femmes veuves que d'hommes, est sans doute due à la différence d'espérance de vie entre les sexes. Les femmes vivent en moyenne plus longtemps que les hommes, ce qui signifie qu'elles sont plus susceptibles de survivre à leur conjoint et de devenir veuves. L'isolement social qui découle souvent du veuvage peut être un obstacle à la participation politique. Les individus qui sont socialement isolés ont moins d'occasions d'interagir avec d'autres personnes et d'être exposés à différentes idées et opinions politiques, ce qui peut réduire leur intérêt pour la politique et leur volonté de participer à des élections. Il est important de souligner que cette situation peut être exacerbée pour les femmes âgées, qui sont déjà confrontées à d'autres formes d'exclusion sociale. Ces obstacles structurels peuvent rendre plus difficile la participation politique active de ces femmes, contribuant à l'écart de participation.
In 2015, 80% of widowers were women and 20% men. In the general population, there are 51% women and 49% men, whereas in the widowhood category, there are 80% women and 20% men. This goes some way to explaining why widowhood is such a powerful factor in social isolation. This disparity, with a much higher number of widowed women than men, is undoubtedly due to the difference in life expectancy between the sexes. On average, women live longer than men, which means they are more likely to outlive their spouse and become widows. The social isolation that often results from widowhood can be an obstacle to political participation. Individuals who are socially isolated have fewer opportunities to interact with other people and to be exposed to different political ideas and opinions, which can reduce their interest in politics and their willingness to take part in elections. It is important to note that this situation can be exacerbated for older women, who already face other forms of social exclusion. These structural barriers can make it more difficult for these women to participate actively in politics, contributing to the participation gap.


Si on est veuf, on a tendance à être plus isolé, on n’a plus de conjoint, on a des enfants qui ont quitté la maison et cet isolement social contribue à un abstentionnisme politique.  le veuvage et l'isolement social qui en découle peuvent avoir un impact significatif sur la participation politique. Comme souligné, ce phénomène affecte plus souvent les femmes, en raison de leur espérance de vie plus longue.
Widowhood and the resulting social isolation can have a significant impact on political participation. As noted, this phenomenon affects women more often, due to their longer life expectancy.


Si on ajuste les données pour équilibrer le nombre de veufs et de veuves, on pourrait probablement observer une réduction de l'écart de participation entre les hommes et les femmes. Cela pourrait indiquer que le veuvage et l'isolement social sont des facteurs importants contribuant à l'écart de participation politique entre les sexes chez les personnes âgées. Autre explication des facteurs de type socioculturels et plus précisément la persistance des modèles traditionnels du rôle des femmes. Cela est presque indépendamment des facteurs sociostructurels qui est le fait qu’il y ait eu pendant très longtemps ce maintien du modèle classique de la vision de la femme dans la société et du rôle de la femme dans la société dans l’espace privé et dans l’espace public qui a eu pour effet de réduire le taux de participation des femmes par rapport aux hommes.
If we adjust the data to balance the number of widowers and widows, we could probably observe a reduction in the participation gap between men and women. This could indicate that widowhood and social isolation are important factors contributing to the gender gap in political participation among older people. Another explanation is socio-cultural factors, and more specifically the persistence of traditional role models for women. This is almost independent of the sociostructural factors, which is the fact that for a very long time the traditional model of the vision of women in society and the role of women in society in both the private and public spheres has been maintained, which has had the effect of reducing the participation rate of women compared with men.


En Suisse, le droit de vote aux femmes a été accordé très tardivement par rapport à d'autres pays. Au niveau fédéral, ce droit n'a été accordé qu'en 1971, bien après la plupart des autres pays occidentaux. Dans certains cantons plus conservateurs, les femmes ont dû attendre encore plus longtemps pour obtenir le droit de vote au niveau cantonal. C'est le cas du canton d'Appenzell Rhodes-Intérieures, qui n'a accordé le droit de vote aux femmes qu'en 1991, suite à une décision de la Cour fédérale. Ce retard dans l'obtention du droit de vote a probablement eu un impact sur la participation politique des femmes, en particulier des femmes plus âgées. Leur intégration dans le processus politique a été retardée, et elles ont eu moins de temps pour s'habituer à l'idée de voter et pour développer les habitudes et les compétences liées à la participation politique. C'est probablement l'une des raisons pour lesquelles la participation des femmes est plus faible que celle des hommes, en particulier chez les personnes âgées.  
In Switzerland, women's right to vote was granted very late compared with other countries. At federal level, this right was not granted until 1971, well after most other Western countries. In some more conservative cantons, women had to wait even longer to obtain the right to vote at cantonal level. This was the case in the canton of Appenzell Innerrhoden, which did not grant women the right to vote until 1991, following a decision by the Federal Court. This delay in obtaining the right to vote probably had an impact on the political participation of women, particularly older women. Their integration into the political process was delayed, and they had less time to get used to the idea of voting and to develop the habits and skills associated with political participation. This is probably one of the reasons why women's participation is lower than men's, particularly among the elderly.  


Le canton d'Appenzell Rhodes-Intérieures a été le dernier canton en Suisse à accorder le droit de vote aux femmes, et cela ne s'est produit qu'en 1991, sous la pression d'un arrêt de la Cour fédérale. Cette dernière a déclaré que le refus d'accorder le droit de vote aux femmes dans le canton était en violation de la Constitution fédérale, qui stipule l'égalité des droits entre les hommes et les femmes. Cette situation est une illustration frappante de la façon dont les normes sociales et politiques peuvent différer considérablement d'une région à l'autre au sein d'un même pays. Il est important de noter que même si les femmes ont obtenu le droit de vote au niveau fédéral en Suisse en 1971, il a fallu encore vingt ans pour que ce droit soit pleinement reconnu dans l'ensemble du pays. C'est un rappel de la manière dont le changement social et politique peut être un processus lent et parfois conflictuel.
The canton of Appenzell Innerrhoden was the last canton in Switzerland to grant women the right to vote, and this did not happen until 1991, under pressure from a Federal Court ruling. The Federal Court ruled that the canton's refusal to grant women the right to vote violated the Federal Constitution, which stipulates equal rights for men and women. This situation is a striking illustration of how social and political norms can differ considerably from one region to another within the same country. It is important to note that although women gained the right to vote at federal level in Switzerland in 1971, it took another twenty years for this right to be fully recognised throughout the country. It's a reminder of how social and political change can be a slow and sometimes divisive process.


Quelles sont les conséquences de cet octroi tardif du droit de vote aux femmes et en quoi est-ce que cela a pu avoir une conséquence sur le taux de participation encore aujourd’hui ?
What were the consequences of this late granting of the right to vote to women, and how did this affect the turnout rate even today?


L'impact de l'acquisition tardive du droit de vote pour les femmes en Suisse, en particulier dans certains cantons, ne doit pas être sous-estimé. L'accession au droit de vote est souvent considérée comme un rite de passage dans la vie adulte, et pour les femmes de certaines générations en Suisse, cette étape n'est venue que tardivement. Les femmes qui n'ont pas obtenu le droit de vote jusqu'à plus tard dans leur vie ont manqué de nombreuses années de socialisation politique qui sont normalement une partie importante de l'âge adulte. Cette socialisation politique peut inclure des choses comme le suivi des élections, la discussion des questions politiques avec des amis et des collègues, et la participation à des organisations ou des groupes politiques. Sans cette socialisation politique, ces femmes ont pu être moins enclines à participer à la vie politique lorsqu'elles ont finalement obtenu le droit de vote. Cela peut aider à expliquer pourquoi, dans les statistiques de participation électorale, nous voyons une participation plus faible chez les femmes âgées en Suisse.  
The impact of the late acquisition of the right to vote for women in Switzerland, particularly in certain cantons, should not be underestimated. Acquiring the right to vote is often seen as a rite of passage into adulthood, and for women of certain generations in Switzerland, this step only came late. Women who did not gain the right to vote until later in life missed out on many years of the political socialisation that is normally an important part of adulthood. This political socialisation can include things like following elections, discussing political issues with friends and colleagues, and participating in political organisations or groups. Without this political socialisation, these women may have been less inclined to participate in politics when they eventually gained the right to vote. This may help to explain why, in electoral participation statistics, we see lower participation among older women in Switzerland.


L'accès tardif au droit de vote a empêché ces femmes d'acquérir de l'expérience et de se familiariser avec les processus politiques au même âge que leurs homologues masculins. Ce retard a sans doute contribué à leur désengagement ou à leur participation moindre à la politique. On peut même imaginer que cet effet institutionnel se conjugue avec l’effet sociostructurel de la grande fréquence des femmes veuves. En effet, l'isolement social résultant du veuvage pourrait se combiner avec le manque d'expérience politique individuelle pour contribuer à un désengagement politique accru parmi les femmes âgées. Si ces femmes s'étaient auparavant fiées à leur mari pour obtenir des informations et des conseils sur la politique, leur participation pourrait diminuer après le décès de leur mari. Cela souligne l'importance de l'autonomie politique et de l'éducation civique pour toutes les personnes, indépendamment de leur sexe. Il est crucial que chacun puisse développer sa propre compréhension des questions politiques et s'engager de manière autonome dans le processus politique.  
Late access to the right to vote prevented these women from acquiring experience and familiarising themselves with political processes at the same age as their male counterparts. This delay has undoubtedly contributed to their disengagement or reduced participation in politics. We can even imagine that this institutional effect is combined with the socio-structural effect of the high incidence of widowhood among women. Indeed, the social isolation resulting from widowhood could combine with a lack of individual political experience to contribute to greater political disengagement among older women. If these women had previously relied on their husbands for information and advice on politics, their participation could decrease after the death of their husbands. This highlights the importance of political empowerment and civic education for all people, regardless of gender. It is crucial that everyone is able to develop their own understanding of political issues and engage autonomously in the political process.  


L'intersection de ces facteurs - le veuvage et l'obtention tardive du droit de vote - peut jouer un rôle important dans le désengagement politique des femmes âgées en Suisse. L'histoire du droit de vote des femmes en Suisse est unique et reflète une évolution sociale et politique plus large qui a conduit à une inclusion politique plus complète. Néanmoins, l'héritage de l'exclusion politique persiste et se manifeste dans les taux de participation des élections. Les femmes âgées en Suisse, qui ont obtenu le droit de vote plus tard dans leur vie, peuvent avoir eu moins d'occasions d'acquérir une expérience politique et d'engagement citoyen, ce qui peut expliquer pourquoi elles se désengagent du processus politique à un rythme plus élevé que les hommes du même âge. De plus, l'impact du veuvage sur l'isolement social et donc sur la participation politique ne doit pas être sous-estimé. Cela renforce la nécessité de politiques publiques et d'interventions ciblées visant à encourager l'engagement politique des populations vulnérables, y compris les femmes âgées.  
The intersection of these factors - widowhood and the late acquisition of the right to vote - may play an important role in the political disengagement of older women in Switzerland. The history of women's suffrage in Switzerland is unique and reflects a broader social and political evolution that has led to fuller political inclusion. Nonetheless, the legacy of political exclusion persists and is evident in election turnout rates. Older women in Switzerland, who gained the right to vote later in life, may have had fewer opportunities to gain political experience and civic engagement, which may explain why they disengage from the political process at a higher rate than men of the same age. Furthermore, the impact of widowhood on social isolation and therefore on political participation should not be underestimated. This reinforces the need for public policies and targeted interventions to encourage political engagement among vulnerable populations, including older women.


La thèse révisionniste sur la participation politique des femmes offre une perspective nouvelle et critique sur les facteurs traditionnels d'analyse. Elle suggère que les explications classiques de la participation des femmes peuvent ne plus être suffisantes pour comprendre les tendances actuelles de la participation politique des femmes. Dans le contexte moderne, plusieurs changements structurels ont été observés qui ont influencé la participation politique des femmes. Les femmes sont devenues plus présentes dans le monde du travail, plus éduquées et plus engagées dans la sphère publique. Ces transformations peuvent conduire à une modification de la relation entre le sexe, l'âge et la participation politique. La thèse révisionniste suggère que la structure de la participation des femmes aux élections a changé et que nous devons examiner d'autres facteurs pour comprendre la participation politique des femmes aujourd'hui. Ces facteurs peuvent comprendre le niveau d'éducation, la participation à la main-d'œuvre, l'indépendance économique, le mariage et la maternité, entre autres.  
The revisionist thesis on women's political participation offers a new and critical perspective on the traditional factors of analysis. It suggests that traditional explanations of women's participation may no longer be sufficient to understand current trends in women's political participation. In the modern context, a number of structural changes have been observed that have influenced women's political participation. Women have become more present in the world of work, better educated and more involved in the public sphere. These transformations may lead to a change in the relationship between gender, age and political participation. The revisionist thesis suggests that the pattern of women's participation in elections has changed and that we need to look at other factors to understand women's political participation today. These factors may include level of education, labour force participation, economic independence, marriage and motherhood, among others.


Au cours des dernières décennies, l'intégration sociale et professionnelle des femmes s'est considérablement accrue, ce qui a eu un impact significatif sur leur participation politique. En premier lieu, l'augmentation de l'éducation des femmes a renforcé leur intégration sociale. Les femmes ont aujourd'hui accès à tous les niveaux d'éducation, y compris l'enseignement supérieur, ce qui leur offre une meilleure connaissance et compréhension des enjeux politiques. Deuxièmement, l'augmentation de la participation des femmes à la main-d'œuvre a également renforcé leur intégration sociale et professionnelle. Aujourd'hui, de plus en plus de femmes travaillent à temps plein et occupent des postes de direction. Cela leur a donné une plus grande autonomie économique, ce qui a renforcé leur capacité à participer à la politique. Troisièmement, les changements dans le rôle des femmes au sein de la famille ont également contribué à leur intégration sociale et professionnelle. Avec l'augmentation du nombre de femmes qui travaillent, le modèle traditionnel de la femme au foyer a été remis en question. De plus, avec l'augmentation des divorces et des familles monoparentales, de plus en plus de femmes assument des rôles de chefs de famille, ce qui peut également augmenter leur participation politique. Tous ces facteurs ont contribué à un "effet de rattrapage" où les femmes ont rattrapé les hommes en termes de participation politique. Cependant, il est important de noter que malgré ces progrès, des disparités persistent. Par exemple, les femmes sont toujours sous-représentées dans les positions de leadership politique et les obstacles structurels à la participation politique des femmes, comme le sexisme et la discrimination, existent toujours.  
Over the last few decades, the social and professional integration of women has increased considerably, which has had a significant impact on their political participation. Firstly, the increase in women's education has strengthened their social integration. Women now have access to all levels of education, including higher education, which gives them a better knowledge and understanding of political issues. Secondly, the increase in women's participation in the workforce has also strengthened their social and professional integration. Today, more and more women work full-time and hold managerial positions. This has given them greater economic autonomy, which in turn has strengthened their ability to participate in politics. Thirdly, changes in women's role within the family have also contributed to their social and professional integration. With more women working, the traditional model of the housewife has been challenged. In addition, with the rise in divorce and single-parent families, more and more women are taking on the role of head of household, which may also increase their political participation. All these factors have contributed to a 'catch-up effect' where women have caught up with men in terms of political participation. However, it is important to note that despite this progress, disparities persist. For example, women are still under-represented in political leadership positions and structural barriers to women's political participation, such as sexism and discrimination, still exist.  


La montée des femmes dans la sphère professionnelle a des implications politiques significatives. Historiquement, les femmes ont été largement exclues de la vie politique et leur taux de participation politique a été plus faible que celui des hommes. Cependant, avec leur intégration croissante dans le monde du travail et leur participation accrue à la vie sociale, les femmes ont acquis une plus grande autonomie économique et sociale. Ceci, à son tour, a stimulé leur engagement et leur participation à la politique. En outre, l'entrée des femmes dans le monde du travail a également changé la dynamique de la vie familiale et domestique, avec une répartition plus égale des responsabilités domestiques entre les hommes et les femmes. Cela a également libéré du temps et de l'énergie pour les femmes, qui peuvent être consacrés à la participation politique. Les femmes sont plus intégrées socialement et professionnellement qu’avant, elles sont donc aussi plus intégrées politiquement qu’elles ne l’étaient avant et elles finissent par rattraper les hommes.
The rise of women in the professional sphere has significant political implications. Historically, women have been largely excluded from political life and their rate of political participation has been lower than that of men. However, with their increasing integration into the world of work and greater participation in social life, women have acquired greater economic and social autonomy. This, in turn, has stimulated their involvement and participation in politics. In addition, women's entry into the world of work has also changed the dynamics of family and domestic life, with a more equal division of domestic responsibilities between men and women. This has also freed up women's time and energy, which can be devoted to political participation. Women are more socially and professionally integrated than they were before, so they are also more politically integrated than they were before, and they are eventually catching up with men.


Selon cette thèse révisionniste, le fossé du genre (« gender gap ») en termes de participation politique aurait disparu. bien que de nombreux pays ont observé une diminution significative de l'écart entre les sexes en termes de participation politique, des différences persistent encore dans certains pays, y compris la Suisse. Dans de nombreux pays développés, y compris les États-Unis, les pays scandinaves, la France et l'Allemagne, l'écart de genre en termes de participation politique a diminué de manière significative au cours des dernières décennies. Cela est en grande partie dû à une combinaison de facteurs, notamment l'évolution des attitudes sociétales, l'amélioration de l'accès à l'éducation pour les femmes, une intégration accrue des femmes dans le monde du travail, ainsi que des efforts politiques délibérés pour augmenter la représentation des femmes en politique. L'écart entre les sexes en termes de participation politique ne se limite pas seulement à voter lors des élections. Il s'étend également à d'autres aspects de la participation politique, tels que le fait de se présenter aux élections, d'occuper des postes de direction politiques, d'être actif dans les partis politiques, et de participer à des mouvements sociaux et à des manifestations.
According to this revisionist thesis, the gender gap in terms of political participation has disappeared. Although many countries have seen a significant reduction in the gender gap in terms of political participation, differences still persist in some countries, including Switzerland. In many developed countries, including the USA, the Scandinavian countries, France and Germany, the gender gap in political participation has narrowed significantly in recent decades. This is largely due to a combination of factors, including changing societal attitudes, improved access to education for women, greater integration of women into the workforce, as well as deliberate political efforts to increase women's representation in politics. The gender gap in political participation is not limited to voting in elections. It also extends to other aspects of political participation, such as standing for election, holding political leadership positions, being active in political parties, and taking part in social movements and demonstrations.


En Suisse, bien qu'il y ait eu une augmentation de la participation des femmes aux élections, il y a encore un écart entre les sexes en termes de représentation politique. Par exemple, les femmes sont sous-représentées dans les postes de leadership politiques, et moins de femmes sont élues aux postes politiques par rapport aux hommes.  
In Switzerland, although there has been an increase in women's participation in elections, there is still a gender gap in terms of political representation. For example, women are under-represented in political leadership positions, and fewer women are elected to political office than men.


Selon les enquêtes, il n'y a plus d'écart de participation entre les hommes et les femmes lors des votations fédérales en Suisse. Cependant, un léger écart persiste lors des élections, avec une participation légèrement inférieure chez les femmes. En Suisse, bien que le processus de rattrapage et de convergence soit en cours, il n'est pas encore totalement achevé. Il est possible que ce processus de rattrapage soit également influencé par le fait que l'impact du facteur institutionnel - l'octroi tardif du droit de vote aux femmes - s'atténue avec le temps. En effet, la proportion de femmes qui ont atteint l'âge adulte sans avoir le droit de vote diminue progressivement.
According to surveys, there is no longer a turnout gap between men and women at federal referenda in Switzerland. However, a slight gap persists at election time, with slightly lower turnout among women. In Switzerland, although the process of catching up and convergence is underway, it is not yet complete. It is possible that this catching-up process is also influenced by the fact that the impact of the institutional factor - the late granting of the right to vote to women - is diminishing over time. Indeed, the proportion of women who have reached adulthood without the right to vote is gradually decreasing.


En Suisse, comme dans de nombreux autres pays, la participation des femmes aux élections a considérablement augmenté au fil du temps. Cela peut être attribué à un certain nombre de facteurs, notamment une plus grande égalité des sexes, une intégration sociale et professionnelle plus forte des femmes et une plus grande sensibilisation et éducation en matière politique. Il est également vrai que l'effet du droit de vote tardif des femmes en Suisse est en train de s'estomper avec le temps, car de plus en plus de femmes ont acquis le droit de vote dès leur majorité. Cela signifie que les femmes qui sont arrivées à l'âge adulte sans le droit de vote sont de moins en moins nombreuses, et que cet effet institutionnel historique a moins d'influence sur les tendances actuelles de la participation électorale. Cependant, il existe toujours un certain écart de participation entre les hommes et les femmes lors des élections en Suisse, bien que cet écart se réduise progressivement. De plus, il est crucial de continuer à travailler pour éliminer les obstacles qui empêchent encore certaines femmes de participer pleinement à la vie politique et sociale.
In Switzerland, as in many other countries, women's participation in elections has increased considerably over time. This can be attributed to a number of factors, including greater gender equality, greater social and professional integration of women and greater political awareness and education. It is also true that the effect of women's late enfranchisement in Switzerland is fading over time, as more and more women acquire the right to vote as soon as they come of age. This means that there are fewer and fewer women who reached adulthood without the right to vote, and that this historical institutional effect has less influence on current trends in electoral participation. However, there is still a certain gap in turnout between men and women at elections in Switzerland, although this gap is gradually narrowing. Moreover, it is crucial to continue working to eliminate the obstacles that still prevent some women from participating fully in political and social life.


Les femmes qui ont été touchées par l'absence de droit de vote lorsqu'elles ont atteint leur majorité sont de plus en plus rares, et par conséquent, l'impact institutionnel va progressivement s'atténuer et finalement disparaître. Il existe encore des disparités, par exemple à Genève, où l'écart de participation entre les hommes et les femmes est presque négligeable. Bien qu'il reste une différence, elle est vraiment très minime. L'existence de ce faible écart de participation entre les hommes et les femmes à Genève suggère que la socialisation politique des femmes s'est considérablement améliorée au fil du temps. Cela peut être attribué à plusieurs facteurs, comme une plus grande intégration sociale et professionnelle des femmes, et une disparition progressive de l'impact institutionnel lié au fait que le droit de vote a été accordé aux femmes plus tardivement qu'aux hommes.
Fewer and fewer women were affected by the lack of voting rights when they came of age, so the institutional impact will gradually diminish and eventually disappear. There are still disparities, for example in Geneva, where the gap in participation between men and women is almost negligible. Although there is still a difference, it is very small indeed. The existence of this small participation gap between men and women in Geneva suggests that women's political socialisation has improved considerably over time. This can be attributed to a number of factors, such as the greater social and professional integration of women, and the gradual disappearance of the institutional impact associated with the fact that women were granted the right to vote later than men.


=== Analyse de l'Effet de l'Âge sur la Participation Politique ===
=== Analysis of the Effect of Age on Political Participation ===
{{Article détaillé|Les bases culturelles du comportement politique{{!}}Effets liés à la relation entre temps, âge et changement social}}
{{Article détaillé|Les bases culturelles du comportement politique{{!}}Effets liés à la relation entre temps, âge et changement social}}



Version actuelle datée du 7 juillet 2023 à 11:48

Intellectual legacy of Émile Durkheim and Pierre Bourdieu in social theoryThe origins of the fall of the Weimar RepublicIntellectual legacy of Max Weber and Vilfredo Pareto in social theoryThe notion of "concept" in social sciencesHistory of the discipline of political science: theories and conceptsMarxism and StructuralismFunctionalism and SystemismInteractionism and ConstructivismThe theories of political anthropologyThe three I's debate: interests, institutions and ideasRational choice theory and the analysis of interests in political scienceAn analytical approach to institutions in political scienceThe study of ideas and ideologies in political scienceTheories of war in political scienceThe War: Concepts and EvolutionsThe reason of StateState, sovereignty, globalization and multi-level governanceTheories of violence in political science‎‎Welfare State and BiopowerAnalysis of democratic regimes and democratisation processesElectoral Systems: Mechanisms, Issues and ConsequencesThe system of government in democraciesMorphology of contestationsAction in Political TheoryIntroduction to Swiss politicsIntroduction to political behaviourPublic Policy Analysis: Definition and cycle of public policyPublic Policy Analysis: agenda setting and formulationPublic Policy Analysis: Implementation and EvaluationIntroduction to the sub-discipline of international relationsIntroduction to Political Theory

The study of political behaviour goes far beyond the observation of overt actions. It also involves examining political attitudes, beliefs, values and opinions. These more subjective and sometimes less visible aspects of political behaviour are just as important as more overt political behaviour, such as voting or taking part in demonstrations.

The term "political behaviour" might seem restrictive, as it evokes observable and concrete actions. However, in the field of political science, this term is generally used to designate a much broader field of study, which includes not only actions, but also thoughts, attitudes, beliefs, opinions and values linked to politics. Indeed, these more abstract elements are crucial to understanding politics and how societies function. For example, an individual's political values, although not always translated into concrete actions, can influence his or her perception of policies, parties and candidates, and guide future political decisions. Similarly, a person's political opinions and beliefs, even if not expressed through actions, can have a significant impact on their political alignment and support for different causes.

Fields of Study in Political Behaviour: An Overview[modifier | modifier le wikicode]

Political behaviour can be broadly classified into two categories: conventional political behaviour and unconventional political behaviour. These two types of behaviour are characterised by different forms of political participation.

Conventional political behaviour[modifier | modifier le wikicode]

Conventional political behaviour, also known as electoral behaviour, focuses primarily on the actions and decisions of voters during elections. There are two main aspects to this field of study: electoral participation and voting choices.

  • Electoral participation: This involves examining who chooses to participate in elections and who chooses to abstain, as well as the reasons for these choices. Factors that can influence voter turnout include age, education, socio-economic status, civic engagement, sense of political efficacy, interest in politics, and many others. Institutional factors, such as the ease of voting and the type of electoral system, may also play a role.
  • Voting choice: This area explores who or what people vote for. This can be influenced by factors such as political ideology, group membership, evaluation of the government or incumbents, specific policy issues, and perceptions of the competence of candidates, among other things.

By combining these two aspects - who votes and how they vote - researchers can get a more complete picture of electoral behaviour. This information can then be used to understand electoral trends, predict election results, and inform efforts to increase voter turnout and civic engagement.

The study of voting behaviour, which is an important facet of political behaviour, focuses primarily on these three fundamental questions: who votes, how they vote and why they vote the way they do.

  • Who votes: This involves examining the characteristics of voters, such as age, gender, level of education, socio-economic class, race or ethnic origin, and other demographic factors. It may also involve examining institutional factors that may influence turnout, such as voter registration laws, the type of ballot, etc.
  • How they vote: This involves looking at who or what people vote for. For example, do they vote for a particular political party, a specific candidate, or based on a specific issue?
  • Why they vote the way they do: This is the stage where researchers try to explain the motivations behind people's voting choices. This can include examining political attitudes and beliefs, party affiliations, perceptions of candidates and issues, economic conditions, and other factors.

Studying these three issues can help to understand not only the results of a specific election, but also broader electoral trends, how democracy works, and how various factors can influence the electoral process. As the name suggests, electoral behaviour refers to elections, so we study behaviour at elections, who votes, for which party and which candidate.

Switzerland is unique in that it has a system of direct democracy, where citizens have the power to vote not only on political representatives, but also on specific public policies, proposed legislation and policy reforms. This adds another dimension to the study of electoral behaviour. Although representative elections (i.e. voting for candidates or political parties) are the most commonly studied type of voting in terms of electoral behaviour, the analysis of direct democracy, such as popular votes in Switzerland, can provide unique and valuable insights. By applying methods for studying voting behaviour to popular votes, researchers can gain valuable insights into how citizens interact with specific and direct political issues, providing a more complete picture of the Swiss political landscape and direct democracy in action.

Unconventional political behaviour[modifier | modifier le wikicode]

The study of unconventional political behaviour focuses on the types of political engagement that take place outside traditional channels such as voting or party activism. Two major examples of this are protest politics and new social movements.

Collective action is a major aspect of unconventional political behaviour. It encompasses any form of activity in which individuals come together to achieve a common goal, often related to defending shared interests or promoting social or political change. Collective action can take many forms, from public demonstrations to strikes and online awareness campaigns. It can involve a formal organisation, such as a trade union or advocacy group, or it can be a more spontaneous mobilisation of citizens around a specific issue or cause. The study of collective action as a component of political behaviour seeks to understand how and why these forms of mobilisation occur. It examines questions such as: What motivates individuals to take part in collective action? How do collective action groups form and how do they function? What factors contribute to the success or failure of collective action?

Protest politics is a specific subset of collective action that focuses on challenging the existing order and promoting change. It represents a form of political engagement that goes beyond the conventional political system and seeks to exert pressure on power structures to bring about change. Protest politics often involves groups mobilising around a specific demand or set of demands. These demands are generally presented to political leaders, such as the government, parliament or other decision-makers, to attract their attention and influence their action.

Protest politics is a very broad concept that encompasses a multitude of forms of collective action. Groups engaged in protest politics often seek to bring about change by using tactics that go beyond traditional avenues of political participation. Here are some of the forms that protest politics can take:

  • Social movements: These are organised groups of people who come together around a common interest or cause. Social movements can have a wide variety of objectives, from human rights to environmental protection, and they can use a variety of tactics to achieve these objectives.
  • Revolts and revolutions: These forms of collective action are often more radical and may involve direct attempts to overthrow a government or political system. They can be violent or non-violent, and can be widely supported by the public or limited to a small group of activists.
  • Civil wars: In some cases, political protest can degenerate into large-scale armed conflict. Civil wars are usually the result of deep and intractable disagreements over political power, national identity, human rights or other key issues.
  • Terrorism: This is an extreme form of political protest that uses violence to create a climate of fear and achieve political objectives. It is important to note that terrorism is generally considered illegal and immoral by the international community.
  • Community activism: This is a form of political mobilisation that focuses on issues specific to a particular community. Community activists often work to solve local problems by organising citizens, influencing public policy and providing direct services. This activism can encompass a wide variety of issues including, but not limited to, housing, education, health and the environment.
  • Grassroots organising: This form of political engagement focuses on mobilising ordinary citizens to participate more actively in political life. This can involve activities such as door-to-door canvassing, telephone campaigns, fundraising and political training. The idea is to strengthen grassroots political participation and encourage more people to become involved in the political process.
  • Creation of alternative media: In a world increasingly dominated by large media companies, the creation of alternative media offers a way for marginalised groups to make their voices heard. This can involve the creation of newspapers, radio stations, TV channels, websites, podcasts or other forms of media that offer different perspectives and information to that provided by the mainstream media. Alternative media can play a crucial role in disseminating information, mobilising support and challenging the dominant discourse.
  • Strikes: A strike is a collective action in which a group of workers stop working to express their discontent and press for change. Strikes can be used to demand pay rises, better working conditions, union recognition, or other work-related demands. They can be particularly effective because they directly disrupt production or service provision, putting economic pressure on employers. Strikes can also be led by students, as we have seen with the recent climate strikes led by young people around the world.

Each of these forms of protest politics has its own dynamics, challenges and potential consequences. Studying these different types of action can help researchers, policy-makers and the public to better understand how social movements and political conflicts develop and how they can be resolved.

The 'new social movements' represent a crucial turning point in the way citizens engage in protest action. These movements differ significantly from traditional social movements, such as trade unions, in terms of their themes, organisational structures and mobilisation techniques. Firstly, in terms of themes and objectives, these new social movements are broader in scope and often focus on societal, cultural and political issues. For example, the environmental movement fights to protect the environment and combat climate change. The LGBTQ+ rights movement, on the other hand, is dedicated to promoting equal rights and social acceptance. Secondly, these movements tend to have less formal and more decentralised organisational structures than traditional social movements. They may have no clearly defined leadership or formal organisational structures. This decentralisation can enable them to adapt more quickly and creatively to changing conditions and challenges. Finally, the mobilisation techniques of these new social movements have been transformed by the advent of social media and other digital technologies. They have the capacity to mobilise supporters on a wider and more effective scale than ever before. Online campaigns, virtual demonstrations and other forms of digital mobilisation are now commonplace tools.

Mobilisation within these new social movements is characterised by its use of unconventional forms of action. These actions go beyond the usual institutional channels, such as voting or collecting signatures for referendums or initiatives. They seek to attract public attention, generate debate and exert pressure for political change.

  • Demonstrations: Demonstrations are a common form of unconventional political action. Citizens gather in public to express their support for or opposition to a particular policy. These events are often highly visible and can attract media attention, helping to raise public awareness and put pressure on politicians.
  • Boycotts: Boycotts are another form of unconventional political action. They involve refusing to buy products or services to protest against the actions of a company or government. Boycotts can effectively exert economic pressure and push for a change in behaviour or policy.
  • Sit-ins: A sit-in is a non-violent form of protest where individuals occupy a space to express their opposition to a certain policy or practice. By refusing to move, participants in sit-ins draw attention to their cause and can disrupt the normal functioning of a place, be it a government office, a restaurant, a university, etc. Sit-ins were a major tool of protest during the civil rights movement in the United States in the 1960s and continue to be used by various social movements today.

These unconventional forms of action play a crucial role in modern democracy. They allow citizens to express themselves and mobilise outside traditional institutional structures, providing additional avenues for influencing the course of politics and social change.

Conventional political behaviour embodies citizen involvement through institutional channels. This includes taking part in elections, signing petitions or collecting signatures to launch initiatives or referendums. These actions are the traditional expression of political involvement. They involve the official mechanisms that the political system has put in place to enable citizens to express their opinions and participate in decision-making. However, not all citizens limit themselves to these forms of political expression. For some, these institutional channels may seem insufficient to express their demands or achieve their political objectives fully. This is where unconventional political behaviour comes in. Unconventional political behaviour occurs when citizens go beyond traditional institutional frameworks to make their voices heard. Demonstrations, strikes, occupations and boycotts all fall into this category. These tactics are often employed when citizens feel the need to highlight unresolved issues, stimulate debate and exert more direct pressure for political change. Both types of behaviour play crucial roles in a democratic society. Conventional actions enable democratic institutions to function smoothly. At the same time, unconventional actions can highlight deeper issues, stimulate discussion and catalyse political change.

Frequently Asked Questions in the Study of Political Behaviour[modifier | modifier le wikicode]

The study of political behaviour, whether in Switzerland or abroad, can focus on several key questions.

  • The effect of age on political participation: Several studies have shown that age has a significant effect on political participation. This effect is not only due to ageing, but also to the individual's life course and membership of a certain generation. The question then arises: how do these factors influence electoral behaviour? What makes some older people vote more or less than others? These are key questions for understanding how age and life course influence political participation.
  • Involvement in social movements: Another crucial question in the study of political behaviour concerns involvement in social movements. Why do some people choose to get involved in these movements, while others do not? Are some individuals more inclined to engage in collective action than others? And if so, what are the individual traits or factors that predispose certain individuals to get involved in collective action and social movements?
  • Individual determinants of voting behaviour: To understand voting patterns and variations from one election to the next, researchers study the individual determinants of voting behaviour. This includes factors such as age, social class, education, gender, religion, ethnic origin and political values. The aim is to identify regularities and patterns in voting behaviour. For example, what personal characteristics make an individual more likely to vote for a conservative party than a progressive one? Understanding these individual determinants can help predict election results and target voter mobilisation efforts.
  • The rise of right-wing populist parties in Europe: Another key issue in the study of political behaviour is the rise of right-wing populist parties in Europe. These parties, such as the Union Démocratique du Centre (UDC) in Switzerland, have gained ground in many countries. What factors explain this rise? Are the causes the same in different countries, or does each country have its own dynamic? Researchers are looking for patterns that could help us to understand this political trend and anticipate its future development.
  • The influence of involvement in associations on the integration of foreigners: Involvement in associations is often seen as a factor that promotes the social and political integration of foreigners. Researchers such as Marco Giugni and Matteo Gianni are attempting to verify this hypothesis by studying the effect of associative involvement on the level and type of integration of foreigners living in Switzerland. They are seeking to determine whether associative integration can constitute an effective model of integration for these populations.
  • The impact of citizenship models on the mobilisation of immigrants: Citizenship models vary greatly from one country to another. Some countries favour jus soli (nationality is determined by place of birth), while others are based on jus sanguinis (nationality is determined by that of the parents). In addition, some countries have more liberal integration policies than others. Can these variations have an impact on the level of political mobilisation of immigrants? This question is the subject of international research aimed at assessing the effect of different models of citizenship on immigrants' political involvement.
  • The influence of electoral campaigns and the media on the formation of opinions prior to an election or vote: This is a dynamic perspective focusing on how voters form their opinions prior to a vote or election. The role of election campaigns and the media in this process is crucial. Some people may have a preconceived opinion and know from the outset who or what they are going to vote for, so that the election campaign has little influence on their final decision. In this case, election campaigns would act mainly as confirmations of existing beliefs. However, in other cases, campaigns can play a considerable role in opinion formation. For example, they can inform voters about issues of which they were previously unaware, they can highlight specific aspects of candidates' personalities, or they can change voters' perceptions of key issues. In this context, the media also play a crucial role. Through their coverage of campaigns, they can influence the public agenda and, consequently, the issues that voters consider important. Moreover, through the way they present candidates and issues, they can also influence voters' perceptions. Overall, the study of the influence of election campaigns and the media on opinion formation is a complex and multidimensional area of political behaviour.

We will leave aside unconventional political behaviour and focus on conventional political behaviour.

Three Dominant Models for Explaining Voting Behaviour[modifier | modifier le wikicode]

There are three main traditional theories in the study of electoral behaviour, which emerged at the beginning of the twentieth century or during its first half. These theories have therefore been around for more than half a century, which justifies their classification as "classic" in the field of explaining voting. That said, over time, more recent models have emerged to explain electoral behaviour. Nevertheless, it is crucial to begin by understanding these classical theories, as they continue to be major references for understanding voting.

The field of political behaviour is relatively recent, its birth being intimately linked to the availability of data. Opinion polls, which appeared between the 1920s and 1940s, enabled a more individualised approach to the study of political behaviour. Prior to this, the study was mainly based on aggregate data, such as the results of elections or votes by canton or municipality. The distribution of results at municipal or cantonal level was therefore examined. The absence of survey data for a long period limited the possibility of studying political behaviour at an individual level, i.e. examining each individual separately. This situation explains why the field of study of political behaviour, as we know it today, emerged relatively late, mainly from the years 1945 and 1950 onwards.

The Socio-structural Model[modifier | modifier le wikicode]

Paul Lazarsfeld.

The first major school of vote explanation is commonly known as the Columbia School. It takes its name from Columbia University, where several researchers, including the famous Paul Lazarsfeld, developed this approach.

The Columbia School is known for its theory of the sociological influence on voting behaviour, which was developed in the 1940s and 1950s. Paul Lazarsfeld and his colleagues looked at the way in which social relationships and membership of social groups can influence an individual's choice of vote. From their perspective, voting is not an isolated decision taken by an independent individual, but is strongly influenced by membership of groups such as family, friends, work colleagues and religious communities. In other words, people are often influenced by the political opinions and voting behaviour of those around them. One of the most famous studies carried out by the Columbia School is 'The People's Choice', which analysed voting behaviour in the 1940 US presidential election. This study found that people were most likely to be influenced by 'opinion leaders' within their respective social groups, and that these leaders played a key role in shaping public opinion.

Paul Lazarsfeld and his colleagues at Columbia School carried out a remarkable and innovative study of electoral behaviour, which focused on a specific county in the state of Ohio. Although his geographical sample was limited, Lazarsfeld's methodological approach was extremely detailed and rigorous. The study used a longitudinal survey method, also known as a panel survey, in which the same people were interviewed repeatedly over a period of time. More specifically, Lazarsfeld carried out six waves of surveys, making it possible to observe how people's opinions and electoral behaviour changed over time.

This approach offered valuable insights into the dynamics of electoral behaviour that could not have been captured by a one-off survey. Indeed, the possibility of following the same individuals over time made it possible to observe changes in opinion and the factors that influence them. In addition, the longitudinal study made it possible to distinguish changes over time (period effects) from differences between individuals (cohort effects) and changes that occur as people age (age effects). Despite the geographical limitations of the study, Lazarsfeld's work laid the foundations for subsequent research into electoral behaviour, and the panel survey method has become a standard technique in the social sciences.

Lazarsfeld's study of the 1940 US presidential election was revolutionary in many ways. He was not so much interested in predicting the outcome of the vote, as is often the case with modern opinion polls, but rather in understanding the motivations that led voters to choose one party over another. From this perspective, Lazarsfeld did not seek to predict the outcome of the election, but rather sought to explain a posteriori why some voters voted for the Republican party and others for the Democratic party. Its main objective was therefore to explore and understand the factors that influence voters' choices. This represented an innovative and more nuanced approach to the study of electoral behaviour. Rather than simply seeking to predict the outcome on the basis of demographic or socio-economic data, Lazarsfeld wanted to understand the underlying, deeper factors that motivate an individual's voting choice. This approach is still widely used today in the field of political science.

To sum up, the results of Lazarsfeld's study gave rise to the socio-structural model, also known as the Columbia model. As its name suggests, this model highlights the considerable influence of socio-structural factors on voting behaviour. One of the fundamental conclusions of the study is that "a person's political thinking is a reflection of his or her social condition. Social characteristics determine political preferences". This model for explaining voting has a profoundly deterministic character, which could be summed up by the idea that "tell me who you are socially, and I'll tell you how you vote". According to this approach, individuals have a very clear idea of their voting choice well before election day. What's more, this choice is considered to be very stable over time, because an individual's social integration remains relatively constant. Thus, the stability of the vote is due to the stability of the individual's social integration.

In the Columbia model, the factors that determine voting are mainly socio-demographic or socio-structural characteristics. These characteristics include socio-economic status, which is reflected in the individual's level of education, income and social class. Religion and place of residence are also considered key factors in determining voting behaviour in this model. Thus, according to the Columbia model, each socio-structural element plays a specific role in voting behaviour.

  • Socio-economic status: Level of education, income and social class all have a significant influence on voting behaviour. For example, people with higher levels of education are generally more likely to participate in elections and to be politically engaged. Similarly, some research suggests that people from higher socio-economic classes are more likely to vote for conservative or right-wing political parties, while people from lower socio-economic classes tend to vote for left-wing or progressive parties.
  • Religion: Religion can also have a significant influence on voting behaviour. Religious beliefs can shape a person's political values and attitudes, which in turn can influence their choice of party or candidate. For example, in the United States, evangelical Christian voters are more likely to vote for the Republican party, while Jewish voters are generally more likely to support the Democratic party.
  • Place of residence: Place of residence can also influence voting behaviour. People living in urban areas tend to have more liberal or progressive political views, while those living in rural areas tend to be more conservative. This can be linked to a variety of factors, including differences in the local economy, education levels and demographic diversity.

In this Columbia model, a person's vote is strongly influenced by the socio-structural characteristics of the group to which they belong. So if we know these characteristics - such as socio-economic status, religion and place of residence - and if these factors are complementary, we can predict a person's voting choice fairly accurately. In other words, voting is highly predetermined, there is a substantial predisposition to vote based on the characteristics of the group to which an individual belongs. This is what we call the pre-structuring of voting. Voting decisions are strongly rooted in the individual's social and economic identity, shaped by the characteristics of the group to which he or she belongs.

This model for explaining voting has a close connection with the literature on social cleavages. The idea here is that if a social divide is very marked and individuals identify strongly with one or other side of that divide, then knowledge of that person's individual characteristics on that specific dimension can provide a significant clue to their voting behaviour. For example, if an individual identifies strongly with a religious divide that pits Catholics against Protestants, knowing this religious affiliation can provide a relatively accurate prediction of how that person will vote.

In Switzerland, religious affiliations have historically played a significant role in defining voting behaviour. In the Catholic cantons, there was a clear dichotomy between those who assiduously practised their religion and those who were more secular. Although most people in these cantons considered themselves to be Catholic, the difference in religious practice often translated into distinct voting choices. The religiously observant tended to support the Christian Democratic Party (PDC), while the secular tended to vote for the Radical Liberal Party. Of course, this was not an absolute rule, but a general trend. In the non-Catholic cantons, the division was different, between Catholics and Protestants. Catholics tended to support the CVP, while Protestants were more inclined to support the Radical Party or the Socialist Party, and more recently the Union Démocratique du Centre (UDC).

The Psychosociological Model[modifier | modifier le wikicode]

The second major school of explanation of voting, also known as the Michigan model, was developed by the University of Michigan, which conducted the first nationwide opinion polls in the United States. The model grew out of an in-depth investigation into the voting behaviour of Americans, which provided new insights into how individuals make their electoral decisions. Unlike Lazarsfeld, who based his research on a single county in Ohio, the University of Michigan broadened its field of study by conducting the first scientific opinion surveys on presidential elections on a national scale. These efforts then led to the creation of the American Election Studies Project, which the University of Michigan still oversees to this day. This project has collected valuable data on electoral trends across the country, providing a much broader view of electoral dynamics in the United States.

The Michigan school considers partisan identification, which is an individual's feeling of being close to or aligned with a certain political party, to be the determining factor in electoral behaviour. This approach differs markedly from the Columbia school, which focuses on socio-demographic factors. According to the Michigan school, it is more important to understand the individual psychosociological orientations of each voter than to focus on the social or demographic group to which they belong. Partisan identification represents a psychological link between the voter and the political party. It can be a strong identification, where the voter feels deeply aligned with a particular party, or a weaker identification, where the voter generally feels in agreement with a party but is open to other options. This identification is influenced by a variety of factors, including the voter's personal beliefs and values, past experiences, social environment and perception of political parties.

Partisan identification, according to the Michigan school, is understood as an affective attachment to a political party. This attachment is not necessarily based on specific policies or ideological positions, but rather on a feeling of belonging and alignment with the image and general values that the party represents. This means that partisan identification can be resilient, even if an individual does not agree with every policy position or candidate of the party. This sense of belonging can be influenced by a variety of factors, including political socialisation (for example, if parents identify strongly with a party, the child may too), membership of specific social or demographic groups aligned with the party, or the individual's personal perceptions and experiences. Moreover, this partisan identification can play a key role in the decision-making process during an election. Voters may use their partisan identification as a 'short cut' to evaluate candidates and issues, relying on their partisan affiliation to guide them in voting. This can also lead to greater stability in voting behaviour, as individuals are likely to vote for the same party across different elections.

According to the Michigan School, partisan identification is strongly influenced by family political socialisation. In other words, parents' political preferences can be passed on to their children, which can lead to early partisan identification that remains relatively stable throughout life. Political socialisation within the family can include political conversations, participation in family elections, or simply exposure to parents' political views. These experiences can lead children to identify with a specific political party and to adopt values and political beliefs similar to those of their parents. However, it is important to note that although party identification is often stable, it is not immutable. Individuals can change their partisan identification in response to major changes in politics or in their personal lives, although these changes are generally less frequent than stability. In addition, factors such as education, work experience and participation in social groups outside the family can also influence partisan identification.

The Michigan model places great emphasis on the stability of political preferences, particularly through partisan identification. This strong and often lasting bond with a specific political party is supposed to influence voting behaviour throughout an individual's life. According to this model, once a person has identified with a political party, this identification tends to influence not only who they vote for, but also how they interpret political information and how they perceive candidates and political issues. For example, a person who identifies strongly with a political party may be more likely to give credence to the positions of that party and its candidates, even when confronted with contradictory information.

In Michigan's model, partisan identification plays a central role in electoral behaviour. It is seen as a "cognitive shortcut" or "heuristic", meaning that it helps voters to simplify the decision-making process in the often complex and information-overloaded political context. In other words, once a person identifies with a party, they don't necessarily need to spend a lot of time analysing every political position, every candidate or every issue on the agenda. Instead, partisan identification provides a simplified framework that guides the individual's political preferences and decisions. Partisan identification can affect not only the choice of vote, but also the way in which individuals perceive and interpret political information. For example, individuals may tend to interpret information in a way that reinforces their existing beliefs and supports their preferred party. This tendency is often referred to as "confirmation bias".

Partisan identification acts as an information filter or shortcut (also known as a "heuristic") that helps individuals navigate through the complex ocean of political information. Due to lack of time, resources, or simply the sheer volume of information to be processed, not all voters can be constantly informed and make a detailed assessment of every political issue. This is where partisan identification comes in. For example, if an individual identifies themselves as a Democrat or Republican, they are likely to adopt the viewpoints and policy positions that are generally associated with that party, even if they do not fully understand the details of each issue. Similarly, an individual may use their partisan identification to evaluate new political information, more readily accepting information that is consistent with their party line and rejecting information that is not. This is not necessarily a bad thing - these shortcuts can be very useful in helping to cope with the complexity of modern politics. However, they can also sometimes lead to errors or biases in judgement, by causing important information to be ignored or by trapping voters in information bubbles that reinforce their existing beliefs.

Although partisan identification is the keystone of Michigan's model, other variables are also taken into account. Michigan's model distinguishes between long-term influences (such as partisan identification) and short-term influences (such as perceptions of candidates and current political issues) on voting behaviour. Partisan identification, which is the key factor in Michigan's model, is considered a long-term influence because it is generally acquired early in life and remains relatively stable over time. As mentioned earlier, it is transmitted from generation to generation through political socialisation, and it guides the electoral behaviour of individuals throughout their lives. On the other hand, perceptions of candidates and current political issues are short-term influences. These factors can change over the course of an election campaign and influence a voter's choice at a given time. For example, a controversy surrounding a candidate or a pressing political issue may cause voting intentions to fluctuate. However, although these short-term factors can influence voting behaviour, the Michigan model maintains that partisan identification remains the strongest influence. Short-term factors can modify a voter's choice, but they generally do so within the framework of his or her partisan identification. For example, a voter may be more likely to change his mind about a candidate or a political issue if he is already weakly attached to his party.

Michigan's model presents partisan identification as the predominant factor influencing voting behaviour, with attitudes on specific issues or candidates serving as secondary factors that may lead to short-term variations. This is not to say that attitudes on specific issues or candidates are not important, but rather that in most cases they are overshadowed by partisan identification. For example, a voter who strongly identifies with a party is likely to continue to vote for that party even if some of its positions on specific issues or candidates do not perfectly match his or her personal preferences. However, if the gap between the voter's preferences and those of his or her party becomes too great, or if a particular issue becomes extremely important to him or her, it is possible that the voter will choose to vote against his or her usual party. This is generally considered to be the exception to the rule of stable party identification. In sum, the Michigan model emphasises continuity and stability in voting behaviour, while recognising that changes may occur as a result of specific events or changes in voters' attitudes to specific issues or candidates.

== The Rational Choice Model

The Rational Choice School, also known as Rational Choice Theory, is closely associated with Anthony Downs, who developed many of its fundamental ideas while working at the University of Rochester. Downs published "An Economic Theory of Democracy" in 1957, in which he presented an economic model of political behaviour. According to him, just like consumers in a market, voters and political parties make rational decisions based on their interests. Voters would vote for the party or candidate that would maximise their benefits (for example, by adopting policies that best matched their preferences), and political parties would position themselves to attract as many voters as possible.

This approach has been widely adopted and developed in political science and economics, and has led to much research into electoral behaviour, political party formation, political decision-making and other aspects of politics. It is a very different model from those proposed by the Columbia and Michigan Schools, as it does not focus on socio-demographic or psychological factors, but on rational decisions based on self-interest.

Anthony Downs' rational choice theory has had a considerable influence not only on political science, but also on other areas of the social sciences. The central idea is that individuals act rationally to maximise their own interests. In other words, they make choices based on what they believe is best for them. In his book "An Economic Theory of Democracy", Downs applied this theory to electoral behaviour, arguing that voters vote for the party or candidate they believe will bring the most benefits. Political parties, in turn, seek to maximise their support by tailoring their policies to appeal to the majority of voters. However, rational choice theory has also been used to analyse a multitude of other political behaviours and institutions. For example, it has been used to study the formation of government coalitions, the functioning of bureaucracies, the creation of rules and regulations, and much more.

In the Rational Choice School model, it is not the voter's profile that determines their vote, but rather their own assessments of the candidates or political parties based on their personal interests. Voters are seen as rational agents who vote to maximise their utility, i.e. they choose the candidate or party they believe is most likely to promote their interests. Thus, rather than focusing on demographic characteristics or psycho-sociological attitudes, the Rational Choice School is interested in how voters evaluate parties and candidates in terms of their own interests. This might involve an assessment of their policies, past performance, likelihood of success, and other factors. The Rational Choice School also introduces the notion of the calculating voter. In this model, the voter is seen as a person who weighs up the pros and cons of each option before making a choice. This means that voting is not necessarily an emotional or irrational decision, but rather the result of a rational calculation of the advantages and disadvantages of each option.

The rational choice model, unlike the Columbia and Michigan models, focuses on individual decision-making rather than on socio-demographic or psychological factors. According to this model, electoral behaviour is not necessarily predetermined, but is rather the result of cost-benefit calculations made by the individual. From this perspective, voters are seen as rational actors who weigh up each option's costs and benefits before deciding. This is known as the "utilitarian" approach to voting. Individuals analyse the different voting options available and choose the one they believe will maximise their utility or satisfaction. This means that voting is not necessarily linked to an individual's social or psychological identity, but is rather the result of a rational decision-making process. In this model, understanding voting behaviour requires an understanding of the cost-benefit calculations that each individual makes. This process can vary considerably from one individual to another, making voting behaviour less predictable than in the Columbia or Michigan models.

The rational choice school postulates that voters carry out a cost-benefit calculation before making a voting decision. Benefits can be seen as the set of advantages that the voter expects from a party or candidate. This may include specific policies that are beneficial to the voter, or values and principles that the voter shares with the party or candidate. Costs, on the other hand, can be seen as anything a voter might lose by voting for a specific party or candidate. This may include policies that are detrimental to the voter, or disagreement with the values or principles of the party or candidate. Costs can also include the time and energy required to find out about parties and candidates, and to go out and vote. The voter, as homopoliticus in this model, is therefore assumed to act rationally, seeking to maximise his utility by minimising the costs and maximising the benefits of his vote. This is an application of the logic of homo economicus, the rational individual in the economic sphere, to the political sphere. It is important to note that this approach assumes that individuals are capable of making precise cost-benefit calculations and taking rational decisions on the basis of these calculations, an assumption that can be challenged.

The rational choice school is based on several key assumptions, including :

  • Voters know their own preferences: According to this postulate, each voter has a clear and precise understanding of his or her own interests and values. To make informed choices, voters are assumed to seek information and evaluate the different policy options available actively.
  • Voters are able to calculate costs and benefits: This postulate assumes that each voter is able to identify and evaluate the costs and benefits associated with each voting option. It also assumes that voters are capable of making rational calculations to determine which option maximises their utility.
  • Voters are autonomous in their decision-making: According to this postulate, voters' voting decisions are primarily influenced by their own rational calculations, rather than by external influences. Voters are not assumed to be significantly influenced by political party propaganda, social or cultural context, family pressures or personal prejudices.

These assumptions represent an ideal of rational electoral behaviour. However, they are often criticised for being unrealistic. In reality, many voters may lack the time, resources or skills to research information and make complex cost-benefit calculations. Furthermore, it is clear that the social, cultural and family environment can have a significant influence on voting behaviour.

Limitations of Traditional Explanatory Voting Models[modifier | modifier le wikicode]

Although these three models have many limitations and imperfections, they form an essential foundation for the study of political behaviour. There is an abundant literature devoted to their criticism, modification and correction. Thus, despite their shortcomings, these models are indispensable in the analysis of electoral behaviour, and constitute the starting point from which we can begin to think more deeply using more recent and more sophisticated models.

What are the shortcomings of these classic models? There are several, and we will concentrate on the main ones.

Weakening of Central Explanatory Factors[modifier | modifier le wikicode]

Empirically, the research carried out in the 1970s, 1980s and 1990s did not really confirm the significant importance of sociological and psychosociological factors in determining electoral behaviour. The hypotheses put forward by the Columbia School and the Michigan School, which postulated that it was possible to explain an individual's vote accurately on the basis of his or her social characteristics and partisan identification, were not supported by these studies. The explanatory power of these models proved limited. Although they may shed some light, their scope remains modest.

These models have not performed as well as expected and have tended to lose effectiveness over the years and decades. The main reason for this decline in performance lies in the historical decline in the explanatory factors central to the models. For example, the importance of social class and religion in determining electoral behaviour, key factors in the Columbia model, has declined over time. Similarly, the importance of partisan identification, which is central to the Michigan model, has also declined. In other words, the fundamental elements of these models have lost relevance over time, reducing their ability to accurately explain electoral behaviour.

The decline in these explanatory factors for voting can be attributed to significant changes in society, such as the transformation of the social structure. Society has evolved from a predominance of the primary sector to a dominance of the secondary and tertiary sectors. This change in the social fabric has had major political consequences. The tertiarisation of the economy has had a profound impact on electoral behaviour. The primary sector has shrunk, as has the secondary sector, and the historical links between, for example, the working class and certain parties, generally on the left, have weakened. In addition, increased geographical mobility has led to a greater social and cultural mix. This diversification has also helped to weaken the traditional links between certain groups and political parties. As a result, the links that were once predictive of electoral behaviour have become less powerful over time, reducing the accuracy of the Columbia and Michigan models. Overall, there was a decline in the loyalties associated with social class and religion, as well as a decline in identification with specific political parties. This development made it more difficult to predict electoral behaviour based solely on these factors, which had an impact on the effectiveness of the Columbia and Michigan models.

The Evolution of Education and its Impact on Voting[modifier | modifier le wikicode]

The second factor that has contributed to the weakening of these major explanatory factors is the development of education. This phenomenon, sometimes referred to as the "education revolution", refers to the considerable increase in the level of education in Western societies. This has led to greater independence of thought and greater autonomy in voting decisions, making voters less captive and less tied to their traditional affiliations.

The expansion of education profoundly transformed Western societies in the second half of the twentieth century. This led to a significant increase in the number of people with access to secondary and higher education. As a result, a larger proportion of the population has acquired skills in critical thinking and independent analysis. This "education revolution" has had a major impact on political and electoral behaviour. In terms of the voting process, it means that voters have become more autonomous in their decision-making. Rather than relying solely on traditional affiliations, such as social class, religion or party identification, they are now more likely to critically examine the proposals of different political parties and make their own decisions. This does not necessarily mean that they will systematically reject the positions of their social class, religious community or preferred political party, but rather that they will not blindly follow them. They are more likely to weigh up the advantages and disadvantages of each option and to vote according to what they feel is in their best interests or in the interests of society as a whole.

The rise in the level of education in Western societies has led to a significant change in electoral behaviour. Thanks to their greater capacity for analysis and criticism, voters have been able to free themselves, in part, from the influence of organisations, social groups or political parties on their voting decisions. This has led to a more independent electorate with autonomous choices. However, this increased independence has also led to greater volatility in voting behaviour. In other words, voters are now more likely to change parties from one election to the next. This contrasts with the more stable voting behaviour observed in the past, when voting was more strongly influenced by factors such as social class, religion or party identification. This increased volatility can be seen as a sign of dynamism within the electorate, reflecting an increased ability to assess and react to political party proposals and changing social, economic and political conditions. However, it can also make election results more unpredictable and government majorities more unstable.

For example, developments in education have contributed to the erosion of the influence of traditional sociological and psychosociological factors on voting behaviour. In their place, more complex and nuanced factors, such as individual political convictions, specific concerns and evaluations of the performance of political parties and their candidates, are playing a greater role. This makes voting behaviour more dynamic and less predictable on the basis of socio-demographic factors alone.

Growing influence of the audiovisual media on voting[modifier | modifier le wikicode]

The third key factor that has profoundly altered electoral behaviour is the rise of the audiovisual media, first with television and more recently with digital media. This development has radically transformed the nature of election campaigns and voting processes. In this new media environment, voters are less under the direct influence of organisations such as political parties. They are now more exposed and receptive to what is broadcast in the media, whether through coverage of political events, political advertising or news and discussions on social networks. This is giving rise to a new dynamic in which the media play a crucial role in shaping public opinion and directing voting. These changes have made voters more autonomous in their decision-making, but also more sensitive to fluctuations in public opinion as reflected and amplified by the media. These transformations make electoral behaviour more complex to anticipate and analyse, as they introduce new variable and dynamic factors that interact in complex ways with traditional factors such as social class, religion or party identification.

In short, political parties now play a less predominant role in political communication, while the media and political campaigns, with their short-term impact, have gained in importance. Traditional models, such as those of the Columbia School and the Michigan School, emphasised the stability of electoral behaviour, linking voting to long-term factors such as social affiliation or partisan identification. However, with societal changes, we see that short-term factors play an increasingly significant role in electoral behaviour. This does not mean that long-term factors have lost all their importance, but rather that their relative impact has diminished compared to short-term influences. As a result, the electorate has become more volatile and voting preferences can change more rapidly in response to specific events or intensive media campaigns.

Simplified Electorate Design in Classical Models[modifier | modifier le wikicode]

Another shortcoming of traditional models to explain voting is their oversimplification of the electorate. Although these models take account of individual differences from a socio-demographic and sometimes psycho-sociological point of view, they consider the electorate to be homogeneous. They do not take into account the idea that individuals can vary greatly in their relationship to politics. This means that they do not take sufficient account of the diversity of political attitudes, levels of interest in politics, levels of political involvement or participation, or patterns of consumption of political information. Individuals can be very politically active, totally indifferent, or anywhere in between. They may also be strongly influenced by certain types of information or sources of information, and less so by others.

There are marked differences between citizens in their relationship to politics, which may be particularly noticeable in terms of their interest in politics and their political competence. There is a wide range of levels of commitment: some citizens are extremely interested in politics, to the point of committing themselves to it and making a career of it, while others are completely disinterested in politics. Similarly, the level of political competence varies considerably. Some citizens have an in-depth knowledge of politics, understand what is at stake, are well-informed and have a good grasp of political issues, while others lack the cognitive skills or motivation to inform themselves, and therefore do not have the knowledge needed to take part in an informed vote. Interest in politics plays a decisive role in the attention paid to politics and influences political participation. Indeed, those who are interested in politics are more likely to participate, while those who are not are more likely to abstain. Motivation and interest in politics therefore condition not only the attention paid to political messages, but also the degree of political participation.

Political skills also play a crucial role in determining people's ability to integrate and understand the messages conveyed in the public arena. Imagine a well-designed information campaign, with clear arguments from both the right and the left, fuelling rich and informative debates. If people do not have the necessary skills to understand, internalise and assimilate this information, these campaigns will not influence their opinion and will not contribute to the formation of their judgement. On the other hand, people with a degree of political competence will be better able to take this information on board. They will be able to weigh up the pros and cons, trying to form an opinion on the basis of the information that is shared in the public arena. This ability to process and understand political information is therefore essential for informed and active political participation.

It is essential to note that interest in politics and political competence, in other words, a motivational factor and a cognitive factor, will condition and play a crucial role in the process of forming people's opinions. It is these two elements - interest and competence - that have become important considerations in the analysis of electoral behaviour. Today, the approach has changed and models of electoral behaviour no longer assume a homogeneous electorate. Instead, we try to take into account the diversity and heterogeneity of the electorate. This is a recognition that each individual has their own unique combination of interest and political competence, which influences their voting behaviour.

Excessive Focus on Individuals in Voting Analysis[modifier | modifier le wikicode]

The final shortcoming of classical models, and one that is particularly apparent in the rational choice school, is the excessive emphasis placed on the individual. The rational choice school is an exemplary example of this focus on the individual, since it postulates that the individual carries out his cost-benefit calculation independently of the context and any external influence. The individual is placed at the centre of this process: he gathers information, evaluates which party will bring him the most benefits and which will cost him the most, and on this basis makes his choice. A typical example of this process would be to determine which party is closest to you on a left-right scale and to vote for that party according to your interests, but always independently of the context. It is a model that considers the individual as an isolated and autonomous actor in the process of deciding how to vote, without taking into account the various environmental and social influences that could also play a role in this decision.

The criticism levelled at these traditional models, and particularly at the rational choice school, is based on an excessive focus on voters and their individual characteristics, to the detriment of insufficient consideration of the context in which these individuals form their political opinions. This means that these models do not take sufficient account of the social, economic, cultural and political environment in which voters live and which significantly influences their attitudes and electoral behaviour.

The criticism in question applies mainly to the rational choice school, but also concerns the Columbia and Michigan schools. For the Columbia school, although individuals are supposed to vote according to the characteristics of the social group to which they belong, the group itself is not really taken into account. Instead, it is reflected solely through the individual characteristics of the voter, for example whether he or she is a blue-collar worker, Catholic, etc. The social position of the voter and the influence of collective institutions, such as trade unions for workers, are not sufficiently taken into account in this model. In other words, these models do not take full account of the role of the social and institutional context in which the voter finds himself, and which can significantly influence his voting behaviour.

Even the Columbia model, which is a sociological model that positions the individual within his or her social group, does not take sufficient account of the importance of the role played by the group itself. What is mainly taken into account are the social characteristics of the individual, rather than those of the group to which he belongs. However, individual opinions do not develop in a political vacuum, but rather in a specific institutional and political context. This specific context has the potential to significantly influence the way in which an individual forms his or her opinions. In other words, the social, cultural and institutional framework in which an individual evolves plays a decisive role in shaping his or her political ideas and behaviour.

The two key elements of the context that can be mentioned are the political offer and the electoral campaign.

Political supply: Political supply and demand, two terms often used in political science to understand electoral behaviour.

  • Political supply refers to the different choices available to voters, including political parties, candidates, political programmes, ideologies and political agendas. This offer can vary considerably from one context to another, thus influencing the way in which individuals make their voting decisions. For example, if the political offer does not represent a wide range of political ideologies or does not offer satisfactory solutions to the problems voters are concerned about, this can lead to electoral disengagement, protest through blank or invalid voting, or a shift in the vote towards less traditional parties.
  • Political demand, on the other hand, refers to voters' preferences, values, expectations and needs. These characteristics are influenced by a variety of factors, including socio-demographics (age, gender, level of education, occupation), psychology (attitudes, values, emotions) and context (economic situation, current political issues, etc.).

In this context, political parties and candidates seek to shape their offer to best meet voter demand. Where there is a match between political supply and demand, we generally see higher levels of electoral commitment. On the other hand, when the political offer is out of step with voter demand, this can lead to dissatisfaction, disengagement or electoral volatility. A thorough understanding of these two concepts is therefore essential for analysing and understanding electoral behaviour.

The electoral campaign: Electoral campaigns have taken on considerable importance in shaping electoral opinion. In addition to socio-demographic and ideological factors, the messages and information disseminated during an election campaign can significantly influence voters' voting decisions. These short-term influences can include a variety of factors, such as :

  • Public debates on key political issues.
  • Media coverage of candidates and political parties.
  • Political advertising campaigns.
  • Candidates' speeches and policy positions.
  • Current events and crises during the campaign.
  • Polls and election forecasts.

All these factors can have an impact on how voters perceive candidates and political parties, and therefore influence their voting decisions. In addition, voting volatility, i.e. the propensity of voters to change their political allegiance from one election to the next, has increased in many countries, suggesting that short-term influences, such as election campaigns, can have a significant impact on voting behaviour.

Both are integral parts of the context in which individuals form their opinions and make their voting decisions. Consequently, it is essential to take them into account when analysing electoral behaviour.

Recent developments in electoral research[modifier | modifier le wikicode]

Researchers have sought to improve the accuracy of traditional electoral models by incorporating new explanatory elements. These elements attempt to take into account the evolution of modern societies and the new dynamics that influence electoral behaviour. These new factors include :

  • Changing social cleavages: In modern societies, social cleavages are no longer limited to distinctions of class or religion. Other cleavages, such as level of education, ethnic origin, gender, age, sexual orientation, place of residence (urban/rural), etc., have gained in importance.
  • The evolution of political issues: The political issues that attract voters' interest have evolved. Issues such as the environment, immigration, nationalism, minority rights, etc., have gained in importance.
  • The influence of the media and new technologies: The impact of traditional and social media on electoral behaviour has become a major area of research. These media can influence voters' opinions, their perception of candidates and parties, and even their electoral participation.
  • The role of emotions in politics: Researchers have begun to take account of the role of emotions in politics. Feelings such as fear, anger, hope, enthusiasm, etc., can influence people's electoral behaviour.
  • The personalisation of politics: The personality and image of candidates have become important factors in voters' choices. Voters may be more inclined to vote for a candidate on the basis of his or her personality or public image than on the basis of his or her policies or party affiliation.

These new approaches do not supplant traditional models, but complement and enrich them. They recognise that electoral behaviour is complex and multifactorial, and that it is influenced by a multitude of factors that evolve over time and in context.

Taking the Context into Account in Voting Analysis[modifier | modifier le wikicode]

The institutional context, in particular the electoral system, plays a crucial role in voting behaviour. The type of electoral system, whether majoritarian, proportional or a mixture of the two, has a significant impact on voters' voting strategies, as well as on the tactics of political parties. In a majoritarian system, where the candidate or party with the most votes wins all the seats in a constituency, voters may have to vote strategically to avoid 'wasting' their vote. They may decide to vote for a candidate or party that is more likely to win, even if it is not their first choice. Similarly, political parties can choose to concentrate on certain constituencies where they believe they have a better chance of winning seats. On the other hand, in a proportional system, where seats are allocated according to the percentage of votes received by each party, voters have more freedom to vote according to their true preferences, because they know that their vote will contribute to winning a seat, even for a small party. Similarly, political parties can afford to field candidates in a variety of constituencies, as each vote counts towards the allocation of seats. Thus, the institutional context is an essential factor to consider when analysing electoral behaviour, as it shapes the incentives and strategies of voters and political parties.

The polarisation of the political system is another contextual element that influences voting behaviour. In a highly polarised system, where political parties propose markedly different policies and take opposing positions on various issues, voters have a wider range of choices. This diversity can stimulate political engagement and make it easier for voters to make decisions, as clear distinctions between parties can make it more obvious who to vote for. Conversely, in a consensual political system where there are few ideological or political differences between parties, voters may find it more difficult to distinguish between parties and decide who to vote for. This lack of differentiation can reduce political engagement and increase voter uncertainty or indecision. Polarisation can also affect the dynamics of election campaigns. In a polarised environment, parties may run more confrontational and issue-based campaigns, which in turn may influence how voters perceive parties and make their choices. In short, the degree of polarisation in a political system can have significant implications for electoral behaviour.

The fragmentation of the party system is another crucial contextual aspect that can influence voting behaviour. Fragmentation refers to the number of significant political parties in a political system. In a highly fragmented party system, where there are many political parties, all of which have a reasonable chance of winning seats or exerting influence, voters have a greater variety of choices. This can lead to a more nuanced representation of voters' political views and preferences. However, it can also make the political landscape more complex and harder for voters to navigate. Conversely, in a less fragmented party system, typically characterised by one or two dominant parties, voter choice is more limited. While this can make electoral choice simpler, it can also lead to less complete political representation or dissatisfaction among voters who feel inadequately represented by the options available. Fragmentation of the party system can also influence the dynamics of the election campaign and party strategy. For example, in a highly fragmented system, parties may be more inclined to form alliances or coalitions and target specific segments of the electorate.

The election campaign and media coverage are two crucial factors influencing voting behaviour. They are particularly relevant in modern models of electoral research. The election campaign itself is a time when parties and candidates present their positions on various issues, try to convince voters of their competence and the relevance of their proposals, and often criticise their opponents. The election campaign is therefore a time of potentially strong influence on voters' opinions, both in terms of their assessment of candidates and parties and their sense of commitment to the political process. The media play an important role in conveying information about the campaign to voters. They are responsible for covering candidate statements, political debates, polls, controversies and campaign incidents. The way in which the media cover the campaign can influence voters' perceptions of the relevance, credibility and attractiveness of different candidates and parties. In addition, the media can also influence voters' perceptions of important campaign issues. For example, if the media focus heavily on certain issues, such as the economy or immigration, voters may perceive these issues as more important than others, which can influence their voting behaviour. Overall, the election campaign and media coverage are two key contextual factors that can have a significant influence on voters' opinion formation and voting behaviour.

Recognition of the heterogeneity of the electorate[modifier | modifier le wikicode]

Modern models of electoral research take account of the heterogeneity of the electorate, which represents a significant departure from traditional models that assumed the relative homogeneity of voters. Today, it is widely recognised that the electorate is diverse and varied, with very different levels of interest and political competence among individuals.

Interest in politics is a key factor that can influence an individual's voting behaviour. Voters with a strong interest in politics are likely to be more engaged in the political process, to follow election campaigns closely, to inform themselves about candidates and parties, and to participate actively in voting. On the other hand, those with little interest in politics may be less engaged and less likely to vote. Political competence is another important factor. Voters with a good knowledge of politics and a clear understanding of the issues are better able to process complex political information and evaluate candidates and parties on the basis of well-informed criteria. Those who are less politically literate may find it more difficult to understand and evaluate political information, which may affect their voting behaviour.

Political psychology is an interdisciplinary field of study that examines how individual psychological processes, as well as personality traits, influence politics at an individual and collective level. In particular, it studies how individuals form their political opinions, how they make political decisions, and how their values, attitudes and personality traits influence their political behaviour. It examines a wide range of topics, from political attitudes and perceptions to the formation of political identities and the effects of emotions on political behaviour. For example, political psychology can study how fears or security concerns can influence attitudes towards immigration policies, or how an individual's core values, such as equality or freedom, can shape their political alignment.

Political psychology is also interested in the influence of cognitive biases on political decision-making. For example, it can examine how biases such as the confirmation effect (the tendency to seek out and interpret information that confirms our existing beliefs) can influence political opinions. By focusing on the underlying psychological mechanisms, political psychology offers a unique perspective on politics and voting behaviour, complementing more traditional approaches in political science that focus on factors such as party affiliations, ideologies or socio-demographic factors.

The idea that issue voting has become more important in recent decades is increasingly accepted in the field of political science. Issue voting refers to voting behaviour based on specific issues or problems ("issues") that voters consider important. Rather than basing their vote solely on overall political ideologies or party affiliations, many voters are now more likely to vote on the basis of particular positions on specific issues, such as the economy, the environment, public health, immigration, and so on. Voters may also base their vote on their perception of the competence of a party or candidate to manage these issues. For example, a voter may decide to vote for a certain party because they perceive it to be the most competent to manage an economic crisis or to implement effective environmental policies. This shift towards more issue-based voting can be attributed to a number of factors. It may be due to increased access to information, which allows voters to be more informed and engaged on specific issues. It may also be linked to the erosion of traditional party loyalties, the increasing individualisation of politics and polarisation around specific issues. Nevertheless, even though issue voting has become more common, political ideologies and party affiliations continue to play a significant role in voting behaviour.

The situation in Switzerland is a good illustration of how the issue vote can play a major role in elections. The Swiss People's Party (SVP), which is known for its tough stance on immigration, has managed to attract a large number of voters who see immigration as a major issue. The UDC has succeeded in building a reputation as a party that actively addresses the issue of immigration, proposing restrictive policies and highlighting the issue in its election campaigns. For many voters, the SVP is seen as the most competent party to deal with the issue of immigration, which partly explains its electoral success. This shows that, in certain contexts, specific issues can become central to the political debate and strongly influence voter behaviour. Parties that are able to position themselves effectively on these issues and convince voters of their competence can therefore enjoy a significant advantage at the ballot box.

Methodological innovations in the study of voting behaviour[modifier | modifier le wikicode]

Multilevel explanatory models, also known as hierarchical models, represent a major methodological advance in the study of electoral behaviour. These models take into account the different scales of influence on the behaviour of individuals, from the local context to the national context, via the individual context. For example, a multilevel model could analyse the effect of individual characteristics such as age, gender, education and ethnicity on voting behaviour, while also taking into account the role of the local and national socio-economic context, the characteristics of the party system and the political offer. In this way, multilevel models can help us understand how influences at different levels interact to shape voting behaviour. These models offer considerable flexibility and allow complex data to be analysed in a more accurate and nuanced way. They have been used to study a range of political phenomena, including voting behaviour, political participation, political attitudes and many others. Thus, the use of hierarchical or explanatory multilevel models represents a significant innovation in voting behaviour research, allowing for a more comprehensive and nuanced understanding of the factors that influence voting.

Statistical models are generally referred to as multilevel or hierarchical models. They are designed to take account of the inherent complexity of social data, which often comprises nested or hierarchical structures.

In the context of electoral behaviour research, these models can be used to examine simultaneously the effect of individual characteristics (such as age, gender, education, political beliefs, etc.) and the effect of context (for example, the electoral system, the political offer, the electoral campaign, etc.) on an individual's vote choice. These models can also be used to study the interactions between individual and contextual factors. For example, they can be used to examine whether the effect of education on the choice of vote varies according to the political context in which an individual finds himself. By simultaneously taking into account individual and contextual factors, as well as their interactions, multilevel models offer a richer and more complete perspective on the formation of electoral choice. They can help reveal complex dynamics that might be missed by analyses that consider individual and contextual factors separately.

For example, the researchers attempt to illustrate that the impact of Catholic identity on electoral behaviour can vary according to the voter's religious environment. In other words, the influence of Catholic identity on voting could be more or less significant depending on whether the individual lives in a predominantly Catholic canton or in a canton with religious diversity. The underlying idea is therefore to integrate both individual factors, such as religious identity, and contextual factors, such as the religious composition of the canton, into the analysis of voting behaviour.

This example is a good illustration of how multilevel models can help reveal complex dynamics in electoral behaviour. In this case, they allow us to see how the impact of religious affiliation on voting choice can vary according to the religious context of the place where the individual lives. This means that the effect of religious affiliation on voting behaviour may be different in a context where most people share the same religion (a Catholic canton, for example) compared with a context where people have different religions (a religiously mixed canton). This may be due to a number of factors. For example, in a predominantly Catholic canton, Catholic individuals may feel more comfortable expressing their religious values in their vote. On the other hand, in a religiously mixed canton, Catholic individuals may be more likely to vote on the basis of other considerations, such as political ideology or economic issues. This is an excellent example of how multilevel models can help us understand the interactions between individual and contextual factors in shaping voting behaviour.

Case Studies: Analysis of Voting Behaviour[modifier | modifier le wikicode]

Case Study 1: Explaining the SVP vote[modifier | modifier le wikicode]

This study analyses the composition of the SVP electorate and how this composition has changed over time.

Source: Oesch et Rennwald 2010

The graph on the left, which shows the proportion of voters by class who voted for the Socialist Party in 2007 (in percentage terms), illustrates the composition of the Socialist Party electorate following the 2007 federal elections. These results are based on an opinion survey carried out after the elections. As mentioned earlier, SELECT surveys, which have been conducted after every federal election since 1995, provide a valuable set of data on voter behaviour at national level in Switzerland.

In 2007, the Socialist Party won around 20% of the vote, which is also its average score. By looking at the different socio-professional categories, we can see the difference between this average score and the proportion of votes obtained in each category. This makes it possible to identify which segments of the population are more likely to vote for the Socialist Party, and which segments are less likely to do so.

Referring to the last line, we can see that one socio-professional category in particular voted massively for the SP: socio-cultural specialists. While the SP's average score was 20%, it reached 34% among this category, an increase of fourteen percentage points. Socio-cultural specialists, sometimes referred to as the "new middle class", include employees working in the health, social, education, culture and media sectors. This is a segment of the upper middle class that has grown significantly in number. We could refer to them somewhat trivially as "bobo", for "bohemian bourgeois". These individuals have relatively substantial resources, but adhere to the redistributive values of the Left. While the rational choice model would predispose them to vote right because of their advantageous socio-economic situation, they tend to support left-wing programmes out of societal solidarity and adherence to other left-wing values such as international openness and solidarity.

All other socio-professional categories appear to be below the average Socialist Party score, including the groups referred to here as "production workers", "service workers" and "office workers". The latter would be what used to be referred to as blue-collar workers. Production workers are typically people working in industry, performing repetitive tasks and having little autonomy in their work. These individuals tend to vote for the Socialist Party less frequently than the average.

The trend observed indicates that production workers, often engaged in industrial roles requiring repetitive tasks and offering little autonomy, have a lower propensity to vote for the Socialist Party. Several factors may explain this phenomenon.

Firstly, the industrial sector has undergone considerable change in recent decades, marked by increasing automation and the relocation of production to low-labour-cost regions. These changes have often led to increased job insecurity and a sense of abandonment among these workers, who may feel less represented by a party traditionally associated with the defence of workers' rights.

Moreover, the nature of the working class has also changed. Today it includes a much wider range of occupations and skill levels than in the past. This diverse group may have more diverse political preferences and may not feel uniformly attracted to the Socialist Party. Secondly, the emergence of social issues such as immigration and national identity has also helped to change the political landscape. In some cases, these issues have eclipsed traditional economic problems on the political agenda, leading some production workers to turn to right-wing or populist parties that promise to solve these problems. Finally, the changing political discourse and priorities of the Socialist Party may also have played a role. As noted above, the Socialist Party appears to have succeeded in attracting a significant proportion of 'socio-cultural specialists', a group that often has higher levels of education and more liberal values. As a result, the Socialist Party may have geared some of its rhetoric and programme to appeal to this group, possibly to the detriment of its traditional appeal to production workers.

In the 2007 elections, the UDC (Union Démocratique du Centre) obtained 28% of the vote, a remarkable result that nevertheless varies greatly according to socio-professional category. In this context, it could be argued that the Columbia model, which focuses on sociological variables such as social class and group membership to explain electoral behaviour, retains some relevance. Indeed, the SVP's score probably reflects the influence of socio-professional factors on voting behaviour. This party has succeeded in appealing to a variety of social groups, reflecting a number of different concerns - from immigration to the economy to national sovereignty. The significant variations in the SVP's electoral support between different socio-professional categories underline the importance of people's social position in shaping their political preferences. That said, the strength of the SVP in 2007 does not mean that the Columbia model provides an exhaustive or definitive explanation of electoral behaviour. Other factors, such as short-term political concerns, perceptions of the issues and candidates, and the effect of the election campaign, may also play an important role. Moreover, individual ideas and values may also interact with social class to influence electoral choices. While the Columbia model can still provide valuable insights into voting for the SVP in 2007, it is necessary to consider a wider range of factors to fully understand voting behaviour.

The SVP's main support in the 2007 elections came from the 'small self-employed', comprising farmers, shopkeepers, craftsmen and other self-employed people who do not run large businesses. Sometimes referred to as the "old middle class", these individuals overwhelmingly supported the SVP. In fact, almost half (44%) of the small self-employed voted for the SVP, a significantly higher percentage than the party's overall score of 28%. It seems that small independents identified with SVP positions on issues such as national sovereignty, immigration, and perhaps also economic autonomy. Their support highlights how an individual's socio-economic position and membership of a specific occupational category can influence their political preferences. However, it is essential to note that these individuals constitute one of the SVP's two major strongholds, suggesting that support for the party is distributed in a diverse and complex way across Swiss society.

The SVP also finds strong support among production and service workers. Despite the SVP's positioning as a right-wing party on the political spectrum, which is not generally associated with defending the interests of workers, it managed to win around 40% of the vote from this category of workers in 2007, exceeding its overall score of 28%. One might ask why such a high proportion of workers chose to vote for the SVP, while some trade unionists might argue that the SVP does not sufficiently protect workers. For example, it could be argued that the SVP does not defend workers against competition from foreign labour, except indirectly by advocating closed-border policies. However, the SVP's success with workers may not be primarily linked to its economic programme. Instead, it seems more plausible that it is its cultural agenda that attracts these voters. The SVP advocates closing borders from a cultural perspective, defending traditions and advocating a certain international closure. This position, which is mainly motivated by cultural, identity and historical considerations rather than economic ones, could explain the SVP's popularity among production and service workers.

From a two-dimensional perspective of political space, we can see that the SVP's success is largely attributable to its position on the tradition-openness axis rather than its position on the economic axis. On this axis, the SVP does not really differ from the Liberal-Radical Party (PLR). This is an illustration of the win-lose divide. From this perspective, the UDC and PLR can be seen as representing the 'winners' in the current economic system, defending liberal and pro-market policies. However, the SVP distinguishes itself on the tradition-openness axis by taking more closed and traditional positions. This means that many voters may be attracted to the SVP not because of its economic positions, which are similar to those of the FDP, but rather because of its positions on cultural and identity issues. This may explain why the SVP has been able to attract a high proportion of votes from groups such as production and service workers, who may feel more threatened by cultural and societal openness.

To sum up, it could be said that those who feel like 'winners' from international openness and globalisation are often the socio-cultural specialists, while the perceived 'losers' are those who fear this openness. The latter fear not only increased economic competition, but also changes in culture and identity. These groups include the small self-employed, as well as production and service workers. At the same time, the SVP scored significantly lower among ethnic and socio-cultural specialists. In a way, this is the opposite effect of what we observe for the Socialist Party. These groups are often more internationally minded and more inclined to embrace cultural diversity, which is reflected in their tendency to vote for more left-wing parties such as the Socialist Party rather than more right-wing parties such as the SVP.

The class divide still plays a crucial role in voting behaviour, but its nature has changed over time. Traditionally, this divide was seen as workers versus employers, reflecting Marx's ideas of the conflict between labour and capital. For a long period in European history, we saw a clear divergence in voting between these two groups, with workers generally leaning towards left-wing parties and employers tending to support right-wing parties. However, this traditional divide has changed over time and the dynamics of class conflict have become more complex. It is no longer just an opposition between labour and capital, but rather a multitude of social, economic and cultural cleavages which interact in complex ways. For example, as we mentioned earlier, groups such as the small self-employed and production and service workers tend to support the right-wing SVP, not necessarily because of their economic positions, but because of their cultural and identity concerns. This shows that, although the class divide remains an important factor, it needs to be analysed in conjunction with other socio-political dimensions to fully understand contemporary electoral behaviour.

In many countries, including Switzerland, we have seen a shift in the way class divisions manifest themselves in electoral behaviour. This phenomenon is often described as a misalignment and realignment of voters in relation to political parties. In concrete terms, we have seen a trend where voters from working-class backgrounds, who were historically aligned with left-wing parties, have begun to move towards populist right-wing parties. This movement has been observed not only in Switzerland, but also in other countries such as France, Austria, the Netherlands and the Scandinavian countries. There are several possible explanations for this phenomenon. Some suggest that these voters are increasingly concerned about issues of cultural identity and national sovereignty, themes often highlighted by right-wing populist parties. Others argue that these voters feel let down by traditional left-wing parties, which tend to focus more on social and economic issues. Whatever the exact reason, it is clear that the political landscape is changing and that the traditional class divide can no longer explain electoral behaviour on its own. Political scientists must therefore take these new dynamics into account when analysing current electoral trends.

In all these countries, it can be observed that a shift took place during the 1980s and 1990s, with a significant proportion of workers who traditionally voted for the left now shifting their vote towards the populist right. It is important to point out that this phenomenon does not concern all workers, but a significant proportion of them. In parallel with this movement, we have seen a strengthening of the socio-cultural specialists, or the new middle class, as a bastion of the left-wing vote. This phenomenon is characterised by individuals with a relatively well-off socio-economic situation, who despite their position, tend to support redistributive ideals and values generally associated with the left, such as international openness and solidarity. This transformation of the electoral landscape is a powerful finding that is as true in Switzerland as it is in other countries. It has a profound impact on politics in these countries, and requires a detailed understanding if current electoral trends are to be properly interpreted.

Source: Oesch et Rennwald 2010

The graph shows how the vote for the UDC (Union Démocratique du Centre) among the working classes evolved between 1995 and 2007. In 1995, between 15% and 20% of service, production and office workers voted SVP. However, over a period of around a decade, we have seen a significant increase in this figure, reaching percentages of 35% to 40% of the working-class vote. It is worth noting that the SVP has seen an increase in support across all segments of the electorate over the last twenty years. However, the most marked increase has been among the working-class electorate. This illustrates the reformulation of the class divide that we discussed earlier, showing a major shift in the voting patterns of these groups over time.

The class divide remains relevant to voting behaviour, but its nature has changed profoundly. It has been restructured by movements of misalignment and realignment between different social classes and political parties. The term 'misalignment' refers, for example, to the phenomenon of workers gradually distancing themselves from the Socialist Party or the left in general, while 'realignment' refers to their growing attraction to parties such as the SVP. This process of shifting party allegiances along class lines has led to a change in the nature of the class divide. Today, we speak of a 'new class divide', which pits the 'winners' of globalisation, such as senior executives and the new middle class, against those who are perceived - or perceive themselves - as the 'losers' of globalisation. The latter include the working classes and the old middle class, made up of small self-employed people such as craftsmen, farmers and shopkeepers.

The table shows how voting for the SVP has evolved among different categories of middle class. It shows three segments of the working classes: office workers (shown in grey), service workers (dotted line) and production workers (black). In all three categories, there was a significant increase in the percentage of people who voted SVP. Although the SVP gained ground in all strata of the population, this is particularly true for the working classes.

This graph is a simple arrangement of voters on a two-dimensional space.

Source: Oesch et Rennwald 2010b: 276

The horizontal axis reflects a socio-economic dimension which can be interpreted as being in favour of 'more state' or 'more market'. This dimension is derived from two main questions asked in opinion polls.

  • The first question concerns social spending: are respondents in favour of an increase or decrease in social spending by the Confederation? This can help determine whether a person is more socially inclined (in favour of more government) or more liberally inclined (in favour of more market).
  • The second question relates to the taxation of high incomes: are respondents for or against an increase in taxation on high incomes? This question measures attitudes towards the redistribution of wealth, which is another way of assessing whether a person is more inclined towards state or market policies.

By combining the answers to these two questions, we can get a rough idea of a person's position on the socio-economic axis. This socio-economic dimension classifies individuals according to their preferences for the redistribution of wealth by the state. If a person is 'in favour of spending' and 'in favour of raising taxes', i.e. supports increased social spending and higher taxation of high incomes, this can be interpreted as left-wing values. These people generally support greater redistribution of wealth by the state, which can mean more public services, more generous social programmes and greater income equality. Conversely, if a person is 'against spending' and 'against raising taxes', i.e. is against increased social spending and higher taxation of high earners, this can be interpreted as right-wing values. These people tend to support less state intervention in the economy, preferring to let the market operate freely. They generally support lower taxes and less redistribution of wealth by the state. This socio-economic dimension is therefore a useful way of understanding where people stand on the political spectrum when it comes to economic issues.

The vertical axis is more related to the cultural or identity dimension of politics, and this helps us to understand where people fall on the political spectrum when it comes to issues of nationality, national identity and immigration. If someone is "in favour of Switzerland joining the European Union" and "in favour of a Switzerland that gives equal opportunities to Swiss and foreigners", we can say that this person is higher up the axis, showing greater openness to foreign influence and participation. These individuals are generally more progressive on issues of identity and immigration, and may be more inclined to support policies of inclusion and diversity. Conversely, if a person is "in favour of a Switzerland that goes it alone" and "in favour of a Switzerland that favours the Swiss over foreigners", they can be said to be further down the axis, showing a more protectionist and nationalist stance. These individuals are generally more conservative on issues of identity and immigration, and may be more inclined to support policies that favour national citizens and limit immigration. These two axes - socio-economic and cultural/identitarian - can combine in different ways to form a wide range of policy positions. For example, someone could be economically conservative (favouring less redistribution) while being culturally progressive (favouring the inclusion of foreigners), or vice versa.

By grouping these sub-groups by profession and political party, we can illustrate where these groups stand on the socio-economic axis (more state or more market) and the cultural/identitarian axis (international openness or national closure). When calculating the average position of each group, it is important to bear in mind that this is an average. This means that it represents a 'central' position around which individual responses vary. This explains why, despite significant differences in political attitudes within each group, the averages may appear relatively close to the centre of the graph. By analysing these averages, we can get a general idea of the dominant political attitudes within each sub-group of voters. However, it is also important to take into account the diversity of opinions within each group. For example, not all managers are economically conservative, and not all socio-cultural specialists are necessarily progressive on issues of identity and immigration.

Using the average position to represent the political orientation of a group gives an overall view, but it can also mask a diversity of opinions within the same group. This may explain why, despite differences in individual opinions, these averages can sometimes lie close to the centre of the graph. For example, if we look at socio-cultural specialists who vote for the Socialist Party (SP) or the Union démocratique du centre (UDC), we can see that, despite their common professional affiliation, their average positions on these socio-economic and cultural/identity axes differ depending on which party they vote for. As for managers, some may be on the right, others on the left, and some may be more or less open or closed on the cultural/identity axis. Taking into account the average of their positions places them near the centre of the graph, reflecting a diversity of political opinions within this group. This kind of analysis highlights not only the political divergences between different occupational classes, but also the divergences within those classes. This is an important reminder that, although certain general trends can be observed, political attitudes are diverse and varied.

The Socialist Party (SP) appears to have a more ideologically diverse electoral base than the Swiss People's Party (SVP). This may suggest that the SP brings together a wider range of views on the economic scale (from redistribution to market preference) and on the scale of openness versus tradition. In contrast, the SVP seems to bring together voters with more similar values, mainly focused on defending traditions and a slight inclination towards right-wing economic policies. This may indicate that the SVP has a more homogeneous voter base that shares a common set of values. The difference between production workers who voted SVP and those who voted SP is also very interesting. It clearly demonstrates how differences in perception and values can divide the same socio-professional group. It also shows that political preferences are not necessarily determined by occupational class alone, but can also be influenced by other factors, such as personal beliefs, cultural identity and worldview.

There is a common dilemma facing many political parties, particularly those on the traditional left such as the Socialist Party in Switzerland. These parties have historically supported working people and promoted economic redistribution and social equity. However, as economies and societies have evolved, they have also gained the support of more educated and liberal socio-cultural groups, who have different political preferences, particularly on the issues of immigration and international openness. This is therefore a delicate situation for the SP, as it has to strike a balance between these two groups of voters. If it turns too much towards one or the other, it risks losing the support of the other group. This is an important issue for the SP and other left-wing parties around the world, as they navigate this complex political environment. This dilemma is also linked to wider trends in many Western countries, where political preferences are less and less defined by economic class and more and more influenced by cultural and identity issues, such as openness to immigration and globalisation. This has led to a political realignment in which some workers have turned to populist right-wing parties, while more educated groups have supported left-wing parties.

This tension between different factions of the electorate is a major challenge for the Socialist Party and other traditional left-wing parties around the world. If they take more liberal positions on issues such as immigration and European integration, they risk losing the support of workers and other groups who are more sceptical about these issues. On the other hand, if they adopt a tougher stance on these issues, they risk alienating the more educated and liberal voters who support these policies. The challenge for these parties is therefore to strike a balance between these different preferences. This may involve developing a message that appeals to both workers and more liberal voters, or finding ways to address the concerns of these groups on specific issues without alienating the other group. It's a difficult task, and there are no easy solutions. This dilemma is partly the result of wider changes in politics and society. Whereas economic class was once the main determinant of electoral behaviour, cultural and identity issues now play a much greater role. These trends, combined with globalisation and other economic changes, have made the political landscape more complex and created new challenges for traditional parties.

The UDC (Union Démocratique du Centre) has succeeded in building a relatively homogeneous voter base around themes such as sovereignty, immigration and tradition. This is not an easy task, as parties can find themselves caught between different factions of their electoral base who have divergent views on these issues. The SVP has managed to maintain a relatively coherent voter base by focusing on issues that transcend traditional class divisions. For example, the issues of sovereignty, immigration and tradition are likely to be important to many voters, whether working or middle class. This suggests that the Swiss People's Party (SVP) has been able to attract a diverse voter base by focusing on issues that cut across traditional class or occupational lines. It is an important reminder that political affiliations are not only defined by economic issues, but can also be shaped by questions of national identity, sovereignty and migration policy. These issues can be particularly important in the context of globalisation and demographic change. In Switzerland, the SVP has been able to exploit these concerns to win the support of various groups of voters. Its insistence on independence, sovereignty, neutrality and a stricter migration policy seems to have struck a chord with many working and middle-class voters.

As we can see, on the horizontal dimension, the Socialist Party doesn't have too many problems because the whole of its electorate is relatively homogeneous on this dimension, they are all aligned on -1 and -1.5 being all grouped almost on a vertical which means that on the questions of redistribution, the Socialist Party electorate is homogeneous. Workers because they are in favour of a redistributive policy that serves their interests, and socio-cultural specialists because they are prepared to make an effort to show solidarity with the less privileged classes.

This highlights an important trend: within the Swiss Socialist Party (SP), there is strong cohesion on economic issues, particularly on redistribution. Working-class people are generally in favour of greater redistribution, because they can benefit directly from it. On the other hand, socio-cultural specialists, although generally better off, are also in favour of greater redistribution. This may be due to a variety of factors, including greater sensitivity to issues of social equity, a commitment to solidarity and a willingness to invest in quality public services. However, the SP faces a greater challenge on the axis of openness and closure, where there is a greater divergence of views between different segments of its electorate. This divergence could pose challenges for the SP in terms of maintaining the cohesion of the party base and formulating a clear and unified political message. Although this graph shows some cohesion within the SP on redistribution issues, this does not necessarily mean that all SP voters agree on the details of how redistribution should be implemented. For example, there may be differences of opinion on issues such as the appropriate level of taxation, the best way to deliver social services or the role of government in the economy.

Despite changes in social structure and economic transformation, social class remains an important factor in understanding electoral behaviour. However, the nature of this class divide has changed. In the past, the class divide could be described quite simply in terms of workers versus owners, or manual workers versus the middle and upper classes. However, economic and social transformations have made the class divide much more complex. For example, divisions can now be observed between workers in different industries, between the employed and the self-employed, and between those who benefit from globalisation and those who feel threatened by it. At the same time, it is important to note that the class divide cannot explain all aspects of electoral behaviour. Other factors, such as cultural values, attitudes towards immigration or the European Union, or views on gender and diversity issues, can also play an important role. In addition, electoral behaviour can be influenced by more contingent factors, such as the political issues of the day, the popularity of party leaders or political scandals.

The political landscape has changed significantly in recent years, with the emergence of "socio-cultural specialists" as a key support group for the left. This is partly due to the values and concerns specific to this group. Socio-cultural specialists, who include professions such as teachers, social workers, health professionals, journalists and artists, are generally well educated and attach great importance to values such as equality, diversity, social justice and environmental sustainability. As a result, they are often in tune with the priorities and values of the left. At the same time, this group may also feel threatened by some of the current economic trends, such as the casualisation of work, wage stagnation, rising living costs, particularly housing, and growing inequality. These concerns may also make them more receptive to messages from the left on issues such as social protection, wealth redistribution and market regulation.

The strengthening of the divide between the supposed winners and losers of globalisation has led to a significant transformation of the political landscape. The working classes and former middle classes, such as small entrepreneurs, craftsmen, shopkeepers and farmers, who may feel threatened or left behind by globalisation and economic change, have turned to parties like the SVP in Switzerland. These parties tend to advocate a more 'national' stance, defending traditions and a certain form of authoritarianism. This is a trend that can be observed not only in Switzerland, but also in other countries, where populist right-wing parties have succeeded in capturing a section of the electorate that feels threatened by economic and social change. These parties tend to focus on issues such as immigration, national sovereignty and the rejection of certain forms of international cooperation. That said, it is important to note that not all members of these groups necessarily share these views. As with any social category, there is a diversity of opinions and priorities within the working classes and the former middle class. At the same time, the 'open-tradition' dimension of the political divide has become increasingly important, reflecting differences of opinion not only on economic issues, but also on questions of cultural and social values. This has added another layer of complexity to contemporary politics.

Case Study 2: Analysing the success of the SVP[modifier | modifier le wikicode]

Issue voting is an approach to the analysis of electoral behaviour that focuses on how voters react to specific issues or questions, rather than on their membership of particular socio-economic groups. In the case of voting for the SVP or similar parties, issues may include questions such as immigration, national sovereignty, security, the defence of traditions, or opposition to European integration. These issues may have particular resonance with voters who feel threatened or left behind by economic and social change, regardless of their specific socio-economic position. This approach recognises that voters are able to make their own assessments of political issues and vote accordingly. It also suggests that voting behaviour can be influenced by political campaigns and media messages that emphasise certain issues over others.

Issue voting is based on the idea that voters make choices based on specific issues that are important to them, rather than on long-term loyalty to a particular political party or membership of a particular social class. The issues can vary significantly from one election to the next and can also vary according to the local, national or international context. They may include economic issues, such as taxation or public spending, social issues, such as immigration or minority rights, or environmental issues, such as climate change.

This approach seeks to understand which issues are most important to voters, how they position themselves in relation to these issues, and how these positions influence their vote. For example, a voter who considers immigration to be the most important issue facing his or her country is more likely to vote for a party that promises to restrict immigration. Researchers using this approach can use opinion surveys to gather information about voters' attitudes to various issues. They can then use this information to build models that predict electoral behaviour based on voters' positions on these issues. It is an approach that recognises that voting behaviour is dynamic and can change in response to current issues. It also recognises that voters are not simply passive recipients of political messages, but are capable of making their own assessments of the issues and taking decisions based on those assessments.

Voters can be influenced by immediate and current issues or problems that affect society. These issues can be very diverse and include economic issues (such as unemployment or inflation), social issues (such as minority rights or gender equality), political issues (such as corruption or government transparency), or environmental issues (such as climate change or pollution). It is important to note that the issues that are relevant in a specific election can vary considerably depending on the local, national and international context. For example, climate change may be a major issue in a country that is heavily affected by the effects of climate change, but not in another country where the problem is less urgent or visible. In addition, the issues may also vary according to the specific electorate. For example, young voters may be more concerned about education and employment issues, while older voters may be more concerned about retirement and healthcare issues. Thus, issue voting implies a more dynamic and flexible approach to politics, which recognises that voters' attitudes and concerns may change in response to changing conditions in society and the world.

Election campaigns are often crucial moments for highlighting particular issues. Political parties and candidates often try to shape the public debate by focusing on specific issues that they believe are strengths for them or weaknesses for their opponents. By focusing on certain issues, they can succeed in changing the public discourse and directing voters' attention to those issues. This strategy can be particularly effective if voters perceive that the party or candidate has a strong, credible and attractive position on the issue in question. This is why political agenda-setting and strategic communication are essential elements of any successful election campaign. However, it should be noted that voters are not simply passive recipients of these messages. They actively evaluate and interpret this information in the light of their own values, experiences and priorities, which can also influence their voting behaviour.

Issue voting highlights a dynamic aspect of voting behaviour. Rather than focusing solely on traditional party affiliations or class identities, this approach seeks to understand how voters react to specific issues and current political challenges. People's political preferences can change depending on the importance they attach to different issues at different times. For example, a person may generally vote for a particular party because of their beliefs on economic issues, but may choose to vote for another party in a specific election if they think that other party has a better approach on an issue that is particularly important to them at that time, such as the environment or public health. This may also explain why voters may sometimes appear to vote against their apparent economic interests if other issues or questions are more important to them. Similarly, voters may change their partisan preferences in response to major political events or crises. This perspective therefore offers a more flexible and responsive view of electoral behaviour, taking into account short-term influences as well as long-term partisan loyalties.

Issue-based voting[modifier | modifier le wikicode]

There are two main types of explanation linked to the issues at stake.

The first explanation is derived directly from a rational choice model, with the voter voting rationally, making a cost-benefit calculation. The idea is that voters will vote for the party that is closest to them in terms of the issues at stake. The parties that have the most similar preferences to voters are the ones that voters will vote for. In this model, voters are seen as political consumers who make voting choices based on an assessment of costs and benefits. This assumes that voters are well informed, that they understand their own interests and that they are able to correctly evaluate the policies proposed by the different parties. They are expected to choose the party or candidate whose positions are closest to their own preferences or convictions. For example, a voter who feels that protecting the environment is the most important issue for him or her will seek to vote for the party or candidate that proposes the strongest or most effective environmental policies.

If, for example, a person is in favour of limiting immigration, they are likely to vote for a party that supports restrictive immigration policies. To model this situation, scales can be used to assess the positions of individuals and political parties on various issues. Once these positions have been established, it is then possible to calculate a 'distance' between the voter and each party based on their respective positions on the issues. This distance can then be used to estimate the probability that a voter will vote for a certain party, with the probability generally being higher for parties that are closer to the voter on the scale of issues.

In this model, political positions are represented in a multidimensional space, where each dimension represents a political issue (for example, immigration, the economy, the environment, etc.). Voters and political parties are placed in this space according to their positions on these issues. It is then generally assumed that voters will vote for the party closest to them in this space, i.e. the party whose positions on the various issues are closest to their own positions. This makes it possible to obtain quantitative predictions about electoral behaviour. For example, if a voter is at a certain distance from a party on the immigration scale, we can calculate the probability that he or she will vote for that party on the basis of that distance.

The proximity model is a major concept in electoral choice theory. It postulates that an individual's electoral behaviour is largely influenced by the proximity between his or her own political views and those of a party or candidate on the issues that are important to that voter. In other words, according to the proximity model, a voter is more likely to vote for the party or candidate whose political positions are closest to his or her own, on the issues he or she considers important. This 'distance' between the voter and the party can be measured on various issues or political dimensions, such as the economy, the environment, immigration, etc. Thus, the 'closer' a party is to the voter's personal views on issues that are important to them, the higher the probability that the voter will vote for that party, according to the proximity model.

The second hypothesis, which is closely linked to the first, is that voters tend to vote for the party that is perceived as being the most competent or the most committed on the issue that they consider to be the most important. This is known as issue-based voting. According to this theory, it is not necessarily the positions of voters and parties on different issues that are decisive, but rather the perception of which issue is currently the most important in the country, and which party is considered to be the most capable of managing that issue. This means that it is not so much the position of voters and parties on different issues that counts, but rather the identification of the most crucial issue at a given moment in the country. It is also a question of knowing which party is associated with this issue, which party has acquired a reputation over the years as an active and competent player on this issue, capable of managing it and finding solutions. If this issue becomes particularly salient among the population, the party in question will be able to draw electoral advantage from it.

This concept is known as "issue ownership". Each party tries to develop its reputation and skills around specific issues. For example, for the Greens, it is the development of their reputation for competence on environmental issues. For the Socialists, the aim is to highlight their expertise in social policy and redistribution. For the PLR, the aim is to strengthen their expertise in economic policy. As for the UDC, their aim is to develop competence in immigration, security and European policy.

The concept of "issue ownership" is an essential aspect of modern politics and the strategic positioning of political parties. It is based on the idea that each political party seeks to be associated with specific issues that are perceived to be important to voters. The idea is to create a mental association between the party and the issue so that when voters think of the issue, they also think of the party. The Greens, for example, have built their political identity around environmental issues. They have sought to position themselves as champions of the environment and sustainability, and have made efforts to ensure that these issues are associated with their brand image. As a result, voters who are particularly concerned about environmental issues are likely to think of the Greens when they vote. The Socialist Party, on the other hand, has long been associated with the defence of workers' rights and the redistribution of wealth. They have cultivated an image as defenders of the working classes and promoters of social equality. As a result, voters who are concerned about social and economic inequalities, or who favour a policy of redistribution, are more likely to vote for the Socialist Party. The PLR, on the other hand, has sought to position itself as the party of the economy, emphasising issues of economic policy, liberalism and free markets. Voters who are concerned about these issues are more likely to vote for the PLR. Finally, the SVP has positioned itself as the party of immigration, security and European policy. Voters who consider these issues to be of particular importance are more likely to vote for the SVP.

A political party's reputation for competence on a certain issue, or its "ownership of the issue", is generally stable and difficult to change. This stability stems from several factors. Firstly, a party's reputation for competence on a given issue is often the result of many years, even decades, of work and commitment on that issue. A party that has regularly and consistently defended a certain position on an issue, or that has made that issue a central part of its political programme, has generally succeeded in convincing voters of its competence in the matter. Changing voters' perceptions takes time. Secondly, political parties are generally reluctant to radically change their position on an issue, as this could be perceived as opportunism or fickleness, which could alienate their voter base. This is why they tend to adhere to long-held positions and issues. However, when the perceived importance of a certain issue increases among voters - perhaps due to current events or social or economic changes - a party with a strong reputation for competence on that issue may benefit electorally. For example, if the environment suddenly becomes a much more important issue for voters, it is likely that environmental parties will see their support increase.

In 2015, at the height of the migration crisis, the subject of immigration and refugees dominated the political debate in Switzerland, as in many other European countries. This benefited the Swiss People's Party (SVP), which had long made limiting immigration one of its main political axes. Because of its firm stance on the issue and its reputation as a party with solutions, even if some people considered them simplistic, to the immigration question, the SVP was able to attract a large number of voters concerned about the migration crisis. Even without an intense election campaign, the SVP was able to make its point because the subject was constantly in the news. This probably contributed to their election victory in October 2015.

Source: Nicolet and Sciarini (2010: 451)

This graph comes from a survey conducted after the 2007 Swiss federal elections. In this survey, we systematically followed a certain methodology. Firstly, we asked respondents to identify the most important problem facing Switzerland at the time. This was an open question, allowing people to answer freely. We then grouped these responses into different categories to facilitate analysis. We then asked a follow-up question: "In your opinion, which party is best placed to solve problem X that you have identified? This allowed us to understand which party voters associated with the ability to solve the specific problems they had identified. In another section of the questionnaire, we asked respondents which party they had voted for in the election. By combining these three pieces of information - the most important problem, the party considered most competent to solve that problem and the actual vote - we can understand how perceptions of problems and party competence influenced voting behaviour.

This graph includes all the people surveyed, i.e. 1,716 people. These individuals all took part in the elections and chose a party. On the first line of the table, we have broken down the answers to the first question, which was open-ended. For 35% of respondents, immigration, security and the integration of refugees were the most important issues. For 16%, it was the environment. For 31% of respondents, their main concern was the economy and the state of social security. If we add up these percentages, we don't reach 100%. The reason for this is simple: there are other important issues that respondents mentioned, but which are not included in this table.

The second row of the table focuses on the party that respondents feel is most competent to solve the problem they have identified. These percentages are calculated on the basis of those who responded. For example, of the 35% who identified 'immigration' as a major problem, a large proportion, 27%, indicated that the UDC (Union démocratique du centre) or the PS (Parti socialiste) were the most competent to solve it. More specifically, 75% of those who cited 'immigration' as a major problem felt that the SVP was best placed to tackle it. Finally, on the last line, we look at what these people actually voted for. For example, 17% of the 1,716 people who responded said that they voted for the SVP because they considered it to be the most competent party to deal with immigration, which is their main problem.

These data do not necessarily provide direct evidence of a causal link between the problem identified, the perception of a party's competence to solve it, and the actual vote. However, they do indicate a correlation between these elements. More specifically, they show that the importance of the immigration issue and the perception of the SVP's competence to deal with it may have influenced the vote for the SVP. This does not mean that all those who identified immigration as a major issue and saw the SVP as competent to deal with it voted for the SVP, but it is likely that there is some tendency or influence in this direction.

The Swiss People's Party (SVP), with its populist discourse and focus on issues such as immigration, national independence and security, has had a marked influence on Swiss politics over the past two decades. This has prompted a great deal of research and analysis, both nationally and internationally, to understand how and why the SVP has gained influence and how this has changed the Swiss political landscape. This research has examined various aspects, including the SVP's electoral strategies, its communication and rhetoric, and the wider socio-economic context in which it has managed to thrive.

Exploiting electoral potential[modifier | modifier le wikicode]

Firstly, socio-professional or class position has been identified as a key factor influencing the SVP vote. Certain social classes may feel more attracted to the SVP's discourse, particularly those who feel threatened by immigration or globalisation. Secondly, specific issues, such as immigration, play a major role. The SVP has succeeded in positioning itself as the party most competent to deal with the issues of immigration, security and national sovereignty. When these issues become salient in the public debate, the SVP benefits, as a significant proportion of voters perceive the party to be best placed to deal with them. These two factors, combined with other elements such as the party's effective communication and its skilful use of populist rhetoric, help to explain the SVP's rise and success in the Swiss political landscape. A third type of explanation refers to the party's strategies and the effects of these strategies in terms of mobilisation.

The SVP has used powerful mobilisation strategies to reach its electorate and encourage them to vote. Even if we do not analyse these strategies directly, we can observe their clear effects through election results and polling data. A crucial aspect of the SVP's success is its ability to galvanise and mobilise its electorate effectively. The impact of this mobilisation can be clearly seen in the increase in support for the SVP over the years, a testament to the effectiveness of their strategies. For example, the SVP has been able to generate enthusiasm among its voters by focusing on important and topical issues such as immigration and security, and by offering simple and straightforward solutions to these problems. In addition, the party has managed to maintain constant communication with its electorate, both during and outside election campaigns, thereby strengthening its support. While it is beyond the scope of this discussion to analyse the specific methods employed by the SVP to achieve this objective, it is clear that their ability to effectively mobilise their electorate has played a crucial role in their continued success.

The question "which party did you vote for" is fundamental to understanding electoral trends. However, there are other methods of gathering information on political preferences that are not limited solely to the actual vote. For example, one approach is to ask participants to rate their degree of sympathy for different political parties on a scale of 1 to 10. This makes it possible to understand not only people's electoral choice, but also their ideological closeness to other parties. Another measure is to ask participants whether they consider themselves close to a particular party, even if they do not always vote for that party. This can reveal partisan affinities that do not necessarily translate into voting in elections. It is also possible to ask questions about participants' attitudes to specific political issues to determine their ideological alignment. For example, their views on issues such as immigration, the economy and the environment can indicate which party they are likely to lean towards. These approaches provide a more nuanced picture of partisan preferences, offering a richer and more complex understanding of electoral behaviour.

Focusing solely on an individual's electoral choice can limit our understanding of their overall political preferences. If someone says they voted for the SVP, this does not give us any information about their disposition towards other parties. For example, this person might also have been inclined to vote for the PLR, but ultimately chose the UDC. Similarly, someone who voted for the Greens might also have considered the Socialist Party as a viable option. Once they have declared that they voted for the Greens, we lose all information about their other potential preferences. This is why it is useful to use complementary measures to explore partisan preferences, as discussed above. By asking people to rate their sympathy for different parties on a scale, or to say whether they feel close to more than one party, we can get a fuller picture of their personal political landscape. This can help reveal nuances in their preferences and identify trends that are not immediately apparent through voting.

What we do is to use a method that asks questions about all the parties. This method is called the vote probability measure. In the survey, we propose a scale from 0 to 10, asking people to rate the probability that one day they would vote for a certain party. The same question is asked for all the main political parties, giving a comparative perspective. In this way, we have information not only on the party that the person has chosen, but also on the other parties that they have not chosen. This makes it possible to compare the parties in much more detail than the simple question of "electoral choice".

After asking all the participants in the survey what their probability is of ever voting for the main parties present in their canton, for example, we can then calculate the average probability of voting for a specific party. It's fairly straightforward, and just involves summing and averaging the probabilities. We add up the scores of each respondent and divide by the total number of respondents. What we get is the average probability of voting for a party, which can be regarded as the party's electoral potential. This operation can be carried out for each party separately.

Then, using this data, we can calculate what is known as the realisation rate or the rate of exploitation of the electoral potential. This is calculated by creating a simple ratio between a party's actual electoral strength, i.e. the percentage of votes it received, and its electoral potential, derived from the survey, which is the average probability of voting for that party. The ratio thus obtained provides a measure of the parties' ability to convert their electoral potential into real support.

Electoral Potential of Parties and Average Probability of Voting[modifier | modifier le wikicode]

Let's start with the electoral potential measured in the surveys, in other words the average probability of voting for one party or another.

Source: Données Selects (mes calculs (M. Sciarini), N=4064-4261)

This graph, based on surveys carried out following the federal elections of 1995, 1999, 2003, 2007 and 2011, illustrates the average probability of voting for each party, in other words the electoral potential of each party. It is clear that for all the parties, their electoral potential is much higher than their actual electoral strength.

Let's take the example of the Greens: they have an electoral potential of 44%, which means that on average, across the whole sample, the probability of an individual voting for the Greens is 4.4 out of 10. In percentage terms, this represents 44%. However, at the end of 2015, the Greens only really had 7% or 8% of the vote. This is the most glaring example of the gap between a party's electoral potential and its actual electoral performance. It is important to stress that the large difference between the electoral potential and the actual votes obtained by the Greens can be explained by two factors. The first is that this graph takes into account the entire electorate, including those who do not vote. Many of these are young people who have a preference for the Greens. The Greens' appeal to young people therefore boosts their electoral potential, but does not translate into votes, as young people tend to vote less often. The second factor is the competition between the Greens and the Socialist Party. These two parties compete for a large proportion of the same potential electorate, but in the end, voters tend to vote more often for the Socialist Party than for the Greens.

There are two important points to remember. Firstly, although potential voting is much higher than actual voting, the two are highly correlated. Indeed, the correlation between potential and actual voting at the individual level is 0.8 to 0.9, indicating a very close relationship. Secondly, although voting potential fluctuates slightly from one survey to the next, it does not change significantly. There was some decline in potential for the Socialists, but they managed to recover some of it in 2011. According to these measures, the two left-wing parties, the Greens and the Socialist Party, have the highest electoral potential.

The main point to note from this graph concerns the SVP. As can be seen, their electoral potential is stable and relatively low, never exceeding 40%. This means that the SVP's electoral potential is both fairly stable and among the lowest of all the parties considered here, including newer parties such as the BBD and the Liberal Greens. What we can conclude from this analysis is that the SVP's success cannot be attributed to a growth in its electoral potential - in fact, this potential has remained constant and even decreased slightly in 2011 compared to 2007. The key point here is that the SVP's potential has not grown and remains relatively low. This is rather surprising when compared with the SVP's marked upward electoral trajectory.

Electoral Potential Utilisation Rate[modifier | modifier le wikicode]

This graph illustrates the rate at which potential is realised. In other words, it is the ratio between the party's electoral strength and its potential.

*mes calculs = M. Sciarini

What we are seeing here is a significant and steady increase in the SVP's success rate. In 1995, 1999, 2003 and even 2011, the SVP almost systematically improved its ability to mobilise its potential electorate. It is this ability that largely explains the SVP's success. This is not a question of an increase in the SVP's popularity among the electorate - the party remains about as popular as it was twenty years ago, which is to say, not very popular. However, voters who consider voting for the SVP do so much more often than for the other parties. The take-up rate for the other parties is just over 40%, and even less than 20% for the Greens, in stark contrast to the SVP.

Indeed, the SVP's rise over the last two decades can be attributed primarily to its increasing ability to mobilise voters, although its potential electorate has remained relatively constant. The SVP seems to have succeeded in galvanising its 'friends' to vote for it more regularly or in greater numbers, even if the overall number of its 'friends' has not increased. Clearly, the party has succeeded in effectively mobilising its potential electorate and converting it into actual votes. This also shows the importance of voter mobilisation in the success of a political party.

Comparison of electoral openness[modifier | modifier le wikicode]

In recent years, several countries in Europe have seen a significant rise in populist parties. This phenomenon is often attributed to a variety of economic, social and political factors.

Sciarini ouverture comparative élections au Parlement européen de 2014.png

This table seeks to show the similarities between the party families. There is a general trend across Europe towards a rise in populism, as these figures show. Right-wing populist parties have grown in popularity in many countries, often focusing on issues such as immigration, nationalism and opposition to European integration. These figures underline the rise of populism across Europe, where many right-wing populist parties have managed to capture a significant share of the vote. Here is a little more background on each of these parties:

  • The Front National (FN) in France, now known as Rassemblement National, is a far-right party led by Marine Le Pen. It won 25% of the vote in the 2014 European elections. The party is best known for its hardline positions on immigration and nationalism.
  • The Freedom Party in Austria, led by Heinz-Christian Strache at the time, won 20% of the vote in the 2014 European elections. The party spoke out against immigration and Islam and argued for a sovereign Austria.
  • UKIP in the UK won 28% of the vote in the 2014 European elections. The party, best known for its support for the UK's exit from the European Union (Brexit), capitalised on dissatisfaction with the EU and concerns about immigration.
  • Italy's Five Star movement won 21% of the vote in the 2014 European elections. Although harder to classify on the traditional political scale, the party has opposed the political establishment and supported populist initiatives such as universal basic income.
  • The Danish People's Party won 27% of the vote in the 2014 European elections. It campaigned on issues of immigration and national sovereignty.
  • The Party for Freedom in the Netherlands, led by Geert Wilders, won 13% of the vote. The party is known for its anti-Islam and anti-immigration stance.
  • In Sweden, the Sweden Democrats won almost 10% of the vote in the 2014 European elections. It is a right-wing nationalist party that opposes immigration and advocates social conservatism.

These results testify to the rise of right-wing populism in Europe, with common themes of opposition to immigration, scepticism about the EU and rejection of the political establishment. The rise of right-wing populism and political parties similar to the Swiss People's Party (SVP) is not a phenomenon confined to Switzerland. A similar trend can be observed in many European countries. In France, for example, the Rassemblement National (formerly the Front National) has grown in popularity in recent decades. This party, which advocates nationalism, anti-immigration and scepticism towards the European Union, has enjoyed significant success at the ballot box. Similarly, in Austria, the Freedom Party (FPÖ), which shares many characteristics with the SVP, has been a major player in Austrian politics in recent years. It was part of the coalition government from 2017 to 2019. In the UK, the UK Independence Party (UKIP) and more recently the Brexit Party have won significant support with an agenda of rejecting the European Union, controlling immigration and protecting British interests. All these parties have succeeded in mobilising an electorate that feels let down by the traditional parties, and is concerned about issues such as immigration, national sovereignty and globalisation. This is a phenomenon that has significant implications for European politics and is likely to continue to play an important role in the years ahead.

Sciarini 2015 ouverture comparative élections parlementaires nationale.png

Election results can vary considerably depending on the type of election. There are several reasons for this. Firstly, there is the question of turnout. In general, turnout in European elections is much lower than in national elections. This can favour political parties with a dedicated and motivated electorate, as is often the case with populist parties. Secondly, the issues at stake in the elections can play an important role. European elections often focus on issues of national sovereignty and European integration, themes that are central to the agenda of populist parties. As a result, these parties may be more successful in European elections than in national ones. Thirdly, there is the factor of the electoral system. For example, in France, the electoral system for parliamentary elections is a two-round majority system, which can make it more difficult for minority parties to win seats. In contrast, European elections are organised according to a proportional representation system, which encourages a greater diversity of parties. These and other factors may explain why a party like the Front National in France can achieve very different results from one election to the next.

European elections are often seen as "second-order" elections because they tend to attract less attention and have a lower turnout than major national elections, such as parliamentary or presidential elections. As a result of this perception, voters may be more inclined to use their vote to express their dissatisfaction with the government of the day, rather than focusing on the specific issues at stake in the European election. This can often result in increased support for opposition or populist parties, which may explain some of the exceptional performances of the Front National and similar parties in European elections. However, although sometimes perceived as less important, European elections can nevertheless have a significant impact, not least in influencing the composition of the European Parliament and shaping policies and decisions at EU level. It is therefore crucial not to downplay their importance.

Populist or 'disaffected' parties may enjoy stronger support in second-order elections, such as the European elections. Voters may be more inclined to express dissatisfaction with the government of the day or to express more radical views than they would in major national elections. However, it is also important to note that the success of these parties in major national elections, with the examples of the FPE in Austria, the Cinque Stelle in Italy, and the People's Party in Denmark, shows that this is a significant political phenomenon that goes beyond second-order elections alone. It may be indicative of wider feelings of discontent, frustration or alienation among certain segments of the population, who may be attracted by the rhetoric and policies of these parties. It is therefore essential for researchers, policy-makers and observers to take these trends into account when analysing the current political landscape.

Case Study 3: The Influence of Gender and Age on Political Participation[modifier | modifier le wikicode]

The analysis of electoral participation is another facet of the study of electoral behaviour. In the scheme of things, the act of participation precedes the electoral choice. Consequently, it is crucial to first understand the reasons why voters do or do not decide to go to the polls before examining their voting preferences. Logically, the initial objective is to decipher who participates in elections, who abstains and for what reasons, before looking at the parties or candidates they vote for.

Comparative analysis[modifier | modifier le wikicode]

Sciarini 2015 taux de participation aux élections et votations fédérales 1.png

This first graph shows the trend in voter turnout at federal elections and votes in Switzerland from 1919 to 2015. In other words, it represents the percentage of the eligible population that has voted in federal elections and referenda since the end of the First World War.

The graph shows a significant drop in turnout in both elections (shown in red) and votes (shown in black). After the First World War, turnout in elections was 80%, but declined steadily to a low of less than 45% in 1995. Voter turnout was lower and more variable, but we see a similar trend between the 1940s and 1970s, peaking at an average turnout of 40% in the late 1970s.

For elections, the turnout rate corresponds to that of the current year's election. For referenda, on the other hand, the rate represents the average turnout over all referenda held over a four-year period. In Switzerland, federal referenda are held four times a year. So to obtain the turnout rate over a four-year period, we need to calculate the average turnout over that period. This is the methodology used to plot and compare the two curves.

We can see a downward trend in voter turnout, which reached its lowest point in the 1990s for elections, then a slight upturn since 1995, with a levelling off in the last three elections. For the election on 18 October 2015, the turnout rate was around 43.8%, similar to the 2011 and 2007 elections when it was just under 48%. Voter turnout has also stabilised at around 43% over the last three periods.

Voter turnout is a key indicator of civic engagement and the democratic health of a society. A high turnout is generally interpreted as a sign of legitimacy of the elected government and confidence in the political system. Similarly, low turnout may indicate dissatisfaction with the political options available, distrust of the political system, or a lack of interest in politics. In the Swiss context, we have observed a general downward trend in voter turnout throughout the twentieth century, with a low point reached in the 1990s. This trend can be attributed to a number of factors. One may be the feeling among some voters that their votes do not have a significant impact on the outcome of elections. This may be particularly the case in a consensual political system such as Switzerland's, where the main parties often govern together in coalitions. In addition, social changes, such as urbanisation and longer working hours, can also contribute to a decline in voter turnout. Individuals may feel disconnected from their local community and therefore less inclined to participate in the electoral process. However, since 1995 we have seen a slight increase in voter turnout, followed by a levelling off in the last three elections. This could be interpreted as a sign of renewed interest in politics, perhaps stimulated by political issues of national importance or by effective campaigns to encourage voter turnout. Compared with elections, turnout in referenda - where citizens are asked to vote directly on specific issues - has also been on a downward trend, but has stabilised at around 43% over the last three periods observed. This could indicate that, although voter turnout has declined, citizens' engagement with specific political issues remains relatively stable.

The overall picture that emerges is one of a sharp fall in turnout, and the question that needs to be asked is where this sharp fall in turnout is coming from.

We're going to focus on two factors that can help us understand political participation, two factors that help explain turnout and abstention, two fairly fundamental factors that are gender and age. Gender and age are two decisive factors when it comes to analysing electoral behaviour and political participation. Here is a brief analysis of these two factors:

  • Gender: Historically, gender differences in turnout have been significant in many countries, although this trend has changed over time. In the past, men were generally more likely to vote than women, but this trend has faded in many contexts, and in some countries women are now more likely to vote than men. However, there are still significant differences in party choice or political preferences between men and women.
  • Age: Voter turnout often varies considerably between age groups. As a general rule, younger adults are less likely to vote than their elders, although this may vary depending on the political context and the perceived importance of the election. Older people generally have more experience of politics, greater residential stability and are more likely to have links with community or political organisations, which may encourage them to vote.

These two factors can combine in different ways to influence voting behaviour. For example, young women may have different turnout rates to older women, or men of the same age. It is important to consider these interactions when analysing electoral participation.

Sciarini 2015 taux de participation aux élections fédérales de 1995 à Genève.png

These turnout figures for federal elections specific to the canton of Geneva are particularly valuable for a detailed analysis of voting behaviour. The fact that these data are real, rather than based on polls or surveys, gives a more accurate and reliable picture of voter turnout. Since 1995, the canton of Geneva has taken the initiative of collecting and digitally archiving data on the turnout of all its citizens. This allows direct observation of changes in voter turnout over time. It would be interesting to examine these figures in detail to identify trends or changes in voter behaviour. The data can be analysed according to various factors such as age, gender, place of residence, occupation, level of education, etc. to gain a more in-depth understanding of the factors influencing voter turnout. These data could also be useful for assessing the effectiveness of various initiatives aimed at increasing voter turnout.

The turnout curve shown for the 1995 federal election resembles a classic, almost perfect, example of what one would expect. It provides a realistic representation of voter turnout in the population. It is a vivid illustration of voter turnout in action, clearly demonstrating how it varies according to different age groups or other demographic categories. Interpreting this curve can reveal important trends in voter turnout. For example, it might indicate which age groups are most likely to vote, or which segments of the population might need more awareness-raising or education about the importance of voting.

This curve is ideal for demonstrating the trend in voter turnout as a function of age. When young people reach the age of 18 and acquire the right to vote, there is a higher peak in turnout than in the 20-25 age group. This increase can be explained by the excitement of exercising a new right. The curve then becomes U-shaped. The low point in participation is between the ages of 20 and 29, after which participation increases almost linearly with age, reaching a peak between the ages of 65 and 69. Beyond this age, participation begins to decline quite considerably. This shows an interesting trend whereby middle-aged and older people are more likely to participate in elections than younger adults. This may be explained by a number of factors, such as an increase in interest in politics with age, greater stability in life giving more time for civic participation, or a heightened awareness of the importance of voting. Conversely, the drop in turnout among the very elderly can be attributed to factors such as health problems or difficulty in accessing polling stations.

Sciarini 2015 taux de participation aux élections fédérales de 2015 à Genève.png

If we re-examine the same data for 2015, we see a curve similar to that for 1995, with the same general movement. However, the initial fall in participation is slightly less pronounced, and the participation rate does not fall below that of the youngest age group, as was the case in the previous graph. This is mainly due to the way in which the age groups have been grouped together in this chart: whereas in the previous chart we had age categories up to 90+, in this chart all people aged 85+ are grouped together in a single category. This has the effect of raising the average turnout, as it is generally accepted that older people tend to vote more regularly than younger age groups. However, the overall shape of the curve remains the same, showing an initially high turnout among young people who have just acquired the right to vote, a decline among young adults, then a steady increase with age to a peak in old age, before falling again among the very old.

An interesting trend emerges from these two graphs. Previously, peak participation was reached between the ages of 65 and 75 for men. However, in 2015, peak participation was reached among men aged 75 to 79 and among women aged 70 to 74. So there seems to be a trend towards voting later and later in life, which would be consistent with increasing life expectancy. As people get older, they stay healthier and more active, which enables them to stay involved and continue voting for longer than before. This suggests that age has a significant impact on voter turnout. This may be because older people often have more free time to inform themselves and engage with the political process, and are also more likely to feel the impact of government policies on their daily lives. In addition, voting is sometimes perceived as a civic duty, a feeling that can increase with age.

The graphs show a clear trend in the difference in participation between the sexes. Whether in 1995 or 2015, young women tend to participate more than young men. After the age of 20 to 24, when participation rates for men and women are almost identical, the difference in participation between the sexes tends to increase with age. This difference is particularly pronounced among older people. For example, among people aged 85 to 89, the participation rate is around 40% for women, compared with over 30% for men. Among people aged 85 and over, the gap is even greater, with a participation rate of 40% among women compared with over 55% among men. There may be several explanations for this difference. Women may be more likely than men to engage in the political process and vote. It is also possible that men are more likely to abstain from voting due to various factors, such as negative perceptions of politics or a lack of confidence in the political system. There may also be socio-cultural factors at work, with different attitudes towards voting and political participation between the sexes.

These graphs show that age and gender are two key factors in electoral participation. While the difference in turnout between men and women is minimal among young voters, this gap tends to increase with age. Voter turnout generally increases with age, a pattern that is mirrored for both men and women. However, the gender gap in turnout widens as age groups increase. This may suggest that socio-cultural factors or living conditions, which can vary with age, play a role in this divergence. It is also interesting to note that, although participation rates increase with age, this is not always the case. For example, among women, participation tends to peak between the ages of 70 and 74 and then decline slightly. This analysis highlights the importance of taking both factors - age and gender - into account when studying voting behaviour. It is not enough to look at one without taking the other into account, as they clearly interact to influence voter turnout.

We will now try to explain why there is this difference in turnout as a function of age on the one hand and gender on the other.

The Influence of Gender on Political Participation[modifier | modifier le wikicode]

Firstly, there are socio-structural factors that have historically explained the difference in participation between men and women.

The first socio-structural factor is the lesser social and professional integration of women. This theory suggests that greater social and professional integration leads to greater political participation. Social integration can include a sense of belonging to a community, the ability to understand and participate in the social life of that community, and involvement in activities that help to strengthen social ties within the community. Professional integration, for its part, can include factors such as stable employment, access to education and training, and the opportunity to progress professionally. The fact that women have historically been less socially and professionally integrated than men (due to factors such as family time use, societal expectations and professional inequalities) would have had an impact on their political commitment. According to this perspective, women's social and professional integration was limited, which could partly explain why they were less likely to participate in politics. It is a view that highlights the importance of gender equality in all areas of life, including the world of work and social life, in order to promote more balanced political participation.

It is true that women generally have a longer life expectancy than men, which means that they are more likely to find themselves widowed at some point in their lives. The social isolation that can result from widowhood can potentially limit political participation. Indeed, the loss of a spouse can lead to a reduction in social interaction and exposure to a variety of political views, both of which in turn can reduce interest in and commitment to politics. In addition, widows may also face economic hardship, which could make them less likely to participate actively in political life. These socio-structural factors could explain why women, and older women in particular, participate less in politics.

In 2015, 80% of widowers were women and 20% men. In the general population, there are 51% women and 49% men, whereas in the widowhood category, there are 80% women and 20% men. This goes some way to explaining why widowhood is such a powerful factor in social isolation. This disparity, with a much higher number of widowed women than men, is undoubtedly due to the difference in life expectancy between the sexes. On average, women live longer than men, which means they are more likely to outlive their spouse and become widows. The social isolation that often results from widowhood can be an obstacle to political participation. Individuals who are socially isolated have fewer opportunities to interact with other people and to be exposed to different political ideas and opinions, which can reduce their interest in politics and their willingness to take part in elections. It is important to note that this situation can be exacerbated for older women, who already face other forms of social exclusion. These structural barriers can make it more difficult for these women to participate actively in politics, contributing to the participation gap.

Widowhood and the resulting social isolation can have a significant impact on political participation. As noted, this phenomenon affects women more often, due to their longer life expectancy.

If we adjust the data to balance the number of widowers and widows, we could probably observe a reduction in the participation gap between men and women. This could indicate that widowhood and social isolation are important factors contributing to the gender gap in political participation among older people. Another explanation is socio-cultural factors, and more specifically the persistence of traditional role models for women. This is almost independent of the sociostructural factors, which is the fact that for a very long time the traditional model of the vision of women in society and the role of women in society in both the private and public spheres has been maintained, which has had the effect of reducing the participation rate of women compared with men.

In Switzerland, women's right to vote was granted very late compared with other countries. At federal level, this right was not granted until 1971, well after most other Western countries. In some more conservative cantons, women had to wait even longer to obtain the right to vote at cantonal level. This was the case in the canton of Appenzell Innerrhoden, which did not grant women the right to vote until 1991, following a decision by the Federal Court. This delay in obtaining the right to vote probably had an impact on the political participation of women, particularly older women. Their integration into the political process was delayed, and they had less time to get used to the idea of voting and to develop the habits and skills associated with political participation. This is probably one of the reasons why women's participation is lower than men's, particularly among the elderly.

The canton of Appenzell Innerrhoden was the last canton in Switzerland to grant women the right to vote, and this did not happen until 1991, under pressure from a Federal Court ruling. The Federal Court ruled that the canton's refusal to grant women the right to vote violated the Federal Constitution, which stipulates equal rights for men and women. This situation is a striking illustration of how social and political norms can differ considerably from one region to another within the same country. It is important to note that although women gained the right to vote at federal level in Switzerland in 1971, it took another twenty years for this right to be fully recognised throughout the country. It's a reminder of how social and political change can be a slow and sometimes divisive process.

What were the consequences of this late granting of the right to vote to women, and how did this affect the turnout rate even today?

The impact of the late acquisition of the right to vote for women in Switzerland, particularly in certain cantons, should not be underestimated. Acquiring the right to vote is often seen as a rite of passage into adulthood, and for women of certain generations in Switzerland, this step only came late. Women who did not gain the right to vote until later in life missed out on many years of the political socialisation that is normally an important part of adulthood. This political socialisation can include things like following elections, discussing political issues with friends and colleagues, and participating in political organisations or groups. Without this political socialisation, these women may have been less inclined to participate in politics when they eventually gained the right to vote. This may help to explain why, in electoral participation statistics, we see lower participation among older women in Switzerland.

Late access to the right to vote prevented these women from acquiring experience and familiarising themselves with political processes at the same age as their male counterparts. This delay has undoubtedly contributed to their disengagement or reduced participation in politics. We can even imagine that this institutional effect is combined with the socio-structural effect of the high incidence of widowhood among women. Indeed, the social isolation resulting from widowhood could combine with a lack of individual political experience to contribute to greater political disengagement among older women. If these women had previously relied on their husbands for information and advice on politics, their participation could decrease after the death of their husbands. This highlights the importance of political empowerment and civic education for all people, regardless of gender. It is crucial that everyone is able to develop their own understanding of political issues and engage autonomously in the political process.

The intersection of these factors - widowhood and the late acquisition of the right to vote - may play an important role in the political disengagement of older women in Switzerland. The history of women's suffrage in Switzerland is unique and reflects a broader social and political evolution that has led to fuller political inclusion. Nonetheless, the legacy of political exclusion persists and is evident in election turnout rates. Older women in Switzerland, who gained the right to vote later in life, may have had fewer opportunities to gain political experience and civic engagement, which may explain why they disengage from the political process at a higher rate than men of the same age. Furthermore, the impact of widowhood on social isolation and therefore on political participation should not be underestimated. This reinforces the need for public policies and targeted interventions to encourage political engagement among vulnerable populations, including older women.

The revisionist thesis on women's political participation offers a new and critical perspective on the traditional factors of analysis. It suggests that traditional explanations of women's participation may no longer be sufficient to understand current trends in women's political participation. In the modern context, a number of structural changes have been observed that have influenced women's political participation. Women have become more present in the world of work, better educated and more involved in the public sphere. These transformations may lead to a change in the relationship between gender, age and political participation. The revisionist thesis suggests that the pattern of women's participation in elections has changed and that we need to look at other factors to understand women's political participation today. These factors may include level of education, labour force participation, economic independence, marriage and motherhood, among others.

Over the last few decades, the social and professional integration of women has increased considerably, which has had a significant impact on their political participation. Firstly, the increase in women's education has strengthened their social integration. Women now have access to all levels of education, including higher education, which gives them a better knowledge and understanding of political issues. Secondly, the increase in women's participation in the workforce has also strengthened their social and professional integration. Today, more and more women work full-time and hold managerial positions. This has given them greater economic autonomy, which in turn has strengthened their ability to participate in politics. Thirdly, changes in women's role within the family have also contributed to their social and professional integration. With more women working, the traditional model of the housewife has been challenged. In addition, with the rise in divorce and single-parent families, more and more women are taking on the role of head of household, which may also increase their political participation. All these factors have contributed to a 'catch-up effect' where women have caught up with men in terms of political participation. However, it is important to note that despite this progress, disparities persist. For example, women are still under-represented in political leadership positions and structural barriers to women's political participation, such as sexism and discrimination, still exist.

The rise of women in the professional sphere has significant political implications. Historically, women have been largely excluded from political life and their rate of political participation has been lower than that of men. However, with their increasing integration into the world of work and greater participation in social life, women have acquired greater economic and social autonomy. This, in turn, has stimulated their involvement and participation in politics. In addition, women's entry into the world of work has also changed the dynamics of family and domestic life, with a more equal division of domestic responsibilities between men and women. This has also freed up women's time and energy, which can be devoted to political participation. Women are more socially and professionally integrated than they were before, so they are also more politically integrated than they were before, and they are eventually catching up with men.

According to this revisionist thesis, the gender gap in terms of political participation has disappeared. Although many countries have seen a significant reduction in the gender gap in terms of political participation, differences still persist in some countries, including Switzerland. In many developed countries, including the USA, the Scandinavian countries, France and Germany, the gender gap in political participation has narrowed significantly in recent decades. This is largely due to a combination of factors, including changing societal attitudes, improved access to education for women, greater integration of women into the workforce, as well as deliberate political efforts to increase women's representation in politics. The gender gap in political participation is not limited to voting in elections. It also extends to other aspects of political participation, such as standing for election, holding political leadership positions, being active in political parties, and taking part in social movements and demonstrations.

In Switzerland, although there has been an increase in women's participation in elections, there is still a gender gap in terms of political representation. For example, women are under-represented in political leadership positions, and fewer women are elected to political office than men.

According to surveys, there is no longer a turnout gap between men and women at federal referenda in Switzerland. However, a slight gap persists at election time, with slightly lower turnout among women. In Switzerland, although the process of catching up and convergence is underway, it is not yet complete. It is possible that this catching-up process is also influenced by the fact that the impact of the institutional factor - the late granting of the right to vote to women - is diminishing over time. Indeed, the proportion of women who have reached adulthood without the right to vote is gradually decreasing.

In Switzerland, as in many other countries, women's participation in elections has increased considerably over time. This can be attributed to a number of factors, including greater gender equality, greater social and professional integration of women and greater political awareness and education. It is also true that the effect of women's late enfranchisement in Switzerland is fading over time, as more and more women acquire the right to vote as soon as they come of age. This means that there are fewer and fewer women who reached adulthood without the right to vote, and that this historical institutional effect has less influence on current trends in electoral participation. However, there is still a certain gap in turnout between men and women at elections in Switzerland, although this gap is gradually narrowing. Moreover, it is crucial to continue working to eliminate the obstacles that still prevent some women from participating fully in political and social life.

Fewer and fewer women were affected by the lack of voting rights when they came of age, so the institutional impact will gradually diminish and eventually disappear. There are still disparities, for example in Geneva, where the gap in participation between men and women is almost negligible. Although there is still a difference, it is very small indeed. The existence of this small participation gap between men and women in Geneva suggests that women's political socialisation has improved considerably over time. This can be attributed to a number of factors, such as the greater social and professional integration of women, and the gradual disappearance of the institutional impact associated with the fact that women were granted the right to vote later than men.

Analysis of the Effect of Age on Political Participation[modifier | modifier le wikicode]

L'âge en tant que variable démographique peut encapsuler plusieurs facteurs qui contribuent à expliquer les différences de comportement, y compris en matière de participation politique. Derrière la variable « âge », il y a différents types de mécanismes.

Il y a trois principaux effets d’âge :

  • Effets de cohorte : Les personnes nées à différentes époques ont vécu des expériences historiques et sociales distinctes qui peuvent façonner leur comportement tout au long de leur vie. Par exemple, une personne qui a grandi pendant une période de bouleversements politiques majeurs peut être plus politiquement active à l'âge adulte que quelqu'un qui n'a pas eu cette expérience.
  • Effets du cycle de vie : Les priorités et les responsabilités des gens changent à mesure qu'ils vieillissent, ce qui peut influencer leur niveau d'engagement politique. Par exemple, les personnes plus âgées, qui sont souvent à la retraite et ont plus de temps libre, peuvent être plus susceptibles de voter que les jeunes adultes qui sont occupés par leur carrière et leur famille.
  • Effets de période : Ces effets se réfèrent à des événements particuliers qui surviennent à un moment précis dans le temps et qui peuvent affecter toutes les personnes vivantes, indépendamment de leur âge ou de la cohorte à laquelle elles appartiennent. Par exemple, un événement majeur comme une guerre, une crise économique ou une élection très polarisée peut mobiliser ou démobiliser les gens politiquement, quel que soit leur âge. Dans le contexte de la participation politique, un effet de période pourrait être observé si, par exemple, une élection particulièrement controversée ou un référendum sur un enjeu majeur entraînait une augmentation de la participation électorale pour toutes les tranches d'âge. Ces effets de période, lorsqu'ils sont pris en compte avec les effets de cohorte et du cycle de vie, peuvent aider à donner une image plus complète et nuancée de la manière dont l'âge influence la participation politique.

Le Cycle de Vie et l'Effet du Vieillissement Biologique[modifier | modifier le wikicode]

L'âge dans le contexte du parcours de vie a des implications profondes pour l'engagement politique. Il faut cependant préciser que ce ne sont pas les âges en eux-mêmes qui déterminent le niveau d'engagement politique, mais plutôt les rôles et les responsabilités associés à chaque étape de la vie. Par exemple, une personne de 20 ans, souvent en train de suivre des études ou de commencer une carrière, peut avoir moins de temps ou de ressources pour s'engager politiquement. De plus, elle peut ne pas se sentir totalement intégrée dans la société en raison de son manque d'expérience ou de responsabilités familiales et professionnelles. À l'inverse, une personne de 40 ans, qui a probablement une carrière établie, peut être mariée et avoir des enfants. Ces éléments peuvent favoriser une plus grande intégration sociale, ce qui, à son tour, peut mener à un engagement politique accru. Cette intégration peut être alimentée par des réseaux sociaux plus vastes, une exposition à une plus grande diversité d'opinions politiques, et un sentiment accru de responsabilité envers la communauté.

L'expérience politique - ou la compétence politique - est un autre facteur important qui peut influencer la participation politique des individus. Ce n'est généralement pas un ensemble de compétences que l'on acquiert du jour au lendemain, mais plutôt quelque chose qui se développe progressivement avec le temps, à mesure que l'on acquiert de l'expérience et des connaissances sur le système politique. En général, plus on vieillit, plus on a l'occasion de se familiariser avec les enjeux politiques et de comprendre leur impact sur notre vie quotidienne. Cela peut stimuler l'intérêt pour la politique et, par conséquent, la volonté de participer à des élections ou d'autres formes d'engagement politique. En d'autres termes, l'âge peut contribuer à augmenter notre capacité à comprendre la politique et à y participer activement.

L'âge peut avoir des impacts contrastés sur la participation politique. D'une part, avec le temps, les gens gagnent en expérience et en connaissance, ce qui peut stimuler leur engagement politique. D'autre part, le vieillissement peut aussi entraîner des problèmes de santé et un isolement social accru, ce qui peut limiter la capacité ou la volonté de participer à la vie politique. À mesure que les gens vieillissent, ils peuvent être confrontés à diverses difficultés, telles que des problèmes de santé qui limitent leur mobilité ou leur capacité à participer pleinement à la vie sociale. De plus, la retraite et la perte de proches peuvent également entraîner un sentiment d'isolement et une diminution de l'intégration sociale, ce qui peut à son tour réduire l'engagement politique. C'est donc une interaction complexe entre l'âge, l'expérience, l'intégration sociale et la santé qui détermine le niveau de participation politique d'un individu. Cette relation multidimensionnelle peut expliquer pourquoi la participation politique tend à augmenter avec l'âge, mais peut également diminuer chez les personnes très âgées.

L'Effet de Génération ou l'Effet de Cohorte[modifier | modifier le wikicode]

L'effet de cohorte, aussi appelé effet générationnel, fait référence à l'influence des événements historiques et culturels vécus par une génération spécifique à un moment précis de son développement. Les personnes nées au même moment partagent une expérience commune qui peut influencer de manière significative leur comportement et leurs attitudes, y compris leur participation politique. Par exemple, une génération qui a grandi pendant une période de guerre ou de bouleversements sociaux majeurs peut avoir une vision très différente de la politique et de l'engagement civique par rapport à une génération qui a grandi pendant une période de stabilité relative. Ces expériences communes peuvent avoir un impact durable sur les attitudes et les comportements politiques.

L'effet de cohorte ou effet générationnel se base sur l'idée que les événements majeurs qui surviennent pendant notre jeunesse ou notre adolescence ont un impact durable sur notre comportement, y compris notre engagement politique. Par exemple, les personnes qui ont vécu Mai 68 en France ont été profondément marquées par cette période de protestation et de changement social. Cet événement a pu influencer leur perception de la politique, leur niveau d'engagement et leur comportement électoral pour le reste de leur vie. Ils pourraient être plus enclins à participer à des manifestations politiques, à voter pour des candidats progressistes, ou à soutenir des causes sociales ou politiques spécifiques. De la même manière, les personnes qui ont vécu la Seconde Guerre Mondiale, la Guerre Froide, la chute du mur de Berlin, ou d'autres événements historiques majeurs peuvent également avoir des attitudes et des comportements politiques distincts qui sont influencés par ces expériences. Par conséquent, pour comprendre la participation politique, il est nécessaire de prendre en compte non seulement l'âge d'un individu, mais aussi les événements historiques qui ont façonné son expérience et ses attitudes politiques.

Le sentiment du devoir civique et l'importance de voter semblent avoir évolué au fil des générations. Les générations plus âgées, qui ont grandi à une époque où les droits civiques étaient souvent durement gagnés, peuvent considérer le vote non seulement comme un droit, mais aussi comme une obligation essentielle. Par contre, les générations plus jeunes, qui ont grandi dans une époque de plus grande stabilité politique et où le droit de vote est souvent tenu pour acquis, peuvent ne pas ressentir le même sens du devoir civique. De plus, ils peuvent se sentir détachés des structures politiques traditionnelles et préférer s'engager politiquement de manières différentes, par exemple par le biais des médias sociaux ou du militantisme.

L'âge avancé peut entraîner une baisse de la participation politique pour diverses raisons. Il peut s'agir de problèmes de santé limitant la capacité à se rendre aux bureaux de vote ou à s'engager activement dans les activités politiques, ou encore de l'isolement social. De plus, les personnes âgées peuvent parfois se sentir déconnectées des problèmes politiques actuels, ce qui pourrait également réduire leur motivation à participer. Cependant, il est également important de noter que beaucoup de personnes âgées restent politiquement actives et engagées. Elles peuvent avoir plus de temps libre pour suivre l'actualité politique et participer à diverses activités liées à la politique. De plus, avec l'avancée des technologies numériques et l'accessibilité croissante de l'information, de plus en plus de personnes âgées sont en mesure de rester impliquées dans la politique malgré les obstacles physiques potentiels. Enfin, il convient de souligner que même si l'âge peut avoir un impact sur la participation politique individuelle, les tendances générales de participation sont également influencées par une variété d'autres facteurs, comme la confiance dans les institutions politiques, le niveau d'éducation, l'intérêt pour la politique, et les caractéristiques du système électoral lui-même.

L'Effet de Période sur la Participation Politique[modifier | modifier le wikicode]

L'effet de période, aussi parfois appelé effet d'époque, fait référence à l'impact des événements et des conditions sociétales qui se produisent à un moment donné et qui peuvent influencer tous les groupes d'âge et toutes les cohortes de manière similaire. Par exemple, une crise économique majeure, une guerre, une élection particulièrement controversée, un mouvement social d'ampleur, ou une pandémie mondiale (comme le COVID-19) peuvent tous être considérés comme des facteurs de période. Ces événements ont le potentiel de changer les attitudes et les comportements politiques indépendamment de l'âge ou de la cohorte d'une personne. Dans le contexte de la participation politique, l'effet de période pourrait se manifester de plusieurs façons. Par exemple, pendant une crise économique majeure, les gens de tous âges et de toutes cohortes peuvent être plus susceptibles de participer à la politique pour exprimer leur mécontentement ou soutenir les politiques de changement. De même, lors d'élections très polarisées ou controversées, les taux de participation peuvent augmenter à travers tous les groupes d'âge et de cohortes.

L'effet de période dans le contexte politique suisse à partir de 1995, est un exemple illustratif de comment les changements globaux dans le climat politique d'une nation peuvent influencer la participation électorale de l'ensemble de sa population, indépendamment de l'âge ou de la cohorte. La politisation croissante et la polarisation de la politique suisse ont créé un environnement plus compétitif et conflictuel, poussant davantage de personnes à participer activement à la politique. La perception d'enjeux plus importants et plus clairement définis a probablement incité davantage de personnes à voter, car elles peuvent ressentir que leur voix a un impact plus significatif sur les résultats. De plus, l'effet de période peut également être renforcé par les changements dans la communication politique et l'accès à l'information. Avec l'essor des médias sociaux et des plateformes de nouvelles en ligne, l'engagement politique peut être plus accessible et immédiat, ce qui peut également contribuer à une augmentation de la participation électorale.

Différenciation entre l'Effet d'Âge, l'Effet de Cohorte et l'Effet de Période[modifier | modifier le wikicode]

Distinguer l'effet d'âge, l'effet de cohorte et l'effet de période peut être un véritable défi en sciences sociales, notamment en politique. Ces trois effets sont souvent entrelacés et peuvent se renforcer mutuellement, ce qui rend difficile leur distinction claire dans l'analyse d'une seule enquête ou élection.

L'effet d'âge est lié à l'évolution personnelle et à l'expérience, l'effet de cohorte est influencé par les événements sociopolitiques qui se sont produits pendant la jeunesse d'un individu, et l'effet de période est le reflet de l'impact d'événements ou de tendances larges et générales qui influencent toutes les générations simultanément. Tous ces effets peuvent avoir un impact sur les attitudes et les comportements politiques d'un individu. Par exemple, une personne née dans les années 60 pourrait avoir des attitudes politiques différentes de celle née dans les années 80 (effet de cohorte), mais leur comportement électoral pourrait également changer à mesure qu'ils vieillissent (effet d'âge). De plus, les événements politiques majeurs peuvent influencer le comportement de vote de tous les âges et cohortes (effet de période). Par conséquent, pour distinguer ces effets, il est souvent nécessaire de réaliser des études longitudinales, qui suivent les mêmes individus ou groupes d'individus sur de longues périodes. De telles études peuvent aider à isoler l'effet de l'âge, de la cohorte et de la période en contrôlant les autres variables.

L'identification précise des effets d'âge, de cohorte et de période nécessite des séries temporelles de longue durée. Ces types de données permettent aux chercheurs d'observer les mêmes individus ou groupes d'individus sur une longue période, leur permettant de suivre les changements dans les attitudes et comportements politiques au fil du temps. Avec une série temporelle de longue durée, les chercheurs peuvent essayer de contrôler ou d'ajuster pour les effets de cohorte et de période, afin de mieux isoler et comprendre l'effet d'âge. De même, ils peuvent également essayer de contrôler l'effet d'âge pour mieux comprendre l'effet de cohorte et de période. Par exemple, ils peuvent comparer les attitudes politiques des individus nés à différentes époques mais à un âge similaire, ou ils peuvent comparer les attitudes des individus du même groupe d'âge à différents moments. Cependant, même avec des séries temporelles de longue durée, il peut être difficile de distinguer parfaitement ces effets en raison de leur nature entrelacée. Néanmoins, ces types de données fournissent un outil précieux pour étudier et comprendre les influences complexes sur les attitudes et comportements politiques.

Il est essentiel d'apprécier la complexité des études sur la participation politique. Alors que les facteurs tels que l'âge et le sexe sont certainement importants et ont été démontrés avoir des impacts significatifs sur la participation politique, il y a beaucoup d'autres variables à prendre en compte. Ces variables peuvent inclure l'éducation, le revenu, l'emploi, la race, l'ethnie, la religion, l'emplacement géographique, l'orientation politique, la satisfaction avec le gouvernement, la confiance dans les institutions politiques, l'intérêt pour la politique, et plus encore. Chacune de ces variables peut interagir avec les autres de manière complexe, influençant la participation politique d'une manière qui peut être difficile à prédire sans un modèle détaillé. De plus, il est également important de noter que la participation politique elle-même peut prendre de nombreuses formes, allant du vote aux manifestations, en passant par l'activisme en ligne ou le bénévolat pour une campagne politique. Ainsi, tout en reconnaissant le poids des facteurs tels que l'âge et le sexe, il est également crucial d'adopter une approche multidimensionnelle pour comprendre la participation politique, une qui tient compte de la variété des facteurs qui peuvent l'influencer et des différentes formes qu'elle peut prendre.

Annexes[modifier | modifier le wikicode]

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