« The reason of State » : différence entre les versions

De Baripedia
Aucun résumé des modifications
 
(7 versions intermédiaires par le même utilisateur non affichées)
Ligne 11 : Ligne 11 :
{{hidden
{{hidden
|[[Introduction to Political Science]]
|[[Introduction to Political Science]]
|[[La pensée sociale d'Émile Durkheim et Pierre Bourdieu]] ● [[Aux origines de la chute de la République de Weimar]] ● [[La pensée sociale de Max Weber et Vilfredo Pareto]] ● [[La notion de « concept » en sciences-sociales]] ● [[Histoire de la discipline de la science politique : théories et conceptions]] ● [[Marxisme et Structuralisme]] ● [[Fonctionnalisme et Systémisme]] ● [[Interactionnisme et Constructivisme]] ● [[Les théories de l’anthropologie politique]] ● [[Le débat des trois I : intérêts, institutions et idées]] ● [[La théorie du choix rationnel et l'analyse des intérêts en science politique]] ● [[Approche analytique des institutions en science politique]] ● [[L'étude des idées et idéologies dans la science politique]] ● [[Les théories de la guerre en science politique]] ● [[La Guerre : conceptions et évolutions]] ● [[La raison d’État]] ● [[État, souveraineté, mondialisation, gouvernance multiniveaux]] ● [[Les théories de la violence en science politique]] ● [[Welfare State et biopouvoir]] ● [[Analyse des régimes démocratiques et des processus de démocratisation]] ● [[Systèmes Électoraux : Mécanismes, Enjeux et Conséquences]] ● [[Le système de gouvernement des démocraties]] ● [[Morphologie des contestations]] ● [[L’action dans la théorie politique]] ● [[Introduction à la politique suisse]] ● [[Introduction au comportement politique]] ● [[Analyse des Politiques Publiques : définition et cycle d'une politique publique]] ● [[Analyse des Politiques Publiques : mise à l'agenda et formulation]] ● [[Analyse des Politiques Publiques : mise en œuvre et évaluation]] ● [[Introduction à la sous-discipline des relations internationales]]
|[[Intellectual legacy of Émile Durkheim and Pierre Bourdieu in social theory]] ● [[The origins of the fall of the Weimar Republic]] ● [[Intellectual legacy of Max Weber and Vilfredo Pareto in social theory]] ● [[The notion of "concept" in social sciences]] ● [[History of the discipline of political science: theories and concepts]] ● [[Marxism and Structuralism]] ● [[Functionalism and Systemism]] ● [[Interactionism and Constructivism]] ● [[The theories of political anthropology]] ● [[The three I's debate: interests, institutions and ideas]] ● [[Rational choice theory and the analysis of interests in political science]] ● [[An analytical approach to institutions in political science]] ● [[The study of ideas and ideologies in political science]] ● [[Theories of war in political science]] ● [[The War: Concepts and Evolutions]] ● [[The reason of State]] ● [[State, sovereignty, globalization and multi-level governance]] ● [[Theories of violence in political science‎‎]] ● [[Welfare State and Biopower]] ● [[Analysis of democratic regimes and democratisation processes]] ● [[Electoral Systems: Mechanisms, Issues and Consequences]] ● [[The system of government in democracies]] ● [[Morphology of contestations]] ● [[Action in Political Theory]] ● [[Introduction to Swiss politics]] ● [[Introduction to political behaviour]] ● [[Public Policy Analysis: Definition and cycle of public policy]] ● [[Public Policy Analysis: agenda setting and formulation]] ● [[Public Policy Analysis: Implementation and Evaluation]] ● [[Introduction to the sub-discipline of international relations]] ● [[Introduction to Political Theory]]  
|headerstyle=background:#ffffff
|headerstyle=background:#ffffff
|style=text-align:center;
|style=text-align:center;
}}
}}


The "raison d'État" refers to a principle of governance according to which the State has the right and the obligation to take decisions that are in the supreme interest of the country, even if these decisions are contrary to other considerations, such as moral, religious or international laws. In practice, the raison d'Etat has often been used to justify actions that would otherwise be considered immoral or illegal. For example, a government might justify declaring war, spying or suspending certain civil liberties in the name of raison d'État.
The "raison d'État" refers to a principle of governance according to which the State has the right and the obligation to take decisions that are in the supreme interest of the country, even if these decisions are contrary to other considerations, such as moral, religious or international laws. In practice, the raison d'Etat has often been used to justify actions that would otherwise be considered immoral or illegal. For example, a government might justify declaring war, spying or suspending certain civil liberties in the name of raison d'État.
Ligne 72 : Ligne 70 :


== Machiavelli (1469 - 1627): Conceptualisation of the reason of State ==
== Machiavelli (1469 - 1627): Conceptualisation of the reason of State ==
{{Article détaillé|La Renaissance italienne}}
 
[[Fichier:Santi di Tito - Niccolo Machiavelli's portrait.jpg|thumb|right|200px|His posthumous portrait by Santi di Tito, in Florence's Palazzo Vecchio.]]
[[Fichier:Santi di Tito - Niccolo Machiavelli's portrait.jpg|thumb|right|200px|His posthumous portrait by Santi di Tito, in Florence's Palazzo Vecchio.]]


One of the fundamental aspects of Niccolò Machiavelli's political thought, often condensed into the expression "the end justifies the means". In his most famous work, The Prince, Machiavelli argues that to achieve and maintain power, leaders must be prepared to act in ways that might otherwise be considered immoral. However, it is important to note that Machiavelli does not advocate the complete rejection of morality. Instead, he points out that conventional morality can sometimes conflict with the demands of politics. For example, a ruler may need to use deception or force to protect the state. In this context, such actions may be justified if they contribute to a higher end, such as political stability or state security. This ties in with the idea of 'raison d'État', which suggests that in certain exceptional circumstances the state may be justified in taking action that departs from ordinary law or customary norms. However, as Machiavelli himself recognises, this presents a complex ethical and political challenge, as it can be difficult to determine when such action is truly justified and how far it can go. Machiavelli's thought has been the subject of much debate and interpretation over the centuries. Some critics see him as a cynic who advocates amorality, while others see him as a pragmatic realist who simply recognises the dilemmas and challenges of politics. Whatever the case, his ideas have had a profound influence on political theory and continue to fuel discussions on issues such as the raison d'état.
One of the fundamental aspects of Niccolò Machiavelli's political thought, often condensed into the expression "the end justifies the means". In his most famous work, The Prince, Machiavelli argues that leaders must be prepared to act in ways that might otherwise be considered immoral to achieve and maintain power. However, it is important to note that Machiavelli does not advocate the complete rejection of morality. Instead, he points out that conventional morality can sometimes conflict with the demands of politics. For example, a ruler may need to use deception or force to protect the state. In this context, such actions may be justified if they contribute to a higher end, such as political stability or state security. This ties in with the idea of 'raison d'État', which suggests that in certain exceptional circumstances the state may be justified in taking action that departs from ordinary law or customary norms. However, as Machiavelli himself recognises, this presents a complex ethical and political challenge, as it can be difficult to determine when such action is truly justified and how far it can go. Machiavelli's thought has been the subject of much debate and interpretation over the centuries. Some critics see him as a cynic who advocates amorality, while others see him as a pragmatic realist who recognises the dilemmas and challenges of politics. Whatever the case, his ideas have profoundly influenced political theory and continue to fuel discussions on issues such as the raison d'état.


Machiavelli has often been associated with the idea of cunning or deception as a strategic tool in politics. In 'The Prince', he suggests that rulers, when acting for the good of the state, may have to use concealment or manipulation to achieve their objectives. Guile, in this context, can be understood as a form of strategic intelligence, where an individual or group holds information that others do not, and uses this asymmetry of information to their advantage. This can involve misleading opponents, disguising true intentions or manipulating perceptions to gain a strategic advantage. However, it is important to note that for Machiavelli, the use of cunning is not an end in itself, but a means to a wider end, such as the stability of the state and the protection of the common good. Furthermore, while Machiavelli may seem to support a certain level of deception or manipulation in politics, he also warns that rulers should act with prudence and wisdom, and maintain the trust and respect of their subjects as much as possible.
Machiavelli has often been associated with the idea of cunning or deception as a strategic tool in politics. In 'The Prince', he suggests that rulers, when acting for the good of the state, may have to use concealment or manipulation to achieve their objectives. Guile, in this context, can be understood as a form of strategic intelligence, where an individual or group holds information that others do not, and uses this asymmetry of information to their advantage. This can involve misleading opponents, disguising true intentions or manipulating perceptions to gain a strategic advantage. However, it is important to note that for Machiavelli, the use of cunning is not an end in itself, but a means to a wider end, such as the stability of the state and the protection of the common good. Furthermore, while Machiavelli may seem to support a certain level of deception or manipulation in politics, he also warns that rulers should act with prudence and wisdom, and maintain the trust and respect of their subjects as much as possible.
Ligne 85 : Ligne 83 :
From Machiavelli's perspective, political action may sometimes require going beyond the traditional frameworks of law and morality in order to achieve the most important objectives, such as the stability of the state. This is where the notion of 'reason of state' connects with his philosophy. Machiavelli recognises that politics, particularly at a high level such as that of the ruler of a state, can involve complex dilemmas where strict adherence to rules and norms can conflict with the practical demands of power and the survival of the state. This is not to say that Machiavelli advocates a total rejection of law or morality, but rather that he sees these aspects as part of a wider set of considerations that must be taken into account when making political decisions. However, it also raises important questions about the limits of political action and the tension between the imperatives of political reality and democratic and ethical ideals. These questions, which are at the heart of the debates on raison d'État, remain relevant and contested today.
From Machiavelli's perspective, political action may sometimes require going beyond the traditional frameworks of law and morality in order to achieve the most important objectives, such as the stability of the state. This is where the notion of 'reason of state' connects with his philosophy. Machiavelli recognises that politics, particularly at a high level such as that of the ruler of a state, can involve complex dilemmas where strict adherence to rules and norms can conflict with the practical demands of power and the survival of the state. This is not to say that Machiavelli advocates a total rejection of law or morality, but rather that he sees these aspects as part of a wider set of considerations that must be taken into account when making political decisions. However, it also raises important questions about the limits of political action and the tension between the imperatives of political reality and democratic and ethical ideals. These questions, which are at the heart of the debates on raison d'État, remain relevant and contested today.


== Giovanni Botero (1544 - 1617) : Contribution à la conceptualisation de la raison d'État ==
== Giovanni Botero (1544 - 1617): Contribution to the conceptualisation of the raison d'état ==


[[Fichier:Giovanni Botero.jpg|thumb|200px|Giovanni Botero.]]
[[Fichier:Giovanni Botero.jpg|thumb|200px|Giovanni Botero.]]


Giovanni Botero est un personnage clé dans le développement du concept de "raison d'État". Né en 1544 dans le Piémont, en Italie, il a été un diplomate, un prêtre jésuite et un écrivain influent sur des sujets allant de l'économie à la géographie et à la politique. Son œuvre la plus célèbre, "Della ragion di Stato" (De la raison d'État), publiée pour la première fois en 1589, a joué un rôle crucial dans la formulation de ce concept. Dans ce traité, Botero explique que la survie et le succès de l'État dépendent d'une combinaison de prudence, de politique et de morale. Il affirme que les dirigeants doivent parfois agir en fonction de considérations pragmatiques qui peuvent dépasser les normes juridiques ou éthiques traditionnelles. Cependant, contrairement à Machiavel, Botero insiste sur le fait que la raison d'État doit toujours être guidée par des principes chrétiens et moraux. Pour lui, la véritable raison d'État est celle qui sert le bien commun et qui est conforme à la loi divine. Ainsi, bien que Botero et Machiavel puissent tous deux être vus comme des contributeurs importants à la théorie de la raison d'État, ils offrent des perspectives différentes sur la relation entre la politique, la morale et le pouvoir. Ces perspectives ont eu une influence profonde sur la pensée politique et continuent d'informer les débats actuels sur des questions comme la raison d'État et l'éthique en politique.
Giovanni Botero is a key figure in the development of the concept of 'raison d'État'. Born in 1544 in Piedmont, Italy, he was a diplomat, Jesuit priest and influential writer on subjects ranging from economics to geography and politics. His most famous work, 'Della ragion di Stato' (On the Reason of State), first published in 1589, played a crucial role in formulating this concept. In this treatise, Botero explains that the survival and success of the state depend on a combination of prudence, politics and morality. He argues that rulers must sometimes act according to pragmatic considerations that may go beyond traditional legal or ethical norms. However, unlike Machiavelli, Botero insists that the reason of state must always be guided by Christian and moral principles. For him, the true reason of State is that which serves the common good and is in accordance with divine law. So while Botero and Machiavelli can both be seen as important contributors to the theory of raison d'état, they offer different perspectives on the relationship between politics, morality and power. These perspectives have had a profound influence on political thought and continue to inform current debates on issues such as reason of state and ethics in politics.
 
Giovanni Botero a été l'un des premiers penseurs à se concentrer sur la construction et l'efficacité du pouvoir d'État. Il s'est intéressé à la manière dont les États peuvent se développer et maintenir leur puissance, en particulier par le biais de l'économie et de la démographie. Pour Botero, la puissance d'un État ne dépendait pas seulement de la taille de son territoire ou de son armée, mais aussi de la richesse et du bien-être de sa population. Il a donc été l'un des premiers à souligner l'importance des facteurs économiques et sociaux dans le renforcement du pouvoir d'État. Dans le cadre de la raison d'État, Botero a soutenu que les dirigeants devaient prendre des décisions pragmatiques pour assurer la survie et la prospérité de leurs États. Cela pouvait parfois nécessiter des actions qui dépassaient les normes juridiques ou éthiques traditionnelles. Cependant, contrairement à Machiavel, Botero a également insisté sur l'importance des principes moraux et chrétiens dans la gouvernance, affirmant que la véritable raison d'État devait toujours servir le bien commun et respecter la loi divine. Cette combinaison de pragmatisme politique et d'engagement moral a fait de la pensée de Botero une influence majeure sur la théorie politique, et son concept de raison d'État reste pertinent pour les discussions contemporaines sur le pouvoir, l'éthique et la gouvernance.
Giovanni Botero was one of the first thinkers to focus on the construction and effectiveness of state power. He was interested in how states can develop and maintain their power, particularly through economics and demography. For Botero, the power of a state depended not only on the size of its territory or its army, but also on the wealth and well-being of its population. He was therefore one of the first to stress the importance of economic and social factors in strengthening state power. As part of the raison d'état, Botero argued that leaders had to take pragmatic decisions to ensure the survival and prosperity of their states. This might sometimes require actions that went beyond traditional legal or ethical norms. However, unlike Machiavelli, Botero also insisted on the importance of moral and Christian principles in governance, asserting that the true reason of state must always serve the common good and respect divine law. This combination of political pragmatism and moral commitment has made Botero's thought a major influence on political theory, and his concept of raison d'État remains relevant to contemporary discussions of power, ethics and governance.
 
Giovanni Botero, en tant que prêtre jésuite, a incorporé des principes théologiques dans sa conception de la raison d'État. Pour lui, l'exercice du pouvoir, y compris l'application de la raison d'État, devrait être guidé par les principes et les enseignements de la foi chrétienne. Botero a affirmé que les dirigeants, en particulier ceux qui exercent un pouvoir exceptionnel en vertu de la raison d'État, ont le devoir de respecter la parole de Dieu et de suivre ses commandements. Ils doivent s'efforcer de réaliser les objectifs divins pour l'humanité, ce qui signifie promouvoir le bien commun, maintenir la justice et la paix, et protéger les faibles et les vulnérables. Dans cette perspective, la raison d'État ne peut pas être utilisée comme une excuse pour agir de manière arbitraire ou injuste. Au contraire, elle doit toujours être utilisée d'une manière qui est compatible avec la loi divine et qui favorise le bien-être de la communauté. C'est une vision de la raison d'État qui diffère de celle de Machiavel et d'autres théoriciens politiques plus séculiers. Elle met l'accent sur la responsabilité morale et spirituelle des dirigeants et sur l'importance de la foi et de la vertu dans la politique. Cette vision a influencé le développement ultérieur de la théorie politique, en particulier au sein de la tradition de la philosophie politique chrétienne.
As a Jesuit priest, Giovanni Botero incorporated theological principles into his conception of the raison d'état. For him, the exercise of power, including the application of raison d'état, should be guided by the principles and teachings of the Christian faith. Botero asserted that leaders, especially those who exercise exceptional power by virtue of the raison d'état, have a duty to respect the word of God and follow his commandments. They must strive to achieve God's objectives for humanity, which means promoting the common good, maintaining justice and peace, and protecting the weak and vulnerable. From this perspective, the reason of State cannot be used as an excuse to act arbitrarily or unjustly. On the contrary, it must always be used in a way that is compatible with divine law and promotes the well-being of the community. This is a vision of the reason of state that differs from that of Machiavelli and other more secular political theorists. It emphasises the moral and spiritual responsibility of rulers and the importance of faith and virtue in politics. This vision influenced the subsequent development of political theory, particularly within the tradition of Christian political philosophy.
 
Giovanni Botero et Niccolò Machiavel ont des perspectives différentes sur la raison d'État en relation avec la moralité. Machiavel est souvent interprété comme mettant de côté les considérations morales traditionnelles au profit d'un pragmatisme politique, selon lequel la fin (la stabilité et le succès de l'État) justifie les moyens. Son approche est parfois qualifiée d'amorale dans le sens où elle ne se conforme pas à la moralité conventionnelle. Botero, en revanche, insiste sur l'importance de la moralité, spécifiquement de la moralité chrétienne, dans la politique. Pour lui, la raison d'État n'est pas une excuse pour agir de manière immorale ou injuste, mais un principe qui doit être appliqué d'une manière qui est en accord avec les commandements de Dieu et qui favorise le bien-être de la communauté. Ainsi, même si les deux hommes sont d'accord sur le fait que les dirigeants peuvent parfois devoir prendre des mesures exceptionnelles pour protéger et renforcer leur État, ils diffèrent sur la question de savoir dans quelle mesure ces actions doivent être limitées par la morale et l'éthique.
Giovanni Botero and Niccolò Machiavelli have different perspectives on the reason of state in relation to morality. Machiavelli is often interpreted as setting aside traditional moral considerations in favour of political pragmatism, according to which the end (the stability and success of the state) justifies the means. His approach is sometimes described as amoral, in the sense that it does not conform to conventional morality. Botero, on the other hand, insists on the importance of morality, specifically Christian morality, in politics. For him, the raison d'Etat is not an excuse for acting immorally or unjustly, but a principle that must be applied in a way that is consistent with God's commandments and promotes the well-being of the community. So while both men agree that leaders may sometimes need to take exceptional measures to protect and strengthen their state, they differ on the extent to which these actions should be constrained by morality and ethics.
 
Pour lui, l'application de la raison d'État doit toujours être guidée par des principes moraux, en particulier ceux dérivés de la foi chrétienne. Le pouvoir politique, même lorsqu'il est exercé de manière exceptionnelle en vertu de la raison d'État, n'est pas une fin en soi, mais un moyen d'atteindre les objectifs divins pour l'humanité. Cela signifie que, bien que les dirigeants puissent parfois devoir prendre des mesures qui semblent aller à l'encontre de la moralité conventionnelle ou des lois existantes, ces mesures peuvent être justifiées si elles sont en accord avec les commandements de Dieu et si elles favorisent le bien-être de la communauté.
For him, the application of the reason of State must always be guided by moral principles, in particular those derived from the Christian faith. Political power, even when it is exercised exceptionally by virtue of the raison d'état, is not an end in itself, but a means of achieving divine objectives for humanity. This means that, although rulers may sometimes have to take measures that appear to go against conventional morality or existing laws, these measures can be justified if they are in accordance with God's commandments and if they promote the well-being of the community.
 
La conception de Botero de la raison d'État sert en quelque sorte de réponse à la vision de Machiavel. Alors que Machiavel se concentre sur l'efficacité politique et le pragmatisme, mettant de côté les considérations morales traditionnelles, Botero met l'accent sur le rôle crucial de la moralité, en particulier de la moralité chrétienne, dans la gouvernance. Botero soutient que le vrai pouvoir et l'autorité proviennent de Dieu, et donc ceux qui gouvernent doivent suivre les commandements et les enseignements de Dieu. Si un dirigeant fait cela, alors il peut justifier l'utilisation de la raison d'État dans des circonstances exceptionnelles. Dans cette vision, la raison d'État n'est pas une excuse pour agir de manière amorale ou injuste, mais un principe qui doit être utilisé en accord avec les enseignements divins. C'est une perspective qui contraste fortement avec celle de Machiavel, et cela reflète les différences plus larges dans leur pensée politique.  
Botero's conception of the raison d'état serves as a kind of response to Machiavelli's vision. While Machiavelli focuses on political efficiency and pragmatism, setting aside traditional moral considerations, Botero emphasises the crucial role of morality, particularly Christian morality, in governance. Botero argues that true power and authority come from God, and therefore those who govern must follow God's commandments and teachings. If a ruler does this, then he or she can justify the use of raison d'état in exceptional circumstances. In this view, the reason of state is not an excuse for acting amoral or unjustly, but a principle that must be used in accordance with divine teachings. It is a perspective that contrasts sharply with that of Machiavelli, and reflects the wider differences in their political thinking.
 
Pour Botero, l'usage de la raison d'État est une extension du devoir du prince envers Dieu et le bien-être de son peuple. Il soutient que le prince, en utilisant la raison d'État, peut parfois devoir dépasser les lois ou les normes conventionnelles pour atteindre les objectifs supérieurs qui lui sont assignés par Dieu. Il est important de préciser que pour Botero, l'usage de la raison d'État n'est pas une licence pour l'immoralité ou l'injustice. Au contraire, le prince doit toujours chercher à agir conformément aux principes moraux et éthiques dérivés de la foi chrétienne, même lorsqu'il agit de manière exceptionnelle. Cette vision de la raison d'État comme un outil au service de la volonté divine et du bien commun est une caractéristique distinctive de la pensée politique de Botero, et elle offre un contraste intéressant avec les approches plus séculières et pragmatiques de la raison d'État.
For Botero, the use of raison d'état is an extension of the prince's duty to God and the welfare of his people. He argues that the prince, in using the reason of state, may sometimes have to go beyond conventional laws or norms in order to achieve the higher goals assigned to him by God. It is important to make it clear that for Botero, the use of raison d'état is not a licence for immorality or injustice. On the contrary, the prince must always seek to act in accordance with the moral and ethical principles derived from the Christian faith, even when acting in exceptional circumstances. This vision of raison d'État as a tool at the service of the divine will and the common good is a distinctive feature of Botero's political thought, and provides an interesting contrast with more secular and pragmatic approaches to raison d'État.
 
Botero est l'un des premiers penseurs à développer une théorie de l'État moderne et à explorer les conditions d'application de la raison d'État. Il est préoccupé par la question de savoir comment construire et maintenir un État puissant et efficace qui peut répondre aux défis et aux crises sans compromettre les principes moraux fondamentaux. Pour Botero, la raison d'État est un instrument essentiel à la disposition du prince pour gérer ces situations exceptionnelles. Cependant, son utilisation doit toujours être guidée par une compréhension profonde de la volonté divine et des besoins de la communauté. Il suggère également que l'État moderne doit être organisé de manière à faciliter l'application efficace et éthique de la raison d'État. Cela implique une structure de gouvernance solide, une administration compétente, et une population qui est à la fois bien gouvernée et moralement vertueuse. En somme, la vision de Botero de la raison d'État est profondément enracinée dans sa conception plus large de l'État moderne et de ses exigences. Cela fait de lui une figure importante dans le développement de la théorie politique moderne.  
Botero was one of the first thinkers to develop a theory of the modern state and to explore the conditions for applying the raison d'état. He is concerned with the question of how to build and maintain a powerful and effective state that can respond to challenges and crises without compromising fundamental moral principles. For Botero, raison d'État is an essential instrument available to the prince to manage these exceptional situations. However, its use must always be guided by a deep understanding of the divine will and the needs of the community. He also suggests that the modern state must be organised in such a way as to facilitate the effective and ethical application of the raison d'État. This implies a solid governance structure, a competent administration, and a population that is both well governed and morally virtuous. In short, Botero's vision of the raison d'État is deeply rooted in his broader conception of the modern state and its requirements. This makes him an important figure in the development of modern political theory.  
 
Botero propose que la raison d'État peut être invoquée en temps de crise grave, notamment lors de guerres civiles. Ces situations exceptionnelles peuvent menacer l'existence même de l'État et la stabilité de la société, nécessitant des mesures extraordinaires pour restaurer l'ordre et la paix. Botero suggère que dans de tels cas, le prince peut être obligé d'outrepasser les lois ordinaires ou les normes éthiques conventionnelles pour préserver l'État et ses citoyens. Cependant, même dans ces circonstances extrêmes, le prince n'est pas libéré de toute contrainte morale. Au contraire, ses actions doivent toujours être guidées par les principes divins et viser le bien-être de la communauté. Ainsi, pour Botero, la raison d'État n'est pas une licence pour l'arbitraire ou l'injustice, mais un principe qui peut justifier des actions extraordinaires dans des circonstances extraordinaires, toujours avec le respect des commandements de Dieu et la promotion du bien commun comme objectifs ultimes.
Botero proposes that raison d'État can be invoked in times of serious crisis, such as civil wars. These exceptional situations can threaten the very existence of the state and the stability of society, requiring extraordinary measures to restore order and peace. Botero suggests that in such cases, the prince may be obliged to go beyond ordinary laws or conventional ethical norms in order to preserve the state and its citizens. However, even in these extreme circumstances, the prince is not free from moral restraint. On the contrary, his actions must always be guided by divine principles and aimed at the well-being of the community. Thus, for Botero, the raison d'État is not a licence for arbitrariness or injustice, but a principle that can justify extraordinary actions in extraordinary circumstances, always with respect for God's commandments and the promotion of the common good as the ultimate objectives.
 
Le paradoxe de Botero est qu’il légitime l’action du prince sur le religieux, mais en même temps il est prêt à définir comme moral des actes qui n’ont rien d’humain. Ce paradoxe est l'un des aspects les plus controversés de la pensée de Botero. D'une part, il insiste sur le fait que la raison d'État doit toujours être guidée par des principes moraux et théologiques. D'autre part, il reconnaît que l'application de la raison d'État peut parfois nécessiter des actions qui, dans d'autres contextes, seraient considérées comme immorales ou inhumaines. Botero semble résoudre ce paradoxe en soutenant que la nécessité exceptionnelle – comme celle qui peut survenir lors d'une guerre civile ou d'une autre crise grave – peut justifier des actions qui seraient autrement inacceptables. Il considère que dans de telles situations, le bien commun et la survie de l'État peuvent exiger des mesures extraordinaires, même si elles impliquent une certaine souffrance ou un préjudice. Cependant, il est important de noter que pour Botero, même dans ces circonstances extrêmes, le prince n'est pas exempt de toute contrainte morale. Il doit toujours chercher à minimiser le préjudice causé et à agir conformément à la volonté divine, telle qu'il la comprend. C'est une approche qui peut sembler paradoxale, mais qui est cohérente avec sa vision de l'État et de la morale politiques.
Botero's paradox is that he legitimises the prince's action on religious grounds, but at the same time he is prepared to define as moral acts that have nothing human about them. This paradox is one of the most controversial aspects of Botero's thinking. On the one hand, he insists that the reason of State must always be guided by moral and theological principles. On the other hand, he acknowledges that the application of raison d'état may sometimes require actions that, in other contexts, would be considered immoral or inhumane. Botero seems to resolve this paradox by arguing that exceptional necessity - such as might arise in a civil war or other serious crisis - can justify actions that would otherwise be unacceptable. He considers that in such situations, the common good and the survival of the state may require extraordinary measures, even if they involve some suffering or harm. However, it is important to note that for Botero, even in these extreme circumstances, the prince is not free from moral constraint. He must always seek to minimise the harm caused and act in accordance with the divine will, as he understands it. It is an approach that may seem paradoxical, but it is consistent with his vision of the state and political morality.
 
En partant d’un apriori conceptuel limité, le prince est moral alors il peut appliquer la raison d’État. Si le prince est fondamentalement immoral, il peut dès lors user de la raison d’État l’utilisant pour assouvir ses propres intérêts au nom de Dieu. C'est une préoccupation importante concernant la théorie de Botero de la raison d'État. En effet, il existe un risque qu'un prince immoral puisse détourner la notion de raison d'État pour justifier des actions qui servent ses propres intérêts plutôt que le bien commun. Il pourrait, par exemple, prétendre agir au nom de la volonté divine ou de la préservation de l'État, tout en poursuivant en réalité des objectifs égoïstes ou tyranniques. C'est un problème qui se pose dans toutes les théories politiques qui autorisent une certaine flexibilité ou discrétion dans l'application des règles morales ou juridiques. Comment s'assurer que cette latitude ne sera pas abusée ? Comment garantir que les dirigeants resteront fidèles aux principes éthiques fondamentaux et ne se serviront pas de la raison d'État comme prétexte pour le pouvoir arbitraire ? Botero, comme beaucoup d'autres penseurs politiques, tente de résoudre ce problème en insistant sur la nécessité d'un contrôle moral et religieux rigoureux sur le prince. Selon lui, le prince doit être profondément conscient de ses devoirs envers Dieu et la communauté, et doit toujours chercher à servir le bien commun plutôt que ses propres intérêts. Cependant, il reste une question ouverte de savoir comment cela peut être assuré en pratique, surtout en l'absence de mécanismes de contrôle démocratique efficaces.
Starting from a limited conceptual apriori, the prince is moral, so he can apply the reason of State. If the prince is fundamentally immoral, then he can use raison d'Etat to further his own interests in the name of God. This is a major concern with Botero's theory of raison d'Etat. Indeed, there is a risk that an immoral prince could misuse the notion of raison d'Etat to justify actions that serve his own interests rather than the common good. He could, for example, claim to be acting in the name of the divine will or the preservation of the state, while in reality pursuing selfish or tyrannical objectives. This is a problem that arises in all political theories that allow a degree of flexibility or discretion in the application of moral or legal rules. How can we ensure that this latitude is not abused? How can we guarantee that rulers will remain faithful to fundamental ethical principles and not use the reason of State as a pretext for arbitrary power? Botero, like many other political thinkers, attempts to solve this problem by insisting on the need for rigorous moral and religious control over the prince. In his view, the prince must be acutely aware of his duties towards God and the community, and must always seek to serve the common good rather than his own interests. However, it remains an open question how this can be ensured in practice, especially in the absence of effective democratic control mechanisms.
 
L'un des présupposés fondamentaux de l'argument de Botero en faveur de la raison d'État semble être que les citoyens ordinaires peuvent manquer de la rationalité nécessaire pour comprendre et gérer les problèmes complexes auxquels l'État est confronté, en particulier en période de crise ou d'urgence. Selon cette perspective, la raison d'État peut être vue comme un mécanisme permettant de rétablir l'ordre et la rationalité lorsque la population n'est pas en mesure de le faire elle-même. Cela peut impliquer des actions qui semblent "déraisonnables" ou arbitraires à première vue, mais qui sont justifiées par la nécessité de préserver la stabilité et le bien-être de l'État dans son ensemble. Cela dit cette approche a de sérieuses limites. Elle peut facilement être utilisée pour justifier des abus de pouvoir ou pour contourner les principes démocratiques. De plus, elle repose sur une vision plutôt pessimiste de la capacité des citoyens à prendre des décisions éclairées et à participer de manière significative à la gouvernance de leur propre société. Dans ce sens, la théorie de Botero, tout en ayant des implications importantes pour la compréhension de la politique et du pouvoir, doit être abordée avec prudence.
One of the fundamental assumptions of Botero's argument for raison d'Etat seems to be that ordinary citizens may lack the rationality to understand and manage the complex problems facing the state, particularly in times of crisis or emergency. From this perspective, raison d'État can be seen as a mechanism for restoring order and rationality when the population is unable to do so itself. This may involve actions that appear 'unreasonable' or arbitrary at first sight, but which are justified by the need to preserve the stability and well-being of the state as a whole. That said, this approach has serious limitations. It can easily be used to justify abuses of power or to circumvent democratic principles. What's more, it is based on a rather pessimistic view of citizens' ability to make informed decisions and participate meaningfully in the governance of their own society. In this sense, Botero's theory, while having important implications for our understanding of politics and power, must be approached with caution.
 
L'idée de raison d'État suggère que dans certaines situations, notamment celles où l'ordre social ou la sécurité de l'État sont menacés, des mesures extraordinaires peuvent être nécessaires. Ces mesures peuvent aller au-delà de ce qui est normalement permis par la loi ou l'éthique conventionnelle. L'objectif est de protéger l'État et ses citoyens contre des menaces importantes. Cependant, il est crucial de souligner que même en cas d'urgence ou de crise, il y a des limites à ce qu'un gouvernement peut justifier au nom de la raison d'État. Par exemple, les droits de l'homme et les principes démocratiques de base ne doivent jamais être violés. De plus, l'usage de la raison d'État doit être temporaire et spécifique à la crise ou à la menace en cours. Une fois que la crise est passée, le gouvernement doit revenir à l'ordre juridique normal. Par ailleurs, l'utilisation de la raison d'État nécessite une grande prudence et un contrôle rigoureux, afin d'éviter les abus de pouvoir. Les dirigeants doivent être tenus responsables de leurs actions et les décisions prises au nom de la raison d'État doivent être transparentes et sujettes à un examen minutieux. Dans une démocratie, cela implique un rôle actif des médias, de la société civile et des institutions de contrôle, comme les tribunaux.
The idea of raison d'état suggests that in certain situations, notably those where social order or state security are threatened, extraordinary measures may be necessary. These measures may go beyond what is normally permitted by law or conventional ethics. The aim is to protect the state and its citizens against major threats. However, it is crucial to emphasise that even in an emergency or crisis, there are limits to what a government can justify in the name of raison d'état. For example, human rights and basic democratic principles must never be violated. In addition, the use of raison d'État must be temporary and specific to the crisis or threat at hand. Once the crisis has passed, the government must return to the normal legal order. Furthermore, the use of raison d'État requires great caution and rigorous control, to avoid abuses of power. Leaders must be held accountable for their actions, and decisions taken in the name of raison d'État must be transparent and subject to scrutiny. In a democracy, this implies an active role for the media, civil society and institutions of control, such as the courts.
 
Historiquement, l'état de guerre a été l'un des moments où la raison d'État a été le plus couramment invoquée. Dans ces moments de crise extrême, l'État peut se voir contraint de prendre des mesures extraordinaires pour assurer sa survie. Cela peut impliquer, par exemple, des restrictions temporaires aux libertés civiles, la mobilisation de ressources de manière inhabituelle, ou la mise en œuvre de stratégies militaires qui pourraient autrement être considérées comme inacceptables. L'objectif est toujours de protéger l'État et ses citoyens contre la menace imminente. Cependant, comme mentionné précédemment, même en temps de guerre, il est crucial que les actions entreprises au nom de la raison d'État respectent certains principes fondamentaux, comme le respect des droits de l'homme, la proportionnalité des mesures prises et leur caractère temporaire. De plus, ces actions doivent toujours être sujettes à un examen et à un contrôle rigoureux pour éviter les abus de pouvoir. Enfin, il convient de noter que la raison d'État ne se limite pas aux situations de guerre. Elle peut également être invoquée dans d'autres situations de crise, comme les urgences sanitaires ou les catastrophes naturelles, lorsque l'ordre normal doit être temporairement suspendu pour faire face à la situation.
Historically, the state of war has been one of the times when the raison d'Etat has been most commonly invoked. At times of extreme crisis, the state may be forced to take extraordinary measures to ensure its survival. This may involve, for example, temporary restrictions on civil liberties, the mobilisation of resources in unusual ways, or the implementation of military strategies that might otherwise be considered unacceptable. The aim is always to protect the state and its citizens from the imminent threat. However, as mentioned above, even in times of war, it is crucial that actions taken in the name of raison d'Etat respect certain fundamental principles, such as respect for human rights, the proportionality of the measures taken and their temporary nature. Furthermore, such actions must always be subject to rigorous scrutiny and control to avoid abuses of power. Finally, it should be noted that the raison d'Etat is not limited to situations of war. It can also be invoked in other crisis situations, such as health emergencies or natural disasters, when the normal order must be temporarily suspended to deal with the situation.
Pour Giovanni Botero, comme pour de nombreux autres penseurs politiques de son époque, l'armée et la capacité à mener la guerre étaient considérées comme des éléments essentiels du pouvoir et de l'autorité de l'État. C'est aussi à travers la conduite de la guerre que l'État pourrait parfois être amené à exercer la raison d'État, en prenant des décisions exceptionnelles pour assurer sa survie et sa sécurité. Dans le contexte de la guerre, la raison d'État pourrait être invoquée pour justifier des stratégies militaires inhabituelles, l'utilisation de ressources de manière non conventionnelle, voire des actions qui pourraient autrement être considérées comme contraires au droit international. Cependant, il est important de souligner que l'utilisation de la raison d'État dans ce contexte doit toujours être proportionnée, temporaire et respecter les droits fondamentaux des individus, y compris ceux des ennemis. En outre, la capacité à maintenir une armée forte et efficace est souvent considérée comme une manifestation de la puissance de l'État et de sa capacité à protéger ses citoyens, ce qui est aussi un élément important de la raison d'État. Une armée puissante peut dissuader les attaques étrangères, maintenir l'ordre interne et garantir la souveraineté et l'indépendance de l'État.
La raison d’État, dans son évolution, s'est progressivement séparée de sa base théologique pour devenir un concept plus largement associé à la philosophie politique et aux pratiques du pouvoir de l’État. Cette évolution a été influencée par les changements dans la nature des sociétés, l’organisation de l'État et la nature des conflits et des défis auxquels les États sont confrontés. L'application de la raison d’État en tant que forme extraordinaire de gouvernance est généralement justifiée par des situations exceptionnelles, comme les crises, les guerres ou les menaces à la sécurité nationale. Ces situations requièrent souvent des réponses rapides et parfois radicales, qui peuvent dépasser les procédures et les normes habituelles de la gouvernance. Toutefois, l'invocation de la raison d’État doit toujours respecter certaines limites, notamment en termes de respect des droits de l'homme et des principes fondamentaux de la démocratie. Elle ne devrait pas être utilisée comme une excuse pour abuser du pouvoir ou violer les libertés fondamentales, mais plutôt comme un moyen de protéger l'intérêt général dans des situations extraordinaires. Il est également important de noter que l'application de la raison d’État doit toujours être temporaire, et l’État doit revenir à sa gouvernance normale dès que la situation d'urgence est résolue. Dans ce sens, la raison d’État est un outil important pour assurer la survie et la continuité de l'État, mais son utilisation doit être régulée et contrôlée pour éviter les abus.
La raison d'État est une notion qui permet à l'État, dans certaines situations exceptionnelles, d'agir de manière extraordinaire dans l'intérêt supérieur de la nation. Cela peut impliquer de prendre des décisions ou d'adopter des politiques qui dérogent à la norme ou même à la loi, si cela est jugé nécessaire pour protéger la sécurité, la stabilité, ou l'intégrité de la nation. Cependant, comme mentionné précédemment, l'utilisation de la raison d'État doit être temporaire et proportionnée à la situation, et toujours dans le respect des droits fondamentaux des citoyens. Dans une démocratie, l'usage de la raison d'État devrait aussi être soumis à des contrôles et des équilibres pour prévenir les abus de pouvoir. Par ailleurs, la raison d'État ne justifie pas les actions qui sont contraires à la morale ou à l'éthique. En effet, si l'intérêt général peut parfois nécessiter des mesures exceptionnelles, ces dernières doivent toujours respecter les principes fondamentaux de justice et de respect de la dignité humaine. C'est un sujet complexe qui a été largement débattu en philosophie politique et en science politique.
Le concept de raison d'État est intrinsèquement paradoxal. En des circonstances extraordinaires, l'État peut être amené à prendre des mesures qui vont au-delà de la norme juridique et des libertés individuelles pour protéger le bien-être général de la société. Le caractère extraordinaire de ces situations justifierait l'usage de mesures non ordinaires, selon la théorie de la raison d'État. D'un côté, il repose sur l'idée que l'État doit parfois adopter des mesures extraordinaires pour protéger l'intérêt général. Cela peut inclure la suspension temporaire de certaines libertés et droits individuels, dans des circonstances exceptionnelles comme une guerre ou une crise majeure. D'un autre côté, ces mesures extraordinaires peuvent elles-mêmes constituer une menace pour la démocratie et l'état de droit, en créant une situation où l'État agit en dehors des limites habituelles de la loi et du contrôle démocratique. Ce paradoxe est au cœur de nombreux débats en philosophie politique et en droit constitutionnel. Comment peut-on justifier des restrictions aux libertés et droits fondamentaux au nom de l'intérêt général ? Quelles sont les limites de l'action de l'État en situation exceptionnelle ? Comment peut-on assurer un contrôle démocratique et prévenir les abus de pouvoir dans ces situations ? Ces questions sont d'autant plus pertinentes dans le contexte actuel, où de nombreux pays à travers le monde ont dû adopter des mesures exceptionnelles pour faire face à des crises comme la pandémie de COVID-19.


== La guerre comme catalyseur de la raison d'État ==
For Giovanni Botero, as for many other political thinkers of his time, the army and the ability to wage war were seen as essential elements of the power and authority of the state. It was also through the conduct of war that the state could sometimes be led to exercise the raison d'état, taking exceptional decisions to ensure its survival and security. In the context of war, the raison d'Etat could be invoked to justify unusual military strategies, the use of resources in unconventional ways, or even actions that might otherwise be considered contrary to international law. However, it is important to stress that the use of raison d'Etat in this context must always be proportionate, temporary and respect the fundamental rights of individuals, including those of enemies. Furthermore, the ability to maintain a strong and effective army is often seen as a manifestation of the power of the state and its ability to protect its citizens, which is also an important element of the raison d'Etat. A powerful army can deter foreign attacks, maintain internal order and guarantee the sovereignty and independence of the state.


=== Michel Senellart (1953 - ) : Perspectives contemporaines sur le rôle de la guerre ===
In its evolution, raison d'État has gradually separated from its theological basis to become a concept more widely associated with political philosophy and the practices of state power. This evolution has been influenced by changes in the nature of societies, the organisation of the state and the nature of the conflicts and challenges facing states. The application of raison d'État as an extraordinary form of governance is generally justified by exceptional situations, such as crises, wars or threats to national security. These situations often require rapid and sometimes radical responses, which may go beyond the usual procedures and norms of governance. However, the invocation of raison d'Etat must always respect certain limits, particularly in terms of respect for human rights and the fundamental principles of democracy. It should not be used as an excuse to abuse power or violate fundamental freedoms, but rather as a means of protecting the general interest in extraordinary situations. It is also important to note that the application of raison d'État must always be temporary, and the state must return to normal governance as soon as the emergency situation is resolved. In this sense, raison d'État is an important tool for ensuring the survival and continuity of the state, but its use must be regulated and controlled to avoid abuse.  
Michel Senellart est un philosophe français contemporain, spécialiste de la philosophie politique et de l'histoire des idées politiques. Sa vision de la raison d’État se concentre beaucoup sur l'idée que l'État a parfois besoin de s'éloigner de la norme pour répondre à des crises majeures, comme la guerre.


Selon Senellart, la raison d’État n’est autre chose qu’une contravention aux raisons ordinaires pour le respect du bien public, ou pour le respect d’une plus grande et universelle raison. Cela signifie que l'État peut parfois être amené à agir de manière contraire aux normes habituelles dans l'intérêt du bien public ou pour respecter une raison plus universelle. La guerre est un exemple typique où la raison d'État peut s'appliquer selon Senellart. En temps de guerre, l'État peut être amené à prendre des mesures extraordinaires pour assurer la sécurité et le bien-être de la nation. Cela pourrait inclure des actions qui, en temps de paix, seraient considérées comme hors de l'ordinaire ou même illégales.
Reason of State is a concept that allows the State, in certain exceptional situations, to act in an extraordinary way in the best interests of the nation. This may involve taking decisions or adopting policies that deviate from the norm or even the law, if this is deemed necessary to protect the security, stability or integrity of the nation. However, as mentioned above, the use of raison d'État must be temporary and proportionate to the situation, and always respectful of the fundamental rights of citizens. In a democracy, the use of raison d'État should also be subject to checks and balances to prevent abuses of power. Moreover, the raison d'État does not justify actions that are contrary to morality or ethics. Indeed, while the general interest may sometimes require exceptional measures, these must always respect the fundamental principles of justice and respect for human dignity. This is a complex subject that has been widely debated in political philosophy and political science.


La raison d'État est souvent invoquée dans des situations d'urgence ou de crise où le fonctionnement normal de la démocratie n'est pas suffisant pour répondre à une menace grave pour l'État ou la société. Cela peut comprendre des situations de guerre, de terrorisme, de catastrophe naturelle ou de pandémie. Dans ces situations, le gouvernement peut estimer qu'il est nécessaire de prendre des mesures extraordinaires pour assurer la sécurité, le bien-être et la continuité de la nation. Cela peut impliquer de déroger temporairement à certaines normes ou lois habituelles. Cependant, l'invocation de la raison d'État doit toujours être effectuée avec précaution. La suspension ou la modification des lois ou des droits habituels doit être proportionnelle à la menace, limitée dans le temps et soumise à un contrôle judiciaire pour éviter les abus de pouvoir et préserver l'état de droit et les principes démocratiques.
The concept of raison d'État is intrinsically paradoxical. In extraordinary circumstances, the state may have to take measures that go beyond legal norms and individual freedoms in order to protect the general welfare of society. The extraordinary nature of these situations would justify the use of non-ordinary measures, according to the theory of the raison d'État. On the one hand, it is based on the idea that the state must sometimes adopt extraordinary measures to protect the general interest. This may include the temporary suspension of certain individual rights and freedoms, in exceptional circumstances such as war or a major crisis. On the other hand, these extraordinary measures may themselves pose a threat to democracy and the rule of law, by creating a situation where the state acts outside the usual bounds of the law and democratic control. This paradox is at the heart of many debates in political philosophy and constitutional law. How can restrictions on fundamental rights and freedoms be justified in the name of the general interest? What are the limits of state action in exceptional situations? How can democratic control be ensured and abuses of power prevented in such situations? These questions are all the more relevant in the current context, where many countries around the world have had to adopt exceptional measures to deal with crises such as the COVID-19 pandemic.


=== Scipione Ammirato (1531 - 1601) : La guerre et la raison d'État ===
== War as a catalyst for the raison d'État ==
Scipione Ammirato était un historien italien de la fin du 16ème siècle. Sa vision de la raison d'État est moins connue que celle de penseurs comme Machiavel ou Botero, mais elle reflète l'idée que dans certaines circonstances, le bien-être de l'État pourrait nécessiter des actions extraordinaires, souvent associées à des situations de conflit ou de guerre. En effet, la guerre est un contexte dans lequel les dirigeants sont souvent confrontés à des décisions difficiles qui peuvent nécessiter de déroger aux règles et pratiques normales pour préserver la sécurité et l'intégrité de l'État. C'est dans ce contexte que la notion de raison d'État peut être invoquée pour justifier de telles actions. Dans le contexte de la guerre, l'application de la raison d'État peut prendre plusieurs formes, comme l'imposition de la loi martiale, la restriction des libertés civiles, la réquisition de biens privés, la mobilisation de la population pour l'effort de guerre, etc.


Dans le contexte de conflits avec d'autres nations ou groupes, notamment religieux, la raison d'État peut être invoquée pour justifier certaines actions ou politiques extraordinaires visant à protéger l'intégrité, la sécurité et les intérêts de l'État. L'application de la raison d'État peut prendre de nombreuses formes dans ces contextes, y compris des politiques de sécurité renforcées, des restrictions sur certaines libertés civiles, des efforts diplomatiques extraordinaires, des mesures de défense militaire, etc. Dans certains cas, ces mesures peuvent être controversées, car elles peuvent sembler en contradiction avec certains principes démocratiques ou droits de l'homme.  
=== Michel Senellart (1953 - ): Contemporary perspectives on the role of war ===
Michel Senellart is a contemporary French philosopher specialising in political philosophy and the history of political ideas. His vision of raison d'État focuses very much on the idea that the state sometimes needs to depart from the norm in order to respond to major crises, such as war.


La raison d'État est souvent invoquée dans les contextes de tensions internationales et de préparation à la guerre. Il s'agit de prendre des mesures extraordinaires pour protéger la sécurité et les intérêts nationaux, ce qui peut inclure la mobilisation des ressources, l'augmentation de la production militaire, la mise en place de politiques de sécurité renforcées et la coordination des efforts pour anticiper et préparer à une éventuelle guerre. Dans cette perspective, la raison d'État est perçue comme un outil de préparation à la guerre, une sorte de "guerre latente". C'est une manière de réunir les ressources de l'État et de concentrer l'attention sur un objectif commun, à savoir la défense de l'État et de ses intérêts. Cependant, il est important de souligner que l'invocation de la raison d'État pour justifier ces mesures extraordinaires doit toujours être faite de manière transparente, proportionnelle et limitée dans le temps. En outre, elle doit toujours respecter les principes de l'état de droit et les droits fondamentaux des citoyens. De plus, il est préférable d'éviter la guerre si possible, en recourant à la diplomatie, la négociation et la coopération internationale pour résoudre les conflits et les tensions. La guerre devrait toujours être le dernier recours, lorsque toutes les autres options ont été épuisées.
According to Senellart, raison d'État is nothing other than a contravention of ordinary reasons for the sake of the public good, or for the sake of a greater and more universal reason. This means that the state can sometimes be led to act in a way that is contrary to the usual norms in the interests of the public good or in order to respect a more universal reason. War is a typical example where reason of State can be applied, according to Senellart. In times of war, the state may have to take extraordinary measures to ensure the security and well-being of the nation. This could include actions that, in peacetime, would be considered out of the ordinary or even illegal.


La guerre, étant une situation exceptionnelle, souvent justifie l'utilisation de la raison d'État. C'est une période où la sécurité et l'existence même de l'État peuvent être menacées. De ce fait, des mesures extraordinaires peuvent être mises en œuvre pour protéger et préserver la nation. Il faut toutefois noter que l'usage de la raison d'État, même en temps de guerre, doit être en conformité avec les principes fondamentaux de la démocratie et les normes internationales. Cela signifie que toute action entreprise doit respecter les droits de l'homme, les principes de la justice et les règles de la guerre.
The raison d'État is often invoked in emergency or crisis situations where the normal functioning of democracy is not sufficient to respond to a serious threat to the state or society. This may include situations of war, terrorism, natural disaster or pandemic. In these situations, the government may deem it necessary to take extraordinary measures to ensure the security, well-being and continuity of the nation. This may involve temporarily derogating from certain usual norms or laws. However, invoking the raison d'État must always be done with care. The suspension or modification of customary laws or rights must be proportional to the threat, limited in time and subject to judicial review to avoid abuse of power and preserve the rule of law and democratic principles.


=== Carl Schmitt (1888 - 1985) : Réévaluation de la relation entre guerre et État ===
=== Scipione Ammirato (1531 - 1601): War and the reason of State ===
[[image:PapenSchleicher0001.jpg|thumb|right|Schmitt conseille le gouvernement von Papen (à gauche) et Schleicher (à droite) dans la question constitutionnelle.]]
Scipione Ammirato was an Italian historian of the late 16th century. His vision of the raison d'État is less well known than that of thinkers such as Machiavelli or Botero, but it reflects the idea that in certain circumstances, the well-being of the state may require extraordinary actions, often associated with situations of conflict or war. Indeed, war is a context in which leaders are often faced with difficult decisions that may require departures from normal rules and practices in order to preserve the security and integrity of the state. It is in this context that the notion of raison d'Etat can be invoked to justify such actions. In the context of war, the application of the raison d'Etat may take several forms, such as the imposition of martial law, the restriction of civil liberties, the requisition of private property, the mobilisation of the population for the war effort, etc.  


Carl Schmitt, un juriste et philosophe politique allemand, a élaboré la théorie du partisan, qui s'intéresse à une forme spécifique de combat - la guérilla, ou la lutte irrégulière. Cette théorie est surtout développée dans son ouvrage "Théorie du partisan" (1962). Selon Schmitt, le partisan est distinct du combattant régulier car il n'opère pas selon les règles conventionnelles de la guerre et n'est pas facilement identifiable. Il est enraciné dans un lieu précis (généralement son territoire local), il est extrêmement mobile, et sa loyauté est plus à une cause qu'à un État. Schmitt voyait l'apparition des partisans comme une transformation significative dans la nature de la guerre. L'impact de cette transformation sur la raison d'État est considérable. Si l'État est conçu pour gérer des conflits entre des entités clairement définies et organisées, comment peut-il gérer le type de conflit asymétrique et irrégulier que le partisan représente ? La question se complique davantage si l'on considère que le partisan peut être interne à l'État - un citoyen qui a pris les armes contre l'État pour une raison ou une autre. Schmitt considère que la figure du partisan remet en cause les catégories traditionnelles du droit de la guerre et oblige à repenser les concepts de souveraineté et d'exception. Ainsi, dans ce cadre, la raison d'État se complexifie puisque la menace ne vient pas uniquement d'acteurs étatiques externes, mais peut également émaner de l'intérieur, ce qui peut justifier des mesures exceptionnelles pour y faire face.
In the context of conflicts with other nations or groups, particularly religious groups, the raison d'Etat may be invoked to justify certain extraordinary actions or policies aimed at protecting the integrity, security and interests of the State. The application of the raison d'Etat may take many forms in these contexts, including enhanced security policies, restrictions on certain civil liberties, extraordinary diplomatic efforts, military defence measures, etc. In some cases, these measures may be justified by the need to protect the integrity, security and interests of the State. In some cases, these measures may be controversial, as they may appear to contradict certain democratic principles or human rights.


Carl Schmitt a developpé une théorie du "décisionnisme" . Le décisionnisme est une approche de la théorie politique qui met l'accent sur le rôle de la décision individuelle dans les processus politiques. La phrase célèbre de Schmitt "le souverain est celui qui décide de l'exception" exprime cette idée. Elle signifie que le véritable pouvoir politique réside dans la capacité de suspendre l'ordre juridique existant pour faire face à une urgence. Ce pouvoir de décider quand et comment l'ordre juridique normal est suspendu est, selon Schmitt, ce qui définit la souveraineté. Pendant la montée du nazisme, Schmitt a été un supporter actif du régime. Il a affirmé que la prise du pouvoir par Hitler était un exemple de décision souveraine, en suspendant l'ordre constitutionnel de la République de Weimar en 1933. La souveraineté et l'état d'exception a été fortement critiquée, non seulement pour son rôle dans la légitimation du régime nazi, mais aussi pour la façon dont elle peut être utilisée pour justifier des abus de pouvoir.
The raison d'État is often invoked in contexts of international tension and preparation for war. It involves taking extraordinary measures to protect national security and interests, which may include mobilising resources, increasing military production, implementing enhanced security policies and coordinating efforts to anticipate and prepare for a possible war. From this perspective, raison d'État is seen as a tool for preparing for war, a kind of "latent war". It is a way of pooling the resources of the state and focusing attention on a common objective, namely the defence of the state and its interests. However, it is important to stress that the invocation of the raison d'Etat to justify these extraordinary measures must always be transparent, proportional and limited in time. In addition, it must always respect the principles of the rule of law and the fundamental rights of citizens. Furthermore, it is preferable to avoid war if possible, using diplomacy, negotiation and international cooperation to resolve conflicts and tensions. War should always be the last resort, when all other options have been exhausted.


Selon Carl Schmitt, le souverain, en tant que celui qui décide de l'exception, a le pouvoir de déterminer les moments d'urgence ou de crise qui justifient la suspension de l'ordre juridique normal. Ce pouvoir d'exception pourrait inclure la capacité de déclarer la guerre ou de prendre des décisions extraordinaires pour répondre à des situations de crise. La théorie de la raison d'État et le concept de guerre totale ont été liés aux régimes totalitaires du 20e siècle, notamment ceux de l'Allemagne nazie et de l'Union soviétique de Staline. Dans ces régimes, l'État cherche à contrôler tous les aspects de la vie publique et privée, y compris l'économie, l'éducation, les arts, la religion, les relations personnelles et même les pensées des individus. Le totalitarisme est souvent associé à une mobilisation totale en temps de guerre, où toutes les ressources de la société sont consacrées à l'effort de guerre. Cela peut se faire par la conscription, la régulation de l'industrie et de l'économie, et la restriction des libertés civiles au nom de la sécurité nationale. Dans ce contexte, la raison d'État est souvent invoquée pour justifier des actions qui, en temps de paix, seraient considérées comme des violations des droits de l'homme.
War, being an exceptional situation, often justifies the use of raison d'Etat. It is a time when the security and very existence of the state may be threatened. As a result, extraordinary measures may be implemented to protect and preserve the nation. It should be noted, however, that the use of raison d'État, even in times of war, must comply with the fundamental principles of democracy and international standards. This means that any action taken must respect human rights, the principles of justice and the rules of war.


Le totalitarisme est un système politique qui cherche à contrôler tous les aspects de la vie publique et privée, y compris l'expression individuelle et la pensée libre. Dans un régime totalitaire, l'État cherche à monopoliser la vérité et à définir la réalité pour ses citoyens. Les médias d'État sont utilisés pour diffuser la propagande officielle, et toute dissidence ou critique du régime est sévèrement réprimée. Cela peut créer un environnement dans lequel la pensée indépendante et la liberté d'expression sont entravées ou même dangereuses. Les individus peuvent se conformer aux attentes du régime, non seulement par peur des représailles, mais aussi par le conditionnement social et l'endoctrinement. Le totalitarisme est souvent associé à des régimes autoritaires qui sont enracinés dans des idéologies extrêmes et qui cherchent à remodeler la société selon une vision utopique. Cependant, cette tentative de contrôler tous les aspects de la vie sociale et individuelle peut souvent conduire à l'oppression, à la violence et à la déshumanisation.  
=== Carl Schmitt (1888 - 1985): Reassessing the relationship between war and the state ===
[[image:PapenSchleicher0001.jpg|thumb|right|Schmitt advised the von Papen government (left) and Schleicher (right) on the constitutional issue.]]


Carl Schmitt, philosophe politique allemand, a écrit de manière approfondie sur la nature de la politique et du pouvoir. Il a soutenu que la distinction fondamentale en politique est entre "l'ami" et "l'ennemi". Dans ce cadre, l'ennemi n'est pas nécessairement un individu ou un groupe personnellement haï ou méprisé, mais plutôt celui qui se trouve de l'autre côté du conflit politique. Selon Schmitt, le rôle du souverain (le "chef") est de faire cette distinction et de prendre des décisions dans les situations d'exception, comme une guerre ou une crise. Schmitt a soutenu que dans de telles situations, la normalité constitutionnelle peut être suspendue au nom de la préservation de l'État. C'est ce que l'on appelle l'état d'exception.  
Carl Schmitt, a German jurist and political philosopher, developed the theory of the partisan, which focuses on a specific form of combat - guerrilla warfare, or irregular struggle. This theory is mainly developed in his book "Theory of the Partisan" (1962). According to Schmitt, the partisan is distinct from the regular combatant because he does not operate according to the conventional rules of war and is not easily identifiable. They are rooted in a specific place (usually their local territory), are extremely mobile, and their loyalty is more to a cause than to a state. Schmitt saw the emergence of partisans as a significant transformation in the nature of war. The impact of this transformation on the raison d'État is considerable. If the state is designed to manage conflicts between clearly defined and organised entities, how can it manage the kind of asymmetric and irregular conflict that the partisan represents? The question becomes even more complicated if we consider that the partisan may be internal to the state - a citizen who has taken up arms against the state for one reason or another. Schmitt considers that the figure of the partisan calls into question the traditional categories of the law of war and forces us to rethink the concepts of sovereignty and exception. In this context, the raison d'État becomes more complex, since the threat does not only come from external state actors, but can also emanate from within, which may justify exceptional measures to deal with it.


La vision du conflit dans une perspective théologique nazie, telle qu'elle a été exprimée par Carl Schmitt, est centrée sur la notion d'ami et d'ennemi. Cela implique que les conflits sont inévitables et même nécessaires dans la politique, car ils permettent de définir clairement qui est "ami" et qui est "ennemi". Cette distinction est fondamentale pour l'exercice du pouvoir politique. Dans le contexte du nazisme, cette théorie a été utilisée pour justifier l'agression et l'expansion impérialiste, en identifiant certains groupes (comme les Juifs ou les communistes) comme des "ennemis" de l'État. Le Futurisme était un mouvement artistique et social qui a commencé en Italie au début du XXe siècle, et qui valorisait la vitesse, la technologie, la jeunesse et la violence, en rejetant le passé. Certains futuristes, comme Filippo Tommaso Marinetti, ont soutenu les mouvements fascistes en Italie et ailleurs. Cependant, le futurisme en tant que mouvement était distinct du nazisme et de la théorie politique de Carl Schmitt, même s'ils partageaient certains thèmes de glorification du conflit et du rejet de la tradition.  
Carl Schmitt developed a theory of "decisionism". Decisionism is an approach to political theory that emphasises the role of individual decisions in political processes. Schmitt's famous phrase "the sovereign is the one who decides on the exception" expresses this idea. It means that true political power lies in the ability to suspend the existing legal order in order to deal with an emergency. This power to decide when and how the normal legal order is suspended is, according to Schmitt, what defines sovereignty. During the rise of Nazism, Schmitt was an active supporter of the regime. He argued that Hitler's seizure of power was an example of a sovereign decision, suspending the constitutional order of the Weimar Republic in 1933. Sovereignty and the state of exception have been heavily criticised, not only for their role in legitimising the Nazi regime, but also for the way in which they can be used to justify abuses of power.


Carl Schmitt a soutenu que l'essence du politique repose sur la distinction entre ami et ennemi. Pour lui, la guerre, en tant que conflit ultime, est l'expression suprême de cette distinction. C'est dans le contexte de la guerre, ou en tout cas de la possibilité de la guerre, que la nature véritable du politique se manifeste, selon Schmitt. Dans ce cadre, le souverain (ou celui qui exerce le pouvoir politique) est celui qui décide de l'état d'exception, c'est-à-dire qui détermine quand une situation est si grave qu'elle justifie des mesures extraordinaires - y compris la guerre. C'est ce que Schmitt appelle le "décisionnisme".
According to Carl Schmitt, the sovereign, as the one who decides on the exception, has the power to determine the moments of emergency or crisis that justify the suspension of the normal legal order. This power of exception could include the ability to declare war or to take extraordinary decisions in response to crisis situations. The theory of raison d'état and the concept of total war have been linked to the totalitarian regimes of the 20th century, particularly those of Nazi Germany and Stalin's Soviet Union. In these regimes, the state seeks to control all aspects of public and private life, including the economy, education, the arts, religion, personal relationships and even the thoughts of individuals. Totalitarianism is often associated with total mobilisation in wartime, where all of society's resources are devoted to the war effort. This can be achieved through conscription, regulation of industry and the economy, and restriction of civil liberties in the name of national security. In this context, the reason of State is often invoked to justify actions which, in peacetime, would be considered violations of human rights.


= Actualité de l’état d’exception et de la raison d'État =
Totalitarianism is a political system that seeks to control all aspects of public and private life, including individual expression and free thought. In a totalitarian regime, the state seeks to monopolise the truth and define reality for its citizens. The state media are used to disseminate official propaganda, and any dissent or criticism of the regime is severely repressed. This can create an environment in which independent thought and freedom of expression are hindered or even dangerous. Individuals may conform to the regime's expectations, not only through fear of reprisals, but also through social conditioning and indoctrination. Totalitarianism is often associated with authoritarian regimes that are rooted in extreme ideologies and seek to reshape society according to a utopian vision. However, this attempt to control all aspects of social and individual life can often lead to oppression, violence and dehumanisation.


== Giorgio Agambe (1942 - ) : Comprendre l'état d'exception ==
Carl Schmitt, the German political philosopher, wrote extensively on the nature of politics and power. He argued that the fundamental distinction in politics is between "friend" and "enemy". In this framework, the enemy is not necessarily an individual or group that is personally hated or despised, but rather the one on the other side of the political conflict. According to Schmitt, the role of the sovereign (the 'ruler') is to make this distinction and to take decisions in exceptional situations, such as war or crisis. Schmitt argued that in such situations, constitutional normality can be suspended in the name of preserving the state. This is known as a state of exception.


[[Fichier:Giorgio Agamben, wall portrait.jpg|thumb|200px|Giorgio Agamben .]]
The vision of conflict from a Nazi theological perspective, as expressed by Carl Schmitt, is centred on the notion of friend and enemy. This implies that conflicts are inevitable and even necessary in politics, because they make it possible to clearly define who is "friend" and who is "enemy". This distinction is fundamental to the exercise of political power. In the context of Nazism, this theory was used to justify aggression and imperialist expansion, by identifying certain groups (such as Jews or Communists) as 'enemies' of the state. Futurism was an artistic and social movement that began in Italy in the early twentieth century, which valued speed, technology, youth and violence, rejecting the past. Some Futurists, such as Filippo Tommaso Marinetti, supported the Fascist movements in Italy and elsewhere. However, Futurism as a movement was distinct from Nazism and Carl Schmitt's political theory, although they shared certain themes of glorifying conflict and rejecting tradition.
 
Carl Schmitt argued that the essence of politics lay in the distinction between friend and foe. For him, war, as the ultimate conflict, is the supreme expression of this distinction. It is in the context of war, or at least the possibility of war, that the true nature of the political manifests itself, according to Schmitt. In this context, the sovereign (or whoever exercises political power) is the one who decides on the state of exception, i.e. who determines when a situation is so serious that it justifies extraordinary measures - including war. This is what Schmitt calls "decisionism".
 
= Current state of emergency and raison d'État =


Giorgio Agamben, un philosophe italien bien connu, a publié un livre intitulé "État d'exception" en 2005 (sa première édition italienne date de 2003). Il examine dans cet ouvrage la notion d'"état d'exception" telle qu'elle a été développée par Carl Schmitt. Agamben analyse comment les États peuvent utiliser l'état d'exception pour suspendre les lois et les droits constitutionnels en situation de crise. Il argumente que, de plus en plus, l'état d'exception est devenu la norme plutôt que l'exception dans les sociétés contemporaines, avec l'extension des pouvoirs de surveillance et de contrôle des gouvernements. Pour Agamben, l'état d'exception est un espace dangereux où le droit est en suspens et où l'autorité gouvernementale agit sans contraintes légales, ce qui peut mener à des abus de pouvoir. Il met en garde contre l'utilisation de cette situation pour restreindre les libertés civiles et les droits de l'homme. C'est un concept puissant et inquiétant qui souligne la tension entre la sécurité et la liberté dans les sociétés modernes. L'ouvrage de Agamben a été largement discuté et débattu, et a eu un impact significatif sur la pensée politique contemporaine.
== Giorgio Agambe (1942 - ): Understanding the state of exception ==


Agamben émet l'idée que les sociétés contemporaines ont tendance à entrer dans un état d'exception permanent, particulièrement sous le prétexte de la sécurité. L'État d'exception est une situation de crise qui permet à l'État de suspendre les lois et les libertés civiles normalement en vigueur. Agamben suggère que cet état d'exception est de plus en plus utilisé comme un moyen de gouvernance normal, plutôt que comme une réponse exceptionnelle à une crise. Par exemple, dans le contexte de la "guerre contre le terrorisme", les États peuvent invoquer la sécurité nationale pour justifier des mesures qui violent les droits de l'homme et les libertés civiles. Cet état d'exception, selon Agamben, met en danger la démocratie en rendant les citoyens vulnérables aux abus de pouvoir. Il soutient que l'état d'exception révèle une tension fondamentale entre la sécurité et la liberté, une tension qui est au cœur des débats contemporains sur le rôle de l'État dans la société.  
[[Fichier:Giorgio Agamben, wall portrait.jpg|thumb|200px|Giorgio Agamben .]]


Dans la Déclaration des Droits de l'Homme et du Citoyen de 1789, il est affirmé que la liberté est la condition préalable à la sécurité. C'est-à-dire que les individus doivent être libres pour être en sécurité. Cependant, dans le monde contemporain, ce paradigme semble avoir été inversé. De plus en plus, la sécurité est vue comme une condition préalable à la liberté. Cela signifie que les États et les sociétés sont de plus en plus disposés à restreindre les libertés individuelles et collectives au nom de la sécurité. Cela peut être vu dans le contexte de la lutte contre le terrorisme, par exemple, où les libertés civiles sont souvent restreintes au nom de la sécurité nationale. C'est une évolution inquiétante pour beaucoup, car elle peut potentiellement mener à des abus de pouvoir et à une diminution de la démocratie. Cette tension entre sécurité et liberté est un débat crucial dans la pensée politique contemporaine. La question est de savoir jusqu'où nous sommes disposés à aller pour garantir notre sécurité et si cela en vaut la peine si cela signifie une restriction de nos libertés.
Giorgio Agamben, a well-known Italian philosopher, published a book entitled 'État d'exception' in 2005 (the first Italian edition dates from 2003). In it, he examines the notion of the 'state of exception' as developed by Carl Schmitt. Agamben analyses how states can use states of exception to suspend laws and constitutional rights in crisis situations. He argues that, increasingly, the state of exception has become the norm rather than the exception in contemporary societies, with the extension of governments' powers of surveillance and control. For Agamben, the state of exception is a dangerous space where the law is in abeyance and government authority acts without legal constraints, which can lead to abuses of power. He warns against using this situation to restrict civil liberties and human rights. It is a powerful and disturbing concept that highlights the tension between security and freedom in modern societies. Agamben's work has been widely discussed and debated, and has had a significant impact on contemporary political thought.  


Giorgio Agamben, dans son ouvrage "État d'exception", soutient que dans les sociétés contemporaines, la sécurité est souvent privilégiée par rapport à la liberté. Selon lui, cela mène à ce qu'il appelle un "état d'exception" : un état dans lequel les normes légales régulières sont suspendues au nom de la sécurité. Pour Agamben, ce n'est pas une situation exceptionnelle ou temporaire, mais un état permanent qui est devenu la norme dans de nombreuses sociétés modernes. Il argue que la notion de sécurité est devenue une excuse pour restreindre les libertés et renforcer le pouvoir de l'État, créant ainsi un environnement de contrôle et de surveillance constants. Ce qu'Agamben critique ici, c'est le glissement de la primauté de la liberté vers la primauté de la sécurité dans nos sociétés contemporaines. Il suggère que cela mène à une rationalisation et à une normalisation de l'état d'exception, qui, à son tour, menace les libertés individuelles et collectives. C'est un débat important qui fait écho à de nombreux problèmes contemporains, de la lutte contre le terrorisme à la gestion des crises sanitaires, où la tension entre liberté et sécurité est constamment présente.
Agamben argues that contemporary societies tend to enter into a permanent state of exception, particularly under the pretext of security. The state of exception is a crisis situation that allows the state to suspend the laws and civil liberties normally in force. Agamben suggests that this state of exception is increasingly used as a normal means of governance, rather than as an exceptional response to a crisis. For example, in the context of the 'war on terror', states can invoke national security to justify measures that violate human rights and civil liberties. This state of exception, Agamben argues, endangers democracy by making citizens vulnerable to abuses of power. He argues that the state of exception reveals a fundamental tension between security and freedom, a tension that lies at the heart of contemporary debates about the role of the state in society.


Selon Agamben, nous vivons maintenant dans une situation où l'état d'exception est devenu la norme, plutôt qu'une occurrence rare et temporaire comme le suggérait Botero. Cette perspective est en accord avec la théorie de Michel Foucault sur la société de surveillance. Foucault a développé la notion de "biopouvoir", où le contrôle exercé par l'État s'étend non seulement à la vie sociale, mais aussi à la vie biologique des individus. Cela implique une surveillance constante et une régulation détaillée des corps et des vies des citoyens. C'est donc un glissement significatif dans la façon dont le pouvoir est exercé par l'État. Ce changement peut être vu comme une menace pour nos libertés individuelles, car le pouvoir de l'État est exercé de manière plus intrusive et omniprésente. En outre, comme Agamben le souligne, la primauté de la sécurité sur la liberté contribue à ce processus, en justifiant l'expansion continue du contrôle et de la surveillance au nom de la protection de la sécurité des individus et de la société dans son ensemble. Il est important de noter que ces perspectives sont fortement débattues dans le domaine académique et politique. Certaines personnes peuvent voir ces développements comme nécessaires et justifiés, tandis que d'autres peuvent les voir comme des atteintes inacceptables à nos libertés individuelles et à nos droits fondamentaux.
The 1789 Declaration of the Rights of Man and of the Citizen states that freedom is the prerequisite for security. In other words, individuals must be free in order to be secure. However, in the contemporary world, this paradigm seems to have been reversed. Increasingly, security is seen as a precondition for freedom. This means that states and societies are increasingly willing to restrict individual and collective freedoms in the name of security. This can be seen in the context of the fight against terrorism, for example, where civil liberties are often restricted in the name of national security. This is a worrying development for many, as it can potentially lead to abuses of power and a diminution of democracy. This tension between security and freedom is a crucial debate in contemporary political thought. The question is how far we are prepared to go to guarantee our security, and whether it is worth it if it means restricting our freedoms.


La notion que nous sommes entrés dans une ère de "non-droit" et de "nécessité" reflète les préoccupations que de nombreux penseurs, juristes et activistes ont aujourd'hui concernant la manière dont le droit et la démocratie sont utilisés, et parfois contournés, au nom de la sécurité, de l'efficacité ou de la nécessité. La traçabilité et la surveillance sont devenues des éléments omniprésents de notre vie quotidienne, sous-tendant des aspects majeurs de notre économie, de notre gouvernement et de notre société. Ceci est facilité par l'avancement technologique rapide, qui permet un niveau de surveillance et de collecte de données sans précédent. La tension entre la nécessité et le droit est une question centrale de notre époque. Traditionnellement, l'état de droit est un principe fondamental des sociétés démocratiques, garantissant que toutes les actions, y compris celles de l'État, sont soumises à la loi. Cependant, dans de nombreux cas, nous voyons des situations où la "nécessité" est invoquée pour justifier des actions qui, autrement, pourraient être considérées comme contraires aux principes juridiques et démocratiques fondamentaux. Cette tension pose des questions fondamentales sur la nature de nos sociétés et de nos systèmes politiques. Comment équilibrer la sécurité et la liberté ? Qu'est-ce que la démocratie signifie dans une ère de surveillance de masse et de données omniprésentes ? Ce sont des questions complexes auxquelles il n'y a pas de réponses simples, mais le débat et la réflexion sont essentiels pour façonner l'avenir de nos sociétés.
Giorgio Agamben, in his book État d'exception, argues that in contemporary societies, security is often privileged over freedom. In his view, this leads to what he calls a 'state of exception': a state in which regular legal norms are suspended in the name of security. For Agamben, this is not an exceptional or temporary situation, but a permanent state that has become the norm in many modern societies. He argues that the notion of security has become an excuse to restrict freedoms and strengthen the power of the state, creating an environment of constant control and surveillance. What Agamben criticises here is the shift from the primacy of freedom to the primacy of security in our contemporary societies. He suggests that this leads to a rationalisation and normalisation of the state of exception, which in turn threatens individual and collective freedoms. This is an important debate that echoes many contemporary issues, from the fight against terrorism to the management of health crises, where the tension between freedom and security is constantly present.


Le concept d'état d'exception décrit par Agamben est précisément celui d'une situation où les lois ordinaires et les droits civils sont suspendus, souvent en réponse à une crise perçue ou à une situation d'urgence. Cet état de choses crée une "zone grise" où les règles normales ne s'appliquent pas et où les pouvoirs de l'État peuvent être étendus de manière significative. Dans ces situations, il y a souvent une tension entre les impératifs de sécurité et les droits et libertés individuels. C'est une question complexe qui n'a pas de réponse facile, car elle nécessite un équilibre entre la protection de la sécurité de l'État et de ses citoyens d'une part, et la sauvegarde des droits et libertés individuels d'autre part.
According to Agamben, we are now living in a situation where the state of exception has become the norm, rather than a rare and temporary occurrence as Botero suggested. This perspective is in line with Michel Foucault's theory of the surveillance society. Foucault developed the notion of 'biopower', where the control exercised by the state extends not only to social life, but also to the biological life of individuals. This involves constant surveillance and detailed regulation of citizens' bodies and lives. It is therefore a significant shift in the way power is exercised by the state. This shift can be seen as a threat to our individual freedoms, as state power is exercised in a more intrusive and omnipresent way. Moreover, as Agamben points out, the primacy of security over freedom contributes to this process, justifying the continued expansion of control and surveillance in the name of protecting the security of individuals and society as a whole. It is important to note that these perspectives are hotly debated in academic and political circles. Some people may see these developments as necessary and justified, while others may see them as unacceptable infringements of our individual freedoms and fundamental rights.


La séparation des pouvoirs est un principe fondamental qui vise à prévenir l'abus de pouvoir et à maintenir l'équilibre dans l'exercice de l'autorité. Cette séparation permet à chaque pouvoir - législatif, exécutif, judiciaire - de contrôler les autres et de garantir ainsi une forme de réciprocité dans le fonctionnement de l'Etat. Cependant, lorsqu'un état d'exception est déclaré, ces frontières peuvent devenir floues. Les pouvoirs de l'exécutif peuvent être élargis, parfois au détriment des autres pouvoirs, ce qui peut mettre en péril l'équilibre démocratique. Il en résulte souvent une accumulation de pouvoirs entre les mains d'un seul organe ou individu, ce qui peut entraîner une concentration du pouvoir et potentiellement mener à des abus.
The notion that we have entered an era of 'lawlessness' and 'necessity' reflects the concerns that many thinkers, lawyers and activists have today about the way in which law and democracy are being used, and sometimes circumvented, in the name of security, efficiency or necessity. Traceability and surveillance have become ubiquitous elements of our daily lives, underpinning major aspects of our economy, government and society. This is facilitated by rapid technological advancement, which enables an unprecedented level of surveillance and data collection. The tension between necessity and the rule of law is a central issue of our time. Traditionally, the rule of law is a fundamental principle of democratic societies, ensuring that all actions, including those of the state, are subject to the law. However, in many cases we see situations where 'necessity' is invoked to justify actions that might otherwise be considered contrary to fundamental legal and democratic principles. This tension raises fundamental questions about the nature of our societies and political systems. How do we balance security and freedom? What does democracy mean in an era of mass surveillance and ubiquitous data? These are complex questions to which there are no simple answers, but debate and reflection are essential if we are to shape the future of our societies.


Dans un État d'exception, les pouvoirs exécutifs sont souvent renforcés aux dépens des autres branches du gouvernement. Cela peut mener à une situation où l'exécutif peut légiférer sans le contrôle du législatif, par le biais de décrets ou d'ordonnances, et où les pouvoirs de contrôle du judiciaire sont limités. En outre, un état d'exception peut également conduire à l'adoption de réglementations restrictives, souvent justifiées par la nécessité de répondre à une urgence ou à une crise, qui peuvent entraver les droits et libertés individuelles. Ces réglementations peuvent affecter de nombreux aspects de la vie des individus, allant de la liberté de mouvement à la protection de la vie privée. Il est donc essentiel, même en temps de crise, de maintenir les principes fondamentaux de la démocratie et de l'état de droit, et de veiller à ce que toute mesure extraordinaire soit proportionnée, nécessaire et temporaire.
The concept of a state of exception described by Agamben is precisely that of a situation in which ordinary laws and civil rights are suspended, often in response to a perceived crisis or emergency. This state of affairs creates a 'grey zone' where normal rules do not apply and where the powers of the state can be significantly extended. In such situations, there is often a tension between the imperatives of security and individual rights and freedoms. This is a complex issue with no easy answer, as it requires a balance between protecting the security of the State and its citizens on the one hand, and safeguarding individual rights and freedoms on the other.


L’application de l‘État d’exception en France est la Première guerre mondiale qui renvoie à un état d’exception ; la préparation de la seconde guerre mondiale en 1938 et en 1939 avec le pacte germano-soviétique qui crée des dissensions dans la politique française, car les communistes souhaitent suivre la position soviétique; la constitution française de 1958, l’article 16 dit qu’en cas de menace sur l’intégrité de la république et de la nation, le président de la République peut prendre tous les pouvoirs nécessaires.Ainsi un article accorde la prise de tous les pouvoirs au nom de l’attaque de l’intégrité du territoire.
The separation of powers is a fundamental principle aimed at preventing the abuse of power and maintaining a balance in the exercise of authority. This separation enables each power - legislative, executive, judicial - to control the others and thus guarantee a form of reciprocity in the operation of the State. However, when a state of emergency is declared, these boundaries can become blurred. The powers of the executive can be extended, sometimes to the detriment of the other powers, which can jeopardise the democratic balance. The result is often an accumulation of power in the hands of a single body or individual, which can lead to a concentration of power and potentially to abuses.


L'état d'exception en France a été appliqué dans diverses situations de crise. Pendant la Première Guerre mondiale, le gouvernement français a dû prendre des mesures extraordinaires, notamment la mobilisation générale, la censure et le rationnement, pour soutenir l'effort de guerre. Plus tard, dans les années précédant la Seconde Guerre mondiale, face à une période de grande incertitude et de tension, le gouvernement a entrepris une série de mesures pour renforcer la défense nationale. Ce climat de tension a atteint son paroxysme avec le Pacte germano-soviétique de 1939 qui a provoqué des dissensions au sein du Parti communiste français, certains membres s'opposant à la position officielle du parti en faveur du pacte. En outre, l'article 16 de la Constitution française de 1958 stipule que le président de la République peut exercer des pouvoirs exceptionnels en cas de crise grave. Ces pouvoirs ont été invoqués une seule fois, pendant la crise algérienne en 1961. Dans chaque cas, l'équilibre entre le fonctionnement de la démocratie et le respect des droits et libertés individuels a été mis à l'épreuve.
In a state of exception, executive powers are often strengthened at the expense of the other branches of government. This can lead to a situation where the executive can legislate without the control of the legislature, by means of decrees or orders, and where the supervisory powers of the judiciary are limited. In addition, a state of emergency may also lead to the adoption of restrictive regulations, often justified by the need to respond to an emergency or crisis, which may restrict individual rights and freedoms. These regulations can affect many aspects of people's lives, from freedom of movement to protection of privacy. It is therefore essential, even in times of crisis, to uphold the fundamental principles of democracy and the rule of law, and to ensure that any extraordinary measures are proportionate, necessary and temporary.


La Constitution française de 1958, dans son article 16, donne des pouvoirs exceptionnels au Président de la République en cas de crise grave menaçant l'intégrité du territoire ou le fonctionnement régulier des pouvoirs publics. Cet article a été conçu dans le contexte de la Guerre Froide, et il était destiné à être utilisé dans des circonstances exceptionnelles où le fonctionnement normal de l'Etat serait gravement perturbé. Il a été invoqué une seule fois, pendant la crise algérienne en 1961. L'article 16 confère au président "les pouvoirs les plus étendus", lui permettant de prendre des mesures nécessaires à la défense de la nation. Cependant, il est important de noter que ces pouvoirs ne sont pas illimités. Le Conseil Constitutionnel, selon une décision prise en 1973, a le pouvoir de contrôler l'application de l'article 16 et peut donc mettre fin à l'état d'exception si les conditions ne sont plus réunies.
The application of the state of exception in France can be traced back to the First World War, which led to a state of exception; the preparation for the Second World War in 1938 and 1939 with the German-Soviet pact, which created dissension in French politics, as the Communists wanted to follow the Soviet position; the French Constitution of 1958, Article 16 states that in the event of a threat to the integrity of the Republic and the nation, the President of the Republic may take all necessary powers. So one article allows all powers to be taken in the name of attacking the integrity of the territory.


La Suisse, en tant que pays traditionnellement neutre, a dû faire face à ses propres défis pendant les deux guerres mondiales. Dans le contexte de la Première Guerre mondiale, le 30 août 1914, l'Assemblée fédérale suisse a confié au Conseil fédéral (le gouvernement suisse) le pouvoir illimité pour garantir la sécurité, l'intégrité et la neutralité du pays. Cette décision a été prise dans le but de permettre au gouvernement de prendre rapidement et efficacement les mesures nécessaires pour préserver la Suisse des conséquences du conflit européen qui se déroulait autour d'elle. Il s'agissait clairement d'un exemple d'application de la "raison d'État", où les règles ordinaires de la gouvernance démocratique ont été temporairement suspendues en réponse à une situation extraordinaire. C'est une illustration claire du concept d'état d'exception, bien qu'il ait été exercé dans le but de préserver la neutralité et l'indépendance de la Suisse plutôt que de l'engager dans le conflit.
The state of exception in France has been applied in various crisis situations. During the First World War, the French government had to take extraordinary measures, including general mobilisation, censorship and rationing, to support the war effort. Later, in the years leading up to the Second World War, faced with a period of great uncertainty and tension, the government undertook a series of measures to strengthen national defence. This climate of tension culminated in the German-Soviet Pact of 1939, which caused dissension within the French Communist Party, with some members opposing the party's official position in favour of the pact. In addition, Article 16 of the 1958 French Constitution stipulates that the President of the Republic may exercise exceptional powers in the event of a serious crisis. These powers were invoked only once, during the Algerian crisis in 1961. In each case, the balance between the functioning of democracy and respect for individual rights and freedoms was put to the test.


== Le 11 septembre et le retour de la raison d’État ==
Article 16 of the 1958 French Constitution gives exceptional powers to the President of the Republic in the event of a serious crisis threatening the integrity of the territory or the proper functioning of the public authorities. This article was conceived in the context of the Cold War, and was intended to be used in exceptional circumstances where the normal functioning of the State would be seriously disrupted. It was invoked only once, during the Algerian crisis in 1961. Article 16 confers on the President "the most extensive powers", enabling him to take measures necessary for the defence of the nation. However, it is important to note that these powers are not unlimited. According to a decision taken in 1973, the Constitutional Council has the power to monitor the application of article 16 and can therefore end the state of emergency if the conditions are no longer met.


{{Article détaillé|Les ruptures du 11 septembre 2001}}
Switzerland, as a traditionally neutral country, faced its own challenges during the two world wars. In the context of the First World War, on 30 August 1914, the Swiss Federal Assembly gave the Federal Council (the Swiss government) unlimited power to guarantee the security, integrity and neutrality of the country. This decision was taken to enable the government to take the necessary measures quickly and effectively to protect Switzerland from the consequences of the European conflict that was unfolding around it. This was clearly an example of the application of "raison d'État", where the ordinary rules of democratic governance were temporarily suspended in response to an extraordinary situation. It is a clear illustration of the concept of a state of exception, albeit one exercised with the aim of preserving Switzerland's neutrality and independence rather than engaging it in conflict.


=== Autorisation de recours à la force militaire de 2001 ===
== 11 September and the return of the raison d'État ==


Après les attentats du 11 septembre 2001, le président américain George W. Bush a déclaré que l'intégrité de la nation avait été attaquée. Cette déclaration était basée sur le fait que les attentats terroristes étaient assimilés à un acte de guerre. Dans ce contexte, le président a invoqué le concept de "raison d'État", suggérant qu'une réponse extraordinaire était nécessaire pour faire face à cette situation extraordinaire. Cette réponse a pris la forme de l'"Authorization for Use of Military Force" (AUMF), qui a été votée par le Congrès américain peu de temps après les attaques. L'AUMF a donné au président l'autorité de prendre toutes les "mesures nécessaires et appropriées" contre ceux qu'il déterminerait avoir "planifié, autorisé, commis ou aidé" les attaques du 11 septembre. En outre, l'administration Bush a mis en place des mesures de sécurité intérieure draconiennes, comme le Patriot Act, qui a étendu les pouvoirs du gouvernement en matière de surveillance et d'enquête. Ces mesures, bien que controversées, ont été présentées comme essentielles pour protéger la nation.
=== Authorisation for the use of military force in 2001 ===


Suite aux attentats du 11 septembre 2001, le président George W. Bush a répondu en plaçant la défense de la nation américaine comme une nécessité primordiale. Dans ses discours, il a présenté les agresseurs non pas comme de simples terroristes, mais comme un ennemi comparable à une nation, ce qui a eu pour effet paradoxal d'élever la stature d'Oussama Ben Laden. En effet, en assimilant Al-Qaïda à un État-nation, Bush a implicitement crédité Ben Laden du statut de chef d'État. Cette approche a également justifié une réponse militaire massive, plutôt qu'une approche policière et judiciaire pour faire face à un crime. Cela a conduit à l'invasion de l'Afghanistan et à la Guerre contre le Terrorisme, une campagne militaire à l'échelle mondiale qui a profondément affecté les relations internationales et les politiques intérieures aux États-Unis.
After the attacks of 11 September 2001, US President George W. Bush declared that the integrity of the nation had been attacked. This declaration was based on the fact that the terrorist attacks had been likened to an act of war. In this context, the President invoked the concept of "raison d'Etat", suggesting that an extraordinary response was required to deal with this extraordinary situation. This response took the form of the Authorization for Use of Military Force (AUMF), which was passed by the US Congress shortly after the attacks. The AUMF gave the President the authority to take all "necessary and appropriate measures" against those he determined to have "planned, authorised, committed or aided" the attacks of 11 September. In addition, the Bush administration introduced draconian homeland security measures, such as the Patriot Act, which extended the government's powers of surveillance and investigation. These measures, although controversial, were presented as essential to protect the nation.


En qualifiant les attaques du 11 septembre 2001 comme un "acte de guerre", George W. Bush a établi une justification pour l'application de la raison d'État. L'acte de guerre est une condition qui autorise l'utilisation de la raison d'État, car il constitue une situation d'exception, une circonstance extraordinaire qui demande des mesures extraordinaires. La raison d'État, dans ce contexte, permet au gouvernement de prendre des décisions et d'agir d'une manière qui pourrait être contraire aux lois et aux principes habituels dans l'intérêt suprême de la nation. Cela pourrait inclure des actions telles que la déclaration de guerre, la mobilisation des forces militaires, l'instauration de mesures de sécurité internes renforcées, et d'autres mesures extraordinaires qui pourraient être perçues comme nécessaires pour assurer la sécurité et l'intégrité de la nation.
Following the attacks of 11 September 2001, President George W. Bush responded by making the defence of the American nation a paramount necessity. In his speeches, he presented the attackers not as mere terrorists, but as an enemy comparable to a nation, which had the paradoxical effect of elevating Osama Bin Laden's stature. Indeed, by equating Al Qaeda with a nation-state, Bush implicitly credited Bin Laden with the status of head of state. This approach also justified a massive military response, rather than a police and judicial approach to dealing with a crime. This led to the invasion of Afghanistan and the War on Terror, a global military campaign that has profoundly affected international relations and domestic politics in the United States.


Lorsque George W. Bush a qualifié les attaques du 11 septembre 2001 comme un "acte de guerre", il a légitimé, en quelque sorte, Al-Qaïda et son chef, Ben Laden, comme des acteurs de guerre traditionnels. Cette déclaration a, de fait, changé le paradigme de l'application de la raison d'État. Cela a permis à l'administration Bush de justifier l'application de la raison d'État, en prenant des mesures extraordinaires pour la défense de la nation, allant de la guerre en Afghanistan à la mise en place de nouvelles mesures de sécurité intérieure. Cette déclaration a marqué un tournant dans l'histoire contemporaine, en introduisant un nouveau type de conflit - la "guerre contre le terrorisme" - où la frontière entre le droit de la paix et le droit de la guerre devient floue.  
By describing the attacks of 11 September 2001 as an "act of war", George W. Bush established a justification for the application of raison d'état. An act of war is a condition that authorises the use of raison d'État, because it constitutes an exceptional situation, an extraordinary circumstance that calls for extraordinary measures. Reason of State, in this context, allows the government to take decisions and act in a way that could be contrary to the usual laws and principles in the supreme interest of the nation. This could include actions such as declaring war, mobilising military forces, introducing enhanced internal security measures, and other extraordinary measures that may be perceived as necessary to ensure the security and integrity of the nation.


Lorsqu'un État est confronté à une situation d'urgence ou à un danger imminent, il peut être amené à invoquer ce que l'on appelle la "raison d'État" ou l'état d'exception pour prendre des mesures extraordinaires afin de protéger la sécurité et l'intégrité de la nation. Cependant, ces mesures extraordinaires peuvent parfois s'écarter des principes traditionnels de l'État de droit, ce qui peut soulever des questions importantes sur l'équilibre entre la sécurité et les libertés individuelles. En effet, dans de tels cas, il peut y avoir une tendance à favoriser les actions d'urgence et la réponse à la menace immédiate, parfois aux dépens des protections juridiques normales et des garanties de procédure. Cela peut conduire à une situation où les règles normales du droit public sont mises de côté au nom de la gestion de l'urgence. Cette situation peut être source de tension et de débats, car elle met en jeu les valeurs fondamentales de la démocratie et de l'État de droit, comme le respect des droits de l'homme et des libertés fondamentales.
When George W. Bush described the attacks of 11 September 2001 as an "act of war", he in a way legitimised Al Qaeda and its leader, Bin Laden, as traditional actors of war. This declaration effectively changed the paradigm for the application of raison d'état. It allowed the Bush administration to justify the application of raison d'état by taking extraordinary measures to defend the nation, ranging from the war in Afghanistan to the introduction of new homeland security measures. This declaration marked a turning point in contemporary history, introducing a new type of conflict - the "war on terror" - where the line between the law of peace and the law of war becomes blurred.  


Le 9 novembre 2001, Stephen John Byers déclarait « c’est un très bon jour pour faire ressortir et passer en douce toutes les mesures que nous devons prendre<ref>Steve Byers, ministre du Commerce anglais du gouvernement de Tony Blair avait envoyé un courrier une heure après le drame « C'est un très bon jour pour faire ressortir et passer en douce toutes les mesures que nous devons prendre. » p. 549</ref> ».Cette déclaration met en évidence un point de tension important dans les situations d'urgence ou d'exception. En réponse à une crise, les gouvernements peuvent être tentés de faire passer rapidement des mesures qui pourraient, dans des circonstances normales, faire l'objet d'un débat public approfondi et de contrôles démocratiques. Dans certains cas, ces mesures peuvent inclure des lois ou des réglementations qui limitent les libertés individuelles, augmentent les pouvoirs de l'État ou modifient d'autres aspects de la gouvernance et de l'ordre public. Bien que ces mesures puissent être justifiées par la gravité de la situation, elles soulèvent des questions importantes sur la transparence, la responsabilité et le respect des principes démocratiques. Il est crucial que même dans les situations d'urgence, les gouvernements s'efforcent de maintenir l'État de droit, de respecter les droits de l'homme et de s'engager de manière transparente avec le public. En outre, les mesures prises en réponse à une situation d'urgence devraient être proportionnées, nécessaires et sujettes à un examen régulier pour s'assurer qu'elles restent appropriées et justifiées.
When a state is faced with an emergency or imminent danger, it may have to invoke what is known as "raison d'État" or a state of emergency to take extraordinary measures to protect the security and integrity of the nation. However, these extraordinary measures can sometimes deviate from the traditional principles of the rule of law, which can raise important questions about the balance between security and individual freedoms. Indeed, in such cases, there may be a tendency to favour emergency action and response to the immediate threat, sometimes at the expense of normal legal protections and procedural safeguards. This can lead to a situation where the normal rules of public law are set aside in the name of emergency management. This situation can be a source of tension and debate, as it puts at stake the fundamental values of democracy and the rule of law, such as respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms.


Les attentats du 11 septembre 2001 ont conduit à une série de changements significatifs dans les législations et politiques, en particulier aux États-Unis, mais aussi à l'échelle internationale. Le besoin perçu de protéger les citoyens contre de futures attaques terroristes a conduit à l'adoption de mesures qui, dans certains cas, ont restreint les libertés civiles et modifié les normes en matière de vie privée, de surveillance et de droits de l'homme. L'une des réponses les plus controversées à ces attaques a été l'adoption du USA PATRIOT Act aux États-Unis, qui a élargi les pouvoirs de surveillance du gouvernement américain dans le but de prévenir le terrorisme. Bien que ces mesures aient été prises dans le but déclaré de protéger la sécurité nationale, elles ont également suscité de vives inquiétudes concernant leur impact sur les libertés civiles et le respect de la vie privée. Dans ce contexte, le débat démocratique peut être confronté à des défis. Il est important que même en temps de crise, la transparence, la responsabilité et le respect des droits de l'homme soient maintenus. Il s'agit d'un délicat équilibre à trouver entre la protection de la sécurité nationale et la préservation des principes démocratiques fondamentaux.  
On 9 November 2001, Stephen John Byers declared that "it is a very good day to bring out and sneak in all the measures we need to take", p. 549. This statement highlights an important point of tension in emergency or exceptional situations. In response to a crisis, governments may be tempted to rush through measures that would, in normal circumstances, be subject to full public debate and democratic scrutiny. In some cases, these measures may include laws or regulations that restrict individual freedoms, increase the powers of the state or alter other aspects of governance and public order. While the gravity of the situation may justify such measures, they raise important questions about transparency, accountability and respect for democratic principles. It is crucial that even in emergency situations, governments strive to uphold the rule of law, respect human rights and engage transparently with the public. In addition, measures taken in response to an emergency should be proportionate, necessary and subject to regular review to ensure that they remain appropriate and justified.


=== USA PATRIOT Act : Implications pour la raison d'État ===
The attacks of 11 September 2001 led to a series of significant changes in legislation and policy, particularly in the United States, but also internationally. The perceived need to protect citizens from future terrorist attacks has led to the adoption of measures which, in some cases, have restricted civil liberties and altered standards of privacy, surveillance and human rights. One of the most controversial responses to these attacks was the passage of the USA PATRIOT Act in the United States, which expanded the surveillance powers of the US government with the aim of preventing terrorism. Although these measures were taken to protect national security, they also raised serious concerns about their impact on civil liberties and privacy. In this context, democratic debate can face challenges. It is important that even in times of crisis, transparency, accountability and respect for human rights are maintained. It is a delicate balance to be struck between protecting national security and preserving fundamental democratic principles.
Le USA PATRIOT Act (Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism Act) est une loi américaine qui a été promulguée peu de temps après les attentats terroristes du 11 septembre 2001. américaine, en particulier en ce qui concerne les lois sur l'immigration, la sécurité nationale, la surveillance et l'application de la loi. Son objectif déclaré était de "déjouer et punir les actes de terrorisme aux États-Unis et dans le monde entier, d'améliorer l'application de la loi pour détecter et prévenir le terrorisme, et pour d'autres objectifs". Certaines des dispositions les plus controversées du Patriot Act concernent la collecte d'informations et la surveillance. La loi a permis aux agences de renseignement de collecter un large éventail d'informations, y compris des données sur les transactions financières, les communications par courrier électronique et téléphone, et a donné aux autorités fédérales une plus grande capacité à suivre et intercepter les communications. Cette loi a grandement élargi les pouvoirs des agences de sécurité et de renseignement américaines en matière de surveillance, d'investigation et de poursuite des crimes de terrorisme. Les dispositions de cette loi touchent à une grande variété de questions, allant de la surveillance électronique à l'immigration, en passant par le financement du terrorisme.


Une des dispositions controversées du USA PATRIOT Act permet la détention indéfinie d'étrangers soupçonnés d'être liés à des activités terroristes. Les autorités américaines ont le pouvoir de détenir une personne sur la base de simples soupçons et peuvent le faire pour une durée indéterminée, sans inculpation ni procès. De plus, la définition du terrorisme et de l'activité terroriste a été élargie pour englober de nombreux actes criminels non violents et les associations lâches avec des groupes soupçonnés d'activités terroristes. Cette définition élargie a été critiquée pour sa potentielle utilisation abusive.
=== USA PATRIOT Act: Implications for the raison d'état ===
The USA PATRIOT Act (Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism Act) is a US law that was enacted shortly after the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001. The USA PATRIOT Act is a major piece of US legislation, particularly with regard to immigration, national security, surveillance and law enforcement laws. Its stated aim was "to thwart and punish acts of terrorism in the United States and around the world, to improve law enforcement to detect and prevent terrorism, and for other purposes". Some of the most controversial provisions of the Patriot Act concern information gathering and surveillance. The law allowed intelligence agencies to collect a wide range of information, including data on financial transactions, email and telephone communications, and gave federal authorities greater ability to track and intercept communications. The Act greatly expanded the powers of US security and intelligence agencies to monitor, investigate and prosecute terrorist crimes. The provisions of the Act cover a wide range of issues, from electronic surveillance to immigration and terrorist financing.


Le système "Carnivore", precuseur de l'USA PATRIOT Act était un système de surveillance de l'Internet mis en place par le FBI au début des années 2000. Mis en place à la fin des années 1990 et utilisé principalement dans les années 2000, il permettait au FBI de surveiller les courriels et les activités en ligne de personnes spécifiquement ciblées dans le cadre d'enquêtes criminelles ou de sécurité nationale. Il a été conçu pour surveiller les communications par courrier électronique et les activités en ligne de personnes spécifiquement ciblées dans le cadre d'enquêtes criminelles ou de sécurité nationale. Le système fonctionnait en étant installé directement sur le réseau de l'Internet Service Provider (ISP) de la personne ciblée. Il pouvait alors filtrer toutes les communications entrantes et sortantes de cette personne. Le système était techniquement un dispositif de capture de paquets, c'est-à-dire un logiciel capable d'intercepter et d'inspecter les "paquets" de données qui circulent sur un réseau informatique. "Carnivore" était installé directement sur le réseau de l'Internet Service Provider (ISP) de la personne ciblée, où il pouvait filtrer toutes les communications entrantes et sortantes de cette personne.  Le FBI a déclaré avoir abandonné l'utilisation de "Carnivore" en 2005, bien que des rapports ultérieurs suggèrent que des outils de surveillance similaires continuent d'être utilisés.
One of the controversial provisions of the USA PATRIOT Act allows for the indefinite detention of foreign nationals suspected of being linked to terrorist activities. The US authorities have the power to detain a person on the basis of mere suspicion and can do so indefinitely, without charge or trial. In addition, the definition of terrorism and terrorist activity has been broadened to include many non-violent criminal acts and loose associations with groups suspected of terrorist activity. This expanded definition has been criticised for its potential misuse.


En termes juridiques, le terrorisme est généralement défini par la commission d'actes violents ou dangereux dans le but d'influencer ou d'affecter le gouvernement par intimidation ou contrainte. Cela peut également inclure les actes commis en représailles à des opérations menées par le gouvernement. Cette définition est assez large et peut potentiellement couvrir une variété d'actes criminels. Par exemple, cela pourrait inclure non seulement des actes de violence physique, comme les attentats à la bombe ou les attaques armées, mais aussi des actes de cyber-terrorisme qui perturbent les systèmes informatiques du gouvernement.
The "Carnivore" system, a precursor to the USA PATRIOT Act, was an Internet surveillance system set up by the FBI in the early 2000s. Set up in the late 1990s and used mainly in the 2000s, it enabled the FBI to monitor the emails and online activities of people specifically targeted as part of criminal or national security investigations. It was designed to monitor the email communications and online activities of individuals specifically targeted as part of criminal or national security investigations. The system worked by being installed directly on the network of the target's Internet Service Provider (ISP). It could then filter all incoming and outgoing communications from that person. The system was technically a packet capture device, i.e. software capable of intercepting and inspecting data 'packets' travelling over a computer network. "Carnivore was installed directly on the network of the target's Internet Service Provider (ISP), where it could filter all incoming and outgoing communications from that person. The FBI claimed to have abandoned the use of 'Carnivore' in 2005, although subsequent reports suggest that similar surveillance tools continue to be used.


[[Image:Camp x-ray detainees.jpg|thumb|L'ennemi est déclaré Hors la loi – Carl Schmitt fournit à Giorgio Agamben les catégories d'une critique fondamentale de Guantanamo.]]  
In legal terms, terrorism is generally defined as the commission of violent or dangerous acts for the purpose of influencing or affecting the government by intimidation or coercion. It can also include acts committed in retaliation for government operations. This definition is quite broad and can potentially cover a variety of criminal acts. For example, it could include not only acts of physical violence, such as bombings or armed attacks, but also acts of cyber-terrorism that disrupt government computer systems.[[Image:Camp x-ray detainees.jpg|thumb|The enemy is declared outside the law - Carl Schmitt provides Giorgio Agamben with the categories for a fundamental critique of Guantanamo.]]  


=== La prison de Guantanamo Bay : Un symbole de la raison d'État en action ===
=== Guantanamo Bay prison: A symbol of the raison d'état in action ===
La prison de Guantanamo Bay, située sur un territoire cubain loué par les États-Unis, est devenue un symbole controversé de l'application de la raison d'État dans le contexte de la lutte contre le terrorisme. Suite aux attentats du 11 septembre 2001, les États-Unis ont commencé à y détenir des personnes considérées comme des "combattants ennemis illégaux" en relation avec Al-Qaïda, les talibans ou d'autres groupes terroristes. L'objectif déclaré était d'obtenir des informations de ces détenus pour prévenir d'autres attaques terroristes. Cependant, le fait que ces individus étaient détenus hors du territoire principal des États-Unis soulevait des questions juridiques complexes concernant leur statut légal et leurs droits. Les critiques ont soutenu que la détention de ces personnes à Guantanamo constituait une violation des lois internationales sur les droits de l'homme, notamment les Conventions de Genève. Les méthodes d'interrogation employées à Guantanamo, souvent décrites comme de la torture, ont également été l'objet de vives critiques. En outre, de nombreux détenus ont été retenus pendant de nombreuses années sans inculpation ni jugement, ce qui a suscité des préoccupations quant à la violation du droit à un procès équitable. Ainsi, Guantanamo est devenu un exemple marquant de la façon dont la raison d'État a été invoquée pour justifier des mesures extraordinaires dans le contexte de la guerre contre le terrorisme.  
The Guantanamo Bay prison, located on Cuban territory leased by the United States, has become a controversial symbol of the application of raison d'état in the context of the fight against terrorism. Following the attacks of 11 September 2001, the United States began detaining people there who were considered to be "unlawful enemy combatants" with links to al-Qaeda, the Taliban or other terrorist groups. The stated aim was to obtain information from these detainees to prevent further terrorist attacks. However, the fact that these individuals were detained outside the main territory of the United States raised complex legal issues concerning their legal status and rights. Critics argued that the detention of these individuals at Guantanamo was a violation of international human rights law, including the Geneva Conventions. The interrogation methods used at Guantanamo, often described as torture, have also been strongly criticised. In addition, many detainees have been held for many years without charge or trial, raising concerns that the right to a fair trial has been violated. As a result, Guantanamo has become a prominent example of how the raison d'état has been invoked to justify extraordinary measures in the context of the war on terror.  


La prison de Guantanamo Bay, située sur une base militaire américaine à Cuba, a été qualifiée de "no man's land" juridique. Il s'agit d'un territoire qui, bien qu'étant sous contrôle américain, n'est pas considéré comme faisant partie des États-Unis au sens propre. Cela a permis au gouvernement américain d'argumenter que les détenus à Guantanamo n'étaient pas éligibles aux protections constitutionnelles normalement accordées aux individus sur le sol américain. Cette situation a créé une zone grise juridique qui a été utilisée pour justifier des pratiques de détention et d'interrogation controversées. Les critiques soutiennent que cela a permis au gouvernement américain d'éviter les protections juridiques traditionnelles, telles que le droit à un procès équitable, le droit à un avocat et la protection contre les traitements cruels et inhumains. Cet état de "no man's land" juridique a été critiqué pour avoir facilité la création d'un système où la raison d'État prévaut sur les droits de l'homme et les principes du droit international. Ainsi, Guantanamo est devenu un symbole du débat sur l'équilibre entre la sécurité nationale et les droits individuels dans la lutte contre le terrorisme.
The prison at Guantanamo Bay, located on a US military base in Cuba, has been described as a legal "no man's land". This is a territory which, although under US control, is not considered to be part of the United States in the proper sense. This has allowed the US government to argue that the detainees at Guantanamo are not eligible for the constitutional protections normally afforded to individuals on US soil. This created a legal grey area that was used to justify controversial detention and interrogation practices. Critics argue that this has allowed the US government to avoid traditional legal protections, such as the right to a fair trial, the right to counsel and protection from cruel and inhuman treatment. This state of legal 'no man's land' has been criticised for facilitating the creation of a system where raison d'état prevails over human rights and the principles of international law. Guantanamo has thus become a symbol of the debate on the balance between national security and individual rights in the fight against terrorism.


La situation de la prison de Guantanamo a créé une complexité juridique unique. La base militaire sur laquelle la prison est située est techniquement sur le territoire cubain, mais elle est contrôlée par les États-Unis en vertu d'un traité de location à long terme. Le gouvernement américain a maintenu que, puisque la base de Guantanamo est située à l'extérieur du territoire américain, les détenus qui y sont détenus ne bénéficient pas des protections constitutionnelles auxquelles ils auraient droit s'ils étaient détenus sur le sol américain. Cette position a été contestée par des avocats, des défenseurs des droits de l'homme et d'autres, qui soutiennent que les détenus de Guantanamo devraient bénéficier de ces protections. C'est précisément cette complexité et cette incertitude juridiques qui ont conduit certains à qualifier Guantanamo de "no man's land" juridique, un espace où les règles normales du droit semblent ne pas s'appliquer. Cela a soulevé des questions sérieuses sur l'équilibre entre les impératifs de la sécurité nationale et le respect des droits de l'homme et des normes du droit international.
The situation of the Guantanamo prison has created a unique legal complexity. The military base on which the prison is located is technically on Cuban territory, but it is controlled by the United States under a long-term lease agreement. The US government has maintained that, because the Guantanamo base is located outside US territory, the detainees held there do not enjoy the constitutional protections to which they would be entitled if held on US soil. This position has been challenged by lawyers, human rights advocates and others who argue that Guantanamo detainees should be afforded these protections. It is precisely this legal complexity and uncertainty that has led some to describe Guantanamo as a legal "no man's land", a place where the normal rules of law seem not to apply. This has raised serious questions about the balance between the imperatives of national security and respect for human rights and the norms of international law.


La désignation des détenus de Guantanamo a été un sujet de controverse majeure depuis l'ouverture de la prison. Le gouvernement américain a affirmé que les détenus sont des "combattants ennemis illégaux", un terme qui n'est pas reconnu par les Conventions de Genève, qui définissent les règles internationales pour le traitement des prisonniers de guerre. Le terme "combattant ennemi illégal" a été critiqué par de nombreux juristes et défenseurs des droits de l'homme, qui soutiennent que cette désignation est utilisée pour contourner les obligations des États-Unis en vertu des Conventions de Genève et d'autres normes internationales en matière de droits de l'homme. En effet, les détenus de Guantanamo n'ont pas les mêmes droits que les prisonniers de guerre (qui ont droit à un certain nombre de protections en vertu des Conventions de Genève), les prisonniers de droit commun (qui ont droit à un procès et à une représentation juridique) ou les prisonniers politiques (qui peuvent bénéficier de protections supplémentaires en vertu du droit international). La position du gouvernement américain a été contestée devant les tribunaux, et bien que certaines pratiques aient été modifiées en réponse à ces contestations, la situation globale de Guantanamo reste un sujet de controverse.
The designation of Guantanamo detainees has been a major point of contention since the prison opened. The US government has claimed that the detainees are "unlawful enemy combatants", a term that is not recognised by the Geneva Conventions, which set out international rules for the treatment of prisoners of war. The term "unlawful enemy combatant" has been criticised by many lawyers and human rights activists, who argue that this designation is used to circumvent the United States' obligations under the Geneva Conventions and other international human rights standards. Indeed, Guantanamo detainees do not have the same rights as prisoners of war (who are entitled to a number of protections under the Geneva Conventions), ordinary prisoners (who are entitled to a trial and legal representation) or political prisoners (who may benefit from additional protections under international law). The US government's position has been challenged in the courts, and although some practices have been changed in response to these challenges, the overall situation at Guantanamo remains controversial.


L'administration Bush, dans sa lutte contre le terrorisme, a créé une nouvelle catégorie de détenus : les "combattants ennemis illégaux". Cela signifie qu'ils n'étaient ni considérés comme des prisonniers de guerre, qui sont protégés par les Conventions de Genève, ni comme des criminels de droit commun, qui ont droit à un procès devant un tribunal civil. En tant que "combattants ennemis illégaux", ces détenus étaient essentiellement en dehors de la protection du droit international et du droit américain, ce qui permettait au gouvernement américain de les détenir indéfiniment sans inculpation ni jugement. Cela a également permis aux interrogateurs d'employer des techniques d'interrogatoire agressives qui seraient autrement interdites. Cette approche a été largement critiquée pour avoir violé les principes fondamentaux des droits de l'homme et de l'état de droit. Bien que certaines des politiques les plus controversées aient été modifiées par la suite, la question du statut et des droits des détenus de Guantanamo reste un sujet de débat.
In its fight against terrorism, the Bush administration created a new category of detainees: "unlawful enemy combatants". This meant that they were neither considered prisoners of war, who are protected by the Geneva Conventions, nor common criminals, who are entitled to a trial in a civilian court. As "unlawful enemy combatants", these detainees were essentially outside the protection of international and US law, allowing the US government to hold them indefinitely without charge or trial. It also allowed interrogators to employ aggressive interrogation techniques that would otherwise be prohibited. This approach has been widely criticised for violating fundamental principles of human rights and the rule of law. Although some of the more controversial policies have subsequently been amended, the status and rights of Guantanamo detainees remain a matter of debate.


Le terme "guerre contre la terreur" implique un conflit armé, ce qui suggère que ceux qui sont capturés en y participant seraient normalement considérés comme des prisonniers de guerre. Cependant, l'administration Bush a décidé de ne pas suivre cette ligne de raisonnement, préférant qualifier ces détenus de "combattants ennemis illégaux". Cette décision a conduit à une situation , bien qu'ils soient capturés dans le cadre de ce qui est appelé une guerre, ils ne bénéficient pas des protections normalement accordées aux prisonniers de guerre en vertu du droit international. En fait, cette situation illustre l'un des nombreux défis posés par la guerre contre le terrorisme. Dans une guerre conventionnelle, les frontières, les combattants et les objectifs sont généralement clairement définis. Cependant, dans la guerre contre le terrorisme, ces éléments sont souvent flous ou non définis. Par exemple, le "terrain de bataille" n'est pas limité à une zone géographique spécifique, mais s'étend à l'échelle mondiale. Les "combattants ennemis" peuvent être des citoyens de presque tous les pays, y compris ceux qui sont en paix avec les États-Unis. Et parce que le terrorisme est une tactique plutôt qu'une entité identifiable, il n'y a pas d'ennemi clairement défini à vaincre pour mettre fin à la guerre. Ces facteurs contribuent tous à la complexité et à la controverse entourant la guerre contre le terrorisme et le traitement des détenus de Guantanamo.
The term 'war on terror' implies an armed conflict, which suggests that those captured while participating in it would normally be considered prisoners of war. However, the Bush administration decided not to follow this line of reasoning, preferring to label these detainees as "unlawful enemy combatants". This decision has led to a situation where, although they are captured as part of what is called a war, they do not enjoy the protections normally accorded to prisoners of war under international law. In fact, this situation illustrates one of the many challenges posed by the war on terror. In a conventional war, the boundaries, combatants and objectives are generally clearly defined. In the war on terror, however, these elements are often blurred or undefined. For example, the "battleground" is not limited to a specific geographical area, but extends worldwide. Enemy combatants" can be citizens of almost any country, including those at peace with the United States. And because terrorism is a tactic rather than an identifiable entity, there is no clearly defined enemy to defeat in order to end the war. These factors all contribute to the complexity and controversy surrounding the war on terror and the treatment of Guantanamo detainees.


La création de la prison de Guantanamo est un exemple notable de l'utilisation de l'extraterritorialité pour échapper aux contraintes juridiques normales. En plaçant la prison hors du territoire des États-Unis, l'administration américaine a cherché à la mettre hors de portée des cours américaines, et donc de l'application des lois américaines sur le traitement des prisonniers.  
The creation of the Guantanamo prison is a notable example of the use of extraterritoriality to evade normal legal constraints. By placing the prison outside US territory, the US administration sought to put it beyond the reach of the US courts, and therefore beyond the application of US laws on the treatment of prisoners.


En 2004, la Cour suprême des États-Unis a statué dans l'affaire Rasul c. Bush que les tribunaux américains avaient compétence pour examiner les demandes d'habeas corpus présentées par les détenus de Guantanamo. Cela signifiait que, contrairement à ce que prétendait l'administration Bush, les détenus de Guantanamo avaient le droit de contester la légalité de leur détention devant les tribunaux américains. L'affaire Rasul v. Bush en 2004 a marqué un tournant, en déclarant que les détenus de Guantanamo avaient le droit de contester leur détention devant les tribunaux américains. Cette décision a élargi les droits des détenus, leur permettant d'avoir un certain niveau de protection juridique. Cependant, l'administration Bush a réagi en 2006 en faisant adopter la Military Commissions Act, qui tentait de limiter l'accès des détenus aux tribunaux. En 2008, la Cour suprême a réaffirmé les droits des détenus dans l'affaire Boumediene v. Bush, déclarant que les détenus de Guantanamo avaient le droit constitutionnel d'habeas corpus. Concernant le terme "combattant irrégulier", c'est une terminologie controversée que l'administration Bush a utilisée pour justifier le traitement des détenus de Guantanamo. Elle a été critiquée par beaucoup comme une tentative de contourner les protections prévues par les lois internationales, notamment la Convention de Genève.
In 2004, the US Supreme Court ruled in Rasul v Bush that US courts had jurisdiction to consider habeas corpus petitions brought by Guantanamo detainees. This meant that, contrary to the claims of the Bush administration, Guantanamo detainees had the right to challenge the lawfulness of their detention in US courts. The case of Rasul v. Bush in 2004 marked a turning point, declaring that Guantanamo detainees had the right to challenge their detention in US courts. This decision extended the rights of the detainees, allowing them to have a certain level of legal protection. However, the Bush administration reacted in 2006 by passing the Military Commissions Act, which attempted to limit detainees' access to the courts. In 2008, the Supreme Court reaffirmed the rights of detainees in Boumediene v. Bush, declaring that Guantanamo detainees had a constitutional right to habeas corpus. Regarding the term "unlawful combatant", this is a controversial terminology that the Bush administration has used to justify the treatment of Guantanamo detainees. It has been criticised by many as an attempt to circumvent the protections provided by international law, in particular the Geneva Convention.


La question de savoir si la "parenthèse" de l'État d'exception aux États-Unis, enclenchée suite aux attaques du 11 septembre, est terminée, est complexe et sujet à débat. L'état d'exception, dans le contexte de la sécurité nationale, a permis l'adoption de mesures extraordinaires, telles que le USA PATRIOT Act, l'ouverture de la prison de Guantanamo, et une surveillance accrue des communications électroniques, parmi d'autres. Plusieurs de ces mesures sont encore en place, même si elles ont été révisées et débattues. Par exemple, la prison de Guantanamo est toujours opérationnelle, même si le nombre de détenus a été réduit et que plusieurs présidents américains ont promis sa fermeture. De même, bien que le USA PATRIOT Act ait expiré en 2015, plusieurs de ses dispositions ont été renouvelées sous d'autres formes législatives. De plus, la menace du terrorisme continue d'influencer la politique américaine et internationale, et le cadre légal de la "guerre contre le terrorisme" a des implications durables. Par conséquent, bien qu'il y ait eu des changements significatifs depuis le 11 septembre 2001, il est difficile de dire que l'état d'exception est complètement fini. Il est important de noter que ce sujet fait l'objet de nombreux débats parmi les juristes, les politologues et les chercheurs en études de sécurité. Il n'y a donc pas de consensus définitif sur la question.
The question of whether the 'parenthesis' of the state of exception in the United States, which began in the wake of the 11 September attacks, has come to an end is complex and open to debate. The state of exception, in the context of national security, enabled the adoption of extraordinary measures, such as the USA PATRIOT Act, the opening of the Guantanamo prison, and increased surveillance of electronic communications, among others. Many of these measures are still in place, even though they have been revised and debated. For example, the Guantanamo prison is still operational, even though the number of detainees has been reduced and several US presidents have promised its closure. Similarly, although the USA PATRIOT Act expired in 2015, many of its provisions have been renewed in other legislative forms. In addition, the threat of terrorism continues to influence US and international policy, and the legal framework of the 'war on terror' has lasting implications. Consequently, although there have been significant changes since 11 September 2001, it is difficult to say that the state of exception is completely over. It is important to note that this subject is the subject of much debate among lawyers, political scientists and security studies researchers. There is therefore no definitive consensus on the issue.


Même après la fin de l'administration de George W. Bush, certaines mesures prises dans le sillage du 11 septembre sont restées en place. Barack Obama, bien qu'il ait promis de fermer la prison de Guantanamo lors de sa campagne présidentielle en 2008, n'a pas réussi à tenir cette promesse pendant ses deux mandats. De plus, des programmes de surveillance de masse révélés par Edward Snowden en 2013 ont montré que le gouvernement américain continuait à surveiller les communications de ses citoyens et d'autres personnes à travers le monde. Cela soulève la question de savoir si ces mesures exceptionnelles sont devenues la norme, et si la notion d'état de droit a été modifiée ou compromise à la suite du 11 septembre. Ces questions sont encore débattues parmi les chercheurs, les politiciens et les défenseurs des droits civiques. L'état d'exception, tel que conceptualisé par Giorgio Agamben, peut devenir permanent et changer la nature de la relation entre l'état et ses citoyens. Il est important de souligner que l'équilibre entre la sécurité et la liberté est une question complexe et contestée. Les décisions prises au nom de la sécurité nationale peuvent avoir des conséquences durables sur les libertés civiles, et l'évaluation de ces décisions nécessite un examen attentif et un débat public.
Even after the end of the George W. Bush administration, some of the measures taken in the wake of 11 September remained in place. Barack Obama, despite promising to close the Guantanamo prison during his presidential campaign in 2008, has failed to deliver on this promise during his two terms in office. In addition, mass surveillance programmes revealed by Edward Snowden in 2013 showed that the US government continued to monitor the communications of its citizens and others around the world. This raises the question of whether these exceptional measures have become the norm, and whether the notion of the rule of law has been altered or compromised in the wake of September 11. These questions are still being debated by researchers, politicians and civil rights activists. The state of exception, as conceptualised by Giorgio Agamben, can become permanent and change the nature of the relationship between the state and its citizens. It is important to stress that the balance between security and freedom is a complex and contested issue. Decisions taken in the name of national security can have lasting consequences for civil liberties, and the assessment of such decisions requires careful scrutiny and public debate.


L'Union européenne a adopté une approche différente par rapport à la gestion du terrorisme. Plutôt que de s'appuyer sur des mesures unilatérales, elle a cherché à harmoniser les législations de ses États membres. Cela a impliqué la création d'un cadre juridique commun pour la définition du terrorisme et la mise en place de mesures de lutte contre le terrorisme. En 2002, l'Union européenne a adopté une décision-cadre sur la lutte contre le terrorisme, qui définit des infractions liées au terrorisme et prévoit des sanctions pénales pour ces infractions. Cette décision-cadre a été modifiée plusieurs fois pour s'adapter à l'évolution de la menace terroriste. De plus, l'Union européenne a mis en place divers instruments pour faciliter la coopération entre les États membres dans la lutte contre le terrorisme. Par exemple, elle a créé Europol, l'agence de l'Union européenne pour la coopération des services répressifs, qui facilite l'échange d'informations et la coordination des actions entre les forces de police des États membres.
The European Union has adopted a different approach to dealing with terrorism. Rather than relying on unilateral measures, it has sought to harmonise the legislation of its Member States. This has involved creating a common legal framework for defining terrorism and putting in place counter-terrorism measures. In 2002, the European Union adopted a Framework Decision on combating terrorism, which defines terrorism-related offences and provides for criminal penalties for these offences. This Framework Decision has been amended several times to adapt to changes in the terrorist threat. In addition, the European Union has put in place various instruments to facilitate cooperation between Member States in the fight against terrorism. For example, it has created Europol, the European Union agency for law enforcement cooperation, which facilitates the exchange of information and the coordination of actions between the police forces of the Member States.


Les programmes de "restitutions extraordinaires" et les "vols secrets" de la CIA qui ont été révélés au grand jour dans les années 2000 sont des exemples marquants de la façon dont certains droits fondamentaux et libertés publiques peuvent être contournés dans le cadre de la lutte contre le terrorisme. La restitution extraordinaire est le transfert secret d'une personne d'un pays à un autre sans recours à un processus judiciaire formel. Cela a souvent conduit à des situations où des individus ont été détenus sans inculpation, ont été privés de leurs droits juridiques fondamentaux et, dans certains cas, ont été soumis à la torture ou à des traitements inhumains et dégradants. Les vols secrets de la CIA, souvent appelés "vols de la torture", sont utilisés pour transporter ces personnes entre différents sites de détention à travers le monde. Il a été révélé que plusieurs pays, y compris certains pays européens, ont collaboré avec ces programmes, soit en permettant l'utilisation de leur espace aérien et de leurs aéroports pour ces vols, soit en participant à la détention et à l'interrogatoire des individus. Ces pratiques sont clairement en contradiction avec les principes de l'État de droit et le respect des droits de l'homme, et elles ont suscité de vives critiques et controverses. De plus, elles ont soulevé des questions importantes sur la responsabilité et la transparence des gouvernements dans le cadre de la lutte contre le terrorisme.
The CIA's 'extraordinary rendition' programmes and 'secret flights' that came to light in the 2000s are striking examples of how certain fundamental rights and civil liberties can be circumvented in the fight against terrorism. Extraordinary rendition is the secret transfer of a person from one country to another without recourse to a formal judicial process. This has often led to situations where individuals have been detained without charge, deprived of their fundamental legal rights and, in some cases, subjected to torture or inhuman and degrading treatment. Secret CIA flights, often referred to as "torture flights", are used to transport these people between different detention sites around the world. It has been revealed that several countries, including some European countries, have collaborated with these programmes, either by allowing the use of their airspace and airports for these flights, or by participating in the detention and interrogation of individuals. These practices clearly run counter to the principles of the rule of law and respect for human rights, and have given rise to fierce criticism and controversy. They have also raised important questions about the accountability and transparency of governments in the fight against terrorism.


= Annexes =
= Annexes =

Version actuelle datée du 7 juillet 2023 à 11:43

Intellectual legacy of Émile Durkheim and Pierre Bourdieu in social theoryThe origins of the fall of the Weimar RepublicIntellectual legacy of Max Weber and Vilfredo Pareto in social theoryThe notion of "concept" in social sciencesHistory of the discipline of political science: theories and conceptsMarxism and StructuralismFunctionalism and SystemismInteractionism and ConstructivismThe theories of political anthropologyThe three I's debate: interests, institutions and ideasRational choice theory and the analysis of interests in political scienceAn analytical approach to institutions in political scienceThe study of ideas and ideologies in political scienceTheories of war in political scienceThe War: Concepts and EvolutionsThe reason of StateState, sovereignty, globalization and multi-level governanceTheories of violence in political science‎‎Welfare State and BiopowerAnalysis of democratic regimes and democratisation processesElectoral Systems: Mechanisms, Issues and ConsequencesThe system of government in democraciesMorphology of contestationsAction in Political TheoryIntroduction to Swiss politicsIntroduction to political behaviourPublic Policy Analysis: Definition and cycle of public policyPublic Policy Analysis: agenda setting and formulationPublic Policy Analysis: Implementation and EvaluationIntroduction to the sub-discipline of international relationsIntroduction to Political Theory

The "raison d'État" refers to a principle of governance according to which the State has the right and the obligation to take decisions that are in the supreme interest of the country, even if these decisions are contrary to other considerations, such as moral, religious or international laws. In practice, the raison d'Etat has often been used to justify actions that would otherwise be considered immoral or illegal. For example, a government might justify declaring war, spying or suspending certain civil liberties in the name of raison d'État.

The raison d'État plays a crucial role in political science, particularly in the analysis of decisions taken by a government or head of state. Political science studies seek to understand the motivations behind political actions, and the concept of raison d'État can help explain why certain choices are made. Political science examines how the raison d'État influences foreign policy strategies, crisis management, war and peace decisions, domestic policies, and other aspects of governance. Researchers can analyse how raison d'État is invoked to justify certain actions and what the implications are for democracy, human rights, ethics and international law. Moreover, the concept of raison d'État is linked to other theories in political science, such as realism and neo-realism, which suggest that states act primarily on the basis of their national security interests. However, there is an ongoing debate about how far a state can or should go to safeguard its interests, and how to balance this with other obligations and values, such as respect for human rights and international norms. This is why raison d'État remains an important subject of study in political science, both to understand past actions and to inform discussions on how best to manage current and future policy challenges.

What is the Reason of State?[modifier | modifier le wikicode]

Reason of State is a concept that allows public authorities to take exceptional measures, which may be outside the usual legal framework, to respond to extraordinary situations or threats to national security. In theory, this concept is intended to protect the higher interests of the State and the people. In practice, however, it is open to controversy and debate, as it can be used to justify actions that violate human rights, international norms or democratic principles. For example, in times of war or serious national crisis, a government may invoke raison d'Etat to justify measures such as declaring martial law, suspending certain civil liberties, or taking emergency measures that would otherwise be illegal.

The idea of raison d'État implies that, in certain circumstances, the state or another institutional political entity may act in a manner that departs from ordinary law in order to protect the supreme interest of the country. This concept is generally invoked in situations of crisis or national emergency, where the state believes it must take extraordinary measures to preserve security, stability or other essential interests. However, the fact that a State may derogate from ordinary law in certain circumstances does not mean that it may do so without restriction or control. In most legal systems, there are checks and balances designed to prevent abuses of power and to ensure that any derogation from ordinary law is proportionate, necessary and consistent with certain minimum standards. For example, the constitutions of many countries contain special provisions for emergency situations that allow certain temporary derogations from normally guaranteed rights and freedoms. However, these provisions generally require that the measures taken be proportionate to the seriousness of the situation, and that they be lifted as soon as the emergency is over. In addition, in democratic systems, decisions taken in the name of the raison d'Etat may be subject to judicial review, and may be challenged in court if found to be unconstitutional or contrary to international law.

Reason of State is a concept that applies in exceptional circumstances, when it is deemed necessary to derogate from ordinary law and potentially from public freedoms in order to protect the supreme interest of the State. In a democracy, the use of raison d'État must be carefully controlled and limited. It should only be invoked in truly exceptional situations, not as a common practice or routine. If used regularly or arbitrarily, it could endanger the rule of law and democratic principles. This is why, even in emergency situations, democracies seek to maintain checks and balances to ensure that the use of raison d'Etat respects certain limits. This may include constitutional requirements, judicial review, and transparency and accountability to the public and parliament. That said, the application of raison d'État remains a complex and delicate subject that gives rise to philosophical, political and legal debate. Decisions taken in the name of raison d'État can have profound and lasting consequences, and it is therefore crucial to approach them with caution and discernment.

The concept of raison d'État may involve going beyond certain usual standards of legality, normality and logic. Let's take a closer look:

  • Exceeding the law: The raison d'État may lead to a departure from the usual laws in force. For example, in an emergency situation, a government could invoke raison d'État to suspend certain laws or rights.
  • Exceeding the normal: The raison d'État concerns exceptional situations, not routine or normal governance. Actions taken under raison d'État are supposed to be extraordinary and temporary.
  • Going beyond what is logical: Reason of State can sometimes involve actions that may seem illogical or contradictory by normal standards. For example, a state may choose to take actions that are contrary to its own laws or principles, or that run counter to its international commitments, if those actions are considered necessary to protect the best interests of the state.

Although the raison d'État may lead to these standards being exceeded, it is important to note that in democratic systems there are generally checks and limits to prevent abuses of power and preserve the rule of law. The raison d'État does not give the government carte blanche to act as it wishes, but must be used with caution and discernment, and with respect for the fundamental principles of democracy and human rights.

A state of emergency is a term often used interchangeably with raison d'état. It refers to a situation in which the government derogates from ordinary law, often in response to an emergency or crisis. The study of states of exception could focus on questions such as: What are the conditions that trigger a state of exception? How do governments justify invoking the raison d'état or declaring a state of exception? What are the effects on society and human rights? What are the mechanisms for controlling and limiting the use of raison d'état?

The events and the response of the US government to the attacks of 11 September 2001 can serve as an example for studying the raison d'État. The measures taken by the US government after the attacks demonstrate several aspects of raison d'Etat in action.

  • Overstepping the law: In response to the attacks, the US Congress passed the USA PATRIOT Act, which extended the powers of intelligence and law enforcement agencies to monitor and investigate terrorist activities. Some of the Act's provisions have been criticised for their potential infringement of the civil liberties guaranteed by the US Constitution.
  • Going beyond the normal: President George W. Bush's declaration of the "war on terror" and the invasion of Afghanistan (and later Iraq) were extraordinary actions taken in response to an exceptional situation.
  • Going beyond what is logical: Certain decisions taken in the context of the "war on terror", such as the establishment of the Guantánamo detention camp and the use of advanced interrogation techniques (considered by many to be torture), may seem illogical or contrary to the usual principles of law and ethics.

These actions, taken in the name of national security, gave rise to much debate about the role of the state, the protection of civil liberties and the limits of raison d'état. The repercussions of these decisions continue to be felt and debated to this day. This makes 11 September 2001 and its aftermath a particularly relevant example for the study of raison d'État.

The notion of 'raison d'Etat' is often linked to that of a 'state of emergency'. In both cases, it refers to a state of action that goes beyond the framework of ordinary law and normality, often in response to a situation of emergency or exceptional crisis. A 'state of exception' is generally declared when circumstances are deemed so serious that the usual rules cannot be applied effectively. It allows the state to take extraordinary action to respond to the situation. This could include measures such as suspending certain civil liberties, declaring martial law, or passing emergency laws. The "raison d'Etat" may be invoked as justification for such exceptional actions, based on the need to protect the supreme interest of the State and the people. However, although these concepts are closely related, they are not necessarily identical. A state of emergency is generally a formal mechanism that is declared in accordance with certain legal procedures and has specific legal implications. The raison d'Etat, on the other hand, is a broader concept that can justify a variety of extraordinary actions, whether or not a formal state of exception is declared. It is also important to note that, although these concepts allow the state to act exceptionally, they do not give it a blank cheque to act without restrictions or controls. In democratic systems, there are generally mechanisms in place to limit and control the use of raison d'Etat and the invocation of states of emergency, in order to prevent abuses of power and preserve fundamental rights.

Reason of State can be interpreted as a form of "reasonableness" in the sense that it seeks to protect the supreme interest of the nation, especially when faced with a crisis or existential threat. However, this does not necessarily mean that all actions taken in the name of raison d'Etat are automatically 'reasonable' in the ordinary sense of the word.

There are a number of factors that can influence whether an action taken in the name of the raison d'état is considered reasonable:

  1. Proportionality: Are actions taken in the name of the raison d'Etat proportionate to the threat or crisis they are intended to combat? Are they the minimum necessary to achieve the desired objective?
  2. Necessity: Were the actions absolutely necessary? Were there other options that could have been just as effective, but less intrusive or less damaging to rights and freedoms?
  3. Effectiveness: Were the actions effective in achieving the desired objective? Did they succeed in resolving the crisis or combating the threat?
  4. Respect for democratic principles and human rights: Were the actions taken in compliance with fundamental democratic principles and international human rights standards?

Ultimately, the question of whether the raison d'état is 'reasonable' is largely subjective and may depend on how these factors are weighed. It is a subject that is often at the centre of political and philosophical debate.

Genealogy of the raison d'État[modifier | modifier le wikicode]

The question of a state of exception, or the suspension of certain democratic norms in exceptional situations, is the subject of intense philosophical, political and legal debate. How can it be justified that a democracy, a system that values the rule of law and respect for human rights, can temporarily suspend these principles in the name of a higher interest?

To understand this paradox, it may be useful to look at the genealogy of the raison d'Etat and the state of exception. The concept of raison d'État is deeply rooted in the political and philosophical history of the West. It dates back at least to the period of the Renaissance and the Wars of Religion in Europe, when philosophers such as Niccolò Machiavelli and Jean Bodin began to articulate the idea that a sovereign might sometimes have to act outside the usual norms of morality and law in order to preserve the state.

The idea of a state of exception was later formalised by jurists and political theorists, who recognised that constitutions and systems of law can sometimes be insufficient to deal with extraordinary crises. This idea was put forward by thinkers such as Carl Schmitt, who argued that the sovereign is the one who has the power to decide on a state of exception. However, the justification of states of exception does not mean that democracy is completely abandoned or that democratic principles are unimportant. On the contrary, the idea is that democracy itself is threatened in these exceptional situations, and that extraordinary measures are necessary to preserve it. Moreover, even in a state of exception, it is generally recognised that there are limits to what the state can do, and that certain fundamental standards of respect for human rights and the rule of law must be maintained. That said, there is a real risk that the state of exception and the raison d'Etat could be abused to justify human rights violations or a slide towards authoritarianism. This is why it is crucial that their use is carefully controlled and limited, and that there are mechanisms to ensure accountability and democratic control.

In situations of emergency or crisis, the temporary suspension of certain democratic norms or the extension of the powers of the State may give rise to a grey area, a legal 'no man's land' where the usual safeguards may no longer apply. It is precisely for this reason that the invocation of a state of emergency is generally surrounded by formal procedures and controls. In many countries, for example, the constitution sets out the circumstances in which a state of emergency may be declared, how long it may last, and the specific powers that the government may exercise during that period. There may also be requirements for parliamentary approval, notification to international bodies, or judicial review. However, even with these controls, there is always a risk that the state of exception could be abused or unduly prolonged, leading to a weakening of the rule of law and civil liberties. Consequently, democratic vigilance, judicial control and human rights monitoring are essential to ensure that a state of exception does not become the norm and that democracy can be restored as soon as circumstances allow.

A state of exception, although often invoked to protect democracy and the state against a serious threat, involves a temporary suspension or relaxation of certain democratic norms, rules and procedures. This creates an area of "vagueness", where the usual limits and guarantees are less clear. It is a state of ambiguity, where the state, in the interests of preserving order and security, may be perceived as rising above the democracy it is supposed to protect. This situation is fraught with risks, in particular the risk that the powers of the state will be extended beyond what is necessary, or that the state of emergency will be unduly prolonged. This is why it is crucial to have robust control and accountability mechanisms to govern the use of states of exception. This may include constitutional or legal requirements, judicial oversight, parliamentary scrutiny and monitoring by the media and civil society. Furthermore, even in a state of exception, it is generally recognised that certain fundamental standards of respect for human rights and the rule of law must be maintained. These include the right to a fair trial, the prohibition of torture, and the right to life, among others. These rights cannot be suspended, even in emergency situations. Finally, it is important to remember that a state of emergency is supposed to be temporary and limited to the duration of the crisis or threat that gave rise to it. Once the crisis is over, the State must return to normal functioning and fully restore democratic norms and procedures.

The raison d'État is deeply rooted in political theory, and understanding it requires reflection on key political concepts and historical and contemporary contexts. Moreover, since actions taken in the name of raison d'État can have major consequences for human rights, democracy and the rule of law, they often give rise to intense political debate. Political theory offers many tools for understanding and analysing raison d'État. For example, it can help clarify the values and interests at stake, assess the justifications for particular actions, and understand the risks and potential consequences. It can also provide a framework for comparing different approaches to raison d'État in different national and international contexts. Moreover, raison d'État cannot be understood in isolation from the specific political conditions of a given moment. Decisions taken in the name of raison d'Etat are often influenced by the political realities of the moment, including security concerns, economic challenges, social and political pressures, and prevailing norms and values. Debates about the raison d'État are therefore often linked to broader questions about the nature and direction of politics and society. Ultimately, the question of the raison d'État leads us to reflect on fundamental principles of politics and governance, such as the balance between security and freedoms, the nature and limits of sovereignty, and the role of the state in protecting the common good.

Machiavelli (1469 - 1627): Conceptualisation of the reason of State[modifier | modifier le wikicode]

His posthumous portrait by Santi di Tito, in Florence's Palazzo Vecchio.

One of the fundamental aspects of Niccolò Machiavelli's political thought, often condensed into the expression "the end justifies the means". In his most famous work, The Prince, Machiavelli argues that leaders must be prepared to act in ways that might otherwise be considered immoral to achieve and maintain power. However, it is important to note that Machiavelli does not advocate the complete rejection of morality. Instead, he points out that conventional morality can sometimes conflict with the demands of politics. For example, a ruler may need to use deception or force to protect the state. In this context, such actions may be justified if they contribute to a higher end, such as political stability or state security. This ties in with the idea of 'raison d'État', which suggests that in certain exceptional circumstances the state may be justified in taking action that departs from ordinary law or customary norms. However, as Machiavelli himself recognises, this presents a complex ethical and political challenge, as it can be difficult to determine when such action is truly justified and how far it can go. Machiavelli's thought has been the subject of much debate and interpretation over the centuries. Some critics see him as a cynic who advocates amorality, while others see him as a pragmatic realist who recognises the dilemmas and challenges of politics. Whatever the case, his ideas have profoundly influenced political theory and continue to fuel discussions on issues such as the raison d'état.

Machiavelli has often been associated with the idea of cunning or deception as a strategic tool in politics. In 'The Prince', he suggests that rulers, when acting for the good of the state, may have to use concealment or manipulation to achieve their objectives. Guile, in this context, can be understood as a form of strategic intelligence, where an individual or group holds information that others do not, and uses this asymmetry of information to their advantage. This can involve misleading opponents, disguising true intentions or manipulating perceptions to gain a strategic advantage. However, it is important to note that for Machiavelli, the use of cunning is not an end in itself, but a means to a wider end, such as the stability of the state and the protection of the common good. Furthermore, while Machiavelli may seem to support a certain level of deception or manipulation in politics, he also warns that rulers should act with prudence and wisdom, and maintain the trust and respect of their subjects as much as possible.

From a Machiavellian perspective, tactics - and in particular the ability to act outside established norms when necessary to achieve a greater goal - are seen as an essential component of statesmanship. This is largely what Machiavelli meant by the statement that "the end justifies the means". In other words, for Machiavelli, political success sometimes requires actions that, outside the political context, might be considered contrary to conventional morality or the law. The ultimate requirement for the ruler, in this framework of thought, is the welfare and stability of the state. However, it is important to note that this view of politics, while sometimes seemingly pragmatic, also raises important ethical and moral issues. It highlights the need for a balance between the pursuit of political objectives and respect for ethical and legal standards. It also highlights the importance of accountability and transparency in the exercise of power. Machiavelli himself was not insensitive to these challenges. In his writings, he recognises that political power, if misused, can lead to tyranny and injustice. Therefore, while he may appear to support the idea that the end justifies the means, he also stresses the importance of prudence, wisdom and restraint in the exercise of power.

Although Machiavelli does not explicitly use the term 'raison d'état', his writings describe a similar concept. For him, the first priority of a ruler is the maintenance of power and the stability of the state. Consequently, it may be necessary to adopt behaviours or methods that do not conform to traditional democratic principles or that may even seem immoral. That said, Machiavelli does not advocate authoritarianism or despotism. Nor is he suggesting that rulers should be free to do as they please without constraint or accountability. In fact, he warns against the misuse of power and insists on the need for wise and prudent governance. He also suggests that rulers should always behave in such a way as to earn the respect and trust of their subjects, as popular support is crucial to long-term stability and success. Machiavelli's philosophy raises important questions about power, ethics and governance. Although it can sometimes seem cynical or amoral, it highlights the challenges inherent in politics and the need for a delicate balance between idealism and realism, between morality and efficiency.

From Machiavelli's perspective, political action may sometimes require going beyond the traditional frameworks of law and morality in order to achieve the most important objectives, such as the stability of the state. This is where the notion of 'reason of state' connects with his philosophy. Machiavelli recognises that politics, particularly at a high level such as that of the ruler of a state, can involve complex dilemmas where strict adherence to rules and norms can conflict with the practical demands of power and the survival of the state. This is not to say that Machiavelli advocates a total rejection of law or morality, but rather that he sees these aspects as part of a wider set of considerations that must be taken into account when making political decisions. However, it also raises important questions about the limits of political action and the tension between the imperatives of political reality and democratic and ethical ideals. These questions, which are at the heart of the debates on raison d'État, remain relevant and contested today.

Giovanni Botero (1544 - 1617): Contribution to the conceptualisation of the raison d'état[modifier | modifier le wikicode]

Giovanni Botero.

Giovanni Botero is a key figure in the development of the concept of 'raison d'État'. Born in 1544 in Piedmont, Italy, he was a diplomat, Jesuit priest and influential writer on subjects ranging from economics to geography and politics. His most famous work, 'Della ragion di Stato' (On the Reason of State), first published in 1589, played a crucial role in formulating this concept. In this treatise, Botero explains that the survival and success of the state depend on a combination of prudence, politics and morality. He argues that rulers must sometimes act according to pragmatic considerations that may go beyond traditional legal or ethical norms. However, unlike Machiavelli, Botero insists that the reason of state must always be guided by Christian and moral principles. For him, the true reason of State is that which serves the common good and is in accordance with divine law. So while Botero and Machiavelli can both be seen as important contributors to the theory of raison d'état, they offer different perspectives on the relationship between politics, morality and power. These perspectives have had a profound influence on political thought and continue to inform current debates on issues such as reason of state and ethics in politics.

Giovanni Botero was one of the first thinkers to focus on the construction and effectiveness of state power. He was interested in how states can develop and maintain their power, particularly through economics and demography. For Botero, the power of a state depended not only on the size of its territory or its army, but also on the wealth and well-being of its population. He was therefore one of the first to stress the importance of economic and social factors in strengthening state power. As part of the raison d'état, Botero argued that leaders had to take pragmatic decisions to ensure the survival and prosperity of their states. This might sometimes require actions that went beyond traditional legal or ethical norms. However, unlike Machiavelli, Botero also insisted on the importance of moral and Christian principles in governance, asserting that the true reason of state must always serve the common good and respect divine law. This combination of political pragmatism and moral commitment has made Botero's thought a major influence on political theory, and his concept of raison d'État remains relevant to contemporary discussions of power, ethics and governance.

As a Jesuit priest, Giovanni Botero incorporated theological principles into his conception of the raison d'état. For him, the exercise of power, including the application of raison d'état, should be guided by the principles and teachings of the Christian faith. Botero asserted that leaders, especially those who exercise exceptional power by virtue of the raison d'état, have a duty to respect the word of God and follow his commandments. They must strive to achieve God's objectives for humanity, which means promoting the common good, maintaining justice and peace, and protecting the weak and vulnerable. From this perspective, the reason of State cannot be used as an excuse to act arbitrarily or unjustly. On the contrary, it must always be used in a way that is compatible with divine law and promotes the well-being of the community. This is a vision of the reason of state that differs from that of Machiavelli and other more secular political theorists. It emphasises the moral and spiritual responsibility of rulers and the importance of faith and virtue in politics. This vision influenced the subsequent development of political theory, particularly within the tradition of Christian political philosophy.

Giovanni Botero and Niccolò Machiavelli have different perspectives on the reason of state in relation to morality. Machiavelli is often interpreted as setting aside traditional moral considerations in favour of political pragmatism, according to which the end (the stability and success of the state) justifies the means. His approach is sometimes described as amoral, in the sense that it does not conform to conventional morality. Botero, on the other hand, insists on the importance of morality, specifically Christian morality, in politics. For him, the raison d'Etat is not an excuse for acting immorally or unjustly, but a principle that must be applied in a way that is consistent with God's commandments and promotes the well-being of the community. So while both men agree that leaders may sometimes need to take exceptional measures to protect and strengthen their state, they differ on the extent to which these actions should be constrained by morality and ethics.

For him, the application of the reason of State must always be guided by moral principles, in particular those derived from the Christian faith. Political power, even when it is exercised exceptionally by virtue of the raison d'état, is not an end in itself, but a means of achieving divine objectives for humanity. This means that, although rulers may sometimes have to take measures that appear to go against conventional morality or existing laws, these measures can be justified if they are in accordance with God's commandments and if they promote the well-being of the community.

Botero's conception of the raison d'état serves as a kind of response to Machiavelli's vision. While Machiavelli focuses on political efficiency and pragmatism, setting aside traditional moral considerations, Botero emphasises the crucial role of morality, particularly Christian morality, in governance. Botero argues that true power and authority come from God, and therefore those who govern must follow God's commandments and teachings. If a ruler does this, then he or she can justify the use of raison d'état in exceptional circumstances. In this view, the reason of state is not an excuse for acting amoral or unjustly, but a principle that must be used in accordance with divine teachings. It is a perspective that contrasts sharply with that of Machiavelli, and reflects the wider differences in their political thinking.

For Botero, the use of raison d'état is an extension of the prince's duty to God and the welfare of his people. He argues that the prince, in using the reason of state, may sometimes have to go beyond conventional laws or norms in order to achieve the higher goals assigned to him by God. It is important to make it clear that for Botero, the use of raison d'état is not a licence for immorality or injustice. On the contrary, the prince must always seek to act in accordance with the moral and ethical principles derived from the Christian faith, even when acting in exceptional circumstances. This vision of raison d'État as a tool at the service of the divine will and the common good is a distinctive feature of Botero's political thought, and provides an interesting contrast with more secular and pragmatic approaches to raison d'État.

Botero was one of the first thinkers to develop a theory of the modern state and to explore the conditions for applying the raison d'état. He is concerned with the question of how to build and maintain a powerful and effective state that can respond to challenges and crises without compromising fundamental moral principles. For Botero, raison d'État is an essential instrument available to the prince to manage these exceptional situations. However, its use must always be guided by a deep understanding of the divine will and the needs of the community. He also suggests that the modern state must be organised in such a way as to facilitate the effective and ethical application of the raison d'État. This implies a solid governance structure, a competent administration, and a population that is both well governed and morally virtuous. In short, Botero's vision of the raison d'État is deeply rooted in his broader conception of the modern state and its requirements. This makes him an important figure in the development of modern political theory.

Botero proposes that raison d'État can be invoked in times of serious crisis, such as civil wars. These exceptional situations can threaten the very existence of the state and the stability of society, requiring extraordinary measures to restore order and peace. Botero suggests that in such cases, the prince may be obliged to go beyond ordinary laws or conventional ethical norms in order to preserve the state and its citizens. However, even in these extreme circumstances, the prince is not free from moral restraint. On the contrary, his actions must always be guided by divine principles and aimed at the well-being of the community. Thus, for Botero, the raison d'État is not a licence for arbitrariness or injustice, but a principle that can justify extraordinary actions in extraordinary circumstances, always with respect for God's commandments and the promotion of the common good as the ultimate objectives.

Botero's paradox is that he legitimises the prince's action on religious grounds, but at the same time he is prepared to define as moral acts that have nothing human about them. This paradox is one of the most controversial aspects of Botero's thinking. On the one hand, he insists that the reason of State must always be guided by moral and theological principles. On the other hand, he acknowledges that the application of raison d'état may sometimes require actions that, in other contexts, would be considered immoral or inhumane. Botero seems to resolve this paradox by arguing that exceptional necessity - such as might arise in a civil war or other serious crisis - can justify actions that would otherwise be unacceptable. He considers that in such situations, the common good and the survival of the state may require extraordinary measures, even if they involve some suffering or harm. However, it is important to note that for Botero, even in these extreme circumstances, the prince is not free from moral constraint. He must always seek to minimise the harm caused and act in accordance with the divine will, as he understands it. It is an approach that may seem paradoxical, but it is consistent with his vision of the state and political morality.

Starting from a limited conceptual apriori, the prince is moral, so he can apply the reason of State. If the prince is fundamentally immoral, then he can use raison d'Etat to further his own interests in the name of God. This is a major concern with Botero's theory of raison d'Etat. Indeed, there is a risk that an immoral prince could misuse the notion of raison d'Etat to justify actions that serve his own interests rather than the common good. He could, for example, claim to be acting in the name of the divine will or the preservation of the state, while in reality pursuing selfish or tyrannical objectives. This is a problem that arises in all political theories that allow a degree of flexibility or discretion in the application of moral or legal rules. How can we ensure that this latitude is not abused? How can we guarantee that rulers will remain faithful to fundamental ethical principles and not use the reason of State as a pretext for arbitrary power? Botero, like many other political thinkers, attempts to solve this problem by insisting on the need for rigorous moral and religious control over the prince. In his view, the prince must be acutely aware of his duties towards God and the community, and must always seek to serve the common good rather than his own interests. However, it remains an open question how this can be ensured in practice, especially in the absence of effective democratic control mechanisms.

One of the fundamental assumptions of Botero's argument for raison d'Etat seems to be that ordinary citizens may lack the rationality to understand and manage the complex problems facing the state, particularly in times of crisis or emergency. From this perspective, raison d'État can be seen as a mechanism for restoring order and rationality when the population is unable to do so itself. This may involve actions that appear 'unreasonable' or arbitrary at first sight, but which are justified by the need to preserve the stability and well-being of the state as a whole. That said, this approach has serious limitations. It can easily be used to justify abuses of power or to circumvent democratic principles. What's more, it is based on a rather pessimistic view of citizens' ability to make informed decisions and participate meaningfully in the governance of their own society. In this sense, Botero's theory, while having important implications for our understanding of politics and power, must be approached with caution.

The idea of raison d'état suggests that in certain situations, notably those where social order or state security are threatened, extraordinary measures may be necessary. These measures may go beyond what is normally permitted by law or conventional ethics. The aim is to protect the state and its citizens against major threats. However, it is crucial to emphasise that even in an emergency or crisis, there are limits to what a government can justify in the name of raison d'état. For example, human rights and basic democratic principles must never be violated. In addition, the use of raison d'État must be temporary and specific to the crisis or threat at hand. Once the crisis has passed, the government must return to the normal legal order. Furthermore, the use of raison d'État requires great caution and rigorous control, to avoid abuses of power. Leaders must be held accountable for their actions, and decisions taken in the name of raison d'État must be transparent and subject to scrutiny. In a democracy, this implies an active role for the media, civil society and institutions of control, such as the courts.

Historically, the state of war has been one of the times when the raison d'Etat has been most commonly invoked. At times of extreme crisis, the state may be forced to take extraordinary measures to ensure its survival. This may involve, for example, temporary restrictions on civil liberties, the mobilisation of resources in unusual ways, or the implementation of military strategies that might otherwise be considered unacceptable. The aim is always to protect the state and its citizens from the imminent threat. However, as mentioned above, even in times of war, it is crucial that actions taken in the name of raison d'Etat respect certain fundamental principles, such as respect for human rights, the proportionality of the measures taken and their temporary nature. Furthermore, such actions must always be subject to rigorous scrutiny and control to avoid abuses of power. Finally, it should be noted that the raison d'Etat is not limited to situations of war. It can also be invoked in other crisis situations, such as health emergencies or natural disasters, when the normal order must be temporarily suspended to deal with the situation.

For Giovanni Botero, as for many other political thinkers of his time, the army and the ability to wage war were seen as essential elements of the power and authority of the state. It was also through the conduct of war that the state could sometimes be led to exercise the raison d'état, taking exceptional decisions to ensure its survival and security. In the context of war, the raison d'Etat could be invoked to justify unusual military strategies, the use of resources in unconventional ways, or even actions that might otherwise be considered contrary to international law. However, it is important to stress that the use of raison d'Etat in this context must always be proportionate, temporary and respect the fundamental rights of individuals, including those of enemies. Furthermore, the ability to maintain a strong and effective army is often seen as a manifestation of the power of the state and its ability to protect its citizens, which is also an important element of the raison d'Etat. A powerful army can deter foreign attacks, maintain internal order and guarantee the sovereignty and independence of the state.

In its evolution, raison d'État has gradually separated from its theological basis to become a concept more widely associated with political philosophy and the practices of state power. This evolution has been influenced by changes in the nature of societies, the organisation of the state and the nature of the conflicts and challenges facing states. The application of raison d'État as an extraordinary form of governance is generally justified by exceptional situations, such as crises, wars or threats to national security. These situations often require rapid and sometimes radical responses, which may go beyond the usual procedures and norms of governance. However, the invocation of raison d'Etat must always respect certain limits, particularly in terms of respect for human rights and the fundamental principles of democracy. It should not be used as an excuse to abuse power or violate fundamental freedoms, but rather as a means of protecting the general interest in extraordinary situations. It is also important to note that the application of raison d'État must always be temporary, and the state must return to normal governance as soon as the emergency situation is resolved. In this sense, raison d'État is an important tool for ensuring the survival and continuity of the state, but its use must be regulated and controlled to avoid abuse.

Reason of State is a concept that allows the State, in certain exceptional situations, to act in an extraordinary way in the best interests of the nation. This may involve taking decisions or adopting policies that deviate from the norm or even the law, if this is deemed necessary to protect the security, stability or integrity of the nation. However, as mentioned above, the use of raison d'État must be temporary and proportionate to the situation, and always respectful of the fundamental rights of citizens. In a democracy, the use of raison d'État should also be subject to checks and balances to prevent abuses of power. Moreover, the raison d'État does not justify actions that are contrary to morality or ethics. Indeed, while the general interest may sometimes require exceptional measures, these must always respect the fundamental principles of justice and respect for human dignity. This is a complex subject that has been widely debated in political philosophy and political science.

The concept of raison d'État is intrinsically paradoxical. In extraordinary circumstances, the state may have to take measures that go beyond legal norms and individual freedoms in order to protect the general welfare of society. The extraordinary nature of these situations would justify the use of non-ordinary measures, according to the theory of the raison d'État. On the one hand, it is based on the idea that the state must sometimes adopt extraordinary measures to protect the general interest. This may include the temporary suspension of certain individual rights and freedoms, in exceptional circumstances such as war or a major crisis. On the other hand, these extraordinary measures may themselves pose a threat to democracy and the rule of law, by creating a situation where the state acts outside the usual bounds of the law and democratic control. This paradox is at the heart of many debates in political philosophy and constitutional law. How can restrictions on fundamental rights and freedoms be justified in the name of the general interest? What are the limits of state action in exceptional situations? How can democratic control be ensured and abuses of power prevented in such situations? These questions are all the more relevant in the current context, where many countries around the world have had to adopt exceptional measures to deal with crises such as the COVID-19 pandemic.

War as a catalyst for the raison d'État[modifier | modifier le wikicode]

Michel Senellart (1953 - ): Contemporary perspectives on the role of war[modifier | modifier le wikicode]

Michel Senellart is a contemporary French philosopher specialising in political philosophy and the history of political ideas. His vision of raison d'État focuses very much on the idea that the state sometimes needs to depart from the norm in order to respond to major crises, such as war.

According to Senellart, raison d'État is nothing other than a contravention of ordinary reasons for the sake of the public good, or for the sake of a greater and more universal reason. This means that the state can sometimes be led to act in a way that is contrary to the usual norms in the interests of the public good or in order to respect a more universal reason. War is a typical example where reason of State can be applied, according to Senellart. In times of war, the state may have to take extraordinary measures to ensure the security and well-being of the nation. This could include actions that, in peacetime, would be considered out of the ordinary or even illegal.

The raison d'État is often invoked in emergency or crisis situations where the normal functioning of democracy is not sufficient to respond to a serious threat to the state or society. This may include situations of war, terrorism, natural disaster or pandemic. In these situations, the government may deem it necessary to take extraordinary measures to ensure the security, well-being and continuity of the nation. This may involve temporarily derogating from certain usual norms or laws. However, invoking the raison d'État must always be done with care. The suspension or modification of customary laws or rights must be proportional to the threat, limited in time and subject to judicial review to avoid abuse of power and preserve the rule of law and democratic principles.

Scipione Ammirato (1531 - 1601): War and the reason of State[modifier | modifier le wikicode]

Scipione Ammirato was an Italian historian of the late 16th century. His vision of the raison d'État is less well known than that of thinkers such as Machiavelli or Botero, but it reflects the idea that in certain circumstances, the well-being of the state may require extraordinary actions, often associated with situations of conflict or war. Indeed, war is a context in which leaders are often faced with difficult decisions that may require departures from normal rules and practices in order to preserve the security and integrity of the state. It is in this context that the notion of raison d'Etat can be invoked to justify such actions. In the context of war, the application of the raison d'Etat may take several forms, such as the imposition of martial law, the restriction of civil liberties, the requisition of private property, the mobilisation of the population for the war effort, etc.

In the context of conflicts with other nations or groups, particularly religious groups, the raison d'Etat may be invoked to justify certain extraordinary actions or policies aimed at protecting the integrity, security and interests of the State. The application of the raison d'Etat may take many forms in these contexts, including enhanced security policies, restrictions on certain civil liberties, extraordinary diplomatic efforts, military defence measures, etc. In some cases, these measures may be justified by the need to protect the integrity, security and interests of the State. In some cases, these measures may be controversial, as they may appear to contradict certain democratic principles or human rights.

The raison d'État is often invoked in contexts of international tension and preparation for war. It involves taking extraordinary measures to protect national security and interests, which may include mobilising resources, increasing military production, implementing enhanced security policies and coordinating efforts to anticipate and prepare for a possible war. From this perspective, raison d'État is seen as a tool for preparing for war, a kind of "latent war". It is a way of pooling the resources of the state and focusing attention on a common objective, namely the defence of the state and its interests. However, it is important to stress that the invocation of the raison d'Etat to justify these extraordinary measures must always be transparent, proportional and limited in time. In addition, it must always respect the principles of the rule of law and the fundamental rights of citizens. Furthermore, it is preferable to avoid war if possible, using diplomacy, negotiation and international cooperation to resolve conflicts and tensions. War should always be the last resort, when all other options have been exhausted.

War, being an exceptional situation, often justifies the use of raison d'Etat. It is a time when the security and very existence of the state may be threatened. As a result, extraordinary measures may be implemented to protect and preserve the nation. It should be noted, however, that the use of raison d'État, even in times of war, must comply with the fundamental principles of democracy and international standards. This means that any action taken must respect human rights, the principles of justice and the rules of war.

Carl Schmitt (1888 - 1985): Reassessing the relationship between war and the state[modifier | modifier le wikicode]

Schmitt advised the von Papen government (left) and Schleicher (right) on the constitutional issue.

Carl Schmitt, a German jurist and political philosopher, developed the theory of the partisan, which focuses on a specific form of combat - guerrilla warfare, or irregular struggle. This theory is mainly developed in his book "Theory of the Partisan" (1962). According to Schmitt, the partisan is distinct from the regular combatant because he does not operate according to the conventional rules of war and is not easily identifiable. They are rooted in a specific place (usually their local territory), are extremely mobile, and their loyalty is more to a cause than to a state. Schmitt saw the emergence of partisans as a significant transformation in the nature of war. The impact of this transformation on the raison d'État is considerable. If the state is designed to manage conflicts between clearly defined and organised entities, how can it manage the kind of asymmetric and irregular conflict that the partisan represents? The question becomes even more complicated if we consider that the partisan may be internal to the state - a citizen who has taken up arms against the state for one reason or another. Schmitt considers that the figure of the partisan calls into question the traditional categories of the law of war and forces us to rethink the concepts of sovereignty and exception. In this context, the raison d'État becomes more complex, since the threat does not only come from external state actors, but can also emanate from within, which may justify exceptional measures to deal with it.

Carl Schmitt developed a theory of "decisionism". Decisionism is an approach to political theory that emphasises the role of individual decisions in political processes. Schmitt's famous phrase "the sovereign is the one who decides on the exception" expresses this idea. It means that true political power lies in the ability to suspend the existing legal order in order to deal with an emergency. This power to decide when and how the normal legal order is suspended is, according to Schmitt, what defines sovereignty. During the rise of Nazism, Schmitt was an active supporter of the regime. He argued that Hitler's seizure of power was an example of a sovereign decision, suspending the constitutional order of the Weimar Republic in 1933. Sovereignty and the state of exception have been heavily criticised, not only for their role in legitimising the Nazi regime, but also for the way in which they can be used to justify abuses of power.

According to Carl Schmitt, the sovereign, as the one who decides on the exception, has the power to determine the moments of emergency or crisis that justify the suspension of the normal legal order. This power of exception could include the ability to declare war or to take extraordinary decisions in response to crisis situations. The theory of raison d'état and the concept of total war have been linked to the totalitarian regimes of the 20th century, particularly those of Nazi Germany and Stalin's Soviet Union. In these regimes, the state seeks to control all aspects of public and private life, including the economy, education, the arts, religion, personal relationships and even the thoughts of individuals. Totalitarianism is often associated with total mobilisation in wartime, where all of society's resources are devoted to the war effort. This can be achieved through conscription, regulation of industry and the economy, and restriction of civil liberties in the name of national security. In this context, the reason of State is often invoked to justify actions which, in peacetime, would be considered violations of human rights.

Totalitarianism is a political system that seeks to control all aspects of public and private life, including individual expression and free thought. In a totalitarian regime, the state seeks to monopolise the truth and define reality for its citizens. The state media are used to disseminate official propaganda, and any dissent or criticism of the regime is severely repressed. This can create an environment in which independent thought and freedom of expression are hindered or even dangerous. Individuals may conform to the regime's expectations, not only through fear of reprisals, but also through social conditioning and indoctrination. Totalitarianism is often associated with authoritarian regimes that are rooted in extreme ideologies and seek to reshape society according to a utopian vision. However, this attempt to control all aspects of social and individual life can often lead to oppression, violence and dehumanisation.

Carl Schmitt, the German political philosopher, wrote extensively on the nature of politics and power. He argued that the fundamental distinction in politics is between "friend" and "enemy". In this framework, the enemy is not necessarily an individual or group that is personally hated or despised, but rather the one on the other side of the political conflict. According to Schmitt, the role of the sovereign (the 'ruler') is to make this distinction and to take decisions in exceptional situations, such as war or crisis. Schmitt argued that in such situations, constitutional normality can be suspended in the name of preserving the state. This is known as a state of exception.

The vision of conflict from a Nazi theological perspective, as expressed by Carl Schmitt, is centred on the notion of friend and enemy. This implies that conflicts are inevitable and even necessary in politics, because they make it possible to clearly define who is "friend" and who is "enemy". This distinction is fundamental to the exercise of political power. In the context of Nazism, this theory was used to justify aggression and imperialist expansion, by identifying certain groups (such as Jews or Communists) as 'enemies' of the state. Futurism was an artistic and social movement that began in Italy in the early twentieth century, which valued speed, technology, youth and violence, rejecting the past. Some Futurists, such as Filippo Tommaso Marinetti, supported the Fascist movements in Italy and elsewhere. However, Futurism as a movement was distinct from Nazism and Carl Schmitt's political theory, although they shared certain themes of glorifying conflict and rejecting tradition.

Carl Schmitt argued that the essence of politics lay in the distinction between friend and foe. For him, war, as the ultimate conflict, is the supreme expression of this distinction. It is in the context of war, or at least the possibility of war, that the true nature of the political manifests itself, according to Schmitt. In this context, the sovereign (or whoever exercises political power) is the one who decides on the state of exception, i.e. who determines when a situation is so serious that it justifies extraordinary measures - including war. This is what Schmitt calls "decisionism".

Current state of emergency and raison d'État[modifier | modifier le wikicode]

Giorgio Agambe (1942 - ): Understanding the state of exception[modifier | modifier le wikicode]

Giorgio Agamben .

Giorgio Agamben, a well-known Italian philosopher, published a book entitled 'État d'exception' in 2005 (the first Italian edition dates from 2003). In it, he examines the notion of the 'state of exception' as developed by Carl Schmitt. Agamben analyses how states can use states of exception to suspend laws and constitutional rights in crisis situations. He argues that, increasingly, the state of exception has become the norm rather than the exception in contemporary societies, with the extension of governments' powers of surveillance and control. For Agamben, the state of exception is a dangerous space where the law is in abeyance and government authority acts without legal constraints, which can lead to abuses of power. He warns against using this situation to restrict civil liberties and human rights. It is a powerful and disturbing concept that highlights the tension between security and freedom in modern societies. Agamben's work has been widely discussed and debated, and has had a significant impact on contemporary political thought.

Agamben argues that contemporary societies tend to enter into a permanent state of exception, particularly under the pretext of security. The state of exception is a crisis situation that allows the state to suspend the laws and civil liberties normally in force. Agamben suggests that this state of exception is increasingly used as a normal means of governance, rather than as an exceptional response to a crisis. For example, in the context of the 'war on terror', states can invoke national security to justify measures that violate human rights and civil liberties. This state of exception, Agamben argues, endangers democracy by making citizens vulnerable to abuses of power. He argues that the state of exception reveals a fundamental tension between security and freedom, a tension that lies at the heart of contemporary debates about the role of the state in society.

The 1789 Declaration of the Rights of Man and of the Citizen states that freedom is the prerequisite for security. In other words, individuals must be free in order to be secure. However, in the contemporary world, this paradigm seems to have been reversed. Increasingly, security is seen as a precondition for freedom. This means that states and societies are increasingly willing to restrict individual and collective freedoms in the name of security. This can be seen in the context of the fight against terrorism, for example, where civil liberties are often restricted in the name of national security. This is a worrying development for many, as it can potentially lead to abuses of power and a diminution of democracy. This tension between security and freedom is a crucial debate in contemporary political thought. The question is how far we are prepared to go to guarantee our security, and whether it is worth it if it means restricting our freedoms.

Giorgio Agamben, in his book État d'exception, argues that in contemporary societies, security is often privileged over freedom. In his view, this leads to what he calls a 'state of exception': a state in which regular legal norms are suspended in the name of security. For Agamben, this is not an exceptional or temporary situation, but a permanent state that has become the norm in many modern societies. He argues that the notion of security has become an excuse to restrict freedoms and strengthen the power of the state, creating an environment of constant control and surveillance. What Agamben criticises here is the shift from the primacy of freedom to the primacy of security in our contemporary societies. He suggests that this leads to a rationalisation and normalisation of the state of exception, which in turn threatens individual and collective freedoms. This is an important debate that echoes many contemporary issues, from the fight against terrorism to the management of health crises, where the tension between freedom and security is constantly present.

According to Agamben, we are now living in a situation where the state of exception has become the norm, rather than a rare and temporary occurrence as Botero suggested. This perspective is in line with Michel Foucault's theory of the surveillance society. Foucault developed the notion of 'biopower', where the control exercised by the state extends not only to social life, but also to the biological life of individuals. This involves constant surveillance and detailed regulation of citizens' bodies and lives. It is therefore a significant shift in the way power is exercised by the state. This shift can be seen as a threat to our individual freedoms, as state power is exercised in a more intrusive and omnipresent way. Moreover, as Agamben points out, the primacy of security over freedom contributes to this process, justifying the continued expansion of control and surveillance in the name of protecting the security of individuals and society as a whole. It is important to note that these perspectives are hotly debated in academic and political circles. Some people may see these developments as necessary and justified, while others may see them as unacceptable infringements of our individual freedoms and fundamental rights.

The notion that we have entered an era of 'lawlessness' and 'necessity' reflects the concerns that many thinkers, lawyers and activists have today about the way in which law and democracy are being used, and sometimes circumvented, in the name of security, efficiency or necessity. Traceability and surveillance have become ubiquitous elements of our daily lives, underpinning major aspects of our economy, government and society. This is facilitated by rapid technological advancement, which enables an unprecedented level of surveillance and data collection. The tension between necessity and the rule of law is a central issue of our time. Traditionally, the rule of law is a fundamental principle of democratic societies, ensuring that all actions, including those of the state, are subject to the law. However, in many cases we see situations where 'necessity' is invoked to justify actions that might otherwise be considered contrary to fundamental legal and democratic principles. This tension raises fundamental questions about the nature of our societies and political systems. How do we balance security and freedom? What does democracy mean in an era of mass surveillance and ubiquitous data? These are complex questions to which there are no simple answers, but debate and reflection are essential if we are to shape the future of our societies.

The concept of a state of exception described by Agamben is precisely that of a situation in which ordinary laws and civil rights are suspended, often in response to a perceived crisis or emergency. This state of affairs creates a 'grey zone' where normal rules do not apply and where the powers of the state can be significantly extended. In such situations, there is often a tension between the imperatives of security and individual rights and freedoms. This is a complex issue with no easy answer, as it requires a balance between protecting the security of the State and its citizens on the one hand, and safeguarding individual rights and freedoms on the other.

The separation of powers is a fundamental principle aimed at preventing the abuse of power and maintaining a balance in the exercise of authority. This separation enables each power - legislative, executive, judicial - to control the others and thus guarantee a form of reciprocity in the operation of the State. However, when a state of emergency is declared, these boundaries can become blurred. The powers of the executive can be extended, sometimes to the detriment of the other powers, which can jeopardise the democratic balance. The result is often an accumulation of power in the hands of a single body or individual, which can lead to a concentration of power and potentially to abuses.

In a state of exception, executive powers are often strengthened at the expense of the other branches of government. This can lead to a situation where the executive can legislate without the control of the legislature, by means of decrees or orders, and where the supervisory powers of the judiciary are limited. In addition, a state of emergency may also lead to the adoption of restrictive regulations, often justified by the need to respond to an emergency or crisis, which may restrict individual rights and freedoms. These regulations can affect many aspects of people's lives, from freedom of movement to protection of privacy. It is therefore essential, even in times of crisis, to uphold the fundamental principles of democracy and the rule of law, and to ensure that any extraordinary measures are proportionate, necessary and temporary.

The application of the state of exception in France can be traced back to the First World War, which led to a state of exception; the preparation for the Second World War in 1938 and 1939 with the German-Soviet pact, which created dissension in French politics, as the Communists wanted to follow the Soviet position; the French Constitution of 1958, Article 16 states that in the event of a threat to the integrity of the Republic and the nation, the President of the Republic may take all necessary powers. So one article allows all powers to be taken in the name of attacking the integrity of the territory.

The state of exception in France has been applied in various crisis situations. During the First World War, the French government had to take extraordinary measures, including general mobilisation, censorship and rationing, to support the war effort. Later, in the years leading up to the Second World War, faced with a period of great uncertainty and tension, the government undertook a series of measures to strengthen national defence. This climate of tension culminated in the German-Soviet Pact of 1939, which caused dissension within the French Communist Party, with some members opposing the party's official position in favour of the pact. In addition, Article 16 of the 1958 French Constitution stipulates that the President of the Republic may exercise exceptional powers in the event of a serious crisis. These powers were invoked only once, during the Algerian crisis in 1961. In each case, the balance between the functioning of democracy and respect for individual rights and freedoms was put to the test.

Article 16 of the 1958 French Constitution gives exceptional powers to the President of the Republic in the event of a serious crisis threatening the integrity of the territory or the proper functioning of the public authorities. This article was conceived in the context of the Cold War, and was intended to be used in exceptional circumstances where the normal functioning of the State would be seriously disrupted. It was invoked only once, during the Algerian crisis in 1961. Article 16 confers on the President "the most extensive powers", enabling him to take measures necessary for the defence of the nation. However, it is important to note that these powers are not unlimited. According to a decision taken in 1973, the Constitutional Council has the power to monitor the application of article 16 and can therefore end the state of emergency if the conditions are no longer met.

Switzerland, as a traditionally neutral country, faced its own challenges during the two world wars. In the context of the First World War, on 30 August 1914, the Swiss Federal Assembly gave the Federal Council (the Swiss government) unlimited power to guarantee the security, integrity and neutrality of the country. This decision was taken to enable the government to take the necessary measures quickly and effectively to protect Switzerland from the consequences of the European conflict that was unfolding around it. This was clearly an example of the application of "raison d'État", where the ordinary rules of democratic governance were temporarily suspended in response to an extraordinary situation. It is a clear illustration of the concept of a state of exception, albeit one exercised with the aim of preserving Switzerland's neutrality and independence rather than engaging it in conflict.

11 September and the return of the raison d'État[modifier | modifier le wikicode]

Authorisation for the use of military force in 2001[modifier | modifier le wikicode]

After the attacks of 11 September 2001, US President George W. Bush declared that the integrity of the nation had been attacked. This declaration was based on the fact that the terrorist attacks had been likened to an act of war. In this context, the President invoked the concept of "raison d'Etat", suggesting that an extraordinary response was required to deal with this extraordinary situation. This response took the form of the Authorization for Use of Military Force (AUMF), which was passed by the US Congress shortly after the attacks. The AUMF gave the President the authority to take all "necessary and appropriate measures" against those he determined to have "planned, authorised, committed or aided" the attacks of 11 September. In addition, the Bush administration introduced draconian homeland security measures, such as the Patriot Act, which extended the government's powers of surveillance and investigation. These measures, although controversial, were presented as essential to protect the nation.

Following the attacks of 11 September 2001, President George W. Bush responded by making the defence of the American nation a paramount necessity. In his speeches, he presented the attackers not as mere terrorists, but as an enemy comparable to a nation, which had the paradoxical effect of elevating Osama Bin Laden's stature. Indeed, by equating Al Qaeda with a nation-state, Bush implicitly credited Bin Laden with the status of head of state. This approach also justified a massive military response, rather than a police and judicial approach to dealing with a crime. This led to the invasion of Afghanistan and the War on Terror, a global military campaign that has profoundly affected international relations and domestic politics in the United States.

By describing the attacks of 11 September 2001 as an "act of war", George W. Bush established a justification for the application of raison d'état. An act of war is a condition that authorises the use of raison d'État, because it constitutes an exceptional situation, an extraordinary circumstance that calls for extraordinary measures. Reason of State, in this context, allows the government to take decisions and act in a way that could be contrary to the usual laws and principles in the supreme interest of the nation. This could include actions such as declaring war, mobilising military forces, introducing enhanced internal security measures, and other extraordinary measures that may be perceived as necessary to ensure the security and integrity of the nation.

When George W. Bush described the attacks of 11 September 2001 as an "act of war", he in a way legitimised Al Qaeda and its leader, Bin Laden, as traditional actors of war. This declaration effectively changed the paradigm for the application of raison d'état. It allowed the Bush administration to justify the application of raison d'état by taking extraordinary measures to defend the nation, ranging from the war in Afghanistan to the introduction of new homeland security measures. This declaration marked a turning point in contemporary history, introducing a new type of conflict - the "war on terror" - where the line between the law of peace and the law of war becomes blurred.

When a state is faced with an emergency or imminent danger, it may have to invoke what is known as "raison d'État" or a state of emergency to take extraordinary measures to protect the security and integrity of the nation. However, these extraordinary measures can sometimes deviate from the traditional principles of the rule of law, which can raise important questions about the balance between security and individual freedoms. Indeed, in such cases, there may be a tendency to favour emergency action and response to the immediate threat, sometimes at the expense of normal legal protections and procedural safeguards. This can lead to a situation where the normal rules of public law are set aside in the name of emergency management. This situation can be a source of tension and debate, as it puts at stake the fundamental values of democracy and the rule of law, such as respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms.

On 9 November 2001, Stephen John Byers declared that "it is a very good day to bring out and sneak in all the measures we need to take", p. 549. This statement highlights an important point of tension in emergency or exceptional situations. In response to a crisis, governments may be tempted to rush through measures that would, in normal circumstances, be subject to full public debate and democratic scrutiny. In some cases, these measures may include laws or regulations that restrict individual freedoms, increase the powers of the state or alter other aspects of governance and public order. While the gravity of the situation may justify such measures, they raise important questions about transparency, accountability and respect for democratic principles. It is crucial that even in emergency situations, governments strive to uphold the rule of law, respect human rights and engage transparently with the public. In addition, measures taken in response to an emergency should be proportionate, necessary and subject to regular review to ensure that they remain appropriate and justified.

The attacks of 11 September 2001 led to a series of significant changes in legislation and policy, particularly in the United States, but also internationally. The perceived need to protect citizens from future terrorist attacks has led to the adoption of measures which, in some cases, have restricted civil liberties and altered standards of privacy, surveillance and human rights. One of the most controversial responses to these attacks was the passage of the USA PATRIOT Act in the United States, which expanded the surveillance powers of the US government with the aim of preventing terrorism. Although these measures were taken to protect national security, they also raised serious concerns about their impact on civil liberties and privacy. In this context, democratic debate can face challenges. It is important that even in times of crisis, transparency, accountability and respect for human rights are maintained. It is a delicate balance to be struck between protecting national security and preserving fundamental democratic principles.

USA PATRIOT Act: Implications for the raison d'état[modifier | modifier le wikicode]

The USA PATRIOT Act (Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism Act) is a US law that was enacted shortly after the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001. The USA PATRIOT Act is a major piece of US legislation, particularly with regard to immigration, national security, surveillance and law enforcement laws. Its stated aim was "to thwart and punish acts of terrorism in the United States and around the world, to improve law enforcement to detect and prevent terrorism, and for other purposes". Some of the most controversial provisions of the Patriot Act concern information gathering and surveillance. The law allowed intelligence agencies to collect a wide range of information, including data on financial transactions, email and telephone communications, and gave federal authorities greater ability to track and intercept communications. The Act greatly expanded the powers of US security and intelligence agencies to monitor, investigate and prosecute terrorist crimes. The provisions of the Act cover a wide range of issues, from electronic surveillance to immigration and terrorist financing.

One of the controversial provisions of the USA PATRIOT Act allows for the indefinite detention of foreign nationals suspected of being linked to terrorist activities. The US authorities have the power to detain a person on the basis of mere suspicion and can do so indefinitely, without charge or trial. In addition, the definition of terrorism and terrorist activity has been broadened to include many non-violent criminal acts and loose associations with groups suspected of terrorist activity. This expanded definition has been criticised for its potential misuse.

The "Carnivore" system, a precursor to the USA PATRIOT Act, was an Internet surveillance system set up by the FBI in the early 2000s. Set up in the late 1990s and used mainly in the 2000s, it enabled the FBI to monitor the emails and online activities of people specifically targeted as part of criminal or national security investigations. It was designed to monitor the email communications and online activities of individuals specifically targeted as part of criminal or national security investigations. The system worked by being installed directly on the network of the target's Internet Service Provider (ISP). It could then filter all incoming and outgoing communications from that person. The system was technically a packet capture device, i.e. software capable of intercepting and inspecting data 'packets' travelling over a computer network. "Carnivore was installed directly on the network of the target's Internet Service Provider (ISP), where it could filter all incoming and outgoing communications from that person. The FBI claimed to have abandoned the use of 'Carnivore' in 2005, although subsequent reports suggest that similar surveillance tools continue to be used.

In legal terms, terrorism is generally defined as the commission of violent or dangerous acts for the purpose of influencing or affecting the government by intimidation or coercion. It can also include acts committed in retaliation for government operations. This definition is quite broad and can potentially cover a variety of criminal acts. For example, it could include not only acts of physical violence, such as bombings or armed attacks, but also acts of cyber-terrorism that disrupt government computer systems.

The enemy is declared outside the law - Carl Schmitt provides Giorgio Agamben with the categories for a fundamental critique of Guantanamo.

Guantanamo Bay prison: A symbol of the raison d'état in action[modifier | modifier le wikicode]

The Guantanamo Bay prison, located on Cuban territory leased by the United States, has become a controversial symbol of the application of raison d'état in the context of the fight against terrorism. Following the attacks of 11 September 2001, the United States began detaining people there who were considered to be "unlawful enemy combatants" with links to al-Qaeda, the Taliban or other terrorist groups. The stated aim was to obtain information from these detainees to prevent further terrorist attacks. However, the fact that these individuals were detained outside the main territory of the United States raised complex legal issues concerning their legal status and rights. Critics argued that the detention of these individuals at Guantanamo was a violation of international human rights law, including the Geneva Conventions. The interrogation methods used at Guantanamo, often described as torture, have also been strongly criticised. In addition, many detainees have been held for many years without charge or trial, raising concerns that the right to a fair trial has been violated. As a result, Guantanamo has become a prominent example of how the raison d'état has been invoked to justify extraordinary measures in the context of the war on terror.

The prison at Guantanamo Bay, located on a US military base in Cuba, has been described as a legal "no man's land". This is a territory which, although under US control, is not considered to be part of the United States in the proper sense. This has allowed the US government to argue that the detainees at Guantanamo are not eligible for the constitutional protections normally afforded to individuals on US soil. This created a legal grey area that was used to justify controversial detention and interrogation practices. Critics argue that this has allowed the US government to avoid traditional legal protections, such as the right to a fair trial, the right to counsel and protection from cruel and inhuman treatment. This state of legal 'no man's land' has been criticised for facilitating the creation of a system where raison d'état prevails over human rights and the principles of international law. Guantanamo has thus become a symbol of the debate on the balance between national security and individual rights in the fight against terrorism.

The situation of the Guantanamo prison has created a unique legal complexity. The military base on which the prison is located is technically on Cuban territory, but it is controlled by the United States under a long-term lease agreement. The US government has maintained that, because the Guantanamo base is located outside US territory, the detainees held there do not enjoy the constitutional protections to which they would be entitled if held on US soil. This position has been challenged by lawyers, human rights advocates and others who argue that Guantanamo detainees should be afforded these protections. It is precisely this legal complexity and uncertainty that has led some to describe Guantanamo as a legal "no man's land", a place where the normal rules of law seem not to apply. This has raised serious questions about the balance between the imperatives of national security and respect for human rights and the norms of international law.

The designation of Guantanamo detainees has been a major point of contention since the prison opened. The US government has claimed that the detainees are "unlawful enemy combatants", a term that is not recognised by the Geneva Conventions, which set out international rules for the treatment of prisoners of war. The term "unlawful enemy combatant" has been criticised by many lawyers and human rights activists, who argue that this designation is used to circumvent the United States' obligations under the Geneva Conventions and other international human rights standards. Indeed, Guantanamo detainees do not have the same rights as prisoners of war (who are entitled to a number of protections under the Geneva Conventions), ordinary prisoners (who are entitled to a trial and legal representation) or political prisoners (who may benefit from additional protections under international law). The US government's position has been challenged in the courts, and although some practices have been changed in response to these challenges, the overall situation at Guantanamo remains controversial.

In its fight against terrorism, the Bush administration created a new category of detainees: "unlawful enemy combatants". This meant that they were neither considered prisoners of war, who are protected by the Geneva Conventions, nor common criminals, who are entitled to a trial in a civilian court. As "unlawful enemy combatants", these detainees were essentially outside the protection of international and US law, allowing the US government to hold them indefinitely without charge or trial. It also allowed interrogators to employ aggressive interrogation techniques that would otherwise be prohibited. This approach has been widely criticised for violating fundamental principles of human rights and the rule of law. Although some of the more controversial policies have subsequently been amended, the status and rights of Guantanamo detainees remain a matter of debate.

The term 'war on terror' implies an armed conflict, which suggests that those captured while participating in it would normally be considered prisoners of war. However, the Bush administration decided not to follow this line of reasoning, preferring to label these detainees as "unlawful enemy combatants". This decision has led to a situation where, although they are captured as part of what is called a war, they do not enjoy the protections normally accorded to prisoners of war under international law. In fact, this situation illustrates one of the many challenges posed by the war on terror. In a conventional war, the boundaries, combatants and objectives are generally clearly defined. In the war on terror, however, these elements are often blurred or undefined. For example, the "battleground" is not limited to a specific geographical area, but extends worldwide. Enemy combatants" can be citizens of almost any country, including those at peace with the United States. And because terrorism is a tactic rather than an identifiable entity, there is no clearly defined enemy to defeat in order to end the war. These factors all contribute to the complexity and controversy surrounding the war on terror and the treatment of Guantanamo detainees.

The creation of the Guantanamo prison is a notable example of the use of extraterritoriality to evade normal legal constraints. By placing the prison outside US territory, the US administration sought to put it beyond the reach of the US courts, and therefore beyond the application of US laws on the treatment of prisoners.

In 2004, the US Supreme Court ruled in Rasul v Bush that US courts had jurisdiction to consider habeas corpus petitions brought by Guantanamo detainees. This meant that, contrary to the claims of the Bush administration, Guantanamo detainees had the right to challenge the lawfulness of their detention in US courts. The case of Rasul v. Bush in 2004 marked a turning point, declaring that Guantanamo detainees had the right to challenge their detention in US courts. This decision extended the rights of the detainees, allowing them to have a certain level of legal protection. However, the Bush administration reacted in 2006 by passing the Military Commissions Act, which attempted to limit detainees' access to the courts. In 2008, the Supreme Court reaffirmed the rights of detainees in Boumediene v. Bush, declaring that Guantanamo detainees had a constitutional right to habeas corpus. Regarding the term "unlawful combatant", this is a controversial terminology that the Bush administration has used to justify the treatment of Guantanamo detainees. It has been criticised by many as an attempt to circumvent the protections provided by international law, in particular the Geneva Convention.

The question of whether the 'parenthesis' of the state of exception in the United States, which began in the wake of the 11 September attacks, has come to an end is complex and open to debate. The state of exception, in the context of national security, enabled the adoption of extraordinary measures, such as the USA PATRIOT Act, the opening of the Guantanamo prison, and increased surveillance of electronic communications, among others. Many of these measures are still in place, even though they have been revised and debated. For example, the Guantanamo prison is still operational, even though the number of detainees has been reduced and several US presidents have promised its closure. Similarly, although the USA PATRIOT Act expired in 2015, many of its provisions have been renewed in other legislative forms. In addition, the threat of terrorism continues to influence US and international policy, and the legal framework of the 'war on terror' has lasting implications. Consequently, although there have been significant changes since 11 September 2001, it is difficult to say that the state of exception is completely over. It is important to note that this subject is the subject of much debate among lawyers, political scientists and security studies researchers. There is therefore no definitive consensus on the issue.

Even after the end of the George W. Bush administration, some of the measures taken in the wake of 11 September remained in place. Barack Obama, despite promising to close the Guantanamo prison during his presidential campaign in 2008, has failed to deliver on this promise during his two terms in office. In addition, mass surveillance programmes revealed by Edward Snowden in 2013 showed that the US government continued to monitor the communications of its citizens and others around the world. This raises the question of whether these exceptional measures have become the norm, and whether the notion of the rule of law has been altered or compromised in the wake of September 11. These questions are still being debated by researchers, politicians and civil rights activists. The state of exception, as conceptualised by Giorgio Agamben, can become permanent and change the nature of the relationship between the state and its citizens. It is important to stress that the balance between security and freedom is a complex and contested issue. Decisions taken in the name of national security can have lasting consequences for civil liberties, and the assessment of such decisions requires careful scrutiny and public debate.

The European Union has adopted a different approach to dealing with terrorism. Rather than relying on unilateral measures, it has sought to harmonise the legislation of its Member States. This has involved creating a common legal framework for defining terrorism and putting in place counter-terrorism measures. In 2002, the European Union adopted a Framework Decision on combating terrorism, which defines terrorism-related offences and provides for criminal penalties for these offences. This Framework Decision has been amended several times to adapt to changes in the terrorist threat. In addition, the European Union has put in place various instruments to facilitate cooperation between Member States in the fight against terrorism. For example, it has created Europol, the European Union agency for law enforcement cooperation, which facilitates the exchange of information and the coordination of actions between the police forces of the Member States.

The CIA's 'extraordinary rendition' programmes and 'secret flights' that came to light in the 2000s are striking examples of how certain fundamental rights and civil liberties can be circumvented in the fight against terrorism. Extraordinary rendition is the secret transfer of a person from one country to another without recourse to a formal judicial process. This has often led to situations where individuals have been detained without charge, deprived of their fundamental legal rights and, in some cases, subjected to torture or inhuman and degrading treatment. Secret CIA flights, often referred to as "torture flights", are used to transport these people between different detention sites around the world. It has been revealed that several countries, including some European countries, have collaborated with these programmes, either by allowing the use of their airspace and airports for these flights, or by participating in the detention and interrogation of individuals. These practices clearly run counter to the principles of the rule of law and respect for human rights, and have given rise to fierce criticism and controversy. They have also raised important questions about the accountability and transparency of governments in the fight against terrorism.

Annexes[modifier | modifier le wikicode]

  • Bouaziz, Franck. "À La Une – Critique De La Raison D’Etat." Le Nouvel Economiste. N.p., 9 Feb. 2011. url: http://www.lenouveleconomiste.fr/critique-de-la-raison-detat-9130/
  • À propos de État d’exception, Homo sacer de Giorgio Agamben, Sidi Askofaré « À propos de État d'exception, Homo sacer de Giorgio Agamben », L'en-je lacanien1/2004 (no 2), p. 193-205.
  • Botero, Giovanni. Della Ragion Di Stato Libri Dieci. In Roma: Presso Vincenzio Pellagallo, 1590.
  • Machiavelli, Niccolò, Jean-Louis Fournel, Jean-Claude Zancarini, and Giorgio Inglese. De Principatibus = Le Prince. Paris: Presses Universitaires De France, 2000.
  • Nuccio, Oscar. Giovanni Botero: Politica E Precettistica Economica Del Medievalismo Controriformistico. Sassari: Gallizzi, 1992.
  • Senellart, Michel. Machiavélisme Et Raison D'Etat: XIIe-XVIIIe Siècle ; Suivi D'un Choix De Textes. Paris: Presses Universitaires De France, 1989.
  • Senellart, Michel. Les Arts De Gouverner: Du Regimen Médiéval Au Concept De Gouvernement. Paris: Ed. Du Seuil, 1995.
  • "Comment L'obsession Sécuritaire Fait Muter La démocratie." Comment L'obsession Sécuritaire Fait Muter La Démocratie, Par Giorgio Agamben (Le Monde Diplomatique, Janvier 2014). N.p., n.d. Web. 15 Sept. 2014. <http://www.monde-diplomatique.fr/2014/01/AGAMBEN/49997>.
  • ARTE. “Terrorisme, Raison D'État (1/2) | ARTE.” YouTube, Arte, 12 Mar. 2019, www.youtube.com/watch?v=r6F9DShho50.
  • ARTE. “Terrorisme, Raison D'État (2/2) | ARTE.” YouTube, YouTube, 12 Mar. 2019, www.youtube.com/watch?v=83fRNSkiIsA.
  • TORRISI Céline, « Raison d’état », dans : Nicolas Kada éd., Dictionnaire d'administration publique. FONTAINE, Presses universitaires de Grenoble, « Droit et action publique », 2014, p. 409-410. URL : https://www.cairn.info/dictionnaire-d-administration-publique--9782706121371-page-409.htm
  • LAZZERI Christian, « Le gouvernement de la raison d’Etat », dans : Christian Lazzeri éd., Le pouvoir de la raison d’État. Paris cedex 14, Presses Universitaires de France, « Recherches politiques », 1992, p. 91-134. DOI : 10.3917/puf.lazze.1992.01.0091. URL : https://www.cairn.info/le-pouvoir-de-la-raison-d-etat--9782130445890-page-91.htm
  • TARANTO Domenico, « Le discours de la raison d'État », dans : Alain Caillé éd., Histoire raisonnée de la philosophie morale et politique. Paris, La Découverte, « Hors collection Sciences Humaines », 2001, p. 255-264. DOI : 10.3917/dec.caill.2001.01.0255. URL : https://www.cairn.info/histoire-raisonnee-de-la-philosophie-morale-et-pol--9782707134219-page-255.htm
  • DARDOT Pierre, LAVAL Christian, « Chapitre 6. Raison d’État, souveraineté et gouvernementalité », dans : , Dominer. Enquête sur la souveraineté de l’État en Occident, sous la direction de DARDOT Pierre, LAVAL Christian. Paris, La Découverte, « Sciences humaines », 2020, p. 303-358. URL : https://www.cairn.info/dominer--9782348042140-page-303.htm
  • BONNET Stéphane, « Botero machiavélien ou l'invention de la raison d'Etat », Les Études philosophiques, 2003/3 (n° 66), p. 315-329. DOI : 10.3917/leph.033.0315. URL : https://www.cairn.info/revue-les-etudes-philosophiques-2003-3-page-315.htm
  • NEMO Philippe, « Chapitre 2. Machiavel. L’émergence de la « raison d’État » », dans : , Histoire des idées politiques aux Temps modernes et contemporains. sous la direction de NEMO Philippe. Paris cedex 14, Presses Universitaires de France, « Quadrige », 2013, p. 45-70. URL : https://www.cairn.info/histoire-des-idees-politiques-aux-temps-modernes--9782130627333-page-45.htm
  • GOYARD-FABRE Simone, « Chapitre 2 - De l’État à la raison d’État », dans : , Philosophie politique. XVIe-XXe siècle : modernité et humanisme, sous la direction de GOYARD-FABRE Simone. Paris cedex 14, Presses Universitaires de France, « Droit fondamental », 1987, p. 55-76. URL : https://www.cairn.info/philosophie-politique--9782130401766-page-55.htm
  • DELMAS-MARTY Mireille, « Quand l'Europe raisonne la raison d'État », Revue Projet, 2011/5 (n° 324 - 325), p. 16-23. DOI : 10.3917/pro.324.0004. URL : https://www.cairn.info/revue-projet-2011-5-page-16.htm

References[modifier | modifier le wikicode]