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|[[Introduction à la science politique]]
|[[Introduction to Political Science]]
|[[La pensée sociale d'Émile Durkheim et Pierre Bourdieu]] ● [[Aux origines de la chute de la République de Weimar]] ● [[La pensée sociale de Max Weber et Vilfredo Pareto]] ● [[La notion de « concept » en sciences-sociales]] ● [[Histoire de la discipline de la science politique : théories et conceptions]] ● [[Marxisme et Structuralisme]] ● [[Fonctionnalisme et Systémisme]] ● [[Interactionnisme et Constructivisme]] ● [[Les théories de l’anthropologie politique]] ● [[Le débat des trois I : intérêts, institutions et idées]] ● [[La théorie du choix rationnel et l'analyse des intérêts en science politique]] ● [[Approche analytique des institutions en science politique]] ● [[L'étude des idées et idéologies dans la science politique]] ● [[Les théories de la guerre en science politique]] ● [[La Guerre : conceptions et évolutions]] ● [[La raison d’État]] ● [[État, souveraineté, mondialisation, gouvernance multiniveaux]] ● [[Les théories de la violence en science politique]] ● [[Welfare State et biopouvoir]] ● [[Analyse des régimes démocratiques et des processus de démocratisation]] ● [[Systèmes Électoraux : Mécanismes, Enjeux et Conséquences]] ● [[Le système de gouvernement des démocraties]] ● [[Morphologie des contestations]] ● [[L’action dans la théorie politique]] ● [[Introduction à la politique suisse]] ● [[Introduction au comportement politique]] ● [[Analyse des Politiques Publiques : définition et cycle d'une politique publique]] ● [[Analyse des Politiques Publiques : mise à l'agenda et formulation]] ● [[Analyse des Politiques Publiques : mise en œuvre et évaluation]] ● [[Introduction à la sous-discipline des relations internationales]]
|[[Intellectual legacy of Émile Durkheim and Pierre Bourdieu in social theory]] ● [[The origins of the fall of the Weimar Republic]] ● [[Intellectual legacy of Max Weber and Vilfredo Pareto in social theory]] ● [[The notion of "concept" in social sciences]] ● [[History of the discipline of political science: theories and concepts]] ● [[Marxism and Structuralism]] ● [[Functionalism and Systemism]] ● [[Interactionism and Constructivism]] ● [[The theories of political anthropology]] ● [[The three I's debate: interests, institutions and ideas]] ● [[Rational choice theory and the analysis of interests in political science]] ● [[An analytical approach to institutions in political science]] ● [[The study of ideas and ideologies in political science]] ● [[Theories of war in political science]] ● [[The War: Concepts and Evolutions]] ● [[The reason of State]] ● [[State, sovereignty, globalization and multi-level governance]] ● [[Theories of violence in political science‎‎]] ● [[Welfare State and Biopower]] ● [[Analysis of democratic regimes and democratisation processes]] ● [[Electoral Systems: Mechanisms, Issues and Consequences]] ● [[The system of government in democracies]] ● [[Morphology of contestations]] ● [[Action in Political Theory]] ● [[Introduction to Swiss politics]] ● [[Introduction to political behaviour]] ● [[Public Policy Analysis: Definition and cycle of public policy]] ● [[Public Policy Analysis: agenda setting and formulation]] ● [[Public Policy Analysis: Implementation and Evaluation]] ● [[Introduction to the sub-discipline of international relations]] ● [[Introduction to Political Theory]]  
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La science politique s'est longtemps intéressée à la guerre, qui représente l'un des aspects les plus extrêmes et dévastateurs des relations internationales. En effet, la guerre a des implications profondes sur la politique, l'économie, la société et la culture, et elle peut changer radicalement le cours de l'histoire.
Political science has long been interested in war, one of the most extreme and devastating aspects of international relations. War has profound implications for politics, economics, society and culture, and can radically change the course of history.


L'approche de la science politique à la guerre est souvent multidimensionnelle. Elle comprend des analyses théoriques, historiques, sociologiques, économiques et psychologiques. Cependant, la capacité de la science politique à comprendre et à expliquer la guerre est parfois remise en question. Il y a plusieurs raisons à cela.
Political science's approach to war is often multidimensional. It includes theoretical, historical, sociological, economic and psychological analyses. However, the ability of political science to understand and explain war is sometimes called into question. There are several reasons for this.


* Limites de la théorie : Beaucoup de théories politiques (par exemple, le réalisme, le libéralisme, le constructivisme) ont leurs propres hypothèses et limites. Elles peuvent expliquer certains aspects de la guerre, mais pas tous. Par exemple, le réalisme met l'accent sur le pouvoir et l'anarchie dans les relations internationales, mais il peut avoir du mal à expliquer pourquoi certains États puissants choisissent de ne pas aller à la guerre.
* Limitations of theory: Many political theories (e.g. realism, liberalism, constructivism) have their own assumptions and limitations. They can explain some aspects of war, but not all. For example, realism emphasises power and anarchy in international relations, but may have difficulty explaining why some powerful states choose not to go to war.
* Prévision et prévention : Bien que la science politique ait fait des progrès dans la compréhension des causes de la guerre, elle a souvent du mal à prédire quand et où les guerres vont éclater. De même, malgré la connaissance des facteurs qui contribuent à la guerre, il est souvent difficile de les prévenir.
* Prediction and prevention: Although political science has made progress in understanding the causes of war, it often has difficulty predicting when and where wars will break out. Similarly, despite our knowledge of the factors that contribute to war, it is often difficult to prevent them.
* Problèmes méthodologiques : La science politique dépend souvent de données historiques pour construire et tester des théories. Cependant, les guerres sont des événements relativement rares et chaque guerre a ses propres caractéristiques uniques. Cela rend difficile la généralisation à partir de cas spécifiques.
* Methodological problems: Political science often relies on historical data to construct and test theories. However, wars are relatively rare events and each war has its own unique characteristics. This makes it difficult to generalise from specific cases.
* L'influence de la politique : La science politique, comme toute discipline, n'est pas à l'abri des pressions politiques. Les scientifiques politiques peuvent être influencés par leurs propres préjugés, par les intérêts de leurs sponsors ou par les courants politiques dominants.
* The influence of politics: Political science, like any discipline, is not immune to political pressures. Political scientists can be influenced by their own prejudices, by the interests of their sponsors or by mainstream politics.


Cela dit, la science politique a beaucoup à offrir dans l'étude de la guerre. Elle fournit des cadres théoriques pour comprendre les causes de la guerre, les stratégies de guerre, et les conséquences de la guerre. Elle permet aussi d'analyser les efforts pour prévenir la guerre et pour construire la paix. Enfin, elle offre une perspective critique qui peut remettre en question les discours dominants sur la guerre.
That said, political science has much to offer the study of war. It provides theoretical frameworks for understanding the causes of war, war strategies and the consequences of war. It also makes it possible to analyse efforts to prevent war and build peace. Finally, it offers a critical perspective that can challenge dominant discourses on war.


La nature de la guerre a évolué au cours des siècles. Traditionnellement, la guerre était considérée comme un conflit entre États-nations, souvent pour des raisons de territoire, de ressources, ou de pouvoir. Dans ce contexte, les règles de la guerre étaient relativement claires et formelles, régies par des conventions internationales comme les Conventions de Genève. Cependant, avec l'avènement de la guerre de partisan au XIXème siècle, la nature de la guerre a commencé à changer. La guerre de partisan, telle qu'elle a été conceptualisée par des penseurs comme Clausewitz, implique souvent des individus ou des groupes non étatiques qui se battent contre un État. Ces guerres sont souvent asymétriques, avec un déséquilibre de pouvoir entre les parties, et elles peuvent être caractérisées par des tactiques de guérilla, le terrorisme, et d'autres formes de résistance irrégulière.  
The nature of war has evolved over the centuries. Traditionally, war was seen as a conflict between nation states, often over territory, resources or power. In this context, the rules of war were relatively clear and formal, governed by international conventions such as the Geneva Conventions. However, with the advent of partisan warfare in the 19th century, the nature of warfare began to change. Partisan warfare, as conceptualised by thinkers such as Clausewitz, often involves non-state individuals or groups fighting against a state. These wars are often asymmetric, with an imbalance of power between the parties, and can be characterised by guerrilla tactics, terrorism and other forms of irregular resistance.  


De plus, nous assistons aujourd'hui à une autre évolution de la guerre. Avec la mondialisation, l'évolution technologique, et l'essor du terrorisme international, nous voyons de plus en plus de conflits qui ne sont pas limités à des frontières nationales et qui impliquent une variété d'acteurs non étatiques, y compris des groupes terroristes, des milices privées, et même des entreprises de cybersécurité. Ces guerres "hybrides" ou "non linéaires" peuvent être difficiles à gérer et à résoudre, car elles ne suivent pas les règles traditionnelles de la guerre. En effet, ces nouvelles formes de guerre soulèvent une préoccupation : elles peuvent sembler ne jamais s'arrêter. Sans un État clairement défini à vaincre ou un territoire spécifique à conquérir, il peut être difficile de définir la victoire ou la fin de la guerre. Cela peut mener à des conflits prolongés, avec toutes les souffrances humaines et les instabilités politiques que cela implique.
What's more, we are witnessing another evolution in warfare today. With globalisation, technological change, and the rise of international terrorism, we are seeing more and more conflicts that are not limited to national borders and that involve a variety of non-state actors, including terrorist groups, private militias, and even cybersecurity companies. These "hybrid" or "non-linear" wars can be difficult to manage and resolve, as they do not follow the traditional rules of warfare. Indeed, one concern with these new forms of warfare is that they can seem never-ending. Without a clearly defined state to defeat or a specific territory to conquer, it can be difficult to define victory or the end of the war. This can lead to protracted conflicts, with all the human suffering and political instability that implies.


Ces évolutions représentent des défis importants pour la science politique et pour la société en général. Il est essentiel de continuer à réfléchir sur ces questions, de développer de nouvelles théories et stratégies, et de travailler pour la prévention des conflits et la construction de la paix.
These developments represent major challenges for political science and for society in general. It is essential to continue to reflect on these issues, to develop new theories and strategies, and to work towards conflict prevention and peace-building.


= Pourquoi la science politique s’est-elle intéressée à la guerre ? =
= Why has political science taken an interest in war? =


La guerre a été un élément omniprésent tout au long de l'histoire de l'humanité, et elle a profondément façonné les sociétés, les cultures, les économies et les politiques. C'est pourquoi la science politique, ainsi que d'autres disciplines comme l'histoire, la sociologie et la psychologie, s'intéressent de près à la guerre. L'Europe a été largement épargnée par les conflits armés directs depuis la fin de la Seconde Guerre mondiale en 1945 jusqu'en 2022, grâce en grande partie à la construction de l'Union européenne, à la dissuasion nucléaire et à la présence de l'OTAN. Il y a eu des exceptions notables, comme les guerres en ex-Yougoslavie dans les années 1990. L'invasion de l'Ukraine par la Russie en 2022 est un rappel sombre que la paix n'est jamais garantie et que la guerre peut éclater même dans des régions qui ont connu une longue période de paix. La crise a souligné les tensions existantes autour de l'expansion de l'OTAN et de l'Union européenne vers l'est, ainsi que les aspirations de l'Ukraine à s'intégrer davantage à l'Europe. Cette situation a des implications profondes pour l'Europe et le monde, en termes de sécurité, de stabilité politique, de relations internationales et de droits de l'homme. Malheureusement, la paix prolongée dont l'Europe a bénéficié est rare dans l'histoire de l'humanité. De nombreuses régions du monde ont connu des conflits armés réguliers, et même aujourd'hui, des guerres font rage dans des endroits comme le Moyen-Orient, l'Afrique et l'Asie.
War has been a ubiquitous feature of human history, profoundly shaping societies, cultures, economies and politics. This is why political science, as well as other disciplines such as history, sociology and psychology, take such a keen interest in war. Europe has been largely spared direct armed conflict from the end of the Second World War in 1945 until 2022, thanks largely to the construction of the European Union, nuclear deterrence and the presence of NATO. There have been notable exceptions, such as the wars in the former Yugoslavia in the 1990s. Russia's invasion of Ukraine in 2022 is a sombre reminder that peace is never guaranteed and that war can break out even in regions that have enjoyed a long period of peace. The crisis has underlined existing tensions around the eastward expansion of NATO and the European Union, as well as Ukraine's aspirations to integrate further with Europe. This situation has profound implications for Europe and the world, in terms of security, political stability, international relations and human rights. Unfortunately, the prolonged peace that Europe has enjoyed is rare in human history. Many parts of the world have experienced regular armed conflict, and even today wars rage in places like the Middle East, Africa and Asia.


La science politique en tant que discipline académique distincte a commencé à prendre forme à la fin du 19ème et au début du 20ème siècle, une période marquée par des tensions politiques et des conflits internationaux majeurs. L'expérience de la Première Guerre mondiale a certainement alimenté l'intérêt pour l'étude systématique du pouvoir, des institutions, des conflits et de la coopération entre les États. Le 20ème siècle a été marqué par de nombreux conflits, dont les deux guerres mondiales, la Guerre froide, et une multitude de guerres régionales, de conflits civils et de guerres par procuration. Ces conflits ont façonné l'ordre politique mondial et ont eu un impact majeur sur le développement de la science politique. Ils ont conduit à l'émergence de nouvelles théories et approches, comme le réalisme et le libéralisme en relations internationales, qui cherchent à expliquer le comportement des États et la dynamique des conflits internationaux. La science politique a également été influencée par les développements technologiques, économiques et sociaux du 20ème siècle, comme l'émergence de l'arme nucléaire, la mondialisation de l'économie, et les mouvements pour les droits civils et les droits de l'homme. Tous ces facteurs ont contribué à façonner la discipline telle que nous la connaissons aujourd'hui. En bref, la guerre et les conflits ont joué un rôle crucial dans la naissance et le développement de la science politique. Ils ont stimulé la réflexion sur des questions fondamentales comme le pouvoir, l'autorité, la justice, la sécurité et la coopération internationale, qui sont au cœur de la discipline.
Political science as a distinct academic discipline began to take shape in the late 19th and early 20th centuries, a period marked by major political tensions and international conflicts. The experience of the First World War certainly fuelled interest in the systematic study of power, institutions, conflict and cooperation between states. The 20th century was marked by numerous conflicts, including the two world wars, the Cold War, and a multitude of regional wars, civil conflicts and proxy wars. These conflicts shaped the global political order and had a major impact on the development of political science. They have led to the emergence of new theories and approaches, such as realism and liberalism in international relations, which seek to explain the behaviour of states and the dynamics of international conflict. Political science has also been influenced by the technological, economic and social developments of the 20th century, such as the emergence of nuclear weapons, the globalisation of the economy, and the civil and human rights movements. All these factors helped to shape the discipline as we know it today. In short, war and conflict have played a crucial role in the birth and development of political science. They have stimulated reflection on fundamental issues such as power, authority, justice, security and international cooperation, which lie at the heart of the discipline.
 
Tout d'abord, les guerres de décolonisation. Après la Seconde Guerre mondiale, une vague d'indépendance a déferlé sur de nombreuses colonies européennes, entraînant une série de guerres de décolonisation. Ces guerres ont souvent été caractérisées par des luttes de pouvoir entre les forces coloniales et les mouvements nationalistes locaux. Elles ont eu un impact profond sur la configuration de l'ordre mondial post-colonial. Ensuite, l'époque de la Guerre froide a été marquée par la menace constante d'une guerre nucléaire entre les superpuissances. Cette menace s'est particulièrement manifestée lors de crises comme la Guerre de Corée et la crise des missiles de Cuba. Ces événements ont souligné le risque existentiel que représentent les armes nucléaires et ont eu une influence significative sur les politiques internationales et les théories de la science politique. Enfin, après la fin de la Guerre froide, les Nations Unies ont joué un rôle de plus en plus important dans la gestion des conflits internationaux, notamment par le biais de missions de maintien de la paix. Cependant, des conflits majeurs, comme les guerres du Golfe et la guerre en Afghanistan, ont révélé les défis et les limites de l'intervention internationale. Chacune de ces phases offre un contexte différent pour l'étude des conflits et des guerres en science politique. Les modifications dans la nature des conflits, les acteurs impliqués, les technologies utilisées, ainsi que les normes et institutions internationales, ont tous influencé la manière dont les politologues abordent l'étude de la guerre et des conflits.
First of all, the wars of decolonisation. After the Second World War, a wave of independence swept through many European colonies, leading to a series of wars of decolonisation. These wars were often characterised by power struggles between colonial forces and local nationalist movements. They had a profound impact on the shape of the post-colonial world order. Secondly, the Cold War era was marked by the constant threat of nuclear war between the superpowers. This threat was particularly evident in crises such as the Korean War and the Cuban missile crisis. These events underlined the existential risk posed by nuclear weapons and had a significant influence on international politics and political science theories. Finally, after the end of the Cold War, the United Nations played an increasingly important role in managing international conflicts, notably through peacekeeping missions. However, major conflicts such as the Gulf Wars and the war in Afghanistan have revealed the challenges and limits of international intervention. Each of these phases provides a different context for the study of conflict and war in political science. Changes in the nature of conflict, the actors involved, the technologies used, and international norms and institutions have all influenced the way political scientists approach the study of war and conflict.
 
The attack of 11 September 2001 marked a turning point in contemporary history and profoundly transformed world politics, particularly with regard to war and terrorism. This tragic event not only led to a war in Afghanistan, but also shaped the way the world perceives and fights terrorism. The war in Afghanistan, which began in 2001 in response to the September 11 attacks, was an attempt to dismantle al-Qa'ida, the terrorist group responsible for the attacks, and to overthrow the Taliban regime that harboured it. However, the war has had complex and lasting consequences, both for Afghanistan and for world politics. The war in Afghanistan demonstrated the difficulties associated with fighting terrorism on a global scale. It revealed the challenges of rebuilding a state after conflict, the complexity of counter-insurgency, and the problems associated with the long-term commitment of foreign forces to a country. The war has also had an impact on the way countries perceive and deal with the terrorist threat. It has led to changes in national security strategies, surveillance and civil rights legislation, and has influenced public discourse on terrorism and security.
 
A crucial aspect of the evolution of warfare is the change in the ratio of civilian to military casualties. Modern warfare often has a devastating impact on civilian populations, not only in terms of deaths and injuries, but also in terms of displacement, destruction of infrastructure and psychological trauma. In the Solferino War in the 19th century, the victims were mainly soldiers. However, with the First World War, the casualty figures began to change, with an almost equal proportion of military and civilian victims. This trend continued and even worsened throughout the twentieth century, particularly during the Second World War and in more recent conflicts. This trend is due to several factors. Firstly, the escalation of military technology, including weapons of mass destruction, has made conflicts more devastating and less discriminating. Secondly, military strategies have changed to increasingly target civilian infrastructure in order to undermine the enemy's morale and war effort. Finally, many modern conflicts take place within rather than between states, meaning that civilians are often caught in the line of fire. This change has important implications for political science and for the way we think about war. It raises questions about the legitimacy of the use of force, human rights, international humanitarian law and the responsibility to protect civilians in war.
 
=What is war?=
The changing nature of warfare has led to significant changes in its economics and in the proportion of civilian casualties. In addition, modern wars tend to last longer, with profound implications for society and the economy. In the past, the war economy focused primarily on the production of armaments and other goods needed for war. However, as military strategies evolved, the aim became to destroy the enemy's production tools in order to weaken its economy and therefore its ability to wage war. This led to an increase in the number of civilian casualties, as civilian infrastructures became military targets. In addition, the protracted nature of many modern conflicts has also had an impact on the economics of war. Instead of short-term intensive production to support the war effort, economies now have to manage the long-term effects of war, such as rebuilding after destruction and supporting the victims of war. These changes have major implications for political science, particularly with regard to questions of human rights, international humanitarian law and military strategy. They also highlight the importance of effective post-conflict peace management to minimise the long-term damage caused by war.
 
An interesting perspective on war is that of an extension of political dialogue, albeit in a violent and destructive form. This idea is in fact an interpretation of the famous quote by Carl von Clausewitz, the 19th century Prussian military strategist, who said that "war is the continuation of politics by other means". From this perspective, war is not simply a failure of politics, but another form of political dialogue, albeit a violent and destructive one. It is a time when conflicts and disputes are resolved by force rather than through dialogue or negotiation. In this sense, war can be seen as an "inversion of normality", where violence replaces peace as the primary means of conflict resolution. However, war also has profound and often devastating consequences. It results in the death and suffering of many people, the destruction of property and infrastructure, and can have lasting economic, political and social consequences. Therefore, although it can be seen as an extension of political dialogue, it is crucial to recognise the high human and social costs of war. It is precisely for these reasons that war is an important subject of study in political science. Understanding war, its causes and consequences, can help prevent future conflicts, effectively manage those that do occur and minimise the human and social costs of war.
 
French philosopher and writer George Bataille's definition of war as "a supreme game" underlines the seriousness and importance of the stakes involved. Compared to a game, war, in this context, is not light entertainment, but rather a strategic and potentially deadly activity that involves everything the participants have, including their lives. Seeing war as a strategic game, however, can have important implications for how we understand and manage it. In a game, there are usually rules to follow, strategies to develop and clearly defined winners and losers. If we apply this framework to war, it can help us to think more strategically about the conduct of war, how to minimise its costs and how to manage its consequences.
 
However, it is also important to note that war differs from ordinary games in several important ways. Firstly, the stakes are infinitely higher - it's not just points or trophies that are at stake, but human lives, societies and entire nations. Secondly, unlike most games, war is not always clearly delineated with fair and universally accepted rules. Finally, while in most games the aim is to win, in war the ultimate goal should always be to achieve a lasting and just peace. This is why political science, in studying war, seeks not only to understand how wars are won, but also how they can be prevented and how their consequences can be managed so as to promote peace and justice.


L'attentat du 11 septembre 2001 a marqué un tournant dans l'histoire contemporaine et a profondément transformé la politique mondiale, notamment en ce qui concerne la guerre et le terrorisme. Ce tragique événement a non seulement mené à une guerre en Afghanistan, mais a également façonné la manière dont le monde perçoit et combat le terrorisme. La guerre en Afghanistan, qui a débuté en 2001 en réponse aux attaques du 11 septembre, a été une tentative de démanteler Al-Qaïda, le groupe terroriste responsable des attaques, et de renverser le régime taliban qui l'hébergeait. Cependant, la guerre a eu des conséquences complexes et durables, à la fois pour l'Afghanistan et pour la politique mondiale. La guerre en Afghanistan a montré les difficultés associées à la lutte contre le terrorisme à l'échelle mondiale. Elle a révélé les défis de la reconstruction d'un État après un conflit, la complexité de la lutte contre les insurrections, et les problèmes liés à l'engagement à long terme des forces étrangères dans un pays. De plus, la guerre a également eu un impact sur la manière dont les pays perçoivent et abordent la menace terroriste. Elle a conduit à des changements dans les stratégies de sécurité nationale, dans la législation relative à la surveillance et aux droits civils, et a influencé le discours public sur le terrorisme et la sécurité.
War can be seen as an 'inversion of a system' in the sense that it replaces the usual mechanisms of dialogue, negotiation and conflict resolution by force. In this context, "dialogue" is achieved not through words, but through acts of violence. This is precisely why war is so devastating and costly, both in terms of human lives and resources. It is also unpredictable, because once the use of force has been initiated, it is difficult to control or predict the outcome. It is also for this reason that political science, as well as other disciplines such as international relations, strive to understand the causes of war and to develop strategies to prevent conflict, manage wars when they occur and restore peace and stability after conflict. Ultimately, war is a "dialogue through force" with profound and lasting consequences. Understanding this "dialogue" is essential to promoting peace and security in the world.
Un aspect crucial de l'évolution de la guerre, est le changement dans la proportion de victimes civiles par rapport aux militaires. Les guerres modernes ont souvent un impact dévastateur sur les populations civiles, non seulement en termes de morts et de blessés, mais aussi de déplacements de population, de destruction d'infrastructures et de traumatismes psychologiques. Dans la guerre de Solferino au XIXe siècle, les victimes étaient principalement des militaires. Cependant, avec la Première Guerre mondiale, le bilan des victimes a commencé à changer, avec une proportion presque égale de victimes militaires et civiles. Cette tendance s'est poursuivie et s'est même aggravée au cours du XXe siècle, en particulier lors de la Seconde Guerre mondiale et dans les conflits plus récents. Cette évolution est due à plusieurs facteurs. Premièrement, l'escalade de la technologie militaire, y compris les armes de destruction massive, a rendu les conflits plus dévastateurs et moins discriminants. Deuxièmement, les stratégies militaires ont changé pour viser de plus en plus les infrastructures civiles afin de saper le moral de l'ennemi et son effort de guerre. Enfin, de nombreux conflits modernes ont lieu au sein des États plutôt qu'entre eux, ce qui signifie que les civils sont souvent pris dans la ligne de feu. Ce changement a des implications importantes pour la science politique et pour la manière dont nous pensons la guerre. Il soulève des questions sur la légitimité de l'utilisation de la force, les droits de l'homme, le droit humanitaire international et la responsabilité de protéger les civils en temps de guerre.


=Qu’est-ce que la guerre ?=
=War: an object of struggle between state powers=
L'évolution de la nature de la guerre a entraîné des changements significatifs dans son économie et dans la proportion de victimes civiles. De plus, les guerres modernes ont tendance à durer plus longtemps, ce qui a des implications profondes pour la société et l'économie. Auparavant, l'économie de guerre se concentrait principalement sur la production d'armements et d'autres biens nécessaires à la guerre. Cependant, à mesure que les stratégies militaires évoluaient, l'objectif est devenu de détruire les outils de production de l'ennemi pour affaiblir son économie et donc sa capacité à faire la guerre. Cela a entraîné une augmentation du nombre de victimes civiles, car les infrastructures civiles sont devenues des cibles militaires. En outre, la nature prolongée de nombreux conflits modernes a également eu un impact sur l'économie de la guerre. Au lieu d'une production intensive à court terme pour soutenir l'effort de guerre, les économies doivent maintenant gérer les effets à long terme de la guerre, comme la reconstruction après la destruction et le soutien aux victimes de la guerre. Ces changements ont des implications majeures pour la science politique, notamment en ce qui concerne les questions de droits de l'homme, de droit humanitaire international et de stratégie militaire. Ils soulignent également l'importance d'une gestion efficace de la paix après le conflit pour minimiser les dommages à long terme causés par la guerre.
Une perspective intéressante sur la guerre est celle d'une extension du dialogue politique, bien qu'elle se présente sous une forme violente et destructrice. Cette idée est en fait une interprétation de la célèbre citation de Carl von Clausewitz, stratège militaire prussien du 19ème siècle, qui a déclaré que "la guerre est la continuation de la politique par d'autres moyens". Selon cette perspective, la guerre n'est pas simplement un échec de la politique, mais une autre forme de dialogue politique, bien que violent et destructeur. C'est une période où les conflits et les différends sont résolus par la force plutôt que par le dialogue ou la négociation. Dans ce sens, la guerre peut être vue comme une "inversion de la normalité", où la violence remplace la paix comme moyen principal de résolution des conflits. Cependant, la guerre a également des conséquences profondes et souvent dévastatrices. Elle entraîne la mort et la souffrance de nombreuses personnes, la destruction de biens et d'infrastructures, et peut avoir des conséquences économiques, politiques et sociales durables. Par conséquent, bien qu'elle puisse être vue comme une extension du dialogue politique, il est crucial de reconnaître les coûts humains et sociaux élevés de la guerre. C'est précisément pour ces raisons que la guerre est un sujet d'étude important en science politique. Comprendre la guerre, ses causes et ses conséquences, peut aider à prévenir les conflits futurs, à gérer efficacement ceux qui se produisent et à minimiser les coûts humains et sociaux de la guerre.
La définition de la guerre par George Bataille, philosophe et écrivain français, comme "un jeu suprême" souligne la gravité et l'importance des enjeux en jeu. Comparée à un jeu, la guerre, dans ce contexte, n'est pas un divertissement léger, mais plutôt une activité stratégique et potentiellement mortelle qui engage tout ce que les participants ont, y compris leur vie. Le fait de voir la guerre comme un jeu stratégique, cependant, peut avoir des implications importantes pour la façon dont nous la comprenons et la gérons. Dans un jeu, il y a généralement des règles à suivre, des stratégies à développer et des gagnants et des perdants clairement définis. Si nous appliquons ce cadre à la guerre, cela peut nous aider à penser de manière plus stratégique à la conduite de la guerre, aux moyens de minimiser ses coûts et à la façon de gérer ses conséquences.


Cependant, il est également important de noter que la guerre diffère des jeux ordinaires de plusieurs façons importantes. Premièrement, les enjeux sont infiniment plus élevés - ce ne sont pas seulement des points ou des trophées qui sont en jeu, mais des vies humaines, des sociétés et des nations entières. Deuxièmement, contrairement à la plupart des jeux, la guerre n'est pas toujours clairement délimitée avec des règles équitables et universellement acceptées. Enfin, alors que dans la plupart des jeux le but est de gagner, dans la guerre, le but ultime devrait toujours être d'arriver à une paix durable et juste. C'est pourquoi la science politique, en étudiant la guerre, cherche non seulement à comprendre comment les guerres sont gagnées, mais aussi comment elles peuvent être prévenues et comment leurs conséquences peuvent être gérées de manière à promouvoir la paix et la justice.
==An ancient phenomenon vs. modern inter-state warfare==


La guerre peut être considérée comme une "inversion d'un système" dans le sens où elle remplace les mécanismes habituels de dialogue, de négociation et de résolution des conflits par la force. Dans ce contexte, le "dialogue" se fait non pas par des mots, mais par des actes de violence. C'est précisément pour cette raison que la guerre est si dévastatrice et coûteuse, tant en termes de vies humaines que de ressources. Elle est également imprévisible, car une fois que le recours à la force est engagé, il est difficile de contrôler ou de prédire les résultats. C'est également pour cette raison que la science politique, ainsi que d'autres disciplines comme les relations internationales, s'efforcent de comprendre les causes de la guerre et de développer des stratégies pour prévenir les conflits, gérer les guerres lorsqu'elles se produisent et rétablir la paix et la stabilité après un conflit. En fin de compte, la guerre est un "dialogue par la force" qui a des conséquences profondes et durables. Comprendre ce "dialogue" est essentiel pour promouvoir la paix et la sécurité dans le monde.
===An ancient phenomenon: historical perspectives===
The study of the mythical dimension of war is a fascinating aspect of political science. States and governments often use myths and narratives to justify war, galvanise public support and give meaning to the violence and sacrifice involved. These myths can take many forms and can be influenced by historical, cultural, religious and political factors. The concept of sacrifice is often central to these war myths. It may be invoked to emphasise the importance of the cause being fought for, to valorise the actions of soldiers, and to help rationalise the human costs of war. Sacrifice can be presented as a patriotic duty, an act of bravery, or a tragic necessity. However, war myths and the discourse of sacrifice can also serve to obscure the true costs and consequences of war, to marginalise dissenting voices, and to avoid a critical examination of the motivations and strategies of war. It is therefore important to interrogate and critique these myths, and to understand how they are constructed and used. Political science can contribute to this task by examining how war myths are created and maintained, how they influence policy and public perceptions of war, and how they can be challenged or deconstructed. This analysis can help to promote a better understanding of war and encourage more thoughtful and critical approaches to the politics of war.  


=La guerre : un objet de lutte entre puissances étatiques=
When a country goes to war, there is often a kind of "flag rally" where internal political differences are temporarily put aside and a sense of national unity is cultivated. Ideological mobilisation" serves to strengthen social cohesion and facilitate the war effort. This cohesion was often underpinned by rhetoric that stigmatised dissent. Those who oppose the war, or even criticise it, may be accused of treason, lack of patriotism or not supporting the troops. This social pressure can be extremely powerful and can stifle the necessary public and critical debate. The example of the reaction to the September 11 attacks and President George W. Bush's decision to declare a "war on terror" illustrates this point well. Those who questioned this policy were often marginalised or denigrated. Yet, with hindsight, many of these criticisms have been validated. The conflict in Afghanistan, for example, proved to be a long and costly engagement that failed to achieve many of its key objectives. This underlines the importance of open and critical public debate in times of war. Political science can play an important role in providing rigorous and independent analyses of war decisions, questioning the underlying assumptions and highlighting the potential costs and consequences of these decisions.


==Un phénomène ancien vs la guerre moderne interétatique==
War often has a sublimated character that can obscure rational and analytical judgements. The rhetoric of war can create a sense of urgency and grandeur that encourages binary thinking (us versus them), the glorification of sacrifice and a heightened tolerance for violence. This can lead to decisions based more on emotion than on a rational assessment of costs and benefits. The sublimation of war can also affect the way societies perceive and remember conflict. Wars can be romanticised or mythologised in order to minimise their darker and more unpleasant aspects. The human and material costs of war can be overlooked, while acts of bravery and sacrifice are emphasised. This is why it is crucial to maintain a critical and rational analysis in times of war. Political scientists and other researchers can help deconstruct the sublimation of war by critically examining war narratives, assessing the real costs of conflict and highlighting alternatives to violence. This approach can help prevent precipitous war decisions and encourage more peaceful and humanitarian policies.


===Un phénomène ancien : perspectives historiques===
===Modern warfare: characteristics and current issues===
L'étude de la dimension mythique de la guerre est un aspect fascinant de la science politique. Les États et les gouvernements ont souvent recours à des mythes et des récits pour justifier la guerre, galvaniser le soutien public, et donner un sens à la violence et au sacrifice qu'elle implique. Ces mythes peuvent prendre de nombreuses formes et peuvent être influencés par des facteurs historiques, culturels, religieux et politiques. Le concept de sacrifice est souvent central dans ces mythes de guerre. Il peut être invoqué pour souligner l'importance de la cause pour laquelle on se bat, pour valoriser les actions des soldats, et pour aider à rationaliser les coûts humains de la guerre. Le sacrifice peut être présenté comme un devoir patriotique, un acte de bravoure, ou une nécessité tragique. Cependant, les mythes de guerre et le discours du sacrifice peuvent aussi servir à masquer les véritables coûts et conséquences de la guerre, à marginaliser les voix dissidentes, et à éviter un examen critique des motivations et des stratégies de guerre. Par conséquent, il est important d'interroger et de critiquer ces mythes, et de comprendre comment ils sont construits et utilisés. La science politique peut contribuer à cette tâche en examinant comment les mythes de guerre sont créés et maintenus, comment ils influencent la politique et la perception publique de la guerre, et comment ils peuvent être contestés ou déconstruits. Cette analyse peut aider à promouvoir une meilleure compréhension de la guerre et à favoriser des approches plus réfléchies et critiques de la politique de guerre.
[[Fichier:Helst, Peace of Münster.jpg|thumb|Banquet of the Amsterdam Civic Guard on the occasion of the Peace of Münster by Bartholomeus van der Helst, painted in 1648|300px]]
Lorsqu'un pays entre en guerre, il existe souvent une sorte de "rallye autour du drapeau" où les différences politiques internes sont temporairement mises de côté et un sens d'unité nationale est cultivé. La "mobilisation idéologique"sert à renforcer la cohésion sociale et à faciliter l'effort de guerre. Cette cohésion est souvent soutenue par une rhétorique qui stigmatise la dissidence. Ceux qui s'opposent à la guerre, ou même qui la critiquent, peuvent être accusés de trahison, de manque de patriotisme ou de ne pas soutenir les troupes. Cette pression sociale peut être extrêmement puissante et peut étouffer le débat public et critique nécessaire. L'exemple de la réaction aux attentats du 11 septembre et la décision du président George W. Bush de déclarer la "guerre contre le terrorisme"  illustre bien ce point. Ceux qui ont remis en question cette politique ont souvent été marginalisés ou dénigrés. Pourtant, avec le recul, beaucoup de ces critiques ont été validées. Le conflit en Afghanistan, par exemple, s'est avéré être un engagement long et coûteux qui n'a pas réussi à atteindre plusieurs de ses objectifs principaux. Cela souligne l'importance d'un débat public ouvert et critique en temps de guerre. La science politique peut jouer un rôle important en fournissant des analyses rigoureuses et indépendantes des décisions de guerre, en interrogeant les hypothèses sous-jacentes et en mettant en lumière les coûts et les conséquences potentielles de ces décisions.
La guerre a souvent un caractère sublimé qui peut obscurcir les jugements rationnels et analytiques. La rhétorique de la guerre peut créer un sentiment d'urgence et de grandeur qui encourage la pensée binaire (nous contre eux), la glorification du sacrifice et une tolérance accrue pour la violence. Cela peut conduire à des décisions basées davantage sur l'émotion que sur une évaluation rationnelle des coûts et des bénéfices. La sublimation de la guerre peut également affecter la façon dont les sociétés perçoivent et se souviennent des conflits. Les guerres peuvent être romancées ou mythifiées de manière à minimiser leurs aspects plus sombres et désagréables. Les coûts humains et matériels de la guerre peuvent être négligés, tandis que les actes de bravoure et de sacrifice sont mis en avant. C'est pourquoi il est crucial de maintenir une analyse critique et rationnelle en temps de guerre. Les politologues et autres chercheurs peuvent aider à déconstruire la sublimation de la guerre en examinant de manière critique les récits de guerre, en évaluant les coûts réels des conflits et en soulignant les alternatives à la violence. Cette approche peut aider à prévenir les décisions de guerre précipitées et à encourager des politiques plus pacifiques et humanitaires.


===La guerre moderne : caractéristiques et enjeux actuels===
The Thirty Years' War, which took place mainly in Central Europe, is often regarded as a turning point in the history of warfare and diplomacy. Although it began as a religious conflict within the Holy Roman Empire, it soon involved several major European powers, including France, Sweden, Spain and Denmark, and became a struggle for political and territorial power.
[[Fichier:Helst, Peace of Münster.jpg|thumb|''Banquet de la garde civique d’Amsterdam à l’occasion de la paix de Münster'' par Bartholomeus van der Helst, peint en 1648|300px]]


la guerre de Trente Ans, qui a eu lieu principalement en Europe centrale, est souvent considérée comme un tournant dans l'histoire de la guerre et de la diplomatie. Bien que cette guerre ait commencé comme un conflit religieux au sein du Saint Empire romain germanique, elle a rapidement impliqué plusieurs grandes puissances européennes, dont la France, la Suède, l'Espagne et le Danemark, et est devenue une lutte pour le pouvoir politique et territorial.
The Thirty Years' War is particularly important in political science for several reasons:


La guerre de Trente Ans est particulièrement importante en science politique pour plusieurs raisons :
* The Treaty of Westphalia: This treaty, signed in 1648, marked the end of the Thirty Years' War and laid the foundations for the modern international order based on the system of sovereign states. This system, often referred to as the Westphalian system, defined the principles of national sovereignty and non-interference, which are still at the heart of international law today.
* The transformation of warfare: The Thirty Years' War was one of the most destructive conflicts in European history, marked by widespread violence against civilians and an unprecedented level of destruction. This led to changes in the way war was fought, including the increasing use of standing armies and siege tactics.
* The politicisation of religion: Although the war began as a religious conflict, it eventually evolved into a struggle for political power. This marked an important stage in the process of secularisation of European politics, where religion became a tool of political legitimisation rather than a driver of conflict.


* Le traité de Westphalie : Ce traité, signé en 1648, a marqué la fin de la guerre de Trente Ans et a posé les bases de l'ordre international moderne basé sur le système d'États souverains. Ce système, souvent appelé système westphalien, définit les principes de souveraineté nationale et de non-ingérence, qui sont encore au cœur du droit international aujourd'hui.
Ultimately, the Thirty Years' War and the Treaty of Westphalia had a profound impact on the formation of the modern state and the international system, making them of great importance to political science.
* La transformation de la guerre : La guerre de Trente Ans a été l'un des conflits les plus destructeurs de l'histoire européenne, marqué par une violence généralisée contre les civils et un niveau de destruction sans précédent. Cela a conduit à des changements dans la façon dont la guerre était menée, y compris l'utilisation croissante d'armées permanentes et de tactiques de siège.
* La politisation de la religion : Bien que la guerre ait commencé comme un conflit religieux, elle a finalement évolué vers une lutte pour le pouvoir politique. Cela a marqué une étape importante dans le processus de sécularisation de la politique européenne, où la religion est devenue un outil de légitimation politique plutôt qu'un moteur de conflit.


En fin de compte, la guerre de Trente Ans et le traité de Westphalie ont eu un impact profond sur la formation de l'État moderne et du système international, ce qui les rend d'une grande importance pour la science politique.
The Treaty of Westphalia in 1648 is often regarded as the moment when the concept of state sovereignty was formally recognised in international law. This treaty ended the Thirty Years' War in Europe and established a system of sovereign states, where each state had exclusive control over its territory and population.


Le traité de Westphalie en 1648 est souvent considéré comme le moment où le concept de souveraineté des États a été formellement reconnu dans le droit international. Ce traité a mis fin à la guerre de Trente Ans en Europe et a établi un système d'États souverains, où chaque État avait le contrôle exclusif sur son territoire et sa population.
State sovereignty has several implications for warfare and international politics:


La souveraineté des États a plusieurs implications pour la guerre et la politique internationale :
* Interstate warfare: In the Westphalian system, war is primarily a matter between states. This means that wars are generally declared by governments, fought by regular armies and governed by international laws and customs.
* The role of the nation state: The idea of the nation state implies that each state has the right to govern its own population without outside interference. This gives states the right to defend their territory and population, which can lead to conflict with other states.
* The right to war: State sovereignty also implies the right to declare war and to make peace. This means that states have the right to use force to defend their interests, whether or not they are in a position to do so.


* Les guerres interétatiques : Dans le système westphalien, la guerre est principalement une affaire entre États. Cela signifie que les guerres sont généralement déclarées par les gouvernements, menées par des armées régulières et régies par des lois et des coutumes internationales.
Public international law, in particular the law of war, focuses primarily on relations between sovereign states. It establishes a number of rules and principles that govern the behaviour of states in times of war. These rules include :
* Le rôle de l'État-nation : L'idée d'État-nation implique que chaque État a le droit de gouverner sa population sans ingérence extérieure. Cela donne aux États le droit de défendre leur territoire et leur population, ce qui peut conduire à des conflits avec d'autres États.
* Le droit à la guerre : La souveraineté des États implique également le droit de déclarer la guerre et de conclure la paix. Cela signifie que les États ont le droit de recourir à la force pour défendre leurs intérêts, bie


Le droit international public, en particulier le droit de la guerre, est principalement axé sur les relations entre États souverains. Il établit un certain nombre de règles et de principes qui régissent le comportement des États en temps de guerre. Parmi ces règles, on peut citer :
* Modern diplomacy: International law has played a key role in establishing diplomatic norms and procedures, including diplomatic immunity, diplomatic and consular relations, and treaty negotiations.
* State sovereignty: The principle of state sovereignty is fundamental to international law. This means that each state has the right to govern its own territory and conduct its international relations as it sees fit, provided it respects the rights of other states.
* The declaration of war: Traditionally, international law required a state to formally declare war before commencing hostilities. Although this practice has largely been abandoned, international law still requires states to respect the principles of just war, including proportionality and discrimination between combatants and non-combatants.
* The conclusion of war: International law also provides that wars must be ended by a peace treaty, which defines the terms of the end of hostilities and establishes a framework for the resolution of remaining disputes. This is important to ensure a peaceful transition to lasting peace after a conflict.


* La diplomatie moderne : Le droit international a joué un rôle clé dans l'établissement de normes et de procédures diplomatiques, y compris l'immunité diplomatique, les relations diplomatiques et consulaires, et les négociations de traités.
These rules are essential for maintaining order and stability in the international system. However, their application and observance can vary according to circumstances, and their violation can have serious consequences, including international sanctions and prosecution for war crimes.
* La souveraineté des États : Le principe de la souveraineté des États est fondamental en droit international. Cela signifie que chaque État a le droit de gouverner son propre territoire et de mener ses relations internationales comme il l'entend, à condition de respecter les droits des autres États.
* La déclaration de guerre : Traditionnellement, le droit international exigeait qu'un État déclare officiellement la guerre avant de commencer les hostilités. Bien que cette pratique ait été largement abandonnée, le droit international exige toujours que les États respectent les principes de la guerre juste, y compris la proportionnalité et la discrimination entre combattants et non-combattants.
* La conclusion de la guerre : Le droit international prévoit également que les guerres doivent être terminées par un traité de paix, qui définit les termes de la fin des hostilités et établit un cadre pour la résolution des différends restants. Cela est important pour assurer une transition pacifique vers une paix durable après un conflit.


Ces règles sont essentielles pour maintenir l'ordre et la stabilité dans le système international. Cependant, leur application et leur respect peuvent varier en fonction des circonstances, et leur violation peut avoir des conséquences graves, y compris des sanctions internationales et des poursuites pour crimes de guerre.
==Theorising war: approaches and key thinkers==
War, in the context of political science, has long been regarded as a natural extension of politics itself. This concept has been theorised by a number of influential thinkers over the centuries, including the famous Chinese military strategist Sun Tzu, who wrote The Art of War, a treatise on military strategy. In the Western context, philosophers such as Plato and Aristotle also considered politics to be an "art". For them, politics is the art of governing and taking decisions for the good of the city. In this sense, war can be seen as an extreme extension of this "art", when dialogue and negotiation fail and force becomes the principal means of resolving conflicts. From this point of view, war is not only an activity involving military strategies and tactics, but also a field that requires deep reflection and an understanding of the political and social issues at stake. This is why war is an important subject of study in political science, as it offers valuable insights into how societies manage conflict, authority and power.


==La théorisation de la guerre :  approches et penseurs clés==
The art of war, as conceptualised by historical figures such as Sun Tzu and Napoleon, is a complex game of strategy that combines respect for certain established norms with innovation and surprise. Napoleon, for example, often circumvented the conventions of war to surprise his enemies and gain a strategic advantage. In doing so, he not only demonstrated military genius, but also underlined the dynamic and unpredictable nature of war. Despite the existence of certain norms and rules, war is often defined by its unpredictability and its ability to exceed established expectations. This complex reality defies attempts to categorise war as a strictly regulated or completely chaotic phenomenon. Instead, war can be better understood as a phenomenon that oscillates between these two extremes, where strategy and surprise constantly coexist and interact.
La guerre, dans le contexte de la science politique, a longtemps été considérée comme une extension naturelle de la politique elle-même. Ce concept a été théorisé par plusieurs penseurs influents au fil des siècles, notamment le célèbre stratège militaire chinois Sun Tzu qui a écrit "L'Art de la Guerre", un traité sur la stratégie militaire. Dans le contexte occidental, des philosophes tels que Platon et Aristote ont également considéré la politique comme un "art". Pour eux, la politique est l'art de gouverner et de prendre des décisions pour le bien de la cité. En ce sens, la guerre peut être vue comme une extension extrême de cet "art", lorsque le dialogue et la négociation échouent et que la force devient le principal moyen de résoudre les conflits. Dans cette perspective, la guerre est non seulement une activité impliquant des stratégies et des tactiques militaires, mais aussi un domaine nécessitant une réflexion profonde et une compréhension des enjeux politiques et sociaux. C'est pourquoi la guerre est un sujet d'étude important en science politique, car elle offre un aperçu précieux de la façon dont les sociétés gèrent les conflits, l'autorité et le pouvoir.


L'art de la guerre, tel que conceptualisé par des figures historiques comme Sun Tzu et Napoléon, est un jeu de stratégie complexe qui combine le respect de certaines normes établies avec l'innovation et la surprise. Napoléon, par exemple, a souvent contourné les conventions de la guerre pour surprendre ses ennemis et obtenir un avantage stratégique. Ce faisant, il a non seulement fait preuve de génie militaire, mais a aussi souligné la nature dynamique et imprévisible de la guerre. Malgré l'existence de certaines normes et règles, la guerre est souvent définie par son imprévisibilité et sa capacité à dépasser les attentes établies. Cette réalité complexe défie les tentatives de catégoriser la guerre comme un phénomène strictement réglementé ou complètement chaotique. Au lieu de cela, la guerre peut être mieux comprise comme un phénomène qui oscille entre ces deux extrêmes, où la stratégie et la surprise coexistent et interagissent constamment.
War is framed by a number of norms and rules - be they international laws governing conduct in war, bilateral treaties between countries, or the unwritten rules of military engagement. These norms provide a structure and predictability to war, allowing the parties in conflict to predict (to some extent) the actions of the other. However, war also involves going beyond these norms. Whether out of necessity, strategy or desperation, parties to a conflict can and often will go beyond the established rules. This can take the form of guerrilla tactics, surprise attacks, the use of prohibited weapons, or even the direct violation of the laws of war. This tension between the norm and going beyond the norm is what makes war so unpredictable and, therefore, so difficult to study and understand. For political science and similar disciplines, this means that we must constantly adapt and reassess our understandings and theories of war to take account of this complex and changing reality.


La guerre est encadrée par un certain nombre de normes et de règles - que ce soit les lois internationales qui régissent la conduite en temps de guerre, les traités bilatéraux entre pays, ou les règles non écrites de l'engagement militaire. Ces normes fournissent une structure et une prévisibilité à la guerre, permettant aux parties en conflit de prévoir (dans une certaine mesure) les actions de l'autre. Cependant, la guerre implique aussi le dépassement de ces normes. Que ce soit par nécessité, par stratégie, ou par désespoir, les parties en conflit peuvent et vont souvent outrepasser les règles établies. Cela peut se traduire par des tactiques de guérilla, des attaques surprises, l'utilisation d'armes interdites, ou même la violation directe des lois de la guerre. Cette tension entre la norme et le dépassement de la norme est ce qui rend la guerre si imprévisible et, par conséquent, si difficile à étudier et à comprendre. Pour la science politique et d'autres disciplines similaires, cela signifie qu'il faut constamment s'adapter et réévaluer nos compréhensions et nos théories de la guerre pour tenir compte de cette réalité complexe et changeante.
It is important for the social sciences, and political science in particular, to recognise and explore this complexity. By treating war not only as a series of strategies and tactics, but also as a broader social, political and cultural phenomenon, researchers can gain a deeper and more nuanced understanding of the nature of war and its impact on human societies.


Il est important pour les sciences sociales, et en particulier pour la science politique, de reconnaître et d'explorer cette complexité. En traitant la guerre non seulement comme une suite de stratégies et de tactiques, mais aussi comme un phénomène social, politique et culturel plus large, les chercheurs peuvent acquérir une compréhension plus profonde et plus nuancée de la nature de la guerre et de son impact sur les sociétés humaines.
War poses major problems for philosophy and raises essential questions about the nature of human culture and consciousness. From a philosophical point of view, war can be analysed on several levels. For example, moral philosophy examines questions of justice and ethics in the context of war. What justifies the outbreak of war (jus ad bellum)? How should it be fought (jus in bello)? What are the moral obligations towards non-combatants or prisoners of war? These questions are often debated in the context of just war theory. War also raises profound questions about the nature of human culture and consciousness. Why do human societies resort to war? How does war influence culture, art, literature and other forms of human expression? How does war affect our understanding of ourselves and our place in the world? Political philosophy looks at the role of the state and power in war. What is the role of the state in declaring war and conducting hostilities? What is the role of the citizen in wartime? What is the relationship between war and sovereignty, or war and democracy? These questions are just some of the many ways in which war can be approached from a philosophical perspective. War, as a social and political phenomenon, is a complex reality that can be analysed and understood in a variety of ways through the prism of philosophy.


La guerre pose des problèmes majeurs en philosophie et soulève des questions essentielles sur la nature de la culture humaine et de la conscience. D'un point de vue philosophique, la guerre peut être analysée à plusieurs niveaux. Par exemple, la philosophie morale se penche sur les questions de justesse et d'éthique dans le contexte de la guerre. Qu'est-ce qui justifie le déclenchement d'une guerre (jus ad bellum)? Comment devrait-elle être menée (jus in bello)? Quelles sont les obligations morales envers les non-combattants ou les prisonniers de guerre? Ces questions sont souvent débattues dans le cadre de la théorie de la guerre juste. La guerre pose également des questions profondes sur la nature de la culture et de la conscience humaine. Pourquoi les sociétés humaines ont-elles recours à la guerre? Comment la guerre influence-t-elle la culture, l'art, la littérature et d'autres formes d'expression humaine? Comment la guerre affecte-t-elle notre compréhension de nous-mêmes et de notre place dans le monde? La philosophie politique, quant à elle, se penche sur le rôle de l'État et du pouvoir dans la guerre. Quel est le rôle de l'État dans la déclaration de guerre et la conduite des hostilités? Quel est le rôle du citoyen en temps de guerre? Quelle est la relation entre guerre et souveraineté, ou guerre et démocratie? Ces questions ne sont que quelques-unes des nombreuses façons dont la guerre peut être abordée d'un point de vue philosophique. La guerre, en tant que phénomène social et politique, est une réalité complexe qui peut être analysée et comprise de diverses manières à travers le prisme de la philosophie.
War is a phenomenon that goes far beyond military action. It can be analysed from a number of angles, including political philosophy, sociology, economics and psychology, among others. Political philosophy can address issues such as the moral justification of war (the just war theory, for example), the role of the state and sovereignty in conflict, or the impact of war on notions of freedom and human rights. From a sociological perspective, war can be analysed in terms of social interaction, the formation of groups and identities, or the impact on social structure and culture. We can also look at how war affects norms and values, and how it is perceived and understood by those who experience it. Economics can look at the impact of war on the economy ('total war' and the war economy, for example), or at the role of economic resources in the conduct and cause of war. Psychology can look at the impact of war on the human mind, whether in terms of combat stress, post-traumatic stress disorder, or the wider impact of war on attitudes and behaviour. War is a complex and multidimensional phenomenon that can be studied from many different angles, each bringing its own perspective and its own analytical tools.


La guerre est un phénomène qui dépasse largement le cadre de l'action militaire. Elle peut être analysée sous plusieurs angles, y compris la philosophie politique, la sociologie, l'économie, la psychologie, entre autres. La philosophie politique peut aborder des questions telles que la justification morale de la guerre (la théorie de la guerre juste, par exemple), le rôle de l'État et de la souveraineté dans les conflits, ou l'impact de la guerre sur les notions de liberté et de droits de l'homme. Du point de vue sociologique, la guerre peut être analysée en termes d'interaction sociale, de formation de groupes et d'identités, ou d'impact sur la structure sociale et la culture. On peut aussi s'interroger sur la manière dont la guerre affecte les normes et les valeurs, et comment elle est perçue et comprise par ceux qui la vivent. L'économie peut se pencher sur l'impact de la guerre sur l'économie (la "guerre totale" et l'économie de guerre, par exemple), ou sur le rôle des ressources économiques dans la conduite et la cause des guerres. La psychologie peut s'intéresser à l'impact de la guerre sur l'esprit humain, que ce soit en termes de stress de combat, de troubles de stress post-traumatique, ou de l'impact plus large de la guerre sur les attitudes et les comportements. La guerre est un phénomène complexe et multidimensionnel qui peut être étudié sous de nombreux angles différents, chacun apportant sa propre perspective et ses propres outils d'analyse.
===Hugo Grotius (1583-1645): Natural law and the foundations of just war===
[[Image:Michiel Jansz van Mierevelt - Hugo Grotius.jpg|right|150px|thumb|Hugo GrotiusPortrait par Michiel Jansz. van Mierevelt (1631).]]


===Hugo Grotius (1583-1645) : Le droit naturel et les fondements de la guerre juste===
Hugo Grotius, a 17th-century Dutch jurist, is widely recognised as one of the founders of modern international law. His work De Jure Belli ac Pacis (On the Law of War and Peace), first published in 1625, remains a major reference in the field. In this text, Grotius laid the foundations of the theory of "just war", which deals with the morality and legality of engaging in war and the conduct of war. He also laid the foundations for many principles of modern international law, such as national sovereignty and the equality of states. Grotius argued that certain moral principles apply even in times of war. For example, he insisted that non-combatant civilians should be spared as far as possible, and that cruel or inhuman treatment of prisoners of war was unacceptable. These ideas were revolutionary at the time and continue to influence the way we think about war today. The concepts of "just war" and "unjust war" are still widely debated in academic, political and military circles. They also play a key role in the development and application of international humanitarian law, which seeks to limit the effects of war and protect those who are most vulnerable in times of conflict.
[[Image:Michiel Jansz van Mierevelt - Hugo Grotius.jpg|right|150px|thumb|Hugo Grotius<br />Portrait par Michiel Jansz. van Mierevelt (1631).]]


Hugo Grotius, un juriste néerlandais du XVIIe siècle, est largement reconnu comme l'un des fondateurs du droit international moderne. Son ouvrage "De Jure Belli ac Pacis" (Sur le droit de la guerre et de la paix), publié pour la première fois en 1625, reste une référence majeure dans le domaine. Dans ce texte, Grotius a établi les fondements de la théorie de la "guerre juste", qui traite de la moralité et de la légalité de l'engagement dans une guerre et de la conduite de celle-ci. Il a également posé les bases pour de nombreux principes du droit international moderne, tels que la souveraineté nationale et l'égalité des États. Grotius a affirmé que certains principes moraux s'appliquent même en temps de guerre. Par exemple, il a insisté sur le fait que les civils non combattants devraient être épargnés autant que possible, et que les traitements cruels ou inhumains envers les prisonniers de guerre étaient inacceptables. Ces idées étaient révolutionnaires à l'époque et continuent d'influencer la manière dont nous pensons la guerre aujourd'hui. Les concepts de "guerre juste" et de "guerre injuste" sont encore largement débattus dans les cercles académiques, politiques et militaires. Ils jouent également un rôle clé dans le développement et l'application du droit international humanitaire, qui cherche à limiter les effets de la guerre et à protéger ceux qui sont les plus vulnérables en temps de conflit.
Hugo Grotius laid the foundations of the law of war, seeking to determine when a war could be considered 'just'. He highlighted two types of war that could be justified under international law:
* Defensive war: Grotius maintained that war waged in defence against external aggression was justified. This idea remains central to contemporary international law, where the right to self-defence is recognised as a fundamental principle.
* Coercive war: Grotius also thought that a war could be justified if it was waged to punish those who had violated the law. This idea is more controversial and more difficult to implement in practice. It raises complex questions about who has the right to judge whether the law has been broken, and what are the appropriate methods of punishment.


Hugo Grotius a établi les bases du droit de la guerre, cherchant à déterminer dans quels cas une guerre pourrait être considérée comme "juste". Il a mis en avant deux types de guerre qui pourraient être justifiées dans le cadre du droit international :
Although Grotius believed that these types of warfare could be justified, he also emphasised the importance of observing certain rules and ethical standards during the conduct of war, such as the prohibition on deliberately attacking non-combatants.


* La '''guerre défensive''' : Grotius soutenait que la guerre menée en défense contre une agression extérieure était justifiée. C'est une idée qui reste centrale dans le droit international contemporain, où le droit à l'autodéfense est reconnu comme un principe fondamental.
Grotius established that certain forms of war were illegitimate and unjust. In particular, he opposed wars of conquest. In his view, a nation state had no right to wage war with the aim of annexing or conquering other states. This principle is fundamental to contemporary international law, which prohibits the acquisition of territory by force. Although these principles were formulated centuries ago, they are still widely accepted today. The United Nations Charter, for example, explicitly prohibits the use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of another state. Such principles continue to guide the way in which international conflicts are managed and resolved.
* La '''guerre coercitive''' : Grotius pensait également qu'une guerre pourrait être justifiée si elle était menée pour punir ceux qui avaient violé le droit. Il s'agit d'une idée plus controversée et plus difficile à mettre en œuvre dans la pratique. Elle pose des questions complexes sur qui a le droit de juger de la violation du droit, et quelles sont les méthodes appropriées pour la punir.


Même si Grotius pensait que ces types de guerre pouvaient être justifiés, il soulignait également l'importance de respecter certaines règles et normes éthiques pendant la conduite de la guerre, comme l'interdiction de s'en prendre délibérément aux non-combattants.
For Hugo Grotius, the law of war and the law of peace are intimately linked. Indeed, the conception of war as a phenomenon that must be governed by certain legal rules and principles also suggests that there are certain conditions that must be met in order to establish a just and lasting peace. According to Grotius, an aggressor who violates the principles of the law of war must be held accountable. This could include sanctions or other forms of repercussions from other states. In this way, the law of war also serves to define and promote justice in peacetime. These ideas continue to be influential in contemporary international law. For example, the concept of the 'responsibility to protect' suggests that the international community has a duty to intervene when a state grossly violates the rights of its own citizens. Finally, it is interesting to note that Grotius' work laid the foundations for the later development of international humanitarian law, which seeks to limit the effects of war on people and property.


Grotius a établi que certaines formes de guerre étaient illégitimes et injustes. En particulier, il s'est opposé aux guerres de conquête. Selon lui, un État-nation n'a pas le droit de mener une guerre dans le but d'annexer ou de conquérir d'autres États. Ce principe est fondamental dans le droit international contemporain, qui interdit l'acquisition de territoire par la force. Nien que ces principes aient été formulés il y a des siècles, ils sont toujours largement acceptés aujourd'hui. La Charte des Nations Unies, par exemple, interdit explicitement l'usage de la force contre l'intégrité territoriale ou l'indépendance politique d'un autre État. De tels principes continuent à guider la manière dont les conflits internationaux sont gérés et résolus.
===Thomas Hobbes (1588-1679): The state of nature and war as a state of permanent conflict===


Pour Hugo Grotius, le droit de la guerre et le droit de la paix sont intimement liés. En effet, la conception de la guerre comme un phénomène qui doit être régi par certaines règles et principes juridiques suggère également qu'il y a certaines conditions qui doivent être remplies pour instaurer une paix juste et durable. Selon Grotius, un agresseur qui viole les principes du droit de la guerre doit être tenu pour responsable. Cela pourrait inclure des sanctions ou d'autres formes de répercussions de la part des autres États. De cette façon, le droit de la guerre sert également à définir et à promouvoir la justice en temps de paix. Ces idées continuent à être influentes dans le droit international contemporain. Par exemple, le concept de la "responsabilité de protéger" suggère que la communauté internationale a le devoir d'intervenir lorsqu'un État viole grossièrement les droits de ses propres citoyens. Enfin, il est intéressant de noter que le travail de Grotius a jeté les bases du développement ultérieur du droit international humanitaire, qui cherche à limiter les effets de la guerre sur les personnes et les biens.
[[Fichier:Leviathan.jpg|thumb|right|160px|The Leviathan, or Treatise on the Matter, Form and Power of an Ecclesiastical and Civil Republic, 1651.]]


===Thomas Hobbes (1588-1679) : L'état de nature et la guerre comme état de conflit permanent===
In his work "Leviathan", Thomas Hobbes reflects on human nature and the state of nature, which he sees as a state of perpetual war between all against all ("bellum omnium contra omnes"). According to Hobbes, without a strong central authority to maintain order, human life would be "lonely, poor, unpleasant, brutish and short". In Hobbes' state of nature, individuals are motivated by their own interests and fears. Competition for limited resources, distrust and the desire to gain reputation can lead to a state of constant conflict. To escape this state of war, Hobbes argues that individuals enter into a social contract in which they give up part of their freedom in favour of a sovereign, whom Hobbes calls Leviathan. The role of this sovereign is to maintain peace and order by exercising unchallengeable authority. Hobbes' ideas have had a major influence on modern political theory and the conception of the state. They emphasise the importance of a strong central power to prevent conflict and guarantee the security of citizens.
{{Article détaillé|La naissance du concept moderne de l’État}}
[[Fichier:Leviathan.jpg|thumb|right|160px|Le Léviathan, ou Traité de la matière, de la forme et du pouvoir d’une république ecclésiastique et civile, 1651.]]


Dans son œuvre "Le Léviathan", Thomas Hobbes propose une réflexion sur la nature humaine et l'état de nature qui, selon lui, est un état de guerre perpétuelle de tous contre tous ("bellum omnium contra omnes"). Selon Hobbes, sans une autorité centrale forte pour maintenir l'ordre, la vie humaine serait "solitaire, pauvre, désagréable, brutale et brève". Dans l'état de nature de Hobbes, les individus sont motivés par leurs propres intérêts et craintes. La compétition pour les ressources limitées, la méfiance et la volonté de gagner en réputation peuvent conduire à un état de conflit constant. Pour échapper à cet état de guerre, Hobbes argumente que les individus concluent un contrat social par lequel ils renoncent à une part de leur liberté en faveur d'un souverain, que Hobbes appelle le Léviathan. Le rôle de ce souverain est de maintenir la paix et l'ordre en exerçant une autorité incontestable. Ces idées de Hobbes ont eu une influence importante sur la théorie politique et la conception de l'État moderne. Elles soulignent l'importance d'un pouvoir central fort pour prévenir le conflit et garantir la sécurité des citoyens.
For Thomas Hobbes, the state of nature is characterised by chaos and uncertainty. According to Hobbes, in this state, individuals are free, but they are also constantly in danger because there is no law or central authority to regulate their behaviour. In the state of nature, individuals are guided by their own interests and by the fear of death. Their absolute freedom is therefore accompanied by constant competition for resources and security. This creates an unstable situation where danger and conflict are omnipresent - a situation Hobbes describes as a "war of all against all". To avoid this chaos, Hobbes proposes the idea of a social contract in which individuals voluntarily cede part of their freedom to an absolute sovereign. In exchange, this sovereign provides them with security and order, which is preferable to the uncertainty and violence of the state of nature.


Pour Thomas Hobbes, l'état de nature est marqué par le chaos et l'incertitude. Selon lui, dans cet état, les individus sont libres mais aussi constamment en danger car il n'existe aucune loi ou autorité centrale pour réguler leur comportement. Dans l'état de nature, les individus sont guidés par leurs propres intérêts et par la peur de la mort. Leur liberté absolue est donc accompagnée d'une compétition constante pour les ressources et la sécurité. Cela crée une situation instable où le danger et le conflit sont omniprésents - une situation que Hobbes décrit comme une "guerre de tous contre tous". Pour éviter ce chaos, Hobbes propose l'idée d'un contrat social par lequel les individus cèdent volontairement une partie de leur liberté à un souverain absolu. En échange, ce souverain leur fournit sécurité et ordre, ce qui est préférable à l'incertitude et à la violence de l'état de nature.
For Hobbes, the state is the guarantor of social peace, an institution necessary to avoid the "war of all against all" that reigns in the state of nature. In his view, the state is founded on a social contract, a form of agreement to which individuals consent in order to escape the chaos of the state of nature. In this contract, individuals agree to give up some of their freedoms and submit their will to that of the sovereign. In return, the sovereign is responsible for maintaining order, ensuring the safety of individuals and preserving the peace. For Hobbes, the sovereign's authority is absolute and indivisible, because it is the only way to ensure peace and prevent a return to the state of nature. This concept has had a major influence on political theory and continues to be debated today. For example, it raises questions about the right balance between security and liberty, or the role and limits of state power.


Pour Hobbes, l'État est le garant de la paix sociale, une institution nécessaire pour éviter la "guerre de tous contre tous" qui règne dans l'état de nature. Selon lui, l'État est fondé sur un contrat social, une forme d'accord auquel les individus consentent pour échapper au chaos de l'état de nature. Dans ce contrat, les individus acceptent de renoncer à une partie de leurs libertés et de soumettre leur volonté à celle du souverain. En retour, le souverain a la responsabilité de maintenir l'ordre, d'assurer la sécurité des individus et de préserver la paix. Pour Hobbes, l'autorité du souverain est absolue et indivisible, car c'est la seule façon d'assurer la paix et de prévenir le retour à l'état de nature. Cette conception a eu une influence majeure sur la théorie politique et continue de faire l'objet de débats aujourd'hui. Par exemple, elle soulève des questions sur le juste équilibre entre la sécurité et la liberté, ou sur le rôle et les limites du pouvoir étatique.
For Hobbes, one of the main responsibilities of the sovereign is to maintain the peace and security of society. To this end, the sovereign has the right to raise an army and to use force if necessary. Hobbes saw the army as a necessary institution to protect society against external and internal threats. Without a military force to ensure security, Hobbes believes that society would be in danger of falling back into the state of nature, where there is a "war of all against all". However, Hobbes also warned against the dangers of abuse of military power by the sovereign. He stresses the importance of the social contract, in which the sovereign is obliged to respect the rights and freedoms of individuals in exchange for their obedience.


Pour Hobbes, l'une des principales responsabilités du souverain est de maintenir la paix et la sécurité de la société. Pour cela, le souverain a le droit de lever une armée et d'exercer la force si nécessaire. Hobbes voit l'armée comme une institution nécessaire pour protéger la société contre les menaces extérieures et intérieures. Sans une force militaire pour assurer la sécurité, Hobbes pense que la société risquerait de retomber dans l'état de nature, où règne une "guerre de tous contre tous". Cependant, Hobbes met aussi en garde contre les dangers de l'abus de pouvoir militaire par le souverain. Il insiste sur l'importance du contrat social, dans lequel le souverain est tenu de respecter les droits et libertés des individus en échange de leur obéissance.
It is also important to note that Hobbes was writing in a specific historical context, that of seventeenth-century England, which was marked by civil war. His political theory therefore reflects the concerns of his time, but continues to provoke important discussions in contemporary political philosophy.


Il est également important de noter que Hobbes écrit dans un contexte historique spécifique, celui de l'Angleterre du XVIIe siècle, qui a été marquée par la guerre civile. Sa théorie politique reflète donc ses préoccupations de son époque, mais continue de susciter des discussions importantes dans la philosophie politique contemporaine.
===Immanuel Kant (1724-1804): Towards perpetual peace and the legitimacy of defensive wars===


===Emmanuel Kant (1724-1804) : Vers la paix perpétuelle et la légitimité des guerres défensives===
Immanuel Kant, in his essay "Project of Perpetual Peace" (1795), asks how lasting peace can be achieved between nations. His work on this subject has greatly influenced political philosophy and theories of international law. Kant proposes several ideas for achieving "perpetual peace". The first is that the "republican constitution" is the most peaceful form of government, because it gives the people the power to decide whether to go to war or not, and the people, being the ones who suffer the consequences of war, are less likely to choose it. The second idea is the "federation of free nations", a kind of league of nations, where states retain their sovereignty but agree to adhere to a common set of international laws to prevent conflict. Finally, Kant argued that perpetual peace could only be achieved when universal human rights were respected, which implied equal rights for all individuals, regardless of their nationality.
Immanuel Kant, dans son essai "Projet de paix perpétuelle" (1795), se demande comment on peut réaliser une paix durable entre les nations. Son travail sur ce sujet a grandement influencé la philosophie politique et les théories du droit international. Kant propose plusieurs idées pour atteindre une "paix perpétuelle". La première est que la "constitution républicaine" est le gouvernement le plus pacifique, car il donne au peuple le pouvoir de décider s'il veut aller à la guerre ou non, et le peuple, étant celui qui subit les conséquences de la guerre, est moins susceptible de la choisir. La deuxième idée est la "fédération des nations libres", une sorte de ligue des nations, où les États conservent leur souveraineté mais acceptent d'adhérer à un ensemble de lois internationales communes pour prévenir les conflits. Enfin, Kant soutient que la paix perpétuelle ne peut être atteinte que lorsque les droits universels de l'homme sont respectés, ce qui implique l'égalité des droits pour tous les individus, sans égard à leur nationalité.


Immanuel Kant soutenait que la paix ne peut être fondée sur l'émotion ou l'affect. Au contraire, elle doit être basée sur la rationalité. Pour lui, c'est la raison, et non l'émotion, qui peut inciter les hommes à rechercher et à accepter la paix. Cette approche est fondamentalement morale, car elle demande aux individus de privilégier le bien commun plutôt que leur propre intérêt personnel. Selon cette vision, la véritable paix ne peut être atteinte que lorsque les individus et les nations adoptent une approche rationnelle, en mettant en commun leurs différences et en travaillant ensemble pour le bien de tous. Cette vision implique une certaine mutualisation des différences et des conflits : au lieu de chercher à imposer sa propre volonté par la force, chaque partie doit chercher à comprendre et à respecter les perspectives des autres. C'est ce que Kant entendait par une "fédération de nations libres". En fin de compte, l'idée de Kant est que la paix perpétuelle n'est pas un simple rêve ou une idée romantique, mais un objectif qui peut être atteint par des moyens rationnels et moraux. Cette idée a eu une grande influence sur les théories modernes de la justice internationale et sur la conception des institutions internationales.
Immanuel Kant argued that peace cannot be based on emotion or affect. On the contrary, it must be based on rationality. For him, it is reason, not emotion, that can motivate people to seek and accept peace. This approach is fundamentally moral, because it asks individuals to put the common good before their own personal interests. According to this vision, true peace can only be achieved when individuals and nations adopt a rational approach, pooling their differences and working together for the common good. This vision implies a certain mutualisation of differences and conflicts: instead of seeking to impose their own will by force, each side must seek to understand and respect the perspectives of the others. This is what Kant meant by a "federation of free nations". Ultimately, Kant's idea is that perpetual peace is not just a dream or a romantic idea, but a goal that can be achieved by rational and moral means. This idea has had a major influence on modern theories of international justice and on the design of international institutions.


[[Image:Kant foto.jpg|thumb|left|100px|Portrait de Emmanuel Kant.]]
[[Image:Kant foto.jpg|thumb|right|150px|Portrait of Immanuel Kant.]]


Immanuel Kant a plaidé pour l'invention d'un droit international de la paix, reconnaissant la nécessité de gérer les relations de force entre les nations. Il a prôné que cette régulation est indispensable car les guerres sont inévitables. L'apport majeur de Kant réside dans son affirmation que le droit international public à construire ne devrait pas se baser sur le principe du "droit du plus fort". Au contraire, il doit être fondamentalement distinct et viser la paix plutôt que la guerre. C'est-à-dire, le droit international ne doit pas servir simplement à justifier les conflits ou à régir leur déroulement, mais plutôt à les prévenir et à favoriser la résolution pacifique des différends. Ce droit de la paix repose sur la reconnaissance de l'égalité souveraine des États et sur le respect des droits de l'homme, deux principes qui sont essentiels pour prévenir la guerre et promouvoir la paix. C'est en cela que l'approche de Kant a été révolutionnaire et a jeté les bases du droit international contemporain, qui met l'accent sur la prévention des conflits et la promotion de la paix durable.
Immanuel Kant argued for the invention of an international law of peace, recognising the need to manage power relations between nations. He argued that this regulation was essential because wars were inevitable. Kant's major contribution lies in his assertion that the public international law to be constructed should not be based on the principle of the "right of the strongest". On the contrary, it must be fundamentally distinct and aim at peace rather than war. In other words, international law should not simply serve to justify conflicts or to regulate their course, but rather to prevent them and to promote the peaceful resolution of disputes. This law of peace is based on the recognition of the sovereign equality of States and respect for human rights, two principles that are essential to preventing war and promoting peace. It is in this respect that Kant's approach was revolutionary and laid the foundations for contemporary international law, which emphasises conflict prevention and the promotion of lasting peace.


Immanuel Kant, dans son essai intitulé "Projet de paix perpétuelle", a présenté un plan pour établir la paix et éviter les guerres. C'est une réflexion structurée en trois niveaux:
Immanuel Kant, in his essay entitled "Project of Perpetual Peace", presented a plan for establishing peace and avoiding wars. It is a reflection structured on three levels:


# Droit de politique interne : Selon Kant, pour atteindre une paix durable, chaque État doit adopter une constitution républicaine. En d'autres termes, il faut assurer un gouvernement démocratique qui respecte les droits de l'homme et la loi. Cela aiderait à résoudre les conflits internes de manière pacifique et démocratique.
# Internal political law: According to Kant, to achieve lasting peace, every state must adopt a republican constitution. In other words, it must ensure a democratic government that respects human rights and the law. This would help to resolve internal conflicts peacefully and democratically.
# Droit international interfédéral/interétatique : Une fois que la paix est établie à l'intérieur des États, elle peut être élargie à l'ensemble des relations internationales. Pour cela, Kant propose la création d'une "fédération des nations libres", qui serait un groupe d'États unis par des traités de paix mutuels et engagés à résoudre leurs différends de manière non-violente.
# International inter-federal/inter-state law: Once peace has been established within states, it can be extended to international relations as a whole. To this end, Kant proposes the creation of a "federation of free nations", which would be a group of states united by mutual peace treaties and committed to resolving their differences non-violently.
# Droit international d’hospitalité : Ce niveau représente la vision cosmopolite de Kant. Il s'agit d'un principe qui implique le respect des étrangers et la possibilité d'avoir des relations pacifiques avec eux. Selon Kant, chaque individu a le droit de visiter un autre pays, tant qu'il se comporte pacifiquement, et chaque pays a le devoir d'accueillir les visiteurs étrangers. Ce principe établit la base pour un droit international cosmopolite.
# International law of hospitality: This level represents Kant's cosmopolitan vision. It is a principle that implies respect for foreigners and the possibility of peaceful relations with them. According to Kant, every individual has the right to visit another country, as long as they behave peacefully, and every country has a duty to welcome foreign visitors. This principle establishes the basis for cosmopolitan international law.


Ainsi, la vision kantienne de la paix perpétuelle est fondée sur une approche multiscalaire qui nécessite des changements à la fois internes (au niveau national) et externes (au niveau international). Il s'agit d'une conception qui continue à influencer les débats contemporains sur le droit international et la paix mondiale.
Thus, the Kantian vision of perpetual peace is based on a multiscalar approach that requires both internal (national) and external (international) changes. It is a conception that continues to influence contemporary debates on international law and world peace.


La philosophie de Kant est fondamentalement axée sur la liberté et le respect des droits de l'homme. Il voyait la guerre comme le résultat ultime de systèmes politiques qui refusent la liberté, violent les droits de l'homme et sont dominés par des autorités autocratiques ou dictatoriales. Pour Kant, la paix durable ne peut être atteinte que par la construction de systèmes politiques qui respectent les droits de l'homme et qui sont démocratiques et républicains. Le concept de "souveraineté limitée" est un élément clé de cette vision, car il implique que même si un État est souverain, il ne doit pas avoir le droit d'opprimer sa population ou de violer les droits de l'homme. De plus, pour éviter les conflits entre les États, Kant a proposé l'idée d'une "fédération des nations libres". Selon cette idée, les États souverains doivent consentir librement à limiter leurs actions et à respecter le droit international pour maintenir la paix mondiale. Ainsi, la philosophie de Kant met en avant l'idée que la paix ne peut être garantie que par l'adhésion à des principes démocratiques, le respect des droits de l'homme, et la coopération internationale dans le cadre d'un droit international respecté par tous.
Kant's philosophy is fundamentally based on freedom and respect for human rights. He saw war as the ultimate result of political systems that denied freedom, violated human rights and were dominated by autocratic or dictatorial authorities. For Kant, lasting peace can only be achieved by building political systems that respect human rights and are democratic and republican. The concept of "limited sovereignty" is a key element of this vision, as it implies that even if a state is sovereign, it must not have the right to oppress its population or violate human rights. Furthermore, to avoid conflict between states, Kant proposed the idea of a "federation of free nations". According to this idea, sovereign states must freely agree to limit their actions and respect international law in order to maintain world peace. Thus, Kant's philosophy puts forward the idea that peace can only be guaranteed by adherence to democratic principles, respect for human rights, and international cooperation within the framework of international law respected by all.


===Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel (1770-1831) : La dialectique de la guerre et le progrès historique===
===Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel (1770-1831): The dialectics of war and historical progress===
[[Image:Hegel portrait by Schlesinger 1831.jpg|thumb|160px|Portrait de Hegel par Schlesinger (1831).]]
[[Image:Hegel portrait by Schlesinger 1831.jpg|thumb|160px|Portrait of Hegel by Schlesinger (1831).]]


Pour Hegel, la guerre est un phénomène qui est profondément enraciné dans la nature humaine et la dynamique de l'histoire. Elle est le résultat de la dialectique historique et de l'interaction de la thèse et de l'antithèse, où la guerre agit comme un agent de changement et de progression dans l'histoire. Hegel considère la guerre comme un moment de la manifestation de la volonté nationale. Selon lui, c'est un moment où la conscience nationale se renforce et se cristallise. La guerre peut être vue comme une expression de la volonté libre et subjective de la nation, c'est-à-dire comme une extension de la volonté de la nation d'affirmer et de préserver son existence. Cependant, la guerre, pour Hegel, n'est pas une fin en soi. Elle est plutôt une étape nécessaire et tragique de l'histoire humaine, qui finalement conduit à une plus grande conscience de soi et à la liberté. Ainsi, malgré le chaos et la destruction qu'elle engendre, la guerre est aussi un moyen de faire avancer l'histoire vers une réalisation plus complète de la liberté humaine.
For Hegel, war is a phenomenon that is deeply rooted in human nature and the dynamics of history. It is the result of historical dialectics and the interplay of thesis and antithesis, in which war acts as an agent of change and progression in history. Hegel sees war as a moment in the manifestation of the national will. In his view, it is a moment when national consciousness is strengthened and crystallised. War can be seen as an expression of the nation's free and subjective will, i.e. as an extension of the nation's will to assert and preserve its existence. For Hegel, however, war is not an end in itself. Rather, it is a necessary and tragic stage in human history, which ultimately leads to greater self-awareness and freedom. Thus, despite the chaos and destruction it engenders, war is also a means of advancing history towards a fuller realisation of human freedom.


Selon la philosophie hégélienne, la guerre a un rôle essentiel à jouer dans l'affirmation de la subjectivité des individus et dans l'évolution de l'histoire humaine. Hegel soutient que la guerre, aussi destructrice soit-elle, joue un rôle crucial dans la consolidation d'une communauté, car elle force les individus à unir leurs efforts pour survivre. Paradoxalement, la guerre peut aussi aider à forger une identité nationale ou collective plus forte, car elle crée un "autre" commun contre lequel une communauté doit se battre. Dans cette perspective, la guerre peut être perçue comme un facteur de cohésion sociale et politique. La guerre, en tant que confrontation de la volonté humaine, permet également aux individus de faire face à leur mortalité et de se définir en opposition à la mort. C'est en ce sens que Hegel prétend que la guerre est une affirmation de la subjectivité. Néanmoins, bien que Hegel voie un rôle pour la guerre dans le développement de l'histoire humaine, cela ne signifie pas qu'il la glorifie ou la promeut. Au contraire, pour Hegel, la guerre est une manifestation tragique des contradictions de l'histoire humaine, une contradiction qui peut finalement conduire à une plus grande réalisation de la liberté humaine.
According to Hegelian philosophy, war has an essential role to play in the affirmation of individual subjectivity and in the evolution of human history. Hegel argues that war, destructive though it may be, plays a crucial role in the consolidation of a community, as it forces individuals to unite their efforts in order to survive. Paradoxically, war can also help to forge a stronger national or collective identity, as it creates a common 'other' against which a community must fight. From this perspective, war can be seen as a factor of social and political cohesion. War, as a confrontation of the human will, also enables individuals to confront their mortality and define themselves in opposition to death. It is in this sense that Hegel claims that war is an affirmation of subjectivity. However, although Hegel sees a role for war in the development of human history, this does not mean that he glorifies or promotes it. On the contrary, for Hegel, war is a tragic manifestation of the contradictions of human history, a contradiction that can ultimately lead to a greater realisation of human freedom.


René Girard, un philosophe et anthropologue français, a développé une théorie connue sous le nom de "théorie du bouc émissaire" pour expliquer la violence humaine. Selon Girard, les conflits sociaux surviennent en raison de la rivalité mimétique - un désir de posséder les mêmes choses que les autres, qui devient contagieux au sein d'une société. Au fur et à mesure que les tensions montent, la société cherche à restaurer l'ordre en se tournant contre un "bouc émissaire" - généralement une personne ou un groupe marginalisé. En se réunissant pour punir le bouc émissaire, la communauté est en mesure de canaliser sa violence et de rétablir un sentiment de cohésion sociale.
René Girard, a French philosopher and anthropologist, developed a theory known as the 'scapegoat theory' to explain human violence. According to Girard, social conflicts arise because of mimetic rivalry - a desire to possess the same things as others, which becomes contagious within a society. As tensions rise, society seeks to restore order by turning against a 'scapegoat' - usually a marginalised person or group. By coming together to punish the scapegoat, the community is able to channel its violence and re-establish a sense of social cohesion.


Girard a également appliqué sa théorie à la guerre, arguant que la guerre peut jouer le même rôle que le sacrifice du bouc émissaire dans la réconciliation des tensions sociales. Comme Hegel, Girard voit la guerre comme un moyen par lequel une communauté peut sublimer ses différences internes pour faire face à une menace extérieure commune. Néanmoins, la perspective de Girard, tout comme celle d'Hegel, ne constitue pas une justification de la guerre. Au contraire, elle offre une analyse de la façon dont la violence peut devenir un moyen d'instaurer l'ordre social, tout en mettant en évidence le coût humain tragique de cette dynamique.
Girard also applied his theory to war, arguing that war can play the same role as scapegoating in reconciling social tensions. Like Hegel, Girard sees war as a means by which a community can sublimate its internal differences to face a common external threat. Nevertheless, Girard's perspective, like Hegel's, does not justify war. On the contrary, it offers an analysis of how violence can become a means of establishing social order, while highlighting the tragic human cost of this dynamic.


===Niccolò Machiavel (1469-1527) : Le réalisme politique et les stratégies de la guerre===
===Niccolò Machiavelli (1469-1527): Political realism and the strategies of war===
{{Article détaillé|La Renaissance italienne}}
[[Fichier:Santi di Tito - Niccolo Machiavelli's portrait.jpg|thumb|right|150px|Portrait posthume de Machiavel par Santi di Tito, au Palazzo Vecchio de Florence.]]


Niccolò Machiavel, un politicien et écrivain italien de la Renaissance, est connu pour son œuvre Le Prince, qui est souvent considérée comme un guide pragmatique pour le leadership politique. Il y dépeint l'exercice du pouvoir, non pas comme il devrait être selon des principes idéaux ou éthiques, mais comme il est réellement dans la pratique. Dans Le Prince, Machiavel soutient que les dirigeants doivent être prêts à agir immoralement si cela est nécessaire pour maintenir leur pouvoir et assurer la stabilité de leur État. Par exemple, il suggère que, bien qu'il soit préférable pour un prince d'être aimé et craint, s'il doit choisir entre les deux, il est plus sûr d'être craint. Concernant la guerre, Machiavel a une approche très réaliste. Il insiste sur le fait que les dirigeants doivent toujours se préparer à la guerre et être prêts à la mener si nécessaire. Pour lui, la guerre est un outil politique, nécessaire pour maintenir et élargir le pouvoir. Machiavel était aussi un fervent défenseur des milices de citoyens. Il croyait que les citoyens qui avaient un intérêt direct à la défense de leur patrie feraient de meilleurs soldats que les mercenaires ou les troupes levées à l'étranger. Cette idée se reflète dans son autre œuvre majeure, Discours sur la première décade de Tite-Live.
[[Fichier:Santi di Tito - Niccolo Machiavelli's portrait.jpg|thumb|right|150px|Posthumous portrait of Machiavelli by Santi di Tito, in Florence's Palazzo Vecchio.]]


Machiavel est célèbre pour sa déclaration que "la fin justifie les moyens". Cela signifie qu'il croyait que les actions d'un leader peuvent être justifiées par les résultats qu'elles produisent, même si ces actions sont en elles-mêmes moralement répréhensibles. Machiavel croyait que la politique et la moralité étaient des domaines distincts. Dans la politique, il soutenait que le succès et la survie de l'État étaient les objectifs les plus importants. Par conséquent, un leader pourrait devoir prendre des décisions difficiles, voire immorales, pour atteindre ces objectifs. La guerre, par exemple, est considérée comme immorale par beaucoup, mais pour Machiavel, elle pourrait être justifiée si elle était nécessaire pour protéger l'État. En outre, Machiavel considérait l'art de la guerre comme une compétence essentielle pour un leader. Il soutenait qu'un prince qui néglige l'art de la guerre met en péril son royaume et sa propre sécurité. Selon lui, même en temps de paix, un leader
Niccolò Machiavelli, an Italian Renaissance politician and writer, is best known for his work The Prince, which is often regarded as a pragmatic guide to political leadership. In it, he depicts the exercise of power, not as it should be according to ideal or ethical principles, but as it actually is in practice. In The Prince, Machiavelli argues that rulers must be prepared to act immorally if necessary to maintain their power and ensure the stability of their state. For example, he suggests that although it is better for a prince to be loved and feared, if he has to choose between the two, it is safer to be feared. Machiavelli's approach to war is very realistic. He insisted that rulers must always be prepared for war and ready to wage it if necessary. For him, war was a political tool, necessary to maintain and extend power. Machiavelli was also a fervent advocate of citizens' militias. He believed that citizens who had a direct interest in defending their homeland would make better soldiers than mercenaries or troops raised abroad. This idea is reflected in his other major work, Discourse on the First Decade of Titus Livius.


L'adjectif "machiavélique" est souvent utilisé pour décrire une personne qui est prête à utiliser des moyens trompeurs ou immoraux pour atteindre ses objectifs. C'est une référence à l'idée de Machiavel que "la fin justifie les moyens". Cela signifie que, pour une personne machiavélique, l'objectif est plus important que les actions prises pour l'atteindre. Donc, peu importe si les actions sont trompeuses, malhonnêtes, voire cruelles, tant qu'elles permettent d'atteindre l'objectif. C'est une interprétation assez négative et simplifiée de la philosophie de Machiavel. Ses écrits étaient beaucoup plus complexes et nuancés, et il ne prônait pas nécessairement un comportement immoral en toutes circonstances. Cependant, c'est ainsi que son nom est souvent utilisé dans le langage courant..
Machiavelli is famous for his statement that "the end justifies the means". This means that he believed that a leader's actions can be justified by the results they produce, even if those actions are in themselves morally reprehensible. Machiavelli believed that politics and morality were distinct domains. In politics, he held that the success and survival of the state were the most important objectives. Consequently, a leader might have to take difficult, even immoral, decisions to achieve these goals. War, for example, is considered immoral by many, but for Machiavelli it could be justified if necessary to protect the state. Furthermore, Machiavelli considered the art of war to be an essential skill for a leader. He argued that a prince who neglects the art of war jeopardises his kingdom and his own security. According to him, even in times of peace, a leader.


Niccolò Machiavel, dans son œuvre "Le Prince", met l'accent sur l'importance de la guerre pour un dirigeant. Pour lui, le dirigeant idéal doit toujours être prêt pour la guerre, à la fois en termes de préparation physique et mentale. Machiavel ne glorifie pas la guerre en soi, mais considère que l'art de la guerre est une compétence nécessaire à tout bon dirigeant. Il affirme que l'un des rôles principaux d'un dirigeant est de protéger l'État et ses citoyens, ce qui peut nécessiter le recours à la guerre. Machiavel écrit dans un contexte historique où l'Italie était divisée en de nombreuses cités-états souvent en conflit. Par conséquent, la guerre était une réalité quotidienne et inévitable. Cependant, cela ne signifie pas qu'il valorise la guerre en tant que telle, mais plutôt qu'il reconnaît et analyse le rôle que la guerre joue dans la politique. Néanmoins, ces perspectives ont souvent été mal interprétées ou simplifiées au fil des siècles, conduisant à une perception de Machiavel comme un stratège sans scrupules prônant l'usage de la guerre à des fins personnelles ou politiques.
The adjective 'Machiavellian' is often used to describe a person who is prepared to use deceitful or immoral means to achieve their goals. It is a reference to Machiavelli's idea that "the end justifies the means". This means that, for a Machiavellian person, the objective is more important than the actions taken to achieve it. So it doesn't matter if the actions are deceitful, dishonest or even cruel, as long as they achieve the objective. This is a rather negative and simplified interpretation of Machiavelli's philosophy. His writings were much more complex and nuanced, and he did not necessarily advocate immoral behaviour in all circumstances. However, this is how his name is often used in everyday language.


===Antoine-Henri de Jomini (1779-1869) : La stratégie militaire et les principes de la guerre===
Niccolò Machiavelli, in his work The Prince, emphasises the importance of war for a ruler. For him, the ideal leader must always be ready for war, both in terms of physical and mental preparation. Machiavelli did not glorify war per se, but considered the art of war to be a necessary skill for any good ruler. He argues that one of the main roles of a ruler is to protect the state and its citizens, which may require the use of war. Machiavelli was writing in a historical context in which Italy was divided into numerous city-states that were often in conflict with each other. Consequently, war was a daily and inevitable reality. However, this does not mean that he values war as such, but rather that he recognises and analyses the role that war plays in politics. Nevertheless, these perspectives have often been misinterpreted or simplified over the centuries, leading to a perception of Machiavelli as an unscrupulous strategist advocating the use of war for personal or political gain.
Antoine-Henri Jomini est un général et théoricien militaire suisse qui a vécu de 1779 à 1869. Jomini a servi dans les armées de Napoléon et a ensuite rejoint l'armée russe. Il est surtout connu pour ses écrits sur la stratégie et la tactique militaires. Son œuvre la plus connue, "Précis de l'art de la guerre" (1838), est considérée comme l'un des textes fondateurs de la stratégie militaire moderne. Jomini y expose ses idées sur les principes fondamentaux de la guerre, parmi lesquels l'importance de la concentration des forces, de la rapidité d'action et de la liberté de manœuvre. Jomini a également identifié ce qu'il considérait comme étant les éléments clés d'une bonne stratégie militaire, à savoir : l'attaque de l'ennemi là où il est le plus faible, la concentration des forces sur un point décisif, la liberté de manœuvre et une chaîne de commandement claire et efficace. Les théories de Jomini ont influencé de nombreux stratèges militaires au cours du XIXe siècle et du début du XXe siècle, et son travail continue d'être étudié dans les académies militaires du monde entier.


Antoine-Henri Jomini est largement reconnu comme l'un des théoriciens les plus influents de la stratégie militaire. Dans son "Précis de l'art de la guerre", il définit la stratégie comme l'art de bien diriger la masse des forces armées, en les concentrant sur un point décisif. Pour Jomini, la stratégie consiste à déterminer quand, où et avec quelle force attaquer l'ennemi. C'est une question de planification et de préparation qui nécessite une connaissance approfondie de la géographie, de la logistique et des ressources disponibles. Jomini a identifié plusieurs principes de base pour la conduite efficace de la guerre, parmi lesquels la concentration des forces sur un point décisif, la rapidité d'action, et l'économie de forces. Il a aussi introduit la notion de "ligne d'opérations", qui est le chemin le plus direct et le plus sûr entre une armée et sa base de ravitaillement, et a souligné l'importance de la logistique dans la réussite des opérations militaires.
===Antoine-Henri de Jomini (1779-1869): Military strategy and the principles of warfare===
Antoine-Henri Jomini was a Swiss general and military theorist who lived from 1779 to 1869. Jomini served in Napoleon's armies and later joined the Russian army. He is best known for his writings on military strategy and tactics. His best-known work, "Précis de l'art de la guerre" (1838), is considered one of the founding texts of modern military strategy. In it, Jomini set out his ideas on the fundamental principles of warfare, including the importance of concentrating forces, speed of action and freedom of manoeuvre. Jomini also identified what he considered to be the key elements of a good military strategy: attacking the enemy where he is weakest, concentrating forces on a decisive point, freedom of manoeuvre and a clear and effective chain of command. Jomini's theories influenced many military strategists throughout the 19th and early 20th centuries, and his work continues to be studied at military academies around the world.


Les éléments ci-dessous font tous partie de l'art de la guerre au sens le plus large. Ils reflètent plusieurs aspects cruciaux de la stratégie et de la tactique militaires.
Antoine-Henri Jomini is widely recognised as one of the most influential theorists of military strategy. In his "Précis de l'art de la guerre", he defined strategy as the art of properly directing the mass of armed forces, concentrating them on a decisive point. For Jomini, strategy consisted of determining when, where and with what force to attack the enemy. It was a matter of planning and preparation that required an in-depth knowledge of geography, logistics and available resources. Jomini identified several basic principles for the effective conduct of warfare, including the concentration of forces on a decisive point, speed of action and economy of forces. He also introduced the notion of the "line of operations", which is the most direct and secure route between an army and its supply base, and emphasised the importance of logistics in the success of military operations.


# Le positionnement des troupes : où et comment les forces sont déployées sur le terrain peut avoir un impact significatif sur le succès d'une campagne militaire. Les commandants doivent prendre en compte le terrain, les routes de communication et de ravitaillement, et la position de l'ennemi.
The elements below are all part of the art of war in the broadest sense. They reflect several crucial aspects of military strategy and tactics.
# L'analyse in situ des forces en présence : comprendre les forces et faiblesses de ses propres troupes et de celles de l'ennemi est crucial pour planifier une stratégie efficace.
# Les modalités de l'attaque des points faibles : identifier et exploiter les faiblesses de l'ennemi est une partie fondamentale de la stratégie militaire.
# Les conditions tactiques de la poursuite de l'ennemi : après une victoire, il peut être avantageux de poursuivre l'ennemi pour maximiser le désordre et minimiser leur capacité à se regrouper et à contre-attaquer.
# Les conditions de la maîtrise du mouvement : contrôler les mouvements de ses propres troupes et, dans la mesure du possible, ceux de l'ennemi, est un autre aspect clé de la stratégie militaire.
# L'intégration du concept de mobilité et de surprise : la capacité à se déplacer rapidement et à surprendre l'ennemi peut souvent être un facteur décisif dans la guerre.
# La ruse, comme les fausses attaques, l'apparence de décrochements et les contre-attaques : utiliser la tromperie pour désorienter et déstabiliser l'ennemi peut également être une tactique efficace.


Tous ces aspects sont essentiels pour comprendre et mener efficacement une campagne militaire.
# Troop positioning: where and how forces are deployed on the ground can have a significant impact on the success of a military campaign. Commanders must take into account the terrain, communication and supply routes, and the enemy's position.
# In situ analysis of the forces present: understanding the strengths and weaknesses of your own troops and those of the enemy is crucial to planning an effective strategy.
# How to attack weak points: identifying and exploiting the enemy's weaknesses is a fundamental part of military strategy.
# The tactical conditions for pursuing the enemy: after a victory, it can be advantageous to pursue the enemy to maximise disorder and minimise their ability to regroup and counter-attack.
# Controlling movement: controlling the movement of one's own troops and, as far as possible, those of the enemy, is another key aspect of military strategy.
# Incorporating the concept of mobility and surprise: the ability to move quickly and surprise the enemy can often be a decisive factor in warfare.
# Ruse, such as false attacks, the appearance of stalling and counter-attacks: using deception to disorientate and destabilise the enemy can also be an effective tactic.


Les idées de Jomini sur la stratégie militaire ont été formulées dans le contexte des guerres napoléoniennes, et qu'elles ont été influencées par l'observation des campagnes de Napoléon. Elles continuent d'être étudiées et appliquées dans les théories militaires contemporaines.
All these aspects are essential to understanding and conducting an effective military campaign.


===Carl von Clausewitz (1780-1831) : La nature politique de la guerre et la trinité de la violence===
Jomini's ideas on military strategy were formulated in the context of Napoleon's wars, and were influenced by observation of Napoleon's campaigns. They continue to be studied and applied in contemporary military theory.
Carl von Clausewitz, dans son célèbre ouvrage "De la guerre", soutient que "la guerre est la continuation de la politique par d'autres moyens". Pour lui, la guerre n'est jamais une fin en soi, mais un outil que les États utilisent pour réaliser des objectifs politiques. C'est un moyen de contraindre l'ennemi à accepter la volonté de l'État.


La question des "guerres sans fin", telle que celle menée par les États-Unis en Afghanistan pendant deux décennies, est souvent vue comme un signe d'échec à définir et à réaliser des objectifs politiques clairs. Cela peut être dû à plusieurs facteurs, tels que des objectifs politiques changeants, des objectifs trop ambitieux ou mal définis, ou encore des obstacles imprévus à la réalisation de ces objectifs. Il est aussi important de rappeler que la perspective de Clausewitz sur la guerre est essentiellement celle de conflits interétatiques conventionnels. De nombreux conflits modernes impliquent des acteurs non étatiques, tels que des groupes terroristes ou des milices, et peuvent être influencés par des facteurs tels que les divisions ethniques ou religieuses, qui ne rentrent pas facilement dans le cadre de la guerre comme politique par d'autres moyens. Ces guerres peuvent sembler "sans fin" parce qu'elles ne sont pas menées de manière à réaliser des objectifs politiques clairs, mais sont plutôt le résultat de profondes divisions sociales, d'inégalités, de pauvreté, et d'autres facteurs structurels.
===Carl von Clausewitz (1780-1831): The political nature of war and the trinity of violence===
Carl von Clausewitz, in his famous book "On War", argues that "war is the continuation of politics by other means". For him, war is never an end in itself, but a tool that states use to achieve political objectives. It is a means of forcing the enemy to accept the will of the state.


Le système westphalien, mis en place par les traités de Westphalie en 1648, est basé sur le principe de la souveraineté des États-nations. Dans ce système, la guerre est traditionnellement considérée comme un moyen de résoudre les conflits entre États en vue de restaurer la paix. Quand on parle de "guerre sans fin", cela désigne généralement des conflits qui ne semblent pas se diriger vers une résolution pacifique. Cela peut être dû à une multitude de raisons, comme des objectifs politiques mal définis, l'absence d'un ennemi clairement défini (comme dans le cas de la "guerre contre le terrorisme"), des obstacles imprévus à la paix, ou des conflits qui échappent au contrôle des États. L'idée que "le temps de la guerre est un temps d'inversion pour revenir vers la paix" reflète la croyance que la guerre est un état temporaire et exceptionnel, et que l'objectif final doit toujours être la restauration de la paix. Cela souligne l'importance de l'engagement diplomatique, des négociations et des compromis pour résoudre les conflits.
The issue of "endless wars", such as the one waged by the United States in Afghanistan for two decades, is often seen as a sign of failure to define and achieve clear political objectives. This can be due to a number of factors, such as shifting political objectives, overly ambitious or ill-defined goals, or unforeseen obstacles to achieving those goals. It is also important to remember that Clausewitz's perspective on war is essentially that of conventional interstate conflict. Many modern conflicts involve non-state actors, such as terrorist groups or militias, and may be influenced by factors such as ethnic or religious divisions, which do not easily fit into the framework of war as politics by other means. These wars can seem "endless" because they are not fought to achieve clear political objectives, but rather are the result of deep social divisions, inequality, poverty and other structural factors.


[[Image:Clausewitz.jpg|thumb|right|185px|Carl von Clausewitz.]]
The Westphalian system, established by the Treaties of Westphalia in 1648, is based on the principle of the sovereignty of nation states. In this system, war is traditionally seen as a means of resolving conflicts between states with a view to restoring peace. When we speak of "endless war", we are generally referring to conflicts that do not appear to be heading towards a peaceful resolution. This may be due to a multitude of reasons, such as ill-defined political objectives, the absence of a clearly defined enemy (as in the case of the "war on terror"), unforeseen obstacles to peace, or conflicts beyond the control of states. The idea that "the time of war is a time of reversal to return to peace" reflects the belief that war is a temporary and exceptional state, and that the final objective must always be the restoration of peace. This underlines the importance of diplomatic engagement, negotiation and compromise in resolving conflicts.[[Image:Clausewitz.jpg|thumb|right|185px|Carl von Clausewitz.]]


Dans l’esprit de la guerre westphalienne, la guerre est subordonnée au politique. La fameuse citation de Clausewitz "la guerre est la continuation de la politique par d'autres moyens" insiste sur le fait que la guerre est un outil utilisé par les États pour atteindre leurs objectifs politiques. Il considérait la guerre comme une action rationnelle, dirigée et contrôlée par l'État, visant à atteindre des objectifs politiques déterminés. Cependant, dans le contexte actuel, l'idée que la guerre est menée sous le contrôle et à l'instigation de l'État est parfois mise en doute. En effet, avec l'émergence de groupes non étatiques, de conflits asymétriques, de terrorisme transnational et de cyberattaques, la guerre ne se limite plus aux seuls États. Dans ces cas, la fin des hostilités peut être plus difficile à atteindre, car les acteurs impliqués peuvent ne pas avoir des objectifs politiques clairs ou partagés qui pourraient être résolus par la négociation ou la diplomatie. De plus, l'absence de structures étatiques ou institutionnelles stables dans certaines régions peut entraver la conclusion de la guerre. Dans de tels contextes, la guerre peut devenir un état perpétuel, avec des niveaux fluctuants de violence, plutôt qu'une "parenthèse" temporaire.  
In the spirit of Westphalian warfare, war is subordinate to politics. Clausewitz's famous quote "war is the continuation of politics by other means" emphasises that war is a tool used by states to achieve their political objectives. He saw war as a rational action, directed and controlled by the state, aimed at achieving specific political objectives. However, in today's context, the idea that war is waged under the control and at the instigation of the state is sometimes called into question. With the emergence of non-state groups, asymmetric conflicts, transnational terrorism and cyber attacks, war is no longer confined to states. In these cases, an end to hostilities may be more difficult to achieve, as the actors involved may not have clear or shared political objectives that could be resolved through negotiation or diplomacy. In addition, the absence of stable state or institutional structures in some regions may hinder the conclusion of war. In such contexts, war can become a perpetual state, with fluctuating levels of violence, rather than a temporary 'parenthesis'.  


Les conflits dans des régions comme le Darfour ont souvent débouché sur une forme de privatisation de la guerre, où le rôle traditionnel de l'État dans la conduite de la guerre est remplacé ou complété par une multitude d'acteurs non étatiques. Cela peut inclure des milices locales, des groupes rebelles, des sociétés militaires privées et même des acteurs internationaux. L'une des conséquences de cette évolution est la fragmentation de l'autorité et de la souveraineté. Au lieu d'un État central qui contrôle l'ensemble du territoire et exerce un monopole de la violence légitime, il y a une multitude d'acteurs qui contrôlent différentes parties du territoire et qui mènent des actions de violence indépendamment les uns des autres. Cela complique énormément les efforts pour mettre fin à la guerre et instaurer une paix durable. Il est difficile de parvenir à un accord de paix lorsque de nombreux acteurs ont des revendications contradictoires et où il n'y a pas d'autorité centrale pour imposer ou garantir l'accord. De plus, la privatisation de la guerre peut entraîner des niveaux élevés de violence, en particulier à l'encontre des civils, car les acteurs non étatiques peuvent ne pas respecter les lois de la guerre de la même manière que les États. Dans ce contexte, les approches traditionnelles de la résolution des conflits peuvent ne pas être suffisantes. Il peut être nécessaire d'adopter des approches plus complexes et nuancées, qui tiennent compte de la multitude d'acteurs impliqués et de leurs intérêts et motivations divergents. Cela peut inclure des efforts pour renforcer la gouvernance locale, promouvoir la réconciliation communautaire et garantir la responsabilité pour les violations des droits de l'homme.
Conflicts in regions such as Darfur have often led to a form of privatisation of war, where the traditional role of the state in the conduct of war is replaced or supplemented by a multitude of non-state actors. This can include local militias, rebel groups, private military companies and even international actors. One of the consequences of this development is the fragmentation of authority and sovereignty. Instead of a central state controlling the whole territory and exercising a monopoly on legitimate violence, there is a multitude of actors controlling different parts of the territory and carrying out violent actions independently of each other. This greatly complicates efforts to end the war and establish a lasting peace. It is difficult to reach a peace agreement when many actors have conflicting claims and there is no central authority to impose or guarantee the agreement. Furthermore, the privatisation of war can lead to high levels of violence, particularly against civilians, as non-state actors may not respect the laws of war in the same way as states. In this context, traditional approaches to conflict resolution may not be sufficient. It may be necessary to adopt more complex and nuanced approaches, which take into account the multitude of actors involved and their divergent interests and motivations. This may include efforts to strengthen local governance, promote community reconciliation and ensure accountability for human rights violations.


Ll'idée de Clausewitz que "la guerre est la continuation de la politique par d'autres moyens" signifie que la guerre est fondamentalement un outil politique. Elle est utilisée pour atteindre des objectifs politiques que les méthodes diplomatiques n'ont pas réussi à réaliser. Par conséquent, la fin de la guerre implique le retour à des moyens politiques pour résoudre des conflits. Cette perspective souligne l'importance de la gouvernance politique dans la gestion des conflits et dans la transition de la guerre à la paix. Si la politique ne peut pas reprendre le dessus, le conflit peut s'éterniser et la guerre peut devenir un état permanent. Cela peut se produire dans les États dits "faillis", où les institutions politiques sont trop faibles pour imposer l'ordre et résoudre les conflits de manière pacifique. Cela peut également se produire dans des situations où les parties au conflit ont perdu confiance dans les mécanismes politiques et ne croient plus en la possibilité d'une résolution pacifique. La guerre continue ainsi jusqu'à ce qu'une solution politique soit trouvée - que ce soit par des négociations de paix, une médiation internationale, ou la mise en place de nouvelles structures politiques. Dans ce sens, Clausewitz souligne l'importance cruciale de la politique dans la résolution des conflits et le retour à la paix.
Clausewitz's idea that "war is the continuation of politics by other means" means that war is fundamentally a political tool. It is used to achieve political objectives that diplomatic methods have failed to achieve. Consequently, the end of war implies a return to political means of resolving conflicts. This perspective underlines the importance of political governance in conflict management and in the transition from war to peace. If politics cannot regain the upper hand, conflict can drag on and war can become a permanent state. This can happen in so-called "failed states", where political institutions are too weak to impose order and resolve conflicts peacefully. It can also occur in situations where the parties to the conflict have lost confidence in the political mechanisms and no longer believe in the possibility of a peaceful resolution. The war thus continues until a political solution is found - whether through peace negotiations, international mediation or the establishment of new political structures. In this sense, Clausewitz emphasises the crucial importance of politics in resolving conflicts and restoring peace.


Clausewitz souligne l'importance primordiale de maintenir le contrôle politique sur l'action militaire. Pour lui, la guerre est un outil que le politique peut et doit utiliser pour atteindre ses objectifs. C'est le politique qui donne à la guerre son but et sa raison d'être, et qui détermine donc quand elle commence, quand elle se termine, et comment elle est menée. Quand la guerre échappe au contrôle du politique, les conséquences peuvent être catastrophiques. Nous risquons de sombrer dans un état de conflit perpétuel, où la violence et le chaos règnent, et où la logique de la guerre remplace la logique de la politique. Ce genre de situation est souvent observé dans les zones de conflit prolongé, où les institutions politiques sont affaiblies ou absentes, et où la guerre devient une façon de vivre plutôt qu'un moyen d'atteindre des objectifs politiques spécifiques. C'est pourquoi il est si crucial que le politique conserve son ascendant sur la guerre. Sans un contrôle politique efficace, la guerre peut devenir autonome et incontrôlable, avec des conséquences dévastatrices pour la société et l'humanité.
Clausewitz emphasised the vital importance of maintaining political control over military action. For him, war was a tool that politics could and should use to achieve its objectives. It is politics that gives war its purpose and raison d'être, and therefore determines when it begins, when it ends and how it is fought. When war gets out of hand, the consequences can be catastrophic. We risk descending into a state of perpetual conflict, where violence and chaos reign, and the logic of war replaces the logic of politics. This kind of situation is often seen in areas of protracted conflict, where political institutions are weak or absent, and where war becomes a way of life rather than a means of achieving specific political objectives. This is why it is so crucial for politics to maintain control over war. Without effective political control, war can become autonomous and uncontrollable, with devastating consequences for society and humanity.


C'est une perspective intéressante et parfois paradoxale. Dans certaines situations, la guerre peut servir d'outil de négociation. Lorsque le dialogue politique échoue ou est bloqué, la guerre peut créer une nouvelle dynamique et forcer les parties à reconsidérer leurs positions. Par exemple, une partie peut utiliser la menace ou l'emploi de la force pour augmenter sa position de négociation et pousser ses adversaires à faire des concessions. En outre, la guerre peut parfois exposer des vérités difficiles et révéler des problèmes profondément enracinés qui doivent être résolus pour parvenir à une paix durable. Les conflits peuvent mettre en lumière les inégalités, les abus de pouvoir et les injustices qui ont été ignorés ou cachés, ouvrant ainsi la voie à leur résolution dans le cadre d'un processus de paix.
It's an interesting and sometimes paradoxical perspective. In certain situations, war can be used as a negotiating tool. When political dialogue fails or is blocked, war can create a new dynamic and force the parties to reconsider their positions. For example, one party may use the threat or use of force to increase its negotiating position and push its opponents to make concessions. In addition, war can sometimes expose difficult truths and reveal deep-rooted problems that need to be resolved if lasting peace is to be achieved. Conflicts can highlight inequalities, abuses of power and injustices that have been ignored or hidden, paving the way for their resolution as part of a peace process.


===Maurice Davie (1893-1964) : Les transformations contemporaines de la guerre et les nouveaux défis===
===Maurice Davie (1893-1964): Contemporary transformations in warfare and new challenges===
Maurice R. Davie est un sociologue reconnu pour ses travaux sur la guerre et le conflit dans les sociétés humaines. Dans son article "The Evolution of War" de 1930, Davie s'intéresse à l'origine de la guerre dans les sociétés primitives.
Maurice R. Davie is a sociologist renowned for his work on war and conflict in human societies. In his 1930 article "The Evolution of War", Davie examined the origins of war in primitive societies.


Il identifie plusieurs causes pour lesquelles ces sociétés pourraient entrer en guerre :
He identifies several reasons why these societies might go to war:


# La concurrence vitale pour la survie du groupe : Dans un environnement où les ressources sont limitées, les groupes peuvent entrer en conflit pour la nourriture, l'eau, le territoire et d'autres ressources vitales. Ces guerres étaient souvent une question de survie, avec le groupe gagnant garantissant son accès à ces ressources.
# Vital competition for group survival: In an environment where resources are limited, groups may come into conflict over food, water, territory and other vital resources. These wars were often a matter of survival, with the winning group guaranteeing its access to these resources.
# Les différends religieux : Les croyances religieuses étaient souvent profondément ancrées dans les sociétés primitives, et tout conflit d'interprétations ou de croyances pourrait entraîner la guerre. De plus, dans certaines cultures, il y avait la croyance que la victoire dans la guerre était une preuve du favoritisme divin, ce qui pouvait encourager davantage le conflit.
# Religious disputes: Religious beliefs were often deeply rooted in primitive societies, and any clash of interpretations or beliefs could lead to war. Furthermore, in some cultures, there was a belief that victory in war was proof of divine favouritism, which could further encourage conflict.
# La vengeance de sang : Dans de nombreuses cultures primitives, une offense contre un membre du groupe était souvent vengée par le meurtre ou la guerre. Ce cycle de vengeance pourrait entraîner une série de conflits qui se perpétuent au fil du temps.
# Blood vengeance: In many primitive cultures, an offence against a member of the group was often avenged by murder or war. This cycle of revenge could lead to a series of conflicts perpetuated over time.
# La gloire : Dans certaines sociétés, la gloire et l'honneur gagnés par le combat étaient très appréciés. Les guerriers pourraient chercher la guerre dans le but de gagner un statut social plus élevé et un prestige.
# Glory: In some societies, glory and honour gained through battle were highly prized. Warriors might seek war in order to gain higher social status and prestige.


Bien que ces facteurs aient pu jouer un rôle dans les sociétés primitives, ils sont également présents dans de nombreux conflits contemporains.
While these factors may have played a role in primitive societies, they are also present in many contemporary conflicts.


===Marvin Harris (1927-2001) : Approches anthropologiques de la guerre et ses motivations socioculturelles===
===Marvin Harris (1927-2001): Anthropological approaches to war and its socio-cultural motivations===


[[Fichier:MarvinHarris.jpg|thumb|right|Marvin Harris.]]
[[Fichier:MarvinHarris.jpg|thumb|right|Marvin Harris.]]


Marvin Harris (1927-2001) était un anthropologue américain et une figure de proue dans le développement du matérialisme culturel, un cadre théorique qui explique les pratiques culturelles en termes de problèmes pratiques de l'existence humaine, tels que la production de nourriture et d'autres biens matériels, plutôt qu'en termes d'idées ou de valeurs abstraites.  
Marvin Harris (1927-2001) was an American anthropologist and a leading figure in the development of cultural materialism, a theoretical framework that explains cultural practices in terms of the practical problems of human existence, such as the production of food and other material goods, rather than in terms of abstract ideas or values.  


Harris is well known for his work in explaining social phenomena using a materialist approach. He argued that societal characteristics such as social structure, culture and even religious beliefs are largely shaped by practical considerations, particularly those related to subsistence and economics. Harris's best-known works include "The Rise of Anthropological Theory" (1968), "Cannibals and Kings" (1977) and "Cows, Pigs, Wars and Witches: The Riddles of Culture" (1974). In these and other works, he explored a wide range of subjects - from the sacred status of cows in India to the practice of cannibalism in prehistoric societies - always with the aim of showing how cultural practices that may seem strange or irrational are in fact sensible adaptations to material conditions. Harris's work has been hugely influential and continues to be widely read and debated in the field of anthropology.


Harris est bien connu pour son travail d'explication des phénomènes sociaux à l'aide d'une approche matérialiste. Il a soutenu que les caractéristiques sociétales telles que la structure sociale, la culture et même les croyances religieuses sont largement façonnées par des considérations pratiques, en particulier celles liées à la subsistance et à l'économie. Les ouvrages les plus connus de Harris comprennent "The Rise of Anthropological Theory" (1968), "Cannibals and Kings" (1977) et "Cows, Pigs, Wars and Witches : Les énigmes de la culture" (1974). Dans ces ouvrages et dans d'autres, il explore des sujets très variés - du statut sacré des vaches en Inde à la pratique du cannibalisme dans les sociétés préhistoriques - toujours dans le but de montrer comment des pratiques culturelles qui peuvent sembler étranges ou irrationnelles sont en fait des adaptations sensées aux conditions matérielles. Les travaux de Harris ont eu une grande influence et continuent d'être largement lus et débattus dans le domaine de l'anthropologie.
In his 1974 book, "Cows, Pigs, Wars and Witches: The Riddles of Culture", Marvin Harris proposed several theories concerning the origin of war in primitive societies.
# War as solidarity: Harris suggests that war can serve as a means of strengthening group solidarity and identity. In a situation of conflict, individuals in a group can feel more united, which reinforces the group's legitimacy.
# War as play: This theory proposes that war can have a playful dimension in certain primitive societies. In fact, in many cultures, war games or games that imitate combat are common. Modern sporting activities can be seen as a continuation of this 'playful' dimension of war.
# War is part of human nature: This theory proposes that war is an inevitable aspect of human nature. It suggests that conflict and confrontation are part of human nature and that war is simply an extension of that nature.
# War as a continuation of politics: This theory is similar to that proposed by Clausewitz, according to which war is a continuation of politics by other means. In this case, war is seen as a political tool used to achieve political objectives.


Marvin Harris a proposé dans son ouvrage de 1974, "Cows, Pigs, Wars and Witches: The Riddles of Culture", plusieurs théories concernant l'origine de la guerre dans les sociétés primitives.
It is important to note that these theories are not mutually exclusive and that they may all play a role in the origin of war in primitive societies.
# La guerre comme solidarité : Harris suggère que la guerre peut servir de moyen pour renforcer la solidarité et l'identité d'un groupe. Dans une situation de conflit, les individus d'un groupe peuvent se sentir plus unis, ce qui renforce la légitimité du groupe.
# La guerre comme jeu : Cette théorie propose que la guerre peut avoir une dimension ludique dans certaines sociétés primitives. En fait, dans de nombreuses cultures, les jeux de guerre ou les jeux qui imitent le combat sont courants. On peut penser à des activités sportives modernes qui peuvent être perçues comme une continuation de cette dimension "ludique" de la guerre.
# La guerre propre à la nature humaine : Cette théorie propose que la guerre est un aspect inévitable de la nature humaine. Elle suggère que les conflits et les affrontements font partie de la nature humaine et que la guerre est simplement une extension de cette nature.
# La guerre comme continuation de la politique : Cette théorie est similaire à celle proposée par Clausewitz, selon laquelle la guerre est la continuation de la politique par d'autres moyens. Dans ce cas, la guerre est perçue comme un outil politique utilisé pour atteindre des objectifs politiques.


Il est important de noter que ces théories ne sont pas mutuellement exclusives et qu'elles peuvent toutes jouer un rôle dans l'origine de la guerre dans les sociétés primitives.
==War and peace: a legal issue and one of international governance==


==La guerre et la paix : un objet juridique et de gouvernance internationale==
===The Law of War or the Law of The Hague===
The Treaty of Westphalia, signed in 1648, marked the end of the Thirty Years' War in Europe. It also laid the foundations for the modern international system of sovereign states. The treaty recognised that each state had the right to govern its territory without outside interference, an idea that is now fundamental to international law.


===Le droit de la guerre ou droit de La Haye===
The "Law of the Hague" refers to a series of international conventions that were negotiated at The Hague in the Netherlands in the late 19th and early 20th centuries. These conventions established rules for the conduct of warfare, including the treatment of prisoners of war and the protection of civilians. They form an important part of international humanitarian law.
Le traité de Westphalie, signé en 1648, a marqué la fin de la guerre de Trente Ans en Europe. Il a également jeté les bases du système international moderne d'États souverains. Le traité a reconnu que chaque État avait le droit de gouverner son territoire sans ingérence extérieure, une idée qui est maintenant fondamentale dans le droit international.


Le "droit de la Haye" fait référence à une série de conventions internationales qui ont été négociées à La Haye, aux Pays-Bas, à la fin du 19ème et au début du 20ème siècle. Ces conventions ont établi des règles pour la conduite de la guerre, notamment le traitement des prisonniers de guerre et la protection des civils. Elles constituent une partie importante du droit international humanitaire.
Japan's attack on Pearl Harbor in December 1941 was considered a flagrant breach of the rules of war, as it was launched without a prior declaration of war. The attack led to the United States' entry into the Second World War. Subsequently, at the Tokyo Trials (the Pacific equivalent of the Nuremberg Trials), several Japanese leaders and military personnel were convicted of war crimes committed during the war, including the attack on Pearl Harbor.


L'attaque de Pearl Harbor par le Japon en décembre 1941 a été considérée comme une rupture flagrante des règles de la guerre, car elle a été lancée sans déclaration de guerre préalable. Cette attaque a conduit à l'entrée des États-Unis dans la Seconde Guerre mondiale. Par la suite, lors des procès de Tokyo (équivalent des procès de Nuremberg, mais pour la zone du Pacifique), plusieurs dirigeants et militaires japonais ont été condamnés pour des crimes de guerre commis pendant la guerre, y compris l'attaque sur Pearl Harbor.
International humanitarian law (IHL), often referred to as the law of war, lays down specific rules to be observed in wartime. It defines what is permitted and what is prohibited during armed conflict, regardless of the motive for the conflict. Here are some of the main obligations:


Le droit international humanitaire (DIH), souvent appelé droit de la guerre, établit des règles spécifiques à respecter en temps de guerre. Il définit ce qui est permis et ce qui est interdit lors d'un conflit armé, quel que soit le motif du conflit. Voici quelques-unes des principales obligations :
* Distinction: parties to a conflict must always distinguish between combatants and civilians. Attacks may only be directed against combatants and military objectives, never against civilians or civilian objects.
* Proportionality: even in the case of a legitimate attack against a military target, it is prohibited to launch an attack which could cause excessive civilian casualties in relation to the concrete and direct military advantage anticipated.
* Precaution: all feasible precautions must be taken to avoid or minimise civilian casualties in an attack against a military target.


* Distinction : les parties à un conflit doivent toujours faire la distinction entre les combattants et les civils. Les attaques ne peuvent être dirigées que contre les combattants et les objectifs militaires, jamais contre les civils ou les biens de caractère civil.
IHL also offers special protection to persons who are not, or are no longer, taking part in hostilities, such as prisoners of war and the wounded. They have the right to be treated humanely, without discrimination. It is important to note that IHL applies to all parties to a conflict, regardless of the motive for the conflict or whether it is considered "just" or "unjust".
* Proportionnalité : même lors d'une attaque légitime contre une cible militaire, il est interdit de lancer une attaque qui pourrait causer des pertes civiles excessives par rapport à l'avantage militaire concret et direct attendu.
* Précaution : toutes les précautions possibles doivent être prises pour éviter ou minimiser les pertes civiles lors d'une attaque contre une cible militaire.


Le DIH offre également une protection spéciale aux personnes qui ne participent pas ou ne participent plus aux hostilités, comme les prisonniers de guerre et les blessés. Ils ont le droit d'être traités humainement, sans discrimination. Il est important de noter que le DIH s'applique à toutes les parties à un conflit, quel que soit le motif du conflit ou qui est considéré comme "juste" ou "injuste".
International humanitarian law (IHL) sets limits on the conduct of war and provides for sanctions against those who break these rules. For example, IHL explicitly prohibits the use of chemical or biological weapons, the use of bullets that expand or deform easily in the human body, and any attack that would cause excessive damage to civilians or the natural environment. In addition, countries that violate these rules can be held accountable for their actions. This may involve economic sanctions, diplomatic restrictions or even legal action. Individuals can also be held responsible for their actions during armed conflict and can be prosecuted for war crimes, crimes against humanity or genocide. The United Nations Security Council plays an important role in the application of IHL. It has the power to impose sanctions, recommend military action and refer cases to the International Criminal Court for investigation and prosecution.


Le droit international humanitaire (DIH) définit des limites à la conduite de la guerre et prévoit des sanctions pour ceux qui enfreignent ces règles. Par exemple, le DIH interdit explicitement l'utilisation d'armes chimiques ou biologiques, l'utilisation de balles qui s'épanouissent ou se déforment facilement dans le corps humain, et toute attaque qui causerait des dommages excessifs aux civils ou à l'environnement naturel. De plus, les pays qui violent ces règles peuvent être tenus pour responsables de leurs actions. Cela peut impliquer des sanctions économiques, des restrictions diplomatiques ou même des poursuites judiciaires. Les individus peuvent également être tenus pour responsables de leurs actions lors d'un conflit armé et peuvent être poursuivis pour crimes de guerre, crimes contre l'humanité ou génocide. Le Conseil de sécurité des Nations Unies joue un rôle important dans l'application du DIH. Il a la capacité d'imposer des sanctions, de recommander des actions militaires et de renvoyer des cas à la Cour pénale internationale pour enquête et poursuite.
===International humanitarian law or Geneva law===


===Le droit international humanitaire ou droit de Genève===
International humanitarian law (IHL), often referred to as Geneva law, aims primarily to protect people who are not, or are no longer, taking part in hostilities, including civilians, the wounded, the sick and prisoners of war. It also aims to restrict the use of certain methods and means of warfare. It derives mainly from the Geneva Conventions of 1949 and their Additional Protocols, which laid down rules for the protection of non-combatants in wartime. For example, the Geneva Conventions lay down rules for the treatment of prisoners of war, prohibit the use of torture, and protect civilians in the event of military occupation. The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) plays an essential role in the promotion and application of IHL. It is partly thanks to the initiative of this organisation that IHL exists today.  
{{Article détaillé|L’individu en tant que sujet du droit international}}
 
Le droit international humanitaire (DIH), souvent appelé droit de Genève, vise principalement à protéger les personnes qui ne participent pas ou ne participent plus aux hostilités, y compris les civils, les blessés, les malades et les prisonniers de guerre. Ce droit vise également à restreindre l'usage de certaines méthodes et moyens de guerre. Il est principalement issu des Conventions de Genève de 1949 et leurs Protocoles additionnels, qui ont posé les règles pour la protection des non-combattants en temps de guerre. Par exemple, les Conventions de Genève établissent les règles pour le traitement des prisonniers de guerre, interdisent l'usage de torture, et protègent les civils en cas d'occupation militaire. Le Comité international de la Croix-Rouge (CICR) joue un rôle essentiel dans la promotion et l'application du DIH. C'est en partie grâce à l'initiative de cette organisation que le DIH existe aujourd'hui.  
   
   
Les distinctions entre civils et combattants, ainsi qu'entre combattants et prisonniers de guerre, sont des éléments clés du droit international humanitaire. Ces distinctions sont essentielles pour protéger les personnes qui ne participent pas (ou plus) directement aux hostilités.  
Distinctions between civilians and combatants, and between combatants and prisoners of war, are key elements of international humanitarian law. These distinctions are essential to protect people who are not (or are no longer) taking a direct part in hostilities.  


* Les combattants sont les membres des forces armées d'une partie à un conflit qui participent directement aux hostilités. Les combattants ont le droit de participer directement aux hostilités, ce qui signifie qu'ils ne peuvent être poursuivis pour avoir participé aux combats. Cependant, ils sont également des cibles légitimes pour l'autre partie.
* Combatants are members of the armed forces of a party to a conflict who take a direct part in hostilities. Combatants have the right to take a direct part in hostilities, which means that they cannot be prosecuted for taking part in the fighting. However, they are also legitimate targets for the other side.
* Les civils sont les personnes qui ne participent pas directement aux hostilités. Ils sont protégés contre les attaques, à moins et jusqu'à ce qu'ils participent directement aux hostilités.
* Civilians are people who are not taking a direct part in hostilities. They are protected from attack unless and until they take a direct part in hostilities.
* Les prisonniers de guerre sont des combattants qui ont été capturés par l'ennemi. Ils ont droit à un certain nombre de protections en vertu de la troisième Convention de Genève, y compris le droit de ne pas être torturés, le droit de correspondre avec leur famille, et le droit de ne pas être poursuivis pour avoir participé légitimement aux hostilités.
* Prisoners of war are combatants who have been captured by the enemy. They are entitled to a number of protections under the Third Geneva Convention, including the right not to be tortured, the right to correspond with their families, and the right not to be prosecuted for taking a legitimate part in hostilities.


Le respect de ces distinctions est essentiel pour réduire les souffrances inutiles en temps de guerre.
Respect for these distinctions is essential to reduce unnecessary suffering in wartime.


En théorie, la sortie de guerre est souvent déterminée par un traité de paix ou un accord de cessez-le-feu, mais il n'y a pas de cadre juridique international précis qui régit comment un conflit devrait se terminer. La notion de "jus post bellum", ou droit après la guerre, est un concept émergent en droit international qui cherche à établir des principes éthiques et juridiques pour la transition de la guerre à la paix. Il comprend des questions telles que la responsabilité de reconstruire après un conflit, le jugement et la punition des crimes de guerre, et le rétablissement des droits de l'homme et de l'État de droit. L'idée est d'assurer une transition juste et durable vers la paix, tout en tenant compte des droits des victimes et des besoins des sociétés post-conflit. Cependant, en 2023, il n'y a pas encore de consensus international sur ce que devrait être le "jus post bellum", et il reste un domaine actif de recherche et de débat.
In theory, the end of a war is often determined by a peace treaty or ceasefire agreement, but there is no precise international legal framework governing how a conflict should end. The notion of "jus post bellum", or law after war, is an emerging concept in international law that seeks to establish ethical and legal principles for the transition from war to peace. It includes issues such as the responsibility to rebuild after conflict, the prosecution and punishment of war crimes, and the restoration of human rights and the rule of law. The idea is to ensure a just and sustainable transition to peace, while taking into account the rights of victims and the needs of post-conflict societies. However, in 2023, there is still no international consensus on what "jus post bellum" should be, and it remains an active area of research and debate.


Il y a deux concepts fondamentaux qui sous-tendent l'ensemble de la gouvernance de la sécurité internationale et du droit international.
There are two fundamental concepts that underpin the whole governance of international security and international law.


L'universalité suggère que certaines normes et principes sont applicables à tous, indépendamment de la culture, de la religion, de l'ethnie, de la nationalité, etc. Cela est particulièrement pertinent pour les droits de l'homme, qui sont considérés comme universels et inaliénables.
Universality suggests that certain norms and principles are applicable to all, regardless of culture, religion, ethnicity, nationality, etc. This is particularly relevant to human rights and international humanitarian law. This is particularly relevant to human rights, which are considered universal and inalienable.


L'idée d'humanité signifie que tous les êtres humains appartiennent à une communauté globale et partagent une certaine dignité et des droits fondamentaux. Cela signifie également que certains actes sont si graves et inhumains qu'ils constituent une attaque contre la communauté humaine dans son ensemble. Ces actes peuvent inclure le génocide, les crimes de guerre, les crimes contre l'humanité, et la torture.
The idea of humanity means that all human beings belong to a global community and share a certain dignity and fundamental rights. It also means that certain acts are so grave and inhuman that they constitute an attack on the human community as a whole. These acts may include genocide, war crimes, crimes against humanity, and torture.


Ces concepts fournissent une base pour le droit international humanitaire, qui protège les individus en temps de guerre, et le droit pénal international, qui permet la poursuite et la condamnation des individus responsables de graves violations de ces normes.
These concepts provide a basis for international humanitarian law, which protects individuals in times of war, and international criminal law, which allows for the prosecution and conviction of individuals responsible for serious violations of these norms.


Après la Première Guerre mondiale, la Société des Nations a été créée dans le but de maintenir la paix et la sécurité internationales en favorisant le dialogue et la coopération entre les nations. Cependant, l'incapacité de la Société des Nations à prévenir la Seconde Guerre mondiale a conduit à sa dissolution et à la création de l'Organisation des Nations Unies (ONU) en 1945. L'ONU, avec son Conseil de sécurité, est devenue l'institution principale pour la résolution des conflits et la promotion de la paix à l'échelle internationale. Le Conseil de sécurité est chargé de maintenir la paix et la sécurité internationales, et a la capacité de prendre des décisions juridiquement contraignantes. Les concepts de peacekeeping (maintien de la paix) et de peacemaking (consolidation de la paix) ont également été introduits. Les opérations de maintien de la paix de l'ONU impliquent le déploiement de troupes, d'observateurs militaires ou de policiers civils pour aider à maintenir la paix et la sécurité dans les zones de conflit. Le peacemaking, d'autre part, vise à résoudre les conflits par la médiation, la négociation et d'autres moyens pacifiques. Ces initiatives et institutions, bien que parfois critiquées pour leur inefficacité ou leur manque de pouvoir coercitif, représentent des efforts importants pour promouvoir l'universalité et l'humanité dans le système international.
After the First World War, the League of Nations was created with the aim of maintaining international peace and security by promoting dialogue and cooperation between nations. However, the inability of the League of Nations to prevent the Second World War led to its dissolution and the creation of the United Nations (UN) in 1945. The UN, with its Security Council, has become the principal institution for resolving conflicts and promoting peace on an international scale. The Security Council is responsible for maintaining international peace and security, and has the power to take legally binding decisions. The concepts of peacekeeping and peacemaking have also been introduced. UN peacekeeping operations involve the deployment of troops, military observers or civilian police to help maintain peace and security in conflict zones. Peacemaking, on the other hand, aims to resolve conflicts through mediation, negotiation and other peaceful means. These initiatives and institutions, although sometimes criticised for their ineffectiveness or lack of coercive power, represent important efforts to promote universality and humanity in the international system.


=Les guerres des partisans : une nouvelle réalité=
=The partisan wars: a new reality=
Ce type de guerre est souvent une réponse à une force militaire supérieure, où les forces conventionnelles ne pourraient pas s'opposer efficacement à l'ennemi. Les partisans ont souvent l'avantage du terrain et de la connaissance locale, ce qui leur permet de se déplacer et de se cacher efficacement. Cependant, leurs actions peuvent aussi mener à des représailles sévères contre les populations civiles par les forces qu'ils combattent. La guerre de partisans est caractérisée par des tactiques de guérilla qui reposent sur une connaissance profonde du terrain, sur la mobilité, la surprise et l'initiative. Par rapport aux forces conventionnelles, les partisans ne se battent pas dans le but de tenir des positions ou de contrôler des territoires, mais plutôt de désorganiser, de harceler et d'affaiblir l'ennemi.  
This type of warfare is often a response to a superior military force, where conventional forces could not effectively oppose the enemy. Partisans often have the advantage of terrain and local knowledge, which enables them to move and hide effectively. However, their actions can also lead to severe reprisals against civilian populations by the forces they are fighting. Partisan warfare is characterised by guerrilla tactics based on in-depth knowledge of the terrain, mobility, surprise and initiative. Compared with conventional forces, partisans do not fight to hold positions or control territory, but rather to disorganise, harass and weaken the enemy.  


Les tactiques utilisées en guerre de partisans peuvent inclure :  
Tactics used in partisan warfare may include:  


# Les attaques en rafale : Les partisans lancent des attaques rapides et soudaines contre l'ennemi, souvent depuis des positions cachées, puis se retirent rapidement avant que l'ennemi ne puisse réagir efficacement.
# Burst attacks: Partisans launch rapid and sudden attacks against the enemy, often from hidden positions, then withdraw quickly before the enemy can react effectively.
# Les embuscades : Les partisans peuvent tendre des pièges à l'ennemi, utilisant le terrain et la surprise pour infliger des pertes maximales.
# Ambushes: Partisans can set traps for the enemy, using terrain and surprise to inflict maximum casualties.
# Le sabotage : Les partisans peuvent cibler les infrastructures de l'ennemi, comme les lignes de communication, les dépôts de munitions, les voies de transport, etc., pour perturber ses opérations.
# Sabotage: Partisans can target the enemy's infrastructure, such as lines of communication, ammunition depots, transport routes, etc., to disrupt its operations.
# La collecte de renseignements : Les partisans peuvent recueillir des informations sur les mouvements et les intentions de l'ennemi et les transmettre à des alliés.
# Intelligence gathering: Partisans can gather information on enemy movements and intentions and pass it on to allies.


Ces tactiques, combinées à l'avantage que les partisans ont souvent en matière de soutien local et de connaissance du terrain, peuvent leur permettre de mener une guerre efficace contre une force ennemie plus grande et mieux équipée.
These tactics, combined with the advantage that partisans often have in terms of local support and knowledge of the terrain, can enable them to wage an effective war against a larger, better-equipped enemy force.


Des exemples notables de guerres de partisans incluent la résistance française contre l'occupation allemande pendant la Seconde Guerre mondiale, la guérilla vietnamienne pendant la guerre du Vietnam, ou encore les mouvements de résistance en Afghanistan contre les occupations soviétiques puis américaines. La guerre de partisans est généralement caractérisée par son asymétrie, c'est-à-dire le fait que les forces en présence ne sont pas équivalentes en termes de capacités militaires. Cela oblige les partisans à recourir à des tactiques non conventionnelles pour compenser leur infériorité numérique ou technologique.
Notable examples of partisan warfare include the French resistance against German occupation during the Second World War, Vietnamese guerrilla warfare during the Vietnam War, and resistance movements in Afghanistan against Soviet and then American occupation. Partisan warfare is generally characterised by its asymmetry, i.e. the fact that the forces involved are not equivalent in terms of military capabilities. This forces the partisans to resort to unconventional tactics to compensate for their numerical or technological inferiority.


La guerre de partisans a transformé la nature du conflit armé, déplaçant le centre d'intérêt de l'État vers l'individu ou des groupes non étatiques. Cela représente un changement majeur dans la façon dont la guerre est conceptualisée et menée. Dans les conflits traditionnels, la guerre était souvent comprise comme un affrontement entre États, avec des armées régulières menées par des commandants en chef, se battant sur des champs de bataille bien définis. Cela s'est transformé avec l'émergence de la guerre de partisans, où de petits groupes ou des individus, souvent sans commandement centralisé, mènent des attaques irrégulières et dispersées. Cela a conduit à des changements importants dans les stratégies militaires, nécessitant une réflexion plus centrée sur la façon de traiter des cibles non étatiques et souvent mobiles, ainsi que sur la manière de gérer les populations locales et le territoire. Cela a également soulevé des questions sur les règles et les normes qui régissent la conduite en temps de guerre, car les conflits de partisans ne s'inscrivent souvent pas facilement dans le cadre du droit de la guerre traditionnel. En outre, l'apparition de la guerre de partisans a également modifié la nature du pouvoir et de la politique en temps de guerre. Les partisans peuvent souvent mobiliser le soutien local d'une manière que les forces armées régulières ne peuvent pas, leur permettant d'exercer une influence politique importante, même s'ils ne contrôlent pas un territoire ou un État de manière formelle.
Partisan warfare has transformed the nature of armed conflict, shifting the focus from the state to the individual or non-state groups. This represents a major change in the way war is conceptualised and fought. In traditional conflicts, war was often understood as a confrontation between states, with regular armies led by commanders-in-chief, fighting on well-defined battlefields. This has changed with the emergence of partisan warfare, where small groups or individuals, often without a centralised command, carry out irregular and dispersed attacks. This has led to significant changes in military strategies, requiring more focused thinking on how to deal with non-state and often mobile targets, as well as how to manage local populations and territory. It has also raised questions about the rules and norms that govern conduct in wartime, as partisan conflicts often do not fit easily into the framework of the traditional laws of war. Moreover, the emergence of partisan warfare has also changed the nature of power and politics in war. Partisans can often mobilise local support in ways that regular armed forces cannot, allowing them to exert significant political influence, even if they do not formally control a territory or state.


==Une nouveauté : la guerre du partisan==
==A novelty: partisan warfare==
Le terme "partisan" est souvent utilisé pour décrire une personne qui choisit de prendre les armes et de combattre pour une cause spécifique, en dehors de la structure d'une armée régulière ou officielle.  
The term "partisan" is often used to describe a person who chooses to take up arms and fight for a specific cause, outside the structure of a regular or official army.  


Dans le contexte d'une guerre ou d'un conflit, les partisans sont généralement associés à des groupes de résistance ou à des mouvements de guérilla. Ils sont souvent motivés par des convictions idéologiques, politiques, religieuses ou nationalistes, et ils peuvent choisir de combattre pour diverses raisons, qu'il s'agisse de la défense de leur communauté, de la résistance à une occupation étrangère, de la révolte contre un régime oppressif, ou de la promotion d'une cause spécifique.
In the context of war or conflict, partisans are usually associated with resistance groups or guerrilla movements. They are often motivated by ideological, political, religious or nationalist convictions, and may choose to fight for a variety of reasons, whether in defence of their community, resistance to foreign occupation, revolt against an oppressive regime, or promotion of a specific cause.


Les partisans utilisent généralement des tactiques de guerre asymétrique, y compris la guérilla, le sabotage, l'espionnage, et d'autres formes de guerre non conventionnelle. Parce qu'ils ne font pas partie d'une armée régulière, ils ne sont généralement pas protégés par les mêmes conventions et lois qui régissent le comportement des soldats en temps de guerre, ce qui peut parfois conduire à des controverses sur leurs droits et leurs protections en vertu du droit international humanitaire.
Partisans generally use asymmetrical warfare tactics, including guerrilla warfare, sabotage, espionage and other forms of unconventional warfare. Because they are not part of a regular army, they are not generally protected by the same conventions and laws that govern the behaviour of soldiers in wartime, which can sometimes lead to controversy over their rights and protections under international humanitarian law.


===Aymon de Gingins-La-Sarraz (1780 - 1840) : pionnier de la guerre des partisans===
===Aymon de Gingins-La-Sarraz (1823 - 1893): pioneer of partisan warfare===
Charles-Jules Guiguer de Prangins, plus connu sous le pseudonyme de Gingins-La Sarraz, était un officier suisse qui a beaucoup contribué à l'élaboration de la stratégie défensive de la Suisse au 19e siècle.
Charles-Jules Guiguer de Prangins, better known by his pseudonym Gingins-La Sarraz, was a Swiss officer who made a major contribution to the development of Switzerland's defensive strategy in the 19th century.


Dans son ouvrage "La guerre défensive en Suisse", Gingins-La Sarraz a mis en avant l'idée que la Suisse, en raison de sa situation géographique, de son relief montagneux et de sa politique de neutralité, devait se concentrer sur le développement d'une stratégie de défense solide plutôt que sur la projection de la force militaire à l'extérieur de ses frontières. Cette approche, selon lui, assurerait le maintien de la neutralité suisse face aux ambitions expansionnistes des grandes puissances européennes de l'époque.
In his book "La guerre défensive en Suisse", Gingins-La Sarraz put forward the idea that Switzerland, because of its geographical location, mountainous terrain and policy of neutrality, should concentrate on developing a solid defence strategy rather than projecting military force outside its borders. This approach, he argued, would ensure that Swiss neutrality was maintained in the face of the expansionist ambitions of the great European powers of the day.


Une partie centrale de cette stratégie de défense était l'idée de former et de mobiliser des partisans en cas d'agression étrangère. Ces partisans, qui seraient des citoyens ordinaires formés au combat et à la survie, constitueraient une force de résistance capable de harceler et de perturber les forces d'invasion, rendant ainsi l'occupation de la Suisse trop coûteuse et difficile pour être réalisable. Cette stratégie s'appuie sur l'idée que la défense de la Suisse ne repose pas seulement sur son armée régulière, mais aussi sur sa population dans son ensemble, ce qui reflète les principes de démocratie directe et de milice qui sont au cœur de la politique suisse.
A central part of this defence strategy was the idea of training and mobilising supporters in the event of foreign aggression. These partisans, who would be ordinary citizens trained in combat and survival, would constitute a resistance force capable of harassing and disrupting the invading forces, thus making the occupation of Switzerland too costly and difficult to achieve. This strategy is based on the idea that the defence of Switzerland rests not only with its regular army, but also with its population as a whole, reflecting the principles of direct democracy and the militia that lie at the heart of Swiss politics.


Gingins-La Sarraz a suggéré le principe suivant pour la défense de la Suisse. En plus de l'armée régulière, le recours aux partisans – des citoyens formés aux tactiques de la guérilla et capables de mobilisation rapide – permettrait de renforcer les capacités défensives du pays. Ces partisans pourraient combler les lacunes des forces régulières en nombre et en flexibilité. Dans une situation de guerre, ils pourraient harceler l'ennemi, perturber ses lignes de communication et d'approvisionnement, et mener des attaques de guérilla qui rendraient toute occupation étrangère difficile et coûteuse. De plus, ces partisans, en étant intégrés dans la population, rendraient la distinction entre civils et combattants difficile pour l'ennemi, ajoutant une autre couche de complexité à toute tentative d'invasion. C'est une stratégie qui reflète le pragmatisme suisse et l'importance qu'il accorde à la neutralité et à la sécurité nationale.  
Gingins-La Sarraz suggested the following principle for the defence of Switzerland. In addition to the regular army, the use of partisans - citizens trained in guerrilla tactics and capable of rapid mobilisation - would strengthen the country's defensive capabilities. These partisans could fill the gaps in the numbers and flexibility of the regular forces. In a war situation, they could harass the enemy, disrupt their lines of communication and supply, and carry out guerrilla attacks that would make any foreign occupation difficult and costly. Moreover, by being integrated into the population, these partisans would make it difficult for the enemy to distinguish between civilians and combatants, adding another layer of complexity to any invasion attempt. It's a strategy that reflects Swiss pragmatism and the importance it places on neutrality and national security.  
   
   
La guerre partisane est souvent une stratégie de résistance face à une occupation ou une invasion étrangère. Les groupes irréguliers, ou partisans, sont typiquement des civils qui ont pris les armes pour résister à une force extérieure. Ils utilisent souvent des tactiques de guérilla, y compris le sabotage, les embuscades, les raids et les attaques-surprise, qui peuvent être extrêmement efficaces contre une force d'invasion conventionnelle. Ces partisans sont souvent capables de se mobiliser rapidement et de se fondre dans la population civile après avoir mené une attaque, ce qui rend difficile pour l'ennemi de les cibler. De plus, leur connaissance locale du terrain et de la population peut être un avantage majeur dans la lutte contre une force d'invasion.
Partisan warfare is often a strategy of resistance in the face of foreign occupation or invasion. Irregular groups, or partisans, are typically civilians who have taken up arms to resist an outside force. They often use guerrilla tactics, including sabotage, ambushes, raids and surprise attacks, which can be extremely effective against a conventional invading force. These supporters are often able to mobilise quickly and blend in with the civilian population after carrying out an attack, making it difficult for the enemy to target them. In addition, their local knowledge of the terrain and the population can be a major advantage in the fight against an invading force.
 
===Carl Schmitt (1888 - 1985): the theorisation of partisan warfare===
[[image:PapenSchleicher0001.jpg|thumb|Schmitt advised the von Papen government (left) and Schleicher (right) on the constitutional issue.]]
 
Carl Schmitt (1888-1985) was a German jurist and political philosopher, widely known for his contribution to political and legal theory. However, he is a controversial figure because of his affiliation with the Nazi party during the 1930s. Schmitt joined the Nazi party in 1933 and served in several high-level positions under the Nazi regime, including as legal adviser to the Foreign Office. Schmitt is best known for his work on the concept of the 'political enemy', which he defines as any entity or group that poses an existential threat to a state or nation. He also developed the theory of the state of exception, according to which the sovereign has the power to suspend the law in times of crisis. Despite his collaboration with the Nazi regime, Schmitt's work continued to exert a significant influence on political and legal studies after the Second World War.
 
In his essay "The Theory of the Partisan" (1962), Carl Schmitt examines the changes in the nature of war over time. He argues that modern warfare is largely fought by irregular groups, or 'partisans', rather than by regular armies. According to Schmitt, this change was strikingly illustrated in the Spanish War of Independence (also known as the Peninsular War) against Napoleon's French occupation in the early nineteenth century. The Spanish used guerrilla tactics to resist the French invasion, demonstrating the effectiveness of this type of combat. He considers that partisan warfare is not simply a tactic of military resistance, but that it also represents a form of political combat. Partisans, he argued, were deeply rooted in their territory and local population, and were therefore capable of prolonged resistance against an invader. Schmitt predicted that this form of warfare would become the norm in the modern world. He argues that partisan warfare challenges the idea of state sovereignty and reshapes the very nature of war.


===Carl Schmitt (1888 - 1985) : la théorisation de la guerre des partisans===
Carl Schmitt's theory of the partisan is revolutionary in that it shifts the focus from interstate warfare to irregular warfare waged by non-state groups. These groups, or partisans, are motivated by strong ideologies and are capable of operating independently of the state apparatus. This transformation of the actors in conflict has important implications for the way wars are fought and, ultimately, for the nature of the international political order. Schmitt predicted that modern conflict would be marked primarily by irregular fighting by partisan groups, a prediction that seems to have been validated by the evolution of conflict in the twenty-first century, with the rise of non-state groups such as terrorist movements and militias. The partisan, according to Schmitt, is defined by three main characteristics: its mobility (it can move quickly and operate outside traditional structures), its combat intensity (it is motivated by an ideology or a cause) and its dependence on the local population (for support and information). These traits make the partisan a formidable player on the modern battlefield.
[[image:PapenSchleicher0001.jpg|thumb|Schmitt conseille le gouvernement von Papen (à gauche) et Schleicher (à droite) dans la question constitutionnelle.]]


Carl Schmitt (1888-1985) était un juriste et philosophe politique allemand, largement connu pour sa contribution à la théorie politique et juridique. Cependant, il est une figure controversée en raison de son affiliation avec le parti nazi pendant les années 1930. Schmitt a adhéré au parti nazi en 1933 et a servi à plusieurs postes de haut niveau sous le régime nazi, notamment en tant que conseiller juridique au ministère des Affaires étrangères. Schmitt est notamment connu pour son travail sur le concept de "l'ennemi politique", qu'il définit comme toute entité ou groupe qui représente une menace existentielle pour un État ou une nation. Il a également développé la théorie de l'état d'exception, selon laquelle le souverain a le pouvoir de suspendre le droit en temps de crise. Malgré sa collaboration avec le régime nazi, les travaux de Schmitt ont continué à exercer une influence significative dans les études politiques et juridiques après la Seconde Guerre mondiale.  
==The concept of revolutionary wars==
Revolutionary wars, or wars of insurrection, refer to conflicts in which a population rises up against a dominant power, often with the aim of achieving independence or regime change. These wars are distinguished by the fact that they generally involve the broad participation of the civilian population, and are often waged by unconventional armed groups or partisans.


Dans son essai "La théorie du partisan" (1962), Carl Schmitt étudie les changements dans la nature de la guerre au fil du temps. Il affirme que la guerre moderne est en grande partie menée par des groupes irréguliers, ou des "partisans", plutôt que par des armées régulières. Selon Schmitt, ce changement a été illustré de manière frappante lors de la guerre d'indépendance espagnole (également connue sous le nom de guerre péninsulaire) contre l'occupation française par Napoléon au début du XIXe siècle. Les Espagnols ont utilisé des tactiques de guérilla pour résister à l'invasion française, démontrant l'efficacité de ce type de combat. Il considère que la guerre de partisans n'est pas simplement une tactique de résistance militaire, mais qu'elle représente aussi une forme de combat politique. Les partisans, selon lui, sont profondément ancrés dans leur territoire et leur population locale, et sont donc capables de mener une résistance prolongée contre un envahisseur. Schmitt prédit que cette forme de guerre deviendrait la norme dans le monde moderne. Il fait valoir que la guerre de partisans met en question l'idée de la souveraineté de l'État et remodèle la nature même de la guerre.
The Second World War saw the emergence of various resistance movements that fought the Nazi occupation in several European countries. These resistance movements were generally made up of armed civilians who used guerrilla tactics to disrupt and weaken the German war effort. After the Second World War, several national liberation movements adopted similar tactics in their fight against colonialism. For example, the Front de Libération Nationale (FLN) in Algeria waged a war of insurrection against the French colonial government that eventually led to Algerian independence in 1962. Similarly, in Egypt, Egyptian nationalists fought for independence from British rule. These revolutionary wars highlighted the important role that partisans and unconventional groups can play in the conduct of modern warfare, a subject explored extensively in Carl Schmitt's theory of the partisan.


Lhéorie du partisan de Carl Schmitt est révolutionnaire en ce sens qu'elle déplace l'attention de la guerre interétatique vers une guerre irrégulière menée par des groupes non étatiques. Ces groupes, ou partisans, sont motivés par des idéologies fortes et sont capables d'opérer de manière indépendante de l'appareil d'État. Cette transformation des acteurs du conflit a d'importantes implications pour la façon dont les guerres sont menées et, ultimement, pour la nature de l'ordre politique international. Schmitt prévoyait que le conflit moderne serait principalement marqué par des combats irréguliers menés par des groupes partisans, une prédiction qui semble avoir été validée par l'évolution des conflits au XXIe siècle, avec la montée de groupes non étatiques tels que les mouvements terroristes et les milices. Le partisan, selon Schmitt, est défini par trois caractéristiques principales : sa mobilité (il peut se déplacer rapidement et opérer en dehors des structures traditionnelles), son intensité de combat (il est motivé par une idéologie ou une cause) et sa dépendance à l'égard de la population locale (pour l'appui et l'information). Ces traits font du partisan un acteur redoutable sur le champ de bataille moderne.
Partisan warfare, also known as guerrilla warfare or asymmetric warfare, has a number of distinctive features.
* No uniform: Partisans are often civilians and have no official uniform. This allows them to blend in with the civilian population, making it difficult for the enemy to distinguish between combatants and non-combatants.
* Strong ideology: Partisans are generally motivated by a strong ideology or cause, such as national liberation, opposition to oppression or the overthrow of a government.
* Asymmetric warfare: Unlike traditional conflicts, partisans often do not have access to the same military resources as their opponents. They are generally less numerous, less well equipped and less well trained than regular forces. However, they use this asymmetry to their advantage by resorting to unconventional tactics.
* Guile and surprise: Partisans rely heavily on the element of surprise. They conduct raids, ambushes and guerrilla attacks, then withdraw quickly before enemy forces can strike back effectively.
* Extreme mobility: Partisans are often highly mobile, able to move quickly and strike unpredictably. This contrasts with traditional forces, which may be slower to move due to their size and equipment.


==Le concept des guerres révolutionnaires==
These characteristics make partisan warfare distinct from more traditional forms of conflict, and present unique challenges to the conventional forces attempting to combat them.
Les guerres révolutionnaires, ou guerres d'insurrection, font référence à des conflits dans lesquels une population se soulève contre une puissance dominante, souvent dans le but d'obtenir l'indépendance ou le changement de régime. Ces guerres se distinguent par le fait qu'elles impliquent généralement une large participation de la population civile, et sont souvent menées par des groupes armés non conventionnels ou des partisans.


La Seconde Guerre mondiale a vu l'émergence de divers mouvements de résistance qui ont combattu l'occupation nazie dans plusieurs pays européens. Ces résistances étaient généralement constituées de civils armés qui utilisaient des tactiques de guérilla pour perturber et affaiblir l'effort de guerre allemand. Après la Seconde Guerre mondiale, plusieurs mouvements de libération nationale ont adopté des tactiques similaires dans leur lutte contre le colonialisme. Par exemple, le Front de Libération Nationale (FLN) en Algérie a mené une guerre d'insurrection contre le gouvernement colonial français qui a finalement abouti à l'indépendance de l'Algérie en 1962. De même, en Égypte, les nationalistes égyptiens ont combattu pour l'indépendance contre la domination britannique. Ces guerres révolutionnaires ont mis en évidence le rôle important que peuvent jouer les partisans et les groupes non conventionnels dans la conduite de la guerre moderne, un sujet qui a été largement exploré dans la théorie du partisan de Carl Schmitt.
The notion of "revolutionary warfare" is closely linked to the thinking of Chinese Communist leader Mao Zedong. For Mao, revolution had to be led by a combination of political and military action. He declared that "political revolution is the primary act; military revolution is a secondary act". This means that victory cannot be achieved by military means alone; political change must also take place. Mao also advocated a guerrilla strategy as a means of fighting a stronger and better equipped enemy. Guerrilla warfare, according to Mao, had to melt into the population like a "fish in water", using the local population as a source of support and recruitment. He advocated the use of guerrilla warfare not only in rural areas, but also in urban areas.


Les guerres de partisans, également connues sous le nom de guerres de guérilla ou de guerres asymétriques, présentent un certain nombre de caractéristiques distinctives.  
In the 1960s and 1970s, some revolutionary groups tried to apply these ideas to their own struggles. This often involved a transition to urban guerrilla warfare, with fighting taking place on city streets rather than in rural areas. A notable example of this is the struggle waged by the Tupamaros in Uruguay. One notable example of the failure of partisan warfare was Ernesto "Che" Guevara's attempt to bring about a revolution in Bolivia. Despite his experience of guerrilla warfare in Cuba, Guevara found it difficult to win the support of the local population in Bolivia and to maintain the cohesion of his own forces. He was captured and executed by the Bolivian army in 1967.


* Pas d'uniforme : Les partisans sont souvent des civils et n'ont pas d'uniforme officiel. Cela leur permet de se fondre dans la population civile, rendant difficile pour l'ennemi de distinguer les combattants des non-combattants.
=Contemporary wars: new issues and realities=
* Idéologie forte : Les partisans sont généralement motivés par une idéologie ou une cause forte, comme la libération nationale, l'opposition à l'oppression ou le renversement d'un gouvernement.
* Guerre asymétrique : Contrairement aux conflits traditionnels, les partisans n'ont souvent pas accès aux mêmes ressources militaires que leurs adversaires. Ils sont généralement moins nombreux, moins bien équipés et moins bien entraînés que les forces régulières. Cependant, ils utilisent cette asymétrie à leur avantage en recourant à des tactiques non conventionnelles.
* Ruse et surprise : Les partisans dépendent fortement de l'effet de surprise. Ils mènent des raids, des embuscades et des attaques de guérilla, puis se retirent rapidement avant que les forces ennemies ne puissent riposter efficacement.
* Mobilité extrême : Les partisans sont souvent très mobiles, capables de se déplacer rapidement et de frapper de manière imprévisible. Cela contraste avec les forces traditionnelles qui peuvent être plus lentes à se déplacer en raison de leur taille et de leur équipement.


Ces caractéristiques rendent la guerre de partisans distincte des formes plus traditionnelles de conflit, et présentent des défis uniques pour les forces conventionnelles qui tentent de les combattre.
==New impacts==


La notion de "guerre révolutionnaire" est étroitement liée à la pensée de Mao Zedong, leader communiste chinois. Pour Mao, la révolution devait être menée par une combinaison d'action politique et militaire. Il a déclaré que "la révolution politique est l'acte principal; la révolution militaire est un acte secondaire". Cela signifie que la victoire ne peut être obtenue uniquement par des moyens militaires; un changement politique doit également se produire. Mao a également préconisé une stratégie de guérilla en tant que moyen de combattre un ennemi plus fort et mieux équipé. La guérilla, selon Mao, devait se fondre dans la population comme un "poisson dans l'eau", utilisant la population locale comme source de soutien et de recrutement. Il a prôné l'utilisation de la guérilla non seulement dans les zones rurales, mais aussi dans les zones urbaines.
===The current impact of modern warfare on the Westphalian system===
The nature of warfare has evolved considerably since the establishment of the Westphalian system in the 17th century. This system, named after the Treaties of Westphalia that ended the Thirty Years' War in Europe, was based on the concept of the sovereignty of nation-states and provided that conflicts would primarily be wars between states. However, the nature of conflict in the contemporary world has changed radically. We are seeing more and more civil wars, ethnic and religious conflicts, terrorism and partisan wars. These conflicts are not necessarily limited to a single state and can involve a multitude of non-state actors. Moreover, with increasing globalisation, these conflicts often have repercussions far beyond their immediate geographical borders.


Dans les années 1960 et 1970, certains groupes révolutionnaires ont tenté d'appliquer ces idées à leurs propres luttes. Cela a souvent impliqué la transition vers la guérilla urbaine, avec des combats se déroulant dans les rues des villes plutôt que dans les zones rurales. Un exemple notable de cela est la lutte menée par les Tupamaros en Uruguay. Un des exemples notoires de l'échec de la guerre de partisan a été la tentative d'Ernesto "Che" Guevara de susciter une révolution en Bolivie. Malgré son expérience de la guérilla à Cuba, Guevara a eu du mal à gagner le soutien de la population locale en Bolivie et à maintenir la cohésion de ses propres forces. Il a été capturé et exécuté par l'armée bolivienne en 1967.
Some academics and theorists have described this as a return to a Hobbesian 'state of nature', where the international order is characterised by anarchy and perpetual war. However, it is important to note that this view is contested.


=Les guerres contemporaines : nouveaux enjeux et réalités=
Hobbesian anarchy is a concept derived from the political theory of Thomas Hobbes, a 17th-century English philosopher. In his major work, "Leviathan", Hobbes describes the state of nature as a state of war between all against all, where each individual is in a constant struggle for survival. He used this concept to justify the need for a strong central power (Leviathan) to maintain peace and order. In the context of international relations, Hobbesian anarchy refers to a state of global disorder in which each state acts according to its own interests, without regard for the interests of others. It is a world without effective international institutions to regulate the behaviour of states, where war is a common means of resolving conflicts. The rise of non-state wars, international terrorism and partisan warfare, coupled with the apparent weakening of some international institutions, has led some to suggest that we could be heading towards such anarchy.


==De nouvelles incidences==
This is a major concern in the current context of international relations. While traditional inter-state conflicts, governed by the laws of war, are declining, we are witnessing an increase in non-state and asymmetric conflicts. These conflicts often involve non-state actors, such as terrorist groups or militias, and often take place within the borders of a single country. These wars tend to be far more destructive for civilian populations, as they are often fought without respect for international laws and standards that are designed to protect civilians in times of war. In addition, these conflicts can often be more difficult to resolve, as they often involve complex local issues and are less likely to be influenced by international pressure. These trends have led to renewed debate about the need to reform the international system to better manage these types of conflicts. This could involve rethinking existing norms and institutions, strengthening international humanitarian law, and developing new approaches to resolving conflicts and promoting peace.


===Les incidences actuelles des guerres modernes sur le système westphalien===
===The state of perpetual war: a critical analysis===
la nature de la guerre a considérablement évolué depuis l'établissement du système westphalien au 17ème siècle. Ce système, nommé d'après les traités de Westphalie qui ont mis fin à la guerre de Trente Ans en Europe, était basé sur le concept de la souveraineté des États-nations et prévoyait que les conflits seraient principalement des guerres entre États. Cependant, la nature des conflits dans le monde contemporain a radicalement changé. Nous voyons de plus en plus de guerres civiles, de conflits ethniques et religieux, de terrorisme et de guerres de partisans. Ces conflits ne sont pas nécessairement limités à un seul État et peuvent impliquer une multitude d'acteurs non étatiques. De plus, avec l'augmentation de la mondialisation, ces conflits ont souvent des répercussions bien au-delà de leurs frontières géographiques immédiates.
The impact of armed conflict on the environment is a growing concern. Indeed, wars can result in massive destruction of the natural environment, whether through deliberate military tactics or simply through the collateral effects of combat. Examples of this include deforestation, water and soil pollution, destruction of wildlife habitats, and increased greenhouse gas emissions. In addition, the environmental consequences of conflict can also have impacts on human health, the economy and social stability, creating a vicious circle where environmental degradation fuels further conflict. The United Nations and other international organisations have recognised this as a serious problem. There is a growing call to include environmental protection in international humanitarian law and to hold parties to conflict accountable for environmental damage caused during war. However, implementing such measures remains a major challenge.  


Certains universitaires et théoriciens ont décrit cela comme un retour à un "état de nature" hobbesien, où l'ordre international est caractérisé par l'anarchie et la guerre perpétuelle. Cependant, il est important de noter que cette vision est contestée.
The use of the natural environment as a 'weapon' in conflict is a matter of grave concern. Ecocide, or the deliberate destruction of the environment for strategic or tactical gain, is a reality in some contemporary conflicts. For example, the deliberate burning of oil wells, the destruction of dams to cause flooding, or the use of toxic chemicals can have disastrous consequences for the environment. These acts of ecocide not only aim to weaken the enemy by destroying its resources, but can also have a long-term impact on local communities by destroying their livelihoods and rendering their habitats uninhabitable.


L'anarchie hobbesienne est un concept issu de la théorie politique de Thomas Hobbes, philosophe anglais du XVIIe siècle. Dans son ouvrage majeur, "Le Léviathan", Hobbes décrit l'état de nature comme un état de guerre de tous contre tous, où chaque individu est en constante lutte pour sa survie. Il a utilisé ce concept pour justifier le besoin d'un pouvoir central fort (le Léviathan) pour maintenir la paix et l'ordre. Dans le contexte des relations internationales, l'anarchie hobbesienne fait référence à un état de désordre mondial où chaque État agit en fonction de ses propres intérêts, sans considération pour les intérêts des autres. Il s'agit d'un monde sans institutions internationales efficaces pour réguler le comportement des États, où la guerre est un moyen courant de résolution des conflits. La montée des guerres non étatiques, du terrorisme international et de la guerre de partisans, associée à l'affaiblissement apparent de certaines institutions internationales, a conduit certains à suggérer que nous pourrions nous diriger vers une telle anarchie.  
The destruction of natural or economic resources is a strategy that has been used in various conflicts throughout history. By eliminating an opponent's resources, you can weaken their ability to fight or survive. This may involve destroying key infrastructure, such as bridges or factories, burning crop fields to deprive the enemy of food, or poisoning water to make an area inhospitable. However, this approach has major negative consequences. It can cause great suffering to the civilian population, who are often the hardest hit by the destruction of essential resources. It can also cause long-term environmental damage that will last long after the conflict has ended. This is why international humanitarian law establishes rules to protect civilian resources in times of war. For example, the Geneva Convention prohibits attacks on objects indispensable to the survival of the civilian population. This includes food, crops, livestock and drinking water. Violations of these rules can be considered war crimes.
c'est une préoccupation majeure dans le contexte actuel des relations internationales. Alors que les conflits classiques interétatiques, régis par le droit de la guerre, diminuent, nous assistons à une augmentation des conflits non étatiques et asymétriques. Ces conflits impliquent souvent des acteurs non étatiques, comme des groupes terroristes ou des milices, et se déroulent souvent au sein des frontières d'un seul pays. Ces guerres ont tendance à être beaucoup plus destructrices pour les populations civiles, car elles sont souvent menées sans respect des lois et normes internationales qui sont conçues pour protéger les civils en temps de guerre. De plus, ces conflits peuvent souvent être plus difficiles à résoudre, car ils impliquent souvent des enjeux locaux complexes et sont moins susceptibles d'être influencés par la pression internationale. Ces tendances ont conduit à un renouvellement du débat sur la nécessité de réformer le système international pour mieux gérer ces types de conflits. Cela pourrait impliquer de repenser les normes et institutions existantes, de renforcer le droit international humanitaire, et de développer de nouvelles approches pour résoudre les conflits et promouvoir la paix.


===L'état de guerre perpétuelle : une analyse critique===
The destruction of the enemy's culture is also a sad reality of some conflicts, an act often known as "cultural cleansing" or "cultural genocide". This involves erasing the enemy's cultural identity by targeting elements such as art, literature, monuments, places of worship, religious practices and even languages. By destroying the enemy's cultural symbols and heritage, the aggressor seeks not only to disorientate and dehumanise his adversaries, but also to erase their history and presence from the collective memory. This practice is widely condemned by the international community, and the deliberate destruction of cultural heritage is considered a war crime by the International Criminal Court. For example, in 2016, the International Criminal Court convicted Ahmad Al Faqi Al Mahdi for the destruction of historical and religious monuments in Timbuktu, Mali, in 2012. That said, although these laws exist, their implementation and enforcement remain a major challenge, particularly in areas of active conflict.
L'impact des conflits armés sur l'environnement est une préoccupation croissante. En effet, les guerres peuvent entraîner des destructions massives de l'environnement naturel, que ce soit par le biais de tactiques militaires délibérées ou simplement par les effets collatéraux des combats. Les exemples de cela incluent la déforestation, la pollution de l'eau et des sols, la destruction des habitats fauniques, et l'augmentation de l'émission de gaz à effet de serre. En outre, les conséquences environnementales des conflits peuvent également avoir des impacts sur la santé humaine, l'économie et la stabilité sociale, créant ainsi un cercle vicieux où la dégradation de l'environnement alimente d'autres conflits. Les Nations Unies et d'autres organisations internationales ont reconnu cette question comme un problème grave. Il y a un appel croissant à inclure la protection de l'environnement dans le droit international humanitaire et à tenir les parties au conflit responsables des dommages environnementaux causés pendant la guerre. Cependant, la mise en œuvre de telles mesures reste un défi majeur.  


L'utilisation de l'environnement naturel comme "arme" dans les conflits est un sujet très préoccupant. L'écocide, ou la destruction délibérée de l'environnement pour des gains stratégiques ou tactiques, est une réalité dans certains conflits contemporains. Par exemple, l'incendie délibéré de puits de pétrole, la destruction de barrages pour provoquer des inondations, ou encore l'utilisation de produits chimiques toxiques peuvent avoir des conséquences désastreuses pour l'environnement. Ces actes d'écocide ne visent pas seulement à affaiblir l'ennemi en détruisant ses ressources, mais ils peuvent aussi avoir un impact à long terme sur les communautés locales en détruisant leurs moyens de subsistance et en rendant leurs habitats inhabitables.  
==Endless wars: protracted conflicts and their consequences==
War was exceptional and peace normal, which leads us to wonder whether war is becoming normal and peace extraordinary. In certain contexts, particularly in regions that have experienced prolonged conflict, war can seem to be the norm and peace the exception. This can be due to a multitude of factors, including entrenched ethnic or religious conflicts, competition for resources, political corruption, socio-economic divisions and foreign interference. Moreover, in some cases, existing power structures may be reinforced by the continuation of the conflict, making it all the more difficult to resolve the war.


La destruction des ressources naturelles ou économiques est une stratégie qui a été utilisée dans divers conflits à travers l'histoire. En éliminant les ressources d'un adversaire, on peut affaiblir sa capacité à se battre ou à survivre. Cela peut s'agir de détruire des infrastructures clés, comme des ponts ou des usines, de brûler des champs de culture pour priver l'ennemi de nourriture, ou d'empoisonner l'eau pour rendre une zone inhospitalière. Cependant, cette approche a des conséquences néfastes importantes. Elle peut causer de grandes souffrances à la population civile, qui est souvent la plus touchée par la destruction de ressources essentielles. De plus, elle peut causer des dommages environnementaux à long terme qui perdureront bien après la fin du conflit. C'est pourquoi le droit international humanitaire établit des règles pour protéger les ressources civiles en temps de guerre. Par exemple, la Convention de Genève interdit les attaques contre les objets indispensables à la survie de la population civile. Cela inclut la nourriture, les cultures, le bétail et l'eau potable. Les violations de ces règles peuvent être considérées comme des crimes de guerre.
Endless wars" can lead to the creation of so-called "war economies". These economies are often dominated by illegal or unregulated activities, including drug trafficking, arms trafficking, human trafficking and other forms of organised crime. These activities can provide income to those involved in the conflict, enabling them to continue fighting despite the enormous human and social costs. In addition, the situation of "endless war" can lead to a breakdown in the rule of law and governance, which in turn can facilitate the continuation of these illegal activities. This makes the resolution of these conflicts particularly difficult, as the actors involved may have financial interests in maintaining the status quo. Furthermore, these conflicts can make peace almost impossible to achieve, as it can be difficult to find legitimate interlocutors with whom to negotiate an end to the conflict.
La destruction de la culture de l'ennemi est également une triste réalité de certains conflits, un acte souvent connu sous le nom de "nettoyage culturel" ou de "génocide culturel". Il s'agit d'effacer l'identité culturelle de l'ennemi en ciblant des éléments tels que l'art, la littérature, les monuments, les lieux de culte, les pratiques religieuses et même les langues. En détruisant les symboles culturels et le patrimoine de l'ennemi, l'agresseur cherche non seulement à désorienter et à déshumaniser ses adversaires, mais aussi à effacer leur histoire et leur présence de la mémoire collective. Cette pratique est largement condamnée par la communauté internationale, et la destruction délibérée du patrimoine culturel est considérée comme un crime de guerre par la Cour pénale internationale. Par exemple, en 2016, la Cour pénale internationale a condamné Ahmad Al Faqi Al Mahdi pour la destruction de monuments historiques et religieux à Tombouctou, au Mali, en 2012. Cela dit, bien que ces lois existent, leur mise en œuvre et leur application restent un défi majeur, en particulier dans les zones de conflit actif.


==Les guerres sans fin : conflits prolongés et leurs conséquences==
The example of Iraq is representative of these "endless wars". Since Iraq's invasion of Kuwait in 1990, which led to the Gulf War in 1991, Iraq has experienced a series of conflicts and periods of instability. After the Gulf War, Iraq was subjected to severe international sanctions and internal instability. Then, in 2003, a US-led coalition invaded Iraq, overthrowing Saddam Hussein's regime. However, instead of bringing stability, the invasion created a power vacuum that led to a new wave of violence and instability, including a violent insurgency and the emergence of extremist groups such as the Islamic State. Even after the defeat of the Islamic State, Iraq continues to face major challenges, including political instability, corruption, economic underdevelopment and community tensions. These problems, in turn, can fuel new conflicts. In this context, peace may seem a distant and elusive goal. However, it is important to note that peace is not simply the absence of war, but also requires the building of strong institutions, the establishment of justice, the promotion of economic development and reconciliation between different communities. These are difficult tasks that require time, resources and the sustained commitment of all concerned.
La guerre relevait d’un exceptionnel et la paix d’une normalité ce qui nous amène à nous demander si la guerre en devient pas être une normalité et la paix ne devient pas quelque chose de l’ordre de l’extraordinaire. Dans certains contextes, notamment dans des régions qui ont connu des conflits prolongés, la guerre peut sembler être la norme et la paix l'exception. Cela peut être dû à une multitude de facteurs, notamment les conflits ethniques ou religieux enracinés, la compétition pour les ressources, la corruption politique, les divisions socio-économiques et l'ingérence étrangère. De plus, dans certains cas, les structures de pouvoir existantes peuvent être renforcées par le maintien du conflit, ce qui rend d'autant plus difficile la résolution de la guerre.
Les "guerres sans fin" peuvent conduire à la création de ce qu'on appelle des "économies de guerre". Ces économies sont souvent dominées par des activités illégales ou non réglementées, y compris le trafic de drogue, le trafic d'armes, le trafic d'êtres humains et d'autres formes de criminalité organisée. Ces activités peuvent fournir des revenus à ceux qui sont impliqués dans le conflit, leur permettant de continuer à se battre malgré les coûts humains et sociaux énormes. De plus, la situation de "guerre sans fin" peut entraîner une dégradation de l'État de droit et de la gouvernance, ce qui peut à son tour faciliter la poursuite de ces activités illégales. Cela rend la résolution de ces conflits particulièrement difficile, car les acteurs impliqués peuvent avoir des intérêts financiers à maintenir le statu quo. De plus ces conflits peuvent rendre la paix presque impossible à réaliser, car il peut être difficile de trouver des interlocuteurs légitimes avec lesquels négocier une fin au conflit.
L'exemple de l'Irak est représentatif de ces "guerres sans fin". Depuis l'invasion du Koweït par l'Irak en 1990, qui a conduit à la guerre du Golfe en 1991, l'Irak a connu une série de conflits et de périodes d'instabilité. Après la guerre du Golfe, l'Irak a été soumis à des sanctions internationales sévères et a connu une instabilité interne. Puis, en 2003, une coalition dirigée par les États-Unis a envahi l'Irak, renversant le régime de Saddam Hussein. Cependant, au lieu d'apporter la stabilité, l'invasion a créé un vide de pouvoir qui a conduit à une nouvelle vague de violence et d'instabilité, notamment une insurrection violente et l'émergence de groupes extrémistes comme l'État islamique. Même après la défaite de l'État islamique, l'Irak continue de faire face à des défis majeurs, notamment l'instabilité politique, la corruption, le sous-développement économique et les tensions communautaires. Ces problèmes, à leur tour, peuvent alimenter de nouveaux conflits. Dans ce contexte, la paix peut sembler être un objectif lointain et difficile à atteindre. Cependant, il est important de noter que la paix n'est pas simplement l'absence de guerre, mais nécessite également la construction d'institutions fortes, l'établissement de la justice, la promotion du développement économique et la réconciliation entre les différentes communautés. Ce sont des tâches difficiles qui nécessitent du temps, des ressources et un engagement soutenu de toutes les parties concernées.


==Vers une nouvelle théorie politique de la guerre - Michael Walzer (1935 - )==
==Towards a new political theory of war - Michael Walzer (1935 - )==


[[Fichier:MichaelWalzer-USNA-Lecture.jpg|thumb|200px|Michael Walzer.]]
[[Fichier:MichaelWalzer-USNA-Lecture.jpg|thumb|200px|Michael Walzer.]]


Michael Walzer est un politologue et philosophe américain bien connu pour ses travaux en philosophie politique et en éthique. Dans son livre "Just and Unjust Wars" (Guerres justes et injustes), il a exploré la question éthique de quand et comment il est justifiable d'aller à la guerre, et comment une guerre devrait être menée pour être considérée comme "juste". Michael Walzer est un des principaux théoriciens du paradigme légaliste. Contrairement à Hobbes, qui considérait l'état de nature comme un état de guerre et la paix comme le résultat d'un contrat social, Walzer s'appuie sur un ensemble de normes internationales et de principes moraux pour évaluer la justesse d'une guerre. Il reprend certains des concepts de Hobbes, comme l'idée que les états ont une responsabilité de protéger leurs citoyens, mais il va plus loin en affirmant que les états ont aussi une obligation de respecter les droits des citoyens des autres états, même en temps de guerre. Walzer insiste sur l'importance de principes tels que la distinction entre combattants et non-combattants, la proportionnalité de l'usage de la force, et la nécessité militaire. Selon lui, ces principes doivent être respectés pour qu'une guerre soit considérée comme juste, quels que soient les motifs pour lesquels elle a été déclenchée. Il s'agit là d'un cadre légaliste, car il repose sur un ensemble de règles et de normes qui doivent être respectées.
Michael Walzer is an American political scientist and philosopher well known for his work in political philosophy and ethics. In his book "Just and Unjust Wars", he explored the ethical question of when and how it is justifiable to go to war, and how a war should be fought to be considered "just". Michael Walzer is one of the main theorists of the legalistic paradigm. Unlike Hobbes, who saw the state of nature as a state of war and peace as the result of a social contract, Walzer relies on a set of international norms and moral principles to assess the justness of a war. He takes up some of Hobbes' concepts, such as the idea that states have a responsibility to protect their citizens, but he goes further by asserting that states also have an obligation to respect the rights of the citizens of other states, even in times of war. Walzer stresses the importance of principles such as the distinction between combatants and non-combatants, the proportionality of the use of force, and military necessity. In his view, these principles must be respected if a war is to be considered just, whatever the reasons for starting it. This is a legalistic framework, as it is based on a set of rules and norms that must be respected.


Walzer a adopté ce qu'il a appelé une approche "légaliste" ou "jus in bello" (droit en guerre), en s'appuyant sur des principes tels que le respect des droits des non-combattants, la proportionnalité de la force utilisée, la nécessité militaire et le fait que les forces armées doivent distinguer entre les combattants et les civils. Selon Walzer, une guerre n'est justifiée que si elle est menée en conformité avec ces principes. Il défend également le concept de "jus ad bellum" (droit à la guerre), qui examine la justesse de l'entrée en guerre. Selon ce concept, une guerre n'est justifiée que si elle est menée pour résister à l'agression, protéger les innocents, défendre les droits humains, etc. En outre, Walzer a également discuté de la notion de "guerre juste", une idée qui remonte à Saint Augustin et Thomas d'Aquin. Selon cette notion, une guerre est juste si elle est menée pour des raisons justes et de manière juste.
Walzer adopted what he called a 'legalistic' or 'jus in bello' (law in war) approach, based on principles such as respect for the rights of non-combatants, the proportionality of the force used, military necessity and the fact that armed forces must distinguish between combatants and civilians. According to Walzer, a war is only justified if it is waged in accordance with these principles. He also defends the concept of "jus ad bellum" (the right to war), which examines the rightness of going to war. According to this concept, a war is only justified if it is waged to resist aggression, protect the innocent, defend human rights, etc. Walzer also discussed the notion of the 'just war', an idea that goes back to Saint Augustine and Thomas Aquinas. According to this notion, a war is just if it is waged for just reasons and in a just manner.


Michael Walzer, dans son ouvrage "Just and Unjust Wars", argue que même dans l'extrême situation de la guerre, des règles morales et éthiques s'appliquent. La guerre, pour lui, n'est pas un état d'anarchie morale. Au contraire, il soutient que le comportement en temps de guerre peut et doit être jugé à partir de standards moraux. En effet, il avance que même si la guerre est une situation d'exception, cela ne signifie pas qu'elle soit dépourvue de toute norme morale ou éthique. Une guerre juste est une guerre maitrisée, c’est une guerre de combattants légaux. Ainsi, il distingue entre une guerre juste, qui respecte certaines règles, et une guerre injuste, qui ne respecte pas ces règles. Pour lui, une guerre juste est une guerre où la cause est juste (par exemple, la défense contre une agression), où les combattants sont des acteurs légitimes (des soldats d'un État), où la force utilisée est proportionnelle et nécessaire, et où une distinction est faite entre les combattants et les non-combattants, ces derniers étant protégés des attaques. Il souligne que même si la guerre est une réalité violente et destructrice, il y a des limites à ce qui est permis en temps de guerre. Cela ne signifie pas qu'il y a quelque chose de fondamentalement moral dans le concept de guerre, mais plutôt que même en guerre, certaines actions peuvent être jugées immorales.
Michael Walzer, in his book Just and Unjust Wars, argues that even in the extreme situation of war, moral and ethical rules apply. War, he argues, is not a state of moral anarchy. On the contrary, he argues that behaviour in war can and should be judged by moral standards. Indeed, he argues that even if war is an exceptional situation, this does not mean that it is devoid of all moral or ethical standards. A just war is a controlled war, a war fought by legal combatants. So he distinguishes between a just war, which respects certain rules, and an unjust war, which does not. For him, a just war is one where the cause is just (for example, defence against aggression), where the combatants are legitimate actors (soldiers of a state), where the force used is proportional and necessary, and where a distinction is made between combatants and non-combatants, the latter being protected from attack. He emphasises that although war is a violent and destructive reality, there are limits to what is permitted in war. This does not mean that there is anything fundamentally moral in the concept of war, but rather that even in war, certain actions can be deemed immoral.


Michael Walzer s'efforce de comprendre comment les normes morales peuvent s'appliquer dans des situations de guerre, qui sont par nature violentes et destructrices. Sa préoccupation centrale est de déterminer si et comment certaines actions peuvent être jugées morales ou immorales en temps de guerre. Selon lui, même dans le contexte de la guerre, il existe des limites morales à ce qui est permis. Par exemple, il est généralement considéré comme immoral de cibler intentionnellement des non-combattants. De même, l'usage disproportionné de la force est également considéré comme immoral. Pour Walzer, la morale de la guerre ne réside pas dans le fait de faire la guerre en soi, mais plutôt dans la manière dont la guerre est menée. Autrement dit, ce ne sont pas les guerres elles-mêmes qui peuvent être morales ou immorales, mais les actions spécifiques prises au cours de ces guerres.
Michael Walzer seeks to understand how moral standards can be applied in situations of war, which are inherently violent and destructive. His central concern is to determine whether and how certain actions can be deemed moral or immoral in wartime. In his view, even in the context of war, there are moral limits to what is permissible. For example, it is generally considered immoral to intentionally target non-combatants. Similarly, the disproportionate use of force is also considered immoral. For Walzer, the morality of war does not lie in waging war per se, but rather in the way in which war is waged. In other words, it is not the wars themselves that can be moral or immoral, but the specific actions taken in the course of these wars.


Michael Walzer soutient qu'il peut y avoir une moralité dans la guerre si celle-ci est menée de manière défensive contre une agression, respecte les principes de discrimination (c'est-à-dire ne cible pas délibérément les non-combattants) et de proportionnalité (c'est-à-dire utilise un niveau de force proportionné à la menace), et si elle est menée par des combattants qui respectent les lois de la guerre. Il affirme que même si la guerre est intrinsèquement destructrice et violente, elle peut être conduite d'une manière qui respecte certains principes moraux. Par exemple, le fait de ne pas utiliser d'armes de destruction massive, de ne pas cibler délibérément des civils et de ne pas recourir à la torture sont des comportements que Walzer considère comme moralement justifiés, même en temps de guerre. Cependant, Walzer ne considère pas ces comportements comme transformant la guerre en une entreprise morale en soi. Au contraire, il s'agit plutôt de limiter le mal que la guerre peut causer.
Michael Walzer argues that there can be morality in war if it is waged defensively against aggression, respects the principles of discrimination (i.e. does not deliberately target non-combatants) and proportionality (i.e. uses a level of force commensurate with the threat), and is waged by combatants who respect the laws of war. He argues that although war is intrinsically destructive and violent, it can be conducted in a way that respects certain moral principles. For example, not using weapons of mass destruction, not deliberately targeting civilians and not resorting to torture are behaviours that Walzer considers morally justified, even in wartime. However, Walzer does not see these behaviours as transforming war into a moral enterprise in itself. On the contrary, it is more a question of limiting the harm that war can cause.


Le terrorisme représente un défi majeur à l'idée de la guerre juste et aux principes de moralité en temps de guerre. Par sa nature même, le terrorisme implique généralement des attaques non discriminatoires contre des civils innocents, dans le but d'engendrer la peur et de perturber la société. Ces tactiques contreviennent directement aux principes de discrimination et de proportionnalité qui sous-tendent la théorie de la guerre juste. L'utilisation délibérée de la violence contre des civils à des fins politiques est largement considérée comme immorale et inacceptable selon les normes internationales. En outre, le terrorisme est souvent perpétré par des acteurs non étatiques qui ne sont pas clairement identifiables comme des combattants, ce qui brouille les distinctions traditionnelles entre combattants et non-combattants et rend difficile l'application des lois de la guerre. La réponse au terrorisme pose également des défis éthiques et moraux. Par exemple, comment les gouvernements peuvent-ils protéger efficacement leurs citoyens contre le terrorisme tout en respectant les droits de l'homme et les principes de l'État de droit ? À quel point est-il acceptable de restreindre les libertés civiles dans le but de prévenir le terrorisme ? Ces questions n'ont pas de réponses faciles et représentent une zone de débat et de discorde continue dans les relations internationales et la théorie politique.
Terrorism represents a major challenge to the idea of just war and to the principles of morality in war. By its very nature, terrorism generally involves indiscriminate attacks on innocent civilians, with the aim of instilling fear and disrupting society. Such tactics directly contravene the principles of discrimination and proportionality that underpin just war theory. The deliberate use of violence against civilians for political purposes is widely regarded as immoral and unacceptable by international standards. Moreover, terrorism is often perpetrated by non-state actors who are not clearly identifiable as combatants, blurring traditional distinctions between combatants and non-combatants and making it difficult to apply the laws of war. The response to terrorism also poses ethical and moral challenges. For example, how can governments effectively protect their citizens from terrorism while respecting human rights and the principles of the rule of law? How acceptable is it to restrict civil liberties in order to prevent terrorism? These questions have no easy answers and represent an area of continuing debate and discord in international relations and political theory.


La théorie de Michael Walzer tente de répondre à la question de savoir quand il est moralement acceptable de faire la guerre et comment elle devrait être conduite d'une manière moralement acceptable. Il soutient que même dans un contexte aussi violent et complexe que la guerre, des règles morales et éthiques doivent être appliquées. Selon Walzer, il existe des cas où une guerre peut être justifiée, généralement en réponse à une agression non provoquée. De plus, il soutient que les combattants doivent se conformer à certaines règles de conduite en temps de guerre. Par exemple, il soutient que les attaques doivent être dirigées uniquement contre des cibles militaires légitimes, et non contre des civils. Dans ce contexte, le "paradigme légaliste" de Walzer est un appel à un retour de la politique dans la conduite de la guerre. Il argumente que les décisions sur la guerre et la paix doivent être prises sur la base de principes politiques et moraux, et non simplement en réponse à des impératifs stratégiques ou de sécurité. Ainsi, bien que la guerre puisse être amorale par nature, Walzer insiste sur le fait que nous pouvons et devons nous efforcer d'y imposer une certaine moralité. Selon Walzer, même si la guerre est une réalité terrifiante et dévastatrice, il est nécessaire d'appliquer des normes éthiques et politiques pour guider sa conduite. C'est ce qu'il entend par le "retour du politique" - un appel à prendre en compte des considérations morales et éthiques dans les décisions de guerre.
Michael Walzer's theory attempts to answer the question of when it is morally acceptable to wage war and how it should be conducted in a morally acceptable manner. He argues that even in a context as violent and complex as war, moral and ethical rules must be applied. According to Walzer, there are cases where war can be justified, usually in response to unprovoked aggression. Furthermore, he argues that combatants must abide by certain rules of conduct in war. For example, it argues that attacks should only be directed against legitimate military targets, and not against civilians. In this context, Walzer's "legalist paradigm" is a call for a return to politics in the conduct of war. He argues that decisions about war and peace must be taken on the basis of political and moral principles, and not simply in response to strategic or security imperatives. Thus, although war may be amoral in nature, Walzer insists that we can and must strive to impose a certain morality on it. According to Walzer, even if war is a terrifying and devastating reality, it is necessary to apply ethical and political standards to guide its conduct. This is what he means by the "return of the political" - a call for moral and ethical considerations to be taken into account in war decisions.


Philippe Delmas est un stratège et auteur français qui a écrit sur divers aspects de la guerre et de la politique internationale. Dans son livre "Le Bel Avenir de la Guerre", il suggère que la guerre est un aspect inévitable et même nécessaire de l'ordre mondial, et que l'idée d'un monde sans guerre est non seulement irréaliste, mais peut même être préjudiciable. Delmas conteste certaines des présomptions de base qui sous-tendent la théorie de la guerre juste et le paradigme légaliste en général. Il suggère que l'effort pour encadrer la guerre avec des règles et des réglementations strictes est une tentative futile et potentiellement contre-productive pour domestiquer une réalité brutale et chaotique. Selon Delmas, la guerre a une valeur politique intrinsèque et peut servir de catalyseur à des changements politiques, sociaux et économiques significatifs. En ce sens, il propose une vision beaucoup plus cynique et plus réaliste de la guerre que celle souvent associée à des penseurs comme Michael Walzer.
Philippe Delmas is a French strategist and author who has written on various aspects of war and international politics. In his book "Le Bel Avenir de la Guerre", he suggests that war is an inevitable and even necessary aspect of world order, and that the idea of a world without war is not only unrealistic, but may even be damaging. Delmas challenges some of the basic assumptions underlying just war theory and the legalistic paradigm in general. He suggests that the effort to frame war with strict rules and regulations is a futile and potentially counterproductive attempt to domesticate a brutal and chaotic reality. According to Delmas, war has intrinsic political value and can act as a catalyst for significant political, social and economic change. In this sense, he offers a much more cynical and realistic view of war than that often associated with thinkers such as Michael Walzer.


=Annexes=
=Annexes=

Version actuelle datée du 12 novembre 2023 à 11:24

Intellectual legacy of Émile Durkheim and Pierre Bourdieu in social theoryThe origins of the fall of the Weimar RepublicIntellectual legacy of Max Weber and Vilfredo Pareto in social theoryThe notion of "concept" in social sciencesHistory of the discipline of political science: theories and conceptsMarxism and StructuralismFunctionalism and SystemismInteractionism and ConstructivismThe theories of political anthropologyThe three I's debate: interests, institutions and ideasRational choice theory and the analysis of interests in political scienceAn analytical approach to institutions in political scienceThe study of ideas and ideologies in political scienceTheories of war in political scienceThe War: Concepts and EvolutionsThe reason of StateState, sovereignty, globalization and multi-level governanceTheories of violence in political science‎‎Welfare State and BiopowerAnalysis of democratic regimes and democratisation processesElectoral Systems: Mechanisms, Issues and ConsequencesThe system of government in democraciesMorphology of contestationsAction in Political TheoryIntroduction to Swiss politicsIntroduction to political behaviourPublic Policy Analysis: Definition and cycle of public policyPublic Policy Analysis: agenda setting and formulationPublic Policy Analysis: Implementation and EvaluationIntroduction to the sub-discipline of international relationsIntroduction to Political Theory

Political science has long been interested in war, one of the most extreme and devastating aspects of international relations. War has profound implications for politics, economics, society and culture, and can radically change the course of history.

Political science's approach to war is often multidimensional. It includes theoretical, historical, sociological, economic and psychological analyses. However, the ability of political science to understand and explain war is sometimes called into question. There are several reasons for this.

  • Limitations of theory: Many political theories (e.g. realism, liberalism, constructivism) have their own assumptions and limitations. They can explain some aspects of war, but not all. For example, realism emphasises power and anarchy in international relations, but may have difficulty explaining why some powerful states choose not to go to war.
  • Prediction and prevention: Although political science has made progress in understanding the causes of war, it often has difficulty predicting when and where wars will break out. Similarly, despite our knowledge of the factors that contribute to war, it is often difficult to prevent them.
  • Methodological problems: Political science often relies on historical data to construct and test theories. However, wars are relatively rare events and each war has its own unique characteristics. This makes it difficult to generalise from specific cases.
  • The influence of politics: Political science, like any discipline, is not immune to political pressures. Political scientists can be influenced by their own prejudices, by the interests of their sponsors or by mainstream politics.

That said, political science has much to offer the study of war. It provides theoretical frameworks for understanding the causes of war, war strategies and the consequences of war. It also makes it possible to analyse efforts to prevent war and build peace. Finally, it offers a critical perspective that can challenge dominant discourses on war.

The nature of war has evolved over the centuries. Traditionally, war was seen as a conflict between nation states, often over territory, resources or power. In this context, the rules of war were relatively clear and formal, governed by international conventions such as the Geneva Conventions. However, with the advent of partisan warfare in the 19th century, the nature of warfare began to change. Partisan warfare, as conceptualised by thinkers such as Clausewitz, often involves non-state individuals or groups fighting against a state. These wars are often asymmetric, with an imbalance of power between the parties, and can be characterised by guerrilla tactics, terrorism and other forms of irregular resistance.

What's more, we are witnessing another evolution in warfare today. With globalisation, technological change, and the rise of international terrorism, we are seeing more and more conflicts that are not limited to national borders and that involve a variety of non-state actors, including terrorist groups, private militias, and even cybersecurity companies. These "hybrid" or "non-linear" wars can be difficult to manage and resolve, as they do not follow the traditional rules of warfare. Indeed, one concern with these new forms of warfare is that they can seem never-ending. Without a clearly defined state to defeat or a specific territory to conquer, it can be difficult to define victory or the end of the war. This can lead to protracted conflicts, with all the human suffering and political instability that implies.

These developments represent major challenges for political science and for society in general. It is essential to continue to reflect on these issues, to develop new theories and strategies, and to work towards conflict prevention and peace-building.

Why has political science taken an interest in war?[modifier | modifier le wikicode]

War has been a ubiquitous feature of human history, profoundly shaping societies, cultures, economies and politics. This is why political science, as well as other disciplines such as history, sociology and psychology, take such a keen interest in war. Europe has been largely spared direct armed conflict from the end of the Second World War in 1945 until 2022, thanks largely to the construction of the European Union, nuclear deterrence and the presence of NATO. There have been notable exceptions, such as the wars in the former Yugoslavia in the 1990s. Russia's invasion of Ukraine in 2022 is a sombre reminder that peace is never guaranteed and that war can break out even in regions that have enjoyed a long period of peace. The crisis has underlined existing tensions around the eastward expansion of NATO and the European Union, as well as Ukraine's aspirations to integrate further with Europe. This situation has profound implications for Europe and the world, in terms of security, political stability, international relations and human rights. Unfortunately, the prolonged peace that Europe has enjoyed is rare in human history. Many parts of the world have experienced regular armed conflict, and even today wars rage in places like the Middle East, Africa and Asia.

Political science as a distinct academic discipline began to take shape in the late 19th and early 20th centuries, a period marked by major political tensions and international conflicts. The experience of the First World War certainly fuelled interest in the systematic study of power, institutions, conflict and cooperation between states. The 20th century was marked by numerous conflicts, including the two world wars, the Cold War, and a multitude of regional wars, civil conflicts and proxy wars. These conflicts shaped the global political order and had a major impact on the development of political science. They have led to the emergence of new theories and approaches, such as realism and liberalism in international relations, which seek to explain the behaviour of states and the dynamics of international conflict. Political science has also been influenced by the technological, economic and social developments of the 20th century, such as the emergence of nuclear weapons, the globalisation of the economy, and the civil and human rights movements. All these factors helped to shape the discipline as we know it today. In short, war and conflict have played a crucial role in the birth and development of political science. They have stimulated reflection on fundamental issues such as power, authority, justice, security and international cooperation, which lie at the heart of the discipline.

First of all, the wars of decolonisation. After the Second World War, a wave of independence swept through many European colonies, leading to a series of wars of decolonisation. These wars were often characterised by power struggles between colonial forces and local nationalist movements. They had a profound impact on the shape of the post-colonial world order. Secondly, the Cold War era was marked by the constant threat of nuclear war between the superpowers. This threat was particularly evident in crises such as the Korean War and the Cuban missile crisis. These events underlined the existential risk posed by nuclear weapons and had a significant influence on international politics and political science theories. Finally, after the end of the Cold War, the United Nations played an increasingly important role in managing international conflicts, notably through peacekeeping missions. However, major conflicts such as the Gulf Wars and the war in Afghanistan have revealed the challenges and limits of international intervention. Each of these phases provides a different context for the study of conflict and war in political science. Changes in the nature of conflict, the actors involved, the technologies used, and international norms and institutions have all influenced the way political scientists approach the study of war and conflict.

The attack of 11 September 2001 marked a turning point in contemporary history and profoundly transformed world politics, particularly with regard to war and terrorism. This tragic event not only led to a war in Afghanistan, but also shaped the way the world perceives and fights terrorism. The war in Afghanistan, which began in 2001 in response to the September 11 attacks, was an attempt to dismantle al-Qa'ida, the terrorist group responsible for the attacks, and to overthrow the Taliban regime that harboured it. However, the war has had complex and lasting consequences, both for Afghanistan and for world politics. The war in Afghanistan demonstrated the difficulties associated with fighting terrorism on a global scale. It revealed the challenges of rebuilding a state after conflict, the complexity of counter-insurgency, and the problems associated with the long-term commitment of foreign forces to a country. The war has also had an impact on the way countries perceive and deal with the terrorist threat. It has led to changes in national security strategies, surveillance and civil rights legislation, and has influenced public discourse on terrorism and security.

A crucial aspect of the evolution of warfare is the change in the ratio of civilian to military casualties. Modern warfare often has a devastating impact on civilian populations, not only in terms of deaths and injuries, but also in terms of displacement, destruction of infrastructure and psychological trauma. In the Solferino War in the 19th century, the victims were mainly soldiers. However, with the First World War, the casualty figures began to change, with an almost equal proportion of military and civilian victims. This trend continued and even worsened throughout the twentieth century, particularly during the Second World War and in more recent conflicts. This trend is due to several factors. Firstly, the escalation of military technology, including weapons of mass destruction, has made conflicts more devastating and less discriminating. Secondly, military strategies have changed to increasingly target civilian infrastructure in order to undermine the enemy's morale and war effort. Finally, many modern conflicts take place within rather than between states, meaning that civilians are often caught in the line of fire. This change has important implications for political science and for the way we think about war. It raises questions about the legitimacy of the use of force, human rights, international humanitarian law and the responsibility to protect civilians in war.

What is war?[modifier | modifier le wikicode]

The changing nature of warfare has led to significant changes in its economics and in the proportion of civilian casualties. In addition, modern wars tend to last longer, with profound implications for society and the economy. In the past, the war economy focused primarily on the production of armaments and other goods needed for war. However, as military strategies evolved, the aim became to destroy the enemy's production tools in order to weaken its economy and therefore its ability to wage war. This led to an increase in the number of civilian casualties, as civilian infrastructures became military targets. In addition, the protracted nature of many modern conflicts has also had an impact on the economics of war. Instead of short-term intensive production to support the war effort, economies now have to manage the long-term effects of war, such as rebuilding after destruction and supporting the victims of war. These changes have major implications for political science, particularly with regard to questions of human rights, international humanitarian law and military strategy. They also highlight the importance of effective post-conflict peace management to minimise the long-term damage caused by war.

An interesting perspective on war is that of an extension of political dialogue, albeit in a violent and destructive form. This idea is in fact an interpretation of the famous quote by Carl von Clausewitz, the 19th century Prussian military strategist, who said that "war is the continuation of politics by other means". From this perspective, war is not simply a failure of politics, but another form of political dialogue, albeit a violent and destructive one. It is a time when conflicts and disputes are resolved by force rather than through dialogue or negotiation. In this sense, war can be seen as an "inversion of normality", where violence replaces peace as the primary means of conflict resolution. However, war also has profound and often devastating consequences. It results in the death and suffering of many people, the destruction of property and infrastructure, and can have lasting economic, political and social consequences. Therefore, although it can be seen as an extension of political dialogue, it is crucial to recognise the high human and social costs of war. It is precisely for these reasons that war is an important subject of study in political science. Understanding war, its causes and consequences, can help prevent future conflicts, effectively manage those that do occur and minimise the human and social costs of war.

French philosopher and writer George Bataille's definition of war as "a supreme game" underlines the seriousness and importance of the stakes involved. Compared to a game, war, in this context, is not light entertainment, but rather a strategic and potentially deadly activity that involves everything the participants have, including their lives. Seeing war as a strategic game, however, can have important implications for how we understand and manage it. In a game, there are usually rules to follow, strategies to develop and clearly defined winners and losers. If we apply this framework to war, it can help us to think more strategically about the conduct of war, how to minimise its costs and how to manage its consequences.

However, it is also important to note that war differs from ordinary games in several important ways. Firstly, the stakes are infinitely higher - it's not just points or trophies that are at stake, but human lives, societies and entire nations. Secondly, unlike most games, war is not always clearly delineated with fair and universally accepted rules. Finally, while in most games the aim is to win, in war the ultimate goal should always be to achieve a lasting and just peace. This is why political science, in studying war, seeks not only to understand how wars are won, but also how they can be prevented and how their consequences can be managed so as to promote peace and justice.

War can be seen as an 'inversion of a system' in the sense that it replaces the usual mechanisms of dialogue, negotiation and conflict resolution by force. In this context, "dialogue" is achieved not through words, but through acts of violence. This is precisely why war is so devastating and costly, both in terms of human lives and resources. It is also unpredictable, because once the use of force has been initiated, it is difficult to control or predict the outcome. It is also for this reason that political science, as well as other disciplines such as international relations, strive to understand the causes of war and to develop strategies to prevent conflict, manage wars when they occur and restore peace and stability after conflict. Ultimately, war is a "dialogue through force" with profound and lasting consequences. Understanding this "dialogue" is essential to promoting peace and security in the world.

War: an object of struggle between state powers[modifier | modifier le wikicode]

An ancient phenomenon vs. modern inter-state warfare[modifier | modifier le wikicode]

An ancient phenomenon: historical perspectives[modifier | modifier le wikicode]

The study of the mythical dimension of war is a fascinating aspect of political science. States and governments often use myths and narratives to justify war, galvanise public support and give meaning to the violence and sacrifice involved. These myths can take many forms and can be influenced by historical, cultural, religious and political factors. The concept of sacrifice is often central to these war myths. It may be invoked to emphasise the importance of the cause being fought for, to valorise the actions of soldiers, and to help rationalise the human costs of war. Sacrifice can be presented as a patriotic duty, an act of bravery, or a tragic necessity. However, war myths and the discourse of sacrifice can also serve to obscure the true costs and consequences of war, to marginalise dissenting voices, and to avoid a critical examination of the motivations and strategies of war. It is therefore important to interrogate and critique these myths, and to understand how they are constructed and used. Political science can contribute to this task by examining how war myths are created and maintained, how they influence policy and public perceptions of war, and how they can be challenged or deconstructed. This analysis can help to promote a better understanding of war and encourage more thoughtful and critical approaches to the politics of war.

When a country goes to war, there is often a kind of "flag rally" where internal political differences are temporarily put aside and a sense of national unity is cultivated. Ideological mobilisation" serves to strengthen social cohesion and facilitate the war effort. This cohesion was often underpinned by rhetoric that stigmatised dissent. Those who oppose the war, or even criticise it, may be accused of treason, lack of patriotism or not supporting the troops. This social pressure can be extremely powerful and can stifle the necessary public and critical debate. The example of the reaction to the September 11 attacks and President George W. Bush's decision to declare a "war on terror" illustrates this point well. Those who questioned this policy were often marginalised or denigrated. Yet, with hindsight, many of these criticisms have been validated. The conflict in Afghanistan, for example, proved to be a long and costly engagement that failed to achieve many of its key objectives. This underlines the importance of open and critical public debate in times of war. Political science can play an important role in providing rigorous and independent analyses of war decisions, questioning the underlying assumptions and highlighting the potential costs and consequences of these decisions.

War often has a sublimated character that can obscure rational and analytical judgements. The rhetoric of war can create a sense of urgency and grandeur that encourages binary thinking (us versus them), the glorification of sacrifice and a heightened tolerance for violence. This can lead to decisions based more on emotion than on a rational assessment of costs and benefits. The sublimation of war can also affect the way societies perceive and remember conflict. Wars can be romanticised or mythologised in order to minimise their darker and more unpleasant aspects. The human and material costs of war can be overlooked, while acts of bravery and sacrifice are emphasised. This is why it is crucial to maintain a critical and rational analysis in times of war. Political scientists and other researchers can help deconstruct the sublimation of war by critically examining war narratives, assessing the real costs of conflict and highlighting alternatives to violence. This approach can help prevent precipitous war decisions and encourage more peaceful and humanitarian policies.

Modern warfare: characteristics and current issues[modifier | modifier le wikicode]

Banquet of the Amsterdam Civic Guard on the occasion of the Peace of Münster by Bartholomeus van der Helst, painted in 1648

The Thirty Years' War, which took place mainly in Central Europe, is often regarded as a turning point in the history of warfare and diplomacy. Although it began as a religious conflict within the Holy Roman Empire, it soon involved several major European powers, including France, Sweden, Spain and Denmark, and became a struggle for political and territorial power.

The Thirty Years' War is particularly important in political science for several reasons:

  • The Treaty of Westphalia: This treaty, signed in 1648, marked the end of the Thirty Years' War and laid the foundations for the modern international order based on the system of sovereign states. This system, often referred to as the Westphalian system, defined the principles of national sovereignty and non-interference, which are still at the heart of international law today.
  • The transformation of warfare: The Thirty Years' War was one of the most destructive conflicts in European history, marked by widespread violence against civilians and an unprecedented level of destruction. This led to changes in the way war was fought, including the increasing use of standing armies and siege tactics.
  • The politicisation of religion: Although the war began as a religious conflict, it eventually evolved into a struggle for political power. This marked an important stage in the process of secularisation of European politics, where religion became a tool of political legitimisation rather than a driver of conflict.

Ultimately, the Thirty Years' War and the Treaty of Westphalia had a profound impact on the formation of the modern state and the international system, making them of great importance to political science.

The Treaty of Westphalia in 1648 is often regarded as the moment when the concept of state sovereignty was formally recognised in international law. This treaty ended the Thirty Years' War in Europe and established a system of sovereign states, where each state had exclusive control over its territory and population.

State sovereignty has several implications for warfare and international politics:

  • Interstate warfare: In the Westphalian system, war is primarily a matter between states. This means that wars are generally declared by governments, fought by regular armies and governed by international laws and customs.
  • The role of the nation state: The idea of the nation state implies that each state has the right to govern its own population without outside interference. This gives states the right to defend their territory and population, which can lead to conflict with other states.
  • The right to war: State sovereignty also implies the right to declare war and to make peace. This means that states have the right to use force to defend their interests, whether or not they are in a position to do so.

Public international law, in particular the law of war, focuses primarily on relations between sovereign states. It establishes a number of rules and principles that govern the behaviour of states in times of war. These rules include :

  • Modern diplomacy: International law has played a key role in establishing diplomatic norms and procedures, including diplomatic immunity, diplomatic and consular relations, and treaty negotiations.
  • State sovereignty: The principle of state sovereignty is fundamental to international law. This means that each state has the right to govern its own territory and conduct its international relations as it sees fit, provided it respects the rights of other states.
  • The declaration of war: Traditionally, international law required a state to formally declare war before commencing hostilities. Although this practice has largely been abandoned, international law still requires states to respect the principles of just war, including proportionality and discrimination between combatants and non-combatants.
  • The conclusion of war: International law also provides that wars must be ended by a peace treaty, which defines the terms of the end of hostilities and establishes a framework for the resolution of remaining disputes. This is important to ensure a peaceful transition to lasting peace after a conflict.

These rules are essential for maintaining order and stability in the international system. However, their application and observance can vary according to circumstances, and their violation can have serious consequences, including international sanctions and prosecution for war crimes.

Theorising war: approaches and key thinkers[modifier | modifier le wikicode]

War, in the context of political science, has long been regarded as a natural extension of politics itself. This concept has been theorised by a number of influential thinkers over the centuries, including the famous Chinese military strategist Sun Tzu, who wrote The Art of War, a treatise on military strategy. In the Western context, philosophers such as Plato and Aristotle also considered politics to be an "art". For them, politics is the art of governing and taking decisions for the good of the city. In this sense, war can be seen as an extreme extension of this "art", when dialogue and negotiation fail and force becomes the principal means of resolving conflicts. From this point of view, war is not only an activity involving military strategies and tactics, but also a field that requires deep reflection and an understanding of the political and social issues at stake. This is why war is an important subject of study in political science, as it offers valuable insights into how societies manage conflict, authority and power.

The art of war, as conceptualised by historical figures such as Sun Tzu and Napoleon, is a complex game of strategy that combines respect for certain established norms with innovation and surprise. Napoleon, for example, often circumvented the conventions of war to surprise his enemies and gain a strategic advantage. In doing so, he not only demonstrated military genius, but also underlined the dynamic and unpredictable nature of war. Despite the existence of certain norms and rules, war is often defined by its unpredictability and its ability to exceed established expectations. This complex reality defies attempts to categorise war as a strictly regulated or completely chaotic phenomenon. Instead, war can be better understood as a phenomenon that oscillates between these two extremes, where strategy and surprise constantly coexist and interact.

War is framed by a number of norms and rules - be they international laws governing conduct in war, bilateral treaties between countries, or the unwritten rules of military engagement. These norms provide a structure and predictability to war, allowing the parties in conflict to predict (to some extent) the actions of the other. However, war also involves going beyond these norms. Whether out of necessity, strategy or desperation, parties to a conflict can and often will go beyond the established rules. This can take the form of guerrilla tactics, surprise attacks, the use of prohibited weapons, or even the direct violation of the laws of war. This tension between the norm and going beyond the norm is what makes war so unpredictable and, therefore, so difficult to study and understand. For political science and similar disciplines, this means that we must constantly adapt and reassess our understandings and theories of war to take account of this complex and changing reality.

It is important for the social sciences, and political science in particular, to recognise and explore this complexity. By treating war not only as a series of strategies and tactics, but also as a broader social, political and cultural phenomenon, researchers can gain a deeper and more nuanced understanding of the nature of war and its impact on human societies.

War poses major problems for philosophy and raises essential questions about the nature of human culture and consciousness. From a philosophical point of view, war can be analysed on several levels. For example, moral philosophy examines questions of justice and ethics in the context of war. What justifies the outbreak of war (jus ad bellum)? How should it be fought (jus in bello)? What are the moral obligations towards non-combatants or prisoners of war? These questions are often debated in the context of just war theory. War also raises profound questions about the nature of human culture and consciousness. Why do human societies resort to war? How does war influence culture, art, literature and other forms of human expression? How does war affect our understanding of ourselves and our place in the world? Political philosophy looks at the role of the state and power in war. What is the role of the state in declaring war and conducting hostilities? What is the role of the citizen in wartime? What is the relationship between war and sovereignty, or war and democracy? These questions are just some of the many ways in which war can be approached from a philosophical perspective. War, as a social and political phenomenon, is a complex reality that can be analysed and understood in a variety of ways through the prism of philosophy.

War is a phenomenon that goes far beyond military action. It can be analysed from a number of angles, including political philosophy, sociology, economics and psychology, among others. Political philosophy can address issues such as the moral justification of war (the just war theory, for example), the role of the state and sovereignty in conflict, or the impact of war on notions of freedom and human rights. From a sociological perspective, war can be analysed in terms of social interaction, the formation of groups and identities, or the impact on social structure and culture. We can also look at how war affects norms and values, and how it is perceived and understood by those who experience it. Economics can look at the impact of war on the economy ('total war' and the war economy, for example), or at the role of economic resources in the conduct and cause of war. Psychology can look at the impact of war on the human mind, whether in terms of combat stress, post-traumatic stress disorder, or the wider impact of war on attitudes and behaviour. War is a complex and multidimensional phenomenon that can be studied from many different angles, each bringing its own perspective and its own analytical tools.

Hugo Grotius (1583-1645): Natural law and the foundations of just war[modifier | modifier le wikicode]

Hugo GrotiusPortrait par Michiel Jansz. van Mierevelt (1631).

Hugo Grotius, a 17th-century Dutch jurist, is widely recognised as one of the founders of modern international law. His work De Jure Belli ac Pacis (On the Law of War and Peace), first published in 1625, remains a major reference in the field. In this text, Grotius laid the foundations of the theory of "just war", which deals with the morality and legality of engaging in war and the conduct of war. He also laid the foundations for many principles of modern international law, such as national sovereignty and the equality of states. Grotius argued that certain moral principles apply even in times of war. For example, he insisted that non-combatant civilians should be spared as far as possible, and that cruel or inhuman treatment of prisoners of war was unacceptable. These ideas were revolutionary at the time and continue to influence the way we think about war today. The concepts of "just war" and "unjust war" are still widely debated in academic, political and military circles. They also play a key role in the development and application of international humanitarian law, which seeks to limit the effects of war and protect those who are most vulnerable in times of conflict.

Hugo Grotius laid the foundations of the law of war, seeking to determine when a war could be considered 'just'. He highlighted two types of war that could be justified under international law:

  • Defensive war: Grotius maintained that war waged in defence against external aggression was justified. This idea remains central to contemporary international law, where the right to self-defence is recognised as a fundamental principle.
  • Coercive war: Grotius also thought that a war could be justified if it was waged to punish those who had violated the law. This idea is more controversial and more difficult to implement in practice. It raises complex questions about who has the right to judge whether the law has been broken, and what are the appropriate methods of punishment.

Although Grotius believed that these types of warfare could be justified, he also emphasised the importance of observing certain rules and ethical standards during the conduct of war, such as the prohibition on deliberately attacking non-combatants.

Grotius established that certain forms of war were illegitimate and unjust. In particular, he opposed wars of conquest. In his view, a nation state had no right to wage war with the aim of annexing or conquering other states. This principle is fundamental to contemporary international law, which prohibits the acquisition of territory by force. Although these principles were formulated centuries ago, they are still widely accepted today. The United Nations Charter, for example, explicitly prohibits the use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of another state. Such principles continue to guide the way in which international conflicts are managed and resolved.

For Hugo Grotius, the law of war and the law of peace are intimately linked. Indeed, the conception of war as a phenomenon that must be governed by certain legal rules and principles also suggests that there are certain conditions that must be met in order to establish a just and lasting peace. According to Grotius, an aggressor who violates the principles of the law of war must be held accountable. This could include sanctions or other forms of repercussions from other states. In this way, the law of war also serves to define and promote justice in peacetime. These ideas continue to be influential in contemporary international law. For example, the concept of the 'responsibility to protect' suggests that the international community has a duty to intervene when a state grossly violates the rights of its own citizens. Finally, it is interesting to note that Grotius' work laid the foundations for the later development of international humanitarian law, which seeks to limit the effects of war on people and property.

Thomas Hobbes (1588-1679): The state of nature and war as a state of permanent conflict[modifier | modifier le wikicode]

The Leviathan, or Treatise on the Matter, Form and Power of an Ecclesiastical and Civil Republic, 1651.

In his work "Leviathan", Thomas Hobbes reflects on human nature and the state of nature, which he sees as a state of perpetual war between all against all ("bellum omnium contra omnes"). According to Hobbes, without a strong central authority to maintain order, human life would be "lonely, poor, unpleasant, brutish and short". In Hobbes' state of nature, individuals are motivated by their own interests and fears. Competition for limited resources, distrust and the desire to gain reputation can lead to a state of constant conflict. To escape this state of war, Hobbes argues that individuals enter into a social contract in which they give up part of their freedom in favour of a sovereign, whom Hobbes calls Leviathan. The role of this sovereign is to maintain peace and order by exercising unchallengeable authority. Hobbes' ideas have had a major influence on modern political theory and the conception of the state. They emphasise the importance of a strong central power to prevent conflict and guarantee the security of citizens.

For Thomas Hobbes, the state of nature is characterised by chaos and uncertainty. According to Hobbes, in this state, individuals are free, but they are also constantly in danger because there is no law or central authority to regulate their behaviour. In the state of nature, individuals are guided by their own interests and by the fear of death. Their absolute freedom is therefore accompanied by constant competition for resources and security. This creates an unstable situation where danger and conflict are omnipresent - a situation Hobbes describes as a "war of all against all". To avoid this chaos, Hobbes proposes the idea of a social contract in which individuals voluntarily cede part of their freedom to an absolute sovereign. In exchange, this sovereign provides them with security and order, which is preferable to the uncertainty and violence of the state of nature.

For Hobbes, the state is the guarantor of social peace, an institution necessary to avoid the "war of all against all" that reigns in the state of nature. In his view, the state is founded on a social contract, a form of agreement to which individuals consent in order to escape the chaos of the state of nature. In this contract, individuals agree to give up some of their freedoms and submit their will to that of the sovereign. In return, the sovereign is responsible for maintaining order, ensuring the safety of individuals and preserving the peace. For Hobbes, the sovereign's authority is absolute and indivisible, because it is the only way to ensure peace and prevent a return to the state of nature. This concept has had a major influence on political theory and continues to be debated today. For example, it raises questions about the right balance between security and liberty, or the role and limits of state power.

For Hobbes, one of the main responsibilities of the sovereign is to maintain the peace and security of society. To this end, the sovereign has the right to raise an army and to use force if necessary. Hobbes saw the army as a necessary institution to protect society against external and internal threats. Without a military force to ensure security, Hobbes believes that society would be in danger of falling back into the state of nature, where there is a "war of all against all". However, Hobbes also warned against the dangers of abuse of military power by the sovereign. He stresses the importance of the social contract, in which the sovereign is obliged to respect the rights and freedoms of individuals in exchange for their obedience.

It is also important to note that Hobbes was writing in a specific historical context, that of seventeenth-century England, which was marked by civil war. His political theory therefore reflects the concerns of his time, but continues to provoke important discussions in contemporary political philosophy.

Immanuel Kant (1724-1804): Towards perpetual peace and the legitimacy of defensive wars[modifier | modifier le wikicode]

Immanuel Kant, in his essay "Project of Perpetual Peace" (1795), asks how lasting peace can be achieved between nations. His work on this subject has greatly influenced political philosophy and theories of international law. Kant proposes several ideas for achieving "perpetual peace". The first is that the "republican constitution" is the most peaceful form of government, because it gives the people the power to decide whether to go to war or not, and the people, being the ones who suffer the consequences of war, are less likely to choose it. The second idea is the "federation of free nations", a kind of league of nations, where states retain their sovereignty but agree to adhere to a common set of international laws to prevent conflict. Finally, Kant argued that perpetual peace could only be achieved when universal human rights were respected, which implied equal rights for all individuals, regardless of their nationality.

Immanuel Kant argued that peace cannot be based on emotion or affect. On the contrary, it must be based on rationality. For him, it is reason, not emotion, that can motivate people to seek and accept peace. This approach is fundamentally moral, because it asks individuals to put the common good before their own personal interests. According to this vision, true peace can only be achieved when individuals and nations adopt a rational approach, pooling their differences and working together for the common good. This vision implies a certain mutualisation of differences and conflicts: instead of seeking to impose their own will by force, each side must seek to understand and respect the perspectives of the others. This is what Kant meant by a "federation of free nations". Ultimately, Kant's idea is that perpetual peace is not just a dream or a romantic idea, but a goal that can be achieved by rational and moral means. This idea has had a major influence on modern theories of international justice and on the design of international institutions.

Portrait of Immanuel Kant.

Immanuel Kant argued for the invention of an international law of peace, recognising the need to manage power relations between nations. He argued that this regulation was essential because wars were inevitable. Kant's major contribution lies in his assertion that the public international law to be constructed should not be based on the principle of the "right of the strongest". On the contrary, it must be fundamentally distinct and aim at peace rather than war. In other words, international law should not simply serve to justify conflicts or to regulate their course, but rather to prevent them and to promote the peaceful resolution of disputes. This law of peace is based on the recognition of the sovereign equality of States and respect for human rights, two principles that are essential to preventing war and promoting peace. It is in this respect that Kant's approach was revolutionary and laid the foundations for contemporary international law, which emphasises conflict prevention and the promotion of lasting peace.

Immanuel Kant, in his essay entitled "Project of Perpetual Peace", presented a plan for establishing peace and avoiding wars. It is a reflection structured on three levels:

  1. Internal political law: According to Kant, to achieve lasting peace, every state must adopt a republican constitution. In other words, it must ensure a democratic government that respects human rights and the law. This would help to resolve internal conflicts peacefully and democratically.
  2. International inter-federal/inter-state law: Once peace has been established within states, it can be extended to international relations as a whole. To this end, Kant proposes the creation of a "federation of free nations", which would be a group of states united by mutual peace treaties and committed to resolving their differences non-violently.
  3. International law of hospitality: This level represents Kant's cosmopolitan vision. It is a principle that implies respect for foreigners and the possibility of peaceful relations with them. According to Kant, every individual has the right to visit another country, as long as they behave peacefully, and every country has a duty to welcome foreign visitors. This principle establishes the basis for cosmopolitan international law.

Thus, the Kantian vision of perpetual peace is based on a multiscalar approach that requires both internal (national) and external (international) changes. It is a conception that continues to influence contemporary debates on international law and world peace.

Kant's philosophy is fundamentally based on freedom and respect for human rights. He saw war as the ultimate result of political systems that denied freedom, violated human rights and were dominated by autocratic or dictatorial authorities. For Kant, lasting peace can only be achieved by building political systems that respect human rights and are democratic and republican. The concept of "limited sovereignty" is a key element of this vision, as it implies that even if a state is sovereign, it must not have the right to oppress its population or violate human rights. Furthermore, to avoid conflict between states, Kant proposed the idea of a "federation of free nations". According to this idea, sovereign states must freely agree to limit their actions and respect international law in order to maintain world peace. Thus, Kant's philosophy puts forward the idea that peace can only be guaranteed by adherence to democratic principles, respect for human rights, and international cooperation within the framework of international law respected by all.

Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel (1770-1831): The dialectics of war and historical progress[modifier | modifier le wikicode]

Portrait of Hegel by Schlesinger (1831).

For Hegel, war is a phenomenon that is deeply rooted in human nature and the dynamics of history. It is the result of historical dialectics and the interplay of thesis and antithesis, in which war acts as an agent of change and progression in history. Hegel sees war as a moment in the manifestation of the national will. In his view, it is a moment when national consciousness is strengthened and crystallised. War can be seen as an expression of the nation's free and subjective will, i.e. as an extension of the nation's will to assert and preserve its existence. For Hegel, however, war is not an end in itself. Rather, it is a necessary and tragic stage in human history, which ultimately leads to greater self-awareness and freedom. Thus, despite the chaos and destruction it engenders, war is also a means of advancing history towards a fuller realisation of human freedom.

According to Hegelian philosophy, war has an essential role to play in the affirmation of individual subjectivity and in the evolution of human history. Hegel argues that war, destructive though it may be, plays a crucial role in the consolidation of a community, as it forces individuals to unite their efforts in order to survive. Paradoxically, war can also help to forge a stronger national or collective identity, as it creates a common 'other' against which a community must fight. From this perspective, war can be seen as a factor of social and political cohesion. War, as a confrontation of the human will, also enables individuals to confront their mortality and define themselves in opposition to death. It is in this sense that Hegel claims that war is an affirmation of subjectivity. However, although Hegel sees a role for war in the development of human history, this does not mean that he glorifies or promotes it. On the contrary, for Hegel, war is a tragic manifestation of the contradictions of human history, a contradiction that can ultimately lead to a greater realisation of human freedom.

René Girard, a French philosopher and anthropologist, developed a theory known as the 'scapegoat theory' to explain human violence. According to Girard, social conflicts arise because of mimetic rivalry - a desire to possess the same things as others, which becomes contagious within a society. As tensions rise, society seeks to restore order by turning against a 'scapegoat' - usually a marginalised person or group. By coming together to punish the scapegoat, the community is able to channel its violence and re-establish a sense of social cohesion.

Girard also applied his theory to war, arguing that war can play the same role as scapegoating in reconciling social tensions. Like Hegel, Girard sees war as a means by which a community can sublimate its internal differences to face a common external threat. Nevertheless, Girard's perspective, like Hegel's, does not justify war. On the contrary, it offers an analysis of how violence can become a means of establishing social order, while highlighting the tragic human cost of this dynamic.

Niccolò Machiavelli (1469-1527): Political realism and the strategies of war[modifier | modifier le wikicode]

Posthumous portrait of Machiavelli by Santi di Tito, in Florence's Palazzo Vecchio.

Niccolò Machiavelli, an Italian Renaissance politician and writer, is best known for his work The Prince, which is often regarded as a pragmatic guide to political leadership. In it, he depicts the exercise of power, not as it should be according to ideal or ethical principles, but as it actually is in practice. In The Prince, Machiavelli argues that rulers must be prepared to act immorally if necessary to maintain their power and ensure the stability of their state. For example, he suggests that although it is better for a prince to be loved and feared, if he has to choose between the two, it is safer to be feared. Machiavelli's approach to war is very realistic. He insisted that rulers must always be prepared for war and ready to wage it if necessary. For him, war was a political tool, necessary to maintain and extend power. Machiavelli was also a fervent advocate of citizens' militias. He believed that citizens who had a direct interest in defending their homeland would make better soldiers than mercenaries or troops raised abroad. This idea is reflected in his other major work, Discourse on the First Decade of Titus Livius.

Machiavelli is famous for his statement that "the end justifies the means". This means that he believed that a leader's actions can be justified by the results they produce, even if those actions are in themselves morally reprehensible. Machiavelli believed that politics and morality were distinct domains. In politics, he held that the success and survival of the state were the most important objectives. Consequently, a leader might have to take difficult, even immoral, decisions to achieve these goals. War, for example, is considered immoral by many, but for Machiavelli it could be justified if necessary to protect the state. Furthermore, Machiavelli considered the art of war to be an essential skill for a leader. He argued that a prince who neglects the art of war jeopardises his kingdom and his own security. According to him, even in times of peace, a leader.

The adjective 'Machiavellian' is often used to describe a person who is prepared to use deceitful or immoral means to achieve their goals. It is a reference to Machiavelli's idea that "the end justifies the means". This means that, for a Machiavellian person, the objective is more important than the actions taken to achieve it. So it doesn't matter if the actions are deceitful, dishonest or even cruel, as long as they achieve the objective. This is a rather negative and simplified interpretation of Machiavelli's philosophy. His writings were much more complex and nuanced, and he did not necessarily advocate immoral behaviour in all circumstances. However, this is how his name is often used in everyday language.

Niccolò Machiavelli, in his work The Prince, emphasises the importance of war for a ruler. For him, the ideal leader must always be ready for war, both in terms of physical and mental preparation. Machiavelli did not glorify war per se, but considered the art of war to be a necessary skill for any good ruler. He argues that one of the main roles of a ruler is to protect the state and its citizens, which may require the use of war. Machiavelli was writing in a historical context in which Italy was divided into numerous city-states that were often in conflict with each other. Consequently, war was a daily and inevitable reality. However, this does not mean that he values war as such, but rather that he recognises and analyses the role that war plays in politics. Nevertheless, these perspectives have often been misinterpreted or simplified over the centuries, leading to a perception of Machiavelli as an unscrupulous strategist advocating the use of war for personal or political gain.

Antoine-Henri de Jomini (1779-1869): Military strategy and the principles of warfare[modifier | modifier le wikicode]

Antoine-Henri Jomini was a Swiss general and military theorist who lived from 1779 to 1869. Jomini served in Napoleon's armies and later joined the Russian army. He is best known for his writings on military strategy and tactics. His best-known work, "Précis de l'art de la guerre" (1838), is considered one of the founding texts of modern military strategy. In it, Jomini set out his ideas on the fundamental principles of warfare, including the importance of concentrating forces, speed of action and freedom of manoeuvre. Jomini also identified what he considered to be the key elements of a good military strategy: attacking the enemy where he is weakest, concentrating forces on a decisive point, freedom of manoeuvre and a clear and effective chain of command. Jomini's theories influenced many military strategists throughout the 19th and early 20th centuries, and his work continues to be studied at military academies around the world.

Antoine-Henri Jomini is widely recognised as one of the most influential theorists of military strategy. In his "Précis de l'art de la guerre", he defined strategy as the art of properly directing the mass of armed forces, concentrating them on a decisive point. For Jomini, strategy consisted of determining when, where and with what force to attack the enemy. It was a matter of planning and preparation that required an in-depth knowledge of geography, logistics and available resources. Jomini identified several basic principles for the effective conduct of warfare, including the concentration of forces on a decisive point, speed of action and economy of forces. He also introduced the notion of the "line of operations", which is the most direct and secure route between an army and its supply base, and emphasised the importance of logistics in the success of military operations.

The elements below are all part of the art of war in the broadest sense. They reflect several crucial aspects of military strategy and tactics.

  1. Troop positioning: where and how forces are deployed on the ground can have a significant impact on the success of a military campaign. Commanders must take into account the terrain, communication and supply routes, and the enemy's position.
  2. In situ analysis of the forces present: understanding the strengths and weaknesses of your own troops and those of the enemy is crucial to planning an effective strategy.
  3. How to attack weak points: identifying and exploiting the enemy's weaknesses is a fundamental part of military strategy.
  4. The tactical conditions for pursuing the enemy: after a victory, it can be advantageous to pursue the enemy to maximise disorder and minimise their ability to regroup and counter-attack.
  5. Controlling movement: controlling the movement of one's own troops and, as far as possible, those of the enemy, is another key aspect of military strategy.
  6. Incorporating the concept of mobility and surprise: the ability to move quickly and surprise the enemy can often be a decisive factor in warfare.
  7. Ruse, such as false attacks, the appearance of stalling and counter-attacks: using deception to disorientate and destabilise the enemy can also be an effective tactic.

All these aspects are essential to understanding and conducting an effective military campaign.

Jomini's ideas on military strategy were formulated in the context of Napoleon's wars, and were influenced by observation of Napoleon's campaigns. They continue to be studied and applied in contemporary military theory.

Carl von Clausewitz (1780-1831): The political nature of war and the trinity of violence[modifier | modifier le wikicode]

Carl von Clausewitz, in his famous book "On War", argues that "war is the continuation of politics by other means". For him, war is never an end in itself, but a tool that states use to achieve political objectives. It is a means of forcing the enemy to accept the will of the state.

The issue of "endless wars", such as the one waged by the United States in Afghanistan for two decades, is often seen as a sign of failure to define and achieve clear political objectives. This can be due to a number of factors, such as shifting political objectives, overly ambitious or ill-defined goals, or unforeseen obstacles to achieving those goals. It is also important to remember that Clausewitz's perspective on war is essentially that of conventional interstate conflict. Many modern conflicts involve non-state actors, such as terrorist groups or militias, and may be influenced by factors such as ethnic or religious divisions, which do not easily fit into the framework of war as politics by other means. These wars can seem "endless" because they are not fought to achieve clear political objectives, but rather are the result of deep social divisions, inequality, poverty and other structural factors.

The Westphalian system, established by the Treaties of Westphalia in 1648, is based on the principle of the sovereignty of nation states. In this system, war is traditionally seen as a means of resolving conflicts between states with a view to restoring peace. When we speak of "endless war", we are generally referring to conflicts that do not appear to be heading towards a peaceful resolution. This may be due to a multitude of reasons, such as ill-defined political objectives, the absence of a clearly defined enemy (as in the case of the "war on terror"), unforeseen obstacles to peace, or conflicts beyond the control of states. The idea that "the time of war is a time of reversal to return to peace" reflects the belief that war is a temporary and exceptional state, and that the final objective must always be the restoration of peace. This underlines the importance of diplomatic engagement, negotiation and compromise in resolving conflicts.

Carl von Clausewitz.

In the spirit of Westphalian warfare, war is subordinate to politics. Clausewitz's famous quote "war is the continuation of politics by other means" emphasises that war is a tool used by states to achieve their political objectives. He saw war as a rational action, directed and controlled by the state, aimed at achieving specific political objectives. However, in today's context, the idea that war is waged under the control and at the instigation of the state is sometimes called into question. With the emergence of non-state groups, asymmetric conflicts, transnational terrorism and cyber attacks, war is no longer confined to states. In these cases, an end to hostilities may be more difficult to achieve, as the actors involved may not have clear or shared political objectives that could be resolved through negotiation or diplomacy. In addition, the absence of stable state or institutional structures in some regions may hinder the conclusion of war. In such contexts, war can become a perpetual state, with fluctuating levels of violence, rather than a temporary 'parenthesis'.

Conflicts in regions such as Darfur have often led to a form of privatisation of war, where the traditional role of the state in the conduct of war is replaced or supplemented by a multitude of non-state actors. This can include local militias, rebel groups, private military companies and even international actors. One of the consequences of this development is the fragmentation of authority and sovereignty. Instead of a central state controlling the whole territory and exercising a monopoly on legitimate violence, there is a multitude of actors controlling different parts of the territory and carrying out violent actions independently of each other. This greatly complicates efforts to end the war and establish a lasting peace. It is difficult to reach a peace agreement when many actors have conflicting claims and there is no central authority to impose or guarantee the agreement. Furthermore, the privatisation of war can lead to high levels of violence, particularly against civilians, as non-state actors may not respect the laws of war in the same way as states. In this context, traditional approaches to conflict resolution may not be sufficient. It may be necessary to adopt more complex and nuanced approaches, which take into account the multitude of actors involved and their divergent interests and motivations. This may include efforts to strengthen local governance, promote community reconciliation and ensure accountability for human rights violations.

Clausewitz's idea that "war is the continuation of politics by other means" means that war is fundamentally a political tool. It is used to achieve political objectives that diplomatic methods have failed to achieve. Consequently, the end of war implies a return to political means of resolving conflicts. This perspective underlines the importance of political governance in conflict management and in the transition from war to peace. If politics cannot regain the upper hand, conflict can drag on and war can become a permanent state. This can happen in so-called "failed states", where political institutions are too weak to impose order and resolve conflicts peacefully. It can also occur in situations where the parties to the conflict have lost confidence in the political mechanisms and no longer believe in the possibility of a peaceful resolution. The war thus continues until a political solution is found - whether through peace negotiations, international mediation or the establishment of new political structures. In this sense, Clausewitz emphasises the crucial importance of politics in resolving conflicts and restoring peace.

Clausewitz emphasised the vital importance of maintaining political control over military action. For him, war was a tool that politics could and should use to achieve its objectives. It is politics that gives war its purpose and raison d'être, and therefore determines when it begins, when it ends and how it is fought. When war gets out of hand, the consequences can be catastrophic. We risk descending into a state of perpetual conflict, where violence and chaos reign, and the logic of war replaces the logic of politics. This kind of situation is often seen in areas of protracted conflict, where political institutions are weak or absent, and where war becomes a way of life rather than a means of achieving specific political objectives. This is why it is so crucial for politics to maintain control over war. Without effective political control, war can become autonomous and uncontrollable, with devastating consequences for society and humanity.

It's an interesting and sometimes paradoxical perspective. In certain situations, war can be used as a negotiating tool. When political dialogue fails or is blocked, war can create a new dynamic and force the parties to reconsider their positions. For example, one party may use the threat or use of force to increase its negotiating position and push its opponents to make concessions. In addition, war can sometimes expose difficult truths and reveal deep-rooted problems that need to be resolved if lasting peace is to be achieved. Conflicts can highlight inequalities, abuses of power and injustices that have been ignored or hidden, paving the way for their resolution as part of a peace process.

Maurice Davie (1893-1964): Contemporary transformations in warfare and new challenges[modifier | modifier le wikicode]

Maurice R. Davie is a sociologist renowned for his work on war and conflict in human societies. In his 1930 article "The Evolution of War", Davie examined the origins of war in primitive societies.

He identifies several reasons why these societies might go to war:

  1. Vital competition for group survival: In an environment where resources are limited, groups may come into conflict over food, water, territory and other vital resources. These wars were often a matter of survival, with the winning group guaranteeing its access to these resources.
  2. Religious disputes: Religious beliefs were often deeply rooted in primitive societies, and any clash of interpretations or beliefs could lead to war. Furthermore, in some cultures, there was a belief that victory in war was proof of divine favouritism, which could further encourage conflict.
  3. Blood vengeance: In many primitive cultures, an offence against a member of the group was often avenged by murder or war. This cycle of revenge could lead to a series of conflicts perpetuated over time.
  4. Glory: In some societies, glory and honour gained through battle were highly prized. Warriors might seek war in order to gain higher social status and prestige.

While these factors may have played a role in primitive societies, they are also present in many contemporary conflicts.

Marvin Harris (1927-2001): Anthropological approaches to war and its socio-cultural motivations[modifier | modifier le wikicode]

Marvin Harris.

Marvin Harris (1927-2001) was an American anthropologist and a leading figure in the development of cultural materialism, a theoretical framework that explains cultural practices in terms of the practical problems of human existence, such as the production of food and other material goods, rather than in terms of abstract ideas or values.

Harris is well known for his work in explaining social phenomena using a materialist approach. He argued that societal characteristics such as social structure, culture and even religious beliefs are largely shaped by practical considerations, particularly those related to subsistence and economics. Harris's best-known works include "The Rise of Anthropological Theory" (1968), "Cannibals and Kings" (1977) and "Cows, Pigs, Wars and Witches: The Riddles of Culture" (1974). In these and other works, he explored a wide range of subjects - from the sacred status of cows in India to the practice of cannibalism in prehistoric societies - always with the aim of showing how cultural practices that may seem strange or irrational are in fact sensible adaptations to material conditions. Harris's work has been hugely influential and continues to be widely read and debated in the field of anthropology.

In his 1974 book, "Cows, Pigs, Wars and Witches: The Riddles of Culture", Marvin Harris proposed several theories concerning the origin of war in primitive societies.

  1. War as solidarity: Harris suggests that war can serve as a means of strengthening group solidarity and identity. In a situation of conflict, individuals in a group can feel more united, which reinforces the group's legitimacy.
  2. War as play: This theory proposes that war can have a playful dimension in certain primitive societies. In fact, in many cultures, war games or games that imitate combat are common. Modern sporting activities can be seen as a continuation of this 'playful' dimension of war.
  3. War is part of human nature: This theory proposes that war is an inevitable aspect of human nature. It suggests that conflict and confrontation are part of human nature and that war is simply an extension of that nature.
  4. War as a continuation of politics: This theory is similar to that proposed by Clausewitz, according to which war is a continuation of politics by other means. In this case, war is seen as a political tool used to achieve political objectives.

It is important to note that these theories are not mutually exclusive and that they may all play a role in the origin of war in primitive societies.

War and peace: a legal issue and one of international governance[modifier | modifier le wikicode]

The Law of War or the Law of The Hague[modifier | modifier le wikicode]

The Treaty of Westphalia, signed in 1648, marked the end of the Thirty Years' War in Europe. It also laid the foundations for the modern international system of sovereign states. The treaty recognised that each state had the right to govern its territory without outside interference, an idea that is now fundamental to international law.

The "Law of the Hague" refers to a series of international conventions that were negotiated at The Hague in the Netherlands in the late 19th and early 20th centuries. These conventions established rules for the conduct of warfare, including the treatment of prisoners of war and the protection of civilians. They form an important part of international humanitarian law.

Japan's attack on Pearl Harbor in December 1941 was considered a flagrant breach of the rules of war, as it was launched without a prior declaration of war. The attack led to the United States' entry into the Second World War. Subsequently, at the Tokyo Trials (the Pacific equivalent of the Nuremberg Trials), several Japanese leaders and military personnel were convicted of war crimes committed during the war, including the attack on Pearl Harbor.

International humanitarian law (IHL), often referred to as the law of war, lays down specific rules to be observed in wartime. It defines what is permitted and what is prohibited during armed conflict, regardless of the motive for the conflict. Here are some of the main obligations:

  • Distinction: parties to a conflict must always distinguish between combatants and civilians. Attacks may only be directed against combatants and military objectives, never against civilians or civilian objects.
  • Proportionality: even in the case of a legitimate attack against a military target, it is prohibited to launch an attack which could cause excessive civilian casualties in relation to the concrete and direct military advantage anticipated.
  • Precaution: all feasible precautions must be taken to avoid or minimise civilian casualties in an attack against a military target.

IHL also offers special protection to persons who are not, or are no longer, taking part in hostilities, such as prisoners of war and the wounded. They have the right to be treated humanely, without discrimination. It is important to note that IHL applies to all parties to a conflict, regardless of the motive for the conflict or whether it is considered "just" or "unjust".

International humanitarian law (IHL) sets limits on the conduct of war and provides for sanctions against those who break these rules. For example, IHL explicitly prohibits the use of chemical or biological weapons, the use of bullets that expand or deform easily in the human body, and any attack that would cause excessive damage to civilians or the natural environment. In addition, countries that violate these rules can be held accountable for their actions. This may involve economic sanctions, diplomatic restrictions or even legal action. Individuals can also be held responsible for their actions during armed conflict and can be prosecuted for war crimes, crimes against humanity or genocide. The United Nations Security Council plays an important role in the application of IHL. It has the power to impose sanctions, recommend military action and refer cases to the International Criminal Court for investigation and prosecution.

International humanitarian law or Geneva law[modifier | modifier le wikicode]

International humanitarian law (IHL), often referred to as Geneva law, aims primarily to protect people who are not, or are no longer, taking part in hostilities, including civilians, the wounded, the sick and prisoners of war. It also aims to restrict the use of certain methods and means of warfare. It derives mainly from the Geneva Conventions of 1949 and their Additional Protocols, which laid down rules for the protection of non-combatants in wartime. For example, the Geneva Conventions lay down rules for the treatment of prisoners of war, prohibit the use of torture, and protect civilians in the event of military occupation. The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) plays an essential role in the promotion and application of IHL. It is partly thanks to the initiative of this organisation that IHL exists today.

Distinctions between civilians and combatants, and between combatants and prisoners of war, are key elements of international humanitarian law. These distinctions are essential to protect people who are not (or are no longer) taking a direct part in hostilities.

  • Combatants are members of the armed forces of a party to a conflict who take a direct part in hostilities. Combatants have the right to take a direct part in hostilities, which means that they cannot be prosecuted for taking part in the fighting. However, they are also legitimate targets for the other side.
  • Civilians are people who are not taking a direct part in hostilities. They are protected from attack unless and until they take a direct part in hostilities.
  • Prisoners of war are combatants who have been captured by the enemy. They are entitled to a number of protections under the Third Geneva Convention, including the right not to be tortured, the right to correspond with their families, and the right not to be prosecuted for taking a legitimate part in hostilities.

Respect for these distinctions is essential to reduce unnecessary suffering in wartime.

In theory, the end of a war is often determined by a peace treaty or ceasefire agreement, but there is no precise international legal framework governing how a conflict should end. The notion of "jus post bellum", or law after war, is an emerging concept in international law that seeks to establish ethical and legal principles for the transition from war to peace. It includes issues such as the responsibility to rebuild after conflict, the prosecution and punishment of war crimes, and the restoration of human rights and the rule of law. The idea is to ensure a just and sustainable transition to peace, while taking into account the rights of victims and the needs of post-conflict societies. However, in 2023, there is still no international consensus on what "jus post bellum" should be, and it remains an active area of research and debate.

There are two fundamental concepts that underpin the whole governance of international security and international law.

Universality suggests that certain norms and principles are applicable to all, regardless of culture, religion, ethnicity, nationality, etc. This is particularly relevant to human rights and international humanitarian law. This is particularly relevant to human rights, which are considered universal and inalienable.

The idea of humanity means that all human beings belong to a global community and share a certain dignity and fundamental rights. It also means that certain acts are so grave and inhuman that they constitute an attack on the human community as a whole. These acts may include genocide, war crimes, crimes against humanity, and torture.

These concepts provide a basis for international humanitarian law, which protects individuals in times of war, and international criminal law, which allows for the prosecution and conviction of individuals responsible for serious violations of these norms.

After the First World War, the League of Nations was created with the aim of maintaining international peace and security by promoting dialogue and cooperation between nations. However, the inability of the League of Nations to prevent the Second World War led to its dissolution and the creation of the United Nations (UN) in 1945. The UN, with its Security Council, has become the principal institution for resolving conflicts and promoting peace on an international scale. The Security Council is responsible for maintaining international peace and security, and has the power to take legally binding decisions. The concepts of peacekeeping and peacemaking have also been introduced. UN peacekeeping operations involve the deployment of troops, military observers or civilian police to help maintain peace and security in conflict zones. Peacemaking, on the other hand, aims to resolve conflicts through mediation, negotiation and other peaceful means. These initiatives and institutions, although sometimes criticised for their ineffectiveness or lack of coercive power, represent important efforts to promote universality and humanity in the international system.

The partisan wars: a new reality[modifier | modifier le wikicode]

This type of warfare is often a response to a superior military force, where conventional forces could not effectively oppose the enemy. Partisans often have the advantage of terrain and local knowledge, which enables them to move and hide effectively. However, their actions can also lead to severe reprisals against civilian populations by the forces they are fighting. Partisan warfare is characterised by guerrilla tactics based on in-depth knowledge of the terrain, mobility, surprise and initiative. Compared with conventional forces, partisans do not fight to hold positions or control territory, but rather to disorganise, harass and weaken the enemy.

Tactics used in partisan warfare may include:

  1. Burst attacks: Partisans launch rapid and sudden attacks against the enemy, often from hidden positions, then withdraw quickly before the enemy can react effectively.
  2. Ambushes: Partisans can set traps for the enemy, using terrain and surprise to inflict maximum casualties.
  3. Sabotage: Partisans can target the enemy's infrastructure, such as lines of communication, ammunition depots, transport routes, etc., to disrupt its operations.
  4. Intelligence gathering: Partisans can gather information on enemy movements and intentions and pass it on to allies.

These tactics, combined with the advantage that partisans often have in terms of local support and knowledge of the terrain, can enable them to wage an effective war against a larger, better-equipped enemy force.

Notable examples of partisan warfare include the French resistance against German occupation during the Second World War, Vietnamese guerrilla warfare during the Vietnam War, and resistance movements in Afghanistan against Soviet and then American occupation. Partisan warfare is generally characterised by its asymmetry, i.e. the fact that the forces involved are not equivalent in terms of military capabilities. This forces the partisans to resort to unconventional tactics to compensate for their numerical or technological inferiority.

Partisan warfare has transformed the nature of armed conflict, shifting the focus from the state to the individual or non-state groups. This represents a major change in the way war is conceptualised and fought. In traditional conflicts, war was often understood as a confrontation between states, with regular armies led by commanders-in-chief, fighting on well-defined battlefields. This has changed with the emergence of partisan warfare, where small groups or individuals, often without a centralised command, carry out irregular and dispersed attacks. This has led to significant changes in military strategies, requiring more focused thinking on how to deal with non-state and often mobile targets, as well as how to manage local populations and territory. It has also raised questions about the rules and norms that govern conduct in wartime, as partisan conflicts often do not fit easily into the framework of the traditional laws of war. Moreover, the emergence of partisan warfare has also changed the nature of power and politics in war. Partisans can often mobilise local support in ways that regular armed forces cannot, allowing them to exert significant political influence, even if they do not formally control a territory or state.

A novelty: partisan warfare[modifier | modifier le wikicode]

The term "partisan" is often used to describe a person who chooses to take up arms and fight for a specific cause, outside the structure of a regular or official army.

In the context of war or conflict, partisans are usually associated with resistance groups or guerrilla movements. They are often motivated by ideological, political, religious or nationalist convictions, and may choose to fight for a variety of reasons, whether in defence of their community, resistance to foreign occupation, revolt against an oppressive regime, or promotion of a specific cause.

Partisans generally use asymmetrical warfare tactics, including guerrilla warfare, sabotage, espionage and other forms of unconventional warfare. Because they are not part of a regular army, they are not generally protected by the same conventions and laws that govern the behaviour of soldiers in wartime, which can sometimes lead to controversy over their rights and protections under international humanitarian law.

Aymon de Gingins-La-Sarraz (1823 - 1893): pioneer of partisan warfare[modifier | modifier le wikicode]

Charles-Jules Guiguer de Prangins, better known by his pseudonym Gingins-La Sarraz, was a Swiss officer who made a major contribution to the development of Switzerland's defensive strategy in the 19th century.

In his book "La guerre défensive en Suisse", Gingins-La Sarraz put forward the idea that Switzerland, because of its geographical location, mountainous terrain and policy of neutrality, should concentrate on developing a solid defence strategy rather than projecting military force outside its borders. This approach, he argued, would ensure that Swiss neutrality was maintained in the face of the expansionist ambitions of the great European powers of the day.

A central part of this defence strategy was the idea of training and mobilising supporters in the event of foreign aggression. These partisans, who would be ordinary citizens trained in combat and survival, would constitute a resistance force capable of harassing and disrupting the invading forces, thus making the occupation of Switzerland too costly and difficult to achieve. This strategy is based on the idea that the defence of Switzerland rests not only with its regular army, but also with its population as a whole, reflecting the principles of direct democracy and the militia that lie at the heart of Swiss politics.

Gingins-La Sarraz suggested the following principle for the defence of Switzerland. In addition to the regular army, the use of partisans - citizens trained in guerrilla tactics and capable of rapid mobilisation - would strengthen the country's defensive capabilities. These partisans could fill the gaps in the numbers and flexibility of the regular forces. In a war situation, they could harass the enemy, disrupt their lines of communication and supply, and carry out guerrilla attacks that would make any foreign occupation difficult and costly. Moreover, by being integrated into the population, these partisans would make it difficult for the enemy to distinguish between civilians and combatants, adding another layer of complexity to any invasion attempt. It's a strategy that reflects Swiss pragmatism and the importance it places on neutrality and national security.

Partisan warfare is often a strategy of resistance in the face of foreign occupation or invasion. Irregular groups, or partisans, are typically civilians who have taken up arms to resist an outside force. They often use guerrilla tactics, including sabotage, ambushes, raids and surprise attacks, which can be extremely effective against a conventional invading force. These supporters are often able to mobilise quickly and blend in with the civilian population after carrying out an attack, making it difficult for the enemy to target them. In addition, their local knowledge of the terrain and the population can be a major advantage in the fight against an invading force.

Carl Schmitt (1888 - 1985): the theorisation of partisan warfare[modifier | modifier le wikicode]

Schmitt advised the von Papen government (left) and Schleicher (right) on the constitutional issue.

Carl Schmitt (1888-1985) was a German jurist and political philosopher, widely known for his contribution to political and legal theory. However, he is a controversial figure because of his affiliation with the Nazi party during the 1930s. Schmitt joined the Nazi party in 1933 and served in several high-level positions under the Nazi regime, including as legal adviser to the Foreign Office. Schmitt is best known for his work on the concept of the 'political enemy', which he defines as any entity or group that poses an existential threat to a state or nation. He also developed the theory of the state of exception, according to which the sovereign has the power to suspend the law in times of crisis. Despite his collaboration with the Nazi regime, Schmitt's work continued to exert a significant influence on political and legal studies after the Second World War.

In his essay "The Theory of the Partisan" (1962), Carl Schmitt examines the changes in the nature of war over time. He argues that modern warfare is largely fought by irregular groups, or 'partisans', rather than by regular armies. According to Schmitt, this change was strikingly illustrated in the Spanish War of Independence (also known as the Peninsular War) against Napoleon's French occupation in the early nineteenth century. The Spanish used guerrilla tactics to resist the French invasion, demonstrating the effectiveness of this type of combat. He considers that partisan warfare is not simply a tactic of military resistance, but that it also represents a form of political combat. Partisans, he argued, were deeply rooted in their territory and local population, and were therefore capable of prolonged resistance against an invader. Schmitt predicted that this form of warfare would become the norm in the modern world. He argues that partisan warfare challenges the idea of state sovereignty and reshapes the very nature of war.

Carl Schmitt's theory of the partisan is revolutionary in that it shifts the focus from interstate warfare to irregular warfare waged by non-state groups. These groups, or partisans, are motivated by strong ideologies and are capable of operating independently of the state apparatus. This transformation of the actors in conflict has important implications for the way wars are fought and, ultimately, for the nature of the international political order. Schmitt predicted that modern conflict would be marked primarily by irregular fighting by partisan groups, a prediction that seems to have been validated by the evolution of conflict in the twenty-first century, with the rise of non-state groups such as terrorist movements and militias. The partisan, according to Schmitt, is defined by three main characteristics: its mobility (it can move quickly and operate outside traditional structures), its combat intensity (it is motivated by an ideology or a cause) and its dependence on the local population (for support and information). These traits make the partisan a formidable player on the modern battlefield.

The concept of revolutionary wars[modifier | modifier le wikicode]

Revolutionary wars, or wars of insurrection, refer to conflicts in which a population rises up against a dominant power, often with the aim of achieving independence or regime change. These wars are distinguished by the fact that they generally involve the broad participation of the civilian population, and are often waged by unconventional armed groups or partisans.

The Second World War saw the emergence of various resistance movements that fought the Nazi occupation in several European countries. These resistance movements were generally made up of armed civilians who used guerrilla tactics to disrupt and weaken the German war effort. After the Second World War, several national liberation movements adopted similar tactics in their fight against colonialism. For example, the Front de Libération Nationale (FLN) in Algeria waged a war of insurrection against the French colonial government that eventually led to Algerian independence in 1962. Similarly, in Egypt, Egyptian nationalists fought for independence from British rule. These revolutionary wars highlighted the important role that partisans and unconventional groups can play in the conduct of modern warfare, a subject explored extensively in Carl Schmitt's theory of the partisan.

Partisan warfare, also known as guerrilla warfare or asymmetric warfare, has a number of distinctive features.

  • No uniform: Partisans are often civilians and have no official uniform. This allows them to blend in with the civilian population, making it difficult for the enemy to distinguish between combatants and non-combatants.
  • Strong ideology: Partisans are generally motivated by a strong ideology or cause, such as national liberation, opposition to oppression or the overthrow of a government.
  • Asymmetric warfare: Unlike traditional conflicts, partisans often do not have access to the same military resources as their opponents. They are generally less numerous, less well equipped and less well trained than regular forces. However, they use this asymmetry to their advantage by resorting to unconventional tactics.
  • Guile and surprise: Partisans rely heavily on the element of surprise. They conduct raids, ambushes and guerrilla attacks, then withdraw quickly before enemy forces can strike back effectively.
  • Extreme mobility: Partisans are often highly mobile, able to move quickly and strike unpredictably. This contrasts with traditional forces, which may be slower to move due to their size and equipment.

These characteristics make partisan warfare distinct from more traditional forms of conflict, and present unique challenges to the conventional forces attempting to combat them.

The notion of "revolutionary warfare" is closely linked to the thinking of Chinese Communist leader Mao Zedong. For Mao, revolution had to be led by a combination of political and military action. He declared that "political revolution is the primary act; military revolution is a secondary act". This means that victory cannot be achieved by military means alone; political change must also take place. Mao also advocated a guerrilla strategy as a means of fighting a stronger and better equipped enemy. Guerrilla warfare, according to Mao, had to melt into the population like a "fish in water", using the local population as a source of support and recruitment. He advocated the use of guerrilla warfare not only in rural areas, but also in urban areas.

In the 1960s and 1970s, some revolutionary groups tried to apply these ideas to their own struggles. This often involved a transition to urban guerrilla warfare, with fighting taking place on city streets rather than in rural areas. A notable example of this is the struggle waged by the Tupamaros in Uruguay. One notable example of the failure of partisan warfare was Ernesto "Che" Guevara's attempt to bring about a revolution in Bolivia. Despite his experience of guerrilla warfare in Cuba, Guevara found it difficult to win the support of the local population in Bolivia and to maintain the cohesion of his own forces. He was captured and executed by the Bolivian army in 1967.

Contemporary wars: new issues and realities[modifier | modifier le wikicode]

New impacts[modifier | modifier le wikicode]

The current impact of modern warfare on the Westphalian system[modifier | modifier le wikicode]

The nature of warfare has evolved considerably since the establishment of the Westphalian system in the 17th century. This system, named after the Treaties of Westphalia that ended the Thirty Years' War in Europe, was based on the concept of the sovereignty of nation-states and provided that conflicts would primarily be wars between states. However, the nature of conflict in the contemporary world has changed radically. We are seeing more and more civil wars, ethnic and religious conflicts, terrorism and partisan wars. These conflicts are not necessarily limited to a single state and can involve a multitude of non-state actors. Moreover, with increasing globalisation, these conflicts often have repercussions far beyond their immediate geographical borders.

Some academics and theorists have described this as a return to a Hobbesian 'state of nature', where the international order is characterised by anarchy and perpetual war. However, it is important to note that this view is contested.

Hobbesian anarchy is a concept derived from the political theory of Thomas Hobbes, a 17th-century English philosopher. In his major work, "Leviathan", Hobbes describes the state of nature as a state of war between all against all, where each individual is in a constant struggle for survival. He used this concept to justify the need for a strong central power (Leviathan) to maintain peace and order. In the context of international relations, Hobbesian anarchy refers to a state of global disorder in which each state acts according to its own interests, without regard for the interests of others. It is a world without effective international institutions to regulate the behaviour of states, where war is a common means of resolving conflicts. The rise of non-state wars, international terrorism and partisan warfare, coupled with the apparent weakening of some international institutions, has led some to suggest that we could be heading towards such anarchy.

This is a major concern in the current context of international relations. While traditional inter-state conflicts, governed by the laws of war, are declining, we are witnessing an increase in non-state and asymmetric conflicts. These conflicts often involve non-state actors, such as terrorist groups or militias, and often take place within the borders of a single country. These wars tend to be far more destructive for civilian populations, as they are often fought without respect for international laws and standards that are designed to protect civilians in times of war. In addition, these conflicts can often be more difficult to resolve, as they often involve complex local issues and are less likely to be influenced by international pressure. These trends have led to renewed debate about the need to reform the international system to better manage these types of conflicts. This could involve rethinking existing norms and institutions, strengthening international humanitarian law, and developing new approaches to resolving conflicts and promoting peace.

The state of perpetual war: a critical analysis[modifier | modifier le wikicode]

The impact of armed conflict on the environment is a growing concern. Indeed, wars can result in massive destruction of the natural environment, whether through deliberate military tactics or simply through the collateral effects of combat. Examples of this include deforestation, water and soil pollution, destruction of wildlife habitats, and increased greenhouse gas emissions. In addition, the environmental consequences of conflict can also have impacts on human health, the economy and social stability, creating a vicious circle where environmental degradation fuels further conflict. The United Nations and other international organisations have recognised this as a serious problem. There is a growing call to include environmental protection in international humanitarian law and to hold parties to conflict accountable for environmental damage caused during war. However, implementing such measures remains a major challenge.

The use of the natural environment as a 'weapon' in conflict is a matter of grave concern. Ecocide, or the deliberate destruction of the environment for strategic or tactical gain, is a reality in some contemporary conflicts. For example, the deliberate burning of oil wells, the destruction of dams to cause flooding, or the use of toxic chemicals can have disastrous consequences for the environment. These acts of ecocide not only aim to weaken the enemy by destroying its resources, but can also have a long-term impact on local communities by destroying their livelihoods and rendering their habitats uninhabitable.

The destruction of natural or economic resources is a strategy that has been used in various conflicts throughout history. By eliminating an opponent's resources, you can weaken their ability to fight or survive. This may involve destroying key infrastructure, such as bridges or factories, burning crop fields to deprive the enemy of food, or poisoning water to make an area inhospitable. However, this approach has major negative consequences. It can cause great suffering to the civilian population, who are often the hardest hit by the destruction of essential resources. It can also cause long-term environmental damage that will last long after the conflict has ended. This is why international humanitarian law establishes rules to protect civilian resources in times of war. For example, the Geneva Convention prohibits attacks on objects indispensable to the survival of the civilian population. This includes food, crops, livestock and drinking water. Violations of these rules can be considered war crimes.

The destruction of the enemy's culture is also a sad reality of some conflicts, an act often known as "cultural cleansing" or "cultural genocide". This involves erasing the enemy's cultural identity by targeting elements such as art, literature, monuments, places of worship, religious practices and even languages. By destroying the enemy's cultural symbols and heritage, the aggressor seeks not only to disorientate and dehumanise his adversaries, but also to erase their history and presence from the collective memory. This practice is widely condemned by the international community, and the deliberate destruction of cultural heritage is considered a war crime by the International Criminal Court. For example, in 2016, the International Criminal Court convicted Ahmad Al Faqi Al Mahdi for the destruction of historical and religious monuments in Timbuktu, Mali, in 2012. That said, although these laws exist, their implementation and enforcement remain a major challenge, particularly in areas of active conflict.

Endless wars: protracted conflicts and their consequences[modifier | modifier le wikicode]

War was exceptional and peace normal, which leads us to wonder whether war is becoming normal and peace extraordinary. In certain contexts, particularly in regions that have experienced prolonged conflict, war can seem to be the norm and peace the exception. This can be due to a multitude of factors, including entrenched ethnic or religious conflicts, competition for resources, political corruption, socio-economic divisions and foreign interference. Moreover, in some cases, existing power structures may be reinforced by the continuation of the conflict, making it all the more difficult to resolve the war.

Endless wars" can lead to the creation of so-called "war economies". These economies are often dominated by illegal or unregulated activities, including drug trafficking, arms trafficking, human trafficking and other forms of organised crime. These activities can provide income to those involved in the conflict, enabling them to continue fighting despite the enormous human and social costs. In addition, the situation of "endless war" can lead to a breakdown in the rule of law and governance, which in turn can facilitate the continuation of these illegal activities. This makes the resolution of these conflicts particularly difficult, as the actors involved may have financial interests in maintaining the status quo. Furthermore, these conflicts can make peace almost impossible to achieve, as it can be difficult to find legitimate interlocutors with whom to negotiate an end to the conflict.

The example of Iraq is representative of these "endless wars". Since Iraq's invasion of Kuwait in 1990, which led to the Gulf War in 1991, Iraq has experienced a series of conflicts and periods of instability. After the Gulf War, Iraq was subjected to severe international sanctions and internal instability. Then, in 2003, a US-led coalition invaded Iraq, overthrowing Saddam Hussein's regime. However, instead of bringing stability, the invasion created a power vacuum that led to a new wave of violence and instability, including a violent insurgency and the emergence of extremist groups such as the Islamic State. Even after the defeat of the Islamic State, Iraq continues to face major challenges, including political instability, corruption, economic underdevelopment and community tensions. These problems, in turn, can fuel new conflicts. In this context, peace may seem a distant and elusive goal. However, it is important to note that peace is not simply the absence of war, but also requires the building of strong institutions, the establishment of justice, the promotion of economic development and reconciliation between different communities. These are difficult tasks that require time, resources and the sustained commitment of all concerned.

Towards a new political theory of war - Michael Walzer (1935 - )[modifier | modifier le wikicode]

Michael Walzer.

Michael Walzer is an American political scientist and philosopher well known for his work in political philosophy and ethics. In his book "Just and Unjust Wars", he explored the ethical question of when and how it is justifiable to go to war, and how a war should be fought to be considered "just". Michael Walzer is one of the main theorists of the legalistic paradigm. Unlike Hobbes, who saw the state of nature as a state of war and peace as the result of a social contract, Walzer relies on a set of international norms and moral principles to assess the justness of a war. He takes up some of Hobbes' concepts, such as the idea that states have a responsibility to protect their citizens, but he goes further by asserting that states also have an obligation to respect the rights of the citizens of other states, even in times of war. Walzer stresses the importance of principles such as the distinction between combatants and non-combatants, the proportionality of the use of force, and military necessity. In his view, these principles must be respected if a war is to be considered just, whatever the reasons for starting it. This is a legalistic framework, as it is based on a set of rules and norms that must be respected.

Walzer adopted what he called a 'legalistic' or 'jus in bello' (law in war) approach, based on principles such as respect for the rights of non-combatants, the proportionality of the force used, military necessity and the fact that armed forces must distinguish between combatants and civilians. According to Walzer, a war is only justified if it is waged in accordance with these principles. He also defends the concept of "jus ad bellum" (the right to war), which examines the rightness of going to war. According to this concept, a war is only justified if it is waged to resist aggression, protect the innocent, defend human rights, etc. Walzer also discussed the notion of the 'just war', an idea that goes back to Saint Augustine and Thomas Aquinas. According to this notion, a war is just if it is waged for just reasons and in a just manner.

Michael Walzer, in his book Just and Unjust Wars, argues that even in the extreme situation of war, moral and ethical rules apply. War, he argues, is not a state of moral anarchy. On the contrary, he argues that behaviour in war can and should be judged by moral standards. Indeed, he argues that even if war is an exceptional situation, this does not mean that it is devoid of all moral or ethical standards. A just war is a controlled war, a war fought by legal combatants. So he distinguishes between a just war, which respects certain rules, and an unjust war, which does not. For him, a just war is one where the cause is just (for example, defence against aggression), where the combatants are legitimate actors (soldiers of a state), where the force used is proportional and necessary, and where a distinction is made between combatants and non-combatants, the latter being protected from attack. He emphasises that although war is a violent and destructive reality, there are limits to what is permitted in war. This does not mean that there is anything fundamentally moral in the concept of war, but rather that even in war, certain actions can be deemed immoral.

Michael Walzer seeks to understand how moral standards can be applied in situations of war, which are inherently violent and destructive. His central concern is to determine whether and how certain actions can be deemed moral or immoral in wartime. In his view, even in the context of war, there are moral limits to what is permissible. For example, it is generally considered immoral to intentionally target non-combatants. Similarly, the disproportionate use of force is also considered immoral. For Walzer, the morality of war does not lie in waging war per se, but rather in the way in which war is waged. In other words, it is not the wars themselves that can be moral or immoral, but the specific actions taken in the course of these wars.

Michael Walzer argues that there can be morality in war if it is waged defensively against aggression, respects the principles of discrimination (i.e. does not deliberately target non-combatants) and proportionality (i.e. uses a level of force commensurate with the threat), and is waged by combatants who respect the laws of war. He argues that although war is intrinsically destructive and violent, it can be conducted in a way that respects certain moral principles. For example, not using weapons of mass destruction, not deliberately targeting civilians and not resorting to torture are behaviours that Walzer considers morally justified, even in wartime. However, Walzer does not see these behaviours as transforming war into a moral enterprise in itself. On the contrary, it is more a question of limiting the harm that war can cause.

Terrorism represents a major challenge to the idea of just war and to the principles of morality in war. By its very nature, terrorism generally involves indiscriminate attacks on innocent civilians, with the aim of instilling fear and disrupting society. Such tactics directly contravene the principles of discrimination and proportionality that underpin just war theory. The deliberate use of violence against civilians for political purposes is widely regarded as immoral and unacceptable by international standards. Moreover, terrorism is often perpetrated by non-state actors who are not clearly identifiable as combatants, blurring traditional distinctions between combatants and non-combatants and making it difficult to apply the laws of war. The response to terrorism also poses ethical and moral challenges. For example, how can governments effectively protect their citizens from terrorism while respecting human rights and the principles of the rule of law? How acceptable is it to restrict civil liberties in order to prevent terrorism? These questions have no easy answers and represent an area of continuing debate and discord in international relations and political theory.

Michael Walzer's theory attempts to answer the question of when it is morally acceptable to wage war and how it should be conducted in a morally acceptable manner. He argues that even in a context as violent and complex as war, moral and ethical rules must be applied. According to Walzer, there are cases where war can be justified, usually in response to unprovoked aggression. Furthermore, he argues that combatants must abide by certain rules of conduct in war. For example, it argues that attacks should only be directed against legitimate military targets, and not against civilians. In this context, Walzer's "legalist paradigm" is a call for a return to politics in the conduct of war. He argues that decisions about war and peace must be taken on the basis of political and moral principles, and not simply in response to strategic or security imperatives. Thus, although war may be amoral in nature, Walzer insists that we can and must strive to impose a certain morality on it. According to Walzer, even if war is a terrifying and devastating reality, it is necessary to apply ethical and political standards to guide its conduct. This is what he means by the "return of the political" - a call for moral and ethical considerations to be taken into account in war decisions.

Philippe Delmas is a French strategist and author who has written on various aspects of war and international politics. In his book "Le Bel Avenir de la Guerre", he suggests that war is an inevitable and even necessary aspect of world order, and that the idea of a world without war is not only unrealistic, but may even be damaging. Delmas challenges some of the basic assumptions underlying just war theory and the legalistic paradigm in general. He suggests that the effort to frame war with strict rules and regulations is a futile and potentially counterproductive attempt to domesticate a brutal and chaotic reality. According to Delmas, war has intrinsic political value and can act as a catalyst for significant political, social and economic change. In this sense, he offers a much more cynical and realistic view of war than that often associated with thinkers such as Michael Walzer.

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