The reason of State

"Reason of State' refers to a principle of governance according to which the state has the right and obligation to make decisions that are in the supreme interest of the country, even if these decisions are contrary to other considerations, such as moral, religious, or international laws. In practice, the reason of State has often been used to justify actions that would otherwise be considered immoral or illegal. For example, a government might justify the declaration of war, espionage or the suspension of certain civil liberties in the name of raison d'Etat.

The reason of state plays a crucial role in political science, especially in the analysis of decisions made by a government or a head of state. Political science studies seek to understand the motivations behind political actions, and the concept of raison d'Etat can help explain why certain choices are made. Political science examines how reason of state influences foreign policy strategies, crisis management, war and peace decisions, domestic policies, and other aspects of governance. Researchers can analyse how raison d'Etat is invoked to justify certain actions and what the implications are for democracy, human rights, ethics and international law. Furthermore, the concept of raison d'état is linked to other theories in political science, such as realism and neo-realism, which suggest that states act primarily according to their national security interests. However, there is an ongoing debate about how far a state can or should go to safeguard its interests, and how to balance this with other obligations and values, such as respect for human rights and international norms. For this reason, raison d'Etat remains an important topic of study in political science, both to understand past actions and to inform discussions on how best to manage current and future policy challenges.

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What is raison d'Etat?

Reason of State is indeed a concept that allows public authorities to take exceptional measures, which might be outside the usual legal framework, to respond to extraordinary situations or threats to national security. In theory, this concept is intended to protect the higher interests of the state and the people. In practice, however, it is subject to controversy and debate, as it can be used to justify actions that violate human rights, international standards, or democratic principles. For example, in times of war or severe national crisis, a government may invoke raison d'Etat to justify measures such as declaring martial law, suspending certain civil liberties, or taking emergency measures that would otherwise be illegal.

The idea of raison d'état implies that in certain circumstances the state or other institutional political entity may act in a manner that departs from ordinary law to protect the supreme interest of the country. This concept is usually invoked in situations of national emergency or crisis, where the state believes it must take extraordinary measures to preserve security, stability, or other essential interests. However, the possibility for a State to derogate from the ordinary law in certain circumstances does not mean that it can do so without restriction or control. In most legal systems, there are checks and balances that are designed to prevent abuses of power and to ensure that any derogation from the general law is proportionate, necessary and in accordance with certain minimum standards. For example, the constitutions of many countries have special provisions for emergency situations that allow for certain temporary derogations from normally guaranteed rights and freedoms. However, these provisions generally require that the measures taken be proportionate to the gravity of the situation, and that they be lifted as soon as the emergency is over. Furthermore, in democratic systems, decisions taken in the name of state reason may be subject to judicial review, and may be challenged in court if found to be unconstitutional or contrary to international law.

Reason of State is a concept that applies in exceptional circumstances, when it is deemed necessary to derogate from ordinary law and potentially from public freedoms to protect the supreme interest of the state. In a democracy, the use of raison d'Etat must be carefully controlled and limited. It should only be invoked in truly exceptional situations, not as a common practice or routine. If it were to be used on a regular or arbitrary basis, it could endanger the rule of law and democratic principles. Therefore, even in emergency situations, democracies seek to maintain checks and balances to ensure that the use of raison d'état respects certain limits. This may include constitutional requirements, judicial review, and transparency and accountability to the public and parliament. That said, the application of raison d'état remains a complex and sensitive issue that generates philosophical, political and legal debate. Decisions taken in the name of raison d'Etat can have far-reaching and long-lasting consequences, and it is therefore crucial to approach them with caution and discernment.

The concept of raison d'Etat may imply a departure from certain usual standards of legality, normality and logic. Let me elaborate on these points:

• Exceeding legality: The reason of State may lead to deviating from the usual laws in force. For example, in an emergency situation, a government could invoke the reason of State to suspend certain laws or rights.
• Exceeding the normal: The raison d'Etat is concerned with exceptional situations, not with routine or normal governance. Actions taken under raison d'état are supposed to be extraordinary and temporary.
• Exceeding what is logical: The raison d'état may sometimes involve actions that may seem illogical or contradictory by normal standards. For example, a state may choose to take actions that are contrary to its own laws or principles, or that run counter to its international commitments, if such actions are considered necessary to protect the best interests of the state.

While the raison d'Etat may lead to a breach of these standards, it is important to note that in democratic systems there are generally checks and balances to prevent abuse of power and to preserve the rule of law. The raison d'état does not give the government carte blanche to act as it wishes, but must be used with caution and discernment, and with respect for the fundamental principles of democracy and human rights.

A state of emergency is indeed a term often used interchangeably with raison d'Etat. It refers to a situation in which the government derogates from ordinary law, often in response to an emergency or crisis. The study of states of exception could focus on questions such as: What are the conditions that trigger a state of exception? How do governments justify the invocation of raison d'état or the declaration of a state of emergency? What are the effects on society and human rights? What are the mechanisms for controlling and limiting the use of raison d'état?

The events and response of the US government to the attacks of 11 September 2001 can be used as an example to study the raison d'état. The actions of the US government after the attacks demonstrate several aspects of raison d'état in action.

• Overstepping the law: In response to the attacks, the US Congress passed the USA PATRIOT Act, a law that expanded the powers of intelligence and law enforcement agencies to monitor and investigate terrorist activities. Some of the provisions of this law have been criticised for their potential infringement of civil liberties guaranteed by the US Constitution.
• Going beyond the normal: President George W. Bush's declaration of the "war on terror" and the invasion of Afghanistan (and later Iraq) were extraordinary actions taken in response to an extraordinary situation.
• Going beyond what is logical: Some of the decisions taken in the 'war on terror', such as the establishment of the Guantánamo detention camp and the use of advanced interrogation techniques (considered by many to be torture), may seem illogical or contrary to normal principles of law and ethics.

These actions, taken in the name of national security, have provoked much debate about the role of the state, the protection of civil liberties and the limits of statecraft. The impact of these decisions continues to be felt and debated to this day. This makes 11 September 2001 and its aftermath a particularly relevant example for the study of raison d'état.

The notion of 'raison d'état' is often linked to that of 'state of emergency'. Both refer to a state of action that goes beyond the framework of ordinary law and normality, often in response to an emergency or exceptional crisis situation. A 'state of exception' is usually declared when circumstances are deemed so serious that the usual rules cannot be applied effectively. It allows the state to act in an extraordinary way to respond to the situation. This could include measures such as the suspension of certain civil liberties, the declaration of martial law, or the adoption of emergency laws. The "raison d'état" may be invoked as a justification for such exceptional actions, based on the need to protect the supreme interest of the state and the people. However, although these concepts are closely related, they are not necessarily identical. A state of emergency is usually a formal mechanism that is declared according to certain legal procedures and has specific legal implications. Reason of State, on the other hand, is a broader concept that can justify a variety of extraordinary actions, regardless of whether a formal state of exception is declared or not. It is also important to note that, although these concepts allow the state to act in an exceptional manner, they do not give a blank cheque to act without restrictions or controls. In democratic systems, there are usually mechanisms in place to limit and control the use of raison d'Etat and the invocation of states of emergency, in order to prevent abuses of power and to preserve fundamental rights.

Reason of State can be interpreted as a form of 'reasonableness' in the sense that it seeks to protect the supreme interest of the nation, especially when faced with an existential crisis or threat. However, this does not necessarily mean that all actions taken in the name of the raison d'état are automatically 'reasonable' in the ordinary sense of the word.

Several factors can influence whether an action taken in the name of state reason is considered reasonable:

1. Proportionality: Are the actions taken in the name of state reason proportionate to the threat or crisis they are intended to address? Are they the minimum necessary to achieve the objective?
2. Necessity: Were the actions absolutely necessary? Were there other options that could have been equally effective, but less intrusive or less damaging to rights and freedoms?
3. Effectiveness: Were the actions effective in achieving the intended purpose? Were they successful in resolving the crisis or combating the threat?
4. Respect for democratic principles and human rights: Were the actions taken in accordance with basic democratic principles and international human rights standards?

Ultimately, the question of whether the reason of state is 'reasonable' is largely subjective and may depend on how these factors are weighed. It is a topic that is often at the centre of political and philosophical debates.

Genealogy of the Reason of State

The question of the state of exception, or the suspension of certain democratic norms in exceptional situations, is a subject of intense philosophical, political and legal debate. Indeed, how can it be justified that a democracy, a system that values the rule of law and respect for human rights, can temporarily suspend these principles in the name of a higher interest?

To understand this paradox, it may be useful to look at the genealogy of raison d'Etat and the state of exception. The concept of raison d'Etat is deeply rooted in the political and philosophical history of the West. It dates back at least to the period of the Renaissance and the Wars of Religion in Europe, when philosophers such as Niccolò Machiavelli and Jean Bodin began to articulate the idea that a ruler might sometimes have to act outside the usual norms of morality and law to preserve the state.

The idea of a state of exception was later formalised by legal scholars and political theorists, who recognised that constitutions and systems of law may sometimes be insufficient to deal with extraordinary crises. This idea was put forward by thinkers such as Carl Schmitt, who argued that the sovereign is the one who has the power to decide on the state of exception. However, the justification of the state of exception does not mean that democracy is completely abandoned or that democratic principles are irrelevant. On the contrary, the idea is that democracy itself is threatened in these exceptional situations, and that extraordinary measures are necessary to preserve it. Moreover, even in a state of exception, it is generally recognised that there are limits to what the state can do, and that certain basic standards of respect for human rights and the rule of law must be maintained. That said, there is a real risk that states of emergency and raison d'état can be abused to justify human rights violations or a slide towards authoritarianism. It is therefore crucial that their use is carefully controlled and limited, and that there are mechanisms to ensure accountability and democratic oversight.

In situations of emergency or crisis, the temporary suspension of certain democratic norms or the extension of state powers can result in a grey area, a legal 'no man's land' where the usual safeguards may no longer apply. It is precisely for this reason that the invocation of a state of emergency is usually surrounded by formal procedures and controls. In many countries, for example, the constitution sets out the circumstances in which a state of emergency may be declared, the length of time it may last, and the specific powers that the government may exercise during that period. There may also be requirements for parliamentary approval, notification to international bodies, or judicial review. However, even with these controls, there is always a risk that the state of emergency could be abused or unduly prolonged, leading to a weakening of the rule of law and civil liberties. Therefore, democratic vigilance, judicial review and human rights monitoring are essential to ensure that the state of exception does not become the norm and that democracy can be restored as soon as circumstances permit.

A state of emergency, although often invoked to protect democracy and the state against a serious threat, effectively involves a temporary suspension or relaxation of certain democratic norms, rules and procedures. This effectively creates a space of 'vagueness', where the usual limits and guarantees are less clear. It is a state of ambiguity, where the state, in order to preserve order and security, can be seen to rise above the democracy it is supposed to protect. This situation is fraught with risks, including the risk that the powers of the state are extended beyond what is necessary, or that the state of emergency is unduly prolonged. For this reason, it is crucial to have robust oversight and accountability mechanisms to guide the use of states of emergency. This may include constitutional or legal requirements, judicial oversight, parliamentary oversight, and media and civil society monitoring. Furthermore, even in a state of emergency, it is generally recognised that certain basic standards of respect for human rights and the rule of law must be maintained. These include the right to a fair trial, the prohibition of torture, and the right to life, among others. These rights cannot be suspended, even in emergency situations. Finally, it is important to remember that a state of emergency is meant to be temporary and limited to the duration of the crisis or threat that motivated it. Once the crisis is over, the state must return to normal functioning and fully restore democratic norms and procedures.

The raison d'état is deeply rooted in political theory and its understanding requires reflection on key political concepts and historical and contemporary contexts. Moreover, as actions taken in the name of raison d'Etat can have major consequences for human rights, democracy and the rule of law, they often generate intense political debate. Political theory offers many tools for understanding and analysing raison d'Etat. For example, it can help clarify the values and interests at stake, assess the justifications for particular actions, and understand the risks and potential consequences. It can also provide a framework for comparing different approaches to raison d'Etat in different national and international contexts. Furthermore, raison d'Etat cannot be understood in isolation from the specific political conditions of a given moment. Decisions taken in the name of raison d'Etat are often influenced by the political realities of the moment, including security concerns, economic challenges, social and political pressures, and prevailing norms and values. Debates about the raison d'état are therefore often linked to broader questions about the nature and direction of politics and society. Ultimately, the question of the reason of state leads us to reflect on fundamental principles of politics and governance, such as the balance between security and freedoms, the nature and limits of sovereignty, and the role of the state in protecting the common good.

Machiavelli (1469 - 1627): Conceptualisation of the reason of state

His posthumous portrait by Santi di Tito, in the Palazzo Vecchio in Florence.

One of the fundamental aspects of Niccolò Machiavelli's political thought, often condensed in the expression "the end justifies the means". In his most famous work, "The Prince", Machiavelli argues that in order to attain and maintain power, rulers must be prepared to act in ways that, in other contexts, might be considered immoral. However, it is important to note that Machiavelli does not advocate the complete rejection of morality. Instead, he points out that conventional morality can sometimes conflict with the demands of politics. For example, a ruler may need to use deception or force to protect the state. In this context, such actions may be justified if they contribute to a higher purpose, such as political stability or state security. This ties in with the idea of 'raison d'état', which suggests that in certain exceptional circumstances the state may be justified in taking actions that deviate from ordinary law or norms. However, as Machiavelli himself recognises, this presents a complex ethical and political challenge, as it can be difficult to determine when such action is actually justified and how far it can go. Machiavelli's thought has been the subject of much debate and interpretation over the centuries. Some critics see him as a cynic who advocates amorality, while others see him as a pragmatic realist who simply recognises the dilemmas and challenges of politics. Either way, his ideas have had a profound influence on political theory and continue to inform discussions on issues such as the reason for state.

Machiavelli has often been associated with the idea of cunning or deception as a strategic tool in politics. In 'The Prince', he suggests that rulers, when acting for the good of the state, may have to use concealment or manipulation to achieve their goals. Cunning, in this context, can be understood as a form of strategic intelligence, where an individual or group has information that others do not, and uses this information asymmetry to their advantage. This may involve misleading opponents, disguising true intentions or manipulating perceptions to gain a strategic advantage. However, it is important to note that for Machiavelli, the use of cunning is not an end in itself, but a means to a larger end, such as the stability of the state and the protection of the common good. Moreover, although Machiavelli may seem to support a certain level of deception or manipulation in politics, he also warns that rulers should act with caution and wisdom, and maintain the trust and respect of their subjects as much as possible.

In the Machiavellian perspective, tactics - and in particular the ability to act outside the established norms when necessary to achieve a greater goal - are seen as an essential component of statesmanship. This is largely what Machiavelli means by the statement that 'the end justifies the means'. In other words, for Machiavelli, political success sometimes requires actions that, outside the political context, might be considered contrary to conventional morality or the law. The ultimate requirement for the ruler, in this framework of thought, is the welfare and stability of the state. However, it is important to note that this view of politics, while it may sometimes seem pragmatic, also raises important ethical and moral issues. It emphasises the need for a balance between the pursuit of political goals and the respect of ethical and legal norms. Moreover, it underlines the importance of accountability and transparency in the exercise of power. Machiavelli himself was not insensitive to these challenges. In his writings he recognises that political power, if misused, can lead to tyranny and injustice. Therefore, although he may seem to support the idea that the end justifies the means, he also stresses the importance of prudence, wisdom and restraint in the exercise of power.

Although Machiavelli does not explicitly use the term 'reason of state', his writings describe a similar concept. For him, the first priority of a ruler is the maintenance of power and the stability of the state. Therefore, it may be necessary to adopt behaviours or methods that do not conform to traditional democratic principles or may even seem immoral. That said, Machiavelli does not advocate authoritarianism or despotism. Nor does he suggest that rulers should be free to do as they please without any restraint or accountability. In fact, he warns against the misuse of power and stresses the need for wise and prudent governance. He also suggests that rulers should always behave in such a way as to gain the respect and trust of their subjects, as popular support is crucial for long-term stability and success. Machiavelli's philosophy raises important questions about power, ethics and governance. Although it may sometimes seem cynical or amoral, it highlights the challenges inherent in politics and the need for a delicate balance between idealism and realism, between morality and efficiency.

In Machiavelli's perspective, political action may sometimes require going beyond the traditional frameworks of law and morality to achieve the most important goals, such as the stability of the state. This is where the notion of 'reason of state' connects to his philosophy. Machiavelli recognises that politics, especially at a high level such as that of the ruler of a state, can involve complex dilemmas where strict adherence to rules and norms can conflict with the practical demands of power and state survival. This does not mean that Machiavelli advocates a total rejection of law or morality, but rather that he sees these aspects as part of a wider set of considerations that must be taken into account in political decision-making. However, it also raises important questions about the limits of political action and the tension between the imperatives of political reality and democratic and ethical ideals. These questions, which are at the heart of the debates on raison d'Etat, remain relevant and contested today.

Giovanni Botero (1544 - 1617): Contribution to the conceptualisation of reason of state

Giovanni Botero.

Giovanni Botero is indeed a key figure in the development of the concept of 'reason of state'. Born in 1544 in Piedmont, Italy, he was a diplomat, a Jesuit priest and an influential writer on subjects ranging from economics to geography and politics. His most famous work, "Della ragion di Stato" (On the Reason of State), first published in 1589, played a crucial role in the formulation of this concept. In this treatise, Botero explains that the survival and success of the state depends on a combination of prudence, politics and morality. He argues that rulers must sometimes act according to pragmatic considerations that may exceed traditional legal or ethical norms. However, unlike Machiavelli, Botero insists that the reason of state must always be guided by Christian and moral principles. For him, the true reason of state is that which serves the common good and is in accordance with divine law. Thus, although both Botero and Machiavelli can be seen as important contributors to the theory of reason of state, they offer different perspectives on the relationship between politics, morality and power. These perspectives have had a profound influence on political thought and continue to inform current debates on issues such as reason of state and ethics in politics.

Giovanni Botero was one of the first thinkers to focus on the construction and effectiveness of state power. He was interested in how states can develop and maintain their power, particularly through economics and demography. For Botero, the power of a state depended not only on the size of its territory or its army, but also on the wealth and well-being of its population. He was therefore one of the first to stress the importance of economic and social factors in strengthening state power. Within the framework of raison d'état, Botero argued that leaders had to make pragmatic decisions to ensure the survival and prosperity of their states. This might sometimes require actions that went beyond traditional legal or ethical norms. However, unlike Machiavelli, Botero also emphasised the importance of moral and Christian principles in governance, arguing that the true reason of state should always serve the common good and respect divine law. This combination of political pragmatism and moral commitment has made Botero's thinking a major influence on political theory, and his concept of raison d'état remains relevant to contemporary discussions of power, ethics and governance.

Giovanni Botero, as a Jesuit priest, incorporated theological principles into his conception of the reason of state. For him, the exercise of power, including the application of statecraft, should be guided by the principles and teachings of the Christian faith. Botero said that leaders, especially those who exercise exceptional power by virtue of the reason of state, have a duty to respect the word of God and follow His commandments. They must strive to achieve the divine goals for humanity, which means promoting the common good, maintaining justice and peace, and protecting the weak and vulnerable. In this perspective, the reason of state cannot be used as an excuse to act arbitrarily or unjustly. On the contrary, it must always be used in a way that is compatible with divine law and promotes the welfare of the community. This is a different view of statecraft from that of Machiavelli and other more secular political theorists. It emphasises the moral and spiritual responsibility of leaders and the importance of faith and virtue in politics. This view has influenced the later development of political theory, particularly within the tradition of Christian political philosophy.

Giovanni Botero and Niccolò Machiavelli have different perspectives on the reason of state in relation to morality. Machiavelli is often interpreted as setting aside traditional moral considerations in favour of a political pragmatism, according to which the end (the stability and success of the state) justifies the means. His approach is sometimes described as amoral in the sense that it does not conform to conventional morality. Botero, on the other hand, insists on the importance of morality, specifically Christian morality, in politics. For him, the reason of state is not an excuse to act immorally or unjustly, but a principle that must be applied in a way that is in accordance with God's commandments and promotes the welfare of the community. Thus, while both men agree that rulers may sometimes need to take exceptional measures to protect and strengthen their state, they differ on the extent to which these actions should be constrained by morality and ethics.

For him, the application of state reason must always be guided by moral principles, especially those derived from the Christian faith. Political power, even when exercised in an exceptional way by virtue of the reason of state, is not an end in itself, but a means to achieve divine goals for humanity. This means that, although rulers may sometimes have to take actions that seem to go against conventional morality or existing laws, these actions can be justified if they are in accordance with God's commandments and if they promote the welfare of the community.

Botero's conception of the reason of state serves as a kind of response to Machiavelli's vision. While Machiavelli focuses on political efficiency and pragmatism, setting aside traditional moral considerations, Botero emphasises the crucial role of morality, particularly Christian morality, in governance. Botero argues that true power and authority come from God, and therefore those who govern must follow God's commandments and teachings. If a ruler does this, then he or she can justify the use of the reason of state in exceptional circumstances. In this view, the reason of state is not an excuse for acting amoral or unjustly, but a principle that must be used in accordance with divine teachings. This is a perspective that contrasts sharply with Machiavelli's, and reflects the wider differences in their political thinking.

For Botero, the use of reason of state is an extension of the prince's duty to God and the welfare of his people. He argues that the prince, in using the reason of state, may sometimes have to go beyond conventional laws or norms in order to achieve the higher goals assigned to him by God. It is important to clarify that for Botero the use of reason of state is not a license for immorality or injustice. On the contrary, the prince must always seek to act in accordance with the moral and ethical principles derived from the Christian faith, even when acting in an exceptional way. This view of state reason as a tool in the service of the divine will and the common good is a distinctive feature of Botero's political thought, and it offers an interesting contrast to more secular and pragmatic approaches to state reason.

Botero is one of the first thinkers to develop a theory of the modern state and to explore the conditions for the application of raison d'état. He is concerned with the question of how to build and maintain a powerful and effective state that can respond to challenges and crises without compromising fundamental moral principles. For Botero, raison d'Etat is an essential instrument at the disposal of the prince to manage these exceptional situations. However, its use must always be guided by a deep understanding of the divine will and the needs of the community. He also suggests that the modern state must be organised in such a way as to facilitate the effective and ethical application of the reason of state. This implies a strong governance structure, a competent administration, and a population that is both well governed and morally virtuous. In sum, Botero's vision of the raison d'état is deeply rooted in his broader conception of the modern state and its requirements. This makes him an important figure in the development of modern political theory.

Botero proposes that raison d'état can be invoked in times of severe crisis, such as civil wars. These exceptional situations can threaten the very existence of the state and the stability of society, requiring extraordinary measures to restore order and peace. Botero suggests that in such cases, the prince may be obliged to override ordinary laws or conventional ethical norms to preserve the state and its citizens. However, even in these extreme circumstances, the prince is not free from moral constraints. On the contrary, his actions must always be guided by divine principles and aimed at the welfare of the community. Thus, for Botero, the reason of state is not a license for arbitrariness or injustice, but a principle that can justify extraordinary actions in extraordinary circumstances, always with respect for God's commandments and the promotion of the common good as the ultimate goals.

Botero's paradox is that he legitimises the action of the prince on religious grounds, but at the same time he is prepared to define as moral acts that have nothing human about them. This paradox is one of the most controversial aspects of Botero's thinking. On the one hand, he insists that the reason of state must always be guided by moral and theological principles. On the other hand, he acknowledges that the application of state reason may sometimes require actions that in other contexts would be considered immoral or inhumane. Botero seems to resolve this paradox by arguing that exceptional necessity - such as that which may arise in a civil war or other serious crisis - may justify actions that would otherwise be unacceptable. He considers that in such situations, the common good and the survival of the state may require extraordinary measures, even if they involve some suffering or harm. However, it is important to note that for Botero, even in these extreme circumstances, the prince is not free from moral restraint. He must always seek to minimise the harm caused and act in accordance with the divine will, as he understands it. This may seem a paradoxical approach, but it is consistent with his view of the state and political morality.

Starting from a limited conceptual apriori, the prince is moral so he can apply the reason of state. If the prince is fundamentally immoral, then he can use the reason of state to further his own interests in the name of God. This is an important concern regarding Botero's theory of reason of state. Indeed, there is a risk that an immoral prince could misuse the notion of reason of state to justify actions that serve his own interests rather than the common good. He could, for example, claim to be acting in the name of the divine will or the preservation of the state, while in reality pursuing selfish or tyrannical objectives. This is a problem in all political theories that allow for flexibility or discretion in the application of moral or legal rules. How can we ensure that this latitude is not abused? How can we guarantee that leaders will remain faithful to fundamental ethical principles and not use the reason of state as a pretext for arbitrary power? Botero, like many other political thinkers, tries to solve this problem by insisting on the need for strict moral and religious control over the prince. According to him, the prince must be deeply aware of his duties towards God and the community, and must always seek to serve the common good rather than his own interests. However, it remains an open question how this can be ensured in practice, especially in the absence of effective democratic control mechanisms.

One of the fundamental assumptions of Botero's argument for raison d'Etat seems to be that ordinary citizens may lack the rationality to understand and manage the complex problems facing the state, especially in times of crisis or emergency. From this perspective, raison d'Etat can be seen as a mechanism for restoring order and rationality when the population is unable to do so itself. This may involve actions that appear 'unreasonable' or arbitrary at first sight, but which are justified by the need to preserve the stability and well-being of the state as a whole. However, this approach has serious limitations. It can easily be used to justify abuses of power or to circumvent democratic principles. Moreover, it is based on a rather pessimistic view of the capacity of citizens to make informed decisions and to participate meaningfully in the governance of their own society. In this sense, Botero's theory, while having important implications for the understanding of politics and power, must be approached with caution.

The idea of raison d'état suggests that in certain situations, especially those where social order or state security are threatened, extraordinary measures may be necessary. These measures may go beyond what is normally permitted by law or conventional ethics. The aim is to protect the state and its citizens from significant threats. However, it is crucial to stress that even in an emergency or crisis, there are limits to what a government can justify in the name of statecraft. For example, basic human rights and democratic principles must never be violated. Furthermore, the use of raison d'Etat must be temporary and specific to the crisis or threat at hand. Once the crisis is over, the government must return to the normal legal order. Furthermore, the use of raison d'état requires great caution and strict control to avoid abuse of power. Leaders must be held accountable for their actions and decisions taken in the name of raison d'Etat must be transparent and subject to scrutiny. In a democracy, this implies an active role for the media, civil society and oversight institutions, such as the courts.

Historically, the state of war has been one of the most common times when raison d'état has been invoked. In these moments of extreme crisis, the state may be forced to take extraordinary measures to ensure its survival. This may involve, for example, temporary restrictions on civil liberties, the mobilisation of resources in unusual ways, or the implementation of military strategies that might otherwise be considered unacceptable. The objective is always to protect the state and its citizens from the imminent threat. However, as mentioned earlier, even in times of war, it is crucial that actions taken in the name of statecraft respect certain fundamental principles, such as respect for human rights, proportionality of measures taken and their temporary nature. Furthermore, such actions must always be subject to rigorous scrutiny and control to avoid abuse of power. Finally, it should be noted that the raison d'Etat is not limited to situations of war. It can also be invoked in other crisis situations, such as health emergencies or natural disasters, when the normal order must be temporarily suspended to deal with the situation.

For Giovanni Botero, as for many other political thinkers of his time, the army and the ability to wage war were considered essential elements of state power and authority. It was also through the conduct of war that the state could sometimes be called upon to exercise the raison d'état, taking exceptional decisions to ensure its survival and security. In the context of war, the raison d'Etat could be invoked to justify unusual military strategies, the use of resources in unconventional ways, or even actions that might otherwise be considered contrary to international law. However, it is important to emphasise that the use of raison d'état in this context must always be proportionate, temporary and respectful of the human rights of individuals, including those of enemies. Furthermore, the ability to maintain a strong and effective military is often seen as a manifestation of the power of the state and its ability to protect its citizens, which is also an important element of the raison d'état. A strong military can deter foreign attacks, maintain internal order and guarantee the sovereignty and independence of the state.

In its evolution, raison d'Etat has gradually separated from its theological basis to become a concept more broadly associated with the political philosophy and practices of state power. This evolution has been influenced by changes in the nature of societies, the organisation of the state and the nature of the conflicts and challenges facing states. The application of raison d'Etat as an extraordinary form of governance is usually justified by exceptional situations, such as crises, wars or threats to national security. These situations often require rapid and sometimes radical responses, which may go beyond the usual procedures and norms of governance. However, the invocation of raison d'Etat must always respect certain limits, particularly in terms of respect for human rights and the fundamental principles of democracy. It should not be used as an excuse to abuse power or violate fundamental freedoms, but rather as a means to protect the public interest in extraordinary situations. It is also important to note that the application of raison d'Etat should always be temporary, and the state should return to its normal governance as soon as the emergency situation is resolved. In this sense, raison d'Etat is an important tool to ensure the survival and continuity of the state, but its use must be regulated and controlled to avoid abuse.

Reason of State is a concept that allows the state, in certain exceptional situations, to act in an extraordinary way in the best interests of the nation. This may involve taking decisions or adopting policies that deviate from the norm or even the law, if deemed necessary to protect the security, stability, or integrity of the nation. However, as mentioned earlier, the use of the raison d'état must be temporary and proportionate to the situation, and always in accordance with the fundamental rights of citizens. In a democracy, the use of raison d'Etat should also be subject to checks and balances to prevent abuse of power. Moreover, the reason of State does not justify actions that are contrary to morality or ethics. Indeed, while the general interest may sometimes require exceptional measures, these must always respect the fundamental principles of justice and respect for human dignity. This is a complex subject that has been widely debated in political philosophy and political science.

The concept of raison d'Etat is inherently paradoxical. In extraordinary circumstances, the state may have to take measures that go beyond the legal norm and individual freedoms to protect the general welfare of society. The extraordinary nature of these situations would justify the use of non-ordinary measures, according to the theory of raison d'Etat. On the one hand, it is based on the idea that the state must sometimes adopt extraordinary measures to protect the general interest. This may include the temporary suspension of certain individual rights and freedoms, in exceptional circumstances such as war or a major crisis. On the other hand, these extraordinary measures may themselves pose a threat to democracy and the rule of law, by creating a situation where the state acts outside the usual bounds of the law and democratic control. This paradox is at the heart of many debates in political philosophy and constitutional law. How can restrictions on fundamental rights and freedoms be justified in the name of the public interest? What are the limits of state action in exceptional situations? How can democratic control be ensured and abuses of power prevented in such situations? These questions are all the more relevant in the current context, where many countries around the world have had to adopt exceptional measures to deal with crises such as the COVID-19 pandemic.

War as a catalyst for statecraft

Michel Senellart (1953 - ): Contemporary perspectives on the role of war

Michel Senellart is a contemporary French philosopher specialising in political philosophy and the history of political ideas. His view of raison d'Etat focuses heavily on the idea that the state sometimes needs to deviate from the norm in order to respond to major crises, such as war.

According to Senellart, reason of state is nothing more than a contravention of ordinary reasons for the sake of the public good, or for the sake of a greater and universal reason. This means that the state may sometimes be required to act in a manner contrary to the usual norms in the interest of the public good or in order to respect a more universal reason. War is a typical example where the reason of state can be applied according to Senellart. In times of war, the state may have to take extraordinary measures to ensure the security and well-being of the nation. This could include actions that in peacetime would be considered out of the ordinary or even illegal.

The reason of State is often invoked in emergency or crisis situations where the normal functioning of democracy is not sufficient to respond to a serious threat to the State or society. This may include situations of war, terrorism, natural disaster or pandemic. In these situations, the government may find it necessary to take extraordinary measures to ensure the security, well-being and continuity of the nation. This may involve temporarily derogating from certain normal norms or laws. However, the invocation of the reason of State must always be carried out with care. The suspension or modification of customary laws or rights must be proportional to the threat, limited in time and subject to judicial review to avoid abuse of power and to preserve the rule of law and democratic principles.

Scipione Ammirato (1531 - 1601): War and the Reason of State

Scipione Ammirato was an Italian historian of the late 16th century. His view of the reason of state is less well known than that of thinkers such as Machiavelli or Botero, but it reflects the idea that in certain circumstances the welfare of the state might require extraordinary actions, often associated with situations of conflict or war. Indeed, war is a context in which leaders are often faced with difficult decisions that may require deviation from normal rules and practices to preserve the security and integrity of the state. It is in this context that the notion of statecraft can be invoked to justify such actions. In the context of war, the application of the raison d'Etat can take many forms, such as the imposition of martial law, the restriction of civil liberties, the requisitioning of private property, the mobilisation of the population for the war effort, etc. In the context of conflicts with other states, the application of the raison d'Etat can take many forms.

In the context of conflicts with other nations or groups, including religious groups, the raison d'Etat may be invoked to justify certain extraordinary actions or policies to protect the integrity, security and interests of the state. The application of the raison d'Etat can take many forms in these contexts, including enhanced security policies, restrictions on certain civil liberties, extraordinary diplomatic efforts, military defence measures, etc. In some cases, these measures may be justified by the state's own interests. In some cases, these measures may be controversial, as they may appear to contradict certain democratic or human rights principles.

The reason of state is often invoked in the context of international tensions and preparations for war. It involves taking extraordinary measures to protect national security and interests, which may include mobilising resources, increasing military production, implementing enhanced security policies and coordinating efforts to anticipate and prepare for a possible war. In this perspective, raison d'état is seen as a tool for preparing for war, a kind of 'latent war'. It is a way of pooling the resources of the state and focusing attention on a common goal, namely the defence of the state and its interests. However, it is important to stress that the invocation of the raison d'Etat to justify such extraordinary measures must always be done in a transparent, proportional and time-limited manner. Furthermore, it must always respect the principles of the rule of law and the fundamental rights of citizens. Furthermore, it is preferable to avoid war if possible, using diplomacy, negotiation and international cooperation to resolve conflicts and tensions. War should always be the last resort, when all other options have been exhausted.

War, being an exceptional situation, often justifies the use of the raison d'état. It is a time when the security and very existence of the state may be threatened. As a result, extraordinary measures may be implemented to protect and preserve the nation. It should be noted, however, that the use of statecraft, even in times of war, must be in accordance with the fundamental principles of democracy and international norms. This means that any action taken must respect human rights, the principles of justice and the rules of war.

Carl Schmitt (1888 - 1985): Reassessment of the relationship between war and state

Schmitt advises the von Papen (left) and Schleicher (right) governments on the constitutional question.

Carl Schmitt, a German jurist and political philosopher, developed the theory of the partisan, which focuses on a specific form of combat - guerrilla warfare, or irregular struggle. This theory is developed mainly in his book "Theory of the Partisan" (1962). According to Schmitt, the partisan is distinct from the regular combatant because he does not operate according to the conventional rules of war and is not easily identifiable. He is rooted in a specific place (usually his local territory), he is extremely mobile, and his loyalty is more to a cause than to a state. Schmitt saw the emergence of partisans as a significant transformation in the nature of warfare. The impact of this transformation on the reason for state is considerable. If the state is designed to manage conflicts between clearly defined and organised entities, how can it manage the kind of asymmetric and irregular conflict that the partisan represents? The question becomes even more complicated if we consider that the partisan may be internal to the state - a citizen who has taken up arms against the state for one reason or another. Schmitt considers that the figure of the partisan challenges the traditional categories of the law of war and forces a rethinking of the concepts of sovereignty and exception. Thus, in this framework, the raison d'Etat becomes more complex since the threat does not only come from external state actors, but can also emanate from within, which may justify exceptional measures to deal with it.

Carl Schmitt developed a theory of 'decisionism'. Decisionism is an approach to political theory that emphasises the role of individual decision in political processes. Schmitt's famous phrase "the sovereign is the one who decides the exception" expresses this idea. It means that real political power lies in the ability to suspend the existing legal order to deal with an emergency. This power to decide when and how the normal legal order is suspended is, according to Schmitt, what defines sovereignty. During the rise of Nazism, Schmitt was an active supporter of the regime. He argued that Hitler's seizure of power was an example of a sovereign decision, suspending the constitutional order of the Weimar Republic in 1933. Sovereignty and the state of exception has been heavily criticised, not only for its role in legitimising the Nazi regime, but also for the way it can be used to justify abuses of power.

According to Carl Schmitt, the sovereign, as the one who decides on the exception, has the power to determine the moments of emergency or crisis that justify the suspension of the normal legal order. This power of exception could indeed include the ability to declare war or to take extraordinary decisions in response to crisis situations. The theory of raison d'état and the concept of total war have indeed been linked to the totalitarian regimes of the 20th century, notably those of Nazi Germany and Stalin's Soviet Union. In these regimes, the state seeks to control all aspects of public and private life, including the economy, education, the arts, religion, personal relationships and even the thoughts of individuals. Totalitarianism is often associated with total mobilisation in wartime, where all of society's resources are devoted to the war effort. This can be done through conscription, regulation of industry and the economy, and restriction of civil liberties in the name of national security. In this context, the reason of state is often invoked to justify actions that, in peacetime, would be considered violations of human rights.

Totalitarianism is a political system that seeks to control all aspects of public and private life, including individual expression and free thought. In a totalitarian regime, the state seeks to monopolise the truth and define reality for its citizens. The state media is used to disseminate official propaganda, and any dissent or criticism of the regime is severely repressed. This can create an environment in which independent thought and freedom of expression are hindered or even dangerous. Individuals may conform to the regime's expectations, not only through fear of reprisals, but also through social conditioning and indoctrination. Totalitarianism is often associated with authoritarian regimes that are rooted in extreme ideologies and that seek to reshape society according to a utopian vision. However, this attempt to control all aspects of social and individual life can often lead to oppression, violence and dehumanisation.

Carl Schmitt, a German political philosopher, wrote extensively about the nature of politics and power. He argued that the fundamental distinction in politics is between 'friend' and 'enemy'. In this framework, the enemy is not necessarily an individual or group that is personally hated or despised, but rather the one on the other side of the political conflict. According to Schmitt, the role of the sovereign (the 'ruler') is to make this distinction and to take decisions in exceptional situations, such as war or crisis. Schmitt argued that in such situations, constitutional normality can be suspended in the name of preserving the state. This is called the state of exception.

The view of conflict from a Nazi theological perspective, as expressed by Carl Schmitt, is centred on the notion of friend and foe. This implies that conflicts are inevitable and even necessary in politics, as they allow for a clear definition of who is 'friend' and who is 'enemy'. This distinction is fundamental to the exercise of political power. In the context of Nazism, this theory was used to justify aggression and imperialist expansion, identifying certain groups (such as Jews or Communists) as 'enemies' of the state. Futurism was an artistic and social movement that began in Italy in the early 20th century, which valued speed, technology, youth and violence, rejecting the past. Some Futurists, such as Filippo Tommaso Marinetti, supported the Fascist movements in Italy and elsewhere. However, Futurism as a movement was distinct from Nazism and Carl Schmitt's political theory, although they shared certain themes of glorifying conflict and rejecting tradition.

Carl Schmitt argued that the essence of politics rests on the distinction between friend and foe. For him, war, as the ultimate conflict, is the ultimate expression of this distinction. It is in the context of war, or at least the possibility of war, that the true nature of the political becomes apparent, according to Schmitt. In this context, the sovereign (or whoever exercises political power) is the one who decides on the state of exception, i.e. who determines when a situation is so serious that it justifies extraordinary measures - including war. This is what Schmitt calls 'decisionism'.

Current state of emergency and reason of State ==

Giorgio Agambe (1942 - ): Understanding the State of Exception

Giorgio Agamben .

Giorgio Agamben, a well-known Italian philosopher, published a book entitled "State of Exception" in 2005 (its first Italian edition dates from 2003). In this book he examines the notion of the 'state of exception' as developed by Carl Schmitt. Agamben analyses how states can use the state of exception to suspend laws and constitutional rights in a crisis situation. He argues that, increasingly, the state of exception has become the norm rather than the exception in contemporary societies, with the expansion of governments' powers of surveillance and control. For Agamben, the state of exception is a dangerous space where the law is in abeyance and where governmental authority acts without legal constraints, which can lead to abuses of power. He warns against using this situation to restrict civil liberties and human rights. It is a powerful and disturbing concept that highlights the tension between security and freedom in modern societies. Agamben's work has been widely discussed and debated, and has had a significant impact on contemporary political thought.

Agamben argues that contemporary societies tend to enter into a permanent state of exception, particularly under the pretext of security. The state of exception is a crisis situation that allows the state to suspend the laws and civil liberties normally in force. Agamben suggests that this state of exception is increasingly used as a normal means of governance, rather than as an exceptional response to a crisis. For example, in the context of the 'war on terror', states may invoke national security to justify measures that violate human rights and civil liberties. This state of exception, according to Agamben, endangers democracy by making citizens vulnerable to the abuse of power. He argues that the state of exception reveals a fundamental tension between security and freedom, a tension that is at the heart of contemporary debates about the role of the state in society.

In the 1789 Declaration of the Rights of Man and of the Citizen, it is stated that freedom is the precondition for security. That is, individuals must be free in order to be secure. However, in the contemporary world, this paradigm seems to have been reversed. Increasingly, security is seen as a precondition for freedom. This means that states and societies are increasingly willing to restrict individual and collective freedoms in the name of security. This can be seen in the context of the fight against terrorism, for example, where civil liberties are often restricted in the name of national security. This is a worrying development for many, as it can potentially lead to abuses of power and a diminution of democracy. This tension between security and freedom is a crucial debate in contemporary political thought. The question is how far we are willing to go to guarantee our security and whether it is worth it if it means restricting our freedoms.

Giorgio Agamben, in his book "State of Exception", argues that in contemporary societies, security is often privileged over freedom. In his view, this leads to what he calls a 'state of exception': a state in which regular legal norms are suspended in the name of security. For Agamben, this is not an exceptional or temporary situation, but a permanent state that has become the norm in many modern societies. He argues that the notion of security has become an excuse to restrict freedoms and strengthen the power of the state, creating an environment of constant control and surveillance. What Agamben criticises here is the shift from the primacy of freedom to the primacy of security in our contemporary societies. He suggests that this leads to a rationalisation and normalisation of the state of exception, which in turn threatens individual and collective freedoms. This is an important debate that echoes many contemporary issues, from the fight against terrorism to the management of health crises, where the tension between freedom and security is constantly present.

According to Agamben, we now live in a situation where the state of exception has become the norm, rather than a rare and temporary occurrence as Botero suggested. This perspective is indeed in line with Michel Foucault's theory on the surveillance society. Foucault developed the notion of 'biopower', where the control exercised by the state extends not only to social life, but also to the biological life of individuals. This involves constant surveillance and detailed regulation of citizens' bodies and lives. It is therefore a significant shift in the way power is exercised by the state. This shift can be seen as a threat to our individual freedoms, as state power is exercised in a more intrusive and pervasive way. Furthermore, as Agamben points out, the primacy of security over freedom contributes to this process, justifying the continued expansion of control and surveillance in the name of protecting the security of individuals and society as a whole. It is important to note that these perspectives are highly debated in the academic and political field. Some people may see these developments as necessary and justified, while others may see them as unacceptable infringements of our individual freedoms and fundamental rights.

The notion that we have entered an era of 'lawlessness' and 'necessity' reflects the concerns that many thinkers, lawyers and activists have today about the way in which law and democracy are used, and sometimes circumvented, in the name of security, efficiency or necessity. Traceability and surveillance have become ubiquitous elements of our daily lives, underpinning major aspects of our economy, government and society. This is facilitated by rapid technological advancement, which allows an unprecedented level of surveillance and data collection. The tension between necessity and law is a central issue of our time. Traditionally, the rule of law is a fundamental principle of democratic societies, ensuring that all actions, including those of the state, are subject to the law. However, in many cases we see situations where 'necessity' is invoked to justify actions that might otherwise be considered contrary to fundamental legal and democratic principles. This tension raises fundamental questions about the nature of our societies and political systems. How do we balance security and freedom? What does democracy mean in an era of mass surveillance and ubiquitous data? These are complex questions to which there are no simple answers, but debate and reflection are essential to shape the future of our societies.

The concept of a state of exception described by Agamben is precisely that of a situation where ordinary laws and civil rights are suspended, often in response to a perceived crisis or emergency. This state of affairs effectively creates a 'grey zone' where normal rules do not apply and where the powers of the state can be significantly extended. In these situations, there is often a tension between security imperatives and individual rights and freedoms. This is a complex issue that has no easy answer, as it requires a balance between protecting the security of the state and its citizens on the one hand, and safeguarding individual rights and freedoms on the other.

The separation of powers is a fundamental principle that aims to prevent the abuse of power and to maintain a balance in the exercise of authority. This separation allows each power - legislative, executive, judicial - to control the others and thus guarantees a form of reciprocity in the functioning of the state. However, when a state of emergency is declared, these boundaries can become blurred. The powers of the executive may be expanded, sometimes to the detriment of other powers, which may jeopardise the democratic balance. This often results in an accumulation of power in the hands of a single body or individual, which can lead to a concentration of power and potentially to abuse.

In a state of emergency, executive powers are often strengthened at the expense of the other branches of government. This can lead to a situation where the executive can legislate without the control of the legislature, through decrees or orders, and where the powers of control of the judiciary are limited. In addition, a state of emergency may also lead to the adoption of restrictive regulations, often justified by the need to respond to an emergency or crisis, which may impede individual rights and freedoms. These regulations can affect many aspects of people's lives, ranging from freedom of movement to privacy. It is therefore essential, even in times of crisis, to maintain the fundamental principles of democracy and the rule of law, and to ensure that any extraordinary measures are proportionate, necessary and temporary.

The application of the state of exception in France is the First World War which refers to a state of exception; the preparation of the Second World War in 1938 and 1939 with the German-Soviet pact which creates dissension in French politics, as the communists wish to follow the Soviet position; the French constitution of 1958, article 16 says that in case of threat to the integrity of the republic and the nation, the president of the republic can take all necessary powers. Thus an article grants the taking of all powers in the name of attacking the integrity of the territory.

The state of exception in France has been applied in various crisis situations. During the First World War, the French government had to take extraordinary measures, including general mobilisation, censorship and rationing, to support the war effort. Later, in the years leading up to the Second World War, faced with a period of great uncertainty and tension, the government undertook a series of measures to strengthen national defence. This climate of tension culminated in the German-Soviet Pact of 1939, which caused dissension within the French Communist Party, with some members opposing the official party position in favour of the pact. In addition, Article 16 of the 1958 French Constitution stipulates that the President of the Republic may exercise exceptional powers in the event of a serious crisis. These powers were invoked only once, during the Algerian crisis in 1961. In each case, the balance between the functioning of democracy and respect for individual rights and freedoms was put to the test.

The French Constitution of 1958, in Article 16, gives exceptional powers to the President of the Republic in the event of a serious crisis threatening the integrity of the territory or the regular functioning of the public authorities. This article was conceived in the context of the Cold War, and was intended to be used in exceptional circumstances where the normal functioning of the state would be seriously disrupted. It was invoked only once, during the Algerian crisis in 1961. Article 16 confers on the President "the most extensive powers", allowing him to take measures necessary for the defence of the nation. However, it is important to note that these powers are not unlimited. The Constitutional Council, according to a decision taken in 1973, has the power to control the application of Article 16 and can therefore put an end to the state of emergency if the conditions are no longer met.

Switzerland, as a traditionally neutral country, faced its own challenges during the two world wars. In the context of the First World War, on 30 August 1914, the Swiss Federal Assembly gave the Federal Council (the Swiss government) unlimited power to guarantee the security, integrity and neutrality of the country. This decision was taken with the aim of enabling the government to take the necessary measures quickly and effectively to preserve Switzerland from the consequences of the European conflict that was taking place around it. This was clearly an example of the application of 'raison d'Etat', where the ordinary rules of democratic governance were temporarily suspended in response to an extraordinary situation. It is a clear illustration of the concept of a state of exception, although it was exercised with the aim of preserving Switzerland's neutrality and independence rather than engaging it in the conflict.

September 11 and the return of the raison d'état

Authorisation for the use of military force 2001

After the attacks of 11 September 2001, US President George W. Bush declared that the integrity of the nation had been attacked. This declaration was based on the fact that the terrorist attacks amounted to an act of war. In this context, the President invoked the concept of 'raison d'état', suggesting that an extraordinary response was needed to deal with this extraordinary situation. This response took the form of the Authorization for Use of Military Force (AUMF), which was passed by the US Congress shortly after the attacks. The AUMF gave the President the authority to take all "necessary and appropriate action" against those he determined to have "planned, authorised, committed or assisted" the September 11 attacks. In addition, the Bush administration put in place draconian homeland security measures, such as the Patriot Act, which expanded the government's surveillance and investigative powers. These measures, although controversial, were presented as essential to protect the nation.

Following the attacks of 11 September 2001, President George W. Bush responded by making the defence of the American nation a paramount necessity. In his speeches, he presented the attackers not as mere terrorists, but as an enemy comparable to a nation, which had the paradoxical effect of elevating Osama Bin Laden's stature. Indeed, by equating al-Qaeda with a nation-state, Bush implicitly credited bin Laden with the status of a head of state. This approach also justified a massive military response, rather than a police and judicial approach to dealing with a crime. This led to the invasion of Afghanistan and the War on Terror, a global military campaign that has profoundly affected international relations and domestic politics in the US.

By describing the attacks of 11 September 2001 as an "act of war", George W. Bush established a justification for the application of the raison d'état. The act of war is a condition for the use of raison d'état, as it constitutes an exceptional situation, an extraordinary circumstance that requires extraordinary measures. Reason of State in this context allows the government to make decisions and act in a way that might be contrary to the usual laws and principles in the supreme interest of the nation. This could include actions such as declaring war, mobilising military forces, instituting enhanced internal security measures, and other extraordinary measures that may be perceived as necessary to ensure the security and integrity of the nation.

When George W. Bush described the attacks of 11 September 2001 as an 'act of war', he in a way legitimised al-Qaeda and its leader, Bin Laden, as traditional war actors. This statement effectively changed the paradigm for the application of raison d'état. It allowed the Bush administration to justify the application of raison d'état, taking extraordinary measures for the defence of the nation, ranging from the war in Afghanistan to the implementation of new homeland security measures. This declaration marked a turning point in contemporary history, introducing a new type of conflict - the 'war on terror' - where the line between the law of peace and the law of war becomes blurred.

When a state is faced with an emergency or imminent danger, it may have to invoke what is known as 'raison d'état' or a state of emergency to take extraordinary measures to protect the security and integrity of the nation. However, such extraordinary measures may sometimes deviate from the traditional principles of the rule of law, which may raise important questions about the balance between security and individual freedoms. Indeed, in such cases, there may be a tendency to favour emergency action and response to the immediate threat, sometimes at the expense of normal legal protections and procedural safeguards. This can lead to a situation where the normal rules of public law are set aside in the name of emergency management. This can be a source of tension and debate, as it puts at stake the fundamental values of democracy and the rule of law, such as respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms.

On 9 November 2001, Stephen John Byers stated that "it is a very good day to bring out and sneak in all the measures we need to take".This statement highlights an important point of tension in emergency or exceptional situations. In response to a crisis, governments may be tempted to rush through measures that would, in normal circumstances, be subject to full public debate and democratic scrutiny. In some cases, these measures may include laws or regulations that restrict individual freedoms, increase the powers of the state, or alter other aspects of governance and public order. While such measures may be justified by the gravity of the situation, they raise important questions about transparency, accountability and respect for democratic principles. It is crucial that even in emergencies, governments strive to maintain the rule of law, respect human rights and engage transparently with the public. Furthermore, measures taken in response to an emergency should be proportionate, necessary and subject to regular review to ensure that they remain appropriate and justified.

The attacks of 11 September 2001 led to a series of significant changes in legislation and policy, particularly in the United States, but also internationally. The perceived need to protect citizens from future terrorist attacks has led to the adoption of measures that, in some cases, have restricted civil liberties and altered privacy, surveillance and human rights standards. One of the most controversial responses to these attacks was the passage of the USA PATRIOT Act in the United States, which expanded the surveillance powers of the US government for the purpose of preventing terrorism. Although these measures were taken with the stated aim of protecting national security, they also raised serious concerns about their impact on civil liberties and privacy. In this context, democratic debate may indeed face challenges. It is important that even in times of crisis, transparency, accountability and respect for human rights are maintained. It is a delicate balance between protecting national security and preserving fundamental democratic principles.

USA PATRIOT Act: Implications for the raison d'état

The USA PATRIOT Act (Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism Act) is a US law that was enacted shortly after the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001. Its stated purpose was "to thwart and punish acts of terrorism in the United States and around the world, to improve law enforcement to detect and prevent terrorism, and for other purposes. Some of the most controversial provisions of the Patriot Act concern information gathering and surveillance. The law allowed intelligence agencies to collect a wide range of information, including data on financial transactions, email and telephone communications, and gave federal authorities a greater ability to track and intercept communications. The Act greatly expanded the powers of US security and intelligence agencies to monitor, investigate and prosecute terrorist crimes. The provisions of the Act touch on a wide range of issues, from electronic surveillance to immigration to terrorist financing.

One of the controversial provisions of the USA PATRIOT Act allows for the indefinite detention of foreigners suspected of being linked to terrorist activities. US authorities have the power to detain a person on mere suspicion and can do so indefinitely, without charge or trial. In addition, the definition of terrorism and terrorist activity has been expanded to include many non-violent criminal acts and loose associations with groups suspected of terrorist activity. This expanded definition has been criticised for its potential misuse.

The "Carnivore" system, a precursor to the USA PATRIOT Act, was an Internet surveillance system set up by the FBI in the early 2000s. Established in the late 1990s and used primarily in the 2000s, it allowed the FBI to monitor the email and online activities of specifically targeted individuals as part of criminal or national security investigations. It was designed to monitor the email communications and online activities of individuals specifically targeted for criminal or national security investigations. The system worked by being installed directly on the target's Internet Service Provider (ISP) network. It could then filter all incoming and outgoing communications from that person. The system was technically a packet capture device, i.e. software capable of intercepting and inspecting data "packets" travelling over a computer network. "Carnivore was installed directly on the target's Internet Service Provider (ISP) network, where it could filter all incoming and outgoing communications from that person. The FBI stated that it abandoned the use of "Carnivore" in 2005, although subsequent reports suggest that similar surveillance tools continue to be used.

In legal terms, terrorism is generally defined as the commission of violent or dangerous acts to influence or affect the government through intimidation or coercion. It can also include acts committed in retaliation for government operations. This definition is quite broad and can potentially cover a variety of criminal acts. For example, it could include not only acts of physical violence, such as bombings or armed attacks, but also acts of cyber-terrorism that disrupt government computer systems.

The Enemy is Declared Outlaw - Carl Schmitt provides Giorgio Agamben with the categories for a fundamental critique of Guantanamo.

Guantanamo Bay Prison: A Symbol of Reason of State in Action

The Guantanamo Bay prison, located on Cuban territory leased by the United States, has become a controversial symbol of the application of raison d'état in the context of the fight against terrorism. Following the attacks of 11 September 2001, the United States began detaining individuals there who were considered "unlawful enemy combatants" with links to al-Qa'ida, the Taliban or other terrorist groups. The stated purpose was to obtain information from these detainees to prevent further terrorist attacks. However, the fact that these individuals were detained outside the main territory of the United States raised complex legal issues regarding their legal status and rights. Critics argued that the detention of these individuals at Guantanamo was a violation of international human rights law, including the Geneva Conventions. The interrogation methods used at Guantanamo, often described as torture, have also been strongly criticised. In addition, many detainees have been held for many years without charge or trial, raising concerns about the violation of the right to a fair trial. Thus, Guantanamo has become a prominent example of how the rationale of state has been invoked to justify extraordinary measures in the context of the war on terror.

The prison at Guantanamo Bay, located on a US military base in Cuba, has been described as a legal "no man's land". It is a territory which, although under US control, is not considered to be part of the United States in the proper sense. This has allowed the US government to argue that detainees at Guantanamo are not eligible for the constitutional protections normally afforded to individuals on US soil. This created a legal grey area that was used to justify controversial detention and interrogation practices. Critics argue that this has allowed the US government to avoid traditional legal protections, such as the right to a fair trial, the right to counsel, and protection from cruel and inhumane treatment. This state of legal "no-man's land" has been criticised for facilitating the creation of a system where the reason of state prevails over human rights and principles of international law. Thus, Guantanamo has become a symbol of the debate on the balance between national security and individual rights in the fight against terrorism.

The situation of the Guantanamo prison has created a unique legal complexity. The military base on which the prison is located is technically on Cuban territory, but is controlled by the US under a long-term lease agreement. The US government has maintained that because the Guantanamo base is located outside US territory, the detainees held there do not enjoy the constitutional protections to which they would be entitled if held on US soil. This position has been challenged by lawyers, human rights advocates and others, who argue that Guantanamo detainees should be afforded these protections. It is precisely this legal complexity and uncertainty that has led some to describe Guantanamo as a legal "no man's land", a space where the normal rules of law do not seem to apply. This has raised serious questions about the balance between the imperatives of national security and respect for human rights and international law standards.

The designation of Guantanamo detainees has been a major point of contention since the prison opened. The US government has claimed that the detainees are "unlawful enemy combatants", a term that is not recognised by the Geneva Conventions, which set out international rules for the treatment of prisoners of war. The term "unlawful enemy combatant" has been criticised by many lawyers and human rights activists, who argue that the designation is used to circumvent US obligations under the Geneva Conventions and other international human rights standards. This is because Guantanamo detainees do not have the same rights as prisoners of war (who are entitled to a number of protections under the Geneva Conventions), ordinary prisoners (who are entitled to a trial and legal representation) or political prisoners (who may have additional protections under international law). The US government's position has been challenged in the courts, and although some practices have been changed in response to these challenges, the overall situation at Guantanamo remains controversial.

The Bush administration, in its fight against terrorism, created a new category of detainees: "unlawful enemy combatants". This meant that they were neither considered prisoners of war, who are protected by the Geneva Conventions, nor common criminals, who are entitled to a trial in a civilian court. As "unlawful enemy combatants", these detainees were essentially outside the protection of international and US law, allowing the US government to hold them indefinitely without charge or trial. It also allowed interrogators to employ aggressive interrogation techniques that would otherwise be prohibited. This approach has been widely criticised for violating fundamental principles of human rights and the rule of law. Although some of the more controversial policies have subsequently been changed, the issue of the status and rights of Guantanamo detainees remains a matter of debate.

The term 'war on terror' implies an armed conflict, which suggests that those captured in it would normally be considered prisoners of war. However, the Bush administration decided not to follow this line of reasoning, preferring to label these detainees as "unlawful enemy combatants". This decision has led to a situation where, although they are captured in the course of what is called a war, they do not enjoy the protections normally afforded to prisoners of war under international law. Indeed, this situation illustrates one of the many challenges posed by the war on terror. In a conventional war, boundaries, combatants and objectives are usually clearly defined. However, in the war on terror, these elements are often unclear or undefined. For example, the "battleground" is not limited to a specific geographical area, but extends globally. Enemy combatants" can be citizens of almost any country, including those at peace with the US. And because terrorism is a tactic rather than an identifiable entity, there is no clearly defined enemy to be defeated to end the war. These factors all contribute to the complexity and controversy surrounding the war on terror and the treatment of Guantanamo detainees.

The creation of the Guantanamo prison is indeed a notable example of the use of extraterritoriality to escape normal legal constraints. By placing the prison outside US territory, the US administration sought to put it beyond the reach of US courts, and thus beyond the application of US laws on the treatment of prisoners.

In 2004, the US Supreme Court ruled in Rasul v. Bush that US courts have jurisdiction to consider habeas corpus petitions brought by Guantanamo detainees. This meant that, contrary to the Bush administration's claim, Guantanamo detainees had the right to challenge the legality of their detention in US courts. The case of Rasul v. Bush in 2004 marked a turning point, ruling that Guantanamo detainees had the right to challenge their detention in US courts. This decision expanded the rights of detainees, allowing them to have some level of legal protection. However, the Bush administration responded in 2006 by passing the Military Commissions Act, which attempted to limit detainees' access to the courts. In 2008, the Supreme Court reaffirmed the rights of detainees in Boumediene v. Bush, stating that detainees in the military can be held in a secure environment. Bush, declaring that Guantanamo detainees had a constitutional right to habeas corpus. Regarding the term "unlawful combatant", this is controversial terminology that the Bush administration has used to justify the treatment of Guantanamo detainees. It has been criticised by many as an attempt to circumvent protections under international law, including the Geneva Convention.

The question of whether the "parenthesis" of the state of emergency in the United States, which began in the wake of the September 11 attacks, has ended is complex and open to debate. The state of exception, in the context of national security, allowed for the adoption of extraordinary measures, such as the USA PATRIOT Act, the opening of the Guantanamo prison, and increased surveillance of electronic communications, among others. Many of these measures are still in place, although they have been reviewed and debated. For example, the Guantanamo prison is still operational, even though the number of detainees has been reduced and several US presidents have promised its closure. Similarly, although the USA PATRIOT Act expired in 2015, many of its provisions have been renewed in other legislative forms. Moreover, the threat of terrorism continues to influence US and international policy, and the legal framework of the 'war on terror' has lasting implications. Therefore, although there have been significant changes since 11 September 2001, it is difficult to say that the state of emergency is completely over. It is important to note that this topic is the subject of much debate among legal scholars, political scientists and security studies researchers. There is therefore no definitive consensus on the issue.

Even after the end of the George W. Bush administration, some of the measures taken in the wake of 9/11 remained in place. Barack Obama, although he promised to close the Guantanamo prison during his presidential campaign in 2008, has failed to deliver on this promise during his two terms in office. In addition, mass surveillance programmes revealed by Edward Snowden in 2013 showed that the US government continues to monitor the communications of its citizens and others around the world. This raises the question of whether such exceptional measures have become the norm, and whether the notion of the rule of law has been altered or compromised in the wake of 9/11. These questions are still being debated among scholars, politicians and civil rights activists. The state of exception, as conceptualised by Giorgio Agamben, may become permanent and change the nature of the relationship between the state and its citizens. It is important to stress that the balance between security and freedom is a complex and contested issue. Decisions taken in the name of national security can have lasting consequences for civil liberties, and the assessment of such decisions requires careful consideration and public debate.

The European Union has taken a different approach to dealing with terrorism. Rather than relying on unilateral measures, it has sought to harmonise the legislation of its Member States. This has involved the creation of a common legal framework for the definition of terrorism and the establishment of measures to combat terrorism. In 2002, the European Union adopted a Framework Decision on combating terrorism, which defines terrorism-related offences and provides for criminal sanctions for these offences. This Framework Decision has been amended several times to adapt to the changing terrorist threat. In addition, the European Union has put in place various instruments to facilitate cooperation between Member States in the fight against terrorism. For example, it has created Europol, the EU's law enforcement cooperation agency, which facilitates the exchange of information and coordination of actions between Member States' police forces.

The CIA's "extraordinary rendition" programmes and "secret flights" that came to light in the 2000s are prominent examples of how certain fundamental rights and civil liberties can be circumvented in the fight against terrorism. Extraordinary rendition is the secret transfer of a person from one country to another without recourse to a formal judicial process. This has often led to situations where individuals have been detained without charge, deprived of their basic legal rights and, in some cases, subjected to torture or inhuman and degrading treatment. Secret CIA flights, often referred to as "torture flights", are used to transport these individuals between different detention sites around the world. It has been revealed that several countries, including some European countries, have collaborated with these programmes, either by allowing the use of their airspace and airports for these flights, or by participating in the detention and interrogation of individuals. These practices clearly contradict the principles of the rule of law and respect for human rights, and have been the subject of considerable criticism and controversy. Moreover, they have raised important questions about the accountability and transparency of governments in the fight against terrorism.

Annexes

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