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| assistants = | | assistants = | ||
| enregistrement = [https://mediaserver.unige.ch/collection/AN3-1220-2014-2015.rss 2014], [https://mediaserver.unige.ch/collection/AN3-1220-2014-2015.rss 2015] | | enregistrement = [https://mediaserver.unige.ch/collection/AN3-1220-2014-2015.rss 2014], [https://mediaserver.unige.ch/collection/AN3-1220-2014-2015.rss 2015] | ||
| cours = [[ | | cours = [[Political Violence and Security Practices]] | ||
| lectures = | | lectures = | ||
*[[ | *[[Political violence and the practice of security]] | ||
*[[ | *[[The birth of modern warfare: war-making and state-making from a Western perspective]] | ||
*[[ | *[[Transformations of war and violence in Europe]] | ||
*[[ | *[[War beyond the West: is the modern state a Western invention?]] | ||
*[[ | *[[What is non-state violence? The Case of Afghan Conflict]] | ||
*[[ | *[[Intervention: Reinventing war?]] | ||
*[[ | *[[Security professionals: bureaucratization, institutionalization, professionalization and differentiation]] | ||
*[[ | *[[The transformation of contemporary security practices: between war and global policing?]] | ||
*[[ | *[[The transformation of contemporary security practices: the logic of risk]] | ||
*[[ | *[[Privatized coercion: from mercenarism to private military companies]] | ||
*[[ | *[[Intelligence and Surveillance]] | ||
}} | }} | ||
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Karas nėra visa ko tėvas, nėra universalus ar natūralus, tai nesenas reiškinys, susijęs su aukštu organizuotumo laipsniu. Trumpai tariant, norint suprasti karą, reikia ne tik sociologijos, bet ir istorijos. | Karas nėra visa ko tėvas, nėra universalus ar natūralus, tai nesenas reiškinys, susijęs su aukštu organizuotumo laipsniu. Trumpai tariant, norint suprasti karą, reikia ne tik sociologijos, bet ir istorijos. | ||
= | = War and modernity = | ||
The question is what is the specificity of war in the era of political modernity? When we talk about political modernity, we are not only talking about the contemporary period, but also about the era that began in the 15th and 16th centuries. | |||
The modern state has a dual characteristic and is often seen as coinciding with: | |||
* | *The "law and order": internally, it has the representation, which historically is not entirely false, that inter-individual violence declined from the 17th and 18th centuries onwards in most European political societies. The authors show a steady decline in inter-individual violence between the 17th century and today. The propensity of individuals to commit murders against their spouses, neighbours, competitors or partners is declining in this period, which could lead us to believe that political modernity is a constant march towards pacification, a progressive civilisation of mores in which violence would be more marginalized. | ||
* | *International peace: when talking about the great movement of history in international organisations at UN level or elsewhere, humanity would march towards the end of history or at least towards a more ambitious attempt to put an end to inter-state wars. One might be led to believe that modernity coincides with a decline in interpersonal violence, but also with a relative decline in inter-state warfare, even in the cradle of the modern state. | ||
* | *It is a vision of political modernity, but contradicted by another facet of political modernity. | ||
But political modernity also coincides with: | |||
* | *For example, genocide, which is the systematic and intentional practice of eradicating an entire group of human beings because of their supposed ethnic or religious affiliation, is part of political modernity. If we look at the Armenian genocide during the First World War, there is a tendency to perceive it as the result of the regime of the Ottoman Empire, but in reality it is not because the Armenian genocide is the result of the centralization of the bureaucracy of the Ottoman Empire. | ||
*" | *The "total war": these are the Civil War, the First World War and the Second World War, which are total wars characterized by the total mobilization of the state apparatus, characteristic of political modernity, which are characterized by the emergence of highly centralized states capable of mobilizing the whole of their society to the war effort. | ||
*" | *The "most violent century of all time": the 20th century was at once the most deadly century in terms of inter-state warfare, but also in terms of internal repression. It would be impossible to understand these mass killings without taking into account the interdependence between the increasingly deadly war and the increasingly centralised and binding form of political organization, hence the importance of understanding the modern state. | ||
The paradox is summed up by Max Weber in 1919 in his famous lecture "The Vocation of Politics": {{citation|Today, the relationship between State and violence is particularly intimate[...] the modern State is a grouping of domination of an institutional character which has sought (with success) to monopolize, within the limits of a territory, legitimate physical violence as a means of domination and which, for this purpose, has brought together in the hands of the rulers the material means of management}}. | |||
[[File:Max Weber 1894.jpg|thumb|200px|Max Weber 1894 | [[File:Max Weber 1894.jpg|thumb|200px|Max Weber en 1894.]] | ||
Max Weber | Max Weber allows us to understand the intimate link between state building and the use of violence. Through these links, political modernity has a pacifying face, but also a political modernity characterized by mass massacres. If there is an organized human community that monopolizes legitimate physical violence on its territory, it means that this organization, the government and its bureaucracies will be able to mobilize capacities of coercion and violence that will make the war know a qualitative leap forward in the direction of war that is becoming more and more deadly and violent. By monopolizing violence on a territory, it means that the population living in the territory loses its capacity to use violence, but also the right to do so in a legitimate way. Today, it is understood that interpersonal violence in general is illegitimate, illegal, punishable and punished in the name of the law by State services, including courts and police forces. The monopolisation of violence allows total wars, but also this progressive movement of human and interpersonal relations in the sense that violence is no longer a normal, legitimate option in social relations. Some authors clearly show that in the relationships between individuals in individual rural societies of the Middle Ages, violence was one type of relationship among others not suppressed by law and socially tolerated as reprimandable if not legitimate. | ||
Weber | Weber adds that {{citation|what is peculiar to our time is that it grants all other groups, or individuals, the right to resort to violence only to the extent that the State tolerates it: it is therefore seen as the sole source of the "right" to violence}}. In some borderline cases, as individuals, we may have to resort to legitimate violence as in the case of self-defence. The State is the source of the right to violence if legitimate violence can be used in some cases because the State allows it to be used in some cases. Self-defence is thus respectful of the Weberian definition, since the State has given us the right to do so. In contemporary warfare, it is increasingly common for private companies to deploy private and armed personnel to protect private or public buildings, but also diplomats. This private personnel, once called "mercenaries", can legitimately resort to violence. In general, these private companies have been delegated the right to resort to violence and therefore the State remains the source of the recourse to violence. | ||
The modern state does not see warrior aristocracies being left in place as opposed to the Roman Empire, which ruled through pre-constituted warrior aristocracies. When the Roman Empire extended into present-day Germany, the Germanic warrior tribes were left in place, but were regarded as an echelon through which the Roman Empire governed its subjects. The modern state creates police forces, but this monopoly of the modern state is much more: | |||
* | *linked to a distinct political order in which the state monopolizes allegiances. It is up to the authority to make decisions as a last resort. With the modern state will emerge nationalism, which is the development of ideologies that demand the obligation of every citizen to recognize himself in the authority that governs the state. | ||
* | *It is linked to a differentiated administration, and not to the exercise of power through pre-constituted local elites, through which bureaucratic and impersonal power is exercised. Differentiated administration means that state administrations use resources that are differentiated from political society. This is different from the system we had in the Middle Ages where the weapons used were the property of aristocrats and not kings. The State is characterized by the fact that the administration has its own resources totally independent of private individuals, leading to a strict separation between the public and private spheres. | ||
* | *territorial as opposed to empires and city-states: the state is politically organized, homogeneous, continuous and bounded by a linear border. The state is first and foremost for Weber a monopoly of legitimate violence. The modern state. | ||
* | *The modern state is not universal, has not existed everywhere and always. The emergence of the modern state coincides with the qualitative leap in warfare. | ||
= Išvados = | = Išvados = | ||
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*Monde-diplomatique.fr,. (2015). Non, les hommes n’ont pas toujours fait la guerre, par Marylène Patou-Mathis (Le Monde diplomatique, juillet 2015). Retrieved 17 July 2015, from http://www.monde-diplomatique.fr/2015/07/PATOU_MATHIS/53204 | *Monde-diplomatique.fr,. (2015). Non, les hommes n’ont pas toujours fait la guerre, par Marylène Patou-Mathis (Le Monde diplomatique, juillet 2015). Retrieved 17 July 2015, from http://www.monde-diplomatique.fr/2015/07/PATOU_MATHIS/53204 | ||
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