« International relations and the fight against international terrorism » : différence entre les versions

De Baripedia
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La Loi du 22 juillet 1996 formule le concept « de terrorisme par association de malfaiteurs » soit un acte criminel pensé ou projeté́ dans lequel l’individu appartient à un groupe, un collectif déclaré « terroriste ». Lors de l’enquête préliminaire, le flagrant délit est du ressort de la police judiciaire. La procédure déroge « par principe de spécialisation » aux règles traditionnelles en matière de compétence géographique. L’instruction et le jugement entrent dans le champ de responsabilité du Parquet de Paris à travers son service central de la lutte antiterroriste et de ses juges spécialisés dans l’antiterrorisme.
La Loi du 22 juillet 1996 formule le concept « de terrorisme par association de malfaiteurs » soit un acte criminel pensé ou projeté́ dans lequel l’individu appartient à un groupe, un collectif déclaré « terroriste ». Lors de l’enquête préliminaire, le flagrant délit est du ressort de la police judiciaire. La procédure déroge « par principe de spécialisation » aux règles traditionnelles en matière de compétence géographique. L’instruction et le jugement entrent dans le champ de responsabilité du Parquet de Paris à travers son service central de la lutte antiterroriste et de ses juges spécialisés dans l’antiterrorisme.


= Conclusion – l’émergence d’un nouvel acteur : l’Europe =
= Conclusion - the emergence of a new actor: Europe =


L’émergence du terrorisme international a engagé une profonde refonte des dispositifs de la lutte antiterroriste. Il y a des points nodaux très importants comme la question de l’extradition. Au niveau des acteurs nationaux, il y a 50 ans de progrès, mais cela s’est fait aussi à travers d’autres institutions comme les acteurs régionaux, au niveau de la gouvernance onusienne ou encore au niveau de la gouvernance européenne.
The emergence of international terrorism has led to a profound overhaul of the anti-terrorism arrangements. There are very important nodes, such as the issue of extradition. At the level of national actors, there has been 50 years of progress, but this has also been achieved through other institutions such as regional actors, UN governance and European governance.
   
   
L’émergence du nouvel acteur européen sur la réflexion de l’espace pénal permet une prise de conscience au niveau européen de la nécessité de faire progresser les législations nationales sur le triple plan du renseignement, de la coopération policière et judiciaire. Ce qui était de l’ordre de la normalisation est entré dans les questions de l’antiterrorisme.
The emergence of the new European actor on the reflection of the penal area makes it possible to raise awareness at European level of the need to advance national legislation on the triple level of intelligence, police and judicial cooperation. What used to be a matter of normalization has entered into anti-terrorism issues.
La logique des États-Nations freine dans certains domaines à cause de la logique de sécurité nationale. Ainsi, on va enjoindre les États-membres à harmoniser leurs législations notamment à partir de la ratification d’urgence des conventions onusiennes
The logic of nation-states slows down in some areas because of the logic of national security. The Member States will be urged to harmonise their legislation, particularly after the urgent ratification of the UN conventions.
   
   
Les accords de Schengen marquent un tournant important avec émergence de l’espace pénal européen. C’est peut-être un pas vers la constitution d’une Europe comme un acteur de premier plan de la lutte antiterroriste à venir.
The Schengen agreements mark an important turning point with the emergence of the European criminal area. This may be a step towards the creation of a Europe as a leading player in the fight against terrorism in the future.


= Annexes =
= Annexes =

Version du 8 février 2018 à 12:40

International terrorism is pre-September 11 terrorism. We will deal with the fight against terrorism by trying to see how the law has interpreted the issue of international terrorism, what have been the different definitions according to it and the different means of combating international terrorism.

Conceiving terrorism in public international law

The different possible meanings of the notion of "international"

Can international law shed light on international terrorism? Obviously, the first difficulty encountered is that it is linked to the fact that the word "terrorism" is passed very late in the cenacles of international criminal law. It was not until 1930 and the Conference on the Unification of Criminal Law that the word "terrorism" appeared for the first time. The definition is rather mundane: {{citation} intentional and systematic use of means likely to provoke terror in order to achieve certain ends ". To qualify an act as "terrorist}}, intentionality is required.

Lawyers will distinguish between the question of the individual act and a collective act. An "individual terrorism" is either an isolated act of an individual, but also an individual act of a group meaning a criminal gang. In this description, there is the fact that the borders are very fragile between a political crime with the ideological intention of a common criminality that would be abused of a situation or destroy for a private interest or non-political motives. At the state level, it would be a group of individuals attacking a state. There is an infringement of public order and a potential destabilization of that public order. It's a legal logic.

A central concept: the concept of EXTRANEITY ["what is foreign"]

The concept of foreignness means something that is foreign, something that has a foreign dimension beyond the domestic question. In terrorism is immediately understood the fact that there are several types of foreigners. It could be:

  • foreign terrorists acting on national soil;
  • terrorists acting off national soil;
  • the place of execution of victims who are foreign to the nationality of the victims;
  • consequences produced outside the place and country where the attack occurred;
  • destroyed interests[persons and property] damaged on foreign soil, for example, the embassy that belongs to the aggressed country and not to the country in which it is located.

The complexity of case situations in foreign countries is becoming apparent, which will obviously interfere with the ability or otherwise to deal with the problem. The more foreign, the more complex the right to manage the situation is. The simplest situation would be a nation state where there is a terrorist act committed by nationals. As soon as there is a foreign country, we enter a much more complicated system that will have a number of legal limits and which will begin to be lifted in the post-9/11 period.

First international terrorism conventions

International conventions show how difficult it is to define terrorism from a legal point of view, but also how difficult it is to define the conditions of prosecution. According to the 1937 Geneva Convention signed by 24 States, terrorism is a « criminal act against a State and the purpose or nature of which is to provoke terror in specified persons, groups of persons or the public ». This vague definition that identifies the personalities accused: it is an isolated act against a head of state in a public.

The second important text is the Washington Convention, which is the convention of the Organization of American States of 2 February 1971[1] which defines terrorism as « acts that produce an effect of terror or intimidation on the inhabitants of a State or a part of its population and that cause a common danger to the life, health, physical integrity or freedom of persons by the use of methods or means which, by their very nature, cause ». There is an effect of tipping point of multiplication of the act and violence.

Le deuxième texte important est la convention de Washington qui est la convention de l’Organisation des États Américains du 2 février 1971[2] which defines terrorism as {{quotation} acts which produce an effect of terror or intimidation on the inhabitants of a State or on part of its population and which cause a common danger to the life, health, physical integrity or liberty of persons by the use of methods or means which, by their nature, cause or may cause widespread harm, serious disturbance in public order, calamity or calamity.}}. Il y a un effet de bascule de démultiplication de l’acte et de la violence.

This convention takes much more control over the issue of disturbance to public order and will begin to evolve towards a definition that is much more rooted in society and the consequences of violence in society. International definitions in public law evolve according to the nature of the evolution of terrorism itself. For example, the concept of the aircraft itself poses the extraneity problem.

Thus, terrorism can be described as international in several ways:

  • An individual or collective internal terrorism which raises itself at the international level as a hold-up committed by a Swiss in Sweden, a hijacking of aircraft committed by Russians in South Africa, the exemplary case of the Basque movements. The international arrives ipso facto as soon as there is a border crossing. International law will take into account any act of terror;
  • an international conflict that is consistent and encourages terrorist violence in third countries. It is a regional conflict that spills over by internationalizing the de facto conflict from a legal point of view;
  • the terrorist act affects a person under international protection;
  • the perpetrator takes refuge in a foreign country.

Case of today's homegrown terrorism

These are the new forms of violence that have arisen over the past decade or so and are developing in Western states, which are domestic terrorism and are terrorist acts produced by nationals, but which have an international or extranational claim.

The term « homegrown terrorism » means the use, planned to use, or threatened use, of force or violence by a group or individual born, raised, or based and operating primarily within the United States or any possession of the United States to intimidate or coerce the United States government, the civilian population of the United States or any segment thereof, in furtherance of political or social objectives.

The different forms of international terrorism under public law

By public international law, there is going to be a concept which raises the problem of "international terrorism under ordinary law". There may be "ideological terrorism", but there may also be international terrorism under ordinary law, such as criminals who use "terrorist processes" and play on the permeability of borders. They are hostage-taking for ransom and border crossings, but also organised crime. However, this raises the difficulty of knowing when to speak of "terrorist acts" in common law violence?

With the concept of "ideological international terrorism", ideologies are transnational. They therefore play with the borders of nation-states in order to import and export themselves. Some countries may use identities or ideologies to intervene with their neighbours. Some can use in the conflicts they have with other countries the ideological contribution is contested in the other country. Risk is the use of terrorism as a destabilizing tool.

The context of "ideological international terrorism" is irredentism and the awakening of local peculiarities that seek logistical support abroad. Or protect yourself behind a border. For example, the Basques of ETA or the case of the Palestinian diaspora, who find themselves separated on several countries and who struggle from one country to Israel or to other countries.

The Nature of International Terrorism in Public International Law

There will be two very interesting designs showing the complexity of things. An important distinction is made between:

  1. "International terrorism arise from legal hostilities": countries are at war with each other and there are acts in the so-called "terrorist" milieu. All public international law wanted to settle the war. In this regulation of wars, it appears that there may be abuses by armed groups on the method of terrorist acts. In the context of war, there are so-called "terrorist" actions either by legal rules or population terrorists in the case of occupation.
  2. "International terrorism arise from illegal hostilities": between States or the interstices of States there appears acts of violence which are in the most complete illegality. It is a matter of subversion in order to change the nature of politics through violence with the deployment of technology in order to change the state and provoke it. These movements think that in the violent reaction they are going to produce, they will succeed in attracting the approval of the population. In the majority of situations, these are struggles within a nation-state by subverting the overthrow of a legal political regime through pressure on a nation-state such as hostage-taking to obtain concessions and benefits.

Acting against international terrorism

Places of production of standards

International conferences for the international unification of criminal law; this is because in the public construction of international law, there are international conferences that will try to support convergence on international laws and regulations. With the international conferences, we are witnessing developments in the concept of the word "terrorism".

Warsaw, 1927: To study "the acts perpetrated abroad and consistent in the deliberate use of any means likely to create a common danger".

Brussels, 1930: Definitions of terrorism:"a common danger." Terrorist acts ":" If the act is directed against the life, physical integrity or liberty of persons or against public or private heritage and is carried out with the aim of promoting or implementing political or social ideas ".

December 1931: Definition of Terrorism:"Anyone who, for the purpose of terrorizing the population, uses against persons or property of bombs, mines, explosives, incendiary materials, firearms or other destructive devices that cause or seek to spread any epidemic disease, epizootic or other calamity or interrupt government services of public utility".

Madrid, 1935: it is a reflection on the notion of universal jurisdiction for terrorist acts. A State may prosecute terrorists regardless of the location of the attack itself and regardless of the nationality of the perpetrators and/or victims. The idea emerges that the terrorist act as such must be combated everywhere. A State could prosecute terrorists regardless of the location of the attack, regardless of the nationality of the perpetrators or victims.

Copenhagen, 1935: Reflection on a special criminalisation in case of "disturbances in the functioning of public authorities or in international relations". Emphasis on attacks on life, heads of state and families and diplomats.

Les conventions internationales

All the international conventions, which are the international legal texts that seek to condemn international terrorism, appear.

The first convention condemning international terrorism was made within the framework of the League of Nations in Geneva in 1937. It is the first to condemn "international terrorism" and was signed by 24 countries. The second establishing an International Criminal Court is signed by 13 countries. However, we didn't come up with something very powerful. No further action, because of the Second World War, there was no ratification and no consensus on the idea of extradition.

United Nations Security Council

The debate was resumed in 1945 with the creation of the United Nations, which would appear to be an important forum for reflection on violence in the international context. The UN has a role to ensure safety and security on the plant. The challenge is political cooperation for peace. The initial thinking is to think of continuity with the Geneva Convention of 1937. Emerges the notion of the possible complicity of States in the development of terrorism.

The United Nations is becoming a place of production of contemporary counter-terrorism norms:

  • The General Assembly ": its mission is" peacekeeping "and" political cooperation ". Since 1945, more than 12,000 resolutions have been adopted.
  • The Security Council: responsible for "maintaining international security". There are 15 members, including 5 permanent members from the United States, Great Britain, France, Russia and China. It is the international police agency that produces resolutions.

First cycle of conventions: 1963 - 1971

The conventions that are to be adopted will follow the news of terrorism. The first round of the Convention appeared in the 1960s and 1970s, when aircraft hijackings appeared. The first important statement is on air piracy, in order to qualify the offence as air piracy. Basically, these first Tokyo Conventions appeared in 1963, the Hague in 1970 and Montreal in 1971, notably to qualify the concept of "air traffic offences".

With the attacks at the Munich Olympic Games, a question that no one had imagined was asked. Peacetime Olympism becomes a theatre of conflict. The Americans in 1972 proposed the concept of an "international crime" offence.

The first problem that shows the complexity of the matter is the setback that European countries are taking, as well as third world countries. The international system is unable to manage the problem. The project is not successful as opposed to European and Third World countries, because there is the fear of measures reaching national liberation movements that they otherwise support. Thus, the project is referred? to a commission created for this purpose. On 13 December 1973, the General Assembly merely postponed consideration of the question of the Commission until the next session of 14 December 1974.

Deuxième cycle de conventions: 1973 - 2000

The second round of conventions shows that nothing concrete has emerged in terms of defining terrorism as a legal definition of international terrorism. These are conventions that will stick to the reality of the transformation of violence.

14 December 1973: Prevention and punishment of offences against internationally protected persons

26 October 1979: Combating the illicit use of nuclear materials

17 December 1979: Qualification of hostage-taking

February 24,1988: Condemnation of acts of violence at airports

10 March 1988: Protection of maritime platforms

1 March 1991: Mandatory marking of plastic explosives to make them detectable.

9 December 1994: Eradicating international terrorism

17 December 1996: Developing legal instruments against international terrorism

9 December 1999: Combating financing and money laundering

The concept of "due diligence" - duty of care - requested of States

The United Nations can only recommend that States have an obligation to be vigilant about what is happening on their territory in order to spread international awareness of the struggle. This dissemination is carried out through all regional organizations managing diplomatic and economic relations. Some will ratify the UN conventions:

  • the Organization of American States (OAS)
  • The Organization of African Unity[OAU]
  • Southeast Asian Association[ASCAR]
  • The Arab League

The example of the Arab League: Convention of 22 April 1998

This example shows why the United Nations did not manage to overcome an interesting reading of terrorism awareness until 11 September 2001.

The Arab League doesn't want to recognize the Palestinian fighters as terrorists.

According to the Arab League, terrorism is « any act of violence or threat of violence, regardless of the causes and purposes committed to carry out an individual or collective criminal project aimed at spreading terror among people or frightening them by harming or endangering their lives, liberty? or security? or at harming the environment, one of the public services, public or private property, or the environment ».

The terrorist offence is "any offence or commencement of an offence committed for the purpose of terrorism in any Contracting State or directed against its nationals, property or interests and punishable under the domestic law of that State". (a) The Tokyo Convention on Offences and Certain Other Acts Committed on Board Aircraft, signed on 14 September 1963; (b) The Hague Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft, signed on 16 December 1970.(d) The New York Convention for the Prevention and Punishment of Crimes against Internationally Protected Persons, including Diplomatic Agents, signed on 14 December 1973.(e) The International Convention against the Taking of Hostages, signed on 17 December 1979; (f) The United Nations Convention of 1983 (sic)[1982] on the Law of the Sea, in particular with regard to maritime piracy ".

Article 2 (a) provides that « not all cases of armed struggle, conducted with various means, including armed struggle against foreign occupation and aggression for liberation and self-determination, in accordance with the principles of international law, constitute an offence ». (b) None of the terrorist offences mentioned in the preceding article constitutes a political offence. Article 2 (a) excludes the fact that Palestinian action can be considered a terrorist act.

The European case

In Europe, the fight against terrorism has long been linked to the fight against terrorism developed by each nation-state. As early as 1974, a movement began to build a European territory for the fight against terrorism. United Nations conventions will be integrated, notably those of Tokyo, The Hague and Montreal.

1973: Council of Europe condemns the "Acts of international terrorism".

1974: Europe's ministers call for stronger control measures.

1975: Strengthening of the extradition convention of December 1957.

1976: Creation of TREVI. System for the exchange of information among States on terrorism, its threats, equipment, technical means and police training to combat international terrorism more effectively.

1977: The French President calls for the "constitution of a European judicial area" based on European mutual assistance is strengthened. Extradition between Member States will be developed.

Between 1981 and 1997,9 resolutions were passed, but there were persistent blockages due to the states' reluctance to act?

1982: Failure of the French Minister of Justice's proposal to create a European Criminal Court which would have been able to deal directly with terrorist acts.

1985: Schengen agreements on the free movement of persons in Europe which strengthen police and judicial cooperation between Member States.

The area of freedom goes hand in hand with the creation of a traffic control area covering organised crime, prostitution, money laundering, trafficking in works of art and terrorism.

1992: Treaty of Maastricht." Third pillar "= justice. Terrorism is becoming a central focus of European cooperation.

1999: Treaty of Amsterdam. The area of freedom? is linked to security? and justice. A step towards European criminal sovereignty? is taken. Mutual recognition of judicial decisions.

1999: Tempere Council of Europe; 4 priority axes are defined in the field of judicial cooperation and the European judicial area:

  • principle of mutual recognition of judicial decisions;
  • Approximation of Member States' criminal legislation;
  • development of European cooperation agencies: EUROPOL - European Police Office) and EUROJUST - European Office of Justice;
  • intensification of relations between EUROJUST and third countries.

2001: Adoption by the Council of Europe of the International Convention on Combating Cybercrime?

Law enforcement: the legal effects of international terrorism on prosecution and repression

Classical principles of judicial law

These are the categories in which questions of law and legal competence can be engaged:

  • "principle of territoriality": normal and priority rule of jurisdiction, i. e. the place where the reprehensible act is committed;

active personality principle "[of wrongdoing] means the prosecution by a State of a national of its own nationality who has committed a wrongdoing abroad;

  • The "passive personality principle"[of reprehensible conduct] is the principle of "passive personality": to prosecute acts committed abroad on national soil, but which have caused the victims of my State. France had not developed it;
  • Reality principle: recognise the jurisdiction of the courts of the country whose interests have been affected by the offences. The least obvious in classic repressive law.

These cases explain why it was difficult to move forward because everyone applied these principles according to their own convenience and interests. ETA used France as a rear base for combat in Spain. The right to prosecute terrorists was thus for a long time limited by the classic principles adopted by each State in judicial matters. The recognition of foreign jurisdictions as having jurisdiction was long and limited by many pitfalls. For example, extradition was also for a long time limited by the non-recognition by courts and States of the jurisdiction of foreign courts and tribunals.

The principle of universal jurisdiction: an original system

Universal jurisdiction is an idea that emerged in the 1990s. It is the idea of undermining universal values and serious crimes such as war crimes and crimes against humanity.

A State is in a position to prosecute the perpetrators of an offence committed in its territory, regardless of the place of execution, the nationality of the persons who participated in the offence, or the nationality of the victims.

This was admitted gradually in the West by the Belgian law of 16 June 1993, which gave rise to numerous complaints. The Belgian courts, in the name of universal jurisdiction, have found themselves beset by a host of requests concerning Bush, Pinochet, Sabra and Chatila creating diplomatic problems and issues. However, this law is limited by the Act of 1 August 2003, which recognizes foreign courts as having jurisdiction. This approach is partly found in other European countries for some of the most serious crimes.

The question posed by jurists is whether the progressive application of international treaties by countries around the world is not conducive to the adoption of a global system of universal jurisdiction. Lawyers are unable to develop an international court to think of terrorism. It is the failure of an international court.

Between 1970 and 2000, it was not possible to imagine the competence of an international court to combat terrorism. Yet it was enshrined in one of the 1937 Geneva Conventions on terrorism, but never ratified, elaborated in the 1972 drafts, but never conceptualized. States are not prepared to relinquish their judicial responsibilities. There has been a major difficulty in applying a renewed principle of extradition.

The imbroglio of extradition

The definition of extradition is a legal procedure whereby an individual subject to an arrest warrant is expelled from a territory and handed over to the requesting authority. This is the case, for example, of Carlos, who is tried and sentenced in Paris in absentia and later handed over by Sudan. The purpose of extradition is to try, in a given country, acts committed by one or more persons either because they are nationals of that country or because they have committed reprehensible acts against the interests of that country.

The acts of international terrorism fit in perfectly well with the logic of extradition, which are acts committed from one national territory to another with victims of third nationality.

Difficulty of the dossier: the historical starting point

The historical starting point is the movement of the ideas of the Enlightenment from the 18th century to the 19th century, which favours the emancipation of peoples with a return to freedom? through the end of slavery. There is benevolence towards the oppressed and the delinquency of political essence. This complacency, at least for some, towards revolutions in order to liberate themselves by force falling under the order of necessity.

We are going to refuse extradition for political reasons because the political reasons are noble. This can be seen very clearly in the famous Belgian law of 1 October 1833, which rejects extradition for political reasons. The Belgian law of 1 October 1833 refuses extradition for political reasons, because Belgium was born of a revolt against the Netherlands. The advantage for states is that they give asylum to political backbenchers to negotiate in the aftermath. The law of 10 March 1927 in France states that extradition must be refused if it has a "political character", but also "if it is requested for a political purpose". We have to produce an inversion that will produce a lot of difficulty. It is therefore necessary to change the mentality so that extradition can be adopted for ideological or political crimes.

The starting point

Huile sur toile illustrant l"attentat d'Orsini" de 1862.

In 1856, the terrorist act against Napoleon III was committed by a Belgian "terrorist". The question arises of how to punish him? The Belgian law of 1 October 1833 should be amended. But in order to respect it, it must be proclaimed that "the attack on a foreign head of state will never be considered? as having a political character" and that it will then be extended to the members of his family.

The European countries have taken over the Belgian clause and will for a long time be putting forward a paradox since, in order for the perpetrators of a terrorist attack to be prosecuted, the terrorist action must not be regarded as political.

Hence the emergence of a second category of actors of violence considered as non-political, namely anarchist crimes. To do the opposite of this law, it is necessary to wait until the twentieth century to allow for non-political extradition to make it possible to judge terrorist political acts. These are "social crimes" which will enable European states to extradite anarchists: Great Britain, Switzerland, Germany, France, etc.

The questioning of "non-political extradition" to allow political extradition comes after the Second World War with the United Nations conventions already mentioned: Tokyo, The Hague and Montreal. Thus, it is possible to try terrorists by extradition if the State in which they have taken refuge refuses to try them. The progressive extension of the concept of universal jurisdiction to terrorist cases is restricting the possible use of refusal of extradition in this type of field.

Judging international terrorism

The problem is that since we are not in a legally unified area, extradition law is difficult to implement. The results of this difficult gestation of an extradition right for international terrorism are that there are few judgments and judgements in absentia, i. e. the perpetrators of terrorist acts are not present.

22 décembre 1975, à l’aéroport de Vienne. C’est le premier coup de force qui fait connaître Illich Ramirez-Sanchez dit Carlos, 26 ans à l’époque: la prise de 66 otages lors d’une réunion de l’OPEP à Vienne, y compris 11 ministres du Pétrole. Ils seront libérés à Alger. L’attaque fait trois morts. Jusqu’à son arrestation en 1994, le terroriste sera vu notamment en Irak, en Syrie, ou en Libye. (AFP)[3]

The school case is the hostage-taking of OPEC ministers in Vienna in December 1975. The balance sheet is of three employees murdered, 66 hostages then a flight to Algiers on board a DC 9 with 42 hostages. Austria does not request extradition from the Algerian government on whose territory the terrorists fled. We do not have the effective tools to make access to these terrorists possible. There is a feeling of inefficiency and wasted time.

The question is raised of how to submit an extradition request when threats have been ceded to facilitate the escape of terrorists with their hostages? Carlos' case is interesting because he was arrested only 20 years later following his extradition from Sudan. The little that was judged is often not applied, on the other hand, these judgments and condemnations engage a new cycle of terror.

La lutte antiterroriste jusqu'au 11 septembre 2001

On distingue des caractères spécifiques. La lutte contre le terrorisme ne s’assimile à aucune autre politique publique :

  • confidentialité : c’est une politique publique ;
  • secret : cela procède d’une gestion d’informations notamment qui ne sont pas dévoilées au public. Le secret est le caractère et l’enjeu de l’efficacité. Dans les démocraties, des commissions parlementaires peuvent interroger les politiques publiques de façon restreinte. La cohérence est à comprendre dans la logique même dans laquelle l’État-Nation s’est construit. C’est quelque chose de complexe, d’autant plus complexe qu’on est dans une certaine forme de secret ;
  • dépasser les limites espace public et espace privé : c’est en allant au cœur même des individus que la lutte se construit. Comme l’enjeu est la sécurité nationale, dans la démocratie la sécurité nationale passe avant la liberté des individus ;
  • action au-delà des frontières nationales : les États-Nations ne jouent pas nécessairement de transparence entre les services secrets ;
  • ne cible pas une population ou une catégorie sociale particulière ;
  • mesures appliquées selon la logique de la Raison d’État ;
  • action du présent : il y a une logique de présent – futur ;
  • mais anticipation : il faut avoir connaissance de la préparation de l’acte avant l’acte. Il faut suivre tout le processus de fabrication d’attentat ;
  • prévision et efficacité prospective : en fonction de la compréhension du terrain, on peut anticiper.

La lutte antiterroriste possède d’autres caractères :

  • elle relève de l’histoire des États-nations ;
  • elle fonde la sécurité extérieure, mais aussi la sécurité intérieure : il faut sécuriser les intérêts à l’extérieur, pour cela il faut surveiller ce qui pourrait se passer. À l’intérieur de l’État-Nation, il faut veiller à ce qu’il n’y ait pas un retour de violence. C’est une logique de gestion des deux rapports ;
  • elle peut se lire comme un processus de densification de méthodes et moyens d’accumulation de strates : il faut parler en termes d’évolution des logiques de strates et de violence. La logique de performance est basée sur le fait que la confidentialité fabrique de la connaissance. Il y un course poursuite à la connaissance afin de savoir ce qu’il se passe ;
  • les nouveaux dispositifs naissent du « passage à de nouvelles violences » ;
  • le poids des cultures et des traditions est prépondérant : un État « sans passé colonial » possède moins de culture du renseignement. C’est l’expérience qui fonde la compétence.

Les cultures sont très importantes, car les sociétés qui ont connu des violences politiques internes ont développé des systèmes de surveillances prépondérants.

La lutte antiterroriste comprend trois niveaux:

  • le renseignement : c’est ce qui conditionne l’action, sans renseignement on est démuni.
  • la coordination
  • la répression

On part d’une nécessité de la gestion de l’information jusqu’à la sanction.

Le renseignement

La fonction prépondérante du renseignement se situe du côté de la menace et de ses probabilités. La construction en temps réel de l’image de la situation permet d’éluder les zones d’ombre qui interdisent de comprendre une situation dans sa globalité. On considère qu’il y a plusieurs types de renseignements :

  • le renseignement stratégique : peut venir d’une analyse d’un milieu ou bien d’une information ;
  • le renseignement de défense : concerne des points vitaux ;
  • le renseignement de police ;
  • le renseignement opérationnel : exploiter dans une vision beaucoup plus active.

Ces 4 activités regroupent 4 pôles :

  • le renseignement de documentation ;
  • le renseignement d’investigation ;
  • le renseignement d’anticipation ;
  • le renseignement de situation.

La nécessité du renseignement va expliciter qu’il y a beaucoup d’officines qui vont travailler sur le renseignement ne pouvant être cantonné à un type de renseignement qui engendre une perte d’efficacité de l’analyse. C’est pourquoi le renseignement se découpe en plusieurs structures. La complexité des missions de renseignement explique la juxtaposition de plusieurs structures au sein d’un même État. Dans les démocraties occidentales, on distingue aussi le renseignement intérieur du renseignement extérieur. Ces différenciations sont aujourd’hui en train de s’estomper.

URSS

  • KGB : Sécurité d’État, renseignement extérieur et sécurité intérieure ;
  • GRU : Renseignement de l’État-Major général - défense extérieure.

Apparaissent des choses très intéressantes qui sont que les militaires possèdent une fonction opérationnelle de sécurité du renseignement. Les armées sont un enjeu de protection de la sécurité. C’est tout un ensemble d’administrations qui pose le renseignement comme fondamental.

États-Unis

Les États-Unis développent le concept de « communauté du renseignement » :

  • FBI : Police sur le sol américain ;
  • CIA : Agence d’analyse pour l’information extérieure ;
  • Coopération institutionnelle entre les deux agences [FBI et CIA]. Intelligence Authorization Act, 1996 ;
  • DIA [Defense Intelligence Agency] ;
  • NSA [National Security Agency] ;
  • NGA [National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency] ;
  • CGI [Coast Guard Intelligence] ;
  • OI [Office of Intelligence] (Département de l’Energie] ;
  • INSCOM [L’Intelligence and Security Command] [Département de la Défense] ;
  • ID [L’Intelligence Department] [Corps des Marines] ;
  • ONI [L’Office of Naval Intelligence [US Navy] ;
  • AIA [Air Inteligence Agency] [US Air Force] ;
  • IAP [Information Analysis and Infrastructure] [Departement de la Sécurité Nationale].
  • TFI [Office of Terrorism and Finance Intelligence], Departement du Trésor.

France

En France, le renseignement est conjointement assumé au Ministère de l’Intérieur par la Direction de la Surveillance du Territoire [DST] créée en 1944 et la Direction centrale des renseignements généraux [DCRG]. Depuis les années 1960, la surveillance interne a intégré le terrorisme international sur le sol national et c’est la DCRG qui est compétente pour le terrorisme national. Au Ministère de la Défense, le Service de documentation extérieure et de contre-espionnage [SDECE] créé en 1945 est devenu en 1982 la Direction générale de la sécurité extérieure [DGSE], elle conserve ses attributions de saisie de l’information sur place à l’étranger.

Dans la question sous la Guerre froide, la lutte antiterroriste est intégrée dans le contrespionnage. Apparaissent progressivement d’autres organismes qui vont s’occuper de la sécurité extérieure. La DNRED [Direction nationale du renseignement et des enquêtes douanières] au ministère de l’Économie, la TRACFIN [cellule Traitement du renseignement sur les circuits financiers clandestins, la FINATER [cellule Financement du terrorisme] ou encore VIGIPIRATE qui est un plan gouvernemental de prévention du terrorisme qui centralise aussi le renseignement.

Cela signifie qu’il y a une organisation au niveau politique. Le Conseil de sécurité intérieure [CSI] qui propose une réflexion sur le terrorisme est sous la responsabilité du Premier ministre. Le CILAT [Comité interministériel de liaison antiterroriste] est le représentant des ministères concernés par le terrorisme). On distingue aussi au niveau de la coordination opérationnelle la Bureau de liaison [BDL] Police judiciaire, mes Renseignements généraux, la Direction de la Surveillance du Territoire qui existe depuis la Guerre d’Algérie. Le UCLAT [Comité permanent de coordination de la lutte antiterroriste] fondé en septembre 1982 sous l’autorité directe du général de la Police nationale. L’idée est de rassembler au niveau interministériel tous les services de l’État.

La répression

On distingue les espions des personnes qui vont coopérer avec les services secrets. Il y a un cercle de professionnels et tout un ensemble d’individus qui vont communiquer ce qu’ils observent. L’enjeu est d’anticiper afin d’éviter.

Les dispositifs existants sont complexes. La DNAT [Division nationale antiterroriste] est lié au Ministère de l’Intérieur fut créée en 1998 et s’appuie en régions sur les SRPJ [Services régionaux de la Police judiciaire] et à Paris, sur ce qui est un cas spécifique, la Section antiterroriste de la Brigade criminelle. Les BRI [brigades de recherches et d’interventions] sont en charge des surveillances et filatures/ En appoint de la surveillance peut être également appelé́ l’OCRB [L’office central de répression du banditisme]. Pour les arrestations, il n‘y a pas de services spécialisés, mais en cas de difficultés particulières, il peut-être fait appel à l’armée, soit le GIGN [Groupe d’Intervention de la gendarmerie nationale] soit le RAID [Groupe de Recherche, assistance, intervention et dissuasion].

Le niveau juridique organise la répression. Pendant longtemps le terrorisme relevait du seul crime de droit commun. Après les attentats de 1986, le terrorisme est replacé dans le contexte de la criminalité organisée puis un régime procédural qui centralise l’instruction et le jugement au tribunal de grande instance de Paris à savoir une Cour d’assises spéciale antiterroriste ou siège des juges antiterroristes. Cinq juges sont spécialisés dans les affaires antiterroristes est peuvent déclencher une instruction spécifique avec une garde à vue prolongée de plus de 72 heures. Lorsqu’un terroriste est jugé, il est jugé par un juge spécialisé. C’est une Cour d’assises composée de magistrats professionnels. Un dispositif en faveur des « repentis » a été mis en place, celui qui fut engagé dans des actes de violence et qui se repenti, accède à un statut spécifique. Notamment en Italie, cela a permis de juguler la violence politique.

En 1994 est mis en place un nouveau code pénal où me terrorisme est reconnu comme une infraction spécifique. Né la définition moderne du terrorisme avec la naissance d’un droit pénal antiterroriste comme droit spécialisé et dérogatoire. Cette nouvelle définition du terrorisme se retrouve à l’Article 421-1 du nouveau Code pénal de 1994 : « Tout acte intentionnel des atteintes volontaires à la vie et à l’intégrité́ des personnes », comprennent les atteintes à la liberté́ des personnes que représentent l’enlèvement, la séquestration, le détournement de tout type de transport. Sont définis comme terrorisme, les vols, extorsions, destructions, infractions informatiques, mais aussi la fabrication et la détention d’engins explosifs, leur vente et exportation, le stockage, l’acquisition et la cession d’armes biologiques, la fabrication, le stockage et l’emploi d’armes chimiques. Émerge de nouvelles formes de terrorisme comme avec le terrorisme écologique.

La Loi du 22 juillet 1996 formule le concept « de terrorisme par association de malfaiteurs » soit un acte criminel pensé ou projeté́ dans lequel l’individu appartient à un groupe, un collectif déclaré « terroriste ». Lors de l’enquête préliminaire, le flagrant délit est du ressort de la police judiciaire. La procédure déroge « par principe de spécialisation » aux règles traditionnelles en matière de compétence géographique. L’instruction et le jugement entrent dans le champ de responsabilité du Parquet de Paris à travers son service central de la lutte antiterroriste et de ses juges spécialisés dans l’antiterrorisme.

Conclusion - the emergence of a new actor: Europe

The emergence of international terrorism has led to a profound overhaul of the anti-terrorism arrangements. There are very important nodes, such as the issue of extradition. At the level of national actors, there has been 50 years of progress, but this has also been achieved through other institutions such as regional actors, UN governance and European governance.

The emergence of the new European actor on the reflection of the penal area makes it possible to raise awareness at European level of the need to advance national legislation on the triple level of intelligence, police and judicial cooperation. What used to be a matter of normalization has entered into anti-terrorism issues. The logic of nation-states slows down in some areas because of the logic of national security. The Member States will be urged to harmonise their legislation, particularly after the urgent ratification of the UN conventions.

The Schengen agreements mark an important turning point with the emergence of the European criminal area. This may be a step towards the creation of a Europe as a leading player in the fight against terrorism in the future.

Annexes

Bibliographie

  • Mario Bettati, Le droit d’ingérence, Paris, Editions Odile Jacob, 1996 ;
  • Gilbert Guillaume, Georges Levasseur, Terrorisme international, Paris, A. Pedone, 1977 ;
  • Alain Joxe, L’empire du chaos. Les Républiques face à la domination américaine dans l’après-guerre froide, Paris, La Découverte, 2004 ;
  • Intervenir ? Droits de la personne et raisons d’Etat, Paris, Grasset, 1993 ;
  • Yves-Marie Laulan, La planète balkanisée, Paris, Pluriel, 1993 ;
  • Philippe Marchesin, Les nouvelles menaces. Les relations Nord-Sud des années 1980 à nos jours, Paris, Karthala, 2001.
  • Philippe Moreau Defarges, Un monde d’ingérences, Paris, Presses de Sciences Po, 1997 ;
  • Michel Wieviorka, Sociétés et terrorisme, Paris, Fayard, 1988 ;
  • Jean Ziegler, Contre l’ordre du monde, les rebelles, Paris, Le Seuil, 1983 ;
  • Charles Zorgbibe, La Méditerranée sans les Grands ? , Paris, 1980 ;
  • Glaser, Stefan. "Le Terrorisme International Et Ses Divers Aspects." Revue Internationale De Droit Comparé 25.4 (1973): 825-50. Web. <http://www.persee.fr/web/revues/home/prescript/article/ridc_0035-3337_1973_num_25_4_15343>.

References

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