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= Qu’est-ce que la raison d’État ? =
= What is the reason of state? =


La raison d'État est un mode d’intervention du pouvoir public ou du pouvoir politique qui déroge au droit commun  pour des circonstances exceptionnelles, l’État ou une puissance politique institutionnelle peut échapper au droit commun.
The State reason is a mode of intervention by the public or political power which derogates from ordinary law for exceptional circumstances, the State or an institutional political power may escape ordinary law.
Il existe des modes d’intervention du politique qui échappent au droit commun. Le pouvoir politique a une capacité d’intervenir en violent des règles de droit commun, c’est la raison d’État.
La raison d’État est hors du droit classique, elle peut s’appliquer en dehors des libertés  publiques. C’est un agir de l’ordre de l’exceptionnel, dans une démocratie on peut appliquer la raison d’État, mais elle ne peut être le quotidien.
Dès lors, il va y avoir trois dépassements possibles dans la raison d’État :
*'''de la légalité''' : on ne dépasse ce qui va être de l’ordre de la loi ;
*'''du normal''' : c’est de l’ordre de l’exceptionnel et nom de la normalité ;
*'''de ce qui est logique''' : c’est une forme d’illogisme.
Nous allons d’abord étudier d’un point de vue théorique puis étudier des exemples sur l’état d’exception. Cela vient de l’exceptionnel et ce qui déroge au quotidien. L’état d’exception dans ce cas est un synonyme de la raison d’État qui décrit un contexte spécifique de l’action publique dans un cadre en dehors du droit commun.
Le cas le plus illustratif de la raison d’État est la gestion du [[Les ruptures du 11 septembre 2001|11 septembre 2001]] après la destruction des Twin Towers aux États-Unis.
La raison d’État décrit un état d’action exceptionnel ; c’est-à-dire que l’état d’exception est associé à celui de raison d’État.
Ainsi, nous pouvons nous poser la question de savoir si la raison d’État est de l’ordre du raisonnable.


= Généalogie de la raison d’État =
There are modes of policy intervention that are outside the ordinary law. Political power has the capacity to intervene in violation of the rules of ordinary law, which is the reason for state power.
L’état d’exception est le fait que l’on accepte que l’on puisse suspendre la démocratie au nom d’un intérêt supérieur à la démocratie. Si la démocratie est un absolu, comment peut-on à un moment donné sursoir au nom de la démocratie ?


Si la démocratie est suspendue, si nous allons au-delà du droit positif de la démocratie, alors nous nous retrouvons dans un « no mans land », c’est-à-dire un territoire ou le droit de la démocratie de s’applique plus.  
The reason of state is out of the classical law, it can be applied outside civil liberties. It is an action of the exceptional order, in a democracy one can apply the reason of state, but it cannot be the everyday.


L’état d’exception ouvre une phase spécifique où au nom de la sauvegarde de la démocratie, la démocratie est amputée de ses modes de fonctionnement en se situant en tant qu’État au-dessus de la démocratie. C’est un territoire flou où les limites n’existent plus.
Therefore, there will be three possible overruns in the state reason:
* '''of legality''': one does not exceed what is going to be the law;
* '''of the normal''': it is of the order of the exceptional and the name of normality;
* '''of what makes sense''': it's a form of illogicality.
We will first study from a theoretical point of view and then study examples on the state of exception. This comes from the exceptional and what deviates from daily life. The state of emergency in this case is synonymous with the state reason which describes a specific context of public action in a context outside the ordinary law.


Dans la question de la raison d’État, nous sommes obligés de revenir aux questions politiques et aux théories politiques du moment.
The most illustrative case of state reason is the management of September 11,2001 after the destruction of the Twin Towers in the United States.


== Machiavel ==
State Reason describes a state of exceptional action; i. e., the state of exception is associated with that of State Reason.
 
Thus, we can ask ourselves the question of whether the state reason is reasonable.
 
= Genealogy of the State reason =
The state of emergency is the acceptance that democracy can be suspended in the name of a greater interest than democracy. If democracy is an absolute, how can we at any given time stay in the name of democracy?
 
If democracy is suspended, if we go beyond the positive law of democracy, then we find ourselves in a "no mans land", that is, a territory where the law of democracy applies more.
 
The state of exception opens a specific phase in which, in the name of safeguarding democracy, democracy is amputated from its modes of operation by positioning itself as a state above democracy. It is a fuzzy territory where boundaries no longer exist.
 
In the question of state reason, we are forced to return to the political questions and political theories of the moment.
 
== Machiavelli ==
{{Article détaillé|La Renaissance italienne}}
{{Article détaillé|La Renaissance italienne}}
[[Fichier:Santi di Tito - Niccolo Machiavelli's portrait.jpg|thumb|right|200px|Son portrait posthume par Santi di Tito, au Palazzo Vecchio de Florence]]
[[Fichier:Santi di Tito - Niccolo Machiavelli's portrait.jpg|thumb|right|200px|His posthumous portrait by Santi di Tito, at the Palazzo Vecchio in Florence]]


[[La Renaissance italienne|Machiavel]] parle de raison politique pour au fond dire que l’enjeu fondamental pour le politique est d’arriver à ses objectifs ; ainsi la fin justifie les moyens. C’est une position amorale, mais que Machiavel définit comme morale dans l’importance du but à attendre.
Machiavelli talks about political reason to basically say that the fundamental challenge for politics is to achieve its objectives; thus the end justifies the means. This is an amoral position, but that Machiavelli defines as moral in the importance of the goal to be expected.


Dès lors, il est possible d’utiliser toutes les techniques pour atteindre le but. Dans ''Le Prince'', Machiavel conseille d’utiliser la stratégie et la ruse. La ruse est la différenciation entre deux individus. Celui qui est rusé est celui qui détient une information et qui ne la transmet pas lui donnant une avance qui est un acquis supérieur à l’autre.
It is therefore possible to use all techniques to achieve the goal. In The Prince, Machiavelli advises to use strategy and trickery. The trick is the differentiation between two individuals. The one who is cunning is the one who holds information and does not pass it on to him, giving him an advance that is a superior asset to the other.


Ce qui est important est la tactique, c’est-à-dire la capacité à pouvoir faire des choses en dehors des lois.
What is important is tactics, the ability to do things outside the law.


La limite est que [[La Renaissance italienne|Machiavel]] n’emploie pas le concept de raison d’État, mais il postule que l’on peut dans certains cas dépasser les valeurs inhérentes à la constitution de l’État moderne. Puisque le prince doit arriver à ses objectifs, il peut utiliser des moyens qui ne sont pas nécessairement démocratiques, mais ce n’est pas important, car par ce comportement lui permet d’atteindre ses objectifs.  
The limit is that Machiavelli does not use the concept of state reason, but postulates that in some cases the values inherent in the constitution of the modern state can be exceeded. Since the prince must reach his objectives, he can use means that are not necessarily democratic, but this is not important, because by this behavior he can achieve his objectives.


Machiavel justifie ainsi qu’à un moment donné, l’action publique et politique peut dépasser le cadre d’une forme de reconnaisse et de dialogue public de l’État.
Machiavelli justifies that at a given moment, public and political action can go beyond a form of recognition and public dialogue of the state.


== Giovanni Botero ==
== Giovanni Botero ==
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[[Fichier:Giovanni Botero.jpg|thumb|200px|Giovanni Botero.]]
[[Fichier:Giovanni Botero.jpg|thumb|200px|Giovanni Botero.]]


Botero est le fondateur du concept moderne de la raison d’État, c’est un jésuite piémontais né 1544 et décède 1617 qui fut aussi diplomate qui rédigea un grand traité sur la raison d’État.
Botero is the founder of the modern concept of state reason, he is a Piedmontese Jesuit born 1544 and died 1617 who was also a diplomat who wrote a great treatise on state reason.
 
Ce qui l’intéresse  est la construction et la constitution du pouvoir à savoir ses formes et sa puissance. Botero s’intéresse à l’efficacité de l’État, à savoir le rapport entre l’État, la population et la croissance du pouvoir politique.
What interests him is the construction and constitution of power, namely its forms and power. Botero is interested in the efficiency of the state, i. e. the relationship between the state, population and the growth of political power.
 
Il va l’envisager de la  façon théologique. Pour qu’il y ait raison d’État, il faut qu’il ait bien évidemment un retour à Dieu. Le pouvoir a une dimension théologique, il faut répondre aux inspirations divines, le prince doit dès lors respecter la parole de Dieu. En respectant la parole de Dieu, il peut gouverner au nom de la raison d’État.
He's going to look at it theologically. For there to be a reason of state, he must obviously have a return to God. Power has a theological dimension, it is necessary to respond to divine inspirations, the prince must therefore respect the word of God. By respecting God's word, he can rule in the name of state reason.
 
S’il répond bien à Dieu par rapport aux objectifs que se donne Dieu pour les hommes sur terre, alors, le prince peut appliquer un pouvoir exceptionnel qui est la raison d’État.  
If he responds well to God in relation to God's objectives for mankind on earth, then the prince can apply an exceptional power which is the reason of state.
 
Botero n’est pas dans une vision amorale au sens de [[La Renaissance italienne|Machiavel]], il cherche à placer la raison d’État dans une logique de moralité. Si Dieu ordonne la façon dont les hommes et les femmes doivent agir sur terre alors le prince peut appliquer la raison d’État dans certains cas exceptionnels pour répondre aux ordres divins.
Botero is not in an amoral vision in the sense of Machiavellian, he seeks to place the reason of state in a logic of morality. If God commands how men and women should act on earth, then the prince can apply state reason in certain exceptional cases to respond to divine orders.
 
Ainsi, Botero ramène la raison d’État du côté de la morale alors que Machiavel la théorise comme une amoralité.
Thus, Botero brings state reason to the side of morality, while Machiavelli theorizes it as amorality.
 
Ce qui est important est que dans le retour à la morale, la raison d’État va apparaitre comme potentiellement possible en termes d’action publique. Si dans certains cas le prince a raison sur ses sujets, s’il a raison et qu’il le fait au nom de Dieu, il a la moralité de la raison d’État. Ce qui peut apparaître comme immoral.
What is important is that in the return to morality, state reason will appear as potentially possible in terms of public action. If in some cases the prince is right about his subjects, if he is right and does it in the name of God, he has the morality of state reason. Which may seem immoral.
 
C’est  l’application de la raison d’État au nom de principes divins,c’est donc l’application de l’ordre de la morale. Les moyens importent peu lorsqu’ils respectent les vertus divines.
It is the application of state reason in the name of divine principles, therefore it is the application of the moral order. Means do not matter when they respect divine virtues.
 
Dans la théorie de Botero est mené un combat contre la pensée de [[La Renaissance italienne|Machiavel]], il faut retourner à Dieu, s’il est soumis à Dieu il peut gouverner selon la raison d’État.  
In Botero's theory is conducted a fight against the thought of Machiavelli, it is necessary to return to God, if he is subject to God he can govern according to the state reason.
 
Le prince est celui qui se donne les moyens de la domination au service de Dieu et la raison d’État est la reconnaissance de ces moyens.
The prince is the one who gives himself the means of domination in the service of God and the reason of state is the recognition of these means.
 
À partir de ce moment, la théorie de Botero consiste à penser l’État moderne ainsi qu’à penser les conditions d’application de la raison d’État.  
From that moment on, Botero's theory consists of thinking about the modern state and the conditions for applying state reason.
 
À partir de quand il va être possible de rentrer dans l’exceptionnalité du pouvoir de la raison d’État ? Botero va illustrer ce cadre par les guerres civiles, une guerre civile  est un risque de déchirement et de destruction de la société par des destructions internes, dès lors la raison d’État peut être appliquée au nom de Dieu.
From when will it be possible to enter into the exceptionality of the power of state reason? Botero will illustrate this framework by civil wars, a civil war is a risk of tearing up and destroying society by internal destruction, so the reason of state can be applied in the name of God.
 
Le paradoxe de Botero est qu’il légitime l’action du prince sur le religieux, mais en même temps il est prêt à définir comme moral des actes qui n’ont rien d’humain.
Botero's paradox is that he legitimizes the action of the prince on the religious, but at the same time he is ready to define as moral acts that have nothing human.
 
En partant d’un apriori conceptuel limité, le prince est moral alors il peut appliquer la raison d’État. Si le prince est fondamentalement immoral, il peut dès lors user de la raison d’État l’utilisant pour assouvir ses propres intérêts au nom de Dieu.
Starting from a limited conceptual apriori, the prince is moral then he can apply state reason. If the prince is fundamentally immoral, he can then use the reason of state to satisfy his own interests in the name of God.
 
Dans la théorie de Botero, il y a de grandes faiblesses pour le parti pris  de la raison d’État, de plus, il y a le parti pris que les hommes ne sont pas suffisamment raisonnable pour être gouvernés de façon classique. Si les hommes ne sont pas raisonnables ils sont déraisonnables, il leur manque la rationalité et la raison, donc la raison d’État va être le retour de la rationalité c’est-à-dire le fait que l’on va reconstruire du raisonnable selon tous les moyens déraisonnables.
In Botero's theory, there are great weaknesses for the bias of state reason, in addition, there is the bias that men are not reasonable enough to be governed in a classical way. If men are not reasonable they are unreasonable, they lack rationality and reason, so the reason of State will be the return of rationality, that is to say the fact that we will rebuild reasonableness according to all unreasonable means.
 
L’homme peut être dangereux et non-social. Le prince a le droit d’utiliser des règles d’exception qui sont des règles de l’abandon de l’ordinaire au profit de l’extraordinaire qui est l’application de la raison d’État.
Man can be dangerous and non-social. The prince has the right to use exceptional rules which are rules of abandonment of the ordinary to the extraordinary which is the application of the reason of state.
 
Il termine son discours en se posant la question des moments les plus forts de potentialités et de circonstances pour appliquer la raison d’État. C'est avant tout la guerre, car c’est un moment exceptionnel, dans une situation de conflit militaire pour gagner la survie de son entité politique on va appliquer la raison d’État afin de conduire la guerre. Dès lors, la raison est une nécessité dans l’ordre de la guerre parce qu’elle va mobiliser les individus et des cités tout en prenant des mesures extraordinaires à l’égard des ennemies.
He concludes his speech by asking himself the question of the strongest moments of potentialities and circumstances to apply the reason of state. It is above all war, because it is an exceptional moment, in a situation of military conflict to win the survival of its political entity, we will apply state reason in order to lead the war. Therefore, reason is a necessity in the order of war because it will mobilize individuals and cities while taking extraordinary measures against enemies.
 
Chez Botero, l’armée est un vecteur de la guerre qui est aussi un des outils de définition de la raison d’État.
In Botero's case, the army is a vector of war which is also one of the tools for defining state reason.
 
En partant du religieux et du théologique, on va progressivement l’abandonner pour fonder une théorie politique moderne de la raison d’État  en affirmant qu’il existe des situations extraordinaires qui ne peuvent pas être réglées, régulées,gouvernée par de l’ordinaire. À situation extraordinaire correspond un gouvernement extraordinaire, ce gouvernement va appliquer la raison d’État.
Starting from the religious and theological, it will gradually be abandoned to found a modern political theory of state reason, asserting that there are extraordinary situations which cannot be regulated, regulated or governed by the ordinary. An extraordinary situation is an extraordinary government, this government will apply the reason of state.
Ainsi, la raison d’État est la mise en situation de gérer un temps extraordinaire par  l’application des règles de la raison d’État nom de l’intérêt général.
Le paradoxe est de prendre conscience du paradoxe absolu dans lequel on arrive ; on définit un extraordinaire en amputant les libertés publiques au nom du bien collectif et de la raison d’État puisque par essence l’extraordinaire est la non-raison et le déraisonnable.


== La guerre comme support à la raison d’État ==
Thus, the State reason is the situation of managing an extraordinary time by applying the rules of the State reason name state reason of the general interest.
 
The paradox is to become aware of the absolute paradox in which one arrives; one defines an extraordinary by amputating public freedoms in the name of the collective good and the reason of the State, since in essence the extraordinary is unreasonableness and unreasonableness.
 
== War as a support for reason of state ==


=== Michel Senellart ===  
=== Michel Senellart ===  
Pour Senellart, la principale application de la raison d’État est la guerre : {{citation|La raison d’État n’est autre chose qu’une contravention aux raisons ordinaires pour le respect du bien public, ou pour le respect d’une plus grande et universelle raison}}.
For Senellart, the main application of state reason is war: "State reason is nothing more than a contravention of ordinary reasons for the respect of the public good, or for the respect of a greater and universal reason".


La raison d’État est justifiée par un contexte qui rompt avec les règles ordinaires du fonctionnement de la démocratie.
State reason is justified by a context that breaks with the ordinary rules of democracy.


=== Scipione Ammirato ===
=== Scipione Ammirato ===
Ammirato postule qu’il y a un lien historique entre guerre et raison d’État. Le lieu même de l’application de la raison d’État est la guerre, le vivant dans son époque dans la conflictualité naissante avec l’Islam. Il est nécessaire d’utiliser le principe de la raison d’État, car elle va être un rempart structurel sur des formes de gouvernements qui vont permettre de lutter contre l’islam.  
Ammirato postulates that there is a historical link between war and state reason. The very place where the application of state reason is applied is war, living it in its time in the fledgling conflict with Islam. It is necessary to use the principle of state reason, because it is going to be a structural bulwark against forms of government that will make it possible to fight Islam.  


Il faut penser la raison d’État comme un acte de guerre latent, cela est un mode de mobilisation, de concentration,d‘organisation qui permet de préparer la guerre. Ainsi la guerre justifie l’extraordinaire et l’application de la raison d’État.
We must think of state reason as an act of latent war, it is a mode of mobilization, concentration and organization that allows us to prepare for war. Thus war justifies the extraordinary and the application of state reason.


=== Carl Schmitt ===
=== Carl Schmitt ===
[[image:PapenSchleicher0001.jpg|thumb|right|Schmitt conseille le gouvernement von Papen (à gauche) et Schleicher (à droite) dans la question constitutionnelle.]]
[[image:PapenSchleicher0001.jpg|thumb|right|Schmitt advises the von Papen (left) and Schleicher (right) governments on the constitutional question.]]


Schmitt a théorisé la théorie du partisan, il  a de nouvelles guerres qui apparaissent par les partisans.
Schmitt had theorized the theory of partisan theory, he had new wars that appeared by the partisans.


Il va s’interroger sous le nazisme, en postulant que le vrai souverain est celui qui décide de la situation exceptionnelle. C’est celui qui décide de l’exceptionnel, c’est ce qu’on appelle le décisionnisme, c’est celui qui a la capacité de décider du rapport à la guerre. Le seul vrai chef et celui de l’état d’exception ce que fait Hitler après 1933.
He will question himself under Nazism, postulating that the real sovereign is the one who decides the exceptional situation. It is the one who decides on the exceptional, it is what is called decision-making, it is the one who has the capacity to decide on the relationship with war. The only true leader and that of the state of exception what Hitler did after 1933.


Au fond, la seule compétence importante pour ce grand chef est de pouvoir porter le discours de l’exceptionnel qui engage vers la guerre. La théorie de la raison d’État transparait sur la question de la guerre totale qui exige une mobilisation totale au sein d’un État total, c’est le totalitarisme. Le totalitarisme est l’impossibilité philosophique de pouvoir de penser en dehors du cadre.
Basically, the only important skill for this great leader is to be able to carry the discourse of the exceptional who engages in war. The theory of state reason is evident in the question of total war, which requires total mobilization within a total state, is totalitarianism. Totalitarianism is the philosophical impossibility of being able to think outside the framework.


Le totalitarisme est un système politique dans lequel on ne peut penser parce que tout a été structuré.  
Totalitarianism is a political system in which one cannot think because everything has been structured.


Schmitt postule que le bon chef est celui qui promeut les conflits. Le conflit dans une vision théologique nazie fonde le rapport ennemi - ami, c’est le discours des futuristes. C’est une représentation de la guerre comme un espace absolu prodigieux qui exige l’application de la raison d’État.  
Schmitt postulates that the right leader is the one who promotes conflict. The conflict in a Nazi theological vision is the basis of the enemy - friend relationship, it is the discourse of the futurists. It is a representation of war as a prodigious absolute space that requires the application of state reason.


Pour Schmitt, la guerre est une sublimation absolue qui est le moment ou le politique peut se révéler en tant que tel.
For Schmitt, war is an absolute sublimation that is the moment when politics can be revealed as such.


= Actualité de l’état d’exception =
= Reccent lookout over exception state =


== De l’État d’exception ==
== The State of emergency ==


[[Fichier:Giorgio Agamben, wall portrait.jpg|thumb|200px|Giorgio Agamben .]]
[[Fichier:Giorgio Agamben, wall portrait.jpg|thumb|200px|Giorgio Agamben .]]


Agamben est un philosophe italien qui publie en 2003 un livre intitulé ''État d’exception''.  
Agamben is an Italian philosopher who published a book entitled État d' exception in 2003.  


Il postule que les sociétés dans lesquelles nous sommes sont en train de rentrer dans un État d’exception  à travers la question de la sécurité.  
He postulates that the societies in which we are now entering an exceptional state through the issue of security.


La déclaration de 1789 dit que la liberté des individus fonde la sécurité. C’est la liberté qui permettrait l’affranchissement et la sécurité. Dans la tradition de la philosophie de la théorie politique moderne, ce qui fonde la sécurité humaine et la liberté.
The 1789 declaration states that the freedom of individuals underlies security. It is freedom that would allow freedom and security. In the tradition of the philosophy of modern political theory, which underpins human security and freedom.


Aujourd’hui, nous avons un renversement de paradigme ou la sécurité fonde la liberté. Avant la liberté on prône le concept de sécurité qui pose des questions de normes, de contrainte et de sécurité des individus.
Today we have a paradigm shift where security underlies freedom. Before freedom we preach the concept of security which raises questions of norms, coercion and the security of individuals.


La théorie de Agamben est que nous sommes tous rentrés dans des états d’exception par ce que nous sommes rentré dans des sociétés qui ont placé la sécurité en premier par rapport au concept de liberté. C’est un contresens philosophique,ce qui est en jeu pour la sécurité et d’abord la liberté, il y aura un principe de rationalité ou de raison qui fait que l’on va vers de la rationalité.
Agamben's theory is that we have all returned to states of exception because we have entered societies that have placed security first and foremost in relation to the concept of freedom. It is a philosophical countermeasure, which is at stake for security and first of all freedom, there will be a principle of rationality or reason that leads us to move towards rationality.


Ainsi nous sommes entrés dans un no mans land qui est un état d’exception continuel ; ce n’est plus un état d’exception qui va être une parenthèse fermée comme Botero le suggérait. Avec Agamben nous serions rentrés dans un état permanent d’état d’exception dans lequel la place de l‘individu n’est plus commandée par la question de la liberté, mais par la question de la sécurité, d’où au sens de Foucault un état permanent de contrôle de l’individu.
So we entered a no mans land which is a state of continuous exception; it is no longer a state of exception that will be a closed parenthesis as Botero suggested. With Agamben we would have returned to a permanent state of exception in which the individual's place is no longer controlled by the question of freedom, but by the question of security, hence in the Foucault sense a permanent state of control of the individual.


Nous sommes entrés dans des sociétés qui n‘acceptent plus des choses invisibles et épaisses est qui ne renvoient à la question de la traçabilité.
We have entered into companies that no longer accept invisible and thick things and do not refer to the issue of traceability.


Au fond, nous sommes dans une rupture fondamentale des sociétés modernes parce que nous rentrons dans du non-droit juridique et un concept de nécessité ou c’est la nécessité qui fait loi alors que la démocratie est un processus.
Basically, we are in a fundamental disruption of modern societies because we are entering into a legal lawlessness and a concept of necessity or it is necessity that makes law, whereas democracy is a process.


C’est une zone d’incertitude, des sociétés de zones grises qui se caractérisent par des lois spécifiques, martiales, sécuritaires qui briment et atteignent les libertés publiques et individuelles. Nous sommes rentrés dans un vocabulaire militaire et un discours stratégique qui justifie la suspension de l’idée de démocratie. C’est une parenthèse qui efface les normes constitutionnelles,le droit des personnes, la liberté individuelle comme principe.
It is a zone of uncertainty, societies of grey zones characterized by specific laws, martial, security laws that curtail and undermine public and individual freedoms. We have entered into a military vocabulary and a strategic discourse that justifies the suspension of the idea of democracy. It is a parenthesis that erases constitutional norms, the rights of individuals and individual freedom as a principle.


C’est la concentration des pouvoirs, la fin de la distinction entre législatif et exécutif et la naissance de règlementations spécifiques qui viennent contrôler l’individu dans toute son existence.
It is the concentration of powers, the end of the distinction between legislative and executive power, and the birth of specific regulations that control the individual throughout his or her life.


L’application de l‘État d’exception en France est la Première guerre mondiale qui renvoie à un état d’exception ; la préparation de la seconde guerre mondiale en 1938 et en 1939 avec le pacte germano-soviétique qui crée des dissensions dans la politique française, car les communistes souhaitent suivre la position soviétique; la constitution française de 1958, l’article 16 dit qu’en cas de menace sur l’intégrité de la république et de la nation, le président de la République peut prendre tous les pouvoirs nécessaires.Ainsi un article accorde la prise de tous les pouvoirs au nom de l’attaque de l’intégrité du territoire.
The application of the state of exception in France is the First World War, which refers to a state of exception; the preparation of the Second World War in 1938 and 1939 with the German-Soviet pact, which created dissensions in French politics, because the Communists wanted to follow the Soviet position; In the French Constitution of 1958, article 16 states that in the event of a threat to the integrity of the republic and the nation, the President of the Republic may take all necessary powers.Thus an article grants the taking of all powers in the name of the attack on territorial integrity.


En Suisse, le 30 août 1914, l’Assemblée fédérale confère au Conseil fédéral le pouvoir illimité  pour garantir la sécurité, l’intégrité et la neutralité de la Suisse.
In Switzerland, on 30 August 1914, the Federal Assembly gave the Federal Council unlimited power to guarantee the security, integrity and neutrality of Switzerland.


== Le 11 septembre et le retour de la raison d’État ==
== September 11 and the Return of Reason of State ==
{{Article détaillé|Les ruptures du 11 septembre 2001}}
{{Article détaillé|Les ruptures du 11 septembre 2001}}
Le premier point qui va permettre de justifier l’état d’exception aux États-Unis après le 11 septembre est la déclaration de George Bush sur la base que l’intégrité de la nation américaine a été atteinte,il a été essayé d’atteindre à l’intégrité de la nation par des attentats terroristes qu’il assimile à un acte de guerre.
The first point that will justify the state of emergency in the United States after 9/11 is George Bush's statement on the basis that the integrity of the American nation has been compromised, he was tried to undermine the integrity of the nation by terrorist attacks that he equates with an act of war.


À partir de ce moment, il se situe dans la nécessité de la défense de la nation américaine. Bush élève l‘ennemie comme un État-nation, il donne du crédit à Ben Laden comme leader d’un État-nation.
From that moment on, he was in need of defending the American nation. Bush elevates the enemy as a nation-state, he gives credit to Bin Laden as leader of a nation-state.


Ce paradigme pose la question de l’application de la raison d’État. La qualification d’acte de guerre élève la guerre comme le référent principal de l’action. Cela signifie qu’à ce moment il est possible d’appliquer la raison d’État au nom de l’acte de guerre.
This paradigm raises the question of the application of state reason. The qualification as an act of war raises war as the principal referent of action. This means that at this time it is possible to apply State reason in the name of the act of war.


Cette phrase sémantique a fait basculer l’histoire rapidement. La légitimation de Ben Laden permet de défendre le territoire en appliquant la raison d’État.  
This semantic phrase quickly changed the story. The legitimation of Bin Laden makes it possible to defend the territory by applying state reason.


Cela s’est traduit par la remise en cause du concept d’État de droit, nous rentrons dans l’ordre de l’extraordinaire ; l’urgence de la situation de l’État pose une question extraordinaire  à l’État, il devient extraordinaire et s’autorise à quitter le champ des règles normales de droit public au nom de l’extraordinaire de la situation.
The urgency of the state's situation raises an extraordinary question for the state, it becomes extraordinary and is allowed to leave the normal rules of public law in the name of the extraordinary of the situation.


Le ministre du Commerce britannique le 9 novembre 2001 dit « c’est un très bon jour pour faire ressortir et passer en douce toutes les mesures que nous devons prendre<ref>Steve Byers, ministre du Commerce anglais du gouvernement de Tony Blair avait envoyé un courrier une heure après le drame « C'est un très bon jour pour faire ressortir et passer en douce toutes les mesures que nous devons prendre. » p. 549</ref> ». Au fond a été engagée la suspension de la démocratie au nom de la nécessité, il y a une rationalité supérieure.
The British Minister for Trade on 9 November 2001 said "it is a very good day to sneak out and sneak out all the measures we need to take". Basically, the suspension of democracy was initiated in the name of necessity, there is a superior rationality.
 
Les attentats du 11 septembre vont être un moteur d’accélération de la transformation de l’espace juridique et surtout de la clôture du débat démocratique parce qu’il y a une urgence qui justifie l’ensemble des mesures extraordinaires.  


The 11 September attacks will be a driving force for accelerating the transformation of the legal space and, above all, for the closure of the democratic debate, because there is an urgency that justifies all the extraordinary measures.
* '''USA patriot act '''
* '''USA patriot act '''
**Les autorités peuvent arrêter et retenir, pour une période non déterminée, des étrangers soupçonnés d’être en relation avec des groupes terroristes, non-qualification du terrorisme
**The authorities may arrest and detain, for an unspecified period of time, foreigners suspected of being in contact with terrorist groups, non-qualification of terrorism.
**Mise en place d’une surveillance du Net, système « carnivore » du FBI.
**Set up surveillance of the Net, FBI carnivorous system.
**que les délits sont considérés comme terroristes s’ils sont « faits sciemment dans le but d’influencer ou d’affecter le gouvernement par intimidation ou contrainte (...) ou dans le cadre de représailles vis-à-vis d’opérations conduites par le gouvernement
**that crimes are considered terrorist if they are "knowingly committed with the aim of influencing or affecting the government by intimidation or coercion... or in retaliation for operations conducted by the government"; and


[[Image:Camp x-ray detainees.jpg|thumb|L'ennemi est déclaré Hors la loi – Carl Schmitt fournit à Giorgio Agamben les catégories d'une critique fondamentale de Guantanamo.]]  
[[Image:Camp x-ray detainees.jpg|thumb|L'ennemi est déclaré Hors la loi – Carl Schmitt fournit à Giorgio Agamben les catégories d'une critique fondamentale de Guantanamo.]]  


*'''Guantanamo'''
*'''Guantanamo'''
La prison de Guantanamo a été étudiée par des juristes, c’est une prison en territoire cubain où sont transférés des individus considérés comme terroristes afin d’en extirper des informations.
The Guantanamo Bay prison has been studied by jurists, it is a prison in Cuban territory where individuals considered as terrorists are transferred in order to extract information from it.  
 
L’histoire de Guantanamo est l’invention du « no mans land ». Toute la procédure de Guantanamo est la procédure de fabrication de la raison d’État. C’est un territoire qui n’est pas américain, c’est une base militaire louée au gouvernement cubain.


Il y a une fabrication juridique du non-droit. Ainsi cette prison échappe aux juridictions américaines, car elle est située dans un territoire cubain.
The story of Guantanamo Bay is the invention of "no mans land". The whole procedure of Guantanamo Bay is the manufacturing procedure of state reason. It is not an American territory, it is a military base leased to the Cuban government.


Ainsi cela permet d’éviter toute contestation, le prisonnier a un statut autre de celui qui est prisonnier de guerre :
There is a legal fabrication of lawlessness. Thus this prison escapes American jurisdictions because it is located in Cuban territory.
*il n’est pas un prisonnier de droit commun
*ni un prisonnier politique
*il est ni un prisonnier de guerre alors que Bush fait la guerre contre la terreur


C’est un principe intéressent de la fabrication d’une extraterritorialité qui fait que personne ne peut contester l’existence de cette prison.  
Thus it allows to avoid any contestation, the prisoner has a different status from the one who is a prisoner of war:
* he is not a common-law prisoner
* nor a political prisoner
* he's not a prisoner of war while Bush is waging a war on terror.
It is an interesting principle of extraterritoriality that no one can dispute the existence of this prison.


Il va falloir attendre 2004, pour que la Cour Suprême des États-Unis arrive à reconnaitre que Guantanamo est placé sous le contrôle et donc sous la juridiction américaine, il faut trois années pour arriver à définir un statut.
It will be necessary to wait until 2004, for the United States Supreme Court to recognize that Guantanamo Bay is under control and therefore under American jurisdiction, it takes three years to define a status.


Ce n’est qu’à partir de 2004 que les prisonniers vont pouvoir commencer à contester les conditions de leur détention devant un tribunal américain. L’administration américaine élabore le concept de combattants irréguliers. Ce sont des arrêts de la Cour Suprême des États-Unis qui vont finalement leur accorder des droits humains plus humanitaires.
It is only from 2004 onwards that prisoners will be able to start challenging the conditions of their detention before an American court. The US Administration is developing the concept of irregular combatants. These are decisions of the U. S. Supreme Court that will ultimately grant them more humanitarian human rights.


Cela pose une question fondamentale qui est que de savoir si la parenthèse de l’état d’exception de la gestion du 11 septembre par les États-Unis est-elle définitivement finie ?
This raises a fundamental question, which is whether the parenthesis of the state of emergency in the United States' management of 11 September is finally over.


Entre les promesses d’Obama et certaines restrictions des libertés qui restent ancrées dans la société d’aujourd’hui comme le contrôle d’internet, etc. nous amène à nous poser la question de savoir si nous sommes sortis de l’état de droit, ce qui n’est pas évident.
Between Obama's promises and certain restrictions on freedoms that remain entrenched in today's society, such as control of the Internet, etc., lead us to ask ourselves the question of whether we have emerged from the rule of law, which is not obvious.


Du point de vue de l’Union européenne, on voit qu’elle engage un processus plus démocratique qu’aux États-Unis sur la gestion du terrorisme planétaire avec une harmonisation des législations et une redéfinition de l’infraction. Ainsi nous pouvons voir comment certaines formes de libertés publiques ainsi que des droits fondamentaux sont toujours malmenés, les vols de la CIA sont le parangon de ce contournement des libertés.
From the European Union's point of view, we can see that it is starting a more democratic process than in the United States on the management of global terrorism, harmonising legislation and redefining the offence. So we can see how certain forms of civil liberties and fundamental rights are still being abused, the CIA's theft is the parangon of this circumvention of freedoms.


= Annexes =
= Annexes =
Ligne 204 : Ligne 201 :
*"Comment L'obsession Sécuritaire Fait Muter La démocratie." Comment L'obsession Sécuritaire Fait Muter La Démocratie, Par Giorgio Agamben (Le Monde Diplomatique, Janvier 2014). N.p., n.d. Web. 15 Sept. 2014. <http://www.monde-diplomatique.fr/2014/01/AGAMBEN/49997>.
*"Comment L'obsession Sécuritaire Fait Muter La démocratie." Comment L'obsession Sécuritaire Fait Muter La Démocratie, Par Giorgio Agamben (Le Monde Diplomatique, Janvier 2014). N.p., n.d. Web. 15 Sept. 2014. <http://www.monde-diplomatique.fr/2014/01/AGAMBEN/49997>.


= Références =
= References =
<references/>
<references />


[[Category:science-politique]]
[[Category:science-politique]]

Version du 18 février 2018 à 09:48

What is the reason of state?

The State reason is a mode of intervention by the public or political power which derogates from ordinary law for exceptional circumstances, the State or an institutional political power may escape ordinary law.

There are modes of policy intervention that are outside the ordinary law. Political power has the capacity to intervene in violation of the rules of ordinary law, which is the reason for state power.

The reason of state is out of the classical law, it can be applied outside civil liberties. It is an action of the exceptional order, in a democracy one can apply the reason of state, but it cannot be the everyday.

Therefore, there will be three possible overruns in the state reason:

  • of legality: one does not exceed what is going to be the law;
  • of the normal: it is of the order of the exceptional and the name of normality;
  • of what makes sense: it's a form of illogicality.

We will first study from a theoretical point of view and then study examples on the state of exception. This comes from the exceptional and what deviates from daily life. The state of emergency in this case is synonymous with the state reason which describes a specific context of public action in a context outside the ordinary law.

The most illustrative case of state reason is the management of September 11,2001 after the destruction of the Twin Towers in the United States.

State Reason describes a state of exceptional action; i. e., the state of exception is associated with that of State Reason.

Thus, we can ask ourselves the question of whether the state reason is reasonable.

Genealogy of the State reason

The state of emergency is the acceptance that democracy can be suspended in the name of a greater interest than democracy. If democracy is an absolute, how can we at any given time stay in the name of democracy?

If democracy is suspended, if we go beyond the positive law of democracy, then we find ourselves in a "no mans land", that is, a territory where the law of democracy applies more.

The state of exception opens a specific phase in which, in the name of safeguarding democracy, democracy is amputated from its modes of operation by positioning itself as a state above democracy. It is a fuzzy territory where boundaries no longer exist.

In the question of state reason, we are forced to return to the political questions and political theories of the moment.

Machiavelli

Article détaillé : La Renaissance italienne.
His posthumous portrait by Santi di Tito, at the Palazzo Vecchio in Florence

Machiavelli talks about political reason to basically say that the fundamental challenge for politics is to achieve its objectives; thus the end justifies the means. This is an amoral position, but that Machiavelli defines as moral in the importance of the goal to be expected.

It is therefore possible to use all techniques to achieve the goal. In The Prince, Machiavelli advises to use strategy and trickery. The trick is the differentiation between two individuals. The one who is cunning is the one who holds information and does not pass it on to him, giving him an advance that is a superior asset to the other.

What is important is tactics, the ability to do things outside the law.

The limit is that Machiavelli does not use the concept of state reason, but postulates that in some cases the values inherent in the constitution of the modern state can be exceeded. Since the prince must reach his objectives, he can use means that are not necessarily democratic, but this is not important, because by this behavior he can achieve his objectives.

Machiavelli justifies that at a given moment, public and political action can go beyond a form of recognition and public dialogue of the state.

Giovanni Botero

Giovanni Botero.

Botero is the founder of the modern concept of state reason, he is a Piedmontese Jesuit born 1544 and died 1617 who was also a diplomat who wrote a great treatise on state reason.

What interests him is the construction and constitution of power, namely its forms and power. Botero is interested in the efficiency of the state, i. e. the relationship between the state, population and the growth of political power.

He's going to look at it theologically. For there to be a reason of state, he must obviously have a return to God. Power has a theological dimension, it is necessary to respond to divine inspirations, the prince must therefore respect the word of God. By respecting God's word, he can rule in the name of state reason.

If he responds well to God in relation to God's objectives for mankind on earth, then the prince can apply an exceptional power which is the reason of state.

Botero is not in an amoral vision in the sense of Machiavellian, he seeks to place the reason of state in a logic of morality. If God commands how men and women should act on earth, then the prince can apply state reason in certain exceptional cases to respond to divine orders.

Thus, Botero brings state reason to the side of morality, while Machiavelli theorizes it as amorality.

What is important is that in the return to morality, state reason will appear as potentially possible in terms of public action. If in some cases the prince is right about his subjects, if he is right and does it in the name of God, he has the morality of state reason. Which may seem immoral.

It is the application of state reason in the name of divine principles, therefore it is the application of the moral order. Means do not matter when they respect divine virtues.

In Botero's theory is conducted a fight against the thought of Machiavelli, it is necessary to return to God, if he is subject to God he can govern according to the state reason.

The prince is the one who gives himself the means of domination in the service of God and the reason of state is the recognition of these means.

From that moment on, Botero's theory consists of thinking about the modern state and the conditions for applying state reason.

From when will it be possible to enter into the exceptionality of the power of state reason? Botero will illustrate this framework by civil wars, a civil war is a risk of tearing up and destroying society by internal destruction, so the reason of state can be applied in the name of God.

Botero's paradox is that he legitimizes the action of the prince on the religious, but at the same time he is ready to define as moral acts that have nothing human.

Starting from a limited conceptual apriori, the prince is moral then he can apply state reason. If the prince is fundamentally immoral, he can then use the reason of state to satisfy his own interests in the name of God.

In Botero's theory, there are great weaknesses for the bias of state reason, in addition, there is the bias that men are not reasonable enough to be governed in a classical way. If men are not reasonable they are unreasonable, they lack rationality and reason, so the reason of State will be the return of rationality, that is to say the fact that we will rebuild reasonableness according to all unreasonable means.

Man can be dangerous and non-social. The prince has the right to use exceptional rules which are rules of abandonment of the ordinary to the extraordinary which is the application of the reason of state.

He concludes his speech by asking himself the question of the strongest moments of potentialities and circumstances to apply the reason of state. It is above all war, because it is an exceptional moment, in a situation of military conflict to win the survival of its political entity, we will apply state reason in order to lead the war. Therefore, reason is a necessity in the order of war because it will mobilize individuals and cities while taking extraordinary measures against enemies.

In Botero's case, the army is a vector of war which is also one of the tools for defining state reason.

Starting from the religious and theological, it will gradually be abandoned to found a modern political theory of state reason, asserting that there are extraordinary situations which cannot be regulated, regulated or governed by the ordinary. An extraordinary situation is an extraordinary government, this government will apply the reason of state.

Thus, the State reason is the situation of managing an extraordinary time by applying the rules of the State reason name state reason of the general interest.

The paradox is to become aware of the absolute paradox in which one arrives; one defines an extraordinary by amputating public freedoms in the name of the collective good and the reason of the State, since in essence the extraordinary is unreasonableness and unreasonableness.

War as a support for reason of state

Michel Senellart

For Senellart, the main application of state reason is war: "State reason is nothing more than a contravention of ordinary reasons for the respect of the public good, or for the respect of a greater and universal reason".

State reason is justified by a context that breaks with the ordinary rules of democracy.

Scipione Ammirato

Ammirato postulates that there is a historical link between war and state reason. The very place where the application of state reason is applied is war, living it in its time in the fledgling conflict with Islam. It is necessary to use the principle of state reason, because it is going to be a structural bulwark against forms of government that will make it possible to fight Islam.

We must think of state reason as an act of latent war, it is a mode of mobilization, concentration and organization that allows us to prepare for war. Thus war justifies the extraordinary and the application of state reason.

Carl Schmitt

Schmitt advises the von Papen (left) and Schleicher (right) governments on the constitutional question.

Schmitt had theorized the theory of partisan theory, he had new wars that appeared by the partisans.

He will question himself under Nazism, postulating that the real sovereign is the one who decides the exceptional situation. It is the one who decides on the exceptional, it is what is called decision-making, it is the one who has the capacity to decide on the relationship with war. The only true leader and that of the state of exception what Hitler did after 1933.

Basically, the only important skill for this great leader is to be able to carry the discourse of the exceptional who engages in war. The theory of state reason is evident in the question of total war, which requires total mobilization within a total state, is totalitarianism. Totalitarianism is the philosophical impossibility of being able to think outside the framework.

Totalitarianism is a political system in which one cannot think because everything has been structured.

Schmitt postulates that the right leader is the one who promotes conflict. The conflict in a Nazi theological vision is the basis of the enemy - friend relationship, it is the discourse of the futurists. It is a representation of war as a prodigious absolute space that requires the application of state reason.

For Schmitt, war is an absolute sublimation that is the moment when politics can be revealed as such.

Reccent lookout over exception state

The State of emergency

Giorgio Agamben .

Agamben is an Italian philosopher who published a book entitled État d' exception in 2003.

He postulates that the societies in which we are now entering an exceptional state through the issue of security.

The 1789 declaration states that the freedom of individuals underlies security. It is freedom that would allow freedom and security. In the tradition of the philosophy of modern political theory, which underpins human security and freedom.

Today we have a paradigm shift where security underlies freedom. Before freedom we preach the concept of security which raises questions of norms, coercion and the security of individuals.

Agamben's theory is that we have all returned to states of exception because we have entered societies that have placed security first and foremost in relation to the concept of freedom. It is a philosophical countermeasure, which is at stake for security and first of all freedom, there will be a principle of rationality or reason that leads us to move towards rationality.

So we entered a no mans land which is a state of continuous exception; it is no longer a state of exception that will be a closed parenthesis as Botero suggested. With Agamben we would have returned to a permanent state of exception in which the individual's place is no longer controlled by the question of freedom, but by the question of security, hence in the Foucault sense a permanent state of control of the individual.

We have entered into companies that no longer accept invisible and thick things and do not refer to the issue of traceability.

Basically, we are in a fundamental disruption of modern societies because we are entering into a legal lawlessness and a concept of necessity or it is necessity that makes law, whereas democracy is a process.

It is a zone of uncertainty, societies of grey zones characterized by specific laws, martial, security laws that curtail and undermine public and individual freedoms. We have entered into a military vocabulary and a strategic discourse that justifies the suspension of the idea of democracy. It is a parenthesis that erases constitutional norms, the rights of individuals and individual freedom as a principle.

It is the concentration of powers, the end of the distinction between legislative and executive power, and the birth of specific regulations that control the individual throughout his or her life.

The application of the state of exception in France is the First World War, which refers to a state of exception; the preparation of the Second World War in 1938 and 1939 with the German-Soviet pact, which created dissensions in French politics, because the Communists wanted to follow the Soviet position; In the French Constitution of 1958, article 16 states that in the event of a threat to the integrity of the republic and the nation, the President of the Republic may take all necessary powers.Thus an article grants the taking of all powers in the name of the attack on territorial integrity.

In Switzerland, on 30 August 1914, the Federal Assembly gave the Federal Council unlimited power to guarantee the security, integrity and neutrality of Switzerland.

September 11 and the Return of Reason of State

Article détaillé : Les ruptures du 11 septembre 2001.

The first point that will justify the state of emergency in the United States after 9/11 is George Bush's statement on the basis that the integrity of the American nation has been compromised, he was tried to undermine the integrity of the nation by terrorist attacks that he equates with an act of war.

From that moment on, he was in need of defending the American nation. Bush elevates the enemy as a nation-state, he gives credit to Bin Laden as leader of a nation-state.

This paradigm raises the question of the application of state reason. The qualification as an act of war raises war as the principal referent of action. This means that at this time it is possible to apply State reason in the name of the act of war.

This semantic phrase quickly changed the story. The legitimation of Bin Laden makes it possible to defend the territory by applying state reason.

The urgency of the state's situation raises an extraordinary question for the state, it becomes extraordinary and is allowed to leave the normal rules of public law in the name of the extraordinary of the situation.

The British Minister for Trade on 9 November 2001 said "it is a very good day to sneak out and sneak out all the measures we need to take". Basically, the suspension of democracy was initiated in the name of necessity, there is a superior rationality.

The 11 September attacks will be a driving force for accelerating the transformation of the legal space and, above all, for the closure of the democratic debate, because there is an urgency that justifies all the extraordinary measures.

  • USA patriot act
    • The authorities may arrest and detain, for an unspecified period of time, foreigners suspected of being in contact with terrorist groups, non-qualification of terrorism.
    • Set up surveillance of the Net, FBI carnivorous system.
    • that crimes are considered terrorist if they are "knowingly committed with the aim of influencing or affecting the government by intimidation or coercion... or in retaliation for operations conducted by the government"; and
L'ennemi est déclaré Hors la loi – Carl Schmitt fournit à Giorgio Agamben les catégories d'une critique fondamentale de Guantanamo.
  • Guantanamo

The Guantanamo Bay prison has been studied by jurists, it is a prison in Cuban territory where individuals considered as terrorists are transferred in order to extract information from it.

The story of Guantanamo Bay is the invention of "no mans land". The whole procedure of Guantanamo Bay is the manufacturing procedure of state reason. It is not an American territory, it is a military base leased to the Cuban government.

There is a legal fabrication of lawlessness. Thus this prison escapes American jurisdictions because it is located in Cuban territory.

Thus it allows to avoid any contestation, the prisoner has a different status from the one who is a prisoner of war:

  • he is not a common-law prisoner
  • nor a political prisoner
  • he's not a prisoner of war while Bush is waging a war on terror.

It is an interesting principle of extraterritoriality that no one can dispute the existence of this prison.

It will be necessary to wait until 2004, for the United States Supreme Court to recognize that Guantanamo Bay is under control and therefore under American jurisdiction, it takes three years to define a status.

It is only from 2004 onwards that prisoners will be able to start challenging the conditions of their detention before an American court. The US Administration is developing the concept of irregular combatants. These are decisions of the U. S. Supreme Court that will ultimately grant them more humanitarian human rights.

This raises a fundamental question, which is whether the parenthesis of the state of emergency in the United States' management of 11 September is finally over.

Between Obama's promises and certain restrictions on freedoms that remain entrenched in today's society, such as control of the Internet, etc., lead us to ask ourselves the question of whether we have emerged from the rule of law, which is not obvious.

From the European Union's point of view, we can see that it is starting a more democratic process than in the United States on the management of global terrorism, harmonising legislation and redefining the offence. So we can see how certain forms of civil liberties and fundamental rights are still being abused, the CIA's theft is the parangon of this circumvention of freedoms.

Annexes

References

Récupérée de « https://baripedia.org/index.php?title=The_reason_of_State&oldid=35719 »