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For Rousseau, 'good government' is that which is guided by the general will of the people. That is, a government that acts according to the wills and interests of the people, not the particular interests of the rulers or an elite. This means that government must be a direct expression of the people. This is why Rousseau was an advocate of direct democracy, where citizens actively participate in political decision-making. For him, the legitimacy of government rests on the consent of the governed, and the social contract is the tool that allows this consent to be expressed. This does not mean that the government must blindly follow the will of the people. The general will, according to Rousseau, is not simply the sum of individual wills. Rather, it must reflect the 'common good' - what is in the interest of all, not simply what is in the interest of a few. The role of good government, therefore, is to detect and follow this general will, always striving to promote the common good and equality among citizens. For Rousseau, the social contract is at the heart of political thought. It defines the relationship between the government and the governed, and is the basis for the legitimacy and authority of government. | For Rousseau, 'good government' is that which is guided by the general will of the people. That is, a government that acts according to the wills and interests of the people, not the particular interests of the rulers or an elite. This means that government must be a direct expression of the people. This is why Rousseau was an advocate of direct democracy, where citizens actively participate in political decision-making. For him, the legitimacy of government rests on the consent of the governed, and the social contract is the tool that allows this consent to be expressed. This does not mean that the government must blindly follow the will of the people. The general will, according to Rousseau, is not simply the sum of individual wills. Rather, it must reflect the 'common good' - what is in the interest of all, not simply what is in the interest of a few. The role of good government, therefore, is to detect and follow this general will, always striving to promote the common good and equality among citizens. For Rousseau, the social contract is at the heart of political thought. It defines the relationship between the government and the governed, and is the basis for the legitimacy and authority of government. | ||
= | = The constitution of the welfare state = | ||
== | == The rise of the social == | ||
Hannah Arendt, | Hannah Arendt, the 20th century political philosopher, offers a unique perspective on the realms of public and private, and the emergence of the social realm. According to Arendt, the historical transformation of the public interest into a competition with the private interest coincides with the emergence of the social sphere. This social realm lies between the public and the private, where matters of everyday life, subsistence and material necessities take centre stage. For Arendt, the public realm is the realm of freedom, where people can act and speak together and where actions and discourses have meaning. It is the place of politics, collective action and public deliberation. In contrast, the private domain is the place of necessity, where individuals provide for their basic needs. However, with the rise of the social domain, the boundary between these two domains has blurred. What were once private concerns have become public issues. For example, issues of economics and material well-being, which were once private, have become public issues. Arendt expressed concern about the impact of this transformation on politics and freedom. In her view, the rise of the social sphere could lead to a depoliticisation of society, where the focus on material well-being and the economy overshadows issues of freedom and political action. | ||
According to Hannah Arendt, the field of the social is a relatively new phenomenon that emerged with modernity. In antiquity, the world was divided into two distinct spheres: the public ('politikos') and the private ('oikos'). The 'politikos' is the realm of politics, where citizens actively participate in public life and take part in the governance of the city. It is the place of action, speech and freedom. It is here that individuals can reveal their unique and distinct identities, and this requires a space of appearance where these revelations can be made and observed by others. The 'oikos', on the other hand, is the domain of the home, the family and the needs of subsistence. It is a private place, hidden from public view, where individuals attend to the necessities of life, such as food, shelter and procreation. The private realm is seen as a place of necessity rather than freedom, where individuals must work to meet their basic needs. For Arendt, the emergence of the social sphere has blurred this clear distinction between the public and the private. In the social sphere, issues that were previously considered private, such as economic and welfare issues, became public concerns. This has led to the erosion of the traditional public sphere, threatening political freedom and participation. | |||
The distinction between the private and public spheres became more blurred in the modern era, between the sixteenth and eighteenth centuries. Indeed, it is during this period that we see the emergence of what can be called the 'social' sphere, where elements of private life begin to impact on public life, and vice versa. With the development of the market economy and the increase in international trade, the family has become an economic unit, and economic activity has become a matter of public concern. In other words, the private (the family and the domestic economy) began to mix with the public (the market economy and the affairs of the state). Parallel to these economic changes, there was also a movement towards greater democratisation and political participation. Enlightenment ideas of equality, liberty and fraternity encouraged greater participation in public life and challenged the old power structures based on status and tradition. However, despite these changes, the concept of the private sphere remained important. Individuals have always needed a space for intimate, family and domestic life, separate from public life. And, as Hannah Arendt noted, the private sphere is a precondition for participation in the public sphere. Without a domain of life that is unique to the individual, there is no 'who' to participate in the public sphere. | |||
The industrial revolution, which began in the late eighteenth century and continued throughout the nineteenth century, brought about profound changes in society and the economy. Industrialisation increased production and wealth, but it also created new forms of inequality and deprivation. Industrial production required a large amount of labour, which led to the emergence of a new class of workers. These workers were often subjected to very difficult working conditions. For example, children were commonly employed in mines and factories, where they worked long hours in dangerous conditions. In response to these social problems, workers began to organise to demand better wages and working conditions. This led to strikes and sometimes revolutions. At the same time, diseases related to poverty and poor living conditions, such as tuberculosis, were spreading, leading to pandemics. Industrialists and the state were forced to address these problems to maintain social and economic stability. This led to reforms in many areas, such as labour law, social security and public health. In addition, this period saw the emergence of new academic disciplines, such as sociology, which sought to understand and solve social problems. | |||
The Industrial Revolution did bring about a significant shift in the structure of society. Where the family was once a private unit focused on subsistence and survival, it became a unit of production in its own right, integrated into a wider economic network. This means that many activities that were previously private have become public economic activities, contributing to the expansion of what we now call the social sphere. For example, education, once a private matter run by the family, has become a matter of public concern. With industrialisation, skills and knowledge became valuable economic assets, and it became increasingly important to provide basic education for all children, not just those from wealthy families. This led to the establishment of public schools and the creation of laws requiring children to attend school. Similarly, health care, once a private matter managed by the family and the local community, became a matter of public concern. Industrialisation created new occupational diseases and promoted the spread of infectious diseases in densely populated cities. This led to the establishment of public health systems and the creation of regulations to protect the health of workers. These changes have led to a reduction in the private sphere, as more and more aspects of daily life have become matters of public concern. At the same time, they have expanded the social sphere, as more and more activities have been integrated into the market economy and the political system. | |||
The emergence of the social as a central concern has had a significant impact on the balance between the public and private spheres, leading to a major transformation of the structures of government and society. This trend was particularly pronounced during and after the Industrial Revolution, with the dramatic increase in social inequalities, public health problems, and social unrest such as strikes and riots. In this context, the management of social issues became a major concern for governments. This has led to a number of changes, including the emergence of the welfare state, the expansion of public services such as education and health, and the introduction of regulations to protect workers and ensure fair working conditions. It has also led to a redefinition of the boundary between the public and private spheres. Aspects of life that were once considered private, such as health and education, have become matters of public concern, managed and regulated by the state. At the same time, the public sphere has been expanded to include not only government but also society as a whole. It is therefore fair to say that the emergence of the social has overturned traditional definitions of public and private space, creating a new social sphere that plays a central role in contemporary governance. | |||
According to Hannah Arendt, with the rise of capitalism and industrialisation, the concept of the family began to be transformed. The family, traditionally seen as part of the private sphere, began to be seen as a unit of production participating in the global economy. This transformation brought what was previously considered private, such as the education and welfare of children, into the public sphere. Education, in particular, has become a major concern for society as a whole, as it is linked to the future of society itself. The quality of education received by children has a direct impact on their ability to contribute to society as adults. Thus, education began to be seen not simply as a matter of individual or family choice, but as a matter of public interest. Arendt argues that this development led to the emergence of the 'social sphere', a new public space in which matters previously considered private were played out. This social sphere has expanded the realm of the public interest to include elements of everyday life previously reserved for the private sphere. Thus, according to Arendt, the advent of the social has brought about a fundamental shift in our understanding of what is public and private, with important implications for the way society is organised and governed. | |||
Hannah Arendt | Hannah Arendt identifies Jean-Jacques Rousseau as a key figure in the recognition of the social sphere as a separate domain from the public and the private. According to Arendt, Rousseau highlighted how the social fits between the traditional private domain of the home and family and the public domain of the state and politics. Rousseau was one of the first to analyse and criticise the social problems caused by the rise of the market economy and economic inequality. In his writings, Rousseau emphasised the importance of community life and the general will, ideas that reflect the growing recognition of the social sphere. According to Arendt, the period from the sixteenth to the eighteenth century, a period of great economic and social transformation, was marked by a progressive shift from the private to the social. The family, once seen as an essentially private entity, became a unit of production integrated into the wider society. This shift made the social realm visible and highlighted the need to take it into account in public governance. This is a process that Arendt sees as a fundamental change in the structure of our society, with profound consequences for our understanding of public and private life. | ||
The transition from one society to another, from one era to another, has often led to the creation of a new sphere of activity that required the establishment of new forms of governance and regulation. In this context, the 'third fact' is the emergence of the social sphere as a domain of public interest. In a society where private life is becoming increasingly public (through, for example, social media and other forms of communication technology), the traditional notion of public space is becoming blurred. This has led to calls for new forms of regulation and governance to manage these new realities. For example, we can see that stricter regulations are being put in place to protect the privacy of individuals as more and more of our personal information becomes publicly available. Similarly, public policies are increasingly aimed at responding to emerging social problems in the social sphere. These new forms of governance and regulation represent an effort to manage the growing complexity of our world and to maintain a balance between private and public interests. It is therefore crucial that we continue to reflect on and debate these issues, as the decisions we take today will have lasting consequences for the future of our society. | |||
The emergence of the social sphere has redefined the boundaries between private and public life. Previously, family matters were primarily a private matter and therefore largely excluded from the realm of public policy. However, with the emergence of the social sphere, the family and other aspects of private life have become matters of public concern, requiring appropriate regulation and governance. In this context, the state, as the representative of the collective, had to assume new responsibilities and obligations. This has led to the establishment of various laws and policies aimed at protecting members of society and promoting their welfare. For example, child protection laws, which regulate the conditions under which children are raised and educated, are an example of how the social sphere has become an area of public concern. Similarly, public policies on work, health, education, etc., have all been influenced by this development. Thus, the emergence of the social sphere has led to an expansion of the sphere of influence of the state, which is now responsible not only for the management of public affairs, but also for the regulation and surveillance of many aspects of private life. This led to the birth of the modern social state, characterised by a more direct and deeper involvement in the social affairs of its citizens. | |||
In "The Human Condition", first published in 1958, the political philosopher Hannah Arendt explores the concept of "vita activa" (the active life) and how it has been transformed throughout human history. She distinguishes three fundamental human activities: work, work and action. | |||
* | * Work is linked to our biological condition of necessity and survival. It is the activity that produces the consumer goods necessary for human life. | ||
* | * Work is about artificiality, i.e. the making of objects in the human world, such as tools, machines and infrastructure. | ||
* | * Action is the properly political human activity. It is through action that individuals participate in the public sphere, engage in discussion and debate, and thereby shape collective life. | ||
According to Arendt, these three activities have become increasingly indistinct in the modern era, especially with the emergence of what she calls the 'mass society' or 'labour society'. In this society, work, once considered the lowest activity, has become dominant, and the value of individuals is often determined by their ability to work and produce. As a result, the traditionally distinct spheres of private life (the realm of work and labour) and public life (the realm of action) have become increasingly blurred. It is in this context that Arendt explores the importance of public space for political action and civic participation, and how the emergence of mass society can threaten these spaces and, therefore, the human condition itself. | |||
== | == Social control: madness and crime == | ||
[[ | [[File:Michel Foucault 1.jpg|vignette|Michel Foucault.]] | ||
Michel Foucault, | Michel Foucault, a twentieth-century French philosopher, is known for his work on power, knowledge and discourse in modern society. He was a key figure in the structural movement in the social sciences and humanities, greatly influencing the fields of sociology, history and philosophy. In his work, Foucault focused on the genealogy of knowledge, seeking to understand how different forms of knowledge, society, subject and truth are produced and reconfigured throughout history. Through genealogy, he sought to show how the things we take for granted or natural are in fact the product of specific historical relations of power and knowledge. Among his most famous works are 'Surveiller et punir' (1975), where he analyses the development of modern systems of discipline and surveillance, and 'L'Histoire de la sexualité' (1976-1984), where he examines how the discourse of sexuality is used as a form of power and control. Foucault also developed the concept of 'biopower', which describes how modern power operates not only by punishing individuals (a 'repressive' power), but also by regulating and managing life itself (a 'productive' power). Biopower, according to Foucault, manifests itself through practices such as public health, education and population management. | ||
Michel Foucault a | Michel Foucault has developed a method of historical analysis that challenges our preconceptions about societies and power structures. According to him, societies are shaped by a multitude of knowledges and techniques, and are far from being static or unchanging. He focuses particularly on how power is exercised through social institutions, discourses and everyday practices, and how these elements interact to produce specific forms of knowledge, behaviour and subjectivity. He argues that in order to understand a society, we need to examine how its various structures (e.g. legal, educational, medical institutions, etc.) have been established and how they function in practice. This involves examining the techniques and knowledge that support these structures and how they are used to regulate and control individuals and populations. Therefore, according to Foucault, understanding society means understanding the power dynamics that shape it and the knowledge that supports it. He used this approach to analyse a number of fields, from psychiatry to sexuality to the prison system. | ||
Foucault | Foucault emphasised the historically constructed nature of our current social understandings and practices, what he called historicity. That is, he insisted that our ways of thinking, our institutions, our behaviours and our knowledge are not natural or inevitable, but have been shaped by specific historical processes. He developed the notion of episteme to refer to the unconscious structures that underlie the systems of thought of a given era. He argues that these epistemic structures determine what can be considered legitimate knowledge at a given time, and how this knowledge is produced, disseminated and put into practice. Furthermore, Foucault argues that social structures and power relations are entangled in these systems of thought and knowledge. This means that power structures influence what is considered valid knowledge and how it is used, while the knowledge produced serves to justify and perpetuate certain forms of power. Thus, for Foucault, analysing society as a societal construct means studying historical forms of knowledge and power, and how they interact to produce current conditions. | ||
Michel Foucault | Michel Foucault developed the notion of 'dispositif' to explain how societies are organised and regulated. For Foucault, a dispositif is a complex network that links together discursive and non-discursive elements - such as ideas, institutions, laws, administrative practices, scientific activities, and individual and collective behaviours - to respond to a specific emergency or need in a certain historical period. Each device has a specific strategic function and aims to manage, control, direct or shape human behaviour in certain ways. They are, in short, mechanisms of power. However, devices are not simply tools of control or management. They are also the means by which a society understands and represents itself. Devices structure the way we think and talk about ourselves and our world, and thus influence our perception of what is normal, acceptable, or possible. Consequently, for Foucault, the study of devices is a way of understanding how societies are constructed and modified, and how power relations are interwoven into these processes. | ||
Michel Foucault | Michel Foucault sought to highlight how the norms and behaviours we often take for granted are in fact the product of specific historical and cultural processes. His approach, often referred to as the 'archaeology' or 'genealogy' of knowledge, is to examine how these behaviours became normative and to understand the systems of power that underpin them. Foucault analysed various social institutions (such as prisons, hospitals, asylums and schools) and concepts (such as sexuality, madness, deviance) to demonstrate how the behaviours and attitudes associated with these institutions and concepts have changed over time. For example, he examined how notions of 'madness' and 'mental health' have been historically constructed, and how these constructions have been used to regulate and control certain populations. In sum, Foucault's aim was not simply to describe behaviours, but to understand them in their historical and societal context, in order to reveal the systems of power that shape and control them. | ||
Michel Foucault | Michel Foucault addressed the historical and critical analysis of prison and hospital institutions in his work. | ||
Folly and Folly: A History of Madness in the Classical Age, published in 1961, explores the history of the conception of madness in Western culture from the Middle Ages to the 19th century. It analyses the different ways in which madness was perceived and treated over the centuries, and how these perceptions and treatments were embedded in specific systems of power and institutional structures, notably the psychiatric hospital. | |||
Surveiller et punir: Naissance de la prison, published in 1975, examines the evolution of the penal system in the West from the 17th to the 20th century. Foucault analyses how the shift from corporal punishment to imprisonment was accompanied by a wider change in the way power was exercised in society. The focus shifted from punishing the body to monitoring and controlling behaviour and the mind, resulting in the emergence of various disciplinary techniques and surveillance regimes. | |||
Both works demonstrate how Foucault uses the concept of 'power' in his analyses, suggesting that power is not only a repressive force, but also a productive force that shapes our identities and behaviour. | |||
In his historical and critical analysis, Foucault focuses on how institutions, such as hospitals and prisons, have played an important role in structuring our societies. Moreover, these institutions have influenced the way in which certain concepts, such as 'madness', have been understood and treated. In "Madness and Unreason: A History of Madness in the Classical Age", Foucault explores how "madness" has moved from being a condition that was once understood in a more nuanced way and integrated into society, to being a "problem" that needs to be treated and isolated. The concept of madness, from this perspective, is not an objective reality, but a social construct that changes according to historical and cultural contexts. From this perspective, madness is "situated" as a representation - that is, the way it is perceived and treated depends on the way it is conceptualised in a certain social and cultural context. Similarly, the prison as an institution influences our concepts of punishment, crime and rehabilitation. The structure and practices of these institutions are both a reflection and a tool of the systems of power and knowledge that prevail at a given time. | |||
For Michel Foucault, power is not simply something one possesses, but rather a relationship or process that runs through society. Power is exercised through a set of practices, discourses, knowledge and technologies that organise social life in certain ways rather than others. These practices and devices constitute what Foucault calls 'devices of power'. From this perspective, power is not only something that is exercised by the state or by a dominant elite, but is diffused and produced at all levels of society. It operates through a multitude of small devices - laws, regulations, social norms, everyday practices, discourses and knowledge - that shape our behaviour and thinking in ways that are usually invisible to us. For example, hospitals and prisons are two types of institutions that Foucault analysed as devices of power. These institutions have rules and procedures, produce specific kinds of knowledge (medical, legal, psychiatric, etc.), and organise people and spaces in certain ways. They help structure our understanding of what is normal and abnormal, healthy and sick, criminal and non-criminal. In this sense, they are tools through which power is exercised in society. | |||
=== | === Madness and unreason === | ||
For Foucault, the notion of 'madness' is not simply an objective medical condition, but is also strongly influenced by social and political factors. In other words, what we consider "madness" depends to a large extent on the norms and values of our society. In his book "Histoire de la folie à l'âge classique", Foucault examines the evolution of the way madness was perceived and treated in Europe from the late Middle Ages to the modern era. He argues that, in the Middle Ages, madness was often seen as a form of wisdom or mystical knowledge. However, with the advent of reason and science in the modern era, madness began to be seen as a disease to be treated. Foucault argues that this change in perception was not simply the result of scientific or medical advances, but was also linked to wider changes in society and culture. For example, as society became more rational and orderly, anything that seemed irrational or chaotic (such as madness) became increasingly stigmatised and excluded. Ultimately, Foucault's argument is that the way we perceive and treat 'madness' (or any other type of behaviour or condition) is deeply influenced by our social and cultural norms. These norms may vary from time to time and place to place, suggesting that our understanding of 'madness' is in part a social and political construction. | |||
In the Middle Ages, madness was often seen in a different light to that of the modern era. It was common to view the insane as being 'touched by God' or possessing some kind of wisdom or mystical knowledge that others did not. This perspective was rooted in a deeply religious worldview, where everything, including madness, was seen as part of the divine plan. In this sense, madness was often associated with innocence rather than guilt or sin. The insane were seen as closer to God because of their simplicity of mind and innocence. They were often treated with compassion and tolerance, rather than fear or disgust. However, this view of madness began to change in modern times, when science and reason began to replace religion as the main sources of knowledge and authority. With this transition, madness began to be seen not as a blessing or a divine mystery, but as a disease or deviance to be treated. Again, this development illustrates Foucault's central point: our understanding of madness (or any other condition or behaviour) is not simply an objective fact, but is deeply influenced by social, cultural and historical norms. | |||
In many traditional societies, including in the Middle Ages, "madness" or what we would today call mental disorders, was often integrated into village or community life. People with mental disorders often lived among other members of the community and were accepted, even if they were sometimes considered different or strange. However, with the advent of modernity, madness began to be treated as an illness to be isolated and treated separately from the rest of society. This led to the creation of specific institutions, such as asylums and mental hospitals, which were intended to isolate the 'insane' from the rest of society. Foucault argues that this change in the way madness was treated was not simply a consequence of scientific or medical advancement, but rather a reflection of wider social and cultural changes. In particular, he suggests that this new approach to madness was linked to the emergence of a more disciplined and regulated society, in which any form of deviance was increasingly intolerable. | |||
<youtube>QNB5OKJ36nQ</youtube> | <youtube>QNB5OKJ36nQ</youtube> | ||
From the 17th century onwards, madness was seen as a negative aspect of reason, rather than a manifestation of divine will. This was a major paradigm shift. Madness was gradually medicalised, which meant that it was defined and treated as a disease. Medicine, as a discipline, began to classify the different forms of madness, to develop diagnoses, treatments and institutional approaches to managing madness. Madness became an object of scientific study, with its own categories and standards of treatment. This led to the creation of specific institutions, such as asylums and mental hospitals, to manage and treat madness. However, as Foucault pointed out, this process of medicalisation was not simply a neutral or inevitable development. Rather, it reflected specific social and cultural choices, as well as specific forms of power and control. By medicalising madness, society was able to further regulate and control those considered mad, often marginalising and excluding them from the wider society. | |||
In the process of medicalisation of madness, institutions play a central role, in particular psychiatric hospitals. These are places where those considered insane are separated from the rest of society. It is no coincidence that the emergence of these institutions corresponds to the rise of the modern state, which needed new mechanisms to regulate and control the population. Michel Foucault analysed this development in depth in his book "Histoire de la folie à l'âge classique". He suggested that the creation of asylums was not so much a humanitarian attempt to help the mentally ill, as a reflection of a desire to isolate and exclude them from society. In other words, asylums were not simply institutions of care, but also instruments of social control. Foucault also pointed out that the treatment of madness in these institutions was not always benevolent or beneficial to the patients. On the contrary, it was often characterised by coercion, repression and even violence. Thus, the medicalisation of madness not only led to the exclusion and marginalisation of those considered mad, but also created new forms of suffering and abuse. | |||
Michel Foucault | Michel Foucault argues that the internment of the 'insane' in psychiatric hospitals marks a major break in the history of madness. Instead of being tolerated or accepted as an integral part of society, the insane were gradually isolated and locked away from the rest of society. This movement is part of the wider context of the emergence of modern societies, which tend to create strict systems of norms governing human behaviour. According to Foucault, these systems of normativity do not only define what is considered normal or abnormal. They also define what is acceptable and unacceptable, what is healthy and sick, and what is rational and irrational. In this context, the internment of the insane can be seen as a way of reinforcing these norms by excluding those who do not fit the idea of normality. This implies a shift in the thresholds of tolerance, in the sense that society becomes less tolerant of those who do not fit its norms. In other words, internment is both a reaction to madness and a way of controlling and regulating it. | ||
Foucault | Foucault argues that the modern state, through its bureaucratic institutions and practices, uses a range of tools and techniques to regulate, control and discipline individuals and society as a whole. These tools range from punitive institutions such as prisons, to bureaucratic practices of surveillance and control, to education and mental health systems. These 'technologies of power', as Foucault calls them, are deeply embedded in our daily routines and social interactions. They are so ubiquitous that we often take them for granted or as natural, when in fact they are historically constructed and shaped by processes of power. For example, the notions of 'mental health' and 'mental illness' are closely linked to the emergence of psychiatry as a field of knowledge and practice in the 19th and 20th centuries. The criteria used to diagnose mental illness are not simply objective facts, but are deeply influenced by social values, norms and expectations. Similarly, educational systems are designed to normalise individuals and adapt them to certain social norms and expectations. This is what Foucault calls 'discipline': a subtle and pervasive means of control and regulation that operates through apparently neutral and benevolent institutions. | ||
=== Surveiller et Punir : | === Surveiller et Punir : The prison === | ||
In his work "Surveiller et punir", Michel Foucault points out that the prison, as an institution, was designed to exert control over all prisoners, regardless of their socio-economic status. He argues that the real power of the prison lies in its use of surveillance and discipline to control the behaviour of prisoners, rather than its use of physical force or violent punishment. | |||
Michel Foucault's idea that punishment in Western societies shifted from public spectacles of torture to a system of prisons during the 19th century. According to Foucault, this change reflects a broader transformation in the way power is exercised in society. Instead of being based on fear and intimidation, power in modern societies tends to operate through institutions such as prisons that seek to discipline and normalise the behaviour of individuals. Foucault explores this idea in his book 'Surveiller et Punir' where he details how the punishment of crimes has evolved from public spectacles of torture and execution to more 'humane' sanctions in prisons. This transition, he argues, was not simply due to a greater sensitivity or humanisation of criminal law, but was also linked to changes in the way power operated in society. | |||
In the old regime, public executions and torture were a way for the ruler to demonstrate his power. They were intended to instil fear and assert the authority of the monarch. However, these methods of punishment were often counterproductive as they could create sympathy for the condemned and anger against the ruler. In the nineteenth century, with the emergence of modern states and disciplinary societies, punishment began to shift towards a model of 'discipline' and 'surveillance'. Prisons became the central institutions of this new system. Instead of punishing the body through torture, the prison system aims to 'reform' the mind of the prisoner. However, Foucault criticises this system because it involves a much more intrusive and total form of control. In the prison, all aspects of the prisoner's life are controlled and monitored, creating what Foucault calls a 'state of permanent visibility'. This constant surveillance, coupled with strict routines and rules, is designed to discipline and normalise the behaviour of the prisoner. Foucault thus argues that the prison, far from being a humanitarian institution, is in fact a powerful instrument of social control. | |||
In certain periods of history and in certain contexts, the prison may have been a place of privilege for the rich. This was because wealthy people could often afford to pay for more comfortable living conditions in prison, such as private cells, better food or even the possibility of going out during the day. However, this was not the norm and depended very much on the time and place. Foucault sees the transition from corporal punishment to confinement as a more subtle and insidious form of control, aiming not only to punish, but also to reform and control the prisoner. From this perspective, the prison becomes an institution of 'discipline', where the prisoner is constantly monitored and his or her behaviour regulated by a series of rules and routines. The aim is not only to punish crime, but also to transform the prisoner into a 'normalised' individual who adheres to the norms and values of society. Foucault argues that this form of disciplinary control is characteristic of modern societies, where power is exercised not only by violent or coercive means, but also by more subtle means, such as surveillance and regulation of behaviour. This is why the prison is an important symbolic site for Foucault: it represents a form of power and control that is not only exercised over prisoners, but is also, at a broader level, characteristic of the way power operates in modern society. | |||
According to Foucault, laws and social norms are not simply abstract rules that govern human conduct, but are the product of power relations and negotiations between different social groups. Illegalism' refers to the idea that certain actions are considered illegal not because they are intrinsically evil, but because they challenge the established order and threaten the power of certain elites. In other words, crime and deviance are often the result of social and economic power structures rather than individual morality. Furthermore, Foucault suggests that institutions such as prison serve to manage these 'illegalisms', not only by punishing deviant behaviour, but also by seeking to transform and normalise individuals to conform to established social norms. In this context, the notion of 'popular illegalism' can refer to the way in which poor and marginalised populations are often perceived as a threat to the social order, and therefore subject to increased forms of surveillance and control. | |||
According to Michel Foucault, the modern state, particularly the social state, exercises considerable power over individuals, not only by regulating their actions, but also by seeking to normalise their behaviour and morality. This normalisation is achieved through a range of techniques and devices, often grouped under the term 'biopower'. Biopower, a term introduced by Foucault, refers to the control of the lives of individuals and populations by the state through a range of policies and practices from surveillance to the regulation of health, education and work. It includes the management of birth, death, disease and health, but also the production and repression of behaviour and desires. The social state is a particularly powerful expression of this biopower. It seeks not only to protect the safety and well-being of its citizens, but also to conform them to certain norms and expectations. This is done through a range of policies and programmes, such as social services, public education, public health, and even the criminal justice system. However, Foucault also highlights how these forms of power can be contested and resisted, and how they can be the source of new forms of subjectivity and identity. He has always emphasised the dynamic and conflictual nature of power, insisting that where there is power, there is resistance. | |||
The nineteenth century witnessed the so-called 'social question', a growing awareness of the social and economic problems facing society as a whole, and the need to respond to them in a coherent and organised way. These problems were largely related to the radical transformations introduced by industrialisation, capitalism and urbanisation. The 'social question' encompassed a range of pressing problems, including poverty, unemployment, poor working conditions, economic inequality, limited access to education and health care, and the resulting social and political tensions. For the first time, these problems were seen as part of a single global issue that required a collective and systematic response. This period saw the emergence of the welfare state and the development of social policies to regulate the economy, improve working conditions, provide assistance to the poorest, promote public education, etc. The social question also stimulated the development of the social economy. The social question also stimulated the development of new academic disciplines, such as sociology and political economy, which sought to understand and solve these problems. The 'social question' was not simply a question of policy or legislation, but also a question of power and control. As Michel Foucault has shown, the nineteenth century witnessed new forms of power and government that sought to regulate and normalise social life as a whole. | |||
The 'social question' is closely linked to the revolutions that swept through Europe and the world in the 19th century. These political, economic and social upheavals revealed and exacerbated tensions and inequalities within society, leading to an increased awareness of the need to deal with social problems in a systematic and organised way. However, the idea of a 'social question' was not necessarily in direct opposition to the revolutions. On the contrary, many revolutionaries were very concerned about the social question and saw their actions as a response to it. They sought to radically transform society in order to address the inequalities and injustices that they believed were at the root of social problems. On the other hand, the notion of the 'social question' was also used by political and economic elites to defend the existing order and prevent revolutions. By promising to deal with the social question through gradual social and economic reforms, they hoped to ease social tensions and avoid revolutionary upheavals. Thus, the 'social question' was both a product of and a response to the revolutions of the nineteenth century. It was a way of recognising the existence of deep-seated social problems and seeking ways to solve them without necessarily resorting to a revolutionary transformation of society. | |||
== | == Theories of solidarity and the insurance paradigm | ||
Durkheim | Durkheim considered that solidarity was a fundamental element that united the members of a society. He conceptualised two main types of solidarity: mechanical solidarity and organic solidarity. Mechanical solidarity was typical of primitive or traditional societies, where cultural similarity, adherence to traditions and customs, and a strong collective consciousness bound individuals together. In other words, in these societies, individuals felt connected to each other because of their similarity. Organic solidarity, on the other hand, characterised modern or advanced societies, in which individuals were linked to each other by their interdependence in an increasingly specialised and complex society. Thus, individuals were linked not by their similarity, but by their complementarity and mutual dependence. Durkheim argued that the transition from mechanical to organic solidarity was a key feature of the transition from a traditional to a modern society. He also argued that the absence of solidarity, or inadequate forms of it, could lead to states of anomie, where social norms are weakened or lacking, resulting in confusion, dissatisfaction and eventually social deviance. | ||
For Durkheim, respect for solidarity was essential for social cohesion. According to him, a violation of this solidarity, whether in a mechanical or organic society, could be sanctioned by social means. This could include ostracism, marginalisation or other forms of social sanction. In mechanical solidarity, violation of shared customs and beliefs, or disrespect for the collective conscience, may be considered an affront to the community as a whole. Individuals who engage in such behaviour may be considered deviant and treated as such. In organic solidarity, violations could include failure to meet contractual obligations or disruption of the interdependent functioning of society. Again, such behaviour could be sanctioned by the community. Conversely, behaviours that promote solidarity, such as respecting traditions in a mechanical society or maintaining cooperation and interdependence in an organic society, would be valued and encouraged. This could be reflected in social rewards, such as status, recognition or other forms of social approval. | |||
The question of the relationship between individual freedom and the construction of the social sphere is an important debate that marked the 19th century and continues to be relevant today. As the social sphere expanded in the nineteenth century, particularly as a result of industrialisation and urbanisation, it became increasingly necessary to regulate social interactions to maintain order and stability. However, this regulation also raised questions about individual freedom. To what extent should the state or society be able to impose rules and norms on individuals? How can it be ensured that the need to maintain social order does not unduly impinge on the rights and freedoms of individuals? This is where the debate between freedom and sociality comes in. On the one hand, there is the idea that individual freedom is sacrosanct and should not be limited by social constraints. On the other hand, there is the idea that some restrictions on individual freedom are necessary for the good of society as a whole. Ultimately, how a society deals with this dilemma depends on its values and its historical and cultural context. Some may value independence and individual freedom above all else, while others may emphasise social cooperation and collective well-being. | |||
Mechanical solidarity is characteristic of traditional or primitive societies, where individuals are very similar to each other in terms of tasks and social roles. These societies are usually small, with strong social cohesion and moral consensus, and are held together by shared beliefs and values. In contrast, organic solidarity is typical of modern or industrial societies, which are characterised by a much more complex division of labour. In these societies, individuals are interdependent because of their specialisation in different tasks and roles. This interdependence creates an organic solidarity, where social cohesion is maintained not by sameness, but by difference. Durkheim argued that the transition from mechanical to organic solidarity is a natural process of social evolution. However, he also noted that this process can lead to problems of social disintegration and anomie (lack of social norms), if society fails to adapt and regulate the division of labour effectively. | |||
The promotion of the social emphasises the idea of society as a united collective entity, and this is often accompanied by the establishment of social law to realise this vision. Social law is a set of rules and laws designed to regulate relationships and behaviour within society, in order to promote social justice and solidarity between individuals. This may include provisions on social security, labour rights, protection of the vulnerable, etc. The development of this type of law reflects the idea that all members of society have mutual rights and responsibilities and that the state has a role to play in promoting solidarity and equality. | |||
The emergence of the social sphere as an area of state intervention has led to the creation of social policies that aim to regulate and administer various aspects of the private lives of individuals. This includes areas such as health, education, housing, employment, social protection, and many others. These policies can have several objectives, such as ensuring a certain level of well-being for all members of society, promoting equality and social justice, or preventing and managing social crises. However, this extension of the state into the private sphere can also be controversial. Some may see it as an excessive intrusion into private life and a threat to individual autonomy. Others, on the other hand, may argue that such policies are necessary to guarantee fundamental rights and to ensure social cohesion. Moreover, the effective implementation and management of these policies requires considerable expertise and resources. The state must also strike a balance between protecting individual rights and promoting collective welfare. | |||
The theory of solidarism played a major role in the creation of the Welfare State. This theory is based on the idea that all members of society are interconnected and dependent on each other. In other words, society is seen as a unified whole, where each individual contributes in his or her own way to the collective welfare. In this context, the welfare state is responsible for implementing social policies aimed at ensuring social cohesion and reducing inequalities. These policies may include measures to redistribute wealth, such as progressive taxes and social benefits, as well as free or subsidised public services, such as education, health and housing. The theory of solidarism was put forward by Léon Bourgeois, a French politician who was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize in 1920. According to Bourgeois, solidarism is both a statement of social reality and a moral and legal principle. He developed these ideas in his book "Solidarité" (1896), where he defended the idea of a "social debt" that each individual would have towards society, and which would justify the intervention of the state to guarantee the well-being of all. | |||
Michel Foucault | Michel Foucault had a critical perspective on the notion of solidarity and the way it is used to justify state intervention in the lives of individuals. For him, the practices of government are not only mechanisms of control, but also means of producing knowledge and truth. He criticised what he called 'biopower', the extension of state power over the lives of individuals, not only at the political and economic level, but also at the biological and bodily level. Public health policies, for example, are for him a manifestation of this biopower, which seeks to regulate the population as a whole to maximise productivity and minimise risk. Foucault also challenged the idea that solidarity is a natural and universal phenomenon. Instead, he argued that solidarity is a social and political construction, reflecting the power relations in a given society. Therefore, the promotion of solidarity can serve specific political purposes, such as the legitimisation of the existing social order or the creation of a consensus around certain values and norms. Thus, following Foucault's thinking, the failure of solidarity would not simply be a political failure, but also a sign of resistance to the exercise of power. In other words, solidarity can be both a tool of social control and a means of contestation and social transformation. | ||
From the 19th century onwards, with the major social and economic transformations brought about by the industrial revolution, the modern state began to play an active role in promoting solidarity and social welfare. This new role is often justified by the idea that the state has a duty to guarantee the well-being of all its citizens and to create a more just and equitable society. Solidarity therefore becomes a central principle of social policy and labour legislation. Governments set up social security, health insurance and pension systems to help the most vulnerable in society and to prevent poverty and inequality. In addition, the state intervenes to regulate the labour market and ensure decent working conditions. The modern state is thus built on the idea of a balance between the private and public spheres, and on the recognition that the family, as an integral part of society, is also concerned with these issues of solidarity and social welfare. However, this approach is not without controversy. Some critics, such as Foucault, warn of the risks of social control and normalisation that may arise from such solidarity policies. Others point to the tensions between the values of individual freedom and the demands of collective solidarity, and question the limits of state intervention in the private lives of citizens. The notion of solidarity and its role in the construction of the modern state thus remains a subject of debate and reflection in social and political sciences. | |||
The modern state, especially from the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries onwards, has taken an increasingly active role in social support, often through public service institutions. States established various programmes, such as unemployment insurance, old-age pensions, health insurance, social housing, public education, and many others, to help reduce social inequalities and injustices. This idea that the state should promote social solidarity and protect its citizens from the vagaries of life, including sickness, old age, unemployment or poverty, has been central to the formation of the so-called welfare state or social state. The role of the state in this sense is to balance and regulate social differences and inequalities, rather than to eliminate them completely. This involves some form of redistribution of resources, through taxes and social transfers, to support the most vulnerable or disadvantaged individuals and groups. | |||
In many countries, the late 20th and early 21st centuries have seen a rethinking of the welfare state and a transition to a more liberal or neo-liberal model. This model tends to favour the market and privatisation over state regulation and social welfare. Some thinkers and academics have warned of the consequences of this development. There is an extensive literature on this subject. Notable works include "The End of the Welfare State?" by Stefan Svallfors and Peter Taylor-Gooby, "The Retreat of the State" by Susan Strange, and "The Third Way: The Renewal of Social Democracy" by Anthony Giddens. These works examine how the adoption of neo-liberal policies has led to privatisation and deregulation, and a reduction in the role of the state in the provision of social services. They point out that this trend can increase social and economic inequalities, and potentially lead to social tensions and conflicts. This is a very lively and recurrent debate, especially since the advent of neoliberalism in the 1980s and 1990s. The idea that politics is losing ground to economics in an increasingly liberal world is central to much of the literature. For example, in "The Great Transformation", the political economist Karl Polanyi argues that the autonomous market economy, devoid of political regulation, leads to destructive social consequences. In his book "The Condition of Postmodernity", David Harvey points out that the modern state is subject to contradictory pressures. On the one hand, the privatisation and deregulation movement of neoliberalism is eroding its capacity to manage the social sphere. On the other hand, it has to take responsibility for managing the crises and inequalities produced by these same market forces. Thomas Piketty, in "Capital and Ideology", also explores these issues. He highlights how, since the 1980s, the redistributive role of the state has diminished in many countries, exacerbating economic and social inequalities. These and other authors warn of the potentially dangerous consequences of this development. If the social sphere is not properly managed, it can lead to increased inequality, marginalisation of certain groups and increased social instability. | |||
Michel Foucault | Michel Foucault explored the notion of 'governmentality', which describes how modern governments exercise power not only by force, but also by influencing, directing and managing the behaviour and attitudes of individuals and populations. For Foucault, the 'social' is not just a domain of life, but an active domain of government and management by the state. According to Foucault, the social has thus become a form of knowledge and a tool of government in modern societies. Through the social, the state can organise, control and direct the lives of citizens. This includes aspects such as health, education, work, and even individual attitudes and behaviour. From this perspective, the social has become an integral part of the way modern states function. It is not just a sphere of activity or a domain of life, but a fundamental technique of government and control. Government is not just about laws and regulations, but also about the management of populations and the way people live their daily lives. This includes the management of the economy, the health system, education, work, etc. For Foucault, the social has become a central power issue in modern governmentality. | ||
Michel Foucault | Michel Foucault defines governmentality as the set of institutions, procedures, analyses and reflections, calculations and tactics that enable the exercise of this very specific, albeit complex, form of power, which has the population as its main target, the political reality as its main means of knowledge, and the security devices as its essential instrument. From the 19th century onwards, a new form of governmentality emerged, marked by the rise of the welfare state and the extension of state intervention into many areas of social life. This new form of governmentality, which Foucault calls 'biopolitics', is characterised by the management and regulation of the population through a set of techniques and strategies that affect different aspects of social life, including health, education, work and poverty. According to Foucault, the welfare state is not simply an institution that provides social services, but a form of power that manages the lives of the population in a comprehensive way. This form of power is not limited to the regulation of individual behaviour, but also includes the management of the population as a whole, with the aim of maintaining social stability, improving public health, ensuring economic growth, etc. The welfare state is an example of a form of power that is not limited to the regulation of individual behaviour. The welfare state is an example of what Foucault calls 'biopolitics', a form of power that aims to manage life itself. This is done through a series of techniques and strategies that aim to monitor, regulate and control the population as a whole. | ||
The welfare state was built around the notion of solidarity, developing policies to promote equity and reduce social inequalities. This vision is based on the idea that society has a collective responsibility towards its most vulnerable members, and that it must take measures to ensure their well-being and integration. It is within this framework that numerous social laws were adopted during the 19th and 20th centuries, in areas as varied as work, housing, health and education. For example, the Industrial Accidents Act, which established the principle of no-fault liability of the employer and created a system of compensation for workers injured or ill as a result of their work, was a major step forward in the recognition of workers' rights and the promotion of safety at work. Similarly, social housing laws have played a crucial role in combating precariousness and social exclusion by ensuring that everyone has access to decent and affordable housing. These laws are based on the principle of solidarity, which implies that society should help those in need and ensure a decent standard of living for all. | |||
According to the welfare state concept, the state's mission is to ensure the welfare of all its citizens, through the provision of public services and the implementation of redistributive policies. The idea is that the well-being of each individual contributes to the health and prosperity of society as a whole. In this framework, solidarity is not only a moral value, but also an organisational principle. Through taxes and social security contributions, every citizen contributes, according to his or her means, to the financing of public services and social protection systems. In return, each citizen is entitled to these services and protections, according to his or her needs. This approach is based on the idea that the state has a responsibility to ensure a decent standard of living for all and to promote social equity. It also implies that progress and national wealth should benefit all, not just an economic elite. | |||
The late 20th and early 21st centuries saw challenges to the welfare state and the social sphere that had expanded throughout the previous century. The rise of neo-liberalism in the 1980s, symbolised by political leaders such as Margaret Thatcher in the UK and Ronald Reagan in the US, introduced policies that focused on reducing the role of the state in the economy and society. This ideology argued that the market, rather than the state, should be the primary mechanism for distributing resources and managing public services. Since then, many countries have seen a reduction in social spending, privatisation of public services, cuts in welfare programmes and deregulation of the economy. At the same time, globalisation and automation have changed the nature of work and economies, creating new pressures on social protection systems. The idea of the welfare state has not disappeared. In many countries, there is an ongoing debate about the role of the state in society and how best to meet social needs in a changing world. Recent crises, such as the COVID-19 pandemic, have also highlighted the importance of social solidarity and social protection, and have led to calls for a strengthening of the social sphere. | |||
The end of the 19th century saw the emergence of a new paradigm: insurance. This idea transformed the way society perceives and manages risk and had a significant impact on the evolution of the welfare state and social policies. Historically, the concept of insurance arose from the need to protect against life's hazards and financial risks. The first insurance systems were mutual aid societies where members contributed to a common fund to help those who were struck by misfortune or illness. | |||
Over time, the idea of insurance became institutionalised and was adopted by states. This development was fuelled by the recognition that certain risks, such as sickness, unemployment and old age, were universal and could be better managed collectively. As a result, many countries established compulsory social insurance systems, financed by contributions from workers and employers. The concept of insurance has also played a key role in defining social responsibility. It has led to the idea that society, through the state, has a duty to provide some protection against risks that individuals cannot cope with alone. This provided a justification for wider state intervention in the social sphere, including the provision of public health services, old age pensions and unemployment benefits. | |||
François Ewald | François Ewald is a French philosopher and sociologist, a disciple of Michel Foucault, who has worked particularly on the welfare state and insurance. For him, the welfare state is essentially an insurance state. In his book "The Welfare State", he argues that insurance, specifically social insurance, has radically transformed our understanding of risk, responsibility and solidarity. He sees insurance as a sophisticated risk management system that requires a detailed legal codification of responsibilities. For example, in the labour context, the mutual obligations of employers and employees are defined in insurance terms. The employer has to pay insurance premiums to cover the risk of accidents at work, while the employee is entitled to compensation in case of injury. In this way, insurance makes it possible to manage risks and liabilities in a predictable and fair way. According to Ewald, the development of insurance has had profound implications for political philosophy. It transformed the concept of solidarity from a moral or charitable idea to a legally defined and institutionalised obligation. This has led to a new form of governmentality where the state assumes responsibility for managing risk and guaranteeing solidarity through insurance. Ewald sees the welfare state not so much as a protection of the weakest, but rather as a mechanism for managing the hazards of life on a society-wide scale. | ||
François Ewald's contribution to the analysis of the insurance society is very significant. He has shown how insurance, as a social institution, has transformed our understanding of risk and responsibility. According to Ewald, insurance is a major innovation that has changed our relationship with fatality and risk. It has made it possible to transform the hazards of life, previously considered as fatalities, into calculable and manageable risks. It has changed the way society deals with uncertainty and the unexpected. At the same time, insurance has also had a profound impact on the concept of responsibility. In an insurance society, liability is defined in terms of insurance obligations. It is the state, through its laws and regulations, that defines these obligations and ensures that they are met. It is therefore the state that ensures the proper functioning of the insurance system and the assumption of risks. As a result, insurance has led to the emergence of a modern social law which is geared towards risk management and protection against the hazards of life. This law reflects the needs and concerns of society and produces standards for use by all. The law has thus become an instrument for normalising social needs, based on the concepts of safety and reparation. It has made it possible to legally categorise social issues according to social universalities, i.e. general principles applicable to the whole of society. Ewald's contribution is therefore essential to understand how insurance has transformed the way we conceive of risk, responsibility and solidarity in modern societies. | |||
The creation of the pension system is indeed a striking example of the implementation of intergenerational solidarity. It involves a transfer of financial resources from the currently active generations to the elderly, reflecting a collective commitment to the older members of society. The pension system is based on the pay-as-you-go principle, i.e. the contributions of current workers are used to finance the pensions of current retirees. This system embodies the idea of intergenerational solidarity: each generation contributes to support the previous one when it reaches retirement age, with the expectation that the next generation will do the same. Thus, the pension system is a good example of how the welfare state implements solidarity mechanisms on a large scale. This principle of solidarity is deeply embedded in the functioning of many social and political institutions, including insurance, social security, and assistance to people in precarious situations. By establishing a pension system, the state recognises its responsibility towards older citizens and translates the principle of solidarity into a set of legal rights and obligations. This also illustrates the importance of categories of semantic analysis in defining the social sphere: by defining workers, pensioners, contributions, pensions, etc., the state constructs a framework of understanding and action for pension management. | |||
= Vers un nouveau concept : le biopouvoir = | = Vers un nouveau concept : le biopouvoir = | ||
Version du 23 mai 2023 à 10:41
The welfare state is intrinsically linked to contractualisation between citizens and politicians. This social contract implies that citizens agree to cede some of their rights or freedoms to the state (by paying taxes, for example) in exchange for the protection and provision of public services. Under the welfare state, this contract becomes more complex, as citizens grant the state the power to intervene significantly in the economy and society to promote the general welfare. The state is allowed to redistribute wealth through taxes and spending, to regulate private businesses to protect workers and consumers, and to provide public services such as education and health care. Therefore, the legitimacy of the welfare state rests on the public's consensus on the appropriate role of the state in the economy and society.
In modern states, citizens are linked by a social contract, which is an unspoken agreement, rather than an explicit contract. This contract is facilitated, managed and developed by the state and political institutions. This social contract is based on the mutual understanding that each individual agrees to give up a certain freedom, or accept certain obligations, for the security, protection and benefits provided by the state. For example, citizens agree to pay taxes and obey the laws set by the state, and in return the state provides services such as education, infrastructure, public health, and security. This social contract is essential for maintaining order and stability in a society. It can be reviewed and revised as society evolves and citizens express new expectations of their government. This is usually done through democratic political mechanisms such as elections, lobbying and activism. Citizens can also engage directly in the political process by voting, running for office, or participating in social movements. The way in which the social contract is designed and implemented can have a significant impact on the nature of the modern state, including whether it functions as a welfare state and how this role of the welfare state is conceived and perceived by citizens.
How the modern state was formed
Ancient Greek philosophers such as Plato and Aristotle thought a lot about the 'polis' and laid the foundations for many of our contemporary ideas about politics and government. The "polis", or city-state, was the main political structure in ancient Greece. It was conceived as a community of citizens who shared a set of rights and duties and who were collectively responsible for managing their common affairs. The 'polis' was both a political entity - a community of citizens organised under a specific political regime - and a place, a physical space where this community resided. Plato and Aristotle had distinct views on how best to manage the 'polis'. Plato, in his work 'The Republic', describes an ideal city governed by 'philosopher-kings' who possess both the philosophical wisdom and the virtue necessary to govern justly. He argued that justice arises from each individual doing what he or she is naturally suited to do. Aristotle, on the other hand, took a more pragmatic and empirical approach in his analysis of the 'polis'. In his 'Politics', he examines a wide range of existing political regimes and explores their strengths and weaknesses. Aristotle argued that the best form of government depends on the particular circumstances of each polis, although he generally favoured a moderate regime that avoided the extremes of wealth and poverty. These ideas have had a lasting influence on Western political thought, including contemporary notions of citizenship, democracy, social justice and government. Although our modern societies are far more complex and diverse than the city-states of ancient Greece, many of the questions Plato and Aristotle posed about the nature of political power, justice and the welfare of citizens remain relevant today.
The agora was a central feature of political life in ancient Greece. The agora was an open public square where citizens gathered to debate and discuss the affairs of the city. It was a gathering place for commerce, political discourse, the adjudication of court cases and the conduct of various civic activities. Athenian democracy, in particular, was characterised by the active participation of citizens in public debates. All citizens (which in ancient Greece meant free men - women, slaves and foreigners were excluded) had the right to speak in the assembly (the Ecclesia), which met on the hill of the Pnyx, and to participate in decisions about the laws and policies of the city. The agora, as a place of political debate, is often seen as the embodiment of the democratic ideal of citizen participation and public deliberation. Dialogue and debate were seen as essential means of achieving truth and wisdom in political matters. This tradition of public debate and citizen participation continues to influence our contemporary ideas about democracy and politics.
Debate is one of the foundations of democracy. It is through open debate and deliberation that citizens can actively participate in politics, express their views, listen to the views of others, and reach consensus or compromise on issues of public interest. The opportunity for all citizens to freely express their views, to challenge the views of others and to engage in informed discussion of social and political issues is a prerequisite for a healthy and functioning democracy. This process not only enables balanced and fair decisions to be made, but also legitimises these decisions in the eyes of the public. It is in these exchanges that the power of politics is manifested: the ability to discuss, deliberate, persuade and negotiate to achieve common goals. This process usually takes place in places symbolic of politics - be it the agora of ancient Greece, the parliament in modern democracies, or the media and social networks in our digital world today. How these debates are organised, who participates in them and how decisions are made depends on the political and social structures of each society. Therefore, although debate is fundamental to democracy, the way in which it is implemented can vary considerably depending on the context.
The question of democracy as a 'natural state' is complex and the subject of much debate among philosophers and political scientists. The idea that a certain type of government or social structure is 'natural' can be interpreted in several ways. One way is to say that democracy is 'natural' in the sense that it is consistent with human nature. For example, some political philosophers argue that the ability to reason, communicate and cooperate with others is a fundamental characteristic of human beings. Therefore, a political system that allows and encourages these activities, such as democracy, would be consistent with our nature. On the other hand, others argue that democracy is not necessarily 'natural' but rather the product of specific historical and social processes. For example, modern democracy as we know it today is the result of centuries of political struggles, social and economic changes, intellectual revolutions and technological transformations. It is also important to note that what is considered 'natural' can vary according to different conceptions of human nature and society. For example, those who believe in the innate competitiveness of human beings might see a form of government based on competition, such as free market capitalism, as more 'natural'. Ultimately, the question of whether democracy is a 'natural state' depends on how we define what is 'natural' and how we understand the relationship between human nature and society. This question continues to generate fascinating and important debates in political philosophy and social studies.
The notion of public space is fundamental to politics, especially in a democracy. The public space is the place where citizens come together to discuss, debate and exchange ideas on issues of common concern. It is a forum where people can express their views, challenge those of others and learn from different perspectives. In ancient Greece, this public space was the agora, an open square where citizens gathered to discuss the affairs of the city. Today, public space can take many forms: legislative assemblies, public gatherings, media, online forums, social networks, etc. Public space plays several important roles in a democracy. First, it facilitates debate and deliberation, which are essential for informed and legitimate decision-making. Second, it enables citizen participation, giving people the opportunity to express themselves and engage in the political process. Finally, it promotes transparency and accountability, by allowing citizens to monitor government action and hold politicians to account. The nature and quality of public space can vary considerably depending on a variety of factors, such as civil liberties, access to information, levels of education and civic competence, the diversity of voices represented, and the quality of dialogue and deliberation. Therefore, the creation and maintenance of a healthy and vibrant public space is a constant challenge for any democracy.
Public space is both the place (physical or virtual) where political debate takes place and the process of that debate itself.
- The place of debate: Public space can be a physical place, such as a city square, a meeting room, a legislative assembly, or even a café, where people gather to discuss political issues. In the contemporary world, public space also includes virtual spaces, such as online forums, blogs, social networks, where political debates take place.
- The process of debate: Beyond being a mere place, the public space is also the process by which citizens, groups, political parties, the media and other actors express their views, exchange ideas, challenge each other's opinions, and reach consensus or compromise on issues of public concern. It is through this process that citizens can influence public policy, monitor government action, and actively participate in the democratic life of their community.
Speech is the main tool in this debate process. Through speech, actors express their ideas, argue for their positions, respond to the arguments of others, and try to persuade others of their views. The quality of speech - its clarity, precision, persuasiveness, honesty - is therefore essential to the quality of political debate in the public space.
In the classical Greek city-state, the distinction between the public and private spheres was fundamental. Each had its own roles, responsibilities and norms, and together they structured the social, economic and political life of the city.
- The public sphere: This was the space for public affairs and politics. It was dominated by free citizens - usually adult men - who participated in the assembly and other political institutions of the city. It was also the space for public debate, where citizens discussed and deliberated on matters of public interest. The agora, which served as a market place and meeting place, was a central location in the public sphere.
- The private sphere: This was the realm of the home and family, including personal relationships, child rearing, management of household goods and family religious rituals. In classical Greek society, this sphere was largely separate from the public sphere and was often the responsibility of women and slaves.
The distinction between the public and private spheres is a key feature of many societies, including that of ancient Greece, and plays a crucial role in the organisation of social and political life. The public sphere is the realm of public affairs, which includes government, politics, law and everything that concerns society as a whole. It is the place where citizens come together to discuss, debate and make decisions on matters of common interest. It is also the place of civic engagement, where citizens can actively participate in the democratic life of their community. The private sphere, on the other hand, concerns those aspects of life that are generally considered to be the domain of the individual or the family. This includes things like domestic life, personal relationships, private property, and personal beliefs and values. Matters that fall within the private sphere are generally considered to be outside the realm of public intervention, except where necessary to protect the rights or welfare of others.
Traditionally, in many cultures, the head of the family, often the father, had considerable authority in the private sphere. He was responsible for decision-making in the home, raising children, managing family finances and other domestic matters. However, these norms have changed significantly over time and vary greatly from culture to culture. In many modern societies, authority within the family is increasingly shared between parents, and children are often encouraged to participate in family decisions in an age-appropriate way. Indeed, each individual lives in both spheres, the public and the private sphere. Everyone has roles and responsibilities in both spheres, and how we navigate between them can have a significant impact on our personal lives, our relationships and our participation in society.
The concepts of public and private spheres are dynamic and evolve over time, reflecting social, cultural, economic and political changes. Definitions of what is considered 'public' and 'private' can vary greatly depending on historical, cultural and political context. For example, changes in attitudes and policies regarding gender equality have had a significant impact on the private sphere. There was a time when women were largely confined to the private sphere, mainly doing domestic work and raising children. However, during the 20th century, many countries saw a significant increase in women's participation in the public sphere, including work, education and politics. Similarly, technological advances, particularly the internet and social media, have also blurred the traditional boundaries between public and private. Information and interactions that were once considered private can now be easily shared and disseminated in the digital public space, raising new questions about privacy, freedom of expression and online security. Different political systems and modes of governance also have a major influence on the definition and relationship between the public and private sphere. For example, in liberal democracies, there is generally a strong distinction between the public and the private, with legal protections for privacy and individual freedom. However, in authoritarian regimes, the private sphere can be much more limited, with extensive government surveillance and restrictions on freedom of expression and association.
Sparta, one of the best known city-states of ancient Greece, was very different from Athens in terms of social, political and cultural structure. While Athens is often celebrated as the cradle of democracy and Western philosophy, Sparta was a rigorously disciplined and hierarchical warrior society, known for its unique military system. In the city-state of Sparta, life was heavily oriented towards preparation for war. Spartan boys began their military training at the age of seven in a rigorous educational system called the agoge. They were taken away from their families and lived in barracks until the age of 20, when they became full-fledged soldiers. This training emphasised discipline, endurance, survival and combat skills. As a result, the distinction between the public and private spheres in Sparta was very different from that in Athens. Private life was largely subordinated to the demands of the state, and family, education and other aspects of private life were tightly regulated to serve the purposes of the military state. This led to a very different society from Athens, with very different values and institutions. However, it is important to note that the social and political structure of Sparta, like that of Athens, was the product of specific historical conditions and should not be taken as representative of all of ancient Greece.
The public sphere concerns everything related to the community at large, including governmental affairs, public infrastructure, laws, education, public health and, in many cases, religion. It is the space where public discussions, debates and negotiations about community affairs take place. In the public sphere, citizens have the opportunity to actively participate in decisions that affect the common good. This participation can take many forms, ranging from voting in elections to social activism, volunteering and community service. Moreover, the public sphere is often the place where citizens' rights and responsibilities are defined and negotiated.
In ancient Greece, the concept of citizenship was closely linked to the ability to participate in the public sphere. Only free men (usually adult males born to citizen parents) were considered full citizens and had the right to participate in public affairs, such as voting in assemblies, holding public office and serving in the military. In contrast, slaves were excluded from the public sphere and were considered 'things' or property rather than persons with political rights. Slaves in ancient Athens were generally used for manual labour and domestic service and had no political or civil rights. In addition, the situation of women and foreigners (metecs) was also limited, as they were not considered full citizens.
In Greek and Roman antiquity, there was a clear distinction between citizens and non-citizens (mainly slaves, but also women and foreigners in some contexts). In these societies, citizenship conferred certain rights and privileges, including the right to participate in the governance of the city. Citizens could vote, debate in the assembly, hold public office, and had specific legal rights. This status was often hereditary and generally reserved for free men. Slaves, on the other hand, were considered property and were deprived of these rights. They were generally used for manual labour and domestic service, and were subject to the authority of their master. Their lives were largely confined to the private sphere, and they were excluded from participation in public life. However, these distinctions were not fixed and could change over time. For example, in Rome, it was possible for a slave to be freed and become a citizen, although this process was often complex and required the approval of the slave's master. These ancient systems of citizenship and slavery are very different from modern notions of civil and human rights. Today, most societies consider that all individuals, regardless of gender, ethnicity or social status, have the right to participate in public life and are entitled to equal legal protections. Slavery is now universally condemned and prohibited by international law.
In the context of ancient Greece, public space was an essential component of political life. It was the place where citizens gathered to discuss the affairs of the city, debate problems and make collective decisions. The 'polis', or city-state, was the entity that was governed, and its governance was a collective activity that required the engagement and participation of citizens. The agora, or market place, was a central public space in most ancient Greek cities. It was a gathering place for citizens, where they could debate and discuss issues of importance to the city. The agora was also the site of many other types of activities, including commercial transactions, social events and religious rituals. The idea of a public space has remained central to politics throughout history. Although the specific forms of public space have changed over time, the idea of a place where citizens can gather to discuss and debate public affairs is still central to many political systems. In contemporary societies, public space also includes the media, social networks and other communication platforms where political discussions can take place.
The presence of a public space, in the literal sense of the word, does not necessarily mean that there is a democracy in place. The term 'public space' refers to a place where citizens can meet, exchange and debate freely, without fear of repercussions. In a true democracy, the public space is a place where differences of opinion are tolerated and even encouraged, where debate is possible and valued. In a dictatorship, on the other hand, spaces that may appear to be public spaces are often used in very different ways. They may be used for demonstrations of force or mass gatherings orchestrated by the regime, but these gatherings are usually carefully controlled and do not allow for genuine debate or dissent. In such contexts, public space can be used as a tool for control and manipulation, rather than as a place for democratic dialogue and deliberation. It is therefore essential to understand that true public space in a democracy is not limited to the mere existence of a gathering place, but also includes specific values and practices, such as freedom of expression, respect for differences of opinion and the possibility of active participation in the political process.
The notion of public space in a democracy is profoundly different from that in a dictatorship. In a democracy, public space is a place of free expression and deliberation, where citizens have the right to express themselves, to debate and to oppose government decisions. Democratic public spaces are open, inclusive and respect freedom of expression. In a dictatorship, however, public space may exist as a physical place, but it is often tightly controlled and monitored by the state. Public gatherings may be heavily regulated, and freedom of expression is usually severely restricted. In this context, public space becomes a tool of control for the regime, rather than a place for debate and dissent. Even in democracies, the nature of public space can be contested and change over time. Technological changes, for example, have created new public spaces in the digital domain, such as social networks and online forums. These spaces can offer new opportunities for dialogue and democratic participation, but they can also pose new challenges in terms of regulation and ensuring fairness and freedom of expression.
Historically, the distinction between private and public space has been a fundamental feature of many political and social systems. Private space is generally associated with domestic and family life. It is the place for personal and intimate interactions, such as marriage, child-rearing, and domestic activities. It is a space of security and comfort, but also of constraints and restrictions, as it is often governed by very specific social norms and rules. The public space, on the other hand, is the domain of politics and citizenship. It is the space of civic life, where citizens can gather to discuss and debate public affairs. It is the place for political debate, collective decision-making, and action for the common good. These two spaces have distinct roles and functions, but they are also interdependent and constantly interact. For example, decisions made in the public space can have an impact on private life, and vice versa. Moreover, the way in which these spaces are defined and structured can vary considerably depending on the cultural, social and political context.
The nineteenth century saw the emergence of the social sphere as a distinct domain between the private and public spheres. This change was largely a product of the industrial revolution and the emergence of modern capitalism, which created new forms of social and economic relations. The social sphere encompasses a set of relationships, institutions and activities that concern society as a whole, but which are not the direct responsibility of the state (the public sphere) or the family (the private sphere). This includes areas such as the economy, education, health, culture, work, etc. The emergence of this social sphere has introduced new dynamics in the way society is organised and governed. On the one hand, it has created new opportunities for cooperation and social progress. On the other hand, it has also introduced new forms of inequality and conflict, and new forms of power and control. This third sphere has also influenced the way power is exercised and structured in society. Michel Foucault, for example, developed the concept of 'biopower' to describe the way in which modern power is exercised not only through direct coercion, but also through the control and management of biological and social processes. This type of power, according to Foucault, is particularly evident in the social sphere, where the state and other institutions exert control over aspects such as health, education, work, etc.
The concept of the social contract is a key mechanism for linking the private, public and social spheres in modern political philosophy. The social contract establishes a kind of symbolic link between individuals and the political structure of society, involving a negotiation between individual freedoms and collective responsibilities. Under the social contract, individuals agree to submit to the authority of the state (or to an agreed political authority) in exchange for protections and services that contribute to their well-being and to the stability of society. This social contract can include aspects such as national defence, law enforcement, protection of civil rights, and other public services such as education and health. The social contract can also be seen as a way of defining the responsibilities of individuals to society. For example, under the social contract, individuals may be required to pay taxes, obey laws, or contribute more generally to the welfare of society. Within the social contract, the social sphere also plays an important role, as it is within this sphere that institutions and structures (such as trade unions, charities, businesses, etc.) contribute to the achievement of society's goals and provide important services that contribute to the general welfare.
Classical theories of the social contract
The notion of the social contract is a central concept in modern political philosophy. It is developed by philosophers such as Thomas Hobbes, John Locke and Jean-Jacques Rousseau, although their conceptions of the contract differ. Overall, the idea is that individuals agree to give up some of their freedoms in exchange for the protection and security offered by the state. It is a mutual agreement, in which individuals agree to abide by the laws and rules of society, and in return the state undertakes to protect their rights and freedoms. In general, the social contract is seen as a way of solving the fundamental dilemma of life in society: how to reconcile individual rights and liberties with the requirements of social cooperation and public order.
- Thomas Hobbes (1588-1679) formulated the idea of the social contract in his work Leviathan. For Hobbes, the state of nature is a state of war of all against all, where life is "solitary, poor, brutish and short". To avoid this state of chaos, individuals agree to enter into a social contract, surrendering their power to an absolute ruler who is charged with maintaining order and peace.
- John Locke (1632-1704), in his Two Treatises on Civil Government, has a more optimistic view of the state of nature, which he sees as a state of freedom and equality. According to Locke, the social contract is concluded to protect the natural rights to life, liberty and property. If a government does not respect these rights, the citizens have the right to overthrow it.
- Jean-Jacques Rousseau (1712-1778) proposed a different conception of the social contract in his book On the Social Contract. For Rousseau, the social contract is an agreement by which individuals come together to form a political community, giving up some of their freedom in exchange for the protection of the whole. The sovereign, according to Rousseau, is the expression of the general will of the community, not a separate authority.
These concepts of the social contract have influenced the evolution of modern political systems, including the emergence of liberal democracy. They have also influenced the way we think about the rights and obligations of citizens and the state, and about issues of justice and equality.
The social contract is a fundamental idea for our modern democracies. It represents the idea that society and its organisation are not imposed arbitrarily or dictated by a higher authority, but are the result of a mutual agreement between citizens. From this perspective, the social contract is a form of consent by the governed: citizens agree to abide by certain rules and to limit certain behaviours, and in exchange they expect protections and social benefits from the state. It is a process of contractualisation of social and political relations. This idea has important implications for democracy. It highlights the idea that the legitimacy of government depends on the consent of those it governs. It also underlines the need for active citizen participation, as the social contract is not simply a fixed past agreement, but must be constantly renegotiated and revised to meet the changing needs and aspirations of society. Finally, the social contract also serves to emphasise the importance of individual rights and freedoms, which are often seen as preconditions for a democratic society. In exchange for their consent to the authority of the state, citizens expect their fundamental rights to be respected and protected by it. Thus, without this contractualisation of relations, without this idea of a mutual agreement between citizens and the state, it would indeed be difficult to conceive of a democracy.
The social contract involves both rights and duties for each individual in a society. Rights can include things like the right to life, liberty, property, protection of the law, education, health, and many others. These rights are often enshrined in the constitutions and laws of democratic countries, and they are supposed to be guaranteed by the state. On the other hand, an individual's duties under the social contract may include such things as obeying laws, paying taxes, respecting the rights and freedoms of others, and participating in civic life (for example, by voting). In exchange for securing their rights, individuals agree to fulfil these duties. In a healthy democracy, there must be a balance between rights and duties. If individuals do not respect their duties, this can be detrimental to the social order and the functioning of democracy. Similarly, if the state does not respect or ensure the rights of individuals, this can lead to oppression and injustice. Thus, the contractualisation of relations within society through the social contract is a cornerstone of democracy, as it allows for a balance between the rights and duties of individuals and the state.
The social contract, as theorised by thinkers such as Thomas Hobbes, John Locke, and Jean-Jacques Rousseau, is the foundation of modern state theory. The social contract represents the idea that the political and social structure of a society is not simply imposed from above, but is the product of a mutual agreement between citizens. Within this framework, individuals agree to submit to certain rules and give up some of their natural rights in exchange for the protection and benefits offered by the state. Thus, the legitimacy of the state and political power is based on the consent of the governed. This is why the social contract is often referred to as a 'pact' between citizens and the state: it is an agreement to live together in an organised society, where each party has rights and duties. This is a key idea in the conception of the modern state and is fundamental to understanding how our democracies work. Indeed, the social contract is constantly at stake in political life: at every election, at every public debate, we renegotiate the terms of our social contract.
There is no modern state without agreement, without the institution of a sovereign state contract. These three elements are essential to understanding social contract theory and the functioning of the modern state.
- Natural law theories: These theories start from the idea that certain rights are inherent to man by nature, independently of any social or political construction. These natural rights may include the right to life, liberty, property, etc. Natural law theorists, such as Locke, Hobbes and Rousseau, consider these rights to be pre-existing to the state and form the moral and philosophical basis of the social contract.
- The social contract: the social contract is a mutual agreement, a convention that individuals make with each other to form an organised society. By this contract, individuals agree to give up some of their natural rights in exchange for the security and order that the state is supposed to provide. The social contract thus sets the rules and norms that regulate community life and the relationship between individuals and the state.
- The principle of sovereignty: Finally, sovereignty is a key concept in modern state theory. It is the supreme power of the state over its territory and its citizens. Sovereignty is the ultimate authority that enables the state to enact and enforce laws, maintain order and defend the community. The principle of sovereignty is intrinsically linked to the social contract: individuals accept the sovereignty of the state in exchange for the benefits that the social order brings.
The rule of law to be built must be a state that respects the natural rights of individuals, that is based on a fair and balanced social contract, and that exercises its sovereignty responsibly and in the interest of the common good. In turn, individuals must respect the authority of the state, follow the laws and rules established by the social contract, and actively participate in democratic life to ensure that the state remains faithful to its obligations.
The social contract interacts with the concepts of natural law and sovereignty to produce the modern state.
- Natural law: This is the basis of our understanding of the fundamental rights and freedoms of the individual, independent of any political structure or system. These rights are seen as inherent to the human condition.
- The social contract: This is the mechanism by which individuals agree to give up some of their natural rights in exchange for the protection and benefits offered by society. It is a kind of transaction: by giving up some freedom, we gain security and stability.
- The principle of sovereignty: The social contract gives rise to the sovereign state, which has the power to enforce the social contract. The state has the duty to protect the rights and freedoms of citizens, to maintain order and peace and to act in the interests of the community.
These three concepts interact and evolve together in the development of the modern state. They form the basis of our current understanding of democracy and human rights. Moreover, they are continuously debated and redefined in the light of changing socio-political contexts and the challenges facing our societies.
Grotius and the Social Contract
Hugo Grotius (1583-1645) was a Dutch jurist widely recognised as one of the founding fathers of international law. He played a key role in the development of the concept of natural law, which had a significant influence on later theories of the social contract.
According to Grotius, natural law is universal and unchangeable, based on the rational and social nature of humanity. For him, even in the absence of God, these natural laws would still exist because they are intrinsically linked to human nature. He also distinguished between "jus naturale" (natural law), which is universal, and "jus gentium" (law of nations), which is a set of customs and practices established by human societies. With regard to the necessity of the social contract, Grotius did not directly address this issue as Thomas Hobbes, John Locke or Jean-Jacques Rousseau would later do. However, his understanding of natural law lays the foundation for these theories, including the idea that individuals can consent to give up some of their natural rights in exchange for the protection of the state. For this reason, Grotius' work has been crucial to modern political philosophy and has influenced subsequent social contract thinkers.
Hugo Grotius supports an integrated view of natural law, the social contract and sovereignty. For him, these three concepts form a continuum, allowing for the peaceful and just coexistence of individuals within a society. In Grotius' perspective, natural law is a law inherent in human nature that applies to all individuals. They are universal rational and ethical principles that govern the behaviour of human beings. These natural rights are inherent to the individual and cannot be taken away, even by contract. The social contract, on the other hand, is a mechanism whereby individuals agree to transfer some of their natural rights to a collective authority, such as a state, in exchange for protections and benefits. This contract is an agreement that allows individuals to live together in an orderly and secure manner. It guarantees respect for natural rights while establishing an authority that can enforce these rights. Finally, sovereignty is the ultimate power of this collective authority or state. It is the power to act autonomously, without external interference, in the management of the affairs of society. Within the framework of the social contract, sovereignty enables the authority to enforce the contract and protect natural rights. Thus, for Grotius, these three elements are interrelated and mutually reinforcing to create a harmonious and just society.
According to Hugo Grotius, the individual can voluntarily consent to transfer part of his or her natural rights to a central authority, such as the state, in order to establish a framework for security and peaceful coexistence. This is not a matter of renouncing these rights, but rather of consenting to their regulation by an authority recognised by all, with a view to ensuring their mutual respect. Grotius argued that this was necessary to move away from the 'state of nature', characterised by uncertainty and chaos, and to create a stable, secure society that respected the rights of every individual. Grotius' conception is fundamental to the development of modern international law and social contract theory. According to him, this contract between individuals and the state is not only about earthly matters, but also has a spiritual dimension. By behaving ethically and respecting the rights of others, individuals honour God, who is seen as the ultimate source of natural law. That said, it is important to note that although Grotius conceptualised these ideas in a religious context, his theories have been widely adopted and adapted in secular contexts and are still a pillar of political and legal thought today.
In the contract, he defines the idea of a transfer from governed to governors. This is one of the central ideas of social contract theory as developed by various thinkers from the modern period onwards. Citizens agree to give up some of their natural rights, such as the right to take justice into their own hands, in exchange for the protection of the state and the maintenance of social order. This transfer of rights implies trust in the state, which is supposed to act in the interests of the community. This transfer of power from the governed to the rulers is, however, governed by the social contract, which ideally balances the rights and responsibilities of each party. Citizens comply with the laws and regulations established by the state, while the state is obliged to respect the fundamental rights of citizens and to promote the general welfare. Failure to comply with these obligations by either party can be considered a breach of the social contract.
Within the social contract, voluntary association is the first step in this process. Individuals voluntarily decide to come together to form a society, recognising that they will benefit from such a grouping in terms of security, peace, prosperity, etc. In the second phase, these individuals agree to submit to some degree of authority - usually embodied by a government or state. They give up some of their natural rights, such as the right to take justice into their own hands, in exchange for the protection of their other rights by the state. Subjugation is not seen as oppressive coercion, but rather as a voluntary acceptance of the responsibilities and obligations necessary to live in a society. This may include obeying laws, paying taxes, participating in the common defence, etc. At the same time, the state is obliged to respect and protect the rights of citizens. This is a delicate balance to maintain, and is one of the reasons why social contract theory has been and continues to be a subject of debate and discussion among philosophers and political scientists.
Etienne de La Boétie, a sixteenth-century French philosopher and humanist, is best known for his "Discourse on Voluntary Servitude". In this treatise, he addresses the issue of mass obedience to authorities, especially to a tyrant. La Boétie asks why people agree to live under tyranny, and he argues that servitude is often voluntary. He argues that people submit to domination not by coercion or force, but because of a kind of social conditioning or habituation. La Boétie's main argument is that tyranny survives through the acquiescence of the people it oppresses. Therefore, he suggests that civil disobedience, or simply refusing to cooperate with the tyrant, is the most effective way to overthrow a tyranny. Although the voluntary servitude described by La Boétie seems contradictory to the idea of the social contract, where individuals agree to give up some of their freedom for security and stability, the two concepts are in fact complementary. They both emphasise the importance of the active and conscious participation of citizens in political life for the proper functioning of a society.
The notion of the transfer of certain individual rights to a governing authority is central to the social contract theory formulated by Hugo Grotius and other political thinkers. Under this contract, individuals agree to give up some of their freedom in exchange for the security, order and protection provided by the state. For example, a person might give up his or her right to take justice into his or her own hands (a right he or she would have in a state of nature) in order to allow the state to maintain order and administer justice in a fair and organised manner. According to Grotius and his contemporaries, the transfer of these rights is not unilateral or authoritarian, but relies on the voluntary consent of individuals. This is what distinguishes a rule of law from a tyranny. In a rule of law state, individuals agree to submit to the authority of the state because they recognise that this is in their collective interest.
Hugo Grotius developed what is known as the concept of 'natural law'. According to him, there are fundamental and inalienable rights that are inherent to all individuals, regardless of positive law (laws created by humans). These natural rights are generally considered to be of divine or universal origin, and therefore unalterable by humans. According to this theory, although individuals consent to transfer some of their rights to the state through the social contract, this must not violate the principles of natural law. For example, although individuals may consent to the state administering justice, this does not allow the state to violate fundamental individual rights, such as the right to life or the right to liberty. If it does not, it is in violation of the social contract and loses its legitimacy. Therefore, natural law serves both as a foundation and a limit to the power of the state.
Hobbes and the Social Contract
Thomas Hobbes, a 17th century English philosopher, is well known for his pessimistic view of the state of nature, which he describes in his book "The Leviathan". According to him, in this state of nature, where there is no authority to impose rules or provide security, life would be "solitary, poor, brutish and short". Men would be in constant conflict over resources, power and security. Because of this "war of all against all" (bellum omnium contra omnes), Hobbes believes that men are naturally driven to seek a way to escape this precarious condition of life. They would therefore choose to enter into a 'social contract', whereby they would transfer all their rights to a sovereign authority (which Hobbes calls Leviathan) in exchange for its protection. For Hobbes, the social contract is not an altruistic act or the product of a desire to live in harmony with others, but rather a rational response to the state of nature. Individuals agree to give up their freedom in exchange for security and peace. The sovereign authority, which is the product of this contract, has absolute power to guarantee order and peace. This view is in contrast to other philosophers such as John Locke or Jean-Jacques Rousseau, who have a more optimistic view of the state of nature and see the social contract as a guarantee of individual rights rather than a total surrender of them to the state.
Hobbes' vision of the social contract is based on a realistic and often pessimistic view of human nature. For Hobbes, individuals do not enter into a social contract out of love for the community or out of democratic idealism, but rather to escape a violent and conflictual state of nature. In this state of nature, he argues, each individual is driven by his or her own selfish interests to seek the satisfaction of his or her desires and to protect himself or herself from others. Without a central authority to impose order, the result is a constant war of 'all against all'. In this context, the social contract is therefore a form of selfish rationality: individuals recognise that they have an interest in cooperating to escape the violence and insecurity of the state of nature. In other words, they agree to surrender some of their freedom to a sovereign authority in exchange for security and order. But this also implies a paradox: even after the social contract is concluded, the potential for conflict remains, because individuals remain, according to Hobbes, fundamentally selfish. It is therefore the responsibility of the sovereign authority, Leviathan, to maintain order and prevent a relapse into the state of nature.
The social contract is a central concept in political philosophy, as it helps to explain the formation of societies and states, and the mutual obligations between citizens and the state. The social contract, as conceived by different philosophers, serves as a tool to imagine how a society can move out of the state of nature, which is often perceived as a state of conflict and chaos, to create an orderly and peaceful society. Hobbes, Locke and Rousseau, among others, have all proposed different versions of the social contract, but the basic idea remains the same: individuals agree to limit some of their natural rights and transfer some of their power to a central authority (the state) in exchange for the protection of their other rights and social order. The ultimate goal of the social contract is therefore to create a society in which peace and security are maintained, and the rights of individuals are respected. It provides a framework for understanding how and why individuals agree to live under the authority of a state, and what the duties and obligations of the state are towards its citizens.
In Thomas Hobbes' thinking, the social contract is more of a rupture than a simple transfer of natural rights. In his best-known work, "The Leviathan", Hobbes presents a rather bleak view of the state of nature, in which life is "solitary, poor, brutish and short". In this state of nature, each individual has the right to do whatever is in his power to preserve his own life, which leads to a state of "war of all against all". Faced with this chaotic situation, individuals voluntarily choose to transfer some of their rights to a sovereign (an individual or a group of individuals) in exchange for protection and security. It is this transfer of rights that constitutes the social contract. This contract, according to Hobbes, is not simply a transfer of certain natural rights from the individual to the collective domain. Rather, it is an exchange in which the individual gives up his natural rights (in particular his right to do whatever he deems necessary for his survival) in exchange for the security and order that the sovereign can provide. Thus, for Hobbes, the social contract constitutes a break with the state of nature. It creates a new reality in which individuals agree to limit their natural rights in order to live together in an orderly and peaceful society under the authority of a sovereign.
Hobbes' vision is that by entering the social contract, individuals agree to limit their natural rights and transfer some of their freedoms to the state. This is done in order to guarantee some form of collective order and security. In the state of nature, each individual has the right to do everything in his or her power to defend and survive. This can lead to a state of constant war, where everyone lives in constant insecurity. The state, on the other hand, has the power to maintain order and guarantee the safety of all. In exchange for this protection, people agree to give up some of their natural rights and to abide by the laws and rules established by the state. This is called the social contract. According to Hobbes, this agreement is non-negotiable. Once an individual has accepted the social contract and entered society, he or she cannot choose to return to the state of nature. The social contract is a permanent agreement that requires constant obedience to the laws of the state.
For Thomas Hobbes, the social contract does not emerge from an altruistic desire for peace or cooperation between individuals. Instead, it is the result of a pragmatic recognition of the realities of the state of nature. In the state of nature, according to Hobbes, life is "solitary, poor, brutish, and short" because of the absence of rules and social order. Consequently, individuals seek to escape this state not out of love for their fellow human beings, but out of fear of violence and danger. By submitting to the authority of a sovereign (whether an individual, a group or a political entity), they create a social contract that provides a measure of security and stability. Although the social contract is partly motivated by selfishness, it is not without moral implications for Hobbes. Once the contract is established, it imposes duties and obligations on individuals, including the obligation to respect the rights of others and to conform to the laws of society.
In Hobbes' social contract, two key concepts are consensus and union.
- Consensus refers to the collective agreement of individuals to cede some of their natural rights to a sovereign or government in exchange for security and order. This means that individuals voluntarily agree to limit their freedom (for example, their freedom to harm others) in order to create a safer and more stable society.
- Union, on the other hand, refers to the idea that individual wills are brought together into a single entity or collective will. Individuals surrender their autonomy to a sovereign, who then acts on their behalf. This unity is essential to maintain social cohesion and prevent a return to the state of nature, characterised by chaos and violence.
The social contract, for Hobbes, is irreversible: once individuals have transferred their rights to the sovereign, they cannot take them back. This guarantees the stability of society and avoids the risk of a return to the state of nature.
The nature of the social contract varies according to the philosophers and their models. If we look at the examples of Grotius and Hobbes, their ideas on the social contract differ in several key ways. Grotius sees the social contract as a means of institutionalising and perpetuating divine natural law. For him, the contract is a tool for moving from the state of nature to an organised political society, while respecting the natural rights of individuals. On the other hand, Hobbes sees the social contract as a necessary break with the state of nature. In his view, individuals must surrender some of their natural rights to a sovereign in order to guarantee peace and security. The social contract, from this perspective, is fundamentally a means of controlling and limiting human actions to prevent the violence and chaos of the state of nature. Thus, although both philosophers recognise the importance of the social contract in the formation of society and the state, their views differ as to how this contract is formed and what it means for individuals and society.
The concept of reciprocity is central to Thomas Hobbes' theory. The idea is that individuals voluntarily surrender some of their natural rights to a sovereign, in exchange for security and public order. This reciprocity is essential for establishing social order and balance. Without it, individuals risk returning to the state of nature, characterised by insecurity and violence. According to Hobbes, the sovereign (or government), in assuming these responsibilities, is obliged to guarantee the security and well-being of society. If the sovereign fails to maintain this balance, according to Hobbes, individuals would have the right to disobey or resist. Thus, although the social contract involves the transfer of some of their rights, individuals are not completely powerless. They still have the right to expect the sovereign to fulfil its obligations. Hobbes' conception of reciprocity is distinct from that of other social contract thinkers such as John Locke or Jean-Jacques Rousseau. For example, Locke suggests that if the government does not respect the natural rights of individuals, they have the right to overthrow it. Rousseau, on the other hand, suggests that the social contract should allow for collective participation in political decision-making to ensure the expression of the general will.
Democracy is often considered the best political system because it allows citizens to actively participate in the decision-making and governance process. This ensures that citizens' rights are respected and that they have a say in how the country is governed. Furthermore, democracy is based on the principle of equality, which means that all citizens have the same right to vote and the same opportunities to participate in government. The contractual aspect of democracy is also important. In a social contract, individuals agree to give up some of their natural rights in exchange for the protection and security provided by the state. In a democracy, this contract is often formalised in a constitution, which establishes the rules of governance and protects the basic rights of citizens.
For Hobbes, the creation of the state through the social contract fulfils a fundamental need for security, both internally and externally.
- External security refers to protection against foreign threats. This includes defence against invasion or attack by other states, but also the management of international relations to avoid conflict. It is in this sense that the state is given a monopoly of legitimate violence, i.e. the exclusive right to use force to protect its citizens.
- Internal security refers to stability and order within the state. This includes protection against crime, but also the management of internal conflicts, whether political, social or economic. For Hobbes, the fear of disorder and conflict in the state of nature encourages individuals to enter into a social contract and submit to a sovereign authority.
Therefore, for Hobbes, the social contract is not only about giving up certain rights, but also about accepting a form of obedience to the state. In exchange, the state has the obligation to guarantee security and peace for all its citizens.
According to social contract theory, individuals agree to give up some of their freedom in exchange for certain protections from the state. This 'contractualisation' of the relationship between the state and individuals manifests itself through reciprocal rights and duties. On the one hand, citizens agree to obey the laws and regulations established by the state. In return, the state has the duty to guarantee the security of its citizens, to defend their fundamental rights and to ensure justice. Moreover, in a modern state, the state also has a duty to provide certain essential public services (education, health, infrastructure, etc.) and to take care of the general welfare of the population. In other words, the social contract aims to establish a kind of balance between individual freedoms and the common good. Individuals agree to limit their individual freedom (e.g. the freedom to do what they want without respecting the rights of others) in order to obtain collective security and stability, guaranteed by the state.
Pufendorf and the social contract
Samuel von Pufendorf was a 17th century German jurist and philosopher who contributed to the theory of the social contract. His thought is a continuation of the ideas of Thomas Hobbes, although he differs from him on some important points. Pufendorf is best known for his contributions to international law and the theory of natural law. He supported the idea that the state of nature was a state of war and that individuals, out of self-preservation, would agree to enter into a social contract. However, unlike Hobbes, Pufendorf believed that the state of nature was governed by certain moral laws or laws of nature, which prohibited individuals from harming others.
With regard to the social contract, Pufendorf distinguished himself by his insistence on the role of reciprocity and mutuality in the formation of society. For him, the social contract was not limited to a transfer of rights to a sovereign to provide security, but also included a series of mutual obligations between citizens. He argued that these obligations were essential for social cohesion and the promotion of civil peace. Pufendorf also introduced the idea that the social contract could take different forms depending on the cultural and historical specificities of each society. He argued that, although the social contract is universal, the specifics of its implementation might vary from place to place.
Samuel von Pufendorf is known for his willingness to separate issues of law and politics from theology. He argued that governance should be based on positive laws, i.e. laws made by human beings, rather than on divine or religious principles. Pufendorf argued that, although the principles of natural law could be discovered by reason, it was necessary to establish positive laws to govern the conduct of individuals in society. These positive laws, he argued, must be established through a social contract, in which individuals agree to give up some of their natural freedom in exchange for the security and order offered by a government. It was this view that made Pufendorf one of the first thinkers to clearly separate the fields of theology and political philosophy. This separation was crucial for the later development of the theories of the social contract and natural law, which played a key role in establishing democratic principles and human rights in modern societies.
The dual contract idea suggests that the process of establishing a democratic society involves two main stages.
The first is the convention, where individuals, by a kind of tacit agreement, agree to give up some of their individual freedom for the common good. This is essentially the process of establishing a social contract. Through this contract, individuals agree to live by specific rules that limit their actions in order to promote cooperation and peaceful coexistence.
The second step is the assembly of contractors, which can be understood as the establishment of a government or political entity by the people. In a democracy, this is usually a process where citizens choose their representatives who will have the power to make political decisions on their behalf. This is an essential aspect of representative democracy, where power is delegated to elected officials to manage public affairs.
These two steps are crucial to understanding how a democratic society is structured and functions. Democracy is based on the idea that power emanates from the people, and these two stages describe the process by which that power is realised.
Social contract theories as developed by thinkers such as Thomas Hobbes, John Locke, and Jean-Jacques Rousseau, generally involve this double contract.
- The first, consensualist contract is one in which individuals, recognising the necessity of social order for their own well-being, voluntarily agree to give up some of their individual rights and liberties to create a civil society. This surrender of rights is compensated by the protection and benefits that civil society offers - safety from violence, access to justice, etc. It is a collective pact where each individual agrees to submit to the authority of a higher entity (the state) for the common good.
- The second contract concerns the choice of sovereign or government. This is the process by which members of society agree on who should have the power to make decisions for the group. This can be done through elections, where citizens choose their leaders, or through other forms of consensus. In a democracy, this process is normally achieved through voting. This second contract establishes a pact between the government and the people, where the government promises to protect and serve the people, and the people agree to abide by the government's laws and regulations.
In sum, the first contract establishes civil society and the second establishes the government of that society.
Pufendorf, in his conception of society and the social contract, emphasises the importance of positive laws. Positive laws, in this context, are the laws established by human beings within society to govern their behaviour and interactions. These laws can be changed and adapted as society evolves. Pufendorf separated the realm of theology (revealed or divine laws) from that of law and politics (natural and positive laws). For him, the social contract and governance should not be based on theology, but rather on rational and natural principles and positive laws agreed upon by society. This separation paved the way for the emergence of more secular thinking in politics, where the state is seen not as a divine agent, but as a human institution, created to serve the interests of the people living in it. Similarly, this understanding has allowed for the development of a public space in which issues of governance, rights and responsibilities can be discussed and negotiated independently of religious considerations.
Jean-Jacques Rousseau and the Social Contract
Jean-Jacques Rousseau, an 18th century philosopher, also contributed to the theory of the social contract in his major work, "On the Social Contract, or Principles of Political Law" published in 1762. His vision of the social contract is distinct from that of Hobbes or Pufendorf.
For Rousseau, the state of nature was characterised by freedom and equality, but it was also full of uncertainties and fears. To escape this state of nature, individuals would enter into a social contract, thus creating a political community or state. Rousseau's unique contribution to social contract theory is the idea of the 'general will'. By entering society through the social contract, individuals give up all their natural rights and merge into the community. This gives rise to a general will, which represents the collective will of the people and guides society. The laws of society are the expression of this general will. Rousseau argues that sovereignty resides entirely in the people and cannot be alienated. Therefore, any law that violates the social contract would be illegitimate. Furthermore, Rousseau believed that the social contract must be constantly renewed to maintain the legitimacy of society and its government. This idea influenced many democratic and revolutionary movements after him.
In Rousseau's "Discourse on the Origin and Foundations of Inequality among Men", he explains that the origin of social inequality lies in the establishment of private property. In the state of nature, according to Rousseau, people lived simply, satisfying their basic needs without much conflict. However, with the development of agriculture and metallurgy, men began to establish territories and claim private property. This created a situation where some had more than others, which led to social inequalities. These inequalities were then reinforced by the creation of governments, which, according to Rousseau, were set up to protect the interests of the rich and powerful, rather than the general welfare of all individuals. According to Rousseau, the solution to this problem is to enter into a social contract, where each individual gives all his or her rights to the community. In exchange, each individual receives the protection of the whole community. This is the concept of the 'general will', which allows freedom to be maintained while ensuring equality and justice for all.
For Rousseau, the introduction of private property marked the transition from the state of nature to civil society, a transition which, he argued, exacerbated inequalities between individuals. In the state of nature, human beings lived simply, satisfying their basic needs without major conflicts. However, with the establishment of private property, individuals began to accumulate wealth and power, creating socio-economic divisions and fuelling conflict. In his conception of the social contract, Rousseau proposed a solution to this problem. According to him, individuals must give up their natural freedom (and thus their right to private property) in favour of the community. In exchange, they receive the protection of the community as a whole and become part of the 'general will'. This general will represents the common interest, which is distinct from the particular interests of individuals. In other words, the social contract aims to establish an egalitarian and just society, where socio-economic inequalities are minimised. This is why Rousseau's concept of the social contract is often associated with democracy and social equality. It emphasises the importance of active participation of citizens in political decision-making and promotes equality by ensuring that decisions made reflect the general will, rather than the particular interests of a few.
Rousseau identified that the introduction of new technologies and private property exacerbated social inequalities, leading to rivalries and exploitation. In this sense, the concentration of wealth in the hands of a few - what he called despotism - was an inherent problem of the civil society he criticised. According to Rousseau, this imbalance in the distribution of wealth and the resulting power leads to injustice and exploitation. To restore equity and social justice, he proposes the establishment of a social contract, where individuals agree to cede some of their rights and freedoms to a common authority (the community or state) in exchange for protection and equality. From this perspective, the social contract aims to establish a form of government where citizens are equally involved in decision-making and benefit equally from the resources and advantages of society. This is in sharp contrast to despotism, where power and wealth are concentrated in the hands of a few. Rousseau believes that this transformation is not only possible, but necessary to establish a just and balanced society. By establishing a social contract, we can create a society where equality and freedom are valued and protected.
We must be wary of the false social contract that the rich seek to contract with the poor, whom they seek to dominate. Rousseau addresses this issue in his book "Du Contrat Social". He criticises the fact that the rich can use the idea of the social contract to impose their will on the poor under the pretext of protection and social order. In his view, a true social contract should not be a means for the rich to maintain and legitimise their power and control over the poor. Instead, it should ensure that every citizen has an equal voice in the decision-making process and that all are treated fairly. This is what he calls the 'general will': the common interest that lies at the heart of civil society and which should guide its actions. Thus, for Rousseau, a true social contract must result in a society where liberty, equality and justice are respected for all, not just for a privileged elite. A social contract that does not respect these principles is only a disguised form of domination and exploitation.
For Rousseau, the authentic social contract requires the primacy of the 'general will' over private interests. This general will is not simply the sum of individual wills, but rather represents the common good, the interest of all. It is crucial that each citizen has the opportunity to participate in the elaboration of this general will, not according to his or her personal interests, but taking into account the interest of the community as a whole. This implies the development of a real public space, where dialogue and debate are encouraged and where citizens can express themselves and be heard. From this perspective, the social contract becomes a means of regulating inequalities and abuses of power, and of preventing the domination of private interests over the general interest. This social contract, according to Rousseau, should aim at preserving the freedom and equality of all citizens, thus allowing the emergence of a true democracy.
Rousseau argued that the public space is essential for the formation of a moral and political community. In this space, citizens have the opportunity to interact, debate and form a general will, which is the basis for law. For Rousseau, the law must be the expression of the general will, i.e. it must represent the common interest rather than the interests of individuals or particular groups. Only when the law represents the general will does it have moral authority and citizens are obliged to obey it. Moreover, a healthy public space is also necessary to maintain a democratic society, as it provides a platform for citizen participation and popular control of power. It is through this participation that citizens can exercise their freedom, not only by choosing their leaders, but also by actively participating in the formulation of policies and laws. Thus, the importance of the public sphere for Rousseau lies not only in the formation of the general will, but also in the promotion of freedom, equality and citizen participation, all of which are essential for a democratic society.
For Rousseau, the social contract is an agreement between the members of a society in which they agree to pool their forces and goods. By this agreement, they form a community or 'Republic' that acts in the common interest, preserving the freedom and well-being of all its members. The social contract is thus an act of sovereignty, where each individual submits to the general will of the community. This means that each individual must give up his natural freedom (the freedom he has in the state of nature) to obtain civil freedom (the freedom he has in the state of society). But Rousseau insists that this renunciation of natural freedom is not a loss, but rather an exchange: by accepting the social contract, each individual gains security, protection against injustice and the possibility of living in an organised society. Moreover, by submitting to the general will, each individual becomes part of the collective destiny of the community. Each individual contributes to the creation of the law and is equally subject to it, thus ensuring freedom and equality for all.
The social contract is not an oppressive mechanism of control or brute force, but rather a rational method of ensuring the freedom, protection and well-being of each individual in society. For Rousseau, freedom is not simply the absence of coercion. Rather, it is the ability to live according to one's own will, which is guided by reason and aligned with the common welfare. Under the social contract, individuals agree to limit some of their natural freedoms in order to enjoy civil liberty, which is the freedom to live under the laws that they themselves have helped to create. Moreover, the social contract is based on mutually beneficial exchange. By accepting the contract, each individual receives the protection of society and the opportunity to live in peace and security with others. This allows each individual to retain their freedom while participating in the collective life of society. Rousseau's vision is thus an optimistic and egalitarian view of the social contract, which emphasises cooperation, consensus and common interest rather than coercion and exploitation.
For Rousseau, 'good government' is that which is guided by the general will of the people. That is, a government that acts according to the wills and interests of the people, not the particular interests of the rulers or an elite. This means that government must be a direct expression of the people. This is why Rousseau was an advocate of direct democracy, where citizens actively participate in political decision-making. For him, the legitimacy of government rests on the consent of the governed, and the social contract is the tool that allows this consent to be expressed. This does not mean that the government must blindly follow the will of the people. The general will, according to Rousseau, is not simply the sum of individual wills. Rather, it must reflect the 'common good' - what is in the interest of all, not simply what is in the interest of a few. The role of good government, therefore, is to detect and follow this general will, always striving to promote the common good and equality among citizens. For Rousseau, the social contract is at the heart of political thought. It defines the relationship between the government and the governed, and is the basis for the legitimacy and authority of government.
The constitution of the welfare state
The rise of the social
Hannah Arendt, the 20th century political philosopher, offers a unique perspective on the realms of public and private, and the emergence of the social realm. According to Arendt, the historical transformation of the public interest into a competition with the private interest coincides with the emergence of the social sphere. This social realm lies between the public and the private, where matters of everyday life, subsistence and material necessities take centre stage. For Arendt, the public realm is the realm of freedom, where people can act and speak together and where actions and discourses have meaning. It is the place of politics, collective action and public deliberation. In contrast, the private domain is the place of necessity, where individuals provide for their basic needs. However, with the rise of the social domain, the boundary between these two domains has blurred. What were once private concerns have become public issues. For example, issues of economics and material well-being, which were once private, have become public issues. Arendt expressed concern about the impact of this transformation on politics and freedom. In her view, the rise of the social sphere could lead to a depoliticisation of society, where the focus on material well-being and the economy overshadows issues of freedom and political action.
According to Hannah Arendt, the field of the social is a relatively new phenomenon that emerged with modernity. In antiquity, the world was divided into two distinct spheres: the public ('politikos') and the private ('oikos'). The 'politikos' is the realm of politics, where citizens actively participate in public life and take part in the governance of the city. It is the place of action, speech and freedom. It is here that individuals can reveal their unique and distinct identities, and this requires a space of appearance where these revelations can be made and observed by others. The 'oikos', on the other hand, is the domain of the home, the family and the needs of subsistence. It is a private place, hidden from public view, where individuals attend to the necessities of life, such as food, shelter and procreation. The private realm is seen as a place of necessity rather than freedom, where individuals must work to meet their basic needs. For Arendt, the emergence of the social sphere has blurred this clear distinction between the public and the private. In the social sphere, issues that were previously considered private, such as economic and welfare issues, became public concerns. This has led to the erosion of the traditional public sphere, threatening political freedom and participation.
The distinction between the private and public spheres became more blurred in the modern era, between the sixteenth and eighteenth centuries. Indeed, it is during this period that we see the emergence of what can be called the 'social' sphere, where elements of private life begin to impact on public life, and vice versa. With the development of the market economy and the increase in international trade, the family has become an economic unit, and economic activity has become a matter of public concern. In other words, the private (the family and the domestic economy) began to mix with the public (the market economy and the affairs of the state). Parallel to these economic changes, there was also a movement towards greater democratisation and political participation. Enlightenment ideas of equality, liberty and fraternity encouraged greater participation in public life and challenged the old power structures based on status and tradition. However, despite these changes, the concept of the private sphere remained important. Individuals have always needed a space for intimate, family and domestic life, separate from public life. And, as Hannah Arendt noted, the private sphere is a precondition for participation in the public sphere. Without a domain of life that is unique to the individual, there is no 'who' to participate in the public sphere.
The industrial revolution, which began in the late eighteenth century and continued throughout the nineteenth century, brought about profound changes in society and the economy. Industrialisation increased production and wealth, but it also created new forms of inequality and deprivation. Industrial production required a large amount of labour, which led to the emergence of a new class of workers. These workers were often subjected to very difficult working conditions. For example, children were commonly employed in mines and factories, where they worked long hours in dangerous conditions. In response to these social problems, workers began to organise to demand better wages and working conditions. This led to strikes and sometimes revolutions. At the same time, diseases related to poverty and poor living conditions, such as tuberculosis, were spreading, leading to pandemics. Industrialists and the state were forced to address these problems to maintain social and economic stability. This led to reforms in many areas, such as labour law, social security and public health. In addition, this period saw the emergence of new academic disciplines, such as sociology, which sought to understand and solve social problems.
The Industrial Revolution did bring about a significant shift in the structure of society. Where the family was once a private unit focused on subsistence and survival, it became a unit of production in its own right, integrated into a wider economic network. This means that many activities that were previously private have become public economic activities, contributing to the expansion of what we now call the social sphere. For example, education, once a private matter run by the family, has become a matter of public concern. With industrialisation, skills and knowledge became valuable economic assets, and it became increasingly important to provide basic education for all children, not just those from wealthy families. This led to the establishment of public schools and the creation of laws requiring children to attend school. Similarly, health care, once a private matter managed by the family and the local community, became a matter of public concern. Industrialisation created new occupational diseases and promoted the spread of infectious diseases in densely populated cities. This led to the establishment of public health systems and the creation of regulations to protect the health of workers. These changes have led to a reduction in the private sphere, as more and more aspects of daily life have become matters of public concern. At the same time, they have expanded the social sphere, as more and more activities have been integrated into the market economy and the political system.
The emergence of the social as a central concern has had a significant impact on the balance between the public and private spheres, leading to a major transformation of the structures of government and society. This trend was particularly pronounced during and after the Industrial Revolution, with the dramatic increase in social inequalities, public health problems, and social unrest such as strikes and riots. In this context, the management of social issues became a major concern for governments. This has led to a number of changes, including the emergence of the welfare state, the expansion of public services such as education and health, and the introduction of regulations to protect workers and ensure fair working conditions. It has also led to a redefinition of the boundary between the public and private spheres. Aspects of life that were once considered private, such as health and education, have become matters of public concern, managed and regulated by the state. At the same time, the public sphere has been expanded to include not only government but also society as a whole. It is therefore fair to say that the emergence of the social has overturned traditional definitions of public and private space, creating a new social sphere that plays a central role in contemporary governance.
According to Hannah Arendt, with the rise of capitalism and industrialisation, the concept of the family began to be transformed. The family, traditionally seen as part of the private sphere, began to be seen as a unit of production participating in the global economy. This transformation brought what was previously considered private, such as the education and welfare of children, into the public sphere. Education, in particular, has become a major concern for society as a whole, as it is linked to the future of society itself. The quality of education received by children has a direct impact on their ability to contribute to society as adults. Thus, education began to be seen not simply as a matter of individual or family choice, but as a matter of public interest. Arendt argues that this development led to the emergence of the 'social sphere', a new public space in which matters previously considered private were played out. This social sphere has expanded the realm of the public interest to include elements of everyday life previously reserved for the private sphere. Thus, according to Arendt, the advent of the social has brought about a fundamental shift in our understanding of what is public and private, with important implications for the way society is organised and governed.
Hannah Arendt identifies Jean-Jacques Rousseau as a key figure in the recognition of the social sphere as a separate domain from the public and the private. According to Arendt, Rousseau highlighted how the social fits between the traditional private domain of the home and family and the public domain of the state and politics. Rousseau was one of the first to analyse and criticise the social problems caused by the rise of the market economy and economic inequality. In his writings, Rousseau emphasised the importance of community life and the general will, ideas that reflect the growing recognition of the social sphere. According to Arendt, the period from the sixteenth to the eighteenth century, a period of great economic and social transformation, was marked by a progressive shift from the private to the social. The family, once seen as an essentially private entity, became a unit of production integrated into the wider society. This shift made the social realm visible and highlighted the need to take it into account in public governance. This is a process that Arendt sees as a fundamental change in the structure of our society, with profound consequences for our understanding of public and private life.
The transition from one society to another, from one era to another, has often led to the creation of a new sphere of activity that required the establishment of new forms of governance and regulation. In this context, the 'third fact' is the emergence of the social sphere as a domain of public interest. In a society where private life is becoming increasingly public (through, for example, social media and other forms of communication technology), the traditional notion of public space is becoming blurred. This has led to calls for new forms of regulation and governance to manage these new realities. For example, we can see that stricter regulations are being put in place to protect the privacy of individuals as more and more of our personal information becomes publicly available. Similarly, public policies are increasingly aimed at responding to emerging social problems in the social sphere. These new forms of governance and regulation represent an effort to manage the growing complexity of our world and to maintain a balance between private and public interests. It is therefore crucial that we continue to reflect on and debate these issues, as the decisions we take today will have lasting consequences for the future of our society.
The emergence of the social sphere has redefined the boundaries between private and public life. Previously, family matters were primarily a private matter and therefore largely excluded from the realm of public policy. However, with the emergence of the social sphere, the family and other aspects of private life have become matters of public concern, requiring appropriate regulation and governance. In this context, the state, as the representative of the collective, had to assume new responsibilities and obligations. This has led to the establishment of various laws and policies aimed at protecting members of society and promoting their welfare. For example, child protection laws, which regulate the conditions under which children are raised and educated, are an example of how the social sphere has become an area of public concern. Similarly, public policies on work, health, education, etc., have all been influenced by this development. Thus, the emergence of the social sphere has led to an expansion of the sphere of influence of the state, which is now responsible not only for the management of public affairs, but also for the regulation and surveillance of many aspects of private life. This led to the birth of the modern social state, characterised by a more direct and deeper involvement in the social affairs of its citizens.
In "The Human Condition", first published in 1958, the political philosopher Hannah Arendt explores the concept of "vita activa" (the active life) and how it has been transformed throughout human history. She distinguishes three fundamental human activities: work, work and action.
- Work is linked to our biological condition of necessity and survival. It is the activity that produces the consumer goods necessary for human life.
- Work is about artificiality, i.e. the making of objects in the human world, such as tools, machines and infrastructure.
- Action is the properly political human activity. It is through action that individuals participate in the public sphere, engage in discussion and debate, and thereby shape collective life.
According to Arendt, these three activities have become increasingly indistinct in the modern era, especially with the emergence of what she calls the 'mass society' or 'labour society'. In this society, work, once considered the lowest activity, has become dominant, and the value of individuals is often determined by their ability to work and produce. As a result, the traditionally distinct spheres of private life (the realm of work and labour) and public life (the realm of action) have become increasingly blurred. It is in this context that Arendt explores the importance of public space for political action and civic participation, and how the emergence of mass society can threaten these spaces and, therefore, the human condition itself.
Social control: madness and crime
Michel Foucault, a twentieth-century French philosopher, is known for his work on power, knowledge and discourse in modern society. He was a key figure in the structural movement in the social sciences and humanities, greatly influencing the fields of sociology, history and philosophy. In his work, Foucault focused on the genealogy of knowledge, seeking to understand how different forms of knowledge, society, subject and truth are produced and reconfigured throughout history. Through genealogy, he sought to show how the things we take for granted or natural are in fact the product of specific historical relations of power and knowledge. Among his most famous works are 'Surveiller et punir' (1975), where he analyses the development of modern systems of discipline and surveillance, and 'L'Histoire de la sexualité' (1976-1984), where he examines how the discourse of sexuality is used as a form of power and control. Foucault also developed the concept of 'biopower', which describes how modern power operates not only by punishing individuals (a 'repressive' power), but also by regulating and managing life itself (a 'productive' power). Biopower, according to Foucault, manifests itself through practices such as public health, education and population management.
Michel Foucault has developed a method of historical analysis that challenges our preconceptions about societies and power structures. According to him, societies are shaped by a multitude of knowledges and techniques, and are far from being static or unchanging. He focuses particularly on how power is exercised through social institutions, discourses and everyday practices, and how these elements interact to produce specific forms of knowledge, behaviour and subjectivity. He argues that in order to understand a society, we need to examine how its various structures (e.g. legal, educational, medical institutions, etc.) have been established and how they function in practice. This involves examining the techniques and knowledge that support these structures and how they are used to regulate and control individuals and populations. Therefore, according to Foucault, understanding society means understanding the power dynamics that shape it and the knowledge that supports it. He used this approach to analyse a number of fields, from psychiatry to sexuality to the prison system.
Foucault emphasised the historically constructed nature of our current social understandings and practices, what he called historicity. That is, he insisted that our ways of thinking, our institutions, our behaviours and our knowledge are not natural or inevitable, but have been shaped by specific historical processes. He developed the notion of episteme to refer to the unconscious structures that underlie the systems of thought of a given era. He argues that these epistemic structures determine what can be considered legitimate knowledge at a given time, and how this knowledge is produced, disseminated and put into practice. Furthermore, Foucault argues that social structures and power relations are entangled in these systems of thought and knowledge. This means that power structures influence what is considered valid knowledge and how it is used, while the knowledge produced serves to justify and perpetuate certain forms of power. Thus, for Foucault, analysing society as a societal construct means studying historical forms of knowledge and power, and how they interact to produce current conditions.
Michel Foucault developed the notion of 'dispositif' to explain how societies are organised and regulated. For Foucault, a dispositif is a complex network that links together discursive and non-discursive elements - such as ideas, institutions, laws, administrative practices, scientific activities, and individual and collective behaviours - to respond to a specific emergency or need in a certain historical period. Each device has a specific strategic function and aims to manage, control, direct or shape human behaviour in certain ways. They are, in short, mechanisms of power. However, devices are not simply tools of control or management. They are also the means by which a society understands and represents itself. Devices structure the way we think and talk about ourselves and our world, and thus influence our perception of what is normal, acceptable, or possible. Consequently, for Foucault, the study of devices is a way of understanding how societies are constructed and modified, and how power relations are interwoven into these processes.
Michel Foucault sought to highlight how the norms and behaviours we often take for granted are in fact the product of specific historical and cultural processes. His approach, often referred to as the 'archaeology' or 'genealogy' of knowledge, is to examine how these behaviours became normative and to understand the systems of power that underpin them. Foucault analysed various social institutions (such as prisons, hospitals, asylums and schools) and concepts (such as sexuality, madness, deviance) to demonstrate how the behaviours and attitudes associated with these institutions and concepts have changed over time. For example, he examined how notions of 'madness' and 'mental health' have been historically constructed, and how these constructions have been used to regulate and control certain populations. In sum, Foucault's aim was not simply to describe behaviours, but to understand them in their historical and societal context, in order to reveal the systems of power that shape and control them.
Michel Foucault addressed the historical and critical analysis of prison and hospital institutions in his work.
Folly and Folly: A History of Madness in the Classical Age, published in 1961, explores the history of the conception of madness in Western culture from the Middle Ages to the 19th century. It analyses the different ways in which madness was perceived and treated over the centuries, and how these perceptions and treatments were embedded in specific systems of power and institutional structures, notably the psychiatric hospital.
Surveiller et punir: Naissance de la prison, published in 1975, examines the evolution of the penal system in the West from the 17th to the 20th century. Foucault analyses how the shift from corporal punishment to imprisonment was accompanied by a wider change in the way power was exercised in society. The focus shifted from punishing the body to monitoring and controlling behaviour and the mind, resulting in the emergence of various disciplinary techniques and surveillance regimes.
Both works demonstrate how Foucault uses the concept of 'power' in his analyses, suggesting that power is not only a repressive force, but also a productive force that shapes our identities and behaviour.
In his historical and critical analysis, Foucault focuses on how institutions, such as hospitals and prisons, have played an important role in structuring our societies. Moreover, these institutions have influenced the way in which certain concepts, such as 'madness', have been understood and treated. In "Madness and Unreason: A History of Madness in the Classical Age", Foucault explores how "madness" has moved from being a condition that was once understood in a more nuanced way and integrated into society, to being a "problem" that needs to be treated and isolated. The concept of madness, from this perspective, is not an objective reality, but a social construct that changes according to historical and cultural contexts. From this perspective, madness is "situated" as a representation - that is, the way it is perceived and treated depends on the way it is conceptualised in a certain social and cultural context. Similarly, the prison as an institution influences our concepts of punishment, crime and rehabilitation. The structure and practices of these institutions are both a reflection and a tool of the systems of power and knowledge that prevail at a given time.
For Michel Foucault, power is not simply something one possesses, but rather a relationship or process that runs through society. Power is exercised through a set of practices, discourses, knowledge and technologies that organise social life in certain ways rather than others. These practices and devices constitute what Foucault calls 'devices of power'. From this perspective, power is not only something that is exercised by the state or by a dominant elite, but is diffused and produced at all levels of society. It operates through a multitude of small devices - laws, regulations, social norms, everyday practices, discourses and knowledge - that shape our behaviour and thinking in ways that are usually invisible to us. For example, hospitals and prisons are two types of institutions that Foucault analysed as devices of power. These institutions have rules and procedures, produce specific kinds of knowledge (medical, legal, psychiatric, etc.), and organise people and spaces in certain ways. They help structure our understanding of what is normal and abnormal, healthy and sick, criminal and non-criminal. In this sense, they are tools through which power is exercised in society.
Madness and unreason
For Foucault, the notion of 'madness' is not simply an objective medical condition, but is also strongly influenced by social and political factors. In other words, what we consider "madness" depends to a large extent on the norms and values of our society. In his book "Histoire de la folie à l'âge classique", Foucault examines the evolution of the way madness was perceived and treated in Europe from the late Middle Ages to the modern era. He argues that, in the Middle Ages, madness was often seen as a form of wisdom or mystical knowledge. However, with the advent of reason and science in the modern era, madness began to be seen as a disease to be treated. Foucault argues that this change in perception was not simply the result of scientific or medical advances, but was also linked to wider changes in society and culture. For example, as society became more rational and orderly, anything that seemed irrational or chaotic (such as madness) became increasingly stigmatised and excluded. Ultimately, Foucault's argument is that the way we perceive and treat 'madness' (or any other type of behaviour or condition) is deeply influenced by our social and cultural norms. These norms may vary from time to time and place to place, suggesting that our understanding of 'madness' is in part a social and political construction.
In the Middle Ages, madness was often seen in a different light to that of the modern era. It was common to view the insane as being 'touched by God' or possessing some kind of wisdom or mystical knowledge that others did not. This perspective was rooted in a deeply religious worldview, where everything, including madness, was seen as part of the divine plan. In this sense, madness was often associated with innocence rather than guilt or sin. The insane were seen as closer to God because of their simplicity of mind and innocence. They were often treated with compassion and tolerance, rather than fear or disgust. However, this view of madness began to change in modern times, when science and reason began to replace religion as the main sources of knowledge and authority. With this transition, madness began to be seen not as a blessing or a divine mystery, but as a disease or deviance to be treated. Again, this development illustrates Foucault's central point: our understanding of madness (or any other condition or behaviour) is not simply an objective fact, but is deeply influenced by social, cultural and historical norms.
In many traditional societies, including in the Middle Ages, "madness" or what we would today call mental disorders, was often integrated into village or community life. People with mental disorders often lived among other members of the community and were accepted, even if they were sometimes considered different or strange. However, with the advent of modernity, madness began to be treated as an illness to be isolated and treated separately from the rest of society. This led to the creation of specific institutions, such as asylums and mental hospitals, which were intended to isolate the 'insane' from the rest of society. Foucault argues that this change in the way madness was treated was not simply a consequence of scientific or medical advancement, but rather a reflection of wider social and cultural changes. In particular, he suggests that this new approach to madness was linked to the emergence of a more disciplined and regulated society, in which any form of deviance was increasingly intolerable.
From the 17th century onwards, madness was seen as a negative aspect of reason, rather than a manifestation of divine will. This was a major paradigm shift. Madness was gradually medicalised, which meant that it was defined and treated as a disease. Medicine, as a discipline, began to classify the different forms of madness, to develop diagnoses, treatments and institutional approaches to managing madness. Madness became an object of scientific study, with its own categories and standards of treatment. This led to the creation of specific institutions, such as asylums and mental hospitals, to manage and treat madness. However, as Foucault pointed out, this process of medicalisation was not simply a neutral or inevitable development. Rather, it reflected specific social and cultural choices, as well as specific forms of power and control. By medicalising madness, society was able to further regulate and control those considered mad, often marginalising and excluding them from the wider society.
In the process of medicalisation of madness, institutions play a central role, in particular psychiatric hospitals. These are places where those considered insane are separated from the rest of society. It is no coincidence that the emergence of these institutions corresponds to the rise of the modern state, which needed new mechanisms to regulate and control the population. Michel Foucault analysed this development in depth in his book "Histoire de la folie à l'âge classique". He suggested that the creation of asylums was not so much a humanitarian attempt to help the mentally ill, as a reflection of a desire to isolate and exclude them from society. In other words, asylums were not simply institutions of care, but also instruments of social control. Foucault also pointed out that the treatment of madness in these institutions was not always benevolent or beneficial to the patients. On the contrary, it was often characterised by coercion, repression and even violence. Thus, the medicalisation of madness not only led to the exclusion and marginalisation of those considered mad, but also created new forms of suffering and abuse.
Michel Foucault argues that the internment of the 'insane' in psychiatric hospitals marks a major break in the history of madness. Instead of being tolerated or accepted as an integral part of society, the insane were gradually isolated and locked away from the rest of society. This movement is part of the wider context of the emergence of modern societies, which tend to create strict systems of norms governing human behaviour. According to Foucault, these systems of normativity do not only define what is considered normal or abnormal. They also define what is acceptable and unacceptable, what is healthy and sick, and what is rational and irrational. In this context, the internment of the insane can be seen as a way of reinforcing these norms by excluding those who do not fit the idea of normality. This implies a shift in the thresholds of tolerance, in the sense that society becomes less tolerant of those who do not fit its norms. In other words, internment is both a reaction to madness and a way of controlling and regulating it.
Foucault argues that the modern state, through its bureaucratic institutions and practices, uses a range of tools and techniques to regulate, control and discipline individuals and society as a whole. These tools range from punitive institutions such as prisons, to bureaucratic practices of surveillance and control, to education and mental health systems. These 'technologies of power', as Foucault calls them, are deeply embedded in our daily routines and social interactions. They are so ubiquitous that we often take them for granted or as natural, when in fact they are historically constructed and shaped by processes of power. For example, the notions of 'mental health' and 'mental illness' are closely linked to the emergence of psychiatry as a field of knowledge and practice in the 19th and 20th centuries. The criteria used to diagnose mental illness are not simply objective facts, but are deeply influenced by social values, norms and expectations. Similarly, educational systems are designed to normalise individuals and adapt them to certain social norms and expectations. This is what Foucault calls 'discipline': a subtle and pervasive means of control and regulation that operates through apparently neutral and benevolent institutions.
Surveiller et Punir : The prison
In his work "Surveiller et punir", Michel Foucault points out that the prison, as an institution, was designed to exert control over all prisoners, regardless of their socio-economic status. He argues that the real power of the prison lies in its use of surveillance and discipline to control the behaviour of prisoners, rather than its use of physical force or violent punishment.
Michel Foucault's idea that punishment in Western societies shifted from public spectacles of torture to a system of prisons during the 19th century. According to Foucault, this change reflects a broader transformation in the way power is exercised in society. Instead of being based on fear and intimidation, power in modern societies tends to operate through institutions such as prisons that seek to discipline and normalise the behaviour of individuals. Foucault explores this idea in his book 'Surveiller et Punir' where he details how the punishment of crimes has evolved from public spectacles of torture and execution to more 'humane' sanctions in prisons. This transition, he argues, was not simply due to a greater sensitivity or humanisation of criminal law, but was also linked to changes in the way power operated in society.
In the old regime, public executions and torture were a way for the ruler to demonstrate his power. They were intended to instil fear and assert the authority of the monarch. However, these methods of punishment were often counterproductive as they could create sympathy for the condemned and anger against the ruler. In the nineteenth century, with the emergence of modern states and disciplinary societies, punishment began to shift towards a model of 'discipline' and 'surveillance'. Prisons became the central institutions of this new system. Instead of punishing the body through torture, the prison system aims to 'reform' the mind of the prisoner. However, Foucault criticises this system because it involves a much more intrusive and total form of control. In the prison, all aspects of the prisoner's life are controlled and monitored, creating what Foucault calls a 'state of permanent visibility'. This constant surveillance, coupled with strict routines and rules, is designed to discipline and normalise the behaviour of the prisoner. Foucault thus argues that the prison, far from being a humanitarian institution, is in fact a powerful instrument of social control.
In certain periods of history and in certain contexts, the prison may have been a place of privilege for the rich. This was because wealthy people could often afford to pay for more comfortable living conditions in prison, such as private cells, better food or even the possibility of going out during the day. However, this was not the norm and depended very much on the time and place. Foucault sees the transition from corporal punishment to confinement as a more subtle and insidious form of control, aiming not only to punish, but also to reform and control the prisoner. From this perspective, the prison becomes an institution of 'discipline', where the prisoner is constantly monitored and his or her behaviour regulated by a series of rules and routines. The aim is not only to punish crime, but also to transform the prisoner into a 'normalised' individual who adheres to the norms and values of society. Foucault argues that this form of disciplinary control is characteristic of modern societies, where power is exercised not only by violent or coercive means, but also by more subtle means, such as surveillance and regulation of behaviour. This is why the prison is an important symbolic site for Foucault: it represents a form of power and control that is not only exercised over prisoners, but is also, at a broader level, characteristic of the way power operates in modern society.
According to Foucault, laws and social norms are not simply abstract rules that govern human conduct, but are the product of power relations and negotiations between different social groups. Illegalism' refers to the idea that certain actions are considered illegal not because they are intrinsically evil, but because they challenge the established order and threaten the power of certain elites. In other words, crime and deviance are often the result of social and economic power structures rather than individual morality. Furthermore, Foucault suggests that institutions such as prison serve to manage these 'illegalisms', not only by punishing deviant behaviour, but also by seeking to transform and normalise individuals to conform to established social norms. In this context, the notion of 'popular illegalism' can refer to the way in which poor and marginalised populations are often perceived as a threat to the social order, and therefore subject to increased forms of surveillance and control.
According to Michel Foucault, the modern state, particularly the social state, exercises considerable power over individuals, not only by regulating their actions, but also by seeking to normalise their behaviour and morality. This normalisation is achieved through a range of techniques and devices, often grouped under the term 'biopower'. Biopower, a term introduced by Foucault, refers to the control of the lives of individuals and populations by the state through a range of policies and practices from surveillance to the regulation of health, education and work. It includes the management of birth, death, disease and health, but also the production and repression of behaviour and desires. The social state is a particularly powerful expression of this biopower. It seeks not only to protect the safety and well-being of its citizens, but also to conform them to certain norms and expectations. This is done through a range of policies and programmes, such as social services, public education, public health, and even the criminal justice system. However, Foucault also highlights how these forms of power can be contested and resisted, and how they can be the source of new forms of subjectivity and identity. He has always emphasised the dynamic and conflictual nature of power, insisting that where there is power, there is resistance.
The nineteenth century witnessed the so-called 'social question', a growing awareness of the social and economic problems facing society as a whole, and the need to respond to them in a coherent and organised way. These problems were largely related to the radical transformations introduced by industrialisation, capitalism and urbanisation. The 'social question' encompassed a range of pressing problems, including poverty, unemployment, poor working conditions, economic inequality, limited access to education and health care, and the resulting social and political tensions. For the first time, these problems were seen as part of a single global issue that required a collective and systematic response. This period saw the emergence of the welfare state and the development of social policies to regulate the economy, improve working conditions, provide assistance to the poorest, promote public education, etc. The social question also stimulated the development of the social economy. The social question also stimulated the development of new academic disciplines, such as sociology and political economy, which sought to understand and solve these problems. The 'social question' was not simply a question of policy or legislation, but also a question of power and control. As Michel Foucault has shown, the nineteenth century witnessed new forms of power and government that sought to regulate and normalise social life as a whole.
The 'social question' is closely linked to the revolutions that swept through Europe and the world in the 19th century. These political, economic and social upheavals revealed and exacerbated tensions and inequalities within society, leading to an increased awareness of the need to deal with social problems in a systematic and organised way. However, the idea of a 'social question' was not necessarily in direct opposition to the revolutions. On the contrary, many revolutionaries were very concerned about the social question and saw their actions as a response to it. They sought to radically transform society in order to address the inequalities and injustices that they believed were at the root of social problems. On the other hand, the notion of the 'social question' was also used by political and economic elites to defend the existing order and prevent revolutions. By promising to deal with the social question through gradual social and economic reforms, they hoped to ease social tensions and avoid revolutionary upheavals. Thus, the 'social question' was both a product of and a response to the revolutions of the nineteenth century. It was a way of recognising the existence of deep-seated social problems and seeking ways to solve them without necessarily resorting to a revolutionary transformation of society.
== Theories of solidarity and the insurance paradigm Durkheim considered that solidarity was a fundamental element that united the members of a society. He conceptualised two main types of solidarity: mechanical solidarity and organic solidarity. Mechanical solidarity was typical of primitive or traditional societies, where cultural similarity, adherence to traditions and customs, and a strong collective consciousness bound individuals together. In other words, in these societies, individuals felt connected to each other because of their similarity. Organic solidarity, on the other hand, characterised modern or advanced societies, in which individuals were linked to each other by their interdependence in an increasingly specialised and complex society. Thus, individuals were linked not by their similarity, but by their complementarity and mutual dependence. Durkheim argued that the transition from mechanical to organic solidarity was a key feature of the transition from a traditional to a modern society. He also argued that the absence of solidarity, or inadequate forms of it, could lead to states of anomie, where social norms are weakened or lacking, resulting in confusion, dissatisfaction and eventually social deviance.
For Durkheim, respect for solidarity was essential for social cohesion. According to him, a violation of this solidarity, whether in a mechanical or organic society, could be sanctioned by social means. This could include ostracism, marginalisation or other forms of social sanction. In mechanical solidarity, violation of shared customs and beliefs, or disrespect for the collective conscience, may be considered an affront to the community as a whole. Individuals who engage in such behaviour may be considered deviant and treated as such. In organic solidarity, violations could include failure to meet contractual obligations or disruption of the interdependent functioning of society. Again, such behaviour could be sanctioned by the community. Conversely, behaviours that promote solidarity, such as respecting traditions in a mechanical society or maintaining cooperation and interdependence in an organic society, would be valued and encouraged. This could be reflected in social rewards, such as status, recognition or other forms of social approval.
The question of the relationship between individual freedom and the construction of the social sphere is an important debate that marked the 19th century and continues to be relevant today. As the social sphere expanded in the nineteenth century, particularly as a result of industrialisation and urbanisation, it became increasingly necessary to regulate social interactions to maintain order and stability. However, this regulation also raised questions about individual freedom. To what extent should the state or society be able to impose rules and norms on individuals? How can it be ensured that the need to maintain social order does not unduly impinge on the rights and freedoms of individuals? This is where the debate between freedom and sociality comes in. On the one hand, there is the idea that individual freedom is sacrosanct and should not be limited by social constraints. On the other hand, there is the idea that some restrictions on individual freedom are necessary for the good of society as a whole. Ultimately, how a society deals with this dilemma depends on its values and its historical and cultural context. Some may value independence and individual freedom above all else, while others may emphasise social cooperation and collective well-being.
Mechanical solidarity is characteristic of traditional or primitive societies, where individuals are very similar to each other in terms of tasks and social roles. These societies are usually small, with strong social cohesion and moral consensus, and are held together by shared beliefs and values. In contrast, organic solidarity is typical of modern or industrial societies, which are characterised by a much more complex division of labour. In these societies, individuals are interdependent because of their specialisation in different tasks and roles. This interdependence creates an organic solidarity, where social cohesion is maintained not by sameness, but by difference. Durkheim argued that the transition from mechanical to organic solidarity is a natural process of social evolution. However, he also noted that this process can lead to problems of social disintegration and anomie (lack of social norms), if society fails to adapt and regulate the division of labour effectively.
The promotion of the social emphasises the idea of society as a united collective entity, and this is often accompanied by the establishment of social law to realise this vision. Social law is a set of rules and laws designed to regulate relationships and behaviour within society, in order to promote social justice and solidarity between individuals. This may include provisions on social security, labour rights, protection of the vulnerable, etc. The development of this type of law reflects the idea that all members of society have mutual rights and responsibilities and that the state has a role to play in promoting solidarity and equality.
The emergence of the social sphere as an area of state intervention has led to the creation of social policies that aim to regulate and administer various aspects of the private lives of individuals. This includes areas such as health, education, housing, employment, social protection, and many others. These policies can have several objectives, such as ensuring a certain level of well-being for all members of society, promoting equality and social justice, or preventing and managing social crises. However, this extension of the state into the private sphere can also be controversial. Some may see it as an excessive intrusion into private life and a threat to individual autonomy. Others, on the other hand, may argue that such policies are necessary to guarantee fundamental rights and to ensure social cohesion. Moreover, the effective implementation and management of these policies requires considerable expertise and resources. The state must also strike a balance between protecting individual rights and promoting collective welfare.
The theory of solidarism played a major role in the creation of the Welfare State. This theory is based on the idea that all members of society are interconnected and dependent on each other. In other words, society is seen as a unified whole, where each individual contributes in his or her own way to the collective welfare. In this context, the welfare state is responsible for implementing social policies aimed at ensuring social cohesion and reducing inequalities. These policies may include measures to redistribute wealth, such as progressive taxes and social benefits, as well as free or subsidised public services, such as education, health and housing. The theory of solidarism was put forward by Léon Bourgeois, a French politician who was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize in 1920. According to Bourgeois, solidarism is both a statement of social reality and a moral and legal principle. He developed these ideas in his book "Solidarité" (1896), where he defended the idea of a "social debt" that each individual would have towards society, and which would justify the intervention of the state to guarantee the well-being of all.
Michel Foucault had a critical perspective on the notion of solidarity and the way it is used to justify state intervention in the lives of individuals. For him, the practices of government are not only mechanisms of control, but also means of producing knowledge and truth. He criticised what he called 'biopower', the extension of state power over the lives of individuals, not only at the political and economic level, but also at the biological and bodily level. Public health policies, for example, are for him a manifestation of this biopower, which seeks to regulate the population as a whole to maximise productivity and minimise risk. Foucault also challenged the idea that solidarity is a natural and universal phenomenon. Instead, he argued that solidarity is a social and political construction, reflecting the power relations in a given society. Therefore, the promotion of solidarity can serve specific political purposes, such as the legitimisation of the existing social order or the creation of a consensus around certain values and norms. Thus, following Foucault's thinking, the failure of solidarity would not simply be a political failure, but also a sign of resistance to the exercise of power. In other words, solidarity can be both a tool of social control and a means of contestation and social transformation.
From the 19th century onwards, with the major social and economic transformations brought about by the industrial revolution, the modern state began to play an active role in promoting solidarity and social welfare. This new role is often justified by the idea that the state has a duty to guarantee the well-being of all its citizens and to create a more just and equitable society. Solidarity therefore becomes a central principle of social policy and labour legislation. Governments set up social security, health insurance and pension systems to help the most vulnerable in society and to prevent poverty and inequality. In addition, the state intervenes to regulate the labour market and ensure decent working conditions. The modern state is thus built on the idea of a balance between the private and public spheres, and on the recognition that the family, as an integral part of society, is also concerned with these issues of solidarity and social welfare. However, this approach is not without controversy. Some critics, such as Foucault, warn of the risks of social control and normalisation that may arise from such solidarity policies. Others point to the tensions between the values of individual freedom and the demands of collective solidarity, and question the limits of state intervention in the private lives of citizens. The notion of solidarity and its role in the construction of the modern state thus remains a subject of debate and reflection in social and political sciences.
The modern state, especially from the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries onwards, has taken an increasingly active role in social support, often through public service institutions. States established various programmes, such as unemployment insurance, old-age pensions, health insurance, social housing, public education, and many others, to help reduce social inequalities and injustices. This idea that the state should promote social solidarity and protect its citizens from the vagaries of life, including sickness, old age, unemployment or poverty, has been central to the formation of the so-called welfare state or social state. The role of the state in this sense is to balance and regulate social differences and inequalities, rather than to eliminate them completely. This involves some form of redistribution of resources, through taxes and social transfers, to support the most vulnerable or disadvantaged individuals and groups.
In many countries, the late 20th and early 21st centuries have seen a rethinking of the welfare state and a transition to a more liberal or neo-liberal model. This model tends to favour the market and privatisation over state regulation and social welfare. Some thinkers and academics have warned of the consequences of this development. There is an extensive literature on this subject. Notable works include "The End of the Welfare State?" by Stefan Svallfors and Peter Taylor-Gooby, "The Retreat of the State" by Susan Strange, and "The Third Way: The Renewal of Social Democracy" by Anthony Giddens. These works examine how the adoption of neo-liberal policies has led to privatisation and deregulation, and a reduction in the role of the state in the provision of social services. They point out that this trend can increase social and economic inequalities, and potentially lead to social tensions and conflicts. This is a very lively and recurrent debate, especially since the advent of neoliberalism in the 1980s and 1990s. The idea that politics is losing ground to economics in an increasingly liberal world is central to much of the literature. For example, in "The Great Transformation", the political economist Karl Polanyi argues that the autonomous market economy, devoid of political regulation, leads to destructive social consequences. In his book "The Condition of Postmodernity", David Harvey points out that the modern state is subject to contradictory pressures. On the one hand, the privatisation and deregulation movement of neoliberalism is eroding its capacity to manage the social sphere. On the other hand, it has to take responsibility for managing the crises and inequalities produced by these same market forces. Thomas Piketty, in "Capital and Ideology", also explores these issues. He highlights how, since the 1980s, the redistributive role of the state has diminished in many countries, exacerbating economic and social inequalities. These and other authors warn of the potentially dangerous consequences of this development. If the social sphere is not properly managed, it can lead to increased inequality, marginalisation of certain groups and increased social instability.
Michel Foucault explored the notion of 'governmentality', which describes how modern governments exercise power not only by force, but also by influencing, directing and managing the behaviour and attitudes of individuals and populations. For Foucault, the 'social' is not just a domain of life, but an active domain of government and management by the state. According to Foucault, the social has thus become a form of knowledge and a tool of government in modern societies. Through the social, the state can organise, control and direct the lives of citizens. This includes aspects such as health, education, work, and even individual attitudes and behaviour. From this perspective, the social has become an integral part of the way modern states function. It is not just a sphere of activity or a domain of life, but a fundamental technique of government and control. Government is not just about laws and regulations, but also about the management of populations and the way people live their daily lives. This includes the management of the economy, the health system, education, work, etc. For Foucault, the social has become a central power issue in modern governmentality.
Michel Foucault defines governmentality as the set of institutions, procedures, analyses and reflections, calculations and tactics that enable the exercise of this very specific, albeit complex, form of power, which has the population as its main target, the political reality as its main means of knowledge, and the security devices as its essential instrument. From the 19th century onwards, a new form of governmentality emerged, marked by the rise of the welfare state and the extension of state intervention into many areas of social life. This new form of governmentality, which Foucault calls 'biopolitics', is characterised by the management and regulation of the population through a set of techniques and strategies that affect different aspects of social life, including health, education, work and poverty. According to Foucault, the welfare state is not simply an institution that provides social services, but a form of power that manages the lives of the population in a comprehensive way. This form of power is not limited to the regulation of individual behaviour, but also includes the management of the population as a whole, with the aim of maintaining social stability, improving public health, ensuring economic growth, etc. The welfare state is an example of a form of power that is not limited to the regulation of individual behaviour. The welfare state is an example of what Foucault calls 'biopolitics', a form of power that aims to manage life itself. This is done through a series of techniques and strategies that aim to monitor, regulate and control the population as a whole.
The welfare state was built around the notion of solidarity, developing policies to promote equity and reduce social inequalities. This vision is based on the idea that society has a collective responsibility towards its most vulnerable members, and that it must take measures to ensure their well-being and integration. It is within this framework that numerous social laws were adopted during the 19th and 20th centuries, in areas as varied as work, housing, health and education. For example, the Industrial Accidents Act, which established the principle of no-fault liability of the employer and created a system of compensation for workers injured or ill as a result of their work, was a major step forward in the recognition of workers' rights and the promotion of safety at work. Similarly, social housing laws have played a crucial role in combating precariousness and social exclusion by ensuring that everyone has access to decent and affordable housing. These laws are based on the principle of solidarity, which implies that society should help those in need and ensure a decent standard of living for all.
According to the welfare state concept, the state's mission is to ensure the welfare of all its citizens, through the provision of public services and the implementation of redistributive policies. The idea is that the well-being of each individual contributes to the health and prosperity of society as a whole. In this framework, solidarity is not only a moral value, but also an organisational principle. Through taxes and social security contributions, every citizen contributes, according to his or her means, to the financing of public services and social protection systems. In return, each citizen is entitled to these services and protections, according to his or her needs. This approach is based on the idea that the state has a responsibility to ensure a decent standard of living for all and to promote social equity. It also implies that progress and national wealth should benefit all, not just an economic elite.
The late 20th and early 21st centuries saw challenges to the welfare state and the social sphere that had expanded throughout the previous century. The rise of neo-liberalism in the 1980s, symbolised by political leaders such as Margaret Thatcher in the UK and Ronald Reagan in the US, introduced policies that focused on reducing the role of the state in the economy and society. This ideology argued that the market, rather than the state, should be the primary mechanism for distributing resources and managing public services. Since then, many countries have seen a reduction in social spending, privatisation of public services, cuts in welfare programmes and deregulation of the economy. At the same time, globalisation and automation have changed the nature of work and economies, creating new pressures on social protection systems. The idea of the welfare state has not disappeared. In many countries, there is an ongoing debate about the role of the state in society and how best to meet social needs in a changing world. Recent crises, such as the COVID-19 pandemic, have also highlighted the importance of social solidarity and social protection, and have led to calls for a strengthening of the social sphere.
The end of the 19th century saw the emergence of a new paradigm: insurance. This idea transformed the way society perceives and manages risk and had a significant impact on the evolution of the welfare state and social policies. Historically, the concept of insurance arose from the need to protect against life's hazards and financial risks. The first insurance systems were mutual aid societies where members contributed to a common fund to help those who were struck by misfortune or illness.
Over time, the idea of insurance became institutionalised and was adopted by states. This development was fuelled by the recognition that certain risks, such as sickness, unemployment and old age, were universal and could be better managed collectively. As a result, many countries established compulsory social insurance systems, financed by contributions from workers and employers. The concept of insurance has also played a key role in defining social responsibility. It has led to the idea that society, through the state, has a duty to provide some protection against risks that individuals cannot cope with alone. This provided a justification for wider state intervention in the social sphere, including the provision of public health services, old age pensions and unemployment benefits.
François Ewald is a French philosopher and sociologist, a disciple of Michel Foucault, who has worked particularly on the welfare state and insurance. For him, the welfare state is essentially an insurance state. In his book "The Welfare State", he argues that insurance, specifically social insurance, has radically transformed our understanding of risk, responsibility and solidarity. He sees insurance as a sophisticated risk management system that requires a detailed legal codification of responsibilities. For example, in the labour context, the mutual obligations of employers and employees are defined in insurance terms. The employer has to pay insurance premiums to cover the risk of accidents at work, while the employee is entitled to compensation in case of injury. In this way, insurance makes it possible to manage risks and liabilities in a predictable and fair way. According to Ewald, the development of insurance has had profound implications for political philosophy. It transformed the concept of solidarity from a moral or charitable idea to a legally defined and institutionalised obligation. This has led to a new form of governmentality where the state assumes responsibility for managing risk and guaranteeing solidarity through insurance. Ewald sees the welfare state not so much as a protection of the weakest, but rather as a mechanism for managing the hazards of life on a society-wide scale.
François Ewald's contribution to the analysis of the insurance society is very significant. He has shown how insurance, as a social institution, has transformed our understanding of risk and responsibility. According to Ewald, insurance is a major innovation that has changed our relationship with fatality and risk. It has made it possible to transform the hazards of life, previously considered as fatalities, into calculable and manageable risks. It has changed the way society deals with uncertainty and the unexpected. At the same time, insurance has also had a profound impact on the concept of responsibility. In an insurance society, liability is defined in terms of insurance obligations. It is the state, through its laws and regulations, that defines these obligations and ensures that they are met. It is therefore the state that ensures the proper functioning of the insurance system and the assumption of risks. As a result, insurance has led to the emergence of a modern social law which is geared towards risk management and protection against the hazards of life. This law reflects the needs and concerns of society and produces standards for use by all. The law has thus become an instrument for normalising social needs, based on the concepts of safety and reparation. It has made it possible to legally categorise social issues according to social universalities, i.e. general principles applicable to the whole of society. Ewald's contribution is therefore essential to understand how insurance has transformed the way we conceive of risk, responsibility and solidarity in modern societies.
The creation of the pension system is indeed a striking example of the implementation of intergenerational solidarity. It involves a transfer of financial resources from the currently active generations to the elderly, reflecting a collective commitment to the older members of society. The pension system is based on the pay-as-you-go principle, i.e. the contributions of current workers are used to finance the pensions of current retirees. This system embodies the idea of intergenerational solidarity: each generation contributes to support the previous one when it reaches retirement age, with the expectation that the next generation will do the same. Thus, the pension system is a good example of how the welfare state implements solidarity mechanisms on a large scale. This principle of solidarity is deeply embedded in the functioning of many social and political institutions, including insurance, social security, and assistance to people in precarious situations. By establishing a pension system, the state recognises its responsibility towards older citizens and translates the principle of solidarity into a set of legal rights and obligations. This also illustrates the importance of categories of semantic analysis in defining the social sphere: by defining workers, pensioners, contributions, pensions, etc., the state constructs a framework of understanding and action for pension management.
Vers un nouveau concept : le biopouvoir
L'analyse de Michel Foucault sur la prison et l'hospice fait partie de ses études sur les institutions disciplinaires de la société. Il a utilisé ces exemples pour illustrer comment l'État moderne utilise des normes de comportement pour contrôler et réguler la société. Dans son ouvrage "Surveiller et punir" (1975), Foucault examine comment la prison est utilisée non seulement pour punir le crime, mais aussi pour discipliner la société. Le système carcéral, selon Foucault, fait plus que simplement enfermer les criminels. Il utilise des techniques de surveillance et de discipline pour transformer les individus en sujets dociles et productifs. De manière similaire, dans "Histoire de la folie à l'âge classique" (1961), Foucault étudie la façon dont les asiles d'aliénés ont été utilisés pour contrôler et réguler les personnes considérées comme folles. Il soutient que ces institutions étaient moins destinées à soigner les patients qu'à les isoler et à les conformer aux normes sociales dominantes. Ces dispositifs - la prison et l'asile - sont des exemples de ce que Foucault appelle des "technologies de pouvoir". Ce sont des outils que l'État moderne utilise pour gérer et réguler différents segments de la société. Ces technologies de pouvoir fonctionnent en établissant des normes de comportement, en surveillant la conformité à ces normes, et en punissant les écarts par rapport à ces normes. Ainsi, ces institutions ne sont pas simplement des réponses à des problèmes sociaux particuliers (la criminalité, la folie), mais font partie d'un système plus large de contrôle et de régulation sociale.
L'observation de l'évolution des dispositifs étatiques est un point central dans la pensée de Foucault. Il a noté que pendant le XIXème siècle, de nombreux dispositifs étatiques sont passés d'une nature essentiellement répressive à un rôle plus axé sur le bien-être social, ou ce que l'on appelle le "welfare state". Au début, ces dispositifs étaient largement utilisés pour contrôler et discipliner les populations, pour maintenir l'ordre et pour punir les écarts par rapport aux normes sociales établies. Des exemples typiques de ces dispositifs sont les prisons, les asiles et les forces de police. Cependant, à mesure que le XIXème siècle avançait, l'État a commencé à adopter des dispositifs plus orientés vers le bien-être social. Ces dispositifs visent à améliorer la vie des citoyens en garantissant un certain niveau de sécurité sociale. Des exemples de ces dispositifs sont les systèmes de sécurité sociale, les programmes d'éducation publique et les soins de santé publique. Ces dispositifs ont pour objectif d'améliorer le bien-être général de la population et de réduire les inégalités sociales.
Bien que ces dispositifs visent à améliorer le bien-être, ils sont également utilisés pour contrôler et réguler la population. Par exemple, le système d'éducation publique a pour objectif d'éduquer les citoyens, mais il est également utilisé pour inculquer certaines normes et valeurs sociales. De même, les systèmes de sécurité sociale fournissent une aide financière aux personnes dans le besoin, mais ils régulent également qui a droit à cette aide et dans quelles conditions. C'est pourquoi, selon Foucault, même si les dispositifs de l'État moderne peuvent sembler plus bienveillants que leurs prédécesseurs plus répressifs, ils continuent d'exercer un contrôle sur la population. Ce changement reflète une transition vers ce que Foucault a appelé "le pouvoir biopolitique", où le contrôle est exercé non seulement sur les individus, mais aussi sur la population dans son ensemble, avec pour objectif de gérer la vie elle-même.
Le concept de "biopolitique" est central dans la pensée de Michel Foucault. La biopolitique se réfère à l'idée que le pouvoir politique s'est étendu au-delà de la simple gouvernance des sujets pour inclure le contrôle et la régulation de la vie elle-même, c'est-à-dire le corps et la biologie des individus. Foucault fait valoir que, dans les sociétés modernes, le pouvoir ne se limite plus à dicter ce que les individus peuvent ou ne peuvent pas faire. Au lieu de cela, il s'infiltre dans tous les aspects de la vie, y compris la santé, la sexualité, la reproduction et même la mort. Il régule non seulement le comportement, mais aussi la vie elle-même - nos corps, notre santé, nos naissances et nos décès sont tous des objets de contrôle politique. C'est ce que Foucault entend par "étatiser le biologique". L'État, dans cette perspective, ne s'intéresse pas seulement à la gestion des hommes en tant qu'entités politiques et économiques, mais aussi en tant qu'êtres vivants. Par exemple, l'État pourrait utiliser des politiques de santé publique pour influencer la manière dont les gens se comportent en matière de santé et de bien-être. Cela pourrait aller de la promotion de l'activité physique et de l'alimentation saine à la réglementation de la reproduction par le contrôle des naissances et l'encouragement de certaines pratiques de procréation. La biopolitique, selon Foucault, révèle comment le pouvoir politique est devenu profondément enraciné dans la vie quotidienne, s'immisçant dans les moindres détails de notre existence. Il a souligné que, bien que ces formes de pouvoir puissent souvent être bénéfiques (par exemple, en améliorant la santé publique), elles sont aussi une forme de contrôle et peuvent être utilisées de manière coercitive ou oppressive.
Les États-providence sont progressivement obligés de s’immerger au nom de la complexité de la technique de nos sociétés dans des gestions de plus en plus poussées de l’homme qui vont atteindre l’humain en tant qu’être. Dans nos sociétés modernes, c’est l’humain en tant que tel qui finit par poser problème. Selon lui, à mesure que les sociétés modernes sont devenues de plus en plus complexes et techniquement avancées, le contrôle politique et social s'est de plus en plus orienté vers la gestion de l'individu en tant qu'entité biologique. La gestion de l'individu n'est plus seulement une question de droit et de normes sociales, mais s'étend aussi à la régulation des processus biologiques, de la santé, de la sexualité, de la reproduction, etc. C'est ce qu'on entend par "étatisation du biologique". Le concept d'État-providence a historiquement impliqué une certaine prise en charge du bien-être de l'individu par l'État, à travers des systèmes de protection sociale comme la santé publique, l'assurance chômage, la sécurité sociale, etc. Cependant, dans ce contexte, la responsabilité de l'État va au-delà de la simple garantie du bien-être économique et social pour inclure également la régulation et la gestion de la vie elle-même. Le risque avec cette approche est que, tout en améliorant le bien-être de l'individu, elle peut aussi conduire à une intrusion excessive de l'État dans la vie privée et à une restriction de la liberté individuelle. Par conséquent, la question de l'équilibre entre le bien-être collectif et la liberté individuelle est devenue un enjeu central dans les débats sur le rôle de l'État-providence dans les sociétés modernes.
Michel Foucault a introduit le concept de "biopolitique" pour décrire une transformation historique dans la manière dont le pouvoir est exercé sur les populations. La biopolitique est un type de pouvoir qui régule la vie humaine de la naissance à la mort et s'intéresse à la population en tant que concept biologique: la naissance, la mort, la reproduction, la santé et les maladies. Foucault a suggéré que, à partir du 18ème siècle, les gouvernements ont commencé à se focaliser de manière croissante sur les populations biologiques. Il a avancé que le pouvoir s'est progressivement déplacé de la menace de la mort à une "pouvoir sur la vie". Ce pouvoir est exercé non seulement à travers les interventions directes sur le corps, mais aussi à travers la régulation de toute une série de problèmes de santé et de processus de la vie elle-même. La biopolitique, selon Foucault, est donc liée à la rationalisation et à la gestion des problèmes qui émergent lorsqu'une population d'êtres vivants est vue comme un problème de gouvernance. Ces problèmes peuvent concerner la santé publique, les démographies, la longévité, la natalité, la mortalité, etc. Dans cette optique, la biopolitique cherche à gérer et à réguler ces phénomènes pour maintenir, contrôler et optimiser la "vie" d'une population. Pour Foucault, la biopolitique est un concept critique. Il s'inquiète du pouvoir exorbitant qu'elle donne aux États, qui peuvent intervenir dans des aspects intimes et personnels de la vie des individus. C'est là qu'interviennent des questions clés d'éthique et de liberté individuelle.
Michel Foucault, dans sa théorie de la biopolitique, argue effectivement que l'État moderne a pris en charge la "vie" elle-même comme un objet d'intervention politique et administrative. Il suggère que la santé, la reproduction, la longévité, l'hygiène et de nombreux autres aspects de la vie biologique sont devenus des problèmes de gouvernance. Dans ce sens, la biopolitique représente une forme d'"étatisation de la biologie". La biopolitique implique des stratégies et des tactiques par lesquelles l'État intervient dans la vie des citoyens, non seulement pour gérer et contrôler les populations, mais aussi pour optimiser la "vie" en termes de santé, de productivité, de longévité et d'autres paramètres biologiques. En d'autres termes, la biopolitique représente une sorte de pouvoir qui s'occupe de la population dans son ensemble et de ses processus vitaux. Foucault voyait la biopolitique comme une forme de pouvoir potentiellement dangereuse. Il a mis en évidence que l'État peut utiliser son pouvoir biopolitique pour exercer un contrôle sur les citoyens de manière intrusive, en affectant des aspects intimes de leur vie personnelle et de leur santé. De ce fait, la biopolitique pose d'importantes questions éthiques concernant la liberté individuelle et les limites de l'intervention de l'État dans la vie privée des citoyens.
La notion de biopolitique telle que décrite par Michel Foucault peut être comprise comme la gestion de l'humain par l'État, mais cette gestion ne se limite pas seulement à la biologie humaine. Le concept de biopolitique se réfère à la manière dont le pouvoir politique s'est étendu à tous les aspects de la vie humaine, y compris mais sans se limiter à la biologie. Dans le cadre de la biopolitique, l'homme est considéré non seulement comme un être biologique, mais aussi comme un être social, économique, culturel, etc. Le pouvoir politique intervient dans tous ces domaines pour gérer, contrôler et optimiser la vie humaine dans son ensemble. Cependant, l'idée que l'homme est défini uniquement en termes biologiques dans le contexte de la biopolitique peut être trompeuse. Bien que l'État s'intéresse à la gestion de la biologie humaine (par exemple, à travers des politiques de santé publique, des politiques démographiques, etc.), cela ne signifie pas qu'il réduit l'homme à sa seule biologie. En réalité, le pouvoir politique s'étend à tous les aspects de la vie humaine, dont la biologie n'est qu'une partie. Le concept de biopolitique soulève des questions éthiques importantes concernant la liberté individuelle et les limites de l'intervention de l'État dans la vie privée des citoyens.
La biopolitique, selon Michel Foucault, est une manière d'organiser et de réguler les populations à travers une multitude de mécanismes qui cherchent à optimiser l'"état de vie". Dans ce contexte, "l'état de vie" fait référence à la santé, à la longévité, à la reproduction et à d'autres aspects biologiques de la vie humaine. C'est donc une forme de pouvoir qui porte sur la vie et la mortalité des populations. Foucault définit la biopolitique comme un tournant dans la manière dont le pouvoir est exercé, où le contrôle de la vie biologique devient une préoccupation centrale du pouvoir politique. Cela inclut des domaines tels que la santé publique, les politiques de population, la gestion des maladies, les soins de santé, etc. Par exemple, dans le domaine de la recherche thérapeutique, les politiques gouvernementales peuvent réguler la recherche et le développement de nouvelles thérapies, l'approbation et la distribution de médicaments, l'accès aux soins de santé, etc. De même, dans le domaine de la santé publique, le gouvernement peut mettre en place des programmes de vaccination, de contrôle des maladies, d'éducation à la santé, etc. La biopolitique va au-delà de la simple régulation des aspects biologiques de la vie. Elle s'intéresse également aux comportements, aux attitudes, aux normes sociales et culturelles, aux systèmes économiques et d'autres aspects de la vie qui peuvent affecter la santé et le bien-être des populations.
Michel Foucault, dans ses écrits sur le pouvoir, la surveillance et la biopolitique, offre une critique importante de certaines tendances des sociétés modernes qui peuvent saper les principes démocratiques. Foucault a exploré le concept de "panoptique", idée développée par le philosophe et réformateur social Jeremy Bentham. Le panoptique est une structure de surveillance idéale, où un gardien peut observer tous les prisonniers sans que ces derniers puissent savoir s'ils sont observés ou non. Pour Foucault, le panoptique symbolise la manière dont le pouvoir et le contrôle sont exercés dans les sociétés modernes, non seulement dans les prisons, mais aussi dans les écoles, les hôpitaux, les usines, etc. En termes de biopolitique, Foucault fait valoir que les sociétés modernes cherchent à gérer et à contrôler la vie de leurs citoyens d'une manière très détaillée et complète, englobant non seulement le comportement, mais aussi la biologie et la santé. Cette forme de contrôle pourrait potentiellement être incompatible avec la démocratie, car elle peut saper l'autonomie individuelle et le débat public. La démocratie, telle que la comprend Foucault, est enracinée dans la négociation, le débat et l'engagement actif des citoyens dans le processus politique. Lorsque le contrôle devient trop omniprésent et minutieux, cela peut saper ces éléments essentiels de la démocratie.
Michel Foucault explore l'idée que les États modernes ont étendu leur contrôle et leur réglementation non seulement aux comportements humains, mais aussi aux aspects biologiques de l'existence humaine. Cette évolution reflète, selon lui, une forme de pouvoir politique qui est profondément préoccupée par la gestion et la régulation de la vie humaine dans son ensemble - un phénomène qu'il appelle "biopouvoir". Dans ce cadre, la visibilité totale - la traçabilité - devient un outil important de contrôle social. Par la surveillance et la collecte de données, les gouvernements et les autres institutions puissantes peuvent suivre, analyser et influencer de nombreux aspects de la vie humaine. Cette visibilité totale peut rendre la différence - tout écart par rapport à la norme ou à l'attente - problématique ou suspecte. Contrairement à des penseurs comme Platon et Aristote, qui considéraient l'humanité comme se distinguant des autres animaux principalement par sa capacité de penser et de raisonner, Foucault suggère que les sociétés modernes tendent à réduire l'homme à un ensemble de processus biologiques à surveiller et à réguler. Cette idée de biopolitique nous invite à repenser notre compréhension de la politique, du pouvoir et de la liberté à l'ère moderne. Il suggère que même nos corps et nos processus biologiques peuvent être des sites de pouvoir politique et de contrôle, et que nous devons en tenir compte lorsque nous réfléchissons aux questions de droits de l'homme, de liberté individuelle et de justice sociale.
Annexes
- Comment l’obsession sécuritaire fait muter la démocratie, Giorgio Agamben, janvier 2014, Le Monde diplomatique
- La Folie, Victor Duché et Christophe Pénicaut url : http://www.geopsy.com/memoires_theses/la_folie.pdf
- Warren, M. E. (1999). What is Political? Journal of Theoretical Politics, 11(2), 207–231. https://doi.org/10.1177/0951692899011002004
- Ewald, Francois. "Insurance and risk." The Foucault effect: Studies in governmentality (1991): 197-210.