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{{Infobox Lecture
| image =
| image_caption =
| cours = [[International Political Economy]]
| faculté = [[Global Studies Institute]]
| département =
| professeurs = [[Christakis Georgiou]]<ref>[https://www.unige.ch/gsi/fr/presentation/enseignants/cer/christakis-georgiou/ Profil de Christakis Georgiou sur le site de l'Université de Genève]</ref><ref>[https://blogs.mediapart.fr/christakis-georgiou Profil de Christakis Georgiou sur le site de Mediapart]</ref><ref>[https://www.cairn.info/publications-de-Christakis-Georgiou--657762.htm# Publications de Christakis Georgiou sur Cairn.info]</ref><ref>[https://affective-sciences.academia.edu/ChristakisGeorgiou Publications de Christakis Georgiou sur Academia.edu]</ref>
| enregistrement =
| lectures =
* [[What is International Political Economy?]]
* [[A brief history of international capitalism]]
* [[Theories of International Political Economy]]
* [[International trade cooperation]]
* [[Domestic trade politics]]
* [[Politics of preferential trade agreements]]
* [[Multinational corporations and global value chains]]
* [[Political of multinational corporations]]
* [[International monetary cooperation]]
* [[Monetary and exchange rate politics]]
* [[Politics of international financial crises]]
* [[Democracies in globalized economies]]
}}
{{Translations
| fr = Qu'est-ce que l'économie politique internationale ?
| es = ¿Qué es la Economía Política Internacional?
}}
=What is International political economy?=
=What is International political economy?=


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A similar question is what explains the interior economic nationalism of the 1920s and the 1930s, the fact that in the 1920s and even more so in the 1930s, states raised tariffs and raised trade barriers with each other, turned inwards resulting in trade volumes to collapse. What explains that and again who won out and who lost from that, who opposed it who favoured it. And why at that particular point in time was that policy pursued by a good number of states. And why is it that after 1945, after the war, the reverse took place? Again the same question comes up: who benefits, which domestic groups in which states benefit from the setting up of those institutions and that cooperation?
A similar question is what explains the interior economic nationalism of the 1920s and the 1930s, the fact that in the 1920s and even more so in the 1930s, states raised tariffs and raised trade barriers with each other, turned inwards resulting in trade volumes to collapse. What explains that and again who won out and who lost from that, who opposed it who favoured it. And why at that particular point in time was that policy pursued by a good number of states. And why is it that after 1945, after the war, the reverse took place? Again the same question comes up: who benefits, which domestic groups in which states benefit from the setting up of those institutions and that cooperation?


If we now look at investment or multinational corporations, the question is how multinational corporate activities affects the relation between states. So, what explains the conflict over Chinese toward foreign direct investment (FDI) into the United States? For example, there is the case of [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Huawei Huawei], a global provider of information and communications technology (ICT) infrastructure and smart devices, that is involved in the development of 5G technology.<ref>Kerstein, R. (2019). 5G is here… Hip, hip, Huawei! The Bulletin of the Royal College of Surgeons of England, 101(6), 236–237. https://doi.org/10.1308/rcsbull.2019.236</ref><ref>Balding, Christopher and Clarke, Donald C., Who Owns Huawei? (April 17, 2019). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3372669 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3372669</ref> The United States has blocked investments by Huawei in the United States and is pressuring the European Union to block investments by Huawei, and not just investments, but also participation by Huawei in projects conducted in the European Union.<ref>Walker, Tony. “[https://theconversation.com/why-the-global-battle-over-huawei-could-prove-more-disruptive-than-trumps-trade-war-with-china-131828 Why the Global Battle over Huawei Could Prove More Disruptive than Trump's Trade War with China].” The Conversation, 21 Feb. 2020</ref><ref>Lyu, Mengting, and Chia-yi Lee. "[https://dr.ntu.edu.sg/handle/10356/105453 RSIS-WTO Parliamentary Workshop–US Blacklist on Huawei: Leverage for the US-China Trade Talks?]." (2019).</ref><ref>“[http://www.eias.org/news/the-trade-war-huawei-and-chinese-strategy/ The Trade War, Huawei and Chinese Strategy].” [http://www.eias.org/ EIAS].</ref><ref>Harrell, Peter E. “[https://foreignpolicy.com/2019/12/27/united-states-china-trade-war-fought-export-import-controls-investment-restrictions-sanctions/ The U.S.-Chinese Trade War Just Entered Phase 2].” Foreign Policy, 27 Dec. 2019.</ref> What explains the fact that [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Macron President Macron] now, and Germany as well, are pushing for the idea that the European Union should set up a body to screen inward Chinese investment into the European Union and say which investment is going to be allowed and which investment is not going to be.<ref>Rose, Michel. “[https://www.reuters.com/article/us-china-france-europe/in-china-macron-presses-eu-for-united-front-on-foreign-takeovers-idUSKBN1EZ0QP In China, Macron Presses EU for United Front on Foreign Takeovers].” Reuters, Thomson Reuters, 10 Jan. 2018.</ref><ref>Brattberg, Erik, and Philippe Le Corre. “[https://carnegieendowment.org/2020/02/19/eu-and-china-in-2020-more-competition-ahead-pub-81096 The EU and China in 2020: More Competition Ahead].” [https://carnegieendowment.org/?lang=en Carnegie Endowment for International Peace].</ref> That is a new case in terms of international investments because the United States and the European Union were the sources of international investment so far.<ref>Sauvant, K. P., & Nolan, M. D. (2015). China’s Outward Foreign Direct Investment and International Investment Law. Journal of International Economic Law, jgv045. https://doi.org/10.1093/jiel/jgv045</ref><ref>Bailliu, J., Kruger, M., Toktamyssov, A., & Welbourn, W. (2017). How fast can China grow? The Middle Kingdom’s prospects to 2030. Pacific Economic Review, 24(2), 373–399. https://doi.org/10.1111/1468-0106.12240</ref><ref>Buckley, P. (2019), "China goes global: provenance, projection, performance and policy", International Journal of Emerging Markets, Vol. 14 No. 1, pp. 6-23. https://doi.org/10.1108/IJoEM-01-2017-0006</ref><ref>Schnabl, G. (2019). China’s Overinvestment and International Trade Conflicts. China & World Economy, 27(5), 37–62. https://doi.org/10.1111/cwe.12293</ref><ref>Baláž, Peter, Stanislav Zábojník, and Lukáš Harvánek. "[https://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1007/978-3-030-21912-3_3 The Growing Importance of China in the Global Trade]." China's Expansion in International Business. Palgrave Macmillan, Cham, 2020. 97-160.</ref>
If we now look at investment or multinational corporations, the question is how multinational corporate activities affects the relation between states. So, what explains the conflict over Chinese toward foreign direct investment (FDI) into the United States? For example, there is the case of [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Huawei Huawei], a global provider of information and communications technology (ICT) infrastructure and smart devices, that is involved in the development of 5G technology.<ref>Kerstein, R. (2019). 5G is here… Hip, hip, Huawei! The Bulletin of the Royal College of Surgeons of England, 101(6), 236–237. https://doi.org/10.1308/rcsbull.2019.236</ref><ref>Balding, Christopher and Clarke, Donald C., Who Owns Huawei? (April 17, 2019). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3372669 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3372669</ref> The United States has blocked investments by Huawei in the United States and is pressuring the European Union to block investments by Huawei, and not just investments, but also participation by Huawei in projects conducted in the European Union.<ref>Walker, Tony. “[https://theconversation.com/why-the-global-battle-over-huawei-could-prove-more-disruptive-than-trumps-trade-war-with-china-131828 Why the Global Battle over Huawei Could Prove More Disruptive than Trump's Trade War with China].” The Conversation, 21 Feb. 2020</ref><ref>Lyu, Mengting, and Chia-yi Lee. "[https://dr.ntu.edu.sg/handle/10356/105453 RSIS-WTO Parliamentary Workshop–US Blacklist on Huawei: Leverage for the US-China Trade Talks?]." (2019).</ref><ref>“[http://www.eias.org/news/the-trade-war-huawei-and-chinese-strategy/ The Trade War, Huawei and Chinese Strategy].” [http://www.eias.org/ EIAS].</ref><ref>Harrell, Peter E. “[https://foreignpolicy.com/2019/12/27/united-states-china-trade-war-fought-export-import-controls-investment-restrictions-sanctions/ The U.S.-Chinese Trade War Just Entered Phase 2].” Foreign Policy, 27 Dec. 2019.</ref> What explains the fact that [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Macron President Macron] now, and Germany as well, are pushing for the idea that the European Union should set up a body to screen inward Chinese investment into the European Union and say which investment is going to be allowed and which investment is not going to be.<ref>Rose, Michel. “[https://www.reuters.com/article/us-china-france-europe/in-china-macron-presses-eu-for-united-front-on-foreign-takeovers-idUSKBN1EZ0QP In China, Macron Presses EU for United Front on Foreign Takeovers].” Reuters, Thomson Reuters, 10 Jan. 2018.</ref><ref>Brattberg, Erik, and Philippe Le Corre. “[https://carnegieendowment.org/2020/02/19/eu-and-china-in-2020-more-competition-ahead-pub-81096 The EU and China in 2020: More Competition Ahead].” [https://carnegieendowment.org/?lang=en Carnegie Endowment for International Peace].</ref> That is a new case in terms of international investments because the United States and the European Union were the sources of international investment so far.<ref>Sauvant, K. P., & Nolan, M. D. (2015). China’s Outward Foreign Direct Investment and International Investment Law. Journal of International Economic Law, jgv045. https://doi.org/10.1093/jiel/jgv045</ref><ref>Bailliu, J., Kruger, M., Toktamyssov, A., & Welbourn, W. (2017). How fast can China grow? The Middle Kingdom’s prospects to 2030. Pacific Economic Review, 24(2), 373–399. https://doi.org/10.1111/1468-0106.12240</ref><ref> Buckley, P. (2019), "China goes global: provenance, projection, performance and policy", International Journal of Emerging Markets, Vol. 14 No. 1, pp. 6-23. https://doi.org/10.1108/IJoEM-01-2017-0006</ref><ref>Schnabl, G. (2019). China’s Overinvestment and International Trade Conflicts. China & World Economy, 27(5), 37–62. https://doi.org/10.1111/cwe.12293</ref><ref>Baláž, Peter, Stanislav Zábojník, and Lukáš Harvánek. "[https://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1007/978-3-030-21912-3_3 The Growing Importance of China in the Global Trade]." China's Expansion in International Business. Palgrave Macmillan, Cham, 2020. 97-160.</ref>


A typical question was about the relationship of international investment before the Second World War in colonialism, and the pattern of investment relationship at that time. Two thirds of the globe were under direct administration by the British Empire, the French Empire, Portuguese empire. What explains the fact that the United States was not, except the Philippine, colonial power and did not attempt to become one after the 1930s.
A typical question was about the relationship of international investment before the Second World War in colonialism, and the pattern of investment relationship at that time. Two thirds of the globe were under direct administration by the British Empire, the French Empire, Portuguese empire. What explains the fact that the United States was not, except the Philippine, colonial power and did not attempt to become one after the 1930s.


And what is the difference between that colonialism and [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Global_value_chain global value chain] (GVC) today in a world? What is the relationship between global value chains, so the way multinational corporations operate today, and [[Multilateral trade agreements|regional trading investment]] agreements and blocks? Is there a relationship between the way international investment takes place today and the setting up of [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mercosur Mercosur], [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/North_American_Free_Trade_Agreement North American Free Trade Agreement] (NAFTA), [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/ASEAN Association of Southeast Asian Nations] (ASEAN) in the Southeast Asian region, the bilateral investment treaties agreed by Japan; is there a relationship between Russia investments in the setting of the European Union? International political economy deal with that kind of question.
And what is the difference between that colonialism and [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Global_value_chain global value chain] today in a world? What is the relationship between global value chains, so the way multinational corporations operate today, and [[Multilateral trade agreements|regional trading investment]] agreements and blocks? Is there a relationship between the way international investment takes place today and the setting up of [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mercosur Mercosur], [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/North_American_Free_Trade_Agreement North American Free Trade Agreement] (NAFTA), [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/ASEAN Association of Southeast Asian Nations] (ASEAN) in the Southeast Asian region, the bilateral investment treaties agreed by Japan; is there a relationship between Russia investments in the setting of the European Union? International political economy deal with that kind of question.


We look more at countries that are a destination for foreign direct investment, what kind of relationship development countries develop toward foreign direct investment. There was a period, for example, between the 1920s and the 1970s where developing states tried to keep out foreign direct investment, multinational corporations. And, since the late and since the mid-1970s, there is a competition to attract capitals, attract international corporations.<ref>Vukšić, G. (2013). Developing countries in competition for foreign investment. The Journal of International Trade & Economic Development, 22(3), 351–376. https://doi.org/10.1080/09638199.2011.578751</ref> So what explains that change in policy?  
We look more at countries that are a destination for foreign direct investment, what kind of relationship development countries develop toward foreign direct investment. There was a period, for example, between the 1920s and the 1970s where developing states tried to keep out foreign direct investment, multinational corporations. And, since the late and since the mid-1970s, there is a competition to attract capitals, attract international corporations.<ref>Vukšić, G. (2013). Developing countries in competition for foreign investment. The Journal of International Trade & Economic Development, 22(3), 351–376. https://doi.org/10.1080/09638199.2011.578751</ref> So what explains that change in policy?  
   
   
A typical question in terms of the [[Money, Finance and the World Economy: 1974 - 2000|international monetary system]] and the [[Exchange rates and the foreign exchange market|exchange rate regime]] is why it is that China and the European Union today that want to reform the international monetary system.<ref>Otero-Iglesias, M., & Zhang, M. (2013). EU-China Collaboration in the Reform of the International Monetary System: Much Ado About Nothing? The World Economy, 37(1), 151–168. https://doi.org/10.1111/twec.12131</ref><ref>Otero‐Iglesias, Miguel, and Ming Zhang. "[https://s3.amazonaws.com/academia.edu.documents/30518663/China_the_euro_and_the_IMS_%28EUISS_MOI_2012%29.pdf?response-content-disposition=inline%3B%20filename%3DChina_the_Euro_and_the_Reform_of_the_Int.pdf&X-Amz-Algorithm=AWS4-HMAC-SHA256&X-Amz-Credential=AKIAIWOWYYGZ2Y53UL3A%2F20200308%2Fus-east-1%2Fs3%2Faws4_request&X-Amz-Date=20200308T213116Z&X-Amz-Expires=3600&X-Amz-SignedHeaders=host&X-Amz-Signature=f3f2939438ad31e999aeb905338597533c1972c9a4c2f38063cb53ff0d34c1f7 EU‐China collaboration in the reform of the international monetary system: much ado about nothing?]." The World Economy 37.1 (2014): 151-168.</ref>Mark Carney, the governor of the [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bank_of_England Bank of England] stated in August 2019 that there should be a new international monetary system that is not dependent on the dollar, while the Chinese central bank has asked the same for the last 15 years.<ref>“[https://www.bankofengland.co.uk/speech/2019/mark-carney-speech-at-jackson-hole-economic-symposium-wyoming The Growing Challenges for Monetary Policy in the Current International Monetary and Financial System - Speech by Mark Carney].” Bank of England, 13 August 2019.</ref><ref>Giles, Chris. “[https://www.ft.com/content/a775b55a-c5c2-11e9-a8e9-296ca66511c9 Mark Carney Calls for Global Monetary System to Replace the Dollar].” Financial Times, 23 Aug. 2019.</ref> Why previous international monetary systems, such as the [[International triumph of the gold standard: 1871 - 1914|gold standard]] and the [[Bretton Woods System: 1944 - 1973|Bretton Wood System]], broke down and who benefited from that and who lost out. Also, why is that [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Donald_Trump President Trump] attacked the [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/European_Central_Bank European Central Bank] in September 2019?<ref>Arnold, Martin. “[https://www.ft.com/content/9b2c29c0-d53d-11e9-a0bd-ab8ec6435630 ECB Cuts Rates and Tells Governments to Act].” Subscribe to Read | Financial Times, Financial Times, 12 Sept. 2019.</ref><ref>Trump, Donald J. “[https://twitter.com/realdonaldtrump/status/1172120964232093697?lang=en European Central Bank, Acting Quickly, Cuts Rates 10 Basis Points. They Are Trying, and Succeeding, in Depreciating the Euro against the VERY Strong Dollar, Hurting U.S. Exports.... And the Fed Sits, and Sits, and Sits. They Get Paid to Borrow Money, While We Are Paying Interest!]” Twitter, Twitter, 12 Sept. 2019.</ref><ref>“[https://www.reuters.com/article/us-ecb-policy-usa/ecb-action-hit-by-trump-as-hurting-u-s-exports-ups-pressure-on-fed-idUSKCN1VX1JE ECB Action, Hit by Trump as 'Hurting U.S. Exports,' Ups Pressure on Fed].” Reuters, Thomson Reuters, 12 Sept. 2019.</ref>
A typical question in terms of the [[Money, Finance and the World Economy: 1974 - 2000|international monetary system]] and the [[Exchange rates and the foreign exchange market|exchange rate regime]] is why it is that China and the European Union today that want to reform the international monetary system.<ref>Otero-Iglesias, M., & Zhang, M. (2013). EU-China Collaboration in the Reform of the International Monetary System: Much Ado About Nothing? The World Economy, 37(1), 151–168. https://doi.org/10.1111/twec.12131</ref><ref>Otero‐Iglesias, Miguel, and Ming Zhang. "[https://s3.amazonaws.com/academia.edu.documents/30518663/China_the_euro_and_the_IMS_%28EUISS_MOI_2012%29.pdf?response-content-disposition=inline%3B%20filename%3DChina_the_Euro_and_the_Reform_of_the_Int.pdf&X-Amz-Algorithm=AWS4-HMAC-SHA256&X-Amz-Credential=AKIAIWOWYYGZ2Y53UL3A%2F20200308%2Fus-east-1%2Fs3%2Faws4_request&X-Amz-Date=20200308T213116Z&X-Amz-Expires=3600&X-Amz-SignedHeaders=host&X-Amz-Signature=f3f2939438ad31e999aeb905338597533c1972c9a4c2f38063cb53ff0d34c1f7 EU‐China collaboration in the reform of the international monetary system: much ado about nothing?]." The World Economy 37.1 (2014): 151-168.</ref> Mark Carney, the governor of the [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bank_of_England Bank of England] stated in August 2019 that there should be a new international monetary system that is not dependent on the dollar, while the Chinese central bank has asked the same for the last 15 years.<ref>“[https://www.bankofengland.co.uk/speech/2019/mark-carney-speech-at-jackson-hole-economic-symposium-wyoming The Growing Challenges for Monetary Policy in the Current International Monetary and Financial System - Speech by Mark Carney].” Bank of England, 13 August 2019.</ref><ref>Giles, Chris. “[https://www.ft.com/content/a775b55a-c5c2-11e9-a8e9-296ca66511c9 Mark Carney Calls for Global Monetary System to Replace the Dollar].” Financial Times, 23 Aug. 2019.</ref> Why previous international monetary systems, such as the [[International triumph of the gold standard: 1871 - 1914|gold standard]] and the [[Bretton Woods System: 1944 - 1973|Bretton Wood System]], broke down and who benefited from that and who lost out. Also, why is that [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Donald_Trump President Trump] attacked the [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/European_Central_Bank European Central Bank] in September 2019?<ref>Arnold, Martin. “[https://www.ft.com/content/9b2c29c0-d53d-11e9-a0bd-ab8ec6435630 ECB Cuts Rates and Tells Governments to Act].” Subscribe to Read | Financial Times, Financial Times, 12 Sept. 2019.</ref><ref>Trump, Donald J. “[https://twitter.com/realdonaldtrump/status/1172120964232093697?lang=en European Central Bank, Acting Quickly, Cuts Rates 10 Basis Points. They Are Trying, and Succeeding, in Depreciating the Euro against the VERY Strong Dollar, Hurting U.S. Exports.... And the Fed Sits, and Sits, and Sits. They Get Paid to Borrow Money, While We Are Paying Interest!]” Twitter, Twitter, 12 Sept. 2019.</ref><ref>“[https://www.reuters.com/article/us-ecb-policy-usa/ecb-action-hit-by-trump-as-hurting-u-s-exports-ups-pressure-on-fed-idUSKCN1VX1JE ECB Action, Hit by Trump as 'Hurting U.S. Exports,' Ups Pressure on Fed].” Reuters, Thomson Reuters, 12 Sept. 2019.</ref>


If we look at all of these things, international trade production, finance, what is their impact on domestic welfare systems and domestic politics? If you look at the history of that question in the 1920s and the 1930s, there were clashes between the rising union in trade unionism and socialism in the advanced countries and the gold standard. What explains that and how did that conflict play out historically; why is it that right populism like Trump today or like Marine Le Pen in France or other forces attack globalization and talk about economic nationalism?
If we look at all of these things, international trade production, finance, what is their impact on domestic welfare systems and domestic politics? If you look at the history of that question in the 1920s and the 1930s, there were clashes between the rising union in trade unionism and socialism in the advanced countries and the gold standard. What explains that and how did that conflict play out historically; why is it that right populism like Trump today or like Marine Le Pen in France or other forces attack globalization and talk about economic nationalism?
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=Brief history of international political economy=
=Brief history of international political economy=
==Prehistory==
==Prehistory==


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[[Fichier:Karl Marx 001.jpg|vignette|Karl Marx in 1875.]]
[[Fichier:Karl Marx 001.jpg|vignette|Karl Marx in 1875.]]


The first obvious exception is the Marxists with the project to continue the work of [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Karl_Marx Karl Marx] on the capital. Marxists authors produced a theory on the way capitalism works as a total social reality and not just as an economic system but as a social order in and of itself. Marx's critical theories about society, economics and politics – collectively understood as Marxism – hold that human societies develop through class struggle. In capitalism, this manifests itself in the conflict between the ruling classes (known as the bourgeoisie) that control the means of production and the working classes (known as the proletariat) that enable these means by selling their labour-power in return for wages.<ref>Marx, K. and Engels, F. (1848).''[https://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1848/communist-manifesto/index.htm The Communist Manifesto]''</ref><ref name=":0">Wikipedia contributors. (2020, March 4). Karl Marx. In ''Wikipedia, The Free Encyclopedia''. Retrieved 17:26, March 9, 2020, from https://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=Karl_Marx</ref> Marxism has had a profound impact on global academia and has influenced many fields.<ref>O’Laughlin, B. (1975). Marxist Approaches in Anthropology. Annual Review of Anthropology, 4(1), 341–370. https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev.an.04.100175.002013</ref><ref>Roseberry, W. (1997). MARX AND ANTHROPOLOGY. Annual Review of Anthropology, 26(1), 25–46. https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev.anthro.26.1.25</ref><ref>Becker, S. L. (1984). Marxist approaches to media studies: The British experience. Critical Studies in Mass Communication, 1(1), 66–80. https://doi.org/10.1080/15295038409360014</ref><ref>Sheehan, H. (2007). Marxism and Science Studies: A Sweep through the Decades. International Studies in the Philosophy of Science, 21(2), 197–210. https://doi.org/10.1080/02698590701498126</ref> The term political economy initially referred to the study of the material conditions of economic production in the capitalist system. In Marxism, political economy is the study of the means of production, specifically of capital and how that manifests as economic activity.<ref name=":0" />
The first obvious exception is the Marxists with the project to continue the work of [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Karl_Marx Karl Marx] on the capital. Marxists authors produced a theory on the way capitalism works as a total social reality and not just as an economic system but as a social order in and of itself. Marx's critical theories about society, economics and politics – collectively understood as Marxism – hold that human societies develop through class struggle. In capitalism, this manifests itself in the conflict between the ruling classes (known as the bourgeoisie) that control the means of production and the working classes (known as the proletariat) that enable these means by selling their labour-power in return for wages.<ref>Marx, K. and Engels, F. (1848).''[https://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1848/communist-manifesto/index.htm The Communist Manifesto]''</ref><ref name=":0">Wikipedia contributors. (2020, March 4). Karl Marx. In ''Wikipedia, The Free Encyclopedia''. Retrieved 17:26, March 9, 2020, from <nowiki>https://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=Karl_Marx</nowiki></ref> Marxism has had a profound impact on global academia and has influenced many fields.<ref>O’Laughlin, B. (1975). Marxist Approaches in Anthropology. Annual Review of Anthropology, 4(1), 341–370. https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev.an.04.100175.002013</ref><ref>Roseberry, W. (1997). MARX AND ANTHROPOLOGY. Annual Review of Anthropology, 26(1), 25–46. https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev.anthro.26.1.25</ref><ref>Becker, S. L. (1984). Marxist approaches to media studies: The British experience. Critical Studies in Mass Communication, 1(1), 66–80. https://doi.org/10.1080/15295038409360014</ref><ref>Sheehan, H. (2007). Marxism and Science Studies: A Sweep through the Decades. International Studies in the Philosophy of Science, 21(2), 197–210. https://doi.org/10.1080/02698590701498126</ref> The term political economy initially referred to the study of the material conditions of economic production in the capitalist system. In Marxism, political economy is the study of the means of production, specifically of capital and how that manifests as economic activity.<ref name=":0" />


In the Marxist tradition, we can notably cite two key authors. There is [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Rudolf_Hilferding Rudolf Hilferding] who wrote ''Finance Capital'' (''Das Finanzkapital'') in 1910<ref>Rudolf Hilferding, [https://www.marxists.org/archive/hilferding/1910/finkap/ Finance Capital. A Study of the Latest Phase of Capitalist Development]. Ed. Tom Bottomore (Routledge & Kegan Paul, London, 1981)</ref><ref>Kowalik, T. (2014). Rudolf Hilferding’s Theory of Finance Capital. In Rosa Luxemburg (pp. 131–142). https://doi.org/10.1057/9781137428349_10</ref>, and [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Rosa_Luxemburg Rosa Luxemburg], who wrote ''[https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/The_Accumulation_of_Capital The Accumulation of Capital]'', first published in 1913, a book about imperialism within which she argues that capitalism needs to constantly expand into noncapitalist areas to access new supply sources, markets for surplus-value, and reservoirs of labor.<ref>Scott, Helen (2008). "Introduction to Rosa Luxemburg". The Essential Rosa Luxemburg: Reform or Revolution and The Mass Strike. By Luxemburg, Rosa. Chicago, IL: Haymarket Books. p. 18.</ref><ref>Wikipedia contributors. (2019, December 18). The Accumulation of Capital. In Wikipedia, The Free Encyclopedia. Retrieved 17:47, March 9, 2020, from https://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=The_Accumulation_of_Capital</ref>  
In the Marxist tradition, we can notably cite two key authors. There is [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Rudolf_Hilferding Rudolf Hilferding] who wrote ''Finance Capital'' in 1910<ref>Rudolf Hilferding, [https://www.marxists.org/archive/hilferding/1910/finkap/ Finance Capital. A Study of the Latest Phase of Capitalist Development]. Ed. Tom Bottomore (Routledge & Kegan Paul, London, 1981)</ref><ref>Kowalik, T. (2014). Rudolf Hilferding’s Theory of Finance Capital. In Rosa Luxemburg (pp. 131–142). https://doi.org/10.1057/9781137428349_10</ref>, and [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Rosa_Luxemburg Rosa Luxemburg], who wrote ''[https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/The_Accumulation_of_Capital The Accumulation of Capital]'', first published in 1913, a book about imperialism within which she argues that capitalism needs to constantly expand into noncapitalist areas to access new supply sources, markets for surplus-value, and reservoirs of labor.<ref>Scott, Helen (2008). "Introduction to Rosa Luxemburg". The Essential Rosa Luxemburg: Reform or Revolution and The Mass Strike. By Luxemburg, Rosa. Chicago, IL: Haymarket Books. p. 18.</ref><ref>Wikipedia contributors. (2019, December 18). The Accumulation of Capital. In Wikipedia, The Free Encyclopedia. Retrieved 17:47, March 9, 2020, from https://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=The_Accumulation_of_Capital</ref>  


There is also [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Vladimir_Lenin Lenin] who published in September 1917 his book ''[https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Imperialism,_the_Highest_Stage_of_Capitalism Imperialism, the Highest Stage of Capitalism]''. Drawing on the economic literature available to him in Zurich and drawing on the works of [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/J._A._Hobson John Atkinson Hobson] and [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Rudolf_Hilferding Rudolf Hilferding] on imperialism, Lenin sets out his views on the recent transformations of capitalism and their political consequences in the context of the First World War.<ref>Géraldine Vaughan, Clarisse Berthezene, Pierre Purseigle, Julien Vincent, ''[https://books.google.fr/books?id=H9E1QwAACAAJ&dq=Le+Monde+britannique+1815-1931&hl=en&sa=X&ved=0ahUKEwiq1KL0pY7oAhUHzIUKHTr5AUQQ6AEIQDAC Le Monde britannique 1815-1931, Historiographie, Bibliographie, Enjeux]'', Belin, 2010, p. 11</ref> He argues that imperialism was a product of monopoly capitalism, as capitalists sought to increase their profits by extending into new territories where wages were lower and raw materials cheaper<ref>[https://www.marxists.org/archive/lenin/works/1916/imp-hsc/ Imperialism, the Highest Stage of Capitalism] by Vladimir Lenin at the [https://www.marxists.org/ Marxists Internet Archive]</ref><ref>Wikipedia contributors. (2020, February 24). Imperialism, the Highest Stage of Capitalism. In ''Wikipedia, The Free Encyclopedia''. Retrieved 20:56, March 9, 2020, from https://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=Imperialism,_the_Highest_Stage_of_Capitalism</ref> with imperialism, the highest (advanced) stage of capitalism, requiring monopolies (of labour and natural-resource exploitation) and the exportation of finance capital (rather than goods) to sustain colonialism, which is an integral function of said economic model.<ref>Paul Bowles (2007) ''Capitalism'', Pearson: London. pp. 91–93</ref><ref>[http://www.marxists.org/archive/lenin/works/1916/imp-hsc/ch03.htm ''Imperialism the Highest Stage of Capitalism'' III. Finance Capital and the Financial Oligarchy]</ref> ''Imperialism, the Highest Stage of Capitalism'' became a standard textbook and propelled Lenin has a central figure in the debate about imperialism. Therefore, for the Marxists, imperialism is a structural feature of capitalism.
There is also [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Vladimir_Lenin Lenin] who published in September 1917 his book ''[https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Imperialism,_the_Highest_Stage_of_Capitalism Imperialism, the Highest Stage of Capitalism]''. Drawing on the economic literature available to him in Zurich and drawing on the works of [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/J._A._Hobson John Atkinson Hobson] and [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Rudolf_Hilferding Rudolf Hilferding] on imperialism, Lenin sets out his views on the recent transformations of capitalism and their political consequences in the context of the First World War.<ref>Géraldine Vaughan, Clarisse Berthezene, Pierre Purseigle, Julien Vincent, ''[https://books.google.fr/books?id=H9E1QwAACAAJ&dq=Le+Monde+britannique+1815-1931&hl=en&sa=X&ved=0ahUKEwiq1KL0pY7oAhUHzIUKHTr5AUQQ6AEIQDAC Le Monde britannique 1815-1931, Historiographie, Bibliographie, Enjeux]'', Belin, 2010, p. 11</ref> He argues that imperialism was a product of monopoly capitalism, as capitalists sought to increase their profits by extending into new territories where wages were lower and raw materials cheaper<ref>[https://www.marxists.org/archive/lenin/works/1916/imp-hsc/ Imperialism, the Highest Stage of Capitalism] by Vladimir Lenin at the [https://www.marxists.org/ Marxists Internet Archive]</ref><ref>Wikipedia contributors. (2020, February 24). Imperialism, the Highest Stage of Capitalism. In ''Wikipedia, The Free Encyclopedia''. Retrieved 20:56, March 9, 2020, from <nowiki>https://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=Imperialism,_the_Highest_Stage_of_Capitalism</nowiki></ref> with imperialism, the highest (advanced) stage of capitalism, requiring monopolies (of labour and natural-resource exploitation) and the exportation of finance capital (rather than goods) to sustain colonialism, which is an integral function of said economic model.<ref>Paul Bowles (2007) ''Capitalism'', Pearson: London. pp. 91–93</ref><ref>[http://www.marxists.org/archive/lenin/works/1916/imp-hsc/ch03.htm ''Imperialism the Highest Stage of Capitalism'' III. Finance Capital and the Financial Oligarchy]</ref> ''Imperialism, the Highest Stage of Capitalism'' became a standard textbook and propelled Lenin has a central figure in the debate about imperialism. Therefore, for the Marxists, imperialism is a structural feature of capitalism.


After the war, Marxist theory, to some extent, became subsumed under anti-colonial preoccupations and gave rise to the [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Dependency_theory dependency theory]. Dependency theory was derived from Listian and Hamiltonian approaches to political economy. This theory was officially developed in the late 1960s following World War II, as scholars searched for the root issue in the lack of development in Latin America.<ref>{{Cite journal|last=Ahiakpor|first=James C. W.|date=1985|title=The Success and Failure of Dependency Theory: The Experience of Ghana|url=http://www.jstor.org/stable/2706689|journal=International Organization|volume=39|issue=3|pages=535–552|issn=0020-8183}}</ref> Dependency theory is, therefore, a Latin American phenomenon mostly because Latin America was the first segment of the old colonial world that became independent in the 19th century and so, theoretically, also was in the vanguard of the anti-colonial struggle.<ref>Wikipedia contributors. (2020, March 6). Dependency theory. In ''Wikipedia, The Free Encyclopedia''. Retrieved 21:22, March 9, 2020, from https://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=Dependency_theory</ref> For the dependency theory, these countries are integrated but are structurally placed in a state of continuous dependency by applying, for example, a ban on domestic production of products to be purchased from colonial companies. For André Gunder Frank, the dependence of the countries of the South can be explained historically by colonization (Asia, Africa, Latin America for example) and by unequal trade (by companies such as the Dutch East India Company or the English East India Company). For the Argentinean economist Raúl Prebisch, the wealth of rich countries is inversely proportional to that of poor countries. For dependency theorists, it is currently impossible for the countries of the South to develop without freeing themselves from the ties of dependency maintained with the North since the development of the countries of the North is based on the underdevelopment of those of the South. <ref>Théorie de la dépendance. (2019, September 3). ''Wikipédia, l'encyclopédie libre''. Page consultée le 01:30, September 3, 2019 à partir de http://fr.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=Th%C3%A9orie_de_la_d%C3%A9pendance</ref>  
After the war, Marxist theory, to some extent, became subsumed under anti-colonial preoccupations and gave rise to the [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Dependency_theory dependency theory]. Dependency theory was derived from Listian and Hamiltonian approaches to political economy. This theory was officially developed in the late 1960s following World War II, as scholars searched for the root issue in the lack of development in Latin America.<ref>{{Cite journal|last=Ahiakpor|first=James C. W.|date=1985|title=The Success and Failure of Dependency Theory: The Experience of Ghana|url=http://www.jstor.org/stable/2706689|journal=International Organization|volume=39|issue=3|pages=535–552|issn=0020-8183}}</ref> Dependency theory is, therefore, a Latin American phenomenon mostly because Latin America was the first segment of the old colonial world that became independent in the 19th century and so, theoretically, also was in the vanguard of the anti-colonial struggle.<ref>Wikipedia contributors. (2020, March 6). Dependency theory. In ''Wikipedia, The Free Encyclopedia''. Retrieved 21:22, March 9, 2020, from <nowiki>https://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=Dependency_theory</nowiki></ref> For the dependency theory, these countries are integrated but are structurally placed in a state of continuous dependency by applying, for example, a ban on domestic production of products to be purchased from colonial companies. For André Gunder Frank, the dependence of the countries of the South can be explained historically by colonization (Asia, Africa, Latin America for example) and by unequal trade (by companies such as the Dutch East India Company or the English East India Company). For the Argentinean economist Raúl Prebisch, the wealth of rich countries is inversely proportional to that of poor countries. For dependency theorists, it is currently impossible for the countries of the South to develop without freeing themselves from the ties of dependency maintained with the North since the development of the countries of the North is based on the underdevelopment of those of the South. <ref>Théorie de la dépendance. (2019, September 3). ''Wikipédia, l'encyclopédie libre''. Page consultée le 01:30, September 3, 2019 à partir de <nowiki>http://fr.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=Th%C3%A9orie_de_la_d%C3%A9pendance</nowiki></ref>  


So Marxism and dependency theory were one major exception to the way the study of economics and politics was organized in academia after the marginalist revolution.
So Marxism and dependency theory were one major exception to the way the study of economics and politics was organized in academia after the marginalist revolution.
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Keynes spent a lot of his energy in the 1920s writing political tracts attacking the policies that were pursued by the major powers in Versailles and then their domestic and foreign economic policies. He will notably publish ''A Revision of the Treaty'' in 1922 to advocate a reduction of German reparations and in ''A Tract on Monetary Reform'' published in 1823 he denounces the post-World War I deflation policies.<ref>Skidelsky, Robert Jacob Alexander. "John Maynard Keynes, 1883-1946: economist, philosopher, statesman." (2003).</ref> He was the first in the 1920s to say that the structures of the classical era should not be reproduced because there were shifts in domestic political economies notably arguing against a return to the gold standard at parity as it ran counter to the need for domestic policy autonomy.
Keynes spent a lot of his energy in the 1920s writing political tracts attacking the policies that were pursued by the major powers in Versailles and then their domestic and foreign economic policies. He will notably publish ''A Revision of the Treaty'' in 1922 to advocate a reduction of German reparations and in ''A Tract on Monetary Reform'' published in 1823 he denounces the post-World War I deflation policies.<ref>Skidelsky, Robert Jacob Alexander. "John Maynard Keynes, 1883-1946: economist, philosopher, statesman." (2003).</ref> He was the first in the 1920s to say that the structures of the classical era should not be reproduced because there were shifts in domestic political economies notably arguing against a return to the gold standard at parity as it ran counter to the need for domestic policy autonomy.


Alongside Keynes, there is [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Jacob_Viner Jacob Viner] who was a Canadian economist in the US Treasury Department during the administration of Franklin Roosevelt, and [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Charles_P._Kindleberger Charles Kindleberger], an economic historian known for the [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hegemonic_stability_theory hegemonic stability theory] and who started his career as an advisor to the US Treasury in the 1940s. Viner is one of the pioneers of theory of the firm, and was the first to distinguish between short-term and long-term cost curves in the article ''Cost curves and supply curves'' published in 1932.<ref>Viner, J. (1932). Cost curves and supply curves. Zeitschrift Für Nationalökonomie, 3(1), 23–46. https://doi.org/10.1007/bf01316299</ref> He was also a notorious opponent of John Maynard Keynes during the Great Depression. For him, Keynes's analysis was containing omissions and would not stand in the long run. As to Kindleberger, is one of the major administrators of the Marshall Plan, the plan that the United States came up with to reconstruct Western Europe after the Second World War. He served as the Acting Director of the Office of Economic Security Policy at the Department of State between 1945 and 1947. Kindleberger is a significant figure in early international political because he wrote the classical analysis of why global capitalism broke down in the 1930s in ''The World in Depression 1929–1939''<ref>Lewis, W. Arthur. The Journal of Interdisciplinary History, vol. 6, no. 1, 1975, pp. 172–174. JSTOR, https://www.jstor.org/stable/202837.</ref> and ''Manias, Panics, and Crashes'' which is the account of the way money and credit mismanagement has contributed to financial crises over centuries.<ref>Kindleberger, Charles P., and Robert Z. Aliber. [https://delong.typepad.com/manias.pdf Manias, panics, and crashes : a history of financial crises]. Hoboken, N.J: John Wiley & Sons, 2005. Print.</ref><ref>“[https://www.economist.com/finance-and-economics/2003/07/17/of-manias-panics-and-crashes Of Manias, Panics and Crashes].” The Economist, The Economist Newspaper, 17 July 2003.</ref><ref>Yuen, Raymond Wai Pong, Book Review – Manias, Panics, and Crashes: A History of Financial Crises 5th Edition (Author of the Book: Charles P. Kindleberger and Robert Aliber) (September 21, 2012). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2127952 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2127952 </ref> He is also known as the father to the [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hegemonic_stability_theory hegemonic stability theory] which is the first major global theory in international political theory that structured the debate. The key idea is that in order for a global economic and political system to work well, there must be a hegemonic power capable of making the necessary decisions to regulate the economy. Therefore, the collapse of an existing hegemon or the state of no hegemon destabilize the international system.<ref>Vincent Ferraro. "The Theory of Hegemonic Stability." http://www.mtholyoke.edu/acad/intrel/pol116/hegemony.htm</ref><ref>Wikipedia contributors. (2020, January 11). Hegemonic stability theory. In Wikipedia, The Free Encyclopedia. Retrieved 19:32, March 10, 2020, from https://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=Hegemonic_stability_theory</ref>
Alongside Keynes, there is [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Jacob_Viner Jacob Viner] who was a Canadian economist in the US Treasury Department during the administration of Franklin Roosevelt, and [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Charles_P._Kindleberger Charles Kindleberger], an economic historian known for the [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hegemonic_stability_theory hegemonic stability theory] and who started his career as an advisor to the US Treasury in the 1940s. Viner is one of the pioneers of theory of the firm, and was the first to distinguish between short-term and long-term cost curves in the article ''Cost curves and supply curves'' published in 1932.<ref>Viner, J. (1932). Cost curves and supply curves. Zeitschrift Für Nationalökonomie, 3(1), 23–46. https://doi.org/10.1007/bf01316299</ref> He was also a notorious opponent of John Maynard Keynes during the Great Depression. For him, Keynes's analysis was containing omissions and would not stand in the long run. As to Kindleberger, is one of the major administrators of the Marshall Plan, the plan that the United States came up with to reconstruct Western Europe after the Second World War. He served as the Acting Director of the Office of Economic Security Policy at the Department of State between 1945 and 1947. Kindleberger is a significant figure in early international political because he wrote the classical analysis of why global capitalism broke down in the 1930s in ''The World in Depression 1929–1939''<ref>Lewis, W. Arthur. The Journal of Interdisciplinary History, vol. 6, no. 1, 1975, pp. 172–174. JSTOR, https://www.jstor.org/stable/202837.</ref> and ''Manias, Panics, and Crashes'' which is the account of the way money and credit mismanagement has contributed to financial crises over centuries.<ref>Kindleberger, Charles P., and Robert Z. Aliber. [https://delong.typepad.com/manias.pdf Manias, panics, and crashes : a history of financial crises]. Hoboken, N.J: John Wiley & Sons, 2005. Print.</ref><ref>“[https://www.economist.com/finance-and-economics/2003/07/17/of-manias-panics-and-crashes Of Manias, Panics and Crashes].” The Economist, The Economist Newspaper, 17 July 2003.</ref><ref> Yuen, Raymond Wai Pong, Book Review – Manias, Panics, and Crashes: A History of Financial Crises 5th Edition (Author of the Book: Charles P. Kindleberger and Robert Aliber) (September 21, 2012). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2127952 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2127952 </ref> He is also known as the father to the [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hegemonic_stability_theory hegemonic stability theory] which is the first major global theory in international political theory that structured the debate. The key idea is that in order for a global economic and political system to work well, there must be a hegemonic power capable of making the necessary decisions to regulate the economy. Therefore, the collapse of an existing hegemon or the state of no hegemon destabilize the international system.<ref>Vincent Ferraro. "The Theory of Hegemonic Stability." http://www.mtholyoke.edu/acad/intrel/pol116/hegemony.htm</ref><ref>Wikipedia contributors. (2020, January 11). Hegemonic stability theory. In Wikipedia, The Free Encyclopedia. Retrieved 19:32, March 10, 2020, from https://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=Hegemonic_stability_theory</ref>


==Birth of the discipline of International Political Economy==
==Birth of the discipline of International Political Economy==
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Why was international political economy born in the early 1970s? The first thing is the historical context of the early seventies and how international politics influenced international economy of that time. The economic life of the 1970s was greatly affected by continuously unstable dynamics which resulted in structural changes of the capitalist world economy and notably a change in the dominant policy stance from Keynesianism to neo-conservative monetarism.<ref>Itoh, Makoto. [https://books.google.fr/books?id=G7muCwAAQBAJ&printsec=frontcover&dq=The+World+Economic+Crisis+and+Japanese+Capitalism&hl=en&sa=X&ved=0ahUKEwjClPjV75DoAhVBKBoKHZpAAaAQ6AEIKTAA#v=onepage&q=The%20World%20Economic%20Crisis%20and%20Japanese%20Capitalism&f=false The World Economic Crisis and Japanese Capitalism]. London: Palgrave Macmillan Limited, 1990. Print.</ref>
Why was international political economy born in the early 1970s? The first thing is the historical context of the early seventies and how international politics influenced international economy of that time. The economic life of the 1970s was greatly affected by continuously unstable dynamics which resulted in structural changes of the capitalist world economy and notably a change in the dominant policy stance from Keynesianism to neo-conservative monetarism.<ref>Itoh, Makoto. [https://books.google.fr/books?id=G7muCwAAQBAJ&printsec=frontcover&dq=The+World+Economic+Crisis+and+Japanese+Capitalism&hl=en&sa=X&ved=0ahUKEwjClPjV75DoAhVBKBoKHZpAAaAQ6AEIKTAA#v=onepage&q=The%20World%20Economic%20Crisis%20and%20Japanese%20Capitalism&f=false The World Economic Crisis and Japanese Capitalism]. London: Palgrave Macmillan Limited, 1990. Print.</ref>


The dollar crisis of 1968-1971 and the decision of President Richard Nixon to terminate the convertibility of gold on 15 August 1971 that had been established under the IMF caused the end of the [[Bretton Woods System: 1944 - 1973|Bretton Woods system]].<ref>Strange, Susan. “The Dollar Crisis 1971.” International Affairs (Royal Institute of International Affairs 1944-), vol. 48, no. 2, 1972, pp. 191–216. JSTOR, https://www.jstor.org/stable/2613437.</ref><ref>Diebold, W., & Gowa, J. (1984). Closing the Gold Window: Domestic Politics and the End of Bretton Woods. Foreign Affairs, 63(1), 190. https://doi.org/10.2307/20042113</ref> A dollar standard was then created in December 1971 with the [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Smithsonian_Agreement Smithsonian Agreement] whereby the currencies of a number of Western countries were fasten to the US dollar.<ref> International Monetary Fund, . (1996). "Chapter 26: Road to the Smithsonian Agreement (August 16–December 18, 1971)". In The International Monetary Fund 1966-1971 : The System Under Stress Volume I: Narrative. USA: INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND. doi: https://doi.org/10.5089/9781451971477.071</ref><ref>Chen, James. “Smithsonian Agreement.” Investopedia, Investopedia, 26 Feb. 2020, https://www.investopedia.com/terms/s/smithsonian-agreement.asp.</ref><ref>Pierce, Francis S., and Roy Forbes Harrod. “The Smithsonian Agreement and After.” Encyclopædia Britannica, Encyclopædia Britannica, Inc., 14 Mar. 2016, https://www.britannica.com/topic/international-payment/The-OECD#ref125864.</ref><ref>Humpage, Owen. “The Smithsonian Agreement.” Federal Reserve History, https://www.federalreservehistory.org/essays/smithsonian_agreement.</ref> The oil crises of 1973 and 1979 resulted in the West to more restrictive monetary policy to better fight inflation. In the 1970s, the so-called Japanese economic miracle took place making Japan a major trading nation and industrial competitors for Western countries. Between 1946 and 1976, Japan sustained economic growth by 55 fold while its exportation known a truly phenomenal growth.<ref>Forsberg, Aaron. [https://books.google.fr/books?id=Lc9FAwAAQBAJ&printsec=frontcover&dq=The+Cold+War+Context+of+Japan%27s+Postwar+Economic+Revival,+1950-1960&hl=en&sa=X&ved=0ahUKEwjg5JTG8ZDoAhWxxoUKHSrFCzYQ6AEIKTAA#v=onepage&q=The%20Cold%20War%20Context%20of%20Japan's%20Postwar%20Economic%20Revival%2C%201950-1960&f=false America and the Japanese miracle: the Cold War context of Japan's postwar economic revival, 1950-1960]. Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 2000. Print.</ref><ref>Monroe, Wilbur F. “Japan's Economy in the 1970s: Implications for the World.” Pacific Affairs, vol. 45, no. 4, 1972, pp. 508–520. JSTOR, www.jstor.org/stable/2755656.</ref> The movement of exchange rates also increased considerably in the early part of the post-Bretton Woods era.<ref>Makin, John H., and John H. Makin. [https://ies.princeton.edu/pdf/E103.pdf Capital flows and exchange-rate flexibility in the post-Bretton Woods era]. No. 103. International Finance Section, Princeton University, 1974.</ref><ref>Frankel, Jeffrey A., et al. "[https://www.nber.org/chapters/c6221.pdf International capital flows and domestic economic policies]." ''The United States in the world economy''. University of Chicago Press, 1988. 559-658.</ref><ref>Yang, D. (2008). Coping with Disaster: The Impact of Hurricanes on International Financial Flows, 1970-2002. The B.E. Journal of Economic Analysis & Policy, 8(1). https://doi.org/10.2202/1935-1682.1903</ref> For smaller or more outward-looking economies, the floating exchange rate is disruptive. The same is true for developing countries that are concerned about the floating exchange rate for the stability of their economies. With the transition to the floating exchange rate, some countries of the world and especially countries that claim to compete for the dominance of the international financial market are liberalizing their international capital transactions. The most important changes are taking place in the United States, which is trying to regain ground following the abolition of capital controls and is committed to the liberalisation of the financial sector. For other countries, we see a "back and forth" during the 1970s even with regard to capital flow controls, not to mention the liberalization of their financial sector.<ref>Baripedia. Money, Finance and the World Economy: 1974 - 2000. from https://baripedia.org/w/index.php?title=Money,_Finance_and_the_World_Economy:_1974_-_2000</ref>
The dollar crisis of 1968-1971 and the decision of President Richard Nixon to terminate the convertibility of gold on 15 August 1971 that had been established under the IMF caused the end of the [[Bretton Woods System: 1944 - 1973|Bretton Woods system]].<ref>Strange, Susan. “The Dollar Crisis 1971.” International Affairs (Royal Institute of International Affairs 1944-), vol. 48, no. 2, 1972, pp. 191–216. JSTOR, https://www.jstor.org/stable/2613437.</ref><ref>Diebold, W., & Gowa, J. (1984). Closing the Gold Window: Domestic Politics and the End of Bretton Woods. Foreign Affairs, 63(1), 190. https://doi.org/10.2307/20042113</ref> A dollar standard was then created in December 1971 with the [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Smithsonian_Agreement Smithsonian Agreement] whereby the currencies of a number of Western countries were fasten to the US dollar.<ref> International Monetary Fund, . (1996). "Chapter 26: Road to the Smithsonian Agreement (August 16–December 18, 1971)". In The International Monetary Fund 1966-1971 : The System Under Stress Volume I: Narrative. USA: INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND. doi: https://doi.org/10.5089/9781451971477.071</ref><ref>Chen, James. “Smithsonian Agreement.” Investopedia, Investopedia, 26 Feb. 2020, https://www.investopedia.com/terms/s/smithsonian-agreement.asp.</ref><ref>Pierce, Francis S., and Roy Forbes Harrod. “The Smithsonian Agreement and After.” Encyclopædia Britannica, Encyclopædia Britannica, Inc., 14 Mar. 2016, https://www.britannica.com/topic/international-payment/The-OECD#ref125864.</ref><ref>Humpage, Owen. “The Smithsonian Agreement.” Federal Reserve History, https://www.federalreservehistory.org/essays/smithsonian_agreement.</ref> The oil crises of 1973 and 1979 resulted in the West to more restrictive monetary policy to better fight inflation. In the 1970s, the so-called Japanese economic miracle took place making Japan a major trading nation and industrial competitors for Western countries. Between 1946 and 1976, Japan sustained economic growth by 55 fold while its exportation known a truly phenomenal growth.<ref>Forsberg, Aaron. [https://books.google.fr/books?id=Lc9FAwAAQBAJ&printsec=frontcover&dq=The+Cold+War+Context+of+Japan%27s+Postwar+Economic+Revival,+1950-1960&hl=en&sa=X&ved=0ahUKEwjg5JTG8ZDoAhWxxoUKHSrFCzYQ6AEIKTAA#v=onepage&q=The%20Cold%20War%20Context%20of%20Japan's%20Postwar%20Economic%20Revival%2C%201950-1960&f=false America and the Japanese miracle: the Cold War context of Japan's postwar economic revival, 1950-1960]. Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 2000. Print.</ref><ref>Monroe, Wilbur F. “Japan's Economy in the 1970s: Implications for the World.” Pacific Affairs, vol. 45, no. 4, 1972, pp. 508–520. JSTOR, www.jstor.org/stable/2755656.</ref> The movement of exchange rates also increased considerably in the early part of the post-Bretton Woods era.<ref>Makin, John H., and John H. Makin. [https://ies.princeton.edu/pdf/E103.pdf Capital flows and exchange-rate flexibility in the post-Bretton Woods era]. No. 103. International Finance Section, Princeton University, 1974.</ref><ref>Frankel, Jeffrey A., et al. "[https://www.nber.org/chapters/c6221.pdf International capital flows and domestic economic policies]." ''The United States in the world economy''. University of Chicago Press, 1988. 559-658.</ref><ref>Yang, D. (2008). Coping with Disaster: The Impact of Hurricanes on International Financial Flows, 1970-2002. The B.E. Journal of Economic Analysis & Policy, 8(1). https://doi.org/10.2202/1935-1682.1903</ref> For smaller or more outward-looking economies, the floating exchange rate is disruptive. The same is true for developing countries that are concerned about the floating exchange rate for the stability of their economies. With the transition to the floating exchange rate, some countries of the world and especially countries that claim to compete for the dominance of the international financial market are liberalizing their international capital transactions. The most important changes are taking place in the United States, which is trying to regain ground following the abolition of capital controls and is committed to the liberalisation of the financial sector. For other countries, we see a "back and forth" during the 1970s even with regard to capital flow controls, not to mention the liberalization of their financial sector.<ref>Baripedia. Money, Finance and the World Economy: 1974 - 2000. from https://baripedia.org/w/index.php?title=Money,_Finance_and_the_World_Economy:_1974_-_2000</ref>


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The discipline was born independently at the same time both in the United Kingdom and the United States. Of course, the developments in the United States are more relevant and also the course here at the University of Geneva is much more aligned on development in the American trends of international political economy.  
The discipline was born independently at the same time both in the United Kingdom and the United States. Of course, the developments in the United States are more relevant and also the course here at the University of Geneva is much more aligned on development in the American trends of international political economy.  


In the United States, two scholars played a central role in the development of the discipline. Those were [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Robert_Keohane Robert Keohane] and [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Joseph_Nye Joseph Nye], the author who notably coined the term soft power in the late 1980s. They were political scientists who were influenced by the functionalists and co-founded the international relations theory of neoliberalism, developed in their 1977 book ''Power and Interdependence''.<ref>Keohane, Robert O., and Joseph S. Nye. ''Power and interdependence''. New York: Longman, 2001. Print.</ref> In the early 1970s, they took over the journal peer-reviewed academic journal [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/International_Organization_(journal) ''International Organization''] and shifted away its focus from the study of international organizations to the study of international political economy.<ref>“International Organization.” Cambridge Core, https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/international-organization.</ref><ref>International Organization.” JSTOR, https://www.jstor.org/journal/inteorga</ref> They organized two key conferences, and specifically, that dealt with world politics and the concept of interdependence. After 1975, ''International Organization'' becomes the main outlet for international political economy in the United States.<ref>Jackson, Robert H., Jørgen Møller, and Georg Sørensen. Introduction to international relations : theories and approaches. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2019. Print. [https://books.google.fr/books?id=L2R7DwAAQBAJ&pg=PA202&lpg=PA202&dq=International+Organization+School+keohane+nye&source=bl&ots=ZLVvCRoLCq&sig=ACfU3U1lP01yvdpIOIbMigANa6Om4H_SiA&hl=en&sa=X&ved=2ahUKEwiI9fmyhJLoAhXRDmMBHbChAXcQ6AEwAHoECAUQAQ#v=onepage&q=International%20Organization%20School%20keohane%20nye&f=false page 202]</ref> From then onward, international political economy is more or less identified with the journal to the extent that some people refer to as the American School as the International Organization School.<ref>Maliniak, D., & Tierney, M. J. (2009). The American school of IPE. Review of International Political Economy, 16(1), 6–33. https://doi.org/10.1080/09692290802524042 </ref>
In the United States, two scholars played a central role in the development of the discipline. Those were [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Robert_Keohane Robert Keohane] and [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Joseph_Nye Joseph Nye], the author who notably coined the term soft power in the late 1980s. They were political scientists who were influenced by the functionalists and co-founded the international relations theory of neoliberalism, developed in their 1977 book ''Power and Interdependence''.<ref>Keohane, Robert O., and Joseph S. Nye. ''Power and interdependence''. New York: Longman, 2001. Print.</ref> In the early 1970s, they took over the journal peer-reviewed academic journal [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/International_Organization_(journal) ''International Organization''] and shifted away its focus from the study of international organizations to the study of international political economy.<ref>“International Organization.” Cambridge Core, https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/international-organization.</ref><ref>International Organization.” JSTOR, https://www.jstor.org/journal/inteorga</ref> They organized two key conferences, and specifically, that dealt with world politics and the concept of interdependence. After 1975, ''International Organization'' becomes the main outlet for international political economy in the United States.<ref> Jackson, Robert H., Jørgen Møller, and Georg Sørensen. Introduction to international relations : theories and approaches. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2019. Print. [https://books.google.fr/books?id=L2R7DwAAQBAJ&pg=PA202&lpg=PA202&dq=International+Organization+School+keohane+nye&source=bl&ots=ZLVvCRoLCq&sig=ACfU3U1lP01yvdpIOIbMigANa6Om4H_SiA&hl=en&sa=X&ved=2ahUKEwiI9fmyhJLoAhXRDmMBHbChAXcQ6AEwAHoECAUQAQ#v=onepage&q=International%20Organization%20School%20keohane%20nye&f=false page 202]</ref> From then onward, international political economy is more or less identified with the journal to the extent that some people refer to as the American School as the International Organization School.<ref>Maliniak, D., & Tierney, M. J. (2009). The American school of IPE. Review of International Political Economy, 16(1), 6–33. https://doi.org/10.1080/09692290802524042 </ref>


Pretty much at the same time, [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Susan_Strange Susan Strange], who was a professor of international relations in the London School of Economics, played a central role in developing international political economy as a field of study in Britain.<ref>BROWN, C. (1999). Susan Strange—a critical appreciation. Review of International Studies, 25(3), 531–535. https://doi.org/10.1017/s0260210599005318</ref> She notably published in 1970 the article ''International Economics and International Relations: A Case of Mutual Neglect'' which was a kind of manifesto calling for international economists and international political scientists to work together and to try and bridge the gap between international economics (IE) and international relations (IR).<ref>Susan Strange. “[https://www.bu.edu/pardeeschool/files/2018/02/Susan-Strange%E2%80%99s-%E2%80%9CInternational-Economics-and-International-Relations-A-Case-of-Mutual-Neglect.pdf International Economics and International Relations: A Case of Mutual Neglect].” International Affairs (Royal Institute of International Affairs 1944-), vol. 46, no. 2, 1970, pp. 304–315. JSTOR, https://www.jstor.org/stable/2613829.</ref> According to her, scholars from both traditions were neglecting fundamental changes in the world economy arguing that a more modern approach to the study of the global economy was needed. Therefore, for Strange, international political economic was 'middle ground' between economic and political analysis of international affairs.<ref>Cohen, B. J. (2015). A concluding note. Contexto Internacional, 37(3), 1069–1080. https://doi.org/10.1590/s0102-85292015000300010</ref>
Pretty much at the same time, [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Susan_Strange Susan Strange], who was a professor of international relations in the London School of Economics, played a central role in developing international political economy as a field of study in Britain.<ref>BROWN, C. (1999). Susan Strange—a critical appreciation. Review of International Studies, 25(3), 531–535. https://doi.org/10.1017/s0260210599005318</ref> She notably published in 1970 the article ''International Economics and International Relations: A Case of Mutual Neglec'' which was a kind of manifesto calling for international economists and international political scientists to work together and to try and bridge the gap between international economics (IE) and international relations (IR).<ref>Susan Strange. “[https://www.bu.edu/pardeeschool/files/2018/02/Susan-Strange%E2%80%99s-%E2%80%9CInternational-Economics-and-International-Relations-A-Case-of-Mutual-Neglect.pdf International Economics and International Relations: A Case of Mutual Neglect].” International Affairs (Royal Institute of International Affairs 1944-), vol. 46, no. 2, 1970, pp. 304–315. JSTOR, https://www.jstor.org/stable/2613829.</ref> According to her, scholars from both traditions were neglecting fundamental changes in the world economy arguing that a more modern approach to the study of the global economy was needed. Therefore, for Strange, international political economic was 'middle ground' between economic and political analysis of international affairs.<ref>Cohen, B. J. (2015). A concluding note. Contexto Internacional, 37(3), 1069–1080. https://doi.org/10.1590/s0102-85292015000300010</ref>


==Evolution: American school vs  British school==
==Evolution: American school vs  British school==
How those two schools developed? In ''International political economy: a tale of two heterodoxies'' published in 2001, Murphy and Nelson refer to the development of the international political economy as a tale of two heterodoxies divided into American and  British schools.<ref>Murphy, C. N., & Nelson, D. R. (2001). International Political Economy: A Tale of Two Heterodoxies. The British Journal of Politics and International Relations, 3(3), 393–412. https://doi.org/10.1111/1467-856x.00065</ref> Why heterodoxy? Because international was heterodox in relation, both to mainstream economic and to mainstream political science.<ref>Leiteritz, R. J. (2005). [https://www.google.com/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=3&ved=2ahUKEwiJr73SspPoAhXmAGMBHcp5AwYQFjACegQIBRAB&url=https%3A%2F%2Fdialnet.unirioja.es%2Fdescarga%2Farticulo%2F5622523.pdf&usg=AOvVaw02nBtX4EEEsNCmeHz0pnWD International Political Economy: the state of the art]. Colombia Internacional, (62), 50–63. https://doi.org/10.7440/colombiaint62.2005.03</ref>
How those two schools developed? In ''International political economy: a tale of two heterodoxies'' published in 2001, Murphy and Nelson refer to the development of the international political economy as a tale of two heterodoxies divided into American and  British schools.<ref>Murphy, C. N., & Nelson, D. R. (2001). International Political Economy: A Tale of Two Heterodoxies. The British Journal of Politics and International Relations, 3(3), 393–412. https://doi.org/10.1111/1467-856x.00065</ref> Why heterodoxy? Because international was heterodox in relation, both to mainstream economic and to mainstream political science.<ref>Leiteritz, R. J. (2005). [https://www.google.com/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=3&ved=2ahUKEwiJr73SspPoAhXmAGMBHcp5AwYQFjACegQIBRAB&url=https%3A%2F%2Fdialnet.unirioja.es%2Fdescarga%2Farticulo%2F5622523.pdf&usg=AOvVaw02nBtX4EEEsNCmeHz0pnWD International Political Economy: the state of the art]. Colombia Internacional, (62), 50–63. https://doi.org/10.7440/colombiaint62.2005.03</ref>


In reccent years, the American international political economy has tried to mimic the methods of mainstream economics. This comes most of the time in form of using quantitative or statistical methods in order to allow for law-like generalizations. There are very broad divergences in the sense that American international political economy is very much state-centric, privileging sovereign governments above all other units of interest and conceiving of itself as a branch of international relations while British School by contrast, treats the state as just one agent among many.<ref>Weber, H. (2015). Is IPE just “boring”,1 or committed to problematic meta-theoretic|al assumptions? A critical engagement with the politics of method. Contexto Internacional, 37(3), 913–944. https://doi.org/10.1590/s0102-85292015000300005</ref> Actors are not driven by norms or ideas but essentially by material interests. As a consequence, different actors pursue different goals. To summarize, the American school analyze actors as rational and goal-oriented, adopting a utility-maximizing behavior and thus self-interested individuals. Therefore, international political economy is considered as the political economy of international relations in the United States. It is state-centric with the main preoccupation to determine how states behave in terms of international economics. American international political economy is suspicious of normative judgements. It is more preoccupied with explaining how the system works rather than with criticizing the way the system works and prescribing alternative ways in which the system should work. It has tried since the mid-1980s more or less to mimic the positivist and quantitative bias that is a methodological hallmark of mainstream political science in particular mainstream economics, and neoclassical economics.
In reccent years, the American international political economy has tried to mimic the methods of mainstream economics. There are very broad divergences in the sense that American international political economy is very much state-centric, privileging sovereign governments above all other units of interest and conceiving of itself as a branch of international relations while British School by contrast, treats the state as just one agent among many.<ref>Weber, H. (2015). Is IPE just “boring”,1 or committed to problematic meta-theoretic|al assumptions? A critical engagement with the politics of method. Contexto Internacional, 37(3), 913–944. https://doi.org/10.1590/s0102-85292015000300005</ref>. Therefore, international political economy is considered as the political economy of international relations in the United States. It is state-centric with the main preoccupation to determine how states behave in terms of international economics. American international political economy is suspicious of normative judgements. It is more preoccupied with explaining how the system works rather than with criticizing the way the system works and prescribing alternative ways in which the system should work. It has tried since the mid-1980s more or less to mimic the positivist and quantitative bias that is a methodological hallmark of mainstream political science in particular mainstream economics, and neoclassical economics.


In ''The Transatlantic Divide: Why Are American and British IPE so Different?'' and ''The transatlantic divide: a rejoinder'' Benjamin Cohen who was one of the major characters in developments of international political economy from the early 1970s, he explained this by saying that it is because, from the mid-1980s, international political economy authors wanted to enjoy the same kind of prestige.<ref>Cohen, Benjamin J. “The Transatlantic Divide: Why Are American and British IPE so Different?” Review of International Political Economy, vol. 14, no. 2, 2007, pp. 197–219. JSTOR, https://www.jstor.org/stable/25261908.</ref><ref>Cohen, B. J. (2007). The transatlantic divide: A rejoinder. Review of International Political Economy, 15(1), 30–34. https://doi.org/10.1080/09692290701751266</ref> So they try to mimic their methods their methodologies in order to advance their careers.
In ''The Transatlantic Divide: Why Are American and British IPE so Different?'' and ''The transatlantic divide: a rejoinder'' Benjamin Cohen who was one of the major characters in developments of international political economy from the early 1970s, he explained this by saying that it is because, from the mid-1980s, international political economy authors wanted to enjoy the same kind of prestige.<ref>Cohen, Benjamin J. “The Transatlantic Divide: Why Are American and British IPE so Different?” Review of International Political Economy, vol. 14, no. 2, 2007, pp. 197–219. JSTOR, https://www.jstor.org/stable/25261908.</ref><ref>Cohen, B. J. (2007). The transatlantic divide: A rejoinder. Review of International Political Economy, 15(1), 30–34. https://doi.org/10.1080/09692290701751266</ref> So they try to mimic their methods their methodologies in order to advance their careers.


British international political economy is the opposite on pretty much every score.<ref>Wullweber, J. (2018). Monism vs. pluralism, the global financial crisis, and the methodological struggle in the field of International Political Economy. Competition & Change, 23(3), 287–311. https://doi.org/10.1177/1024529418813830</ref> British international political economy refers to itself as the global political economy, to begin with, and not the international political economy most of the time. Again because global and not international because it is not state-centre. It is very much preoccupied with the erosion, the place that the state occupies within the international system and the rise of importance of non-state actors in the international system works.
British international political economy is the opposite on pretty much every score. British international political economy refers to itself as the global political economy, to begin with, and not the international political economy most of the time. Again because global and not international because it is not state-centre. It is very much preoccupied with the erosion, the place that the state occupies within the international system and the rise of importance of non-state actors in the international system works.


British international political economy is also the home for contemporaries. British international political economy is a broad church in terms of methods and terms of schools of thoughts. It is methodologically and thematically eclectic, and it looks at all kinds of issues with our drawing limits. For British School, the approach is more interpretative and critical. The different trends reject the positivist assumption that the purpose of social science is to identify causal relationships in an objective world. They seek in the wider range of approaches in the field of social science for alternative theories and explanations (e.g., historical sociology structuralism and poststructuralism, feminism, cultural studies, etc).<ref>Reflections on the “British School” of International Political Economy. (2009). New Political Economy, 14(3), 313–314. https://doi.org/10.1080/13563460903087425</ref> British School approaches have produced a more profound toolkit to analyze international political economy.<ref>Marchiano, Aldo. “International Political Economy Research: American School vs. British School.” Sui Genesis, 2014, https://www.sett.com/suigeneris/international-political-economy-research-american-school-vs-british-school.</ref> If in the United States, international political economy has been mostly seen as a sub-specialty of the study of the field of International Relations, British international political economy does not consider itself as a branch of international relations. Thus, in many places in the United Kingdom, international political economy is stored into departments that do not teach international relations. Moreover, the British international political economy has a much more ambitious agenda in the sense that it introduced the concept of globalization but also approaches such environmental culture and feminist political economy.
British international political economy is also the home for contemporaries. British international political economy is a broad church in terms of methods and terms of schools of thoughts. It is methodologically and thematically eclectic, and it looks at all kinds of issues with our drawing limits. British international political economy does not consider itself as a branch of international relations. Thus, in many places in the United Kingdom, international political economy is stored into departments that do not teach international relations. Moreover, the British international political economy has a much more ambitious agenda in the sense that it introduced the concept of globalization but also approaches such environmental culture and feminist political economy.


==Old vs New International Political Economy==
==Old vs New International Political Economy==


American international political economy can be split up into the old and the new international political economy.<ref>Lee, Donna, and David Hudson. “The Old and New Significance of Political Economy in Diplomacy.” Review of International Studies, vol. 30, no. 3, 2004, pp. 343–360. JSTOR, https://www.jstor.org/stable/20097922.</ref><ref>Dickins, Amanda. “The Evolution of International Political Economy.” International Affairs (Royal Institute of International Affairs 1944-), vol. 82, no. 3, 2006, pp. 479–492. JSTOR, https://www.jstor.org/stable/3874263.</ref> The old international political economy based itself on methodologically loose attempts and holistic understandings of the international political economy. From that, the old international political economy of the 1970s gradually moved towards a more positivist and behavioralist direction. From the mid-1980s, international political economy became mainly concerned with positivist explorations of the individual dimensions of the system or with what some authors refer to as Mertonian [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Middle-range_theory_(sociology) middle-range theory].<ref>Bluedorn, A. C., & Evered, R. (1980). Middle Range Theory and the Strategies of Theory Construction. In Middle Range Theory and the Study of Organizations (pp. 19–32). https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-009-8733-3_2</ref> There is also a shift from qualitative to quantitative methodologies.
American international political economy can be split up into the old and the new international political economy. The old international political economy based itself on methodologically loose attempts and holistic understandings of the international political economy. From that, the old international political economy of the 1970s gradually moved towards a more positivist and behavioralist direction. From the mid-1980s, international political economy became mainly concerned with positivist explorations of the individual dimensions of the system or with what some authors refer to as Mertonian middle-range theory. There is also a shift from qualitative to quantitative methodologies.


The primary debate in the old international political economy was the debate about complex interdependence, hegemonic stability theory and hegemonic decline. There was a major debate about whether the United States was in hegemonic decline in the late 1970s and 1980s, and another one about international organizations and the governance of the global system. The main focus of the discipline was the international level.
The primary debate in the old international political economy was the debate about complex interdependence, hegemonic stability theory and hegemonic decline. There was a major debate about whether the United States was in hegemonic decline in the late 1970s and 1980s, and another one about international organizations and the governance of the global system. The main focus of the discipline was the international level.


The main aspects of the new international political economy focus on the domestic sources of foreign economic policy. In contrast, the new international political economy attempts to determine the relationships between key individuals, political, and economic variables in the system. It is a more-integrated type of analysis, which explicitly sought to trace the connections between political and economic factors.<ref>Veseth, Michael A., and David N. Balaam. “International Political Economy.” Encyclopædia Britannica, Encyclopædia Britannica, Inc., 3 Mar. 2014, https://www.britannica.com/topic/political-economy/International-political-economy.</ref>
The main aspects of the new international political economy focus on the domestic sources of foreign economic policy. In contrast, the new international political economy attempts to determine the relationships between key individuals, political, and economic variables in the system.  


Keohane, who was the founder of the old international political economy, in the article ''The old IPE and the new. Review of International Political Economy'' published in 2019, sustained attention to issues of structural power and the synthetic interpretation of change.<ref>Keohane, R. O. (2009). The old IPE and the new. Review of International Political Economy, 16(1), 34–46. https://doi.org/10.1080/09692290802524059</ref> There are debates within the American international political economy itself about which direction the discipline should take.
Keohane, who was the founder of the old international political economy, in 2009 in the article X sustained attention to issues of structural power and the synthetic interpretation of change. There are debates within the American international political economy itself about which direction the discipline should take.


[https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Open_economy Open economy politics] is the name given by contemporary practitioners of American international political economy to their approach.<ref>Robert H. Bates, 1998. "[https://ideas.repec.org/h/pup/chapts/6067-1.html Introduction to Open-Economy Politics: The Political Economy of the World Coffee Trade]," [https://ideas.repec.org/s/pup/chapts.html Introductory Chapters], in: Open-Economy Politics: The Political Economy of the World Coffee Trade, Princeton University Press.</ref> It adopts the assumptions of neoclassical economics and international trade theory.<ref>Lake, David A. "[https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s11558-009-9060-y Open economy politics: A critical review]." The Review of International Organizations 4.3 (2009): 219-244.</ref> The main idea is that today international political economy tries to determine the relationships between three distinct variables, namely domestic interests, domestic and international institutions, and international bargaining between states. For contemporaries, the combination of those three variables determined the way the international political economy functions.
Opening economy politics is the name given by contemporary practitioners of American international political economy to their approach. The main idea is that today international political economy tries to determine the relationships between three distinct variables, namely domestic interests, domestic and international institutions, and international bargaining between states. For contemporaries, the combination of those three variables determined the way the international political economy functions.


The key protagonist in the old international political economy was [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Robert_Keohane Robert Keohane], a political scientist and neoliberal institutionalist. There is also [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Stephen_D._Krasner Stephen Krasner] a neorealist academic who focused on international regimes, and he is a leading figure in the study of [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Regime_theory Regime theory]. [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Peter_J._Katzenstein Peter Katzenstein] was credited with introducing the issues of domestic variables and ideational variables into the study of international political economy in the early 1980s.<ref>Gourevitch, P. A., Keohane, R. O., Krasner, S. D., Laitin, D., Pempel, T. J., Streeck, W., & Tarrow, S. (2008). The Political Science of Peter J. Katzenstein. PS: Political Science & Politics, 41(4), 893–899. https://doi.org/10.1017/s1049096508211273</ref> For him, until the end of the 1970s, the litterature on foreign economic policy has discounted the influence of domestic forces.<ref>Peter J. Katzenstein, ed. Between Power and Plenty: Foreign Economic Policies of Advanced Industrial States. Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1978. (1980). Politics & Society, 10(1), 115–116. https://doi.org/10.1177/003232928001000112</ref><ref>Cohen, Benjamin J. International political economy : an intellectual history. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2008. Print. [https://books.google.fr/books?id=H79WVDwMzCEC&lpg=PA127&ots=z6miK2z3-s&dq=domestic%20variables%20Katzenstein&pg=PA125#v=onepage&q=domestic%20variables%20Katzenstein&f=false page 125]</ref> For Katzenstein, international and domestic factors have been closely intertwined in the historical evolution of the international political economy since the middle of the XIXth century. He argues that the domestic structure of the national state is an essential explanatory variable of the interrelation between international interdependence and political structure.<ref>Talani, Leila Simona. European political economy: issues and theories. Routledge, 2016. [https://books.google.fr/books?id=cYQGDAAAQBAJ&lpg=PA46&ots=NLM11ImoX1&dq=domestic%20variables%20Katzenstein&pg=PA46#v=onepage&q=domestic%20variables%20Katzenstein&f=false page 45-46]</ref> There is [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Charles_P._Kindleberger Charles Kindleberger] and also [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Robert_Gilpin Robert Gilpin] who wrote a string of books that became classic.
The key people in the old international political economy were Robert Keohane, a political scientist and neoliberal institutionalist. There is also Stephen Krasner more a neorealist. Peter Katzenstein was credited with introducing the issues of domestic variables and ideational variables into the study of international political economy in the early 1980s. There is Charles Kindleberger and also Robert Gilpin who wrote a string of books that became classic.


Americans are almost exclusively in international relations, and most come from Ivy League universities. Furthermore, it is mainly a group of people associated with a legit university in the United States. Those academics are close to policymaking circles as well, whereas actors in the British international political economy come from different horizons. Two institutions are particularly important in the field of international political economy: one is the [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/London_School_of_Economics London School of Economics] of course, and the other one is the [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/University_of_Warwick University of Warwick]. It should be highlighted that there are also the Canadians who try to bridge the gap between the Americans the British.<ref>Clement, Wallace, and Glen Williams. [https://books.google.fr/books?hl=en&lr=&id=TK6g24CiKjQC&oi=fnd&pg=PR5&dq=New+Canadian+Political+Economy&ots=2leYS2nULm&sig=c9wb9UfcqZNLjDvz7ChDuu6GnSw#v=onepage&q=New%20Canadian%20Political%20Economy&f=false The New Canadian political economy]. Kingston Montreal London: McGill-Queen's University Press, 1989. Print.</ref> International political economy in Canada is defined by its pluralism with several Canadian academics keeping a foot in each camp drawing from the American school's emphasise on scientific positivism and empiricism, and the British school-style historicism.<ref> Cohen, Benjamin J. [https://books.google.fr/books?id=PAyEDwAAQBAJ&lpg=PT115&ots=tenTQdRyug&dq=Canada%20school%20international%20Political%20Economy&pg=PT115#v=onepage&q=Canada%20school%20international%20Political%20Economy&f=false Advanced introduction to international political economy]. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar Publishing, 2019. Print.</ref> The Canadian approach is based on eclecticism combining rigorous observational studies and theoretically informed analyzes with a keen appreciation of the positions of history, institutions and ideas.
Americans are almost exclusively in international relations, and most come from Ivy League universities. Furthermore, it is very much a group of people who are associated with a legit university in the United States. They are very close to policymaking circles as well, whereas actors in the British international political economy come from all over the place. Two institutions are particularly important in the field of international political economy: one is the London School of Economics obviously, and the other one is the University of Warwick. Authors in British international economy come from different horizons. There are also the Canadians who try to bridge the gap between the Americans the British.
 
This illustration shows the way international relations as a discipline has developed since the Second World War. We can see how gradually since the 1970s and the emergence of international political economy, there is a decline of neoliberalism.
 
Since the 1970s there has been a debate between the rationalists and the constructivists. In the 1990s there is the emergence of the constructivist school of thought which in by contradictions to the rationalists posits that ideas have an independent influence on the way processes are now coming in international relations happen. The new realists, the new Marxists, the constructivists try to identify the independent influence of ideas, norms, and how it influences the way the international system works.


=Annexes=
=Annexes=
*Deciancio, M. (2018). La Economía Política Internacional en el campo de las Relaciones Internacionales argentinas. Desafíos, 30(2), 15. https://doi.org/10.12804/revistas.urosario.edu.co/desafios/a.6106
 
*“International Monetary Fund.” International Organization, vol. 1, no. 1, 1947, pp. 124–125. JSTOR, https://www.jstor.org/stable/2703527.
*“International Monetary Fund.” International Organization, vol. 1, no. 1, 1947, pp. 124–125. JSTOR, https://www.jstor.org/stable/2703527.


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