Modification de The reason of State

{{Translations
| fr = La raison d’État
| es = La razón de Estad
| it = Ragion di Stato
| lt = 
| de = Die Staatsraison
| ch = 
| jp = 
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|[[Introduction to Political Science]]
|[[La pensée sociale d'Émile Durkheim et Pierre Bourdieu]] ● [[Aux origines de la chute de la République de Weimar]] ● [[La pensée sociale de Max Weber et Vilfredo Pareto]] ● [[La notion de « concept » en sciences-sociales]] ● [[Histoire de la discipline de la science politique : théories et conceptions]] ● [[Marxisme et Structuralisme]] ● [[Fonctionnalisme et Systémisme]] ● [[Interactionnisme et Constructivisme]] ● [[Les théories de l’anthropologie politique]] ● [[Le débat des trois I : intérêts, institutions et idées]] ● [[La théorie du choix rationnel et l'analyse des intérêts en science politique]] ● [[Approche analytique des institutions en science politique]]  ● [[L'étude des idées et idéologies dans la science politique]] ● [[Les théories de la guerre en science politique]] ● [[La Guerre : conceptions et évolutions]] ● [[La raison d’État]] ● [[État, souveraineté, mondialisation, gouvernance multiniveaux]] ● [[Les théories de la violence en science politique]] ● [[Welfare State et biopouvoir]] ● [[Analyse des régimes démocratiques et des processus de démocratisation]] ● [[Systèmes Électoraux : Mécanismes, Enjeux et Conséquences]] ● [[Le système de gouvernement des démocraties]] ● [[Morphologie des contestations]] ● [[L’action dans la théorie politique]] ● [[Introduction à la politique suisse]] ● [[Introduction au comportement politique]] ● [[Analyse des Politiques Publiques : définition et cycle d'une politique publique]] ● [[Analyse des Politiques Publiques : mise à l'agenda et formulation]] ● [[Analyse des Politiques Publiques : mise en œuvre et évaluation]] ● [[Introduction à la sous-discipline des relations internationales]]
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The "raison d'État" refers to a principle of governance according to which the State has the right and the obligation to take decisions that are in the supreme interest of the country, even if these decisions are contrary to other considerations, such as moral, religious or international laws. In practice, the raison d'Etat has often been used to justify actions that would otherwise be considered immoral or illegal. For example, a government might justify declaring war, spying or suspending certain civil liberties in the name of raison d'État.

The raison d'État plays a crucial role in political science, particularly in the analysis of decisions taken by a government or head of state. Political science studies seek to understand the motivations behind political actions, and the concept of raison d'État can help explain why certain choices are made. Political science examines how the raison d'État influences foreign policy strategies, crisis management, war and peace decisions, domestic policies, and other aspects of governance. Researchers can analyse how raison d'État is invoked to justify certain actions and what the implications are for democracy, human rights, ethics and international law. Moreover, the concept of raison d'État is linked to other theories in political science, such as realism and neo-realism, which suggest that states act primarily on the basis of their national security interests. However, there is an ongoing debate about how far a state can or should go to safeguard its interests, and how to balance this with other obligations and values, such as respect for human rights and international norms. This is why raison d'État remains an important subject of study in political science, both to understand past actions and to inform discussions on how best to manage current and future policy challenges.

= What is the Reason of State? =

Reason of State is a concept that allows public authorities to take exceptional measures, which may be outside the usual legal framework, to respond to extraordinary situations or threats to national security. In theory, this concept is intended to protect the higher interests of the State and the people. In practice, however, it is open to controversy and debate, as it can be used to justify actions that violate human rights, international norms or democratic principles. For example, in times of war or serious national crisis, a government may invoke raison d'Etat to justify measures such as declaring martial law, suspending certain civil liberties, or taking emergency measures that would otherwise be illegal.

The idea of raison d'État implies that, in certain circumstances, the state or another institutional political entity may act in a manner that departs from ordinary law in order to protect the supreme interest of the country. This concept is generally invoked in situations of crisis or national emergency, where the state believes it must take extraordinary measures to preserve security, stability or other essential interests. However, the fact that a State may derogate from ordinary law in certain circumstances does not mean that it may do so without restriction or control. In most legal systems, there are checks and balances designed to prevent abuses of power and to ensure that any derogation from ordinary law is proportionate, necessary and consistent with certain minimum standards. For example, the constitutions of many countries contain special provisions for emergency situations that allow certain temporary derogations from normally guaranteed rights and freedoms. However, these provisions generally require that the measures taken be proportionate to the seriousness of the situation, and that they be lifted as soon as the emergency is over. In addition, in democratic systems, decisions taken in the name of the raison d'Etat may be subject to judicial review, and may be challenged in court if found to be unconstitutional or contrary to international law.

Reason of State is a concept that applies in exceptional circumstances, when it is deemed necessary to derogate from ordinary law and potentially from public freedoms in order to protect the supreme interest of the State. In a democracy, the use of raison d'État must be carefully controlled and limited. It should only be invoked in truly exceptional situations, not as a common practice or routine. If used regularly or arbitrarily, it could endanger the rule of law and democratic principles. This is why, even in emergency situations, democracies seek to maintain checks and balances to ensure that the use of raison d'Etat respects certain limits. This may include constitutional requirements, judicial review, and transparency and accountability to the public and parliament. That said, the application of raison d'État remains a complex and delicate subject that gives rise to philosophical, political and legal debate. Decisions taken in the name of raison d'État can have profound and lasting consequences, and it is therefore crucial to approach them with caution and discernment.

The concept of raison d'État may involve going beyond certain usual standards of legality, normality and logic. Let's take a closer look:
* Exceeding the law: The raison d'État may lead to a departure from the usual laws in force. For example, in an emergency situation, a government could invoke raison d'État to suspend certain laws or rights.
* Exceeding the normal: The raison d'État concerns exceptional situations, not routine or normal governance. Actions taken under raison d'État are supposed to be extraordinary and temporary.
* Going beyond what is logical: Reason of State can sometimes involve actions that may seem illogical or contradictory by normal standards. For example, a state may choose to take actions that are contrary to its own laws or principles, or that run counter to its international commitments, if those actions are considered necessary to protect the best interests of the state.

Although the raison d'État may lead to these standards being exceeded, it is important to note that in democratic systems there are generally checks and limits to prevent abuses of power and preserve the rule of law. The raison d'État does not give the government carte blanche to act as it wishes, but must be used with caution and discernment, and with respect for the fundamental principles of democracy and human rights.

A state of emergency is a term often used interchangeably with raison d'état. It refers to a situation in which the government derogates from ordinary law, often in response to an emergency or crisis. The study of states of exception could focus on questions such as: What are the conditions that trigger a state of exception? How do governments justify invoking the raison d'état or declaring a state of exception? What are the effects on society and human rights? What are the mechanisms for controlling and limiting the use of raison d'état?

The events and the response of the US government to the attacks of 11 September 2001 can serve as an example for studying the raison d'État. The measures taken by the US government after the attacks demonstrate several aspects of raison d'Etat in action.
* Overstepping the law: In response to the attacks, the US Congress passed the USA PATRIOT Act, which extended the powers of intelligence and law enforcement agencies to monitor and investigate terrorist activities. Some of the Act's provisions have been criticised for their potential infringement of the civil liberties guaranteed by the US Constitution.
* Going beyond the normal: President George W. Bush's declaration of the "war on terror" and the invasion of Afghanistan (and later Iraq) were extraordinary actions taken in response to an exceptional situation.
* Going beyond what is logical: Certain decisions taken in the context of the "war on terror", such as the establishment of the Guantánamo detention camp and the use of advanced interrogation techniques (considered by many to be torture), may seem illogical or contrary to the usual principles of law and ethics.

These actions, taken in the name of national security, gave rise to much debate about the role of the state, the protection of civil liberties and the limits of raison d'état. The repercussions of these decisions continue to be felt and debated to this day. This makes 11 September 2001 and its aftermath a particularly relevant example for the study of raison d'État.

The notion of 'raison d'Etat' is often linked to that of a 'state of emergency'. In both cases, it refers to a state of action that goes beyond the framework of ordinary law and normality, often in response to a situation of emergency or exceptional crisis. A 'state of exception' is generally declared when circumstances are deemed so serious that the usual rules cannot be applied effectively. It allows the state to take extraordinary action to respond to the situation. This could include measures such as suspending certain civil liberties, declaring martial law, or passing emergency laws. The "raison d'Etat" may be invoked as justification for such exceptional actions, based on the need to protect the supreme interest of the State and the people. However, although these concepts are closely related, they are not necessarily identical. A state of emergency is generally a formal mechanism that is declared in accordance with certain legal procedures and has specific legal implications. The raison d'Etat, on the other hand, is a broader concept that can justify a variety of extraordinary actions, whether or not a formal state of exception is declared. It is also important to note that, although these concepts allow the state to act exceptionally, they do not give it a blank cheque to act without restrictions or controls. In democratic systems, there are generally mechanisms in place to limit and control the use of raison d'Etat and the invocation of states of emergency, in order to prevent abuses of power and preserve fundamental rights.

Reason of State can be interpreted as a form of "reasonableness" in the sense that it seeks to protect the supreme interest of the nation, especially when faced with a crisis or existential threat. However, this does not necessarily mean that all actions taken in the name of raison d'Etat are automatically 'reasonable' in the ordinary sense of the word.

There are a number of factors that can influence whether an action taken in the name of the raison d'état is considered reasonable:
# Proportionality: Are actions taken in the name of the raison d'Etat proportionate to the threat or crisis they are intended to combat? Are they the minimum necessary to achieve the desired objective?
# Necessity: Were the actions absolutely necessary? Were there other options that could have been just as effective, but less intrusive or less damaging to rights and freedoms?
# Effectiveness: Were the actions effective in achieving the desired objective? Did they succeed in resolving the crisis or combating the threat?
# Respect for democratic principles and human rights: Were the actions taken in compliance with fundamental democratic principles and international human rights standards?

Ultimately, the question of whether the raison d'état is 'reasonable' is largely subjective and may depend on how these factors are weighed. It is a subject that is often at the centre of political and philosophical debate.

= Genealogy of the raison d'État =
The question of a state of exception, or the suspension of certain democratic norms in exceptional situations, is the subject of intense philosophical, political and legal debate. How can it be justified that a democracy, a system that values the rule of law and respect for human rights, can temporarily suspend these principles in the name of a higher interest?

To understand this paradox, it may be useful to look at the genealogy of the raison d'Etat and the state of exception. The concept of raison d'État is deeply rooted in the political and philosophical history of the West. It dates back at least to the period of the Renaissance and the Wars of Religion in Europe, when philosophers such as Niccolò Machiavelli and Jean Bodin began to articulate the idea that a sovereign might sometimes have to act outside the usual norms of morality and law in order to preserve the state.

The idea of a state of exception was later formalised by jurists and political theorists, who recognised that constitutions and systems of law can sometimes be insufficient to deal with extraordinary crises. This idea was put forward by thinkers such as Carl Schmitt, who argued that the sovereign is the one who has the power to decide on a state of exception. However, the justification of states of exception does not mean that democracy is completely abandoned or that democratic principles are unimportant. On the contrary, the idea is that democracy itself is threatened in these exceptional situations, and that extraordinary measures are necessary to preserve it. Moreover, even in a state of exception, it is generally recognised that there are limits to what the state can do, and that certain fundamental standards of respect for human rights and the rule of law must be maintained. That said, there is a real risk that the state of exception and the raison d'Etat could be abused to justify human rights violations or a slide towards authoritarianism. This is why it is crucial that their use is carefully controlled and limited, and that there are mechanisms to ensure accountability and democratic control.

In situations of emergency or crisis, the temporary suspension of certain democratic norms or the extension of the powers of the State may give rise to a grey area, a legal 'no man's land' where the usual safeguards may no longer apply. It is precisely for this reason that the invocation of a state of emergency is generally surrounded by formal procedures and controls. In many countries, for example, the constitution sets out the circumstances in which a state of emergency may be declared, how long it may last, and the specific powers that the government may exercise during that period. There may also be requirements for parliamentary approval, notification to international bodies, or judicial review. However, even with these controls, there is always a risk that the state of exception could be abused or unduly prolonged, leading to a weakening of the rule of law and civil liberties. Consequently, democratic vigilance, judicial control and human rights monitoring are essential to ensure that a state of exception does not become the norm and that democracy can be restored as soon as circumstances allow. 

A state of exception, although often invoked to protect democracy and the state against a serious threat, involves a temporary suspension or relaxation of certain democratic norms, rules and procedures. This creates an area of "vagueness", where the usual limits and guarantees are less clear. It is a state of ambiguity, where the state, in the interests of preserving order and security, may be perceived as rising above the democracy it is supposed to protect. This situation is fraught with risks, in particular the risk that the powers of the state will be extended beyond what is necessary, or that the state of emergency will be unduly prolonged. This is why it is crucial to have robust control and accountability mechanisms to govern the use of states of exception. This may include constitutional or legal requirements, judicial oversight, parliamentary scrutiny and monitoring by the media and civil society. Furthermore, even in a state of exception, it is generally recognised that certain fundamental standards of respect for human rights and the rule of law must be maintained. These include the right to a fair trial, the prohibition of torture, and the right to life, among others. These rights cannot be suspended, even in emergency situations. Finally, it is important to remember that a state of emergency is supposed to be temporary and limited to the duration of the crisis or threat that gave rise to it. Once the crisis is over, the State must return to normal functioning and fully restore democratic norms and procedures.

The raison d'État is deeply rooted in political theory, and understanding it requires reflection on key political concepts and historical and contemporary contexts. Moreover, since actions taken in the name of raison d'État can have major consequences for human rights, democracy and the rule of law, they often give rise to intense political debate. Political theory offers many tools for understanding and analysing raison d'État. For example, it can help clarify the values and interests at stake, assess the justifications for particular actions, and understand the risks and potential consequences. It can also provide a framework for comparing different approaches to raison d'État in different national and international contexts. Moreover, raison d'État cannot be understood in isolation from the specific political conditions of a given moment. Decisions taken in the name of raison d'Etat are often influenced by the political realities of the moment, including security concerns, economic challenges, social and political pressures, and prevailing norms and values. Debates about the raison d'État are therefore often linked to broader questions about the nature and direction of politics and society. Ultimately, the question of the raison d'État leads us to reflect on fundamental principles of politics and governance, such as the balance between security and freedoms, the nature and limits of sovereignty, and the role of the state in protecting the common good.

== Machiavelli (1469 - 1627): Conceptualisation of the reason of State ==

[[Fichier:Santi di Tito - Niccolo Machiavelli's portrait.jpg|thumb|right|200px|His posthumous portrait by Santi di Tito, in Florence's Palazzo Vecchio.]]

One of the fundamental aspects of Niccolò Machiavelli's political thought, often condensed into the expression "the end justifies the means". In his most famous work, The Prince, Machiavelli argues that leaders must be prepared to act in ways that might otherwise be considered immoral to achieve and maintain power. However, it is important to note that Machiavelli does not advocate the complete rejection of morality. Instead, he points out that conventional morality can sometimes conflict with the demands of politics. For example, a ruler may need to use deception or force to protect the state. In this context, such actions may be justified if they contribute to a higher end, such as political stability or state security. This ties in with the idea of 'raison d'État', which suggests that in certain exceptional circumstances the state may be justified in taking action that departs from ordinary law or customary norms. However, as Machiavelli himself recognises, this presents a complex ethical and political challenge, as it can be difficult to determine when such action is truly justified and how far it can go. Machiavelli's thought has been the subject of much debate and interpretation over the centuries. Some critics see him as a cynic who advocates amorality, while others see him as a pragmatic realist who recognises the dilemmas and challenges of politics. Whatever the case, his ideas have profoundly influenced political theory and continue to fuel discussions on issues such as the raison d'état.

Machiavelli has often been associated with the idea of cunning or deception as a strategic tool in politics. In 'The Prince', he suggests that rulers, when acting for the good of the state, may have to use concealment or manipulation to achieve their objectives. Guile, in this context, can be understood as a form of strategic intelligence, where an individual or group holds information that others do not, and uses this asymmetry of information to their advantage. This can involve misleading opponents, disguising true intentions or manipulating perceptions to gain a strategic advantage. However, it is important to note that for Machiavelli, the use of cunning is not an end in itself, but a means to a wider end, such as the stability of the state and the protection of the common good. Furthermore, while Machiavelli may seem to support a certain level of deception or manipulation in politics, he also warns that rulers should act with prudence and wisdom, and maintain the trust and respect of their subjects as much as possible.

From a Machiavellian perspective, tactics - and in particular the ability to act outside established norms when necessary to achieve a greater goal - are seen as an essential component of statesmanship. This is largely what Machiavelli meant by the statement that "the end justifies the means". In other words, for Machiavelli, political success sometimes requires actions that, outside the political context, might be considered contrary to conventional morality or the law. The ultimate requirement for the ruler, in this framework of thought, is the welfare and stability of the state. However, it is important to note that this view of politics, while sometimes seemingly pragmatic, also raises important ethical and moral issues. It highlights the need for a balance between the pursuit of political objectives and respect for ethical and legal standards. It also highlights the importance of accountability and transparency in the exercise of power. Machiavelli himself was not insensitive to these challenges. In his writings, he recognises that political power, if misused, can lead to tyranny and injustice. Therefore, while he may appear to support the idea that the end justifies the means, he also stresses the importance of prudence, wisdom and restraint in the exercise of power.

Although Machiavelli does not explicitly use the term 'raison d'état', his writings describe a similar concept. For him, the first priority of a ruler is the maintenance of power and the stability of the state. Consequently, it may be necessary to adopt behaviours or methods that do not conform to traditional democratic principles or that may even seem immoral. That said, Machiavelli does not advocate authoritarianism or despotism. Nor is he suggesting that rulers should be free to do as they please without constraint or accountability. In fact, he warns against the misuse of power and insists on the need for wise and prudent governance. He also suggests that rulers should always behave in such a way as to earn the respect and trust of their subjects, as popular support is crucial to long-term stability and success. Machiavelli's philosophy raises important questions about power, ethics and governance. Although it can sometimes seem cynical or amoral, it highlights the challenges inherent in politics and the need for a delicate balance between idealism and realism, between morality and efficiency.

From Machiavelli's perspective, political action may sometimes require going beyond the traditional frameworks of law and morality in order to achieve the most important objectives, such as the stability of the state. This is where the notion of 'reason of state' connects with his philosophy. Machiavelli recognises that politics, particularly at a high level such as that of the ruler of a state, can involve complex dilemmas where strict adherence to rules and norms can conflict with the practical demands of power and the survival of the state. This is not to say that Machiavelli advocates a total rejection of law or morality, but rather that he sees these aspects as part of a wider set of considerations that must be taken into account when making political decisions. However, it also raises important questions about the limits of political action and the tension between the imperatives of political reality and democratic and ethical ideals. These questions, which are at the heart of the debates on raison d'État, remain relevant and contested today.

== Giovanni Botero (1544 - 1617): Contribution to the conceptualisation of the raison d'état ==

[[Fichier:Giovanni Botero.jpg|thumb|200px|Giovanni Botero.]]

Giovanni Botero is a key figure in the development of the concept of 'raison d'État'. Born in 1544 in Piedmont, Italy, he was a diplomat, Jesuit priest and influential writer on subjects ranging from economics to geography and politics. His most famous work, 'Della ragion di Stato' (On the Reason of State), first published in 1589, played a crucial role in formulating this concept. In this treatise, Botero explains that the survival and success of the state depend on a combination of prudence, politics and morality. He argues that rulers must sometimes act according to pragmatic considerations that may go beyond traditional legal or ethical norms. However, unlike Machiavelli, Botero insists that the reason of state must always be guided by Christian and moral principles. For him, the true reason of State is that which serves the common good and is in accordance with divine law. So while Botero and Machiavelli can both be seen as important contributors to the theory of raison d'état, they offer different perspectives on the relationship between politics, morality and power. These perspectives have had a profound influence on political thought and continue to inform current debates on issues such as reason of state and ethics in politics.

Giovanni Botero was one of the first thinkers to focus on the construction and effectiveness of state power. He was interested in how states can develop and maintain their power, particularly through economics and demography. For Botero, the power of a state depended not only on the size of its territory or its army, but also on the wealth and well-being of its population. He was therefore one of the first to stress the importance of economic and social factors in strengthening state power. As part of the raison d'état, Botero argued that leaders had to take pragmatic decisions to ensure the survival and prosperity of their states. This might sometimes require actions that went beyond traditional legal or ethical norms. However, unlike Machiavelli, Botero also insisted on the importance of moral and Christian principles in governance, asserting that the true reason of state must always serve the common good and respect divine law. This combination of political pragmatism and moral commitment has made Botero's thought a major influence on political theory, and his concept of raison d'État remains relevant to contemporary discussions of power, ethics and governance.

As a Jesuit priest, Giovanni Botero incorporated theological principles into his conception of the raison d'état. For him, the exercise of power, including the application of raison d'état, should be guided by the principles and teachings of the Christian faith. Botero asserted that leaders, especially those who exercise exceptional power by virtue of the raison d'état, have a duty to respect the word of God and follow his commandments. They must strive to achieve God's objectives for humanity, which means promoting the common good, maintaining justice and peace, and protecting the weak and vulnerable. From this perspective, the reason of State cannot be used as an excuse to act arbitrarily or unjustly. On the contrary, it must always be used in a way that is compatible with divine law and promotes the well-being of the community. This is a vision of the reason of state that differs from that of Machiavelli and other more secular political theorists. It emphasises the moral and spiritual responsibility of rulers and the importance of faith and virtue in politics. This vision influenced the subsequent development of political theory, particularly within the tradition of Christian political philosophy.

Giovanni Botero and Niccolò Machiavelli have different perspectives on the reason of state in relation to morality. Machiavelli is often interpreted as setting aside traditional moral considerations in favour of political pragmatism, according to which the end (the stability and success of the state) justifies the means. His approach is sometimes described as amoral, in the sense that it does not conform to conventional morality. Botero, on the other hand, insists on the importance of morality, specifically Christian morality, in politics. For him, the raison d'Etat is not an excuse for acting immorally or unjustly, but a principle that must be applied in a way that is consistent with God's commandments and promotes the well-being of the community. So while both men agree that leaders may sometimes need to take exceptional measures to protect and strengthen their state, they differ on the extent to which these actions should be constrained by morality and ethics.

For him, the application of the reason of State must always be guided by moral principles, in particular those derived from the Christian faith. Political power, even when it is exercised exceptionally by virtue of the raison d'état, is not an end in itself, but a means of achieving divine objectives for humanity. This means that, although rulers may sometimes have to take measures that appear to go against conventional morality or existing laws, these measures can be justified if they are in accordance with God's commandments and if they promote the well-being of the community.

Botero's conception of the raison d'état serves as a kind of response to Machiavelli's vision. While Machiavelli focuses on political efficiency and pragmatism, setting aside traditional moral considerations, Botero emphasises the crucial role of morality, particularly Christian morality, in governance. Botero argues that true power and authority come from God, and therefore those who govern must follow God's commandments and teachings. If a ruler does this, then he or she can justify the use of raison d'état in exceptional circumstances. In this view, the reason of state is not an excuse for acting amoral or unjustly, but a principle that must be used in accordance with divine teachings. It is a perspective that contrasts sharply with that of Machiavelli, and reflects the wider differences in their political thinking.

For Botero, the use of raison d'état is an extension of the prince's duty to God and the welfare of his people. He argues that the prince, in using the reason of state, may sometimes have to go beyond conventional laws or norms in order to achieve the higher goals assigned to him by God. It is important to make it clear that for Botero, the use of raison d'état is not a licence for immorality or injustice. On the contrary, the prince must always seek to act in accordance with the moral and ethical principles derived from the Christian faith, even when acting in exceptional circumstances. This vision of raison d'État as a tool at the service of the divine will and the common good is a distinctive feature of Botero's political thought, and provides an interesting contrast with more secular and pragmatic approaches to raison d'État.

Botero was one of the first thinkers to develop a theory of the modern state and to explore the conditions for applying the raison d'état. He is concerned with the question of how to build and maintain a powerful and effective state that can respond to challenges and crises without compromising fundamental moral principles. For Botero, raison d'État is an essential instrument available to the prince to manage these exceptional situations. However, its use must always be guided by a deep understanding of the divine will and the needs of the community. He also suggests that the modern state must be organised in such a way as to facilitate the effective and ethical application of the raison d'État. This implies a solid governance structure, a competent administration, and a population that is both well governed and morally virtuous. In short, Botero's vision of the raison d'État is deeply rooted in his broader conception of the modern state and its requirements. This makes him an important figure in the development of modern political theory. 

Botero proposes that raison d'État can be invoked in times of serious crisis, such as civil wars. These exceptional situations can threaten the very existence of the state and the stability of society, requiring extraordinary measures to restore order and peace. Botero suggests that in such cases, the prince may be obliged to go beyond ordinary laws or conventional ethical norms in order to preserve the state and its citizens. However, even in these extreme circumstances, the prince is not free from moral restraint. On the contrary, his actions must always be guided by divine principles and aimed at the well-being of the community. Thus, for Botero, the raison d'État is not a licence for arbitrariness or injustice, but a principle that can justify extraordinary actions in extraordinary circumstances, always with respect for God's commandments and the promotion of the common good as the ultimate objectives.

Botero's paradox is that he legitimises the prince's action on religious grounds, but at the same time he is prepared to define as moral acts that have nothing human about them. This paradox is one of the most controversial aspects of Botero's thinking. On the one hand, he insists that the reason of State must always be guided by moral and theological principles. On the other hand, he acknowledges that the application of raison d'état may sometimes require actions that, in other contexts, would be considered immoral or inhumane. Botero seems to resolve this paradox by arguing that exceptional necessity - such as might arise in a civil war or other serious crisis - can justify actions that would otherwise be unacceptable. He considers that in such situations, the common good and the survival of the state may require extraordinary measures, even if they involve some suffering or harm. However, it is important to note that for Botero, even in these extreme circumstances, the prince is not free from moral constraint. He must always seek to minimise the harm caused and act in accordance with the divine will, as he understands it. It is an approach that may seem paradoxical, but it is consistent with his vision of the state and political morality.

Starting from a limited conceptual apriori, the prince is moral, so he can apply the reason of State. If the prince is fundamentally immoral, then he can use raison d'Etat to further his own interests in the name of God. This is a major concern with Botero's theory of raison d'Etat. Indeed, there is a risk that an immoral prince could misuse the notion of raison d'Etat to justify actions that serve his own interests rather than the common good. He could, for example, claim to be acting in the name of the divine will or the preservation of the state, while in reality pursuing selfish or tyrannical objectives. This is a problem that arises in all political theories that allow a degree of flexibility or discretion in the application of moral or legal rules. How can we ensure that this latitude is not abused? How can we guarantee that rulers will remain faithful to fundamental ethical principles and not use the reason of State as a pretext for arbitrary power? Botero, like many other political thinkers, attempts to solve this problem by insisting on the need for rigorous moral and religious control over the prince. In his view, the prince must be acutely aware of his duties towards God and the community, and must always seek to serve the common good rather than his own interests. However, it remains an open question how this can be ensured in practice, especially in the absence of effective democratic control mechanisms.

One of the fundamental assumptions of Botero's argument for raison d'Etat seems to be that ordinary citizens may lack the rationality to understand and manage the complex problems facing the state, particularly in times of crisis or emergency. From this perspective, raison d'État can be seen as a mechanism for restoring order and rationality when the population is unable to do so itself. This may involve actions that appear 'unreasonable' or arbitrary at first sight, but which are justified by the need to preserve the stability and well-being of the state as a whole. That said, this approach has serious limitations. It can easily be used to justify abuses of power or to circumvent democratic principles. What's more, it is based on a rather pessimistic view of citizens' ability to make informed decisions and participate meaningfully in the governance of their own society. In this sense, Botero's theory, while having important implications for our understanding of politics and power, must be approached with caution.

The idea of raison d'état suggests that in certain situations, notably those where social order or state security are threatened, extraordinary measures may be necessary. These measures may go beyond what is normally permitted by law or conventional ethics. The aim is to protect the state and its citizens against major threats. However, it is crucial to emphasise that even in an emergency or crisis, there are limits to what a government can justify in the name of raison d'état. For example, human rights and basic democratic principles must never be violated. In addition, the use of raison d'État must be temporary and specific to the crisis or threat at hand. Once the crisis has passed, the government must return to the normal legal order. Furthermore, the use of raison d'État requires great caution and rigorous control, to avoid abuses of power. Leaders must be held accountable for their actions, and decisions taken in the name of raison d'État must be transparent and subject to scrutiny. In a democracy, this implies an active role for the media, civil society and institutions of control, such as the courts.

Historically, the state of war has been one of the times when the raison d'Etat has been most commonly invoked. At times of extreme crisis, the state may be forced to take extraordinary measures to ensure its survival. This may involve, for example, temporary restrictions on civil liberties, the mobilisation of resources in unusual ways, or the implementation of military strategies that might otherwise be considered unacceptable. The aim is always to protect the state and its citizens from the imminent threat. However, as mentioned above, even in times of war, it is crucial that actions taken in the name of raison d'Etat respect certain fundamental principles, such as respect for human rights, the proportionality of the measures taken and their temporary nature. Furthermore, such actions must always be subject to rigorous scrutiny and control to avoid abuses of power. Finally, it should be noted that the raison d'Etat is not limited to situations of war. It can also be invoked in other crisis situations, such as health emergencies or natural disasters, when the normal order must be temporarily suspended to deal with the situation.

For Giovanni Botero, as for many other political thinkers of his time, the army and the ability to wage war were seen as essential elements of the power and authority of the state. It was also through the conduct of war that the state could sometimes be led to exercise the raison d'état, taking exceptional decisions to ensure its survival and security. In the context of war, the raison d'Etat could be invoked to justify unusual military strategies, the use of resources in unconventional ways, or even actions that might otherwise be considered contrary to international law. However, it is important to stress that the use of raison d'Etat in this context must always be proportionate, temporary and respect the fundamental rights of individuals, including those of enemies. Furthermore, the ability to maintain a strong and effective army is often seen as a manifestation of the power of the state and its ability to protect its citizens, which is also an important element of the raison d'Etat. A powerful army can deter foreign attacks, maintain internal order and guarantee the sovereignty and independence of the state.

In its evolution, raison d'État has gradually separated from its theological basis to become a concept more widely associated with political philosophy and the practices of state power. This evolution has been influenced by changes in the nature of societies, the organisation of the state and the nature of the conflicts and challenges facing states. The application of raison d'État as an extraordinary form of governance is generally justified by exceptional situations, such as crises, wars or threats to national security. These situations often require rapid and sometimes radical responses, which may go beyond the usual procedures and norms of governance. However, the invocation of raison d'Etat must always respect certain limits, particularly in terms of respect for human rights and the fundamental principles of democracy. It should not be used as an excuse to abuse power or violate fundamental freedoms, but rather as a means of protecting the general interest in extraordinary situations. It is also important to note that the application of raison d'État must always be temporary, and the state must return to normal governance as soon as the emergency situation is resolved. In this sense, raison d'État is an important tool for ensuring the survival and continuity of the state, but its use must be regulated and controlled to avoid abuse. 

Reason of State is a concept that allows the State, in certain exceptional situations, to act in an extraordinary way in the best interests of the nation. This may involve taking decisions or adopting policies that deviate from the norm or even the law, if this is deemed necessary to protect the security, stability or integrity of the nation. However, as mentioned above, the use of raison d'État must be temporary and proportionate to the situation, and always respectful of the fundamental rights of citizens. In a democracy, the use of raison d'État should also be subject to checks and balances to prevent abuses of power. Moreover, the raison d'État does not justify actions that are contrary to morality or ethics. Indeed, while the general interest may sometimes require exceptional measures, these must always respect the fundamental principles of justice and respect for human dignity. This is a complex subject that has been widely debated in political philosophy and political science.

The concept of raison d'État is intrinsically paradoxical. In extraordinary circumstances, the state may have to take measures that go beyond legal norms and individual freedoms in order to protect the general welfare of society. The extraordinary nature of these situations would justify the use of non-ordinary measures, according to the theory of the raison d'État. On the one hand, it is based on the idea that the state must sometimes adopt extraordinary measures to protect the general interest. This may include the temporary suspension of certain individual rights and freedoms, in exceptional circumstances such as war or a major crisis. On the other hand, these extraordinary measures may themselves pose a threat to democracy and the rule of law, by creating a situation where the state acts outside the usual bounds of the law and democratic control. This paradox is at the heart of many debates in political philosophy and constitutional law. How can restrictions on fundamental rights and freedoms be justified in the name of the general interest? What are the limits of state action in exceptional situations? How can democratic control be ensured and abuses of power prevented in such situations? These questions are all the more relevant in the current context, where many countries around the world have had to adopt exceptional measures to deal with crises such as the COVID-19 pandemic.

== War as a catalyst for the raison d'État ==

=== Michel Senellart (1953 - ): Contemporary perspectives on the role of war === 
Michel Senellart is a contemporary French philosopher specialising in political philosophy and the history of political ideas. His vision of raison d'État focuses very much on the idea that the state sometimes needs to depart from the norm in order to respond to major crises, such as war.

According to Senellart, raison d'État is nothing other than a contravention of ordinary reasons for the sake of the public good, or for the sake of a greater and more universal reason. This means that the state can sometimes be led to act in a way that is contrary to the usual norms in the interests of the public good or in order to respect a more universal reason. War is a typical example where reason of State can be applied, according to Senellart. In times of war, the state may have to take extraordinary measures to ensure the security and well-being of the nation. This could include actions that, in peacetime, would be considered out of the ordinary or even illegal.

The raison d'État is often invoked in emergency or crisis situations where the normal functioning of democracy is not sufficient to respond to a serious threat to the state or society. This may include situations of war, terrorism, natural disaster or pandemic. In these situations, the government may deem it necessary to take extraordinary measures to ensure the security, well-being and continuity of the nation. This may involve temporarily derogating from certain usual norms or laws. However, invoking the raison d'État must always be done with care. The suspension or modification of customary laws or rights must be proportional to the threat, limited in time and subject to judicial review to avoid abuse of power and preserve the rule of law and democratic principles.

=== Scipione Ammirato (1531 - 1601): War and the reason of State ===
Scipione Ammirato was an Italian historian of the late 16th century. His vision of the raison d'État is less well known than that of thinkers such as Machiavelli or Botero, but it reflects the idea that in certain circumstances, the well-being of the state may require extraordinary actions, often associated with situations of conflict or war. Indeed, war is a context in which leaders are often faced with difficult decisions that may require departures from normal rules and practices in order to preserve the security and integrity of the state. It is in this context that the notion of raison d'Etat can be invoked to justify such actions. In the context of war, the application of the raison d'Etat may take several forms, such as the imposition of martial law, the restriction of civil liberties, the requisition of private property, the mobilisation of the population for the war effort, etc. 

In the context of conflicts with other nations or groups, particularly religious groups, the raison d'Etat may be invoked to justify certain extraordinary actions or policies aimed at protecting the integrity, security and interests of the State. The application of the raison d'Etat may take many forms in these contexts, including enhanced security policies, restrictions on certain civil liberties, extraordinary diplomatic efforts, military defence measures, etc. In some cases, these measures may be justified by the need to protect the integrity, security and interests of the State. In some cases, these measures may be controversial, as they may appear to contradict certain democratic principles or human rights.

The raison d'État is often invoked in contexts of international tension and preparation for war. It involves taking extraordinary measures to protect national security and interests, which may include mobilising resources, increasing military production, implementing enhanced security policies and coordinating efforts to anticipate and prepare for a possible war. From this perspective, raison d'État is seen as a tool for preparing for war, a kind of "latent war". It is a way of pooling the resources of the state and focusing attention on a common objective, namely the defence of the state and its interests. However, it is important to stress that the invocation of the raison d'Etat to justify these extraordinary measures must always be transparent, proportional and limited in time. In addition, it must always respect the principles of the rule of law and the fundamental rights of citizens. Furthermore, it is preferable to avoid war if possible, using diplomacy, negotiation and international cooperation to resolve conflicts and tensions. War should always be the last resort, when all other options have been exhausted.

War, being an exceptional situation, often justifies the use of raison d'Etat. It is a time when the security and very existence of the state may be threatened. As a result, extraordinary measures may be implemented to protect and preserve the nation. It should be noted, however, that the use of raison d'État, even in times of war, must comply with the fundamental principles of democracy and international standards. This means that any action taken must respect human rights, the principles of justice and the rules of war.

=== Carl Schmitt (1888 - 1985): Reassessing the relationship between war and the state ===
[[image:PapenSchleicher0001.jpg|thumb|right|Schmitt advised the von Papen government (left) and Schleicher (right) on the constitutional issue.]]

Carl Schmitt, a German jurist and political philosopher, developed the theory of the partisan, which focuses on a specific form of combat - guerrilla warfare, or irregular struggle. This theory is mainly developed in his book "Theory of the Partisan" (1962). According to Schmitt, the partisan is distinct from the regular combatant because he does not operate according to the conventional rules of war and is not easily identifiable. They are rooted in a specific place (usually their local territory), are extremely mobile, and their loyalty is more to a cause than to a state. Schmitt saw the emergence of partisans as a significant transformation in the nature of war. The impact of this transformation on the raison d'État is considerable. If the state is designed to manage conflicts between clearly defined and organised entities, how can it manage the kind of asymmetric and irregular conflict that the partisan represents? The question becomes even more complicated if we consider that the partisan may be internal to the state - a citizen who has taken up arms against the state for one reason or another. Schmitt considers that the figure of the partisan calls into question the traditional categories of the law of war and forces us to rethink the concepts of sovereignty and exception. In this context, the raison d'État becomes more complex, since the threat does not only come from external state actors, but can also emanate from within, which may justify exceptional measures to deal with it.

Carl Schmitt developed a theory of "decisionism". Decisionism is an approach to political theory that emphasises the role of individual decisions in political processes. Schmitt's famous phrase "the sovereign is the one who decides on the exception" expresses this idea. It means that true political power lies in the ability to suspend the existing legal order in order to deal with an emergency. This power to decide when and how the normal legal order is suspended is, according to Schmitt, what defines sovereignty. During the rise of Nazism, Schmitt was an active supporter of the regime. He argued that Hitler's seizure of power was an example of a sovereign decision, suspending the constitutional order of the Weimar Republic in 1933. Sovereignty and the state of exception have been heavily criticised, not only for their role in legitimising the Nazi regime, but also for the way in which they can be used to justify abuses of power.

According to Carl Schmitt, the sovereign, as the one who decides on the exception, has the power to determine the moments of emergency or crisis that justify the suspension of the normal legal order. This power of exception could include the ability to declare war or to take extraordinary decisions in response to crisis situations. The theory of raison d'état and the concept of total war have been linked to the totalitarian regimes of the 20th century, particularly those of Nazi Germany and Stalin's Soviet Union. In these regimes, the state seeks to control all aspects of public and private life, including the economy, education, the arts, religion, personal relationships and even the thoughts of individuals. Totalitarianism is often associated with total mobilisation in wartime, where all of society's resources are devoted to the war effort. This can be achieved through conscription, regulation of industry and the economy, and restriction of civil liberties in the name of national security. In this context, the reason of State is often invoked to justify actions which, in peacetime, would be considered violations of human rights.

Totalitarianism is a political system that seeks to control all aspects of public and private life, including individual expression and free thought. In a totalitarian regime, the state seeks to monopolise the truth and define reality for its citizens. The state media are used to disseminate official propaganda, and any dissent or criticism of the regime is severely repressed. This can create an environment in which independent thought and freedom of expression are hindered or even dangerous. Individuals may conform to the regime's expectations, not only through fear of reprisals, but also through social conditioning and indoctrination. Totalitarianism is often associated with authoritarian regimes that are rooted in extreme ideologies and seek to reshape society according to a utopian vision. However, this attempt to control all aspects of social and individual life can often lead to oppression, violence and dehumanisation.

Carl Schmitt, the German political philosopher, wrote extensively on the nature of politics and power. He argued that the fundamental distinction in politics is between "friend" and "enemy". In this framework, the enemy is not necessarily an individual or group that is personally hated or despised, but rather the one on the other side of the political conflict. According to Schmitt, the role of the sovereign (the 'ruler') is to make this distinction and to take decisions in exceptional situations, such as war or crisis. Schmitt argued that in such situations, constitutional normality can be suspended in the name of preserving the state. This is known as a state of exception.

The vision of conflict from a Nazi theological perspective, as expressed by Carl Schmitt, is centred on the notion of friend and enemy. This implies that conflicts are inevitable and even necessary in politics, because they make it possible to clearly define who is "friend" and who is "enemy". This distinction is fundamental to the exercise of political power. In the context of Nazism, this theory was used to justify aggression and imperialist expansion, by identifying certain groups (such as Jews or Communists) as 'enemies' of the state. Futurism was an artistic and social movement that began in Italy in the early twentieth century, which valued speed, technology, youth and violence, rejecting the past. Some Futurists, such as Filippo Tommaso Marinetti, supported the Fascist movements in Italy and elsewhere. However, Futurism as a movement was distinct from Nazism and Carl Schmitt's political theory, although they shared certain themes of glorifying conflict and rejecting tradition. 

Carl Schmitt argued that the essence of politics lay in the distinction between friend and foe. For him, war, as the ultimate conflict, is the supreme expression of this distinction. It is in the context of war, or at least the possibility of war, that the true nature of the political manifests itself, according to Schmitt. In this context, the sovereign (or whoever exercises political power) is the one who decides on the state of exception, i.e. who determines when a situation is so serious that it justifies extraordinary measures - including war. This is what Schmitt calls "decisionism".

= Current state of emergency and raison d'État =

== Giorgio Agambe (1942 - ): Understanding the state of exception ==

[[Fichier:Giorgio Agamben, wall portrait.jpg|thumb|200px|Giorgio Agamben .]]

Giorgio Agamben, a well-known Italian philosopher, published a book entitled 'État d'exception' in 2005 (the first Italian edition dates from 2003). In it, he examines the notion of the 'state of exception' as developed by Carl Schmitt. Agamben analyses how states can use states of exception to suspend laws and constitutional rights in crisis situations. He argues that, increasingly, the state of exception has become the norm rather than the exception in contemporary societies, with the extension of governments' powers of surveillance and control. For Agamben, the state of exception is a dangerous space where the law is in abeyance and government authority acts without legal constraints, which can lead to abuses of power. He warns against using this situation to restrict civil liberties and human rights. It is a powerful and disturbing concept that highlights the tension between security and freedom in modern societies. Agamben's work has been widely discussed and debated, and has had a significant impact on contemporary political thought. 

Agamben argues that contemporary societies tend to enter into a permanent state of exception, particularly under the pretext of security. The state of exception is a crisis situation that allows the state to suspend the laws and civil liberties normally in force. Agamben suggests that this state of exception is increasingly used as a normal means of governance, rather than as an exceptional response to a crisis. For example, in the context of the 'war on terror', states can invoke national security to justify measures that violate human rights and civil liberties. This state of exception, Agamben argues, endangers democracy by making citizens vulnerable to abuses of power. He argues that the state of exception reveals a fundamental tension between security and freedom, a tension that lies at the heart of contemporary debates about the role of the state in society.

The 1789 Declaration of the Rights of Man and of the Citizen states that freedom is the prerequisite for security. In other words, individuals must be free in order to be secure. However, in the contemporary world, this paradigm seems to have been reversed. Increasingly, security is seen as a precondition for freedom. This means that states and societies are increasingly willing to restrict individual and collective freedoms in the name of security. This can be seen in the context of the fight against terrorism, for example, where civil liberties are often restricted in the name of national security. This is a worrying development for many, as it can potentially lead to abuses of power and a diminution of democracy. This tension between security and freedom is a crucial debate in contemporary political thought. The question is how far we are prepared to go to guarantee our security, and whether it is worth it if it means restricting our freedoms.

Giorgio Agamben, in his book État d'exception, argues that in contemporary societies, security is often privileged over freedom. In his view, this leads to what he calls a 'state of exception': a state in which regular legal norms are suspended in the name of security. For Agamben, this is not an exceptional or temporary situation, but a permanent state that has become the norm in many modern societies. He argues that the notion of security has become an excuse to restrict freedoms and strengthen the power of the state, creating an environment of constant control and surveillance. What Agamben criticises here is the shift from the primacy of freedom to the primacy of security in our contemporary societies. He suggests that this leads to a rationalisation and normalisation of the state of exception, which in turn threatens individual and collective freedoms. This is an important debate that echoes many contemporary issues, from the fight against terrorism to the management of health crises, where the tension between freedom and security is constantly present.

According to Agamben, we are now living in a situation where the state of exception has become the norm, rather than a rare and temporary occurrence as Botero suggested. This perspective is in line with Michel Foucault's theory of the surveillance society. Foucault developed the notion of 'biopower', where the control exercised by the state extends not only to social life, but also to the biological life of individuals. This involves constant surveillance and detailed regulation of citizens' bodies and lives. It is therefore a significant shift in the way power is exercised by the state. This shift can be seen as a threat to our individual freedoms, as state power is exercised in a more intrusive and omnipresent way. Moreover, as Agamben points out, the primacy of security over freedom contributes to this process, justifying the continued expansion of control and surveillance in the name of protecting the security of individuals and society as a whole. It is important to note that these perspectives are hotly debated in academic and political circles. Some people may see these developments as necessary and justified, while others may see them as unacceptable infringements of our individual freedoms and fundamental rights.

The notion that we have entered an era of 'lawlessness' and 'necessity' reflects the concerns that many thinkers, lawyers and activists have today about the way in which law and democracy are being used, and sometimes circumvented, in the name of security, efficiency or necessity. Traceability and surveillance have become ubiquitous elements of our daily lives, underpinning major aspects of our economy, government and society. This is facilitated by rapid technological advancement, which enables an unprecedented level of surveillance and data collection. The tension between necessity and the rule of law is a central issue of our time. Traditionally, the rule of law is a fundamental principle of democratic societies, ensuring that all actions, including those of the state, are subject to the law. However, in many cases we see situations where 'necessity' is invoked to justify actions that might otherwise be considered contrary to fundamental legal and democratic principles. This tension raises fundamental questions about the nature of our societies and political systems. How do we balance security and freedom? What does democracy mean in an era of mass surveillance and ubiquitous data? These are complex questions to which there are no simple answers, but debate and reflection are essential if we are to shape the future of our societies.

The concept of a state of exception described by Agamben is precisely that of a situation in which ordinary laws and civil rights are suspended, often in response to a perceived crisis or emergency. This state of affairs creates a 'grey zone' where normal rules do not apply and where the powers of the state can be significantly extended. In such situations, there is often a tension between the imperatives of security and individual rights and freedoms. This is a complex issue with no easy answer, as it requires a balance between protecting the security of the State and its citizens on the one hand, and safeguarding individual rights and freedoms on the other.

The separation of powers is a fundamental principle aimed at preventing the abuse of power and maintaining a balance in the exercise of authority. This separation enables each power - legislative, executive, judicial - to control the others and thus guarantee a form of reciprocity in the operation of the State. However, when a state of emergency is declared, these boundaries can become blurred. The powers of the executive can be extended, sometimes to the detriment of the other powers, which can jeopardise the democratic balance. The result is often an accumulation of power in the hands of a single body or individual, which can lead to a concentration of power and potentially to abuses.

In a state of exception, executive powers are often strengthened at the expense of the other branches of government. This can lead to a situation where the executive can legislate without the control of the legislature, by means of decrees or orders, and where the supervisory powers of the judiciary are limited. In addition, a state of emergency may also lead to the adoption of restrictive regulations, often justified by the need to respond to an emergency or crisis, which may restrict individual rights and freedoms. These regulations can affect many aspects of people's lives, from freedom of movement to protection of privacy. It is therefore essential, even in times of crisis, to uphold the fundamental principles of democracy and the rule of law, and to ensure that any extraordinary measures are proportionate, necessary and temporary.

The application of the state of exception in France can be traced back to the First World War, which led to a state of exception; the preparation for the Second World War in 1938 and 1939 with the German-Soviet pact, which created dissension in French politics, as the Communists wanted to follow the Soviet position; the French Constitution of 1958, Article 16 states that in the event of a threat to the integrity of the Republic and the nation, the President of the Republic may take all necessary powers. So one article allows all powers to be taken in the name of attacking the integrity of the territory.

The state of exception in France has been applied in various crisis situations. During the First World War, the French government had to take extraordinary measures, including general mobilisation, censorship and rationing, to support the war effort. Later, in the years leading up to the Second World War, faced with a period of great uncertainty and tension, the government undertook a series of measures to strengthen national defence. This climate of tension culminated in the German-Soviet Pact of 1939, which caused dissension within the French Communist Party, with some members opposing the party's official position in favour of the pact. In addition, Article 16 of the 1958 French Constitution stipulates that the President of the Republic may exercise exceptional powers in the event of a serious crisis. These powers were invoked only once, during the Algerian crisis in 1961. In each case, the balance between the functioning of democracy and respect for individual rights and freedoms was put to the test.

Article 16 of the 1958 French Constitution gives exceptional powers to the President of the Republic in the event of a serious crisis threatening the integrity of the territory or the proper functioning of the public authorities. This article was conceived in the context of the Cold War, and was intended to be used in exceptional circumstances where the normal functioning of the State would be seriously disrupted. It was invoked only once, during the Algerian crisis in 1961. Article 16 confers on the President "the most extensive powers", enabling him to take measures necessary for the defence of the nation. However, it is important to note that these powers are not unlimited. According to a decision taken in 1973, the Constitutional Council has the power to monitor the application of article 16 and can therefore end the state of emergency if the conditions are no longer met.

Switzerland, as a traditionally neutral country, faced its own challenges during the two world wars. In the context of the First World War, on 30 August 1914, the Swiss Federal Assembly gave the Federal Council (the Swiss government) unlimited power to guarantee the security, integrity and neutrality of the country. This decision was taken to enable the government to take the necessary measures quickly and effectively to protect Switzerland from the consequences of the European conflict that was unfolding around it. This was clearly an example of the application of "raison d'État", where the ordinary rules of democratic governance were temporarily suspended in response to an extraordinary situation. It is a clear illustration of the concept of a state of exception, albeit one exercised with the aim of preserving Switzerland's neutrality and independence rather than engaging it in conflict.

== Le 11 septembre et le retour de la raison d’État ==

{{Article détaillé|Les ruptures du 11 septembre 2001}}

=== Autorisation de recours à la force militaire de 2001 ===

Après les attentats du 11 septembre 2001, le président américain George W. Bush a déclaré que l'intégrité de la nation avait été attaquée. Cette déclaration était basée sur le fait que les attentats terroristes étaient assimilés à un acte de guerre. Dans ce contexte, le président a invoqué le concept de "raison d'État", suggérant qu'une réponse extraordinaire était nécessaire pour faire face à cette situation extraordinaire. Cette réponse a pris la forme de l'"Authorization for Use of Military Force" (AUMF), qui a été votée par le Congrès américain peu de temps après les attaques. L'AUMF a donné au président l'autorité de prendre toutes les "mesures nécessaires et appropriées" contre ceux qu'il déterminerait avoir "planifié, autorisé, commis ou aidé" les attaques du 11 septembre. En outre, l'administration Bush a mis en place des mesures de sécurité intérieure draconiennes, comme le Patriot Act, qui a étendu les pouvoirs du gouvernement en matière de surveillance et d'enquête. Ces mesures, bien que controversées, ont été présentées comme essentielles pour protéger la nation.

Suite aux attentats du 11 septembre 2001, le président George W. Bush a répondu en plaçant la défense de la nation américaine comme une nécessité primordiale. Dans ses discours, il a présenté les agresseurs non pas comme de simples terroristes, mais comme un ennemi comparable à une nation, ce qui a eu pour effet paradoxal d'élever la stature d'Oussama Ben Laden. En effet, en assimilant Al-Qaïda à un État-nation, Bush a implicitement crédité Ben Laden du statut de chef d'État. Cette approche a également justifié une réponse militaire massive, plutôt qu'une approche policière et judiciaire pour faire face à un crime. Cela a conduit à l'invasion de l'Afghanistan et à la Guerre contre le Terrorisme, une campagne militaire à l'échelle mondiale qui a profondément affecté les relations internationales et les politiques intérieures aux États-Unis.

En qualifiant les attaques du 11 septembre 2001 comme un "acte de guerre", George W. Bush a établi une justification pour l'application de la raison d'État. L'acte de guerre est une condition qui autorise l'utilisation de la raison d'État, car il constitue une situation d'exception, une circonstance extraordinaire qui demande des mesures extraordinaires. La raison d'État, dans ce contexte, permet au gouvernement de prendre des décisions et d'agir d'une manière qui pourrait être contraire aux lois et aux principes habituels dans l'intérêt suprême de la nation. Cela pourrait inclure des actions telles que la déclaration de guerre, la mobilisation des forces militaires, l'instauration de mesures de sécurité internes renforcées, et d'autres mesures extraordinaires qui pourraient être perçues comme nécessaires pour assurer la sécurité et l'intégrité de la nation.

Lorsque George W. Bush a qualifié les attaques du 11 septembre 2001 comme un "acte de guerre", il a légitimé, en quelque sorte, Al-Qaïda et son chef, Ben Laden, comme des acteurs de guerre traditionnels. Cette déclaration a, de fait, changé le paradigme de l'application de la raison d'État. Cela a permis à l'administration Bush de justifier l'application de la raison d'État, en prenant des mesures extraordinaires pour la défense de la nation, allant de la guerre en Afghanistan à la mise en place de nouvelles mesures de sécurité intérieure. Cette déclaration a marqué un tournant dans l'histoire contemporaine, en introduisant un nouveau type de conflit - la "guerre contre le terrorisme" - où la frontière entre le droit de la paix et le droit de la guerre devient floue. 

Lorsqu'un État est confronté à une situation d'urgence ou à un danger imminent, il peut être amené à invoquer ce que l'on appelle la "raison d'État" ou l'état d'exception pour prendre des mesures extraordinaires afin de protéger la sécurité et l'intégrité de la nation. Cependant, ces mesures extraordinaires peuvent parfois s'écarter des principes traditionnels de l'État de droit, ce qui peut soulever des questions importantes sur l'équilibre entre la sécurité et les libertés individuelles. En effet, dans de tels cas, il peut y avoir une tendance à favoriser les actions d'urgence et la réponse à la menace immédiate, parfois aux dépens des protections juridiques normales et des garanties de procédure. Cela peut conduire à une situation où les règles normales du droit public sont mises de côté au nom de la gestion de l'urgence. Cette situation peut être source de tension et de débats, car elle met en jeu les valeurs fondamentales de la démocratie et de l'État de droit, comme le respect des droits de l'homme et des libertés fondamentales.

Le 9 novembre 2001, Stephen John Byers déclarait « c’est un très bon jour pour faire ressortir et passer en douce toutes les mesures que nous devons prendre<ref>Steve Byers, ministre du Commerce anglais du gouvernement de Tony Blair avait envoyé un courrier une heure après le drame « C'est un très bon jour pour faire ressortir et passer en douce toutes les mesures que nous devons prendre. » p. 549</ref> ».Cette déclaration met en évidence un point de tension important dans les situations d'urgence ou d'exception. En réponse à une crise, les gouvernements peuvent être tentés de faire passer rapidement des mesures qui pourraient, dans des circonstances normales, faire l'objet d'un débat public approfondi et de contrôles démocratiques. Dans certains cas, ces mesures peuvent inclure des lois ou des réglementations qui limitent les libertés individuelles, augmentent les pouvoirs de l'État ou modifient d'autres aspects de la gouvernance et de l'ordre public. Bien que ces mesures puissent être justifiées par la gravité de la situation, elles soulèvent des questions importantes sur la transparence, la responsabilité et le respect des principes démocratiques. Il est crucial que même dans les situations d'urgence, les gouvernements s'efforcent de maintenir l'État de droit, de respecter les droits de l'homme et de s'engager de manière transparente avec le public. En outre, les mesures prises en réponse à une situation d'urgence devraient être proportionnées, nécessaires et sujettes à un examen régulier pour s'assurer qu'elles restent appropriées et justifiées.

Les attentats du 11 septembre 2001 ont conduit à une série de changements significatifs dans les législations et politiques, en particulier aux États-Unis, mais aussi à l'échelle internationale. Le besoin perçu de protéger les citoyens contre de futures attaques terroristes a conduit à l'adoption de mesures qui, dans certains cas, ont restreint les libertés civiles et modifié les normes en matière de vie privée, de surveillance et de droits de l'homme. L'une des réponses les plus controversées à ces attaques a été l'adoption du USA PATRIOT Act aux États-Unis, qui a élargi les pouvoirs de surveillance du gouvernement américain dans le but de prévenir le terrorisme. Bien que ces mesures aient été prises dans le but déclaré de protéger la sécurité nationale, elles ont également suscité de vives inquiétudes concernant leur impact sur les libertés civiles et le respect de la vie privée. Dans ce contexte, le débat démocratique peut être confronté à des défis. Il est important que même en temps de crise, la transparence, la responsabilité et le respect des droits de l'homme soient maintenus. Il s'agit d'un délicat équilibre à trouver entre la protection de la sécurité nationale et la préservation des principes démocratiques fondamentaux. 

=== USA PATRIOT Act : Implications pour la raison d'État ===
Le USA PATRIOT Act (Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism Act) est une loi américaine qui a été promulguée peu de temps après les attentats terroristes du 11 septembre 2001. américaine, en particulier en ce qui concerne les lois sur l'immigration, la sécurité nationale, la surveillance et l'application de la loi. Son objectif déclaré était de "déjouer et punir les actes de terrorisme aux États-Unis et dans le monde entier, d'améliorer l'application de la loi pour détecter et prévenir le terrorisme, et pour d'autres objectifs". Certaines des dispositions les plus controversées du Patriot Act concernent la collecte d'informations et la surveillance. La loi a permis aux agences de renseignement de collecter un large éventail d'informations, y compris des données sur les transactions financières, les communications par courrier électronique et téléphone, et a donné aux autorités fédérales une plus grande capacité à suivre et intercepter les communications. Cette loi a grandement élargi les pouvoirs des agences de sécurité et de renseignement américaines en matière de surveillance, d'investigation et de poursuite des crimes de terrorisme. Les dispositions de cette loi touchent à une grande variété de questions, allant de la surveillance électronique à l'immigration, en passant par le financement du terrorisme.

Une des dispositions controversées du USA PATRIOT Act permet la détention indéfinie d'étrangers soupçonnés d'être liés à des activités terroristes. Les autorités américaines ont le pouvoir de détenir une personne sur la base de simples soupçons et peuvent le faire pour une durée indéterminée, sans inculpation ni procès. De plus, la définition du terrorisme et de l'activité terroriste a été élargie pour englober de nombreux actes criminels non violents et les associations lâches avec des groupes soupçonnés d'activités terroristes. Cette définition élargie a été critiquée pour sa potentielle utilisation abusive.

Le système "Carnivore", precuseur de l'USA PATRIOT Act était un système de surveillance de l'Internet mis en place par le FBI au début des années 2000.  Mis en place à la fin des années 1990 et utilisé principalement dans les années 2000, il permettait au FBI de surveiller les courriels et les activités en ligne de personnes spécifiquement ciblées dans le cadre d'enquêtes criminelles ou de sécurité nationale. Il a été conçu pour surveiller les communications par courrier électronique et les activités en ligne de personnes spécifiquement ciblées dans le cadre d'enquêtes criminelles ou de sécurité nationale. Le système fonctionnait en étant installé directement sur le réseau de l'Internet Service Provider (ISP) de la personne ciblée. Il pouvait alors filtrer toutes les communications entrantes et sortantes de cette personne. Le système était techniquement un dispositif de capture de paquets, c'est-à-dire un logiciel capable d'intercepter et d'inspecter les "paquets" de données qui circulent sur un réseau informatique. "Carnivore" était installé directement sur le réseau de l'Internet Service Provider (ISP) de la personne ciblée, où il pouvait filtrer toutes les communications entrantes et sortantes de cette personne.  Le FBI a déclaré avoir abandonné l'utilisation de "Carnivore" en 2005, bien que des rapports ultérieurs suggèrent que des outils de surveillance similaires continuent d'être utilisés.

En termes juridiques, le terrorisme est généralement défini par la commission d'actes violents ou dangereux dans le but d'influencer ou d'affecter le gouvernement par intimidation ou contrainte. Cela peut également inclure les actes commis en représailles à des opérations menées par le gouvernement. Cette définition est assez large et peut potentiellement couvrir une variété d'actes criminels. Par exemple, cela pourrait inclure non seulement des actes de violence physique, comme les attentats à la bombe ou les attaques armées, mais aussi des actes de cyber-terrorisme qui perturbent les systèmes informatiques du gouvernement.

[[Image:Camp x-ray detainees.jpg|thumb|L'ennemi est déclaré Hors la loi – Carl Schmitt fournit à Giorgio Agamben les catégories d'une critique fondamentale de Guantanamo.]] 

=== La prison de Guantanamo Bay : Un symbole de la raison d'État en action ===
La prison de Guantanamo Bay, située sur un territoire cubain loué par les États-Unis, est devenue un symbole controversé de l'application de la raison d'État dans le contexte de la lutte contre le terrorisme. Suite aux attentats du 11 septembre 2001, les États-Unis ont commencé à y détenir des personnes considérées comme des "combattants ennemis illégaux" en relation avec Al-Qaïda, les talibans ou d'autres groupes terroristes. L'objectif déclaré était d'obtenir des informations de ces détenus pour prévenir d'autres attaques terroristes. Cependant, le fait que ces individus étaient détenus hors du territoire principal des États-Unis soulevait des questions juridiques complexes concernant leur statut légal et leurs droits. Les critiques ont soutenu que la détention de ces personnes à Guantanamo constituait une violation des lois internationales sur les droits de l'homme, notamment les Conventions de Genève. Les méthodes d'interrogation employées à Guantanamo, souvent décrites comme de la torture, ont également été l'objet de vives critiques. En outre, de nombreux détenus ont été retenus pendant de nombreuses années sans inculpation ni jugement, ce qui a suscité des préoccupations quant à la violation du droit à un procès équitable. Ainsi, Guantanamo est devenu un exemple marquant de la façon dont la raison d'État a été invoquée pour justifier des mesures extraordinaires dans le contexte de la guerre contre le terrorisme. 

La prison de Guantanamo Bay, située sur une base militaire américaine à Cuba, a été qualifiée de "no man's land" juridique. Il s'agit d'un territoire qui, bien qu'étant sous contrôle américain, n'est pas considéré comme faisant partie des États-Unis au sens propre. Cela a permis au gouvernement américain d'argumenter que les détenus à Guantanamo n'étaient pas éligibles aux protections constitutionnelles normalement accordées aux individus sur le sol américain. Cette situation a créé une zone grise juridique qui a été utilisée pour justifier des pratiques de détention et d'interrogation controversées. Les critiques soutiennent que cela a permis au gouvernement américain d'éviter les protections juridiques traditionnelles, telles que le droit à un procès équitable, le droit à un avocat et la protection contre les traitements cruels et inhumains. Cet état de "no man's land" juridique a été critiqué pour avoir facilité la création d'un système où la raison d'État prévaut sur les droits de l'homme et les principes du droit international. Ainsi, Guantanamo est devenu un symbole du débat sur l'équilibre entre la sécurité nationale et les droits individuels dans la lutte contre le terrorisme.

La situation de la prison de Guantanamo a créé une complexité juridique unique. La base militaire sur laquelle la prison est située est techniquement sur le territoire cubain, mais elle est contrôlée par les États-Unis en vertu d'un traité de location à long terme. Le gouvernement américain a maintenu que, puisque la base de Guantanamo est située à l'extérieur du territoire américain, les détenus qui y sont détenus ne bénéficient pas des protections constitutionnelles auxquelles ils auraient droit s'ils étaient détenus sur le sol américain. Cette position a été contestée par des avocats, des défenseurs des droits de l'homme et d'autres, qui soutiennent que les détenus de Guantanamo devraient bénéficier de ces protections. C'est précisément cette complexité et cette incertitude juridiques qui ont conduit certains à qualifier Guantanamo de "no man's land" juridique, un espace où les règles normales du droit semblent ne pas s'appliquer. Cela a soulevé des questions sérieuses sur l'équilibre entre les impératifs de la sécurité nationale et le respect des droits de l'homme et des normes du droit international.

La désignation des détenus de Guantanamo a été un sujet de controverse majeure depuis l'ouverture de la prison. Le gouvernement américain a affirmé que les détenus sont des "combattants ennemis illégaux", un terme qui n'est pas reconnu par les Conventions de Genève, qui définissent les règles internationales pour le traitement des prisonniers de guerre. Le terme "combattant ennemi illégal" a été critiqué par de nombreux juristes et défenseurs des droits de l'homme, qui soutiennent que cette désignation est utilisée pour contourner les obligations des États-Unis en vertu des Conventions de Genève et d'autres normes internationales en matière de droits de l'homme. En effet, les détenus de Guantanamo n'ont pas les mêmes droits que les prisonniers de guerre (qui ont droit à un certain nombre de protections en vertu des Conventions de Genève), les prisonniers de droit commun (qui ont droit à un procès et à une représentation juridique) ou les prisonniers politiques (qui peuvent bénéficier de protections supplémentaires en vertu du droit international). La position du gouvernement américain a été contestée devant les tribunaux, et bien que certaines pratiques aient été modifiées en réponse à ces contestations, la situation globale de Guantanamo reste un sujet de controverse.

L'administration Bush, dans sa lutte contre le terrorisme, a créé une nouvelle catégorie de détenus : les "combattants ennemis illégaux". Cela signifie qu'ils n'étaient ni considérés comme des prisonniers de guerre, qui sont protégés par les Conventions de Genève, ni comme des criminels de droit commun, qui ont droit à un procès devant un tribunal civil. En tant que "combattants ennemis illégaux", ces détenus étaient essentiellement en dehors de la protection du droit international et du droit américain, ce qui permettait au gouvernement américain de les détenir indéfiniment sans inculpation ni jugement. Cela a également permis aux interrogateurs d'employer des techniques d'interrogatoire agressives qui seraient autrement interdites. Cette approche a été largement critiquée pour avoir violé les principes fondamentaux des droits de l'homme et de l'état de droit. Bien que certaines des politiques les plus controversées aient été modifiées par la suite, la question du statut et des droits des détenus de Guantanamo reste un sujet de débat.

Le terme "guerre contre la terreur" implique un conflit armé, ce qui suggère que ceux qui sont capturés en y participant seraient normalement considérés comme des prisonniers de guerre. Cependant, l'administration Bush a décidé de ne pas suivre cette ligne de raisonnement, préférant qualifier ces détenus de "combattants ennemis illégaux". Cette décision a conduit à une situation où, bien qu'ils soient capturés dans le cadre de ce qui est appelé une guerre, ils ne bénéficient pas des protections normalement accordées aux prisonniers de guerre en vertu du droit international. En fait, cette situation illustre l'un des nombreux défis posés par la guerre contre le terrorisme. Dans une guerre conventionnelle, les frontières, les combattants et les objectifs sont généralement clairement définis. Cependant, dans la guerre contre le terrorisme, ces éléments sont souvent flous ou non définis. Par exemple, le "terrain de bataille" n'est pas limité à une zone géographique spécifique, mais s'étend à l'échelle mondiale. Les "combattants ennemis" peuvent être des citoyens de presque tous les pays, y compris ceux qui sont en paix avec les États-Unis. Et parce que le terrorisme est une tactique plutôt qu'une entité identifiable, il n'y a pas d'ennemi clairement défini à vaincre pour mettre fin à la guerre. Ces facteurs contribuent tous à la complexité et à la controverse entourant la guerre contre le terrorisme et le traitement des détenus de Guantanamo.

La création de la prison de Guantanamo est un exemple notable de l'utilisation de l'extraterritorialité pour échapper aux contraintes juridiques normales. En plaçant la prison hors du territoire des États-Unis, l'administration américaine a cherché à la mettre hors de portée des cours américaines, et donc de l'application des lois américaines sur le traitement des prisonniers. 

En 2004, la Cour suprême des États-Unis a statué dans l'affaire Rasul c. Bush que les tribunaux américains avaient compétence pour examiner les demandes d'habeas corpus présentées par les détenus de Guantanamo. Cela signifiait que, contrairement à ce que prétendait l'administration Bush, les détenus de Guantanamo avaient le droit de contester la légalité de leur détention devant les tribunaux américains. L'affaire Rasul v. Bush en 2004 a marqué un tournant, en déclarant que les détenus de Guantanamo avaient le droit de contester leur détention devant les tribunaux américains. Cette décision a élargi les droits des détenus, leur permettant d'avoir un certain niveau de protection juridique. Cependant, l'administration Bush a réagi en 2006 en faisant adopter la Military Commissions Act, qui tentait de limiter l'accès des détenus aux tribunaux. En 2008, la Cour suprême a réaffirmé les droits des détenus dans l'affaire Boumediene v. Bush, déclarant que les détenus de Guantanamo avaient le droit constitutionnel d'habeas corpus. Concernant le terme "combattant irrégulier", c'est une terminologie controversée que l'administration Bush a utilisée pour justifier le traitement des détenus de Guantanamo. Elle a été critiquée par beaucoup comme une tentative de contourner les protections prévues par les lois internationales, notamment la Convention de Genève.

La question de savoir si la "parenthèse" de l'État d'exception aux États-Unis, enclenchée suite aux attaques du 11 septembre, est terminée, est complexe et sujet à débat. L'état d'exception, dans le contexte de la sécurité nationale, a permis l'adoption de mesures extraordinaires, telles que le USA PATRIOT Act, l'ouverture de la prison de Guantanamo, et une surveillance accrue des communications électroniques, parmi d'autres. Plusieurs de ces mesures sont encore en place, même si elles ont été révisées et débattues. Par exemple, la prison de Guantanamo est toujours opérationnelle, même si le nombre de détenus a été réduit et que plusieurs présidents américains ont promis sa fermeture. De même, bien que le USA PATRIOT Act ait expiré en 2015, plusieurs de ses dispositions ont été renouvelées sous d'autres formes législatives. De plus, la menace du terrorisme continue d'influencer la politique américaine et internationale, et le cadre légal de la "guerre contre le terrorisme" a des implications durables. Par conséquent, bien qu'il y ait eu des changements significatifs depuis le 11 septembre 2001, il est difficile de dire que l'état d'exception est complètement fini. Il est important de noter que ce sujet fait l'objet de nombreux débats parmi les juristes, les politologues et les chercheurs en études de sécurité. Il n'y a donc pas de consensus définitif sur la question.

Même après la fin de l'administration de George W. Bush, certaines mesures prises dans le sillage du 11 septembre sont restées en place. Barack Obama, bien qu'il ait promis de fermer la prison de Guantanamo lors de sa campagne présidentielle en 2008, n'a pas réussi à tenir cette promesse pendant ses deux mandats. De plus, des programmes de surveillance de masse révélés par Edward Snowden en 2013 ont montré que le gouvernement américain continuait à surveiller les communications de ses citoyens et d'autres personnes à travers le monde. Cela soulève la question de savoir si ces mesures exceptionnelles sont devenues la norme, et si la notion d'état de droit a été modifiée ou compromise à la suite du 11 septembre. Ces questions sont encore débattues parmi les chercheurs, les politiciens et les défenseurs des droits civiques. L'état d'exception, tel que conceptualisé par Giorgio Agamben, peut devenir permanent et changer la nature de la relation entre l'état et ses citoyens. Il est important de souligner que l'équilibre entre la sécurité et la liberté est une question complexe et contestée. Les décisions prises au nom de la sécurité nationale peuvent avoir des conséquences durables sur les libertés civiles, et l'évaluation de ces décisions nécessite un examen attentif et un débat public.

L'Union européenne a adopté une approche différente par rapport à la gestion du terrorisme. Plutôt que de s'appuyer sur des mesures unilatérales, elle a cherché à harmoniser les législations de ses États membres. Cela a impliqué la création d'un cadre juridique commun pour la définition du terrorisme et la mise en place de mesures de lutte contre le terrorisme. En 2002, l'Union européenne a adopté une décision-cadre sur la lutte contre le terrorisme, qui définit des infractions liées au terrorisme et prévoit des sanctions pénales pour ces infractions. Cette décision-cadre a été modifiée plusieurs fois pour s'adapter à l'évolution de la menace terroriste. De plus, l'Union européenne a mis en place divers instruments pour faciliter la coopération entre les États membres dans la lutte contre le terrorisme. Par exemple, elle a créé Europol, l'agence de l'Union européenne pour la coopération des services répressifs, qui facilite l'échange d'informations et la coordination des actions entre les forces de police des États membres.

Les programmes de "restitutions extraordinaires" et les "vols secrets" de la CIA qui ont été révélés au grand jour dans les années 2000 sont des exemples marquants de la façon dont certains droits fondamentaux et libertés publiques peuvent être contournés dans le cadre de la lutte contre le terrorisme. La restitution extraordinaire est le transfert secret d'une personne d'un pays à un autre sans recours à un processus judiciaire formel. Cela a souvent conduit à des situations où des individus ont été détenus sans inculpation, ont été privés de leurs droits juridiques fondamentaux et, dans certains cas, ont été soumis à la torture ou à des traitements inhumains et dégradants. Les vols secrets de la CIA, souvent appelés "vols de la torture", sont utilisés pour transporter ces personnes entre différents sites de détention à travers le monde. Il a été révélé que plusieurs pays, y compris certains pays européens, ont collaboré avec ces programmes, soit en permettant l'utilisation de leur espace aérien et de leurs aéroports pour ces vols, soit en participant à la détention et à l'interrogatoire des individus. Ces pratiques sont clairement en contradiction avec les principes de l'État de droit et le respect des droits de l'homme, et elles ont suscité de vives critiques et controverses. De plus, elles ont soulevé des questions importantes sur la responsabilité et la transparence des gouvernements dans le cadre de la lutte contre le terrorisme.

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= References =
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[[Category:science-politique]]
[[Category:théorie politique]]
[[Category:Rémi Baudoui]]