Version actuelle datée du 19 juillet 2022 à 22:22

Privatized coercion: from mercenarism to private military companies

Données clés
Professeur(s)	Stephan Davidshofer^[1]^[2]^[3] Christian Olsson^[4]^[5]^[6]
Enregistrement	2014, 2015
Cours	Political Violence and Security Practices

Lectures

Generally speaking, the question of privatization is something that systematically revolves around the notion of the State. Privatisation is a central issue in our contemporary societies and is part of our daily lives. For a long time, when we talked about security, we had the impression that this was the last bastion of the exclusive monopoly of the State, it was easier to liberalize the telecommunications sector than the field of violence. For a long time, the monopoly on violence has been fundamental to the structuring of Western states. One of the fundamental reasons why we have functional states in the West is because we have had the mechanism that Tilly calls "war making - state making" where the monopoly of violence has allowed state building. Erosion of the monopoly through privatisation is central. Talking about the privatization of violence, the erosion of the state monopoly on the management of violence is something that was not given until recently. Today, this question must be approached through the prism of questioning this monopoly with a view to practices and private companies.

When we talk about security professionals, we intuitively have people who work for public sectors in mind. We have the impression that we are talking about public actors, but before putting security operators and actors in perspective, security has always been not necessarily only public, where the actors have not been directly representative of a public service as is the case, for example, of private detectives. Since the 1970s, the presence of these actors in our societies has accelerated. There is a wide variety of tasks that are not necessarily interrelated.

The term private military and security companies (PSME) is the term most affected by the regulatory issues of private security companies. There is a wide variety of private military companies (PMCs). David Shearer suggests a way to classify them by distinguishing practices:

advice;
logistics: for example, we will only deal with canteens at military bases;
Operational: this remains rather marginal.

The distinction between logistics and operations is not necessarily clear. In Iraq, in 2003, being a truck driver could be an activity that very often involved fighting. Things are not at all clear, the lines are getting blurred.

Our primary focus will be on the "operational PMCs" involved in external military operations of a rather military nature, ranging from peace operations to NATO operations and US military interventions. We will be interested in a wide range of clients ranging from NGOs to international organizations, private companies, the military themselves and foreign affairs officers to secure embassies. In the logistics dimension, currently in Afghanistan, there are employees of private companies working directly for ministries. This is a rather opaque area, but the State retains a right of scrutiny.

One of the first modern operational PMCs is the Executive Outcomes, which was a South African company. Executive Outcomes was created in the early 1990s by former South African special forces involved in the border conflict with Namibia and linked to the survival of the apartheid regime, which created the firm with their expertise. Their field of action was mainly in Angola, securing platforms and participating directly in fighting. Where we see that their activities are not only those of operational combatants and that the Angolan government cannot pay in terms of money and has paid with mining rights. It should be noted that Executive Outcomes was part of a larger consortium that included mining. These are new opportunities for former military personnel through the private sector.

This type of private company is representative of the phenomenon that emerged in the early 1990s with former military personnel engaging in mercenary-like practices. When it is the market that regulates the use of violence, we are in different practices compared to monopolistic practices of classical physical violence?

The involvement of CACI and TITAN in the Abu Ghraib scandal in 2004 gives an idea of the extent and variety of PMC activities. Two of the people involved in this scandal were working for private companies raising the fact that the practice of torture can be outsourced to private companies. The legal framework behind the deployment of these private companies and one of the security stakes.

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Speeches on Private Military Companies (PMCs) and their limitations[modifier | modifier le wikicode]

The transnationalist discourse[modifier | modifier le wikicode]

Behind this discourse is the image of the erosion of the state and the end of the state monopoly on legitimate violence. The importance of this issue is reflected in the role that the state is supposed to play. Does the advent, multiplication and success of these private companies put an end to the state monopoly on legitimate violence? In The Rise and Decline of the State published in 1999, Martin van Creveld estimates that until the 1970s, the idea of a legitimate monopoly was more or less functional and that this monopoly is now disappearing in favour of market logic. Already, in light of what we have seen from a historical point of view, Weber's monopoly is not a total truth formula either, being a fiction and even a recent phenomenon.

This erosion is doubtful because the main customer of these companies is the states, especially the American state. Not only are the United States the primary customer of these companies, but also the major employees of the companies are former military or police officers who have themselves been trained in state armies. Contrary to what Martin van Creveld postulates, we are not at the end of the state monopoly, but we are instead dealing with changes to the monopoly.

In order to deepen this complexity of the stakes surrounding the privatization of military coercion put forward by the transnationalist thesis which aims to minimize the role of the State, we will examine three dimensions of the privatization of military coercion and the role that this raises in relation to the State:

The ownership of coercive resources: the question is whether they are public or private. The answer is that we are faced with privatization because any private security company uses its own resources.
Armed forces and weapons allocation: that is to say who will decide on the allocation of certain weapons and the deployment of armed forces if we are in a privatization logic. The question is whether this privatization is economic in a market logic or is it by authorization. There's a mixture of the two. Unlike the first question, there may be cases where ownership is public, but the allocation is economic. With the program lend and lease in the 1940s, the U.S. government made a loan in the form of military equipment to Britain and the USSR. It is not just anyone who decides, and there is also a political logic. As far as the allocation is concerned, we are in a mixture of economic logic by authorization involving the mediation of a law enforcement agency at a given time.
This is the basis for decision-making about the use of force: even if the state will set rules, on the ground things are not going to be really clear about the rules of engagement. We enter a fuzzy terrain where we do not know how actors that we do not necessarily control are going to have room for manoeuvre. Companies, unlike states, have their own rules of operation with their own directives raising other problems. On the very central issue of the use of force, with the PMCs we enter a grey zone creating spaces where they can make decisions more freely than the military because the chains of command are distended.

The question that arises is the regulation of PMCs. War in general was a means of regulating violence. In a private logic where the market is supposed to impose its rules, the question of regulation is quite representative of this vagueness. There are two types of processes, on the one hand:

agreements between States, these States impose binding regulations and legal frameworks to regulate the framework in which these companies operate. An interesting initiative is the Montreux process. Since 2008, this process has been the culmination of discussions initiated in Switzerland with the ICRC, including 17 states that have agreed to regulate these activities and, in particular, to ensure that they comply with humanitarian law. At the same time, this Montreux process aims to establish a code of conduct to develop "good practices". In a logic of market logic, we are in a change of rationality, entering into a logic of self-regulation as is the case with fair trade. This refers to the social responsibility of players, which calls for the ethical dimension of market regulation. Most of the States associated with the Montreux Process, which aims both to have non-binding international regulation and to develop a code of conduct, are not inclined to address this issue within the framework of the UN.
companies are not opposed to this self-regulatory logic. An International Stability Operations Association treaty is a grouping of private military companies that aims to establish a code of good conduct with the idea of presenting private military companies for one day meeting the standards of UN peacekeeping operations, particularly in the 1990s.

The Realist interpretation[modifier | modifier le wikicode]

The advantage of the realistic approach is to have anhistorical analyses that quickly address the issue of PMCs as a state-supported phenomenon that can be seen as a "high politics" instrument. Behind these companies, there are States that have decided to entrust these missions to private companies. In international relations, non-state actors are not very interesting for realists, since private actors have never had any influence on political decisions and remain proxies for the State. This thesis applies not only to PMCs, but also to terrorist movements, i. e. a state must be found behind any group.

Realistic interpretation has limitations since, by disqualifying private or state actors, one cannot see the impact they might have on decision-making themselves, while many cases call into question the reading of MMPs that do not call into question the very functioning of the state. The realistic thesis is not able to see how much influence private military companies can have on the lobbying mechanism. We have actors who will move from one to the other and who will influence decision-making or even the development of operations by this indistinction. There is also a revolving-doors phenomenon where the distinction between private and public actors is not clear, with some people going back and forth between bureaucracies, governments and private companies.

Causes and consequences[modifier | modifier le wikicode]

We are going to discuss some of the elements that have already been mentioned. We will look in more detail at the question of replacing a public, inter-state logic articulated around the monopoly of the legitimate violence of the State by asking ourselves the question of the economic causes. Do we really have a security market that was set up after the end of the Cold War and it is extremely reductive to see this because there is a political logic behind it? We must remember the economic functioning.

As far as supply is concerned, there are certain phenomena which may lead us to believe that there is the emergence of a real supply with a reduction in the armies with the end of the Cold War. There is a shift from conscription armies to professional armies and the idea that we will now reap the dividends of peace and therefore there are fewer soldiers. There are a lot of military offers coming out of it, with military personnel no longer working or available for a private security market.

source : Science Po^[7]

Just because there is less money and fewer armies does not mean that there are no new challenges. The end of the Cold War led to the multiplication of infra-state conflicts with a demand for intervention. The UN and NATO will be much more active in the end of the Cold War in terms of intervention and there is still a strong demand for troops. There is a Somali syndrome, which means that during the intervention in Somalia, there was a multinational intervention and UN investment with a high demand for international troops, but also with Rwanda and Bosnia, which meant that some Western states did not necessarily want their soldiers to die in peacekeeping operations. In terms of demand, there is also the fact that Western countries do not necessarily want to join peacekeeping operations in the 1990s. Beginning in the 1990s, a demand arose from the disaffection of Western countries for peacekeeping operations. Today, the overwhelming majority of the troops involved in peacekeeping operations come from India and Bangladesh. There is also a cost logic behind this logic, since these soldiers also cost less.

There is a real demand with the multiplication of African conflicts and Koffi Annan questioned the UN's ability to mobilize resources.

A paradox emerges. As much as European countries' military spending has fallen, in terms of the world's largest military budget, the US budget since the end of the Cold War has risen exponentially and steadily.

The U.S. military did not grow up, but are exploded budgeta with private military companies. In 1991, the share of private contactors was 1%, in 2003 10% and in 2009, the number of private companies was higher than the number of US troops in Iraq. The budget is increasing, but the number of troops deployed on the ground is not increasing.

Now, we have to think about other causes because it is not just the post-Cold War and peace dividend logic that made it necessary to call on private contactors because we had fewer soldiers. By making fictional politics, we can see that at the time, with the path we were heading towards, the idea was to say to ourselves that in order to settle the solutions at the global level, we need inclusive multilateral solutions. There were optimistic theories of a more just world where multilateral decision-making translated into the development of multilateral institutions. This is not only through the United Nations, but also through the OSCE, the European Union, which will conduct crisis management operations from 2003 onwards. The idea of multilateralism has been very much at the forefront and was seen as a credible option. One could have imagined that the consequences of 9/11 in terms of the international community could have been studied within the framework of a multilateral intervention.

What could explain why governments will increasingly resort to private companies? In the operation of many states, this began in Britain and the United States in the 1970s, and a new way of managing the state was developed, which found that bureaucracies were too slow, cumbersome, and not effective enough to have a dynamic society. This is called[New Public Management]]. There was a widespread idea that tasks would be outsourced or assigned to private actors that would allow for more efficient bureaucracy. The U.S. military will make use of many subcontractors especially for logistics. Another factor is that the professionalization of armies has taken people away from them to perform subordinate tasks. This is a neoliberal turn of events that aims to reduce the size of the state and even the armies have been affected by this phenomenon. It is important to put that in perspective.

In short, it allows us to question the market argument which is a circular argument since it is said that it is the market logic that will generate the market, it is a presupposed rationality that we will apply to a phenomenon. Finally, the cause of the market explanation is totally circular. There are practical questions, but there is clearly a more political will to move towards more neoliberal public policies. This phenomenon is linked to the transformation of the State into a logic of redeployment and different functioning. The American state remains important even though the decision-making process has changed.

The SMPs are part of a legal no-mans's land in Iraq with Order 17 of the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA). The employees of these companies were not subject to Iraqi law, it is an extremely grey area. Since 2007, employees of these companies have been subject to the United States Unified Military Justice Code. In Afghanistan, former President Karzai wanted to regulate the presence of private military companies by making them subject to Afghan law. The reaction of these companies was to threaten the merger to break their contract because this clause was not included. There is no taking over of local judicial systems, their status is weak because they are not military. Despite the fact that they were tried to be associated with a military code, de facto, this highlights the fact that there was very little control and no punishment for abuse.

SMPs in Practice: The Effects of the Relationship Between Politics and Security Professionals[modifier | modifier le wikicode]

How does this phenomenon of privatization affect relations between the different actors and professions involved? Continuity between state and private actors must be discussed in a network analysis. These networks are cross-sectional beyond the private - public distinction. These networks do not unilaterally weaken state actors, but they certainly transform power relations within states.

Politicians and ministerial bureaucracies[modifier | modifier le wikicode]

With regard to the transformation of practices, we will look at a series of practical cases of how the arrival of PMCs will transform the relationship between certain actors.

In 2003, during the intervention in Iraq, there was a disagreement within the Pentagon between civilians and the military, namely the issue of neo-conservatives and military privatization in the context of military opposition to military operations abroad. The military was not very enthusiastic about the war in Iraq. A 2002 report said that the military felt that sending troops to Iraq was not complicated, but in terms of management it was very complicated when the neo-conservatives were in favour of intervention. In this type of opposition, with the advent of PMC actor, how does this lead to a transformation. The fact that PMCs are a viable solution is going to make it give more options for civilians, making the military less important. Civil bureaucracy had more options.

One case is the way politicians bypass their allies with the example of counter-narcotics in Afghanistan. The call for a private company has bypassed a traditional allied political issue. What privatization can change is also to bypass the parliamentary opposition. Plan Colombia was part of the continuity against drug trafficking in Colombia. The multi-phased plan aimed to tackle drug cultivation, which weakened the guerrillas on the ground by eradicating coca cultivation. Congress was not "for" fearing that an escalation operation would be launched. The Clinton administration has made extensive use of private companies, particularly to eradicate coca cultivation.

One way of describing the relationship between departmental bureaucracies and the MPS is the principle of "plausible denial". In 2007, the "Nissour Square shooting" took place. Black Water employees who were supposed to protect a diplomatic convoy and were forced to shoot into the crowd killing about 20 people. The plausible denial is that the U.S. secretary of state at the time could not plausibly say that he did not really control these people, that even though they gave them instructions, shooting in the crowd was not the total responsibility of the Americans. It remains unclear how this company interprets the American directives. The term "plausible denial" is often used to illustrate the room for manoeuvre that can be left by appealing to military societies.

Military and intelligence services[modifier | modifier le wikicode]

Their work has been largely transformed by private companies. For the military, there is the obvious advantage of focusing on the essential missions of the army. The advantage of delegation to PMCs for the military is that they can focus on core missions in a limited troop-staffing context, which increases the tooth-to-tail ratio. For the military, there is an advantage that in an army relatively small in number of men, if the less glorious tasks are left to private companies, one focuses more on the essential aspects of the milestone activity.

But the military sometimes loses certain prerogatives because many things have been outsourced. Leaving some prerogatives aside means that the military can also lose quite significant prerogatives. The fact that the resources available are private means that, within the bureaucracy, other aspects dedicated to the military will benefit private companies. Today, the CIA does not need to use military means to make a targeted strike in Afghanistan that reduces military prerogatives. The military has less control over logistical aspects, leaving more room for manoeuvre for other actors.

Local elite[modifier | modifier le wikicode]

The increasing presence of PMCs within the State redefines and reacts with the relations with politics. The interest of PMCs for local elites in war-torn developing countries such as Afghanistan or Iraq may be purely economic. In Afghanistan, PMCs represent a purely economic interest for local elites. To pay some militias on the spot and give them the screen to be PMCs, eventually having an influence in the local game. If the regime wants to have an Afghan state-owned public security apparatus, many militias can see the PMCs as subversive forces. We see how the privatization of security can have an impact on the very process of state building and the acquisition of a state monopoly on its territory. The Disbandment of Illegal Armed Groups (DIAG) reportedly failed to disarm these militias, removing them from the equation of state building in Afghanistan after 2001.

Conclusion[modifier | modifier le wikicode]

There is a logic of symbiosis between the State and war entrepreneurs. Instead, there is a transformation within the State without necessarily calling into question the State itself, since no logic escapes the State. The sociohistorical perspective makes it possible to see that privatization is not something new, that in the 19th century there was a kind of parenthesis with a state influencing the exercise of the monopoly of violence, even if one could say that this monopoly was never total. We are now perhaps witnessing the end of this parenthesis, we would see a return. Why a return of the phenomenon? A distinction should be made between stronger and weaker states, i. e. not all states are equal in the privatization of the monopoly of violence. Privatisation, if it is made possible and comes mainly from the northern state, there would be an imperial reason behind it, it would be less serious for a northern state to privatise part of its security apparatus, because it can afford it. It is possible for some States and privatization has consequences in other States.

Bibliography[modifier | modifier le wikicode]

References[modifier | modifier le wikicode]

↑ [Davidshofer | University of Geneva] - Academia.edu
↑ Publications de Stephan Davidshofer | Cairn.info
↑ Davidshofer, Stephan. “La Gestion De Crise Européenne Ou Quand L'Europe Rencontre La Sécurité : Modalités Pratiques Et Symboliques D'une Autonomisation.” Http://Www.theses.fr/, Paris, Institut D'études Politiques, 1 Jan. 2009
↑ Page personnelle de Christian Olsson sur le site de l'Université Libre de Bruxelles
↑ Page de Christian Olsson sur Academia.edu
↑ Profile Linkedin de Christian Olsson
↑ http://cartographie.sciences-po.fr/cartotheque/51C_conflits_armes_2006.jpg

[1] [Davidshofer | University of Geneva] - Academia.edu

[2] Publications de Stephan Davidshofer | Cairn.info

[3] Davidshofer, Stephan. “La Gestion De Crise Européenne Ou Quand L'Europe Rencontre La Sécurité : Modalités Pratiques Et Symboliques D'une Autonomisation.” Http://Www.theses.fr/, Paris, Institut D'études Politiques, 1 Jan. 2009

[4] Page personnelle de Christian Olsson sur le site de l'Université Libre de Bruxelles

[5] Page de Christian Olsson sur Academia.edu

[6] Profile Linkedin de Christian Olsson

[7] ttp://cartographie.sciences-po.fr/cartotheque/51C_conflits_armes_2006.jpg

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@@ Ligne 1 : / Ligne 1 : @@
-De manière générale, la question de la privatisation est quelque chose qui revient systématiquement autour de la notion d’État. La question de la privatisation est centrale dans nos sociétés contemporaines et fait partie de notre quotidien. Pendant, longtemps, lorsqu’on parlait de la sécurité, on avait l’impression que c’était le dernier bastion du monopole exclusif de l’État, il est plus facile de libéraliser le domaine de la télécommunication que celui de la violence. Pendant longtemps, le monopole de la violence a été fondamental dans la structuration des États occidentaux. Une des raisons fondamentales pour laquelle nous avons des États fonctionnels en Occident est parce qu’on a eu le mécanisme que Tilly appelle « war making – state making » où le monopole de la violence a permis la construction de l’État. L’érosion du monopole à travers la privatisation est centrale. Parler de la privatisation de la violence, de l’érosion du monopole étatique sur la gestion de la violence est quelque chose qui n’était pas donné jusqu’à récemment. Aujourd’hui, on se doit d’aborder cette question à travers le prisme de la remise en question de ce monopole en vue des pratiques et des sociétés privées.
+{{Infobox Lecture
+ | image =
+ | image_caption =
+ | faculté =
+ | département =
+ | professeurs = [[Stephan Davidshofer]]<ref>[[http://unige.academia.edu/StephanDavidshofer|Stephan Davidshofer | University of Geneva]] - Academia.edu</ref><ref>[http://www.cairn.info/publications-de-Davidshofer-Stephan--56940.htm Publications de Stephan Davidshofer] | Cairn.info</ref><ref>Davidshofer, Stephan. “[http://www.theses.fr/2009IEPP0047 La Gestion De Crise Européenne Ou Quand L'Europe Rencontre La Sécurité : Modalités Pratiques Et Symboliques D'une Autonomisation].” Http://Www.theses.fr/, Paris, Institut D'études Politiques, 1 Jan. 2009</ref> <br> [[Christian Olsson]]<ref>[http://philoscsoc.ulb.be/fr/users/colsson Page personnelle de Christian Olsson sur le site de l'Université Libre de Bruxelles]</ref><ref>[http://ulb.academia.edu/COlsson Page de Christian Olsson sur Academia.edu]</ref><ref>[https://fr.linkedin.com/in/christian-olsson-2ba437b Profile Linkedin de Christian Olsson]</ref>
+ | assistants =
+ | assistants =
+ | enregistrement = [https://mediaserver.unige.ch/collection/AN3-1220-2014-2015.rss 2014], [https://mediaserver.unige.ch/collection/AN3-1220-2014-2015.rss 2015]
+ | cours = [[Political Violence and Security Practices]]
+ | lectures =
+*[[Political violence and the practice of security]]
+*[[The birth of modern warfare: war-making and state-making from a Western perspective]]
+*[[Transformations of war and violence in Europe]]
+*[[War beyond the West: is the modern state a Western invention?]]
+*[[What is non-state violence? The Case of Afghan Conflict]]
+*[[Intervention: Reinventing war?]]
+*[[Security professionals: bureaucratization, institutionalization, professionalization and differentiation]]
+*[[The transformation of contemporary security practices: between war and global policing?]]
+*[[The transformation of contemporary security practices: the logic of risk]]
+*[[Privatized coercion: from mercenarism to private military companies]]
+*[[Intelligence and Surveillance]]
+}}
-Lorsqu’on parle de professionnels de la sécurité, on a intuitivement en tête des gens qui travaillent pour des secteurs publics. On a l’impression qu’on parle d’acteurs publics, mais avant de mettre en perspective, les opérateurs et acteurs de la sécurité, de tout temps, la sécurité n’a pas été nécessairement que publique, où les acteurs n’ont pas été directement représentatifs d’une fonction publique comme c’est par exemple le cas des détectives privés. On assiste, depuis les années 1970, à une accélération de la présence de ces acteurs dans nos sociétés. Il y a une grande variété de tâches qui ne sont pas forcements liés entre elles.
+Generally speaking, the question of privatization is something that systematically revolves around the notion of the State. Privatisation is a central issue in our contemporary societies and is part of our daily lives. For a long time, when we talked about security, we had the impression that this was the last bastion of the exclusive monopoly of the State, it was easier to liberalize the telecommunications sector than the field of violence. For a long time, the monopoly on violence has been fundamental to the structuring of Western states. One of the fundamental reasons why we have functional states in the West is because we have had the mechanism that Tilly calls "war making - state making" where the monopoly of violence has allowed state building. Erosion of the monopoly through privatisation is central. Talking about the privatization of violence, the erosion of the state monopoly on the management of violence is something that was not given until recently. Today, this question must be approached through the prism of questioning this monopoly with a view to practices and private companies.
-Le terme d’entreprises militaires et de sécurité privées (EMSP) est le plus touché par les questions de régulation des entreprises de sécurité privée. Il y a une grande variété des sociétés militaires privées (SMP). David Shearer propose une façon de les classifier par une distinction des pratiques :
+When we talk about security professionals, we intuitively have people who work for public sectors in mind. We have the impression that we are talking about public actors, but before putting security operators and actors in perspective, security has always been not necessarily only public, where the actors have not been directly representative of a public service as is the case, for example, of private detectives. Since the 1970s, the presence of these actors in our societies has accelerated. There is a wide variety of tasks that are not necessarily interrelated.
-*de conseil ;
-*logistiques : par exemple, on ne va s’occuper que des cantines dans les bases militaires ;
-*opérationnelles : cela reste assez marginal.
-La distinction entre logistique et opérationnel n’est pas forcément claire. En Irak, en 2003, être conducteur de camion pouvait être une activité qui mettait très souvent au contact de combats. Les choses ne sont pas du tout claires, les lignes se brouillent.
+The term private military and security companies (PSME) is the term most affected by the regulatory issues of private security companies. There is a wide variety of private military companies (PMCs). David Shearer suggests a way to classify them by distinguishing practices:
+*advice;
+*logistics: for example, we will only deal with canteens at military bases;
+*Operational: this remains rather marginal.
-Nous nous intéresserons principalement au « SMP opérationnelles » impliqué dans des opérations militaires extérieures d’ordre plutôt militaire allant des opérations de la paix, aux opérations de l’OTAN ou encore aux interventions militaires américaines. Les clients qui vont nous intéresser sont très larges allant des ONG aux organisations internationales en passant par les compagnies privées, les militaires eux-mêmes ou encore les chargés d’affaires étrangères pour sécuriser des ambassades. Dans la dimension logistique, actuellement, en Afghanistan, il y a des employés de sociétés privées qui travaillent directement pour des ministères. C’est un domaine assez opaque, mais l’État garde un droit de regard.
+The distinction between logistics and operations is not necessarily clear. In Iraq, in 2003, being a truck driver could be an activity that very often involved fighting. Things are not at all clear, the lines are getting blurred.
+Our primary focus will be on the "operational PMCs" involved in external military operations of a rather military nature, ranging from peace operations to NATO operations and US military interventions. We will be interested in a wide range of clients ranging from NGOs to international organizations, private companies, the military themselves and foreign affairs officers to secure embassies. In the logistics dimension, currently in Afghanistan, there are employees of private companies working directly for ministries. This is a rather opaque area, but the State retains a right of scrutiny.
 [[Fichier:Ri3 smp 1.png|gauche|vignette]]
-Une des premières SMP opérationnelle moderne est l’Executive Outcomes qui fut une entreprise sud-africaine. Executive Outcomes a été créé au début des années 1990 par d’anciens des forces spéciales sud-africaines impliqués dans le conflit frontalier avec la Namibie et lié à la survie du régime de l’apartheid, qui on créé cette firme en apportant leur expertise. Leur champ d’action était surtout en Angola en sécurisant des plateformes et participant directement à des combats. Où on voit que leurs activités ne sont pas que celles opérationnelles de participant aux combats et que le gouvernement angolais ne pouvant payer en termes d’argent et a payé avec des droits d’exploitation minière. Il faut noter que Executive Outcomes faisait partie d’un consortium plus large qui notamment s’occupait d’exploitation minière. Ce sont de nouveaux débouchés pour d’anciens militaires à travers le secteur privé.
+One of the first modern operational PMCs is the Executive Outcomes, which was a South African company. Executive Outcomes was created in the early 1990s by former South African special forces involved in the border conflict with Namibia and linked to the survival of the apartheid regime, which created the firm with their expertise. Their field of action was mainly in Angola, securing platforms and participating directly in fighting. Where we see that their activities are not only those of operational combatants and that the Angolan government cannot pay in terms of money and has paid with mining rights. It should be noted that Executive Outcomes was part of a larger consortium that included mining. These are new opportunities for former military personnel through the private sector.
-Ce type de société privée est représentatif du phénomène émergeant au début des années 1990 avec d’anciens militaires qui s’adonnent à des pratiques proches du mercenariat. Quand c’est le marché qui régule l’usage de la violence, on est dans des pratiques différentes par rapport à des pratiques de monopole de la violence physique classique ?
+This type of private company is representative of the phenomenon that emerged in the early 1990s with former military personnel engaging in mercenary-like practices. When it is the market that regulates the use of violence, we are in different practices compared to monopolistic practices of classical physical violence?
 [[Fichier:Ri3 Abou Ghraib smp 2.png|vignette]]
-L’implication de CACI et TITAN dans le scandale d’Abou Ghraib en 2004 donne une idée de l’étendue et la variété des activités des SMP. Deux des personnes impliquées dans ce scandale travaillaient pour des sociétés privées soulevant le fait que la pratique de torture peut être externalisée vers des sociétés privées. Le cadre juridique derrière le déploiement de ces sociétés privées et un des enjeux de la sécurité.
+The involvement of CACI and TITAN in the Abu Ghraib scandal in 2004 gives an idea of the extent and variety of PMC activities. Two of the people involved in this scandal were working for private companies raising the fact that the practice of torture can be outsourced to private companies. The legal framework behind the deployment of these private companies and one of the security stakes.
+{{Translations
+| fr = La coercition privatisée : du mercenariat aux compagnies militaires privées
+| es = Coacción privatizada: del mercenarismo a las empresas militares privadas
+| lt = Privatizuota prievarta: nuo samdinių iki privačių karinių bendrovių
+}}
-= Les discours sur les Sociétés militaires privées (SMP) et leurs limites =
+= Speeches on Private Military Companies (PMCs) and their limitations =
-== Le discours transnationaliste ==
+== The transnationalist discourse ==
-Derrière ce discours, il y a l’image de l’érosion de l’État et celui de la fin du monopole d’État sur la violence légitime. On voit l’importance de cette question à l’image du rôle qu’est censé jouer l’État. Est-ce que l’avènement, la multiplication et le succès de ces sociétés privées met un point de fin au monopole d’État sur la violence légitime ? Dans ''The Rise and Decline of the State'' publié en 1999, Martin van Creveld estime que jusqu’aux années 1970, l’idée d’un monopole légitime était plus ou moins fonctionnel et que désormais ce monopole disparaît au profit des logiques de marché. Déjà, à la lumière de ce qu’on a vu d’un point de vue historique, le monopole énoncé par Weber n’est pas non plus une formule de vérité totale étant une fiction et même un phénomène récent.
+Behind this discourse is the image of the erosion of the state and the end of the state monopoly on legitimate violence. The importance of this issue is reflected in the role that the state is supposed to play. Does the advent, multiplication and success of these private companies put an end to the state monopoly on legitimate violence? In'' The Rise and Decline of the State'' published in 1999, Martin van Creveld estimates that until the 1970s, the idea of a legitimate monopoly was more or less functional and that this monopoly is now disappearing in favour of market logic. Already, in light of what we have seen from a historical point of view, Weber's monopoly is not a total truth formula either, being a fiction and even a recent phenomenon.
-Cette érosion est douteuse parce que le principal client de ces compagnies est les États et notamment l’État américain. Non seulement les États-Unis sont le principal client de ces compagnies, mais aussi les principaux employés des compagnies sont d’anciens militaires ou policiers qui ont eux-mêmes été formés dans les armées des États. Au contraire de ce que postule Martin van Creveld, on n’est pas à la fin du monopole de l’État, mais on a plutôt à faire à des réagencements de ce monopole.
+This erosion is doubtful because the main customer of these companies is the states, especially the American state. Not only are the United States the primary customer of these companies, but also the major employees of the companies are former military or police officers who have themselves been trained in state armies. Contrary to what Martin van Creveld postulates, we are not at the end of the state monopoly, but we are instead dealing with changes to the monopoly.
-Pour approfondir cette complexité des enjeux autour de la privatisation de la coercition militaire mise en avant par la thèse transnationaliste qui vise à minimiser le rôle de l’État, on va s’intéresser à trois dimensions de la privatisation de la coercition militaire et au rôle que cela soulève par rapport à l’État :
+In order to deepen this complexity of the stakes surrounding the privatization of military coercion put forward by the transnationalist thesis which aims to minimize the role of the State, we will examine three dimensions of the privatization of military coercion and the role that this raises in relation to the State:
-#la propriété des ressources de la coercition : la question est de savoir si elles sont publiques ou privées. La réponse est qu’on est face à une privatisation puisque n’importe quelle société de sécurité privée utilise ses propres ressources.
+#The ownership of coercive resources: the question is whether they are public or private. The answer is that we are faced with privatization because any private security company uses its own resources.
-#allocation des forces armées et des armes : c’est-à-dire qui va décider de l’allocation de certaines armes et du déploiement de forces armées si on est dans une logique de privatisation. La question est de savoir si cette privatisation est économique dans une logique de marché ou alors, est-ce que cela est par autorisation. Il y a un mélange des deux. À l’inverse de la première question, on peut avoir des cas où une propriété est publique, mais l’allocation est économique. Avec le programme lend and lease dans les années 1940, le gouvernement américain faisait un prêt sous la forme de matériel militaire à la Grande-Bretagne et l’URSS. Ce n’est pas n’importe qui qui décide et il y a également une logique politique. Pour ce qui touche à l’allocation, on est dans un mélange de logique économique par autorisation impliquant la médiation d’une force publique à un moment donné.
+#Armed forces and weapons allocation: that is to say who will decide on the allocation of certain weapons and the deployment of armed forces if we are in a privatization logic. The question is whether this privatization is economic in a market logic or is it by authorization. There's a mixture of the two. Unlike the first question, there may be cases where ownership is public, but the allocation is economic. With the program lend and lease in the 1940s, the U.S. government made a loan in the form of military equipment to Britain and the USSR. It is not just anyone who decides, and there is also a political logic. As far as the allocation is concerned, we are in a mixture of economic logic by authorization involving the mediation of a law enforcement agency at a given time.
-#qui est à l’origine de la prise de décision au sujet de l’usage de la force : même si l’État va fixer des règles, sur le terrain, les choses ne vont pas être vraiment claires sur les règles d’engagements. On entre dans un terrain flou où on ne sait pas comment des acteurs qu’on ne contrôle pas forcément vont avoir une marge de manœuvre. Les compagnies, à la différence des États, ont leurs propres règles de fonctionnement avec ses propres directives soulevant d’autres problèmes. Sur l’enjeu même central de l’usage de la force, avec les SMP on entre dans une zone grise créant des espaces où ils peuvent prendre des décisions de manière plus libre que les militaires parce que les chaines de commandement sont distendues.
+#This is the basis for decision-making about the use of force: even if the state will set rules, on the ground things are not going to be really clear about the rules of engagement. We enter a fuzzy terrain where we do not know how actors that we do not necessarily control are going to have room for manoeuvre. Companies, unlike states, have their own rules of operation with their own directives raising other problems. On the very central issue of the use of force, with the PMCs we enter a grey zone creating spaces where they can make decisions more freely than the military because the chains of command are distended.
-La question qui se pose est celle de la régulation des SMP. La guerre de manière en générale était un moyen de régulation de la violence. Dans une logique privée où le marché est censé imposer ses règles, la question de la régulation est assez représentative de ce flou. On distingue deux types de processus, il y a d’un côté :
+The question that arises is the regulation of PMCs. War in general was a means of regulating violence. In a private logic where the market is supposed to impose its rules, the question of regulation is quite representative of this vagueness. There are two types of processes, on the one hand:
-*des conventions entre États, ces États imposent des régulations et des cadres juridiques contraignants pour réguler le cadre d’activité de ces compagnies. Une initiative intéressante est le processus de Montreux. Depuis 2008, ce processus est l’aboutissement d’une réflexion initiée en Suisse avec le CICR incluant 17 États qui se mettent d’accord pour réguler ces activités et notamment leur faire respecter le droit humanitaire. En parallèle, ce processus de Montreux vise à mettre en place un code de conduite pour élaborer des « bonnes pratiques ». Dans une logique de marché, on est dans un changement de rationalité, rentrant dans une logique d’autorégulation comme c’est le cas avec le commerce équitable. Cela renvoie à la responsabilité sociale des acteurs qui fait appel à la dimension éthique de la régulation du marché. La plupart des États associés au processus de Montreux visant à la fois à avoir une régulation internationale non-contraignante et à développer un code de conduite n’étant pas enclins à aborder cette problématique dans le cadre de l’ONU.
+*agreements between States, these States impose binding regulations and legal frameworks to regulate the framework in which these companies operate. An interesting initiative is the Montreux process. Since 2008, this process has been the culmination of discussions initiated in Switzerland with the ICRC, including 17 states that have agreed to regulate these activities and, in particular, to ensure that they comply with humanitarian law. At the same time, this Montreux process aims to establish a code of conduct to develop "good practices". In a logic of market logic, we are in a change of rationality, entering into a logic of self-regulation as is the case with fair trade. This refers to the social responsibility of players, which calls for the ethical dimension of market regulation. Most of the States associated with the Montreux Process, which aims both to have non-binding international regulation and to develop a code of conduct, are not inclined to address this issue within the framework of the UN.
-*les compagnies ne sont pas contre cette logique d’autorégulation. Un traité International Stability Operations Association est un regroupement de sociétés militaires privées qui visent à mettre en place un code de bonne conduite avec l’idée de présenter les sociétés militaires privées pour un jour répondre aux standards des opérations de maintien de la paix de l’ONU notamment dans les années 1990.
+*companies are not opposed to this self-regulatory logic. An International Stability Operations Association treaty is a grouping of private military companies that aims to establish a code of good conduct with the idea of presenting private military companies for one day meeting the standards of UN peacekeeping operations, particularly in the 1990s.
-== L’interprétation réaliste ==
+== The Realist interpretation ==
-L’avantage de l’approche réaliste est d’avoir des analyses anhistoriques réglant la question rapidement disant que les SMP est un phénomène soutenu par l’État pouvant être vu comme un instrument de « high politics ». Derrière ces compagnies, il y a des États qui ont souverainement décidé de confier ces missions à des sociétés privées. En relations internationales, les acteurs non-étatiques ne sont pas très intéressants pour les réalistes puisque les acteurs privés n’ont jamais eu d’influence sur les décisions politiques et restent des proxys de l’État. Cette thèse s’applique aux SMP, mais aussi aux mouvements terroristes, c’est-à-dire qu’il faut trouver un État derrière n’importe quel groupe.
+The advantage of the realistic approach is to have anhistorical analyses that quickly address the issue of PMCs as a state-supported phenomenon that can be seen as a "high politics" instrument. Behind these companies, there are States that have decided to entrust these missions to private companies. In international relations, non-state actors are not very interesting for realists, since private actors have never had any influence on political decisions and remain proxies for the State. This thesis applies not only to PMCs, but also to terrorist movements, i. e. a state must be found behind any group.
-L’interprétation réaliste a des limites puisqu’en disqualifiant les acteurs privés ou étatiques, on ne peut pas voir l’impact qu’ils pourraient avoir sur la prise de décision elles-mêmes alors que de nombreux cas remettent en question la lecture des SMP qui ne remettent pas en question le fonctionnement même de l’État. La thèse réaliste n’est pas capable de voir à quel point les sociétés militaires privées peuvent avoir une grande influence sur le mécanisme de lobbying. On a des acteurs qui vont passer de l’un à l’autre et qui vont influencer la prise de décision ou même le déroulement des opérations par cette indistinction. Il y a aussi un phénomène de revolving-doors où la distinction entre acteurs privés et publics n’est pas claire, certaines personnes faisant des aller-retour entre des bureaucraties, des gouvernements et des sociétés privées.
+Realistic interpretation has limitations since, by disqualifying private or state actors, one cannot see the impact they might have on decision-making themselves, while many cases call into question the reading of MMPs that do not call into question the very functioning of the state. The realistic thesis is not able to see how much influence private military companies can have on the lobbying mechanism. We have actors who will move from one to the other and who will influence decision-making or even the development of operations by this indistinction. There is also a revolving-doors phenomenon where the distinction between private and public actors is not clear, with some people going back and forth between bureaucracies, governments and private companies.
-== Causes et conséquences ==
+== Causes and consequences ==
-Nous allons poser le débat autour d’éléments qui ont déjà été évoqués. On va regarder plus en détail la question du remplacement d’une logique publique, interétatique articulée autour du monopole de la violence légitime de l‘État en se posant la question des causes économiques. A-t-on vraiment un marché de la sécurité qui s’est mis en place après la fin de la Guerre froide et il est extrêmement réducteur de voir cela parce qu’il y a une logique politique derrière. Il faut retenir le fonctionnement économique.
+We are going to discuss some of the elements that have already been mentioned. We will look in more detail at the question of replacing a public, inter-state logic articulated around the monopoly of the legitimate violence of the State by asking ourselves the question of the economic causes. Do we really have a security market that was set up after the end of the Cold War and it is extremely reductive to see this because there is a political logic behind it? We must remember the economic functioning.
 [[Fichier:Ri3 offre smp 1.png|vignette]]
-En ce qui concerne l’offre, on assiste à certains phénomènes qui peuvent faire croire qu’il y a l’émergence d’une véritable offre avec une réduction des armées avec la fin de la Guerre froide. Il y a un passage d’armée de conscription à des armées de professionnels et l’idée qu’on va désormais récolter les dividendes de la paix et donc il y a moins de militaires. Il y a énormément d’offres militaires qui s’en dégagent, avec des militaires qui n’ont plus de travail ou disponible pour un marché privé de la sécurité.
+As far as supply is concerned, there are certain phenomena which may lead us to believe that there is the emergence of a real supply with a reduction in the armies with the end of the Cold War. There is a shift from conscription armies to professional armies and the idea that we will now reap the dividends of peace and therefore there are fewer soldiers. There are a lot of military offers coming out of it, with military personnel no longer working or available for a private security market.
 [[Fichier:Conflits armés et interventions de paix en 2006.jpg|vignette|source : Science Po<ref>http://cartographie.sciences-po.fr/cartotheque/51C_conflits_armes_2006.jpg</ref>]]
-Ce n’est pas parce qu’il y a moins d’argent et d’armées qu’il n’y a pas de nouveaux défis. La fin de la Guerre froide débouche sur la multiplication de conflits infra-étatiques avec une demande d’intervention. L’ONU et l’OTAN vont être beaucoup plus actifs dans la fin de la Guerre froide en matière d’intervention et il y a une demande de troupes qui reste forte. Il y a un syndrome somalien, c’est-à-dire que lors de l’intervention en Somalie, il y a eu une intervention multinationale et un investissement de l’ONU avec une forte demande pour les troupes internationales, mais aussi avec le Rwanda et la Bosnie, cela a fait que certains États occidentaux n’avaient pas forcément envie de voir leurs soldats mourir dans des interventions de maintien de la paix. En matière de demande, il y a aussi le fait que les pays occidentaux n’ont pas forcément envie de s’insérer dans des opérations de maintien de la paix dans les années 1990. À partir des années 1990, une demande se crée à partir de la désaffection des pays occidentaux en ce qui concerne les opérations de maintien de la paix. Aujourd’hui, l’écrasante majorité des troupes engagées dans les opérations de maintien de la paix provient de l’Inde et du Bangladesh. Il y a également une logique de coût derrière cette logique puisque ces soldats coûtent également moins cher.
+Just because there is less money and fewer armies does not mean that there are no new challenges. The end of the Cold War led to the multiplication of infra-state conflicts with a demand for intervention. The UN and NATO will be much more active in the end of the Cold War in terms of intervention and there is still a strong demand for troops. There is a Somali syndrome, which means that during the intervention in Somalia, there was a multinational intervention and UN investment with a high demand for international troops, but also with Rwanda and Bosnia, which meant that some Western states did not necessarily want their soldiers to die in peacekeeping operations. In terms of demand, there is also the fact that Western countries do not necessarily want to join peacekeeping operations in the 1990s. Beginning in the 1990s, a demand arose from the disaffection of Western countries for peacekeeping operations. Today, the overwhelming majority of the troops involved in peacekeeping operations come from India and Bangladesh. There is also a cost logic behind this logic, since these soldiers also cost less.
 [[Fichier:Ri3 smp 1.png|vignette]]
-Il y a une véritable demande avec la multiplication des conflits africains est Koffi Annan s’est interrogé sur la capacité de l’ONU a mobiliser des ressources.
+There is a real demand with the multiplication of African conflicts and Koffi Annan questioned the UN's ability to mobilize resources.
 [[Fichier:us military expenditure since 1998.png|gauche|vignette]]
-Un paradoxe émerge. Autant les dépenses militaires des pays européens ont baissé, en ce qui concerne le principal budget militaire dans le monde, tandis que le budget américain depuis la fin de la Guerre froide n’a cessé d’augmenter et de façon exponentielle.
+A paradox emerges. As much as European countries' military spending has fallen, in terms of the world's largest military budget, the US budget since the end of the Cold War has risen exponentially and steadily.
 [[Fichier:Ri3 smp irak 1.png|vignette]]
-L’armée américaine n’a pas grandi, mais sont budgeta explosé ayant pour cause les sociétés militaires privées. En 1991, la part de contacteurs privés est de 1%, en 2003 de 10% et en 2009, les effectifs de sociétés privées sont plus importants que les troupes américaines en Irak. Le budget augmente, mais le nombre de soldats déployés sur le terrain n’augmente pas.
+The U.S. military did not grow up, but are exploded budgeta with private military companies. In 1991, the share of private contactors was 1%, in 2003 10% and in 2009, the number of private companies was higher than the number of US troops in Iraq. The budget is increasing, but the number of troops deployed on the ground is not increasing.
-Désormais, il faut réfléchir sur d’autres causes puisque ce n’est pas simplement la logique de post-Guerre froide et de dividende de la paix qui fait qu’on a dû faire appel à des contacteurs privés puisqu’on avait moins de soldat. En faisant de la politique fiction, on voit qu’à l’époque, avec la voie vers laquelle on se dirigeait, l’idée était de se dire que pour régler les solutions au niveau mondial, il faut des solutions multilatérales inclusives. Il y avait des thèses optimistes d’un monde qui fonctionne plus juste où la prise de décision est multilatérale se traduisant par le développement d’institutions multilatérales. Cela ne passe pas que par l’ONU, mais aussi par l’OSCE, l’Union européenne qui va mener des opérations de gestion de crise à partir de 2003. L’idée du multilatéralisme a beaucoup occupé le devant de la scène et a été considérée comme une option crédible. On aurait pu imaginer que les conséquences du 11 Septembre en termes de communauté internationale soient étudiées dans le cadre d’une intervention multilatérale.
+Now, we have to think about other causes because it is not just the post-Cold War and peace dividend logic that made it necessary to call on private contactors because we had fewer soldiers. By making fictional politics, we can see that at the time, with the path we were heading towards, the idea was to say to ourselves that in order to settle the solutions at the global level, we need inclusive multilateral solutions. There were optimistic theories of a more just world where multilateral decision-making translated into the development of multilateral institutions. This is not only through the United Nations, but also through the OSCE, the European Union, which will conduct crisis management operations from 2003 onwards. The idea of multilateralism has been very much at the forefront and was seen as a credible option. One could have imagined that the consequences of 9/11 in terms of the international community could have been studied within the framework of a multilateral intervention.
-Qu’est-ce qui pourrait expliquer que les États vont faire de plus en plus appel à des sociétés privées ? Dans le fonctionnement de nombreux États, cela à commencé en Grande-Bretagne et aux États-Unis dans les années 1970, on est arrivé à un nouveau mode de gestion de l’État qui constatait que les bureaucraties étaient trop lentes, lourdes, pas assez efficaces pour avoir une société dynamique. C’est ce qu’on a appelé le [[La Nouvelle Gestion Publique|new public management]]. L’idée était répandue qu’on allait externaliser ou confier des tâches à des acteurs privés qui permettraient un fonctionnement bureaucratique plus efficace. L’armée américaine va faire recours à de nombreux sous-traitants notamment pour le domaine logistique. Un autre facteur est que la professionnalisation des armées a enlevé des gens pour s’occuper de tâches subalternes. On est dans un tournant néolibéral qui vise à diminuer la taille de l’État et même les armées ont été touchées par ce phénomène. Il est important de remettre en perspective cela.
+What could explain why governments will increasingly resort to private companies? In the operation of many states, this began in Britain and the United States in the 1970s, and a new way of managing the state was developed, which found that bureaucracies were too slow, cumbersome, and not effective enough to have a dynamic society. This is called[New Public Management]]. There was a widespread idea that tasks would be outsourced or assigned to private actors that would allow for more efficient bureaucracy. The U.S. military will make use of many subcontractors especially for logistics. Another factor is that the professionalization of armies has taken people away from them to perform subordinate tasks. This is a neoliberal turn of events that aims to reduce the size of the state and even the armies have been affected by this phenomenon. It is important to put that in perspective.
-In fine, cela permet de remettre en cause l’argument du marché qui est un argument circulaire étant donné qu’on dit que c’est la logique de marché qui va générer le marché, c’est une rationalité présupposée qu’on va appliquer à un phénomène. Finalement, la cause de l’explication du marché est totalement circulaire. Il y a des questions pratiques, mais on est clairement dans une volonté plus politique d’aller vers des politiques publiques plus néolibérales. Ce phénomène est lié à la transformation de l’État dans une logique de redéploiement et de fonctionnement différent. L’État américain reste important même si le processus de décision a changé.
+In short, it allows us to question the market argument which is a circular argument since it is said that it is the market logic that will generate the market, it is a presupposed rationality that we will apply to a phenomenon. Finally, the cause of the market explanation is totally circular. There are practical questions, but there is clearly a more political will to move towards more neoliberal public policies. This phenomenon is linked to the transformation of the State into a logic of redeployment and different functioning. The American state remains important even though the decision-making process has changed.
-Les SMP s’inscrivent dans un no-mans’s land légal en Irak avec l’Ordre 17 de l’Autorité provisoire de la coalition (APC). Les employés de ces compagnies n’étaient pas soumis au droit irakien, c’est une zone extrêmement grise. Depuis 2007, les employés de ces compagnies sont soumis au code unifié de justice militaire américaine. En Afghanistan, l’ancien président Karzai voulait réguler la présence des sociétés militaires privées en les faisant dépendre du droit afghan. La réaction de ces sociétés a été de menacer la coalisation de casser leur contrat parce que cette clause n’était pas prévue. Il n’y a aucune prise des systèmes judiciaires locaux, leur statut est faible parce que ce ne sont pas des militaires. Malgré le fait qu’on a essayé de les associer à un code militaire, de facto, cela met en exergue le fait qu’il y avait très peu de contrôle et pas de sanction en cas d’abus.
+The SMPs are part of a legal no-mans's land in Iraq with Order 17 of the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA). The employees of these companies were not subject to Iraqi law, it is an extremely grey area. Since 2007, employees of these companies have been subject to the United States Unified Military Justice Code. In Afghanistan, former President Karzai wanted to regulate the presence of private military companies by making them subject to Afghan law. The reaction of these companies was to threaten the merger to break their contract because this clause was not included. There is no taking over of local judicial systems, their status is weak because they are not military. Despite the fact that they were tried to be associated with a military code, de facto, this highlights the fact that there was very little control and no punishment for abuse.
-= Les SMP en pratique : les effets de la relation entre professionnels de la politique et de la sécurité =
+= SMPs in Practice: The Effects of the Relationship Between Politics and Security Professionals =
-Comment ce phénomène de privatisation influe les relations entre les différents acteurs et métiers impliqués ? Il faut parler de continuités entre acteurs étatiques et privés dans le cadre d’une analyse en termes de réseaux. Ces réseaux sont transversaux au-delà de la distinction privé – public. Ces réseaux n’affaiblissent pas unilatéralement les acteurs étatiques, mais ils transforment certainement les relations de pouvoir au sein des États.
+How does this phenomenon of privatization affect relations between the different actors and professions involved? Continuity between state and private actors must be discussed in a network analysis. These networks are cross-sectional beyond the private - public distinction. These networks do not unilaterally weaken state actors, but they certainly transform power relations within states.
-== Politiciens et bureaucraties ministérielles ==
+== Politicians and ministerial bureaucracies ==
-Au niveau de la transformation des pratiques, nous allons regarder une série de cas pratiques de comment l’arrivée des SMP va transformer le rapport entre certains acteurs.
+With regard to the transformation of practices, we will look at a series of practical cases of how the arrival of PMCs will transform the relationship between certain actors.
-En 2003, lors de l’intervention en Irak, il y avait un désaccord au sein du Pentagone entre les civils et les militaires à savoir la question des néoconservateurs et la privatisation militaire dans le contexte de l’opposition militaire aux opérations militaires extérieures. Les militaires n’étaient pas très enthousiastes à l’idée de la guerre en Irak. Un rapport de 2002 disait que les militaires estimaient qu’envoyer des militaires en Irak n’était pas compliqué, mais en termes de gestion cela était très compliqué alors que les néo-conservateurs étaient en faveur d’une intervention. Dans ce type d’opposition, avec l’avènement d’acteur de SMP, comment cela amène une transformation. Le fait que les SMP sont une solution viable va faire que cela donne plus d’options au civil rendant les militaires moins importants. La bureaucratie civile avait plus d’options.
+In 2003, during the intervention in Iraq, there was a disagreement within the Pentagon between civilians and the military, namely the issue of neo-conservatives and military privatization in the context of military opposition to military operations abroad. The military was not very enthusiastic about the war in Iraq. A 2002 report said that the military felt that sending troops to Iraq was not complicated, but in terms of management it was very complicated when the neo-conservatives were in favour of intervention. In this type of opposition, with the advent of PMC actor, how does this lead to a transformation. The fact that PMCs are a viable solution is going to make it give more options for civilians, making the military less important. Civil bureaucracy had more options.
-Un cas est la manière dont les politiques contournent leurs alliés avec l’exemple de la lutte antidrogue en Afghanistan. L’appel à une société privée a permis de contourner un sujet de politique traditionnel entre alliés. Ce que la privatisation peut changer est aussi de contourner l’opposition parlementaire. Le plan Colombia s’inscrivait dans la continuité contre le trafic de drogue en Colombie. Ce plan en plusieurs phases visait à s’attaquer à la culture de la drogue qui permettait d’affaiblir la guérilla sur place par l’éradication de la culture de la coca. Le Congrès n’était pas « pour » ayant peur que ne s’enclenche une opération d’escalade. L’administration Clinton a fait largement appel à des compagnies privées notamment pour éradiquer les cultures de coca.
+One case is the way politicians bypass their allies with the example of counter-narcotics in Afghanistan. The call for a private company has bypassed a traditional allied political issue. What privatization can change is also to bypass the parliamentary opposition. Plan Colombia was part of the continuity against drug trafficking in Colombia. The multi-phased plan aimed to tackle drug cultivation, which weakened the guerrillas on the ground by eradicating coca cultivation. Congress was not "for" fearing that an escalation operation would be launched. The Clinton administration has made extensive use of private companies, particularly to eradicate coca cultivation.
-Une façon de décrire le rapport des bureaucraties ministérielles aux SMP est le principe de « déni plausible ». En 2007 a eu lieu la « fusillade de la place Nissour ». Des employés de Black Water qui devaient protéger un convoi diplomatique et ont été amenés à tirer dans la foule faisant une vingtaine de morts. Le déni plausible est que le secrétaire d’État américain à l’époque ne pouvait pas de manière plausible dire qu’il ne contrôlait pas vraiment ces gens, que même s’ils leur ont donné des instructions, le fait d’avoir tiré dans la foule n’était pas de la responsabilité totale des américains. Il reste le flou sur la façon dont cette compagnie à interpréter les directives américaines. Le terme de « déni plausible » revient souvent pour illustrer la marge de manœuvre que peut laisser l’appel aux sociétés militaires.
+One way of describing the relationship between departmental bureaucracies and the MPS is the principle of "plausible denial". In 2007, the "Nissour Square shooting" took place. Black Water employees who were supposed to protect a diplomatic convoy and were forced to shoot into the crowd killing about 20 people. The plausible denial is that the U.S. secretary of state at the time could not plausibly say that he did not really control these people, that even though they gave them instructions, shooting in the crowd was not the total responsibility of the Americans. It remains unclear how this company interprets the American directives. The term "plausible denial" is often used to illustrate the room for manoeuvre that can be left by appealing to military societies.
-== Militaires et services de renseignement ==
+== Military and intelligence services ==
-Leur travail a été largement transformé par des sociétés privées. Pour les militaires, il y a l’avantage assez évident qui est celui de se concentrer sur les missions essentielles de l’armée. L’avantage de la délégation à des SMP pour les militaires est qu’ils peuvent se concentrer sur les missions essentielles dans un contexte de dotation en troupes limitées permettant d’augmenter le tooth-to-tail ratio. Pour les militaires, il y a un avantage que dans une armée relativement réduite en nombre d’hommes, si les tâches les moins glorieuses sont laissées à des sociétés privées, on se concentre d’avantage sur les aspects essentiels de l’activité milliaire.
+Their work has been largely transformed by private companies. For the military, there is the obvious advantage of focusing on the essential missions of the army. The advantage of delegation to PMCs for the military is that they can focus on core missions in a limited troop-staffing context, which increases the tooth-to-tail ratio. For the military, there is an advantage that in an army relatively small in number of men, if the less glorious tasks are left to private companies, one focuses more on the essential aspects of the milestone activity.
-Mais les militaires perdent parfois certaines prérogatives puisque de nombreuses choses ont été externalisées. Le fait de laisser tomber certaines prérogatives fait que les militaires peuvent aussi en perdre d’assez importantes. Le fait que les moyens à disposition sont d’ordre privé, veut dire qu’au sein de la bureaucratie, d’autres aspects dédiés aux militaires vont profiter à des sociétés privées. Aujourd’hui, la CIA n’a pas besoin de faire recours à des moyens militaires pour faire une frappe ciblée en Afghanistan réduisant les prérogatives des militaires. Les militaires ont moins de contrôle sur les aspects logistiques laissant une marge de manœuvre plus large à d’autres acteurs.
+But the military sometimes loses certain prerogatives because many things have been outsourced. Leaving some prerogatives aside means that the military can also lose quite significant prerogatives. The fact that the resources available are private means that, within the bureaucracy, other aspects dedicated to the military will benefit private companies. Today, the CIA does not need to use military means to make a targeted strike in Afghanistan that reduces military prerogatives. The military has less control over logistical aspects, leaving more room for manoeuvre for other actors.
-== Élite locales ==
+== Local elite ==
-L’augmentation de la présence des SMP, au sein de l’État redéfinit et réagence les rapports avec le politique. L’intérêt que représente les SMP pour les élites locales dans des pays en développement en guerre comme l’Afghanistan ou l’Irak peut être purement économique. En Afghanistan, les SMP représentent pour les élites locales un intérêt purement économique. De payer certaines milices sur place et leur donner le paravent d’être des SMP, fini par avoir une influence dans le jeu local. Si le régime en place veut avoir un appareil de sécurité publique appartenant à l’État afghan,beaucoup de milices peuvent voir les SMP comme des forces subversives. On voit à quel point la privatisation de la sécurité peut avoir un impact sur le processus même de construction de l’État et de l’acquisition d’un monopole de l’État sur son territoire. Le Disbandment of Illegal Armed Groups(DIAG) serait un échec n’ayant pas permis de désarmer ces milices, à savoir les enlever de l’équation de la construction de l’État en Afghanistan après 2001.
+The increasing presence of PMCs within the State redefines and reacts with the relations with politics. The interest of PMCs for local elites in war-torn developing countries such as Afghanistan or Iraq may be purely economic. In Afghanistan, PMCs represent a purely economic interest for local elites. To pay some militias on the spot and give them the screen to be PMCs, eventually having an influence in the local game. If the regime wants to have an Afghan state-owned public security apparatus, many militias can see the PMCs as subversive forces. We see how the privatization of security can have an impact on the very process of state building and the acquisition of a state monopoly on its territory. The Disbandment of Illegal Armed Groups (DIAG) reportedly failed to disarm these militias, removing them from the equation of state building in Afghanistan after 2001.
 = Conclusion =
-On assiste à une logique de symbiose entre l’État et les entrepreneurs de guerre. Il y a plutôt une transformation au sein de l’État sans forcément remettre en question l’État lui-même puisqu’aucune logique n’échappe à l’État. La perspective sociohistorique permet de voir que la privatisation n’est pas quelque chose de nouveau, qu’on a assisté au XIXème siècle à une sorte de parenthèse avec un État influent sur l’exercice du monopole de la violence même si on pourrait dire que ce monopole n’a jamais été total. On assiste aujourd’hui peut-être à la fin de cette parenthèse, on assisterait à un retour. Pourquoi un retour du phénomène ? On devrait établir la distinction entre les États plus fort et plus faible, c’est-à-dire que tous les États ne sont pas égaux face à la privatisation du monopole de la violence. La privatisation, si elle est rendue possible et vient principalement de l’État du nord, il y aurait derrière une raison impériale, cela serait moins grave pour un État du nord de privatiser un pan de son appareil sécuritaire, c’est parce qu’il peut se le permettre. Il est possible pour certains États et la privatisation a des conséquences dans d’autres États.
+There is a logic of symbiosis between the State and war entrepreneurs. Instead, there is a transformation within the State without necessarily calling into question the State itself, since no logic escapes the State. The sociohistorical perspective makes it possible to see that privatization is not something new, that in the 19th century there was a kind of parenthesis with a state influencing the exercise of the monopoly of violence, even if one could say that this monopoly was never total. We are now perhaps witnessing the end of this parenthesis, we would see a return. Why a return of the phenomenon? A distinction should be made between stronger and weaker states, i. e. not all states are equal in the privatization of the monopoly of violence. Privatisation, if it is made possible and comes mainly from the northern state, there would be an imperial reason behind it, it would be less serious for a northern state to privatise part of its security apparatus, because it can afford it. It is possible for some States and privatization has consequences in other States.
 = Bibliography =
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 <references/>
-[[Category:science-politique]] [[Category:relations internationales]]
+[[Category:political science]]
+[[Category:international relations]]
+[[Category:Stephan Davidshofer]]
+[[Category:Christian Olsson]]
+[[Category:security]]
+[[Category:2014]]

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