Modification de Karas už Vakarų ribų: ar šiuolaikinė valstybė yra Vakarų išradimas?
Attention : vous n’êtes pas connecté(e). Votre adresse IP sera visible de tout le monde si vous faites des modifications. Si vous vous connectez ou créez un compte, vos modifications seront attribuées à votre propre nom d’utilisateur(rice) et vous aurez d’autres avantages.
La modification peut être annulée. Veuillez vérifier les différences ci-dessous pour voir si c’est bien ce que vous voulez faire, puis publier ces changements pour finaliser l’annulation de cette modification.
Version actuelle | Votre texte | ||
Ligne 8 : | Ligne 8 : | ||
| assistants = | | assistants = | ||
| enregistrement = [https://mediaserver.unige.ch/collection/AN3-1220-2014-2015.rss 2014], [https://mediaserver.unige.ch/collection/AN3-1220-2014-2015.rss 2015] | | enregistrement = [https://mediaserver.unige.ch/collection/AN3-1220-2014-2015.rss 2014], [https://mediaserver.unige.ch/collection/AN3-1220-2014-2015.rss 2015] | ||
| cours = [[ | | cours = [[Political Violence and Security Practices]] | ||
| lectures = | | lectures = | ||
*[[ | *[[Political violence and the practice of security]] | ||
*[[ | *[[The birth of modern warfare: war-making and state-making from a Western perspective]] | ||
*[[ | *[[Transformations of war and violence in Europe]] | ||
*[[ | *[[War beyond the West: is the modern state a Western invention?]] | ||
*[[ | *[[What is non-state violence? The Case of Afghan Conflict]] | ||
*[[ | *[[Intervention: Reinventing war?]] | ||
*[[ | *[[Security professionals: bureaucratization, institutionalization, professionalization and differentiation]] | ||
*[[ | *[[The transformation of contemporary security practices: between war and global policing?]] | ||
*[[ | *[[The transformation of contemporary security practices: the logic of risk]] | ||
*[[ | *[[Privatized coercion: from mercenarism to private military companies]] | ||
*[[ | *[[Intelligence and Surveillance]] | ||
}} | }} | ||
Ligne 41 : | Ligne 41 : | ||
| fr = La guerre au-delà de l’Occident : l’État moderne est-il une invention occidentale ? | | fr = La guerre au-delà de l’Occident : l’État moderne est-il une invention occidentale ? | ||
| es = La guerra más allá de Occidente: ¿el Estado moderno es una invención occidental? | | es = La guerra más allá de Occidente: ¿el Estado moderno es una invención occidental? | ||
| | | lt = Karas už Vakarų ribų: ar šiuolaikinė valstybė yra Vakarų išradimas? | ||
}} | }} | ||
Ligne 79 : | Ligne 79 : | ||
[[Fichier:Ri3 failed states 2.png|vignette|center]] | [[Fichier:Ri3 failed states 2.png|vignette|center]] | ||
The whole literature on fragile states has served to objectify the notion of failed state. With this map, we can see that the failed state problem gives priority to third world states and second world states. | |||
[[Fichier:Ri3 failed states 3.jpg|vignette|center]] | [[Fichier:Ri3 failed states 3.jpg|vignette|center]] | ||
Geographically, there seems to be a link between what the southern states have in common: their colonial history and their propensity for internal conflict. | |||
<gallery | <gallery> | ||
ri3 violent conflicts 2013 1.gif| | ri3 violent conflicts 2013 1.gif| | ||
ri3 violent conflicts 2013 2.gif| | ri3 violent conflicts 2013 2.gif| | ||
</gallery> | </gallery> | ||
This map shows violent conflicts in 2013. This map raises a number of questions. The other map shows that conflicts are actually localized. | |||
The notion of a failed state has been criticized for many reasons. On the one hand, it is Eurocentric and supported by a normative vision of the State. It is a state that differs from what would be considered a "successful state" that would be the western state or at least the state of a number of so-called developed countries that provide the model to the rest of the world. This is based on a normative vision because the states that would have "succeeded" would be peaceful and non-violent, raising an idealised but historically false vision. The notion of a failed state does not take into account local power structures. There is the idea that in the absence of a power structure, a government and therefore a modern state, there is a lack of power structures and therefore wars between all against all. Just because there is no centralized system does not mean that there is no local power structure. In situations described as a failed state, there are structures based on "anocracy" that stop struggles based on local elites in the absence of public institutions with legal status. Anocracy is a power based on a fragile balance between elites that are not based on democratic institutions. Elite struggles between elites can be either violent as in Somalia and non-violent as in Pountland and Somaliland. This vision is based on an idealized vision of the state. | |||
2001 | In ''On the Postcolony'' published in 2001, Achille Mbembe describes the political uses of this concept:"Unlike the fable of the Weapons of Mass Destruction, it rests on a political mythology that is all the more robust to the extent that, as with all theologies, it cannot be falsified. Codified in the US Government's National Security Strategy of 2002, state failure has been tendered as the significant clause in the doctrine of pre-emption. That document famously announced that' America is now threatened less by conquering states than by failing ones'". The notion of a failed state is used to justify interventions taking place for other reasons. | ||
= | = The "burden" of the Third World = | ||
There are alternative interpretations of the positive feedback loop between war and state "weakening" established by many authors. The retroactive loop can be challenged. | |||
The first would be Tilly's strictly evolutionary and universalistic interpretation. A second is Cohen, Brown and Organski in'' The Paradoxical Nature of State Making''. The construction of the State creates internal turmoil at first, it is only after a certain threshold that it becomes a factor of stability. The authors do not consider that war strengthens states through the extraction of resources from their internal society, but they consider that it is the strengthening of states that leads to internal wars. It is the fact that these are States under construction obliged to extract resources from their populations, even though these governments are not considered legitimate and create internal opposition. They overturned Tilly's reasoning by saying that war is not a factor in the constitution of the state, but that it is the fact that it is states under construction that justifies internal wars. At a certain level of resource concentration, the government becomes powerful enough to strengthen itself further. Cohen, Brown and Organski's reasoning is more complex than it seems. To some extent, they make it clear that sometimes weak states are in civil wars, but this does not mean that they are weakening. These are strengthening States that do not have the possibility and the capacity to legitimize further strengthening and, from a certain threshold effect, the construction of the State will become a pacification factor. | |||
A third is that of Malesevic, war can be a factor of "modernization" as well as "regression", but the problem here is to maintain a linear interpretation of history. A fourth would be that of Mohammed Ayoob as described in his article "Humanitarian Intervention and State Sovereignty" published in 2002, for which the war remains linked to dynamics of state building, but which are diffracted by the context of colonial post-independence, producing paradoxical effects. He will insist on three points. | |||
== Vidaus saugumo dilema == | == Vidaus saugumo dilema == | ||
Ligne 130 : | Ligne 130 : | ||
Pilietiniai karai paprastai suvokiami kaip destruktyvūs valstybės konfliktai. Turime atsargiai vertinti retoriką apie žlugusias valstybes. Pilietiniai karai taip pat gali būti interpretuojami kaip politinės modernybės sudedamoji dalis. Leandrui eksportuoti Vakarų modelį nėra lengva, taikyti Tilly pietų šalims yra sudėtinga, tačiau jis taip pat pateikia realistinio argumento kritiką, kad jei pietų šalims reikia laiko, tai mes turime palikti jį joms. Edwardas Luttwakas straipsnyje "Suteikite karui šansą", paskelbtame 1998 m. žurnale "Foreign Affairs", postuluoja, kad pietų šalims reikia suteikti šansą susikurti per karą<ref>Luttwak, Edward N. “Give War a Chance.” Foreign Affairs, 28 Jan. 2009, www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/1999-07-01/give-war-chance. </ref>. | Pilietiniai karai paprastai suvokiami kaip destruktyvūs valstybės konfliktai. Turime atsargiai vertinti retoriką apie žlugusias valstybes. Pilietiniai karai taip pat gali būti interpretuojami kaip politinės modernybės sudedamoji dalis. Leandrui eksportuoti Vakarų modelį nėra lengva, taikyti Tilly pietų šalims yra sudėtinga, tačiau jis taip pat pateikia realistinio argumento kritiką, kad jei pietų šalims reikia laiko, tai mes turime palikti jį joms. Edwardas Luttwakas straipsnyje "Suteikite karui šansą", paskelbtame 1998 m. žurnale "Foreign Affairs", postuluoja, kad pietų šalims reikia suteikti šansą susikurti per karą<ref>Luttwak, Edward N. “Give War a Chance.” Foreign Affairs, 28 Jan. 2009, www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/1999-07-01/give-war-chance. </ref>. | ||
= | = Bibliography = | ||
= | = References = | ||
<references /> | <references /> | ||