« Subjects of international law: States » : différence entre les versions

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There are no minimum limits in the population of a state, there are no rules. There are micro-States, including island States, that are being lost due to rising water levels.
There are no minimum limits in the population of a state, there are no rules. There are micro-States, including island States, that are being lost due to rising water levels.


A very special case would be that of the Vatican City. There are various theories, but a whole multitude of people accept that the Vatican City is a State under the 1929 Lateran Treaties, if it is a State it is a very particular State from the point of view of population, because the Vatican City has some functional passports, but does not have automatically its own nationals, because each national has the nationality of his country of origin.
A very special case would be that of Vatican City. There are various theories, but a whole multitude of people accept that the Vatican City is a State under the 1929 Lateran Treaties, if it is a State it is a very particular State from the point of view of the population, because the Vatican City has some functional passports, but does not have automatically its own nationals, because each national has the nationality of his country of origin.


Whether it is multi-ethnic states where the population is partly nomadic, this has no influence, these are sociological facts that do not deprive the state of its population.
Whether it is multi-ethnic states where the population is partly nomadic, this has no influence, these are sociological facts that do not deprive the state of its population.
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Undercover German state agents may invite a German to Zurich to arrest him. This type of fraudulent labour has been convicted several times. This type of violation of territorial sovereignty is done by circumventing extradition measures, by fraudulent labour by circumventing the possibility of deciding in the last instance.
Undercover German state agents may invite a German to Zurich to arrest him. This type of fraudulent labour has been convicted several times. This type of violation of territorial sovereignty is done by circumventing extradition measures, by fraudulent labour by circumventing the possibility of deciding in the last instance.


In the Federal Court Decision ATF 117 I 337 it is stipulated: "the rule of good faith prohibits a State from using coercion or deception to seize a person it seeks and who is staying in the territory of another State where he or she would enjoy extradition immunity. Any improper machination to remove an individual from such immunity in order to bring him or her to the territory of the pursuing State or to the territory of another State which would in principle be obliged to extradite him or her shall be prohibited. The requested State to whose territory a person has been attracted by such procedures has a duty not to condone them by accepting an extradition request from the offending State".<ref>[http://jumpcgi.bger.ch/cgi-bin/JumpCGI?id=BGE-117-IB-337&lang=fr 117 Ib 337]  - Extrait de l'arrêt de la Ire Cour de droit public du 14 octobre 1991 dans la cause P. contre Office fédéral de la police (recours de droit administratif)</ref>.
In the Federal Court Decision ATF 117 I 337 it is stipulated: "the rule of good faith prohibits a State from using coercion or deception to seize a person it seeks and who is staying in the territory of another State where he or she would enjoy extradition immunity. Any improper machination to remove an individual from such immunity in order to bring him or her to the territory of the pursuing State or to the territory of another State which would in principle be obliged to extradite him or her shall be prohibited. The requested State to whose territory a person has been attracted by such procedures has a duty not to condone them by accepting an extradition request from the offending State"<ref>[http://jumpcgi.bger.ch/cgi-bin/JumpCGI?id=BGE-117-IB-337&lang=fr 117 Ib 337]  - Extrait de l'arrêt de la Ire Cour de droit public du 14 octobre 1991 dans la cause P. contre Office fédéral de la police (recours de droit administratif)</ref>.


=== Investigations and all forms of evidence gathering ===
=== Investigations and all forms of evidence gathering ===
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At the same time, such a rigid principle of territorial impermeability has never been practicable and is even less so today in a period of globalization; however, there are a whole series of exceptions:
At the same time, such a rigid principle of territorial impermeability has never been practicable and is even less so today in a period of globalization; however, there are a whole series of exceptions:


=== Exceptions basées sur des traités ou des accords ===  
=== Exceptions based on treaties or agreements ===  
Les traités sont des textes écrits alors qu’un accord n’est pas nécessairement écrit. Il y a toute une série d’accords qui prévoit des exceptions et notamment des exceptions massives à l’intégrité territoriale et l’exclusivité de la compétence territoriale comme :
Treaties are written texts whereas an agreement is not necessarily written. There is a whole series of agreements that provide for exceptions, including massive exceptions to territorial integrity and exclusive territorial jurisdiction, such as:
*'''bases militaires'''
*military bases
Les bases militaires dans le monde qui sont basées parfois sur des accords en stipulant la bonne volonté de l’adversaire par des pressions plus ou moins douces ou par des accords conclus tout à fait librement comme le Japon dans les années 1950 entourées alors par des États communistes à l’exception de la Chine nationaliste qui ne faisait pas le poids du point de vue militaire.
Military bases around the world that are sometimes based on agreements by stipulating the good will of the adversary through more or less gentle pressures or through agreements concluded entirely freely, such as Japan in the 1950s, then surrounded by communist states, with the exception of nationalist China, which did not have any military influence.
*'''accords douaniers'''
*customs agreements
En 1923, il y eut un accord entre la Suisse et le Liechtenstein dans le domaine des activités douanières, le Liechtenstein a dévolu les douanes à la Suisse qui fait des actes de souveraineté sur un autre territoire ne remettant pas en cause la souveraineté territoriale du Liechtenstein.
In 1923, there was an agreement between Switzerland and Liechtenstein in the field of customs activities, Liechtenstein devolved customs to Switzerland, which makes acts of sovereignty over another territory without calling into question Liechtenstein's territorial sovereignty.


=== Permission ad-hoc en dehors d’un accord ou d’un traité ===
=== Ad-hoc permission outside an agreement or treaty ===
Ce sont des permissions particulières pour que des autorités étrangères puissent faire certains actes sur le territoire d’un État. Parfois, les États accordent des autorisations à des enquêteurs étrangers en dehors des accords d’entraide. Il peut y avoir des accords particuliers afin que des juges de la Cour Internationale de Justice puissent venir dans le cadre de leurs fonctions.
These are special permissions for foreign authorities to carry out certain acts on the territory of a State. Sometimes, States grant authorizations to foreign investigators outside of mutual assistance agreements. There may be special agreements so that judges of the International Court of Justice may come in the course of their duties.
 
The last time this happened was in 1997 when the Court visited the water project between Hungary and Slovakia. The dispute allowed the Court to visit the site to observe and investigate.
 
The judges of the International Court are agents of the United Nations who cannot make acts of authority outside this framework, and Hungary and Slovakia had invited them to make their observations.
 
=== Exception to the custom of general international law ===
*the '''war occupation'''
In international armed conflict, it happens that the army of one State progresses while the army of another State retreats because of the fortunes of the war. The advancing army advances into the territory of the enemy it will control by making the territory an occupied territory that is controlled by conventions. During a period of armed conflict, there is not only occupation of a territory if one finds oneself in a de facto position of occupying it, but one has a duty to administer it, one cannot refuse one's duty as an occupying force, one is the only public power in the territory.
 
War occupation is one of the situations provided for where the State has the right and duty to administer a territory that does not belong to it in the place of the sovereign.
*'''diplomatic and consular services'''
Each State has embassies and consulates abroad, embassies, above all, perform acts of public authority.
 
These acts are carried out on the territory of a foreign State, the Embassy's premises remain on the host territory.
 
Under ancient customary international law, codified in the Vienna Conventions on Diplomatic and Consular Relations, agents of the sending State operating within the framework of diplomatic or consular missions may carry out all acts of public authority granted by international law against the foreign State.
 
Espionage is not one of them. This does not include a series of other acts, such as the Moroccan embassy, which had pronounced a divorce between Moroccan nationals. The question was whether this divorce could be recognised in Switzerland; the Federal Court refused, because under Swiss law, according to Swiss public policy, a divorce cannot be pronounced by an embassy, but only by a court, which is why this divorce cannot be pronounced in Switzerland and beyond what is permitted by the diplomatic service with a violation of sovereignty.
*'''international organisations'''
They are not States, but they do act of public authority, and of course these international organizations under customary international law and headquarters agreements have the power to do all acts recognized to them either under international law or headquarters agreements.
 
An international organization is not necessarily an intergovernmental organization, it can also be any international body. All these bodies act as public authorities.
 
=== Exceptions based on bilateral custom ===
In the case of enclaves, the right of passage is based on a bilateral custom implying that one must pass through the territory of a State to reach its enclaves.
 
The principle of territorial exclusivity is well established and there are a whole series of exceptions, a large number of more or less broad agreements and exceptions, it is not in violation of sovereignty, but it is accepted.
 
== Personal competence ==
 
=== What is meant by "personal competence"? ===
This is the jurisdiction of a State over all its citizens. No matter where the nationals are, there is a personal jurisdiction of the State, on its State personal jurisdiction is confused with its territorial jurisdiction, a State can do a whole lot of things on its territory.
 
Personal jurisdiction has its own value when nationals are not in the territory of the State, but in the territory of another State or in common areas; there are recognized territorial jurisdictions, a Swiss always remains subject to Swiss law wherever he is in the world, this is called personal jurisdiction. It is in the case of nationals abroad that personal competence is perceived. In this respect, a distinction must be made between two types of "jurisdiction":
*'''normative competence''': competence to enact rules.
*'''executive competence''': competence to enforce rules.
In English, there are terms such as "juridiction to prescrive" and "juridiction to enforce".
 
A distinction must be made because when nationals are abroad they are subject to the normative jurisdiction of the host State's State, but Switzerland may lay down rules for its nationals even if they are abroad.
 
When the national is abroad if he is in the territory of another State, the competence of the State of origin to enforce the rule it imposes on its national and placed in brackets, the person cannot be taken back to his country of origin, as this would violate the exclusivity of the territorial jurisdiction of the other State.
 
Extradition may be requested for offences and crimes under certain conditions, and laws may also be enforced, i.e. executed, if the national is on a ship flying the national flag, in the high seas or in the Antarctic.
 
In common spaces, the law can be enforced, executive competence persists in common spaces.
 
=== What about nationals, because jurisdiction is only over persons with nationality? ===
International law does not have rules on the granting of nationality, it leaves this question to domestic law, it must be determined under international law; but international law still knows limits in terms of the nationalities it is prepared to recognize.
 
International law limits, but does not have rules in the first place.
 
The most frequent rules that apply in different States is an international practice and recognized by all States are:
 
==== Acquisition of nationality at birth, there are two systems ====
*blood law
*territorial right
   
   
La dernière fois que c’est arrivé, c’était en 1997 lorsque la Cour s’est déplacée concernant le projet hydraulique entre la Hongrie et la Slovaquie<ref>COUR INTERNATIONALE DE JUSTICE  RECUEIL DES ARRÊTS, AVIS CONSULTATIFS ET ORDONNANCES - [http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/92/7374.pdf AFFAIRE RELATIVE AU PROJET  GA.BCIKOVO-NAGYMAROS  (HONGRIEISLOVAQUIE)] - ARRÊT DU 25 SEPTEMBRE 1997 </ref>. Le litige porté a permis à la Cour de descendre sur les lieux pour constater et s’informer.
These terms denote the acquisition of nationality by descent in the case of blood law, the child receives the nationality of his or her parents, and the law of the land means that a child born in the territory of domiciled parents acquires the nationality of that State there.
   
   
Les juges de la Cour Internationale sont des agents des Nations Unies ne pouvant faire des actes d’autorité hors de ce cadre, et la Hongrie et la Slovaquie les avaient invités à faire leur constat.
==== Reasons for subsequent acquisition or loss ====
There are also recurrent things such as naturalization when certain conditions for the establishment of a State are met, or if certain things have been done or a service rendered to a State are grounds for naturalization under domestic law.
 
Sometimes there are also reasons that are much more particular, some states at some point in their history have forgotten the acquisition of nationality; in the 1920s in Mexico if one bought land one obtained de facto Mexican nationality, Porfirio Diaz says "poor Mexico, so far from God so close to the United States"<ref>"¡Pobre México! ¡Tan lejos de Dios y tan cerca de los Estados Unidos!"</ref><ref>"Pobre México tan lejos de Dios y tan cerca de Estados Unidos. En realidad fue escrita por Nemesio García Naranjo, intelectual regiomontano" - [http://www.jornada.unam.mx/2013/07/14/opinion/030a1cap Malos Vecinos, Ángeles González Gamio; La Jornada]</ref>. This feature was finally abandoned.
 
You have to imagine beyond that, sometimes in the world there are things you can't think of.
 
=== Concerning the limits that international law proposes to nationality and what the limits to nationality mean ===
There are cases of granting a nationality under domestic law that may seem abusive or not internationally recognised, as if, for example, Russia considers that the entire world population is its nationals by sending tax forms to everyone.
 
There are real disputes over nationalities approached in a "bizarre" way; one of the famous cases was a case that almost concerned Switzerland, namely Liechtenstein: the Nottebohm case, this case was decided by the International Court of Justice in 1950<ref>[http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/18/9009.pdf C.I J. Mémoires, 49aire Nottebohm (Liechtenstein c. Guatemala),  vol. I]</ref><ref>COUR INTERNATIONALE DE JUSTICE RECUEIL DES ARRETS,  AVIS CONSULTATIFS ET ORDONNANCES - [http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/18/2057.pdf AFFAIRE NOTTEBOHM  (LIECHTENSTEIN c. GUATEMALA)] - ARRÊT DU 18 NOVEMBRE 1953 </ref><ref>COUR INTERNATIONALE DE JUSTICE  RECUEIL DES ARRETS,  AVIS CONSULTATIFS ET ORDONNANCES  - [http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/18/2674.pdf AFFAIRE NOTTEBOHM  (LIECHTENSTEIN c. GUATEMALA), DEUXIÈME PHASE] -  ARRÊT DU 6 AVRIL 1955</ref>.


=== Exception à la coutume du droit international général ===
A German national has been living in Guatemala for some time and has established his business; when the Second World War began, Guatemala at some point entered the war.
*'''l’occupation de guerre'''
 
Il arrive lors d’un conflit armé international que l’armée d’un État progresse alors que l’armée d’un autre État recule à cause fortunes de la guerre. L’armée qui progresse, progresse sur le territoire de l’ennemie qu’elle va contrôler en faisant du territoire un territoire occupé qui est contrôlé par des conventions. Lors d’une période de conflit armé, il n’y a pas seulement d’occupation d’un territoire si on s’en trouve de position de fait l’occuper, mais on en a le devoir de l’administrer, on ne peut refuser son de devoir de force occupante, on est l’unique puissance publique sur le territoire.
Nottebohm anticipated that Guatemala would go to war against its country of origin; if Guatemala goes to war against Germany then it becomes an enemy national causing damage to its trade knowing that at that time the property of nationals of enemy nationality could be confiscated.
 
He had to get rid of German nationality as soon as possible; he had relations with Liechtenstein; Nottebohm obtained a nationality in an extraordinary way in a few weeks outside the ordinary procedures and simply through some relations with the payment of a sum against the payment of a sum.
 
Guatemala entered the war against Germany; at that time, Guatemala considered Nottebohm to be an enemy national and confiscated his assets.
 
Liechtenstein has defended its national by holding Guatemala accountable for a violation of international law through a violation of one of its nationals.
 
The case comes before the International Court of Justice with Judge Guggenheim; the Court rules that the limit that applies under international law to the acquisition of nationality and that there must be an effective connecting link, a nationality given by simple complacency is not a nationality that is based on an effective connecting link.
 
An effective connecting link and the fact that a national is bound more to a particular territory than to any other State in the world; if there is such an effective connecting link, at that time the nationality becomes enforceable.
 
The Court did not say that Nottebohm is German or Liechtenstein, nationality may be different according to the States; for Lichtenstein, Nottebohm is a Liechtensteiner because he has acquired Liechtenstein nationality and has the right to treat him as a Liechtenstein national, German law may consider him as a German national.
 
Guatemala could be justified because there was no effective connecting link, while Nottebohm was considered a German national because it had no effective connecting link with Liechtenstein, it is not enforceable.
 
There is a distinction between nationality acquired by modalities recognized by international law and nationality acquired by modalities that are not recognized by international law.
 
In cases where nationality is acquired in accordance with recognized procedures, then nationality is enforceable, when nationality is acquired outside those procedures, it is not enforceable, a third State is not obliged to recognize it; in the case of Liechtenstein and Nottebohm, Guatemala was not obliged to recognize it as a Liechtenstein national.
 
The effective link of connection causes problems, we understand why, moreover, today this is a problem in a globalised world. There are also other reasons, Judge Guggenheim had a dissenting opposition.
 
We see the limit of the International Court called in the Nottebohm case, we must refer to that case to note that an acquired nationality is not opposable to a third State.
 
In criminal law, words are used that have to do with the personal jurisdiction of a State in criminal matters.
 
=== We have for the criminal jurisdiction of a State ===
 
==== Principle of territoriality ====
Corresponds to territorial jurisdiction, a State may prosecute all crimes committed on its territory, regardless of the nationality of the persons concerned.
   
   
L’occupation de guerre est l’une des situations prévues où l’État a le droit et le devoir d’administrer à la place du souverain un territoire qui ne lui appartient pas.
==== Personality principle ====
Personal competence, there is the distinction between the principle of active personality and the principle of passive personality:
*'''active personality''': means that a State may prosecute all crimes committed by one of its nationals anywhere in the world under the sole condition that it constitutes a crime at the scene. If you do something legal in Australia, you can't be punished in Switzerland. For blood crimes, a crime committed in Australia allows Switzerland to have legal jurisdiction.
*'''passive personality''': a State acquires criminal jurisdiction over anyone who has committed a crime against one of its nationals anywhere in the world; this is a contested principle, it means that if one goes to Australia and is killed there by a national of nationality X, Switzerland acquires criminal jurisdiction over him, it can prosecute him by criminal jurisdiction and Switzerland can request extradition.
   
   
*'''les services diplomatiques et consulaires'''
==== Principle of state security ====
Chaque État a des ambassades et consulats à l’étranger, les ambassades, surtout, font des actes de puissance publique.
It is a series of crimes where the State acquires jurisdiction over crimes related to espionage or counterfeiting of Swiss currency.
   
   
Ces actes sont faits sur le territoire d’un État étranger, les locaux de l’ambassade restent sur le territoire hôte.
==== Principle of universality ====
This is important for international law, the principle that a state can prosecute certain crimes wherever they are committed in the world even if it has no connection with that country.
En vertu du droit international coutumier ancien, codifié dans les conventions de Vienne sur les relations diplomatiques et consulaires, les agents de l’État d’envoie qui opèrent dans le cadre de missions diplomatiques voire consulaires peuvent faire sur l’État étranger tous les actes de puissance publique consentis par le droit international.
 
For a State to have criminal jurisdiction to prosecute a specific crime it must have a connection to that crime, these are public services.
L’espionnage n’en fait pas partie. N’en font pas partie une série d’autres actes comme ce fut le cas de l’ambassade du Maroc qui avait prononcé un divorce entre ressortissants marocains. Il s’agissait de savoir si ce divorce pouvait être reconnu en Suisse ; le tribunal fédéral a refusé, car en droit Suisse, selon l’ordre public suisse, un divorce ne peut être prononcé par une ambassade, mais uniquement par un tribunal c’est pourquoi ce divorce ne peut être prononcé en Suisse et au-delà de ce qui est permis par la fonction diplomatique avec une violation de la souveraineté.
 
There are situations where it is considered that a crime has been committed affecting the interests of all States and therefore all States are granted punitive jurisdiction; this is the case either because the crime has been committed in a common area and there is no territorial jurisdiction such as piracy, which is an act of violence committed for private reasons by one ship on another private ship at sea, which is why there is this offence with universal jurisdiction: each State that captures pirates has jurisdiction because the crime was committed in a common area.
*'''organisations internationales'''
 
Ce ne sont pas des États, mais elles font des actes de puissance publique, or, bien entendu, ces organisations internationales en vertu du droit international coutumier et des accords de siège ont le pouvoir de faire tous les actes qui leur sont reconnus soit en vertu du droit international ou des accords de siège.
There are crimes that affect all humanity and we do not want criminals to rest, these are war crimes, crimes against humanity and genocide.
 
Une organisation internationale n’est pas nécessairement une organisation intergouvernementale, cela peut être aussi un organe international quelconque. Tous ces organes font des actes de puissance publique.
There are exceptional cases where States are obliged to prosecute under universal jurisdiction on the basis of certain anti-terrorist conventions and serious offences such as offences under the Geneva Convention on Humanitarian Law.
 
In the majority of cases, universal jurisdiction is merely a factual matter of how it can and cannot be exercised.
 
The way in which it can exercise is linked to domestic law, if there is no territorial link with the crime, the State can exercise universal jurisdiction and not in absentia. This universal jurisdiction makes it possible to prosecute for certain crimes either committed in common areas or for crimes of great importance to the community. It will be recalled that Balthazar Garzon in Spain had proceeded on this basis with respect to Mr. Pinochet.
 
== Competences relating to crafts ==
These are on the one hand state-owned vessels, followed by aircraft and spacecraft. From the point of view of international law, a ship is no longer considered, as formerly by fiction, to be part of the floating territory of a State and an aircraft part of the mobile territory; the State of registration of a craft is now considered to be the State that is responsible for the proper functioning of its devices and is the State that exercises jurisdiction over the account on board its vessels, aircraft and spacecraft.
 
This is true for both state vehicles themselves and warships, but here the question is broader. The State also has duties in relation to civilian vessels such as the obligation to control the safety of such vessels or working conditions, the State incurs its own responsibility, even for commercial vessels the State exercises its jurisdiction.
 
= The territory of the State and its delimitation =
The territory of the State and its delimitation raises two sets of problems:
 
First, the territory of the State refers to the problem of the acquisition and loss of the State: how can a State acquire and lose territory?
 
Secondly, it raises the problem of the territory's membership in one or the other as well as disputes over the delimitation of the territory.
 
On the one hand, we are wondering how to acquire the territory, and on the other hand, how to determine the territory.
 
If we apply this problem to islands, there is an attribution problem, but if we think of continental territory, we automatically have delimitation problems.
 
We discuss all this material very often using the term legal "title". A title is a fact that the legal order recognizes as the basis of law in a territory, it is therefore a fact recognized by the legal order giving rise to a right in a territory.


=== Exceptions basées sur la coutume bilatérale ===
For a territory to belong to us, it is necessary to produce a title, so the title is always a fact to which the legal system affects a consequence.
Dans le cas des enclaves le droit de passage est basé sur une coutume bilatérale impliquant qu’on doit passer sur le territoire d’un État pour rejoindre ses enclaves.
Le principe de l’exclusivité territoriale est bien assis et il y a toute une série d’exceptions, une grande masse d’accords et d’exceptions plus ou moins large, ce n’est pas en violation de la souveraineté, mais cela est accepté.


== Compétence personnelle ==
What are the facts recognized by the legal system to acquire and concurrently to lose it?


=== Qu’entend-on par « compétence personnelle » ? ===
There are a few of them:
C’est la compétence qu’a un État sur l’ensemble de ses citoyens. Peu importe où se trouvent les ressortissants, il y a une compétence personnelle de l’État, sur son État la compétence personnelle se confond à sa compétence territoriale, un État peut faire tout un tas de choses sur son territoire.
La compétence personnelle a sa valeur propre lorsque les ressortissants ne se trouvent pas sur le territoire de l’État, mais sur le territoire d‘un autre État ou des espaces communs ; il y a des compétences territoriales reconnues, un Suisse reste toujours soumis au droit suisse où qu’il soit dans le monde, cela s’appelle la compétence personnelle.
C’est dans le cas de ressortissants à l’étranger qu’on perçoit la compétence personnelle. À cet égard, il faut distinguer selon deux modalités de la « compétence » :
*'''compétence normative''' : compétence d’édicter des règles.
*'''compétence exécutive''' : compétence de faire exécuter des règles.
En anglais, on a des termes consacrés pour cela « juridiction to prescrive » et « juridiction to enforce ».
On doit faire la distinction parce que lorsque les ressortissants sont à l’étranger ils sont soumis à la compétence normative de l‘État de l’État hôte, toutefois la Suisse peut édicter des règles pour ses ressortissants même s’ils sont à l’étranger.
Lorsque le ressortissant est à l‘étranger s’il se trouve sur le territoire d’un autre État, la compétence de l’État d’origine de faire exécuter la règle qu’il impose à son ressortissant et mise entre parenthèses, on ne peut prendre la personne afin de la ramener dans son pays d’origine, car cela serait une violation de l’exclusivité de la compétence territoriale de l’autre État.
On peut demander l’extradition pour des délits et des crimes sous certaines conditions, on peut aussi faire appliquer les lois donc les exécuter si le ressortissant se trouve sur un navire battant pavillon national, en haute-mer ou en antarctique.
Dans les espaces communs, on peut faire appliquer la loi, la compétence exécutive persiste sur les espaces communs.


=== Quid des ressortissants, car la compétence n’est que sur les personnes ayant la nationalité ? ===
== Title of occupation of the territory without a master ==
Le droit international ne connaît pas de règles sur l’attribution de la nationalité, il laisse cette question au droit interne, il faut déterminer en vertu du droit international; mais le droit international connaît quand même des limites pour ce qui est des nationalités qu’il est prêt à reconnaitre.
A territory without a master can be acquired by the first occupier, today the time when people rushed to territories to occupy them is over, but the occupation remains a valid and important title for two reasons:
*because of intertemporal law if someone disputes certain territories, someone can argue that he occupied them five centuries ago when he was without a master, this title continues to have effects to this day.
Le droit international limite, mais n’a pas en premier lieu des règles.
*if an island emerges in the high seas, it may be subject to occupation.
The term "occupation" is the same as that of "war occupation", but it is different; war occupation is not a title of acquisition of territory, but a title of administration of territory during an armed conflict, there is prohibition to annex, occupation is that of a territory without a master, occupation of the tera nullius.
Les règles les plus fréquentes qui encourent dans les différents États est une pratique internationale et reconnue par l’ensemble des États sont :
==== Acquisition de la nationalité à la naissance, on distingue deux systèmes ====
*droit du sang
*droit du sol
Ces termes dénotent l’acquisition de la nationalité par la filiation dans le cas du droit du sang, l’enfant reçoit la nationalité de ses parents, et le droit du sol signifie qu’un enfant qui née sur le territoire de parents domiciliés y acquiert la nationalité de cet État.
==== Motifs d‘acquisition ou de perte par la suite ====
Il y a là aussi des choses récurrentes comme la naturalisation lorsqu’on remplit certaines conditions de rattachement d’un État, ou si on a fait certaines choses ou avoir prêté un service à un État sont des motifs de naturalisation qui relèvent du droit interne.
Parfois il y a aussi des motifs qui sont beaucoup plus particuliers, certains États à un moment donné de leur histoire ont oublié l’acquisition de la nationalité ; dans les années 1920 au Mexique si on achetait un bien-fonds on obtenait de facto la nationalité mexicaine, Porfirio Diaz dit « pauvre Mexique, si loin de dieu si prêt des États-Unis"<ref>"¡Pobre México! ¡Tan lejos de Dios y tan cerca de los Estados Unidos!"</ref><ref>"Pobre México tan lejos de Dios y tan cerca de Estados Unidos. En realidad fue escrita por Nemesio García Naranjo, intelectual regiomontano" - [http://www.jornada.unam.mx/2013/07/14/opinion/030a1cap Malos Vecinos, Ángeles González Gamio; La Jornada]</ref>. Cette caractéristique fut finalement abandonnée.
Il faut imaginer au-delà, parfois dans le monde il y a des choses qu’on ne peut penser.


=== Concernant les limites que le droit international propose à la nationalité et ce que signifie les limites à la nationalité ===
It is also possible to claim a title of conquest in the same waters, but it is now prohibited to conquer and annex territory by force under article 4, paragraph 2, of the Charter of the United Nations.
Il y a des cas d’attribution d’une nationalité d’après le droit interne peuvent paraitres abusives ou pas reconnus internationalement comme si par exemple la Russie estime que l’ensemble de la population mondiale était ses ressortissants en envoyant des feuilles d’impositions à tout le monde.
Il y a des disputes réelles sur des nationalités abordées de manière « bizarre » ; l’un des cas célèbres était un cas qui concernait presque la Suisse à savoir le Liechtenstein : l’[http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/18/2674.pdf affaire Nottebohm], cette affaire fut jugée par la Cour Internationale de Justice en 1950<ref>[http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/18/9009.pdf C.I J. Mémoires, 49aire Nottebohm (Liechtenstein c. Guatemala),  vol. I]</ref><ref>COUR INTERNATIONALE DE JUSTICE RECUEIL DES ARRETS,  AVIS CONSULTATIFS ET ORDONNANCES - [http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/18/2057.pdf AFFAIRE NOTTEBOHM  (LIECHTENSTEIN c. GUATEMALA)] - ARRÊT DU 18 NOVEMBRE 1953 </ref><ref>COUR INTERNATIONALE DE JUSTICE  RECUEIL DES ARRETS,  AVIS CONSULTATIFS ET ORDONNANCES  - [http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/18/2674.pdf AFFAIRE NOTTEBOHM  (LIECHTENSTEIN c. GUATEMALA),  DEUXIÈME PHASE] -  ARRÊT DU 6 AVRIL 1955</ref>.
Un ressortissant allemand a élu domicile depuis un certain temps et établie son commerce au Guatemala ; lorsque la Seconde guerre mondiale a débuté, le Guatemala a un moment donné est entré en guerre.
Nottebohm prévoyait que le Guatemala allé entrer en guerre contre son pays d’origine ; si le Guatemala entre en guerre contre l’Allemagne alors il devient un ressortissant ennemi causant un préjudice pour son commerce sachant qu’on pouvait à ce moment confisquer les biens de ressortissants de nationalité ennemie.
Il devait se débarrasser au plus vite de la nationalité allemande ; il avait des relations au Liechtenstein ; Nottebohm a obtenu contre le paiement d’une somme une nationalité de manière extraordinaire en quelques semaines en dehors des procédures ordinaires et simplement à travers quelques relations avec le paiement d’une somme.
Le Guatemala est entré en guerre contre l‘Allemagne ; à ce moment-là, le Guatemala a considéré que Nottebohm était un ressortissant ennemi et a confisqué ses avoirs.
Le Liechtenstein a défendu son ressortissant en demandant des comptes au Guatemala par une violation du droit international à travers une violation de l’un de ses ressortissants.
L’affaire arrive devant la Cour Internationale de Justice avec le juge Guggenheim ; la Cour juge que la limite qui s’applique en droit international pour l’acquisition de la nationalité et qu’il faille un lien effectif de rattachement, une nationalité donnée par simple complaisance n’est pas une nationalité qui repose sur un lien effectif de rattachement.
Un lien effectif de rattachement et le fait qu’un ressortissant est lié davantage à un territoire déterminé qu’à n’importe qu’elle autre État dans le monde ; s’il y a un tel lien effectif de rattachement, à ce moment-là la nationalité devient opposable.
La Cour n’a pas dit que Nottebohm est allemand ou liechtensteinois, la nationalité peut être différente selon les États ; pour le Lichtenstein, Nottebohm est un Liechtensteinois parce qu’il a acquis la nationalité du Liechtenstein et a le droit de le traiter comme un ressortissant liechtensteinois, la loi allemande peut le considérer comme un ressortissant allemand.
Le Guatemala pouvait se justifier parce qu’il n’y avait pas un lien effectif de rattachement alors Nottebohm était considéré comme un ressortissant allemand parce qu’il n’avait pas de liens effectifs de rattachement au Liechtenstein, ce n’est pas opposable.
Il y a une distinction entre la nationalité acquise par des modalités reconnues par le droit international et la nationalité acquise par des modalités qui ne sont pas reconnus par le droit international.
Dans les cas où la nationalité est acquise selon des modalités reconnues alors la nationalité est opposable, lorsque la nationalité est acquise en dehors de ces modalités, elle n’est pas opposable, un État tiers n’est pas obligé de la reconnaitre ; dans le cas du Liechtenstein et de Nottebohm, le Guatemala n’était pas obligé de le reconnaître en tant que Liechtensteinois.
Le lien effectif de rattachement cause des problèmes, on comprend pourquoi, d’ailleurs, aujourd’hui cela pose un problème dans un monde globalisé. Il y a aussi d’autres motifs, le juge Guggenheim avait une opposition dissidente.
On voit la limite de la Cour Internationale dite dans l’affaire Nottebohm, il faut se référer à cette affaire-là pour noter qu’une nationalité acquise n’est pas opposable à un État tiers.
En droit pénal on utilise des mots qui ont à faire avec la compétence personnelle d’un État en matière pénale.


=== Nous avons pour la compétence pénale d’un État ===
Once again it is a question of intertemporal law, if one can assert a title as if one had conquered a territory in the 13th century then one can still assert this title today.


==== Principe de territorialité ====
== Treaty - Agreement(s) ==
Correspond à la compétence territoriale, un État peut poursuivre tous les crimes commis sur son territoire, peu importe la nationalité des personnes.
Territory can be acquired through treaty-based land transfers.
==== Principe de personnalité ====
Compétence personnelle, il y a la distinction entre le principe de personnalité active et le principe de personnalité passive :
*'''personnalité active''' : signifie qu’un État peut poursuive tous les crimes commis par l’un de ses ressortissants partout dans le monde à la seule condition qu’il constitue un crime sur le lieu commis. Si on fait quelque chose de licite en Australie, on ne peut être puni en Suisse. Pour les crimes de sang, un crime commis en Australie permet à la Suisse d’avoir une compétence légale.
*'''personnalité passive''' : un État acquiert la compétence pénale sur tout un chacun qui a commis un crime à l’égard de l’un de ses ressortissants partout dans le monde ; c’est un principe contesté, cela signifie que si on va en Australie et qu’on s’y fait tuer par un ressortissant de la nationalité X, la Suisse acquiert à son égard une compétence pénale, il peut le poursuivre par une compétence pénale et la Suisse peut demander une extradition.
==== Principe de sureté de l’État ====
C’est une série de crimes où l’État acquiert la compétence à savoir les crimes liés à l’espionnage ou de la contrefaçon de monnaie suisse.
==== Principe d’universalité ====
Cela est important pour le droit international, ce principe veut qu’un État puisse poursuivre certains crimes où qu’il soit commis dans le monde même s’il ne possède aucun lien avec ce pays.
Pour qu’un État détienne la compétence pénale afin de poursuivre un crime déterminé il doit avoir un lien de rattachement avec ce crime, ce sont les services publics.
Il y a des situations où on estime qu’un crime a été commis affectant les intérêts de tous les États et que par conséquent on accorde à tous les États une compétence punitive ; c’est la cas soit parce que le crime a été commis sur un espace commun et qu’il n’y a pas de compétence territoriale comme la piraterie qui est un acte de violence fait pour des raisons privées constituées par un navire sur un autre navire privé en la haute-mer, c’est la raison pour laquelle il y a cette infraction avec une compétence universelle : chaque État qui capture des pirates a une compétence étant donné que le crime a été commis sur un espace commun.
Il y a des crimes qui affectent l’humanité entière et on ne veut que les criminels ne se repose, ce sont les crimes de guerre, contre l’humanité et les génocides.
Il existe des cas exceptionnels où les États sont obligés de poursuivre selon la compétence universelle en fonction de certaines conventions antiterroristes et d’infractions graves comme dans le cas d’infractions relevant de la Convention de Genève sur le droit humanitaire.
Dans la majorité des cas, la compétence universelle n’est qu’un simple factuel sur la manière dont il peut et ne peut pas l’exercer.
La manière dont il peut exercer est liée au droit interne, s’il n’y a pas de lien territorial avec le crime, l’État peut exercer une compétence universelle et non pas par contumace. Cette compétence universelle permet de poursuivre pour certains crimes soit commis sur des espaces communs soit pour des crimes d’une grande importance pour la communauté. On se souvient que Balthazar Garzon en Espagne avait procédé sur cette base relativement à monsieur Pinochet.


== Compétences relatives aux engins ==
In the past, land transfers were very often carried out. Today, this is much less the case because the self-determination of peoples has been achieved through this process. In the 1950s, the French territory was transferred to Switzerland in order to expand Geneva International Airport, but this portion was returned elsewhere<ref>[http://www.admin.ch/opc/fr/classified-compilation/19560067/index.html 0.748.131.934.91] - Texte original Convention entre la Suisse et la France concernant l'aménagement de l'aéroport de Genève-Cointrin et la création de bureaux à contrôles nationaux juxtaposés à Ferney-Voltaire et à Genève-Cointrin Conclue le 25 avril 1956 Approuvée par l'Assemblée fédérale le 5 oct. 1956 Entré en vigueur le 6 mars 1958</ref>.
Il s’agit d’un côté des navires d’État, ensuite des aéronefs et d’engins spatiaux. Du point de vue du droit international, on ne considère plus, comme anciennement par fiction, qu’un navire est du territoire flottant d’un État et un avion du territoire mobile ; on considère maintenant que l’État d’immatriculation d’un engin est l’État qui est responsable pour le bon fonctionnement de ses engins et est l’État qui exerce sa compétence pour ce qui est du compte à bord de ses navires, aéronefs et des engins spatiaux.
Cela vaut pour les engins étatiques eux-mêmes comme pour les navires de guerre, mais ici la question est plus large. L’État a aussi des devoirs par rapport à des embarcations civiles comme l’obligation de contrôle de la sécurité de ces embarcations ou des conditions de travail, l’État encourt sa propre responsabilité, même pour les navires commerciaux l’État exerce sa compétence.


= Le territoire de l’État et sa délimitation =
On the other hand, we can have the formation of new states organised through a treaty; the current Germany was born from the 2+4 treaty<ref>Dufourcq Bertrand. 2+4 ou la négociation atypique. In: Politique étrangère N°2 - 2000 - 65e année pp. 467-484.  doi : 10.3406/polit.2000.4952 url : http://www.persee.fr/web/revues/home/prescript/article/polit_0032-342x_2000_num_65_2_4952</ref><ref>[http://mjp.univ-perp.fr/traites/1990traite2+4.htm Traité portant règlement définitif concernant l'Allemagne], [http://mjp.univ-perp.fr/mjp.htm Digithèque de matériaux juridiques et politiques]</ref>. The treaty is a very important vector for acquiring the territory and is also the main vector used for delimiting the territory.
Le territoire de l’État et sa délimitation soulève deux séries de problèmes:
Tout d’abord, le territoire de l’État évoque le problème de l’acquisition et de la perte de l’État : comment un État peut acquérir et perdre du territoire ?
Deuxièmement, cela soulève le problème de l’appartenance du territoire à l’un ou à l’autre ainsi que les différends sur la délimitation du territoire.
D’un côté, on s’interroge sur comment acquérir le territoire, de l’autre sur la détermination du territoire.
Si on applique ce problème à des iles il y a un problème d’attribution, en revanche si on songe à du territoire continental on a automatiquement des problèmes de délimitation.
Nous discutons de toute cette matière en utilisant très souvent le terme « titre » juridique. Un titre est un fait que l’ordre juridique reconnait comme le fondement de droit sur un territoire, c’est donc un fait reconnu par l’ordre juridique faisant naitre un droit sur un territoire.
Pour qu’un territoire nous appartienne, il faut produire un titre, le titre est donc toujours un fait auquel l’ordre juridique affecte une conséquence.
Quels sont les faits reconnus par l’ordre juridique pour acquérir et concomitamment pour le perdre ?
Il y en a quelques-uns :
== Titre d’occupation du territoire sans maitre ==
Un territoire sans maitre peut être acquis par le premier occupant, aujourd’hui le temps où on se ruait sur des territoires pour les occuper est révolu, mais l’occupation reste un titre valable et important pour deux raisons :
*à cause du droit intertemporel si quelqu’un conteste certains territoires, quelqu’un peut faire valoir qu’il l’a occupé il y a cinq siècles quand il était sans maitre, ce titre continu à déployer des effets jusqu’à aujourd’hui.
*si une ile émerge en haute-mer, elle peut être soumise à occupation.
Le terme « occupation » est le même que celui de « l’occupation de guerre », mais il est différent ; l’occupation de guerre n’est pas un titre d’acquisition de territoire, mais un titre d’administration de territoire pendant un conflit armé, il y a interdiction d’annexer, l’occupation est celle d’un territoire sans maitre, occupation de la tera nullius.
On peut aussi dans les mêmes eaux faire valoir un titre de conquête, aujourd’hui il est interdit de conquérir et d’annexer du territoire par la force selon le paragraphe 2 de l’article 4 de la Charte des Nations Unies.
Une fois de plus c’est une question de droit intertemporel, si on peut faire valoir un titre comme quoi on a conquis un territoire au XIIIème siècle alors on peut faire valoir encore aujourd’hui ce titre.
== Traité – Accord(s) ==
On peut acquérir du territoire par des transferts de territoires organisé par traité.
Les transferts de territoire se faisaient très souvent dans le passé. Aujourd’hui cela se fait beaucoup moins parce que l’autodétermination des peuples est passée par là. Dans les années 1950 on a transféré du territoire français vers la Suisse afin d’élargir l’aéroport international de Genève, mais cette portion a été rétrocédée ailleurs<ref>[http://www.admin.ch/opc/fr/classified-compilation/19560067/index.html 0.748.131.934.91] - Texte original Convention entre la Suisse et la France concernant l'aménagement de l'aéroport de Genève-Cointrin et la création de bureaux à contrôles nationaux juxtaposés à Ferney-Voltaire et à Genève-Cointrin Conclue le 25 avril 1956 Approuvée par l'Assemblée fédérale le 5 oct. 1956 Entré en vigueur le 6 mars 1958</ref>.
En revanche, on peut avoir la formation d’États nouveaux organisée à travers un traité ; l’Allemagne actuelle est née du traité des 2+4<ref>Dufourcq Bertrand. 2+4 ou la négociation atypique. In: Politique étrangère N°2 - 2000 - 65e année pp. 467-484.  doi : 10.3406/polit.2000.4952 url : http://www.persee.fr/web/revues/home/prescript/article/polit_0032-342x_2000_num_65_2_4952</ref><ref>[http://mjp.univ-perp.fr/traites/1990traite2+4.htm Traité portant règlement définitif concernant l'Allemagne], [http://mjp.univ-perp.fr/mjp.htm Digithèque de matériaux juridiques et politiques]</ref>. Le traité est un vecteur d’acquisition du territoire de grande importance et c’est aussi le vecteur principal utilisé pour la délimitation du territoire.


== Prescription acquisitive ==
== Prescription acquisitive ==
Possibilité d’acquérir un territoire par le fait d’y exercer de manière prolongée, pacifique et continue des prérogatives de puissance publique sans qu’un autre État ne proteste contre cette pratique. Il y a un État sur une portion de territoire qui fait acte de puissance publique de façon prolongée avec acquiescement des autres États qui vaut titre.
The possibility of acquiring a territory by the prolonged, peaceful and continuous exercise of public power without any other State protesting against this practice. There is a State on a portion of territory that acts of public power for a prolonged period of time with the acquiescence of the other States, which is equivalent to title.
 
Because of the self-determination of peoples today, these are only marginal areas.
 
Protest is essential to preserve one's rights, if one does not protest against the public authority then one loses this territory, if one protests, acquisition by prescription can never take place. Some authors do not like the term "acquisitive prescription", because it is a matter of private law, but the mechanism is similar.
 
There are certain natural modalities or facts that make territory acquired by other states such as alluvium; if a state has a maritime coast and the coasts move because the sands sediment, then the territory is acquired by alluvium, its territory has moved, but automatically it acquires it.
 
The same is true for rivers, there are cases where the border is in the middle of rivers. It is a line in the river, there are sometimes very dynamic rivers that move, causing the border to move; this means that one State is growing, but the other is shrinking. This type of phenomenon is of minor importance, but a natural fact and not voluntary and subject to the acquisition of the territory.
 
The loss of territory is concomitant, a state could abandon a portion of territory if it no longer wants to, but that is not relevant.
 
== As for the delimitation, what are the legal facts when delimiting territory? In other words, what is the legal basis for delimiting between territories? ==
   
   
À cause de l’autodétermination des peuples aujourd’hui il ne s’agit que de zones marginales.
We have several important principles:
   
   
La protestation est capitale pour préserver ses droits, si on ne proteste pas contre la puissance publique alors on perd ce territoire, si on proteste, l’acquisition par prescription ne peut jamais avoir lieu. Des auteurs n’aiment pas le terme « prescription acquisitive », car cela relève du droit privé, mais le mécanisme est similaire.
=== Accord(s) - Traité ===
Delimitation is almost always by agreement, sometimes a sequence of agreements on a border covers sectors, agreements that have modified or rectified borders are often bouquets of agreements.
Il y a certaines modalités ou faits naturels qui font que du territoire soit acquis par d’autres États comme l’alluvion ; si un État a une côte maritime et que les côtes se déplacent parce que les sables font de la sédimentions, alors le territoire est acquis par alluvions, son territoire a bougé, mais automatiquement il l’acquiert.
 
When the Court of Justice deals with disputes between African or Latin American States, it will always have to deal with treaties from the 19th or even 13th century. It is always the title at the time the delimitation was made that continues to prevail. It is therefore necessary to interpret the treaty of the time and know what the parties could mean.
La même chose est pour les fleuves, il y a des cas où la frontière est au milieu des fleuves. C’est une ligne dans le fleuve, il arrive qu’il y ait des fleuves très dynamiques qui bougent faisant bouger la frontière ; cela veut dire qu’un État s’accroit, mais l’autre diminue. Ce genre phénomène a une importance mineure, mais un fait naturel et non pas volontaire et sujet à l’acquisition du territoire.
 
The International Court of Justice has informed us about a case between Libya and Chad<ref>COUR INTERNATIONALE DE JUSTICE  RECUEIL DES ARRÊTS,  [http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/83/6897.pdf AVIS CONSULTATIFS ET ORDONNANCES  AFFAIRE  DU DIFFÉREND TERRITORIAL  (JAMAf-IIRIYA ARABE LIBYENNEITCHAD)] - Arrêt du 3 février 1994</ref><ref>Koskenniemi Martti. L'affaire du différend territorial Tchad/Libye (arrêt de la Cour internationale de Justice du 3 février 1994). In: Annuaire français de droit international, volume 40, 1994. pp. 442-464.  doi : 10.3406/afdi.1994.3202 url : http://www.persee.fr/web/revues/home/prescript/article/afdi_0066-3085_1994_num_40_1_320</ref> concerning a border dispute that a treaty may fix the border, but that the border acquires a value independent of the treaty established, in other words, the treaty establishes the border, but at that moment the border becomes a legally detachable fact.
La perte du territoire est concomitante, un État pourrait abandonner une portion de territoire s’il ne le veut plus, mais cela ne fait pas pertinence.
 
This means that if the treaty expires, if it is not renewed or denounced, the border remains, it is the principle of border stability.
== Quant à la délimitation quels sont les faits juridiques lorsqu’on délimite du territoire ? Autrement dit sur quoi se fonde-t-on juridiquement pour opérer une délimitation entre territoires ? ==
 
The boundary or title created by the treaty has more permanence than the treaty itself, the treaty may disappear, but the boundary remains. In the Court's view, the Treaty must give rise to a permanent border, "once agreed, the border remains, because any other approach would deprive the fundamental principle of border stability, the importance of which the Court has repeatedly stressed"<ref>[http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/83/6896.pdf Dyjgrend territorial (Jurnuhiriyu arabe libyenne/Tclzad),  arrêt, C.I. J. Recueil 1994, p. 37] </ref>.
Nous avons plusieurs principes importants :
 
Delimitation can only be joint evidence between the States concerned, the same can be said of land borders; delimiting a legally binding or legally recognized border can only be the work of the States concerned jointly, if done alone, the other State is not bound by the border that is being attempted to be imposed.
=== Accord(s) Traité ===
 
La délimitation est presque toujours opérée par accord, parfois une séquence d’accord sur une frontière porte sur des secteurs, des accords qui ont modifiés ou rectifiés des frontières sont souvent des bouquets d’accords.
If each State unilaterally delineates borders, we would have non-accepted borders. Since the principle is that a boundary can only be legally delimited by agreement, treaties are the basis for delimitation.
 
Lorsque la Cour de Justice traite de différends entre États africains ou États latino-américains, chaque fois il aura à connaitre des traités du XIXème siècle voire du XIIIème siècle. C’est toujours le titre au moment où la délimitation a été faite qui continue à valoir. Il faut donc interpréter le traité de l‘époque et savoir ce que les parties pouvaient vouloir dire.
The delineation of borders is found in agreements that are usually bilateral because a border is normally bilateral, separating State A from State B.
 
La Cour Internationale de Justice nous a appris sur une affaire entre la Libye et le Tchad<ref>COUR INTERNATIONALE DE JUSTICE  RECUEIL DES ARRÊTS,  [http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/83/6897.pdf AVIS CONSULTATIFS ET ORDONNANCES  AFFAIRE  DU DIFFÉREND TERRITORIAL  (JAMAf-IIRIYA ARABE LIBYENNEITCHAD)] - Arrêt du 3 février 1994</ref><ref>Koskenniemi Martti. L'affaire du différend territorial Tchad/Libye (arrêt de la Cour internationale de Justice du 3 février 1994). In: Annuaire français de droit international, volume 40, 1994. pp. 442-464.  doi : 10.3406/afdi.1994.3202 url : http://www.persee.fr/web/revues/home/prescript/article/afdi_0066-3085_1994_num_40_1_320</ref> concernant un différend frontalier qu’un traité peut fixer la frontière, mais que la frontière acquiert une valeur indépendante du traité instauré, autrement dit, le traité instaure la frontière, mais à ce moment la frontière devient un fait juridiquement détachable.
In the case of the Swiss borders, in François Schröter's book, all the borders of Switzerland have been delimited by agreements, some of which were concluded with the kings of France.
 
Cela signifie que si le traité arrive à échéance, s’il n’est pas renouvelé ou dénoncé, la frontière reste, c’est le principe de stabilité des frontières.
It is in the treaties that we find the title to know where a certain border crosses.
 
La frontière ou le titre que crée le traité a plus de permanence que le traité lui-même, le traité peut disparaitre, mais la frontière demeure. Le traité doit de l’avis de la Cour donner lieu à une frontière permanente, « une fois convenue, la frontière demeure, car toute autre approche priverait d’effet le principe fondamental de la stabilité des frontières, dont la Cour a souligné à maintes reprises l’importance »<ref>[http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/83/6896.pdf Dyjgrend territorial (Jurnuhiriyu arabe libyenne/Tclzad),  arrêt, C.I. J. Recueil 1994, p. 37] </ref>.  
In a dispute between Libya and Tunisia, the Court said that the border is detached from the treaty and to its own existence, the fact that the treaty disappears at some point is not relevant for the extinction of a border.
 
La délimitation ne peut être qu’une preuve conjointe entre les États concernés, la même chose peut être dite des frontières terrestres ; délimiter une frontière juridiquement contraignante ou juridiquement reconnue ne peut être que l’œuvre des États concernés conjointement, si on le fait seul, l’autre État n’est pas lié par la frontière qui est tentée d’être imposée.
It may be uncertain where the border passes exactly, treaties describe the borders, but sometimes they do it wrong and imprecisely, or they are old treaties with topographical problems. In this case, it is a question of interpreting the treaty and also a question of filling the gap in the treaty, the aim is to eliminate uncertainty by specifying where the border crosses or by calling on a judge who can determine or cross the border.
Si chaque État délimite unilatéralement on aurait des frontières non agréées. Comme le principe est qu’une frontière ne peut être juridiquement délimitée que par accords alors les traités sont le fondement de la délimitation.
On trouve le tracé des frontières dans des accords le plus souvent bilatéraux parce qu’une frontière est normalement bilatérale, elle sépare l’État A de l’état B.
Dans le cas des frontières suisses, dans l’ouvrage de François Schröter, toutes les frontières de la Suisse ont été délimitées par des accords dont certains conclus avec les rois de France.
C’est dans les traités qu’on trouve le titre pour savoir où passe une certaine frontière.
Dans un litige entre la Libye et la Tunisie, la Cour a dit que la frontière se détache du traité et à son existence propre, le fait que le traité disparaisse à un certain moment n’est pas pertinent pour l’extinction d’une frontière.
Il peut être incertain où la frontière passe exactement, les traités décrivent les frontières, mais parfois ils le font mal et avec imprécision, ou ce sont d’anciens traités avec de problèmes de topographie. Dans ce cas, c’est une question d’interprétation du traité et aussi une question de comblement de lacune contenue dans le traité, on cherche à éliminer l’incertitude en précisant où passe la frontière soit en faisant appel à un juge qui pourra déterminer ou passe la frontière.


=== Uti Possidetis juris ===
=== Uti Possidetis juris ===
C’est la possession en fonction du droit et non pas en fonction du fait.
It is possession according to the law and not according to the fact.
 
Que veut dire « uti possidetis » ?
What does "uti possidetis" mean?
 
C’est un principe applicable en matière de décolonisation originellement ; à un moment donné de l’histoire, beaucoup d’États nouveaux ont été créés issus de la décolonisation.
It is a principle originally applicable to decolonization; at some point in history, many new States have been created as a result of decolonization.
 
Ces États n’avaient pas de frontières préconstituées parce qu’ils étaient une partie d’un ancien empire colonial, seules les frontières administratives intérieures existaient relativement à la puissance coloniale ; dans l’empire colonial français, il y avait des circonscriptions soumettant les différentes portions des territoires à des gouverneurs séparés.
These states had no pre-constituted borders because they were part of a former colonial empire, only internal administrative borders existed in relation to colonial power; in the French colonial empire, there were constituencies subjecting the different parts of the territories to separate governors.
 
Lorsque la décolonisation eut lieu, déjà d’ailleurs en Amérique latine au XIXème et ensuite en Afrique au XXème siècle, les États concernés ont décidé de maintenir les anciennes frontières administratives coloniales qui anciennement étaient des frontières internes en faisant en sorte qu’après la décolonisation ces frontières deviennent des frontières internationales ; en d’autres termes de transformer des frontières administratives internes en des frontières internationales, comme cela était déjà selon les frontières administratives cela doit rester.
When decolonization took place, already in Latin America in the 19th century and then in Africa in the 20th century, the States concerned decided to maintain the former colonial administrative borders, which were formerly internal borders, by ensuring that after decolonization these borders became international borders; in other words, to transform internal administrative borders into international borders, as was already the case with administrative borders, this must remain.
 
Ce principe a été choisi parce qu’il était le seul qui pouvait dans ces espaces assurer immédiatement une frontière claire et sûre, à défaut d’uti possidetis nous n’aurions pas eu de frontières du tout, il aurait fallu conclure des traités de frontières qui auraient facilement, en Afrique notamment avec ses instabilités structurelles et ses États composites, amener, comme les États africains l’ont reconnu eux-mêmes, à des luttes fratricides ; si la guerre de décolonisation dure, on aurait risqué d’avoir des luttes de frontières par la suite ajoutant à l’effort des guerres de décolonisations à la déroute des guerres de frontières.
This principle was chosen because it was the only one that could immediately ensure a clear and secure border in these areas, in the absence of a use possidetis we would not have had borders at all, we would have had to conclude border treaties that would have easily led, in Africa in particular with its structural instabilities and composite States, as the African States themselves have recognized, to fratricidal struggles; if the decolonization war lasts, there would have been a risk of border struggles later on, adding to the effort of decolonization wars the rout of border wars.
 
L’Organisation de l’Unité Africaine par une résolution de 1964 a considéré qu’on devait maintenir les anciennes frontières administratives en les reconnaissant comme les frontières internationales<ref>Borella François. Le régionalisme africain en 1964. In: Annuaire français de droit international, volume 10, 1964. pp. 621-637.  doi : 10.3406/afdi.1964.1782 url : http://www.persee.fr/web/revues/home/prescript/article/afdi_0066-3085_1964_num_10_1_1782</ref><ref>Sorel Jean-Marc, Mehdi Rostane. L'uti possidetis entre la consécration juridique et la pratique : essai de réactualisation. In: Annuaire français de droit international, volume 40, 1994. pp. 11-40.  doi : 10.3406/afdi.1994.3181 url : http://www.persee.fr/web/revues/home/prescript/article/afdi_0066-3085_1994_num_40_1_3181</ref><ref>[http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/149/17312.pdf SEPARATE OPINION OF JUDGE YUSUF] about Uti possidetis juris and the OAU/AU principle on respect of borders are neither identical nor equivalent</ref>.
The Organization of African Unity, by a resolution of 1964, considered that the old administrative borders should be maintained by recognizing them as international borders<ref>Borella François. Le régionalisme africain en 1964. In: Annuaire français de droit international, volume 10, 1964. pp. 621-637.  doi : 10.3406/afdi.1964.1782 url : http://www.persee.fr/web/revues/home/prescript/article/afdi_0066-3085_1964_num_10_1_1782</ref><ref>Sorel Jean-Marc, Mehdi Rostane. L'uti possidetis entre la consécration juridique et la pratique : essai de réactualisation. In: Annuaire français de droit international, volume 40, 1994. pp. 11-40.  doi : 10.3406/afdi.1994.3181 url : http://www.persee.fr/web/revues/home/prescript/article/afdi_0066-3085_1994_num_40_1_3181</ref><ref>[http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/149/17312.pdf SEPARATE OPINION OF JUDGE YUSUF] about Uti possidetis juris and the OAU/AU principle on respect of borders are neither identical nor equivalent</ref>.
 
Tout d’abord l’uti possidetis est l’Amérique latine avec des dates critiques de 1810 et 1823 soit la décolonisation de l’Empire espagnol ; les frontières avec le Brésil étaient d’ailleurs déjà des frontières internationales. Les États européens ont appliqué ce principe dans le cadre de la décomposition d’États fédéraux pour l’ancienne URSS et en Yougoslavie.
First of all, the uti possidetis is Latin America with critical dates of 1810 and 1823, the decolonization of the Spanish Empire; the borders with Brazil were already international borders. European states have applied this principle in the context of the decomposition of federal states for the former USSR and Yugoslavia.
 
Juridiquement la seule chose certaine est que le principe s’applique en cas de décolonisation, pour les États fédéraux on a appliqué ce principe parce qu’il est assez pratique, mais il n’est pas certain que le droit le requiert ; à l’époque où ces États fédéraux se sont décomposés, il n’en était pas encore ainsi.
Legally, the only certain thing is that the principle applies in the event of decolonization, for federal States this principle has been applied because it is quite practical, but it is not certain that the law requires it; at the time when these federal States broke down, this was not yet the case.
 
L’arrêt clef qui pose le principe de l’uti possidetis comme outil général de la décolonisation est l’arrêt de la chambre de la Cour sur l’affaire du différend territorial entre le Burkina Faso et le Mali en 1986<ref>COUR INTERNATIONALE DE JUSTICE  RECUEIL DES ARRÊTS,  AVIS CONSULTATIFS ET ORDONNANCES - [http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/69/6447.pdf AFFAIRE DU DIFFÉREND FRONTALIER  (BURKINA FASO/RÉPUBLIQUE DU MALI)], arrêt du 22 décembre 1986</ref>.
The key judgment establishing the principle of uti possidetis as a general tool of decolonization is the judgment of the Chamber of the Court on the case of the territorial dispute between Burkina Faso and Mali in 1986<ref>COUR INTERNATIONALE DE JUSTICE  RECUEIL DES ARRÊTS,  AVIS CONSULTATIFS ET ORDONNANCES - [http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/69/6447.pdf AFFAIRE DU DIFFÉREND FRONTALIER  (BURKINA FASO/RÉPUBLIQUE DU MALI)], arrêt du 22 décembre 1986</ref>.
 
Au moment de la décolonisation, une frontière est automatiquement établie, c’est l’ancienne limitation administrative coloniale ; lorsque le juge est appelé à dire ou passe exactement la frontière, la ligne uti possidetis n’est pas toujours évidente dans des territoires difficiles d’accès, la Cour et l’arbitre doivent toujours se retourner vers des dates critiques et regarder où étaient les frontières administratives.
At the time of decolonization, a boundary is automatically established, the former colonial administrative limitation; when the judge is called upon to say or cross the boundary exactly, the uti possidetis line is not always obvious in territories that are difficult to access, the Court and the arbitrator must always turn to critical dates and look at where the administrative boundaries were.
 
L’uti possidetis signifia qu’on a automatiquement une frontière et qu’elle ne peut pas être unilatéralement changée ; cela ne veut pas dire qu’on gel des frontières et qu’on ne peut modifier les frontières ; on peut la modifier soit par accord, les États concernés peuvent conclure des accords et modifier les frontières.
Uti possidetis meant that you automatically have a border and that it cannot be unilaterally changed; this does not mean that borders are frozen and that borders cannot be changed; it can be changed either by agreement, the states concerned can conclude agreements and change borders.
 
En Afrique plus encore qu’ailleurs, les frontières tracées par le colonisateur étaient parfaitement arbitraires. Il y aurait donc souvent bien des raisons de rectifier ces anciennes frontières, cela doit être fait par accord ; toucher aux frontières signifie se diriger très rapidement vers des conflits armés.
In Africa even more than elsewhere, the borders drawn by the colonizer were perfectly arbitrary. There are therefore often many reasons to rectify these old borders, it must be done by agreement; touching the borders means moving very quickly towards armed conflicts.
 
En même temps il ne faut pas toujours un accord formel ; si un État administre une portion d’un État au-delà de l’uti possidetis et que l’autre État ne fait rien et est silencieux face aux prétentions, cette situation suffit à modifier la règle de l’uti possidetis ; on parle ici d’acquiescement aux prétentions adverses et notamment de l’[http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/75/6637.pdf affaire du différend territorial maritime et insulaire du Salvador et du Honduras]<ref>COUR INTERNATIONALE DE JUSTICE  RECUEIL DES ARRÊTS,  AVIS CONSULTATIFS ET ORDONNANCES - [http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/75/6637.pdf AFFAIRE DU DIFFÉREND FRONTALIER  TERRESTRE, INSULAIRE ET MARITIME  (EL SALVADOR/HONDURAS)] , ORDONNANCE DU 13 DÉCEMBRE 1989</ref>.
At the same time, a formal agreement is not always required; if one State administers a portion of a State beyond the uti possidetis and the other State does nothing and is silent in response to the claims, this situation is sufficient to modify the uti possidetis rule; this is referred to as acquiescence to adverse claims and in particular the case of the territorial maritime and island dispute of El Salvador and Honduras<ref>COUR INTERNATIONALE DE JUSTICE  RECUEIL DES ARRÊTS,  AVIS CONSULTATIFS ET ORDONNANCES - [http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/75/6637.pdf AFFAIRE DU DIFFÉREND FRONTALIER  TERRESTRE, INSULAIRE ET MARITIME  (EL SALVADOR/HONDURAS)] , ORDONNANCE DU 13 DÉCEMBRE 1989</ref>.
 
La Cour nous apprend à la page 412 de l’arrêt, « il est évidemment loisible à ces États de modifier par un accord les frontières les séparant, et certaines formes d’activités ou d’inactivités pourrait valoir acquiescement à une limite différente de celle de 1821. »
The Court tells us at page 412 of the judgment, "it is obviously open to these States to modify by agreement the boundaries separating them, and certain forms of activity or inactivity could be deemed to be acquiescence at a different limit than in 1821. »
 
Certaines formes d’activités ou d’inactivités sont une forme d’acquiescement à la prétention adverse prolongée.
Some forms of activity or inactivity are a form of acquiescence to the prolonged adverse claim.
   
 
On peut modifier le principe d’uti possidetis, mais cela ne doit pas venir d’attitudes unilatérales non-agrées parce que cela pose des conflits.
The principle of uti possidetis can be modified, but this must not come from unagreed unilateral attitudes because it raises conflicts.
 
== General principle of border stability ==
The use possidetis is one aspect of this; in modern international law, there is a principle of border stability.
 
It has been expressed in various forms, as was the Hague Court in the Treah Vihar Temple case in 1962, "Generally speaking, when two countries define a border between them, one of their main objectives is to reach a stable and definitive solution. This is impossible if the route thus established can be challenged at any time on the basis of a constantly open procedure, and if rectification can be requested whenever an inaccuracy in relation to a provision of the basic treaty is discovered<ref>Cot Jean-Pierre. L'arrêt de la Cour internationale de Justice dans l'affaire du temple de Préah Vihéar (Cambodge c. Thaïlande - Fond). In: Annuaire français de droit international, volume 8, 1962. pp. 217-247.  doi : 10.3406/afdi.1962.969 url : http://www.persee.fr/web/revues/home/prescript/article/afdi_0066-3085_1962_num_8_1_969 </ref>.
 
The principle of border stability aims to avoid conflicts and in particular armed conflicts and it is understandable because the border is a very sensitive issue, the border defines home, it is linked to a sense of security, but also to the well-being of populations; the population and States in modern times moreover with their way of conceiving things based on the idea of the nation further increases the sense of perimeter and security that distinguishes us from the other.
 
Border insecurity very easily generates unrest because it is psychologically traumatic.
 
In the practice of States, there is the development of the principle of border stability, which has a whole series of concrete implications.


== Principe général de la stabilité des frontières ==
In the Libya v. Chad case, the Court said that a boundary cannot be separated from the treaty, but the boundary remains if the treaty is extinguished; in the succession of States to the treaty, that is, when a territory moves from one to the other, there are principles in the Vienna Convention on Succession of States to the treaty. In Articles 11 and 12 there is the rule that treaties establish borders and that they contain territorial statutes.[[Fichier:Convention de Vienne sur le droit des traités de 1969 - article 11.png|vignette|center|700px|[http://legal.un.org/ilc/texts/instruments/francais/traites/1_1_1969_francais.pdf Convention de Vienne sur le droit des traités de 1969] - [http://www.admin.ch/opc/fr/classified-compilation/19690099/index.html#a11 article 11]]]
L’uti possidetis en est un aspect ; dans le droit international moderne, il y a un principe de stabilité des frontières.
Il a été exprimé dans des formes diverses comme le fut la Cour de la Haye dans l’[http://www.persee.fr/web/revues/home/prescript/article/afdi_0066-3085_1962_num_8_1_969 affaire du temple de Treah Vihar en 1962], « D’une manière générale lorsque deux pays définissent entre eux une frontière, un de leurs principaux objectifs est d’arrêter une solution stable et définitive. Cela est impossible si le tracé ainsi établi peut être remis en question à tout moment sur la base d’une procédure constamment ouverte, et si la rectification peut être demandée chaque fois que l’on découvre une inexactitude par rapport à une disposition du traité de base »<ref>Cot Jean-Pierre. L'arrêt de la Cour internationale de Justice dans l'affaire du temple de Préah Vihéar (Cambodge c. Thaïlande - Fond). In: Annuaire français de droit international, volume 8, 1962. pp. 217-247. doi : 10.3406/afdi.1962.969 url : http://www.persee.fr/web/revues/home/prescript/article/afdi_0066-3085_1962_num_8_1_969  </ref>.
Le principe de stabilité des frontières vise à éviter des conflits et notamment des conflits armés et il se comprend parce que la frontière est une question très sensible, la frontière définit le chez-soi, il est lié à un sentiment de sécurité, mais aussi de bien-être des populations ; la population et les États à l’époque moderne de plus avec leur manière de concevoir les choses basées sur l‘idée de la nation incrémente encore le sentiment de périmètre et de sécurité qui nous distingue de l’autre.
L’insécurité quant à la frontière génère très facilement des troubles parce qu’elle est psychologiquement traumatisante.
Dans la pratique des États, il y a le développement du principe de la stabilité des frontières qui reçoit tout une série d’implications concrètes.
 
Dans l’affaire Libye contre Tchad, la Cour dit qu’une frontière ne peut se détacher du traité, mais la frontière demeure si le traité s’éteint ; dans la succession d’États au traité c’est-à-dire lorsqu‘un territoire passe de l’un à l’autre, il y a des principes dans la Convention de Vienne sur la succession d’états au traité. Dans les articles 11 et 12 il y a la règle que les traités fixent les frontières et qu’ils contiennent des statuts territoriaux.
[[Fichier:Convention de Vienne sur le droit des traités de 1969 - article 11.png|vignette|center|700px|[http://legal.un.org/ilc/texts/instruments/francais/traites/1_1_1969_francais.pdf Convention de Vienne sur le droit des traités de 1969] - [http://www.admin.ch/opc/fr/classified-compilation/19690099/index.html#a11 article 11]]]


[[Fichier:Convention de Vienne sur le droit des traités de 1969 - article 12.png|vignette|center|700px|[http://legal.un.org/ilc/texts/instruments/francais/traites/1_1_1969_francais.pdf Convention de Vienne sur le droit des traités de 1969] - [http://www.admin.ch/opc/fr/classified-compilation/19690099/index.html#a12 article 12]]]
[[Fichier:Convention de Vienne sur le droit des traités de 1969 - article 12.png|vignette|center|700px|[http://legal.un.org/ilc/texts/instruments/francais/traites/1_1_1969_francais.pdf Convention de Vienne sur le droit des traités de 1969] - [http://www.admin.ch/opc/fr/classified-compilation/19690099/index.html#a12 article 12]]]


[[Fichier:Convention de Vienne sur le droit des traités de 1969 - article 62.png|vignette|center|700px|[http://legal.un.org/ilc/texts/instruments/francais/traites/1_1_1969_francais.pdf Convention de Vienne sur le droit des traités de 1969] - [http://www.admin.ch/opc/fr/classified-compilation/19690099/index.html#a62 article 62]]]
[[Fichier:Convention de Vienne sur le droit des traités de 1969 - article 62.png|vignette|center|700px|[http://legal.un.org/ilc/texts/instruments/francais/traites/1_1_1969_francais.pdf Convention de Vienne sur le droit des traités de 1969] - [http://www.admin.ch/opc/fr/classified-compilation/19690099/index.html#a62 article 62]]]The Vienna Convention states that it is not possible to assert a change of circumstances with regard to a border even if the circumstances have fundamentally changed; this is an application of the principle of border stability.
 
La Convention de Vienne statut disant qu’il n’est pas possible de faire valoir le changement de circonstances vis-à-vis d’une frontière même si les circonstances ont fondamentalement changées ; c’est une application du principe de la stabilité des frontières.
In a restrictive interpretation of the law of States, one should not unilaterally touch the providers; when it is in concert everything is possible or almost possible within the limits of the self-determination of peoples; when it is unilateral, one should be careful.
 
Dans le cadre d’une interprétation restrictive du droit relatif aux États, il ne faut pas toucher unilatéralement aux fournières ; lorsque c’est de concert tout est possible ou presque dans les limites de l’autodétermination des peuples ; lorsque c’est unilatéral, il faut faire attention.
=== The effectivities ===
In the law of delimitation there is on the one hand the title either the treaty or the use possidetis; but it happens in life that the effectivities are not in conformity with the title, it is the things that happen on the ground and in particular who administers.
=== Les effectivités ===
 
Dans le droit de la délimitation il y a d’un côté le titre soit le traité soit l’uti possidetis ; mais il arrive dans la vie que les effectivités ne soient pas conforment au titre, ce sont les choses qui se passent sur le terrain et en particulier qui administre.
If we have a line set by a treaty that leaves part of the territory to State A, in fact for 80 years State B has been administering that small part of the territory and that is not in accordance with the treaty, but there is an effectiveness, a reality that has taken root. In the colonial field, we speak of colonial effectiveness.
 
Si on a une ligne fixée par un traité qui laisse une partie du territoire à l‘État A, en fait depuis 80 ans l’État B administre cette petite partie du territoire et cela n’est pas conforme au traité, mais il y a une effectivité, une réalité qui s’est implantée. Dans le domaine colonial, on parle d’effectivité coloniale.
The question is, what is the relationship between title and effectiveness?
 
La question est de savoir qu’elle est la relation entre le titre et l’effectivité ?
As a general rule, there can be no doubt as to what the answer is, the title prevails because the treaty is the law and effectiveness and the fact, the fact cannot prevail over the law.
 
En règle générale, il ne peut faire de doute de quel est la réponse, le titre l’emporte parce que le traité est le droit et l’effectivité et le fait, le fait ne peut prévaloir contre le droit.
This rule is not without exception; first of all, if there is acquiescence, i.e. acquisitive prescription, effectiveness is recognized and similarly induced, but it is no longer a simple effectiveness, because there is an effective administration of the State that is not entitled, but the other State has acquiesced becoming something bilateral, there is an exercise of power; the title State has remained silent, creating a trust that it is losing interest in the territory.
 
Cette règle n’est pas sans exception ; tout d’abord s’il y a acquiescement, soit la prescription acquisitive, l’effectivité se voit reconnue et de même induite, mais ce n’est plus une simple effectivité, car il y a une administration effective de l’État qui n’a pas droit, mais l’autre État a acquiescé devenant quelque chose de bilatéral, il y a un exercice de pouvoir ; l’État titre est resté silencieux créant une confiance qu’il se désintéresse du territoire.
At some point, courts consider that effectiveness has become law through the tacit acceptance of the other party.
 
À un certain moment, des tribunaux considèrent que l’effectivité est devenue du droit par l’acceptation tacite de l’autre partie.
The International Court of Justice has considered this type of problem, title on the one hand, effectiveness on the other, and has given it an extremely nuanced perspective, as was the case, for example, in the case of the border dispute between Burkina Faso and Mali in §63.
 
La Cour Internationale de Justice a considéré ce genre de problèmes, titre d’un côté, effectivité de l’autre et lui a donné un éclairage extrêmement nuancé comme ce fut par exemple le cas dans l’affaire du différend frontalier entre le Burkina Faso et le Mali au §63.
The Court refers to four possible relationships between effectiveness on the one hand and law on the other:
 
La Cour évoque quatre rapports possibles entre l’effectivité d’un côté et le droit de l’autre :
=== Effectiveness corresponds to the right, i.e. the title ===
Effectiveness is aligned with the law, the border must cross there and both states administer what the treaty has affected countries.
=== L’effectivité correspond au droit c’est-à-dire au titre ===
 
L’effectivité est alignée sur le droit, la frontière doit passer là et les deux états administrent ce que le traité a affecté aux pays.
Effectiveness only occurs as confirmation of the title. The Chamber of the Court was able to apply this principle in the case of the land and island border dispute El Salvador v. Honduras in 1992.
 
L’effectivité n’intervient que comme confirmation du titre. La chambre de la Cour a pu appliquer ce principe dans l’affaire du différend frontalier terrestre et insulaire El Salvador contre Honduras en 1992.
El Salvador successfully presented a whole series of effectivities, presenting them as confirmation of its Spanish titles of uti possidetis. The Chamber of the Court confirmed El Salvador's reading or presents its arguments at page 397 §59.
 
Le Salvador présentait avec succès toute une série d’effectivités, les présentant comme confirmation de ses titres espagnols d‘uti possidetis. La chambre de la Cour a confirmé la lecture du Salvador ou elle présente ses arguments à la page 397 §59.
==== Effectiveness does not correspond to the title ====
There is a divorce between the two and an opposition between effectiveness and title. The general rule is that the holder of the security should be preferred.
==== L’effectivité ne correspond pas au titre ====
 
Il y a un divorce entre les deux et une opposition entre l’effectivité et le titre. La règle générale en la matière est qu’il y a lieu de préférer le titulaire du titre.
One situation in which the Court has had the opportunity to apply this rule is the dispute between the land and maritime border between Cameroon and Nigeria in 2002.
 
Une situation dans laquelle la Cour a eu l’occasion d‘appliquer cette règle est celle du différend entre la frontière terrestre et maritime entre le Cameroun et le Nigeria en 2002.
The Court concluded that in this case there was a conflict between Cameroon's conventional titles and Nigeria, which had the effectiveness, according to the title certain areas were allocated to Cameroon and Nigeria had entered these territories and administered them; according to the Court the holder of the title must prevail and therefore this territory belongs to Cameroon.
 
La Cour conclut que dans ce cas il y avait conflit entre les titres conventionnels du Cameroun et le Nigeria qui possédait les effectivités, selon le titre certaines zones revenaient au Cameroun et le Nigeria avait pénétré ces territoires et les administrait ; selon la Cour le titulaire du titre doit prévaloir et donc ce territoire revient au Cameroun.
==== Effectiveness does not coexist with any title ====
We have effectiveness, but no title; in this case, according to the Court, effectiveness must be taken into consideration and will very often be decisive.
==== L’effectivité ne coexiste avec aucun titre ====
 
Nous avons une effectivité, mais pas de titre ; dans ce cas selon la Cour, l’effectivité doit être prise en considération est sera très souvent décisive.
The case of sovereignty over Pulau Ligitan and Pulau Sipadan, is a 2002 case between Indonesia and Malaysia; these are two small islands relatively far from the central area of the States concerned, the Court discards the conventional titles that the parties have presented to it, because according to the interpretation that the Court gives to these treaties they do not extend so far into the sea.
 
L’affaire de la souveraineté sur Pulau Ligitan et Pulau Sipadan, est une affaire de 2002 entre l’Indonésie et la Malaisie; il s’agit de deux petites iles relativement loin de la zone centrale des États concernés, la Cour écarte des titres conventionnels que les parties lui ont présentés, car selon l’interprétation que la Cour donne à ces traités ils ne s’étendent pas si loin dans la mer.
If this is the case, there is no title and at the same time the successor States could not acquire the title.
 
S’il en est ainsi, il n’y a pas de titre et en même temps les États successeurs ne pouvaient acquérir le titre.
=== What if you don't have a title? ===
The Court turns to effectivities, it notes that Malaysia has better effectivities; the Court notes that Indonesia has none that have not made any act of sovereignty.
=== Que faire si on est dépourvu de titre ? ===
 
Malaysia, on the other hand, can do two things: the executive regulatory activity relating to fishing, namely the capture of torture and birds and the construction and maintenance of lighthouses by means of navigation; these two activities are sufficient to give Malaysia the title.
La Cour se tourne vers les effectivités, elle constata que la Malaisie possède de meilleures effectivités ; la Cour constate que l’Indonésie n’en a aucune n’ayant fait aucun acte de souveraineté.
 
==== Effectiveness coexists with a title, but the title is not clear ====
En revanche quant à la Malaisie, elle peut deux activités : l’activité règlementaire exécutive relative à la pèche à savoir capturer des tortus et des oiseaux et à la construction et l’entretien de phares à l’aide de navigation ; ces deux effectivités suffisent pour donner le titre à la Malaisie.
This is a fairly common situation, but it is no longer clear where the line passes.
 
==== L’effectivité coexiste avec un titre, mais le titre n’est pas clair ====
The treaty may be unclear, the line uti possidetis or the description is inconclusive; in this case in particular in the case of effectiveness at the time the title was concluded because effectiveness immediately after the time of decolonization tends to show what the parties considered to be the title.
C’est une situation assez fréquente, mais on ne sait plus exactement où la ligne passe.
 
The presumption is that the parties administered the territory assigned at the time, if we no longer know where the uti possidetis line passes, then we must refer to the actual activities at the time of colonization, the parties behaved according to what they had agreed or what the law granted them.
Le traité peut être peu clair, la ligne uti possidetis ou la description est peu concluante ; dans ce cas notamment dans le cas des effectivités à l’époque où le titre était conclu parce que les effectivités immédiatement après le moment de la décolonisation tendent à montrer ce que les parties considéraient être le titre.
 
In the El Salvador v. Honduras dispute, there was a problem with some islands in the Gulf of Fonseca; the old titles in this marginal area were not clear, so the Chamber of the Court considered it appropriate to take into account the actual conduct of the States concerned during the period immediately following independence, thus determining the respective membership of these islands in the Gulf of Fonseca drawing the border in this area.
La présomption est que les parties administraient le territoire assigné à l’époque, si on ne sait plus où passe la ligne uti possidetis alors il faut se référer aux effectivités au moment de la colonisation, les parties se comportaient en fonction sur quoi elles s’étaient accordées ou ce que le droit leur concédait.
 
==== Role of equity ====
Dans le différend El Salvador contre Honduras, il y avait un problème avec certaines iles dans le golfe de Fonseca ; les titres anciens dans cette zone marginale n’étaient pas clairs donc la chambre de la Cour a considéré qu’il était approprié de prendre en compte le comportement effectif des États intéressés pendant la période qui a immédiatement suivi l’indépendance déterminant ainsi l’appartenance respective de ces iles dans le golfe de Fonseca traçant la frontière dans cette zone.
This is not a fundamental role, but sometimes it is not insignificant; there are certain compromises, such as an agreement by which a dispute is submitted to an arbitrator or a judge, sometimes the arbitrator can rule in equity, he must not only limit himself to the title, but also to equitable considerations reflecting the effectiveness of the activities that have created links.
 
==== Rôle de l’équité ====
The arbitrator may for equitable reasons modify the boundary or draw one based on what he or she considers to be fair only when the parties agree, equity also plays a role in the interpretation of the title or in the filling of gaps in the title.
C’est un rôle qui n’est pas fondamental, mais parfois il n’est pas négligeable ; il existe certains compromis soit un accord par lequel on soumet un litige à un arbitre ou à un juge, parfois l’arbitre peut statuer en équité, il ne doit pas s’en tenir seulement au titre, mais aussi à des considérations équitables reprenant des effectivités qui ont créé des liens de rattachement.
 
The first situation is that the arbitrator is free to draw certain lines, depending on what he considers fair, if the States agree to give him this mission, then the arbitrator will draw the border.
L’arbitre peut pour des motifs équitables modifier la frontière ou en tracer une en fonction de ce qu’il estime être équitable uniquement lorsque les parties s’accordent, l’équité joue aussi un rôle dans l’interprétation du titre ou dans le comblement de lacunes contenues dans le titre.
 
In other cases, the arbitrator does not have this mission; he cannot modify the law according to what he considers to be equity. In the latter case, the arbitrator is bound by the law and nevertheless equity can play a certain role.
La première situation est que l’arbitre est libre par rapport au droit, il peut en fonction de ce qu’il considère équitable tracer certaines lignes, si les États s’accordent à lui donner cette mission alors l’arbitre va tracer la frontière.
 
The arbitrator applies the law and the treaty; there are two roles that equity can play:
Dans les autres cas, l’arbitre n’a pas cette mission il ne peut modifier le droit en fonction de ce qu’il estime être l’équité. Dans ce dernier cas, l’arbitre est lié par le droit et néanmoins l’équité peut jouer un certain rôle.
 
Equity can be used by the arbitrator in interpreting the title, sometimes the title is not very clear, the description of the boundary line is confusing, the geomorphological aspects have changed over time, so if there is uncertainty in a certain area and the boundary could cross either here or there, then we could, since we are covered by the title, rely on equity.
L’arbitre applique le droit et le traité ; il a y deux rôles que l’équité peut jouer :
 
If we draw the line according to line A possible according to the title, but if we take line 1 we are in a desert region where there are water points that are fundamental for the population, if we take line A the water points are all on the side of A. If line B, also possible according to the title, shares the water points either 2 between 2 or 1 against 3, there would be a reason to prefer line B because it shares more equitably water points that are crucial for the populations in the region.
L ‘équité peut servir à l’arbitre dans l’interprétation du titre, il y arrive que le titre ne soit pas très clair, que la description de la ligne frontière soit confuse, que les aspects géomorphologiques aient changés depuis le temps, si donc il y a une incertitude dans une certaine aire et que la frontière pourrait passer soit par ici ou soit par-là, on pourrait à ce moment-là, puisqu’on est couvert par le titre, on pourrait faire fond sur l’équité.
 
If the shelter does not have the notion of modifying the law by equity, if line A is the one provided for by the title and one can say with certainty what is provided for then it is line A; the assumption is that the title is not clear allowing either line A or B because it is compatible with the description of the title; equity can intervene within the law to recommend interpretation B rather than interpretation A.
Si on trace la ligne en fonction de la ligne A possible selon le titre, mais si on prend la ligne 1 on est dans une région désertique ou il y a des points d’eau qui sont fondamentaux pour la population, si on prend la ligne A les points d’eau sont tous du côté de A. Si la ligne B, également possible selon le titre, partage les points d’eau soit 2 entre 2 soit 1 contre 3, il y aurait un motif de préférer la ligne B parce qu’elle partage plus équitablement des points d’eau capitaux pour les populations dans la région.
 
To fill gaps in the title, it may be defective in some areas. The most radical case is a line uti posidetis, if in the archives the documents relating to this sector of the border are missing, we have nothing. In this case, the judge or arbitrator applies the equity praeter legem, on the margins of the law and in reinforcement of the law, thus filling a gap, and will then fix a boundary assuming that the parties want him to fix the boundary.
Si l’abrite n’a pas la notion de modifier le droit par l’équité, si la ligne A est celle qui est prévue par le titre et qu’on peut dire avec certitude ce qui est prévu alors c’est la ligne A ; l’hypothèse est que le titre n’est pas clair permettant soit la ligne A ou B parce que compatible avec la description du titre ; l’équité peut intervenir à l’intérieur du droit afin de recommander l’interprétation B plutôt que l’interprétation A.
 
It would be counterproductive and non-compliant if the arbitrator said that he cannot delimit, equity must be used at the edge and in support of the law.
Pour combler des lacunes que laisse le titre, il peut être défaillant dans certaines zones. Le cas le plus radical est une ligne uti posidetis, si dans les archives il manque les documents relatifs à ce secteur de la frontière, on n’a rien. Dans ce cas le juge ou l’arbitre applique l’équité praeter legem, en marge du droit et en renforcement du droit, comblement de lacune donc, et il fixera à ce moment-là une frontière en supposant que les parties veulent qu’il fixe la frontière.
 
In the case of the territorial and maritime island dispute El Salvador v. Honduras before the Chamber of the International Court of Justice there were six border sectors over a considerable number of kilometres which were to be delimited, in one of these sectors the border uti possidetis could no longer be determined as the sector between the source of the Negro-Quiagara River and the Malpaso de Similaton border pillar, between these two points the titles were not loquacious; the Chamber of the Court therefore relied on an 1869 treaty also concerning the area in question and said that it took over the border contained in that treaty because it seemed fair to it, the treaty was not applicable because it had not been ratified by the two States; a non-binding treaty was issued for a small part of the border which was inserted in the judgment on the basis of equity praeter legem, pages 514 - 515 of the 1982 Code.
Il serait contreproductif et non-conforme si l’arbitre disait qu’il ne peut délimiter, il faut utiliser l’équité au bord et en appui du droit.
 
=== Role of geographical maps ===
Dans l’affaire du différend territorial et maritime insulaire El Salvador contre Honduras devant la chambre de la Cour Internationale de Justice il y avait six secteurs de frontières sur un nombre considérable de kilomètres qui étaient à délimiter, dans l‘un de ces secteurs la frontière uti possidetis ne pouvait plus être déterminée à savoir le secteur entre la source du fleuve Negro-Quiagara et le pilier frontière de Malpaso de Similaton, entre ces deux points les titres n’étaient pas loquaces ; la chambre de la Cour a dès lors fait fond sur un traité de 1869 concernant aussi la zone en cause et a dit qu’elle reprenait la frontière contenue dans ce traité parce qu’elle lui paraissait équitable, le traité n’était pas applicable parce qu’il n’avait pas été ratifié par les deux États ; un traité pas contraignant a été émis pour un petit secteur de la frontière qui a été insérée dans l’arrêt sur la base de l’équité praeter legem, page 514 515 du recueil de 1982.
What is the value of maps in the delimitation?
 
=== Rôle des cartes géographiques ===
The answer must be sought in a fundamental distinction that jurisprudence makes. In the judgment on the border dispute between Burkina Faso and Mali, on pages 582 and 583 of the compendiums, the distinction is between the cards of a whole that are an integral part of a treaty that is binding and all other cards that are not an integral part of a treaty and are not binding. The map was part of the treaty is supposed to be legally binding, the map is a legal standard with considerable weight that can be decisive. Such a case is mentioned in a border dispute between Somalia and Eritrea.
Quelle est la valeur de cartes géographiques dans la délimitation ?
 
In all other cases, the maps are only sources of information of varying weight depending on their quality, technical reliability and the neutrality of the bodies that produced them.
La réponse doit être recherchée dans une distinction fondamentale que la jurisprudence fait. Dans l’arrêt sur le différend frontalier entre le Burkina Faso et le Mali page 582 et 583 des recueils, la distinction est entre les cartes d’un tout qui font partie intégrante d’un traité ayant force obligatoire et toutes les autres cartes ne faisant partie intégrante à un traité et ne faisant force contraignante. La carte faisait partie du traité est censée être juridiquement contraignante, la carte est une norme juridique ayant un poids considérable pouvant être décisive. Un cas de ce genre est évoqué dans un différend frontalier entre la Somalie et l’Érythrée.
 
Case law has sometimes shown annoyance because arbitrators and judges are flooded with it. The parties produce hundreds of maps, some of which have relative value, either inaccurate or contradictory; they have relatively limited usefulness; the case law pushes back a little bit, depending on the circumstances.
Dans tous les autres cas, les cartes ne sont que des sources d’informations de poids variable en fonction de leur qualité de leur fiabilité technique, ainsi que de la neutralité des organes qui les ont produites.
 
Such a map that is not part of a treaty may also become more important if it is acquiesced in.
La jurisprudence a montré parfois de l’agacement parce que les arbitres et les juges en sont inondés. Les parties produisent des centaines de cartes dont certaines ont une valeur relative, soit elles ne sont pas précises soit elles se contredisent ; elles ont une utilité relativement limitée ; la jurisprudence repousse un tout petit peu, cela dépend des circonstances.
 
If the opposing party accepts the relevance of this map, the arbitral award is relevant between Ethiopia and Eritrea in the collection of arbitral awards. The case law on page 115 teaches us that a map can question a line and does not necessarily need to have the same probative value.
Une telle carte qui n’est pas partie d’un traité peut également devenir plus importante si elle fait l’objet d’un acquiescement.
 
When a map is produced only to confirm or question a line, but not to establish an asset, case law tells us that the probative value of this type of argument does not need to be subjected to the same force of conviction.
Si la partie adverse admet la pertinence de cette carte, la sentence arbitrale est intéressent entre l’Éthiopie et Érythrée dans le recueil des sentences arbitrales. La jurisprudence à la page 115 nous apprend qu’une carte peut mettre en doute une ligne et elle n’a pas nécessairement besoin d’avoir la même force probante.
 
In the case of maritime delimitations, States such as Libya and Tunisia may be bordering and it is necessary to see where the boundary extends in order to separate their continental shelf from their territorial sea. There is the case where there are several States with States facing each other, so we must delimit, because this indicates that there is an overlap.
Lorsqu’une carte est produite uniquement pour confirmer ou mettre en doute une ligne, mais non pas pour fonder un acquis, la jurisprudence nous apprend que la force probante de ce genre d’argument n’a pas besoin d’être soumise à la même force de conviction.
Dans le cas de délimitations maritimes, il arrive que des États soient limitrophes comme la Libye et la Tunisie et il faut voir où la limite se prolonge afin de séparer leur plateau continental et leur mer territoriale. Il y a le cas où il y a plusieurs États avec des États qui se font face alors il faut délimiter, car cela indique qu’il y a un chevauchement.
Toute cette branche du droit est compliquée parce que le fait d’être appliqué, les configurations sont à chaque fois différentes, tout cela influe sur le tracé des lignes, d’où une jurisprudence riche, mais détaillée sur les principes applicables en la matière.


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This whole branch of law is complicated because the fact of being applied, the configurations are different each time, all this influences the drawing of the lines, hence a rich but detailed jurisprudence on the principles applicable in this field.<gallery mode="packed-hover">
Fichier:Burkina fasoMali croquis 2.png|[http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/69/6447.pdf Différend frontalier, arrêt, C.I.J. Recueil 1986]
Fichier:Burkina fasoMali croquis 2.png|[http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/69/6447.pdf Différend frontalier, arrêt, C.I.J. Recueil 1986]
Fichier:Burkina fasoMali croquis 3.png|[http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/69/6447.pdf Différend frontalier, arrêt, C.I.J. Recueil 1986]
Fichier:Burkina fasoMali croquis 3.png|[http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/69/6447.pdf Différend frontalier, arrêt, C.I.J. Recueil 1986]
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= Les principes fondamentaux des relations entre États =
= The fundamental principles of inter-State relations =
[[Fichier:CHARTE DES NATIONS UNIES - article 2.png|vignette|center|700px|[https://www.un.org/fr/documents/charter/pdf/charter.pdf Charte des Nations Unies] - [https://www.un.org/fr/documents/charter/chap1.shtml Chapitre I : Buts et principes - article 2]]]
[[Fichier:CHARTE DES NATIONS UNIES - article 2.png|vignette|center|700px|[https://www.un.org/fr/documents/charter/pdf/charter.pdf Charte des Nations Unies] - [https://www.un.org/fr/documents/charter/chap1.shtml Chapitre I : Buts et principes - article 2]]]It is not a question of going into detail, but of making us aware of its existence, because this Article 2 contains almost all the rules of modern international law.
 
Il ne s’agit pas d’aller dans le détail, mais de nous sensibiliser à son existence, car cet article 2 contient presque toutes les règles du droit international moderne.
Resolutions 25 - 26 are an authentic interpretation of Article 2; Article 2 of the Statute on clear but nevertheless incomplete formulas that raise problems of interpretation.
 
Les résolutions 25 26 sont une interprétation authentique de l’article 2 ; l’article 2 statut sur des formules claires, mais néanmoins lacunaires posant des problèmes d’interprétation.
The General Assembly has taken the trouble to adopt a resolution of great importance since it proposes to give everyone an interpretation of the provisions of article 2, which adds the principle of cooperation between States and the self-determination of peoples.
 
L’Assemblée générale a pris la peine d’adopter une résolution de grande importance puisqu’elle se propose de donner à tous une interprétation sur les dispositions de l‘article 2 rajoutant le principe de la coopération entre États et l’autodétermination des peuples.
== First paragraph ==
{{citation bloc|L'Organisation est fondée sur le principe de l'égalité souveraine de tous ses Membres.}}It is a bizarre, caustic and even unexpected formulation because it merges two heterogeneous elements between "equality" and "sovereignty" by specifying that one is inseparable from the other. One State cannot impose its sovereignty on the other because this would violate the equality of sovereigns.
== Paragraphe premier ==
 
{{citation bloc|L'Organisation est fondée sur le principe de l'égalité souveraine de tous ses Membres.}}
Sovereignty in 1945 had bad press, that was one of the reasons why the League of Nations had sunk, for aggressive powers had emanated the world from a long and hard war, a tendency to do whatever one wants; one wanted to infer this sovereignty in the reminder of equality, forcing one to take into account the other, because sovereignty is not a prerogative that one has alone.
 
C’est une formulation bizarre, causasse voire inattendue parce qu’elle fait la fusion entre deux éléments hétéroclites entre « égalité » et « souveraineté » en précisant que l’un est indissociable de l’autre. Un État ne peut imposer sa souveraineté à l’autre parce que cela enfreindrait l’égalité entre les souverains.
On "sovereign equality", it seems important to understand what it says and does not say, on the principle of equality, what equality says is legal equality in the first place, i. e. the fact that no State can be considered as being diminished, there is no second category State but the first category on an equal footing.
 
La souveraineté en 1945 avait mauvaise presse, c’était un des motifs pour lequel la Société des Nations avait sombré, pour des puissances agressives avaient émané le monde d’une guerre longue et dure, une tendance à faire tout ce que l’on souhaite ; on a voulu inférer cette souveraineté dans le rappel de l’égalité obligeant à tenir compte de l‘autre, car la souveraineté n’est pas une prérogative qu’on a seule.
It does not seem like much to us, but in 1945 it was not, we were emerging from the era of mandates, protectorates and colonies that continued to exist.
 
Sur « l’égalité souveraine », il est, semble-t-il, important de comprendre ce qu’elle dit et ne dit pas, sur le principe d’égalité, ce que dit l’égalité c’est l’égalité juridique en tout premier lieu c’est-à-dire le fait qu’aucun État ne peut être considéré comme étant diminué, il n’y a pas d’État de seconde catégorie que de la première catégorie sur un pied d’égalité.
In other words, what Article 2 §1 seeks to achieve beyond the equal dignity of States is also the right recognized by international law for each State to have rights and obligations and to be subject to the same rights and obligations of general international law, each State has the same right to have rights and obligations and is subject to the same law and obligations of general international law.
 
Cela nous parait peu, mais en 1945 cela ne l’était pas, on sortait de l‘époque des mandats, des protectorats, des colonies qui continuaient à perdurer.
There is also the part of what equality does not mean, first of all it would be wrong to say that each State has the same rights and obligations under international law; this is completely wrong. There is only the same capacity to have rights and obligations and the same capacity of general international law that does not apply to the particular law.
 
En d’autres termes, ce que veut faire admettre l’article 2 §1 au-delà de l’égale dignité des États, c’est aussi la faculté que reconnaît le droit international à chaque État d’avoir des droits et des obligations et d’être soumis aux mêmes droits et obligations du droit international général, chaque État a la même faculté d’avoir des droits et des obligations et est soumis au même droit et obligations du droit international général.
The State that has contracted will have more rights and obligations imposed on it under the treaty, the State that does not have a contract will not have these rights and obligations under the treaty. If we take the particular law all States differ, the more we are involved in particular legal situations the more rights and obligations we will have.
 
Il y a aussi le volet de ce que l’égalité ne veut pas dire, tout d’abord il serait faux de dire que chaque État a les mêmes droits et obligations en vertu du droit international; c’est complètement faux. Il y a uniquement la même capacité d’avoir des droits et des obligations ainsi que la capacité égale du droit international général ne s’appliquant pas au droit particulier.
Secondly, equality also does not mean that States are de facto equal, States are de jure equal to a certain extent for general law, they are not de facto equal.
 
L’État qui aura contracté se verra imposer plus de droits et d’obligations en fonction du traité, l’État qui n’a pas contrat n’aura pas ces droits et obligations en vertu du traité. Si on prend le droit particulier tous les États diffèrent, le plus on est parti à des situations de droit particulier le plus on aura des droits et des obligations.
The large and powerful state is not de facto equal to the small and weak state, which does not prevent us from fighting for more equality between states.
 
Deuxièmement, l’égalité ne veut pas dire non plus que les États sont égaux de fait, les États sont égaux de droit jusqu'à un certain point pour le droit général, ils ne sont pas égaux du point de vue du fait.
Thereafter, the principle of equality is not a norm of ius cogens, it can be waived, as it is the case in all weighted voting systems or some States admit that they will not have the same weight in the vote. This status of inequality must be accepted by particular law which will prevail over the general rule of equality by virtue of the lex specials rule which prevails over the general rule from which the treaty derogates.
 
L’État grand et puissant n’est pas de fait égal à l’État petit et faible n’empêchant pas de lutter pour plus d’égalité entre les États.
Finally, in resolution 25-26, States must be treated despite their differences, so there is no discrimination between States according to their political systems or otherwise legal equality cannot be modulated according to a State's political, economic and social orientations.
 
Par la suite, le principe de l’égalité n’est pas une norme de ius cogens, on peut y renoncer, c’est le cas dans tous les systèmes de vote pondérés ou certains États admettent qu’ils n’auront pas le même poids dans le vote. Il faut accepter ce statut d’inégalité par du droit particulier qui primera sur la règle générale d’égalité en vertu de la règle lex specials qui prévaut à la règle générale auquel le traité déroge.
== Paragraph 2 ==
{{citation bloc|Les Membres de l'Organisation, afin d'assurer à tous la jouissance des droits et avantages résultant de leur qualité de Membre, doivent remplir de bonne foi les obligations qu'ils ont assumées aux termes de la présente Charte.}}In paragraph 2 it is the question of good faith. This provision was inserted in 1945 in response to the "paper rag doctrine" that some states had applied since the First World War; what is a treaty against the dignity and survival of the German people: it is a paper rag.
Enfin, dans la résolution 25 26, on doit traiter les États malgré leurs différences donc il n’y a pas de discrimination entre États en fonction de leurs régimes politiques ou autrement l’égalité juridique ne peut pas être modulée en fonction des orientations politiques, économiques et sociales d’un État.
 
We cannot have an international order based on a minimum of security, we oblige States to fulfil this charter in good faith.
== Paragraphe 2 ==
 
{{citation bloc|Les Membres de l'Organisation, afin d'assurer à tous la jouissance des droits et avantages résultant de leur qualité de Membre, doivent remplir de bonne foi les obligations qu'ils ont assumées aux termes de la présente Charte.}}
In very brief terms, this paragraph recalls pacta sund servanda, treaties must be respected, applied and interpreted in good faith involving the spirit in such a way that the letter does not seek to avoid the spirit.
 
Au paragraphe 2 c’est la question de la bonne foi. Cette disposition a été insérée en 1945 en réaction à la « doctrine du chiffon de papier » que certains États avaient appliquée depuis la Première guerre mondiale ; qu’est-ce qu’un traité contre la dignité et la survie du peuple allemand : c’est un chiffon de papier.
== Paragraph 3 ==
On ne peut avoir un ordre international fondé sur un minimum de sécurité, on oblige les États à remplir cette charte de bonne foi.
En terme très bref, ce paragraphe rappelle pacta sund servanda, les traités doivent être respectés, appliqués et interprétés de bonne foi mettant en jeu l’esprit de manière à ce que la lettre ne vise pas à éviter l’esprit.
== Paragraphe 3 ==
{{citation bloc|Les Membres de l'Organisation règlent leurs différends internationaux par des moyens pacifiques, de telle manière que la paix et la sécurité internationales ainsi que la justice ne soient pas mises en danger.}}
{{citation bloc|Les Membres de l'Organisation règlent leurs différends internationaux par des moyens pacifiques, de telle manière que la paix et la sécurité internationales ainsi que la justice ne soient pas mises en danger.}}
   
   
C’est une règle importante du droit international moderne donnant lieu à toute une branche du droit international ; on dit parfois à juste titre que rien ne peut être plus fort que le maillon le plus faible.
This is an important rule of modern international law that gives rise to a whole branch of international law; it is sometimes rightly said that nothing can be stronger than the weakest link.
   
   
== Paragraphe ==
== Paragraph ==
{{citation bloc|Les Membres de l'Organisation s'abstiennent, dans leurs relations internationales, de recourir à la menace ou à l'emploi de la force, soit contre l'intégrité territoriale ou l'indépendance politique de tout État, soit de toute autre manière incompatible avec les buts des Nations Unies.}}
{{citation bloc|Les Membres de l'Organisation s'abstiennent, dans leurs relations internationales, de recourir à la menace ou à l'emploi de la force, soit contre l'intégrité territoriale ou l'indépendance politique de tout État, soit de toute autre manière incompatible avec les buts des Nations Unies.}}
   
   
Il s’agit d’un principe tout à fait fondateur pour le droit international moderne, s’agissant d’un principe de grande importance le résumer en quelque mot est impossible.
This is a very fundamental principle of modern international law, since it is a principle of great importance, it is impossible to summarize it in any word.
   
   
== Paragraphe ==
== Paragraph ==
{{citation bloc|Les Membres de l'Organisation donnent à celle-ci pleine assistance dans toute action entreprise par elle conformément aux dispositions de la présente Charte et s'abstiennent de prêter assistance à un État contre lequel l'Organisation entreprend une action préventive ou coercitive.}}
{{citation bloc|Les Membres de l'Organisation donnent à celle-ci pleine assistance dans toute action entreprise par elle conformément aux dispositions de la présente Charte et s'abstiennent de prêter assistance à un État contre lequel l'Organisation entreprend une action préventive ou coercitive.}}
   
   
C’est l’assistance que les membres doivent à l’organisation lorsqu’elle prend des mesures en vertu du chapitre 7 soit du Conseil de sécurité qui pend des mesures pour maintenir la paix qui sont donc contraignantes. Tous les États ont l’obligation d’assister les Nations Unies dans la mise en œuvre des sanctions.
It is the assistance that members owe to the organization when it takes action under either Chapter 7 or the Security Council that is pending peace-keeping measures that are therefore binding. All States have an obligation to assist the United Nations in the implementation of sanctions.
   
   
== Paragraphe 6 ==
== Paragraph 6 ==
{{citation bloc|L'Organisation fait en sorte que les États qui ne sont pas Membres des Nations Unies agissent conformément à ces principes dans la mesure nécessaire au maintien de la paix et de la sécurité internationales.}}
{{citation bloc|L'Organisation fait en sorte que les États qui ne sont pas Membres des Nations Unies agissent conformément à ces principes dans la mesure nécessaire au maintien de la paix et de la sécurité internationales.}}This paragraph refers to non-member States following in the footsteps of paragraph 5; in paragraph 5, all members must collectively implement sanctions and cooperate if necessary.
 
Ce paragraphe a trait aux États non membres s’inscrivant dans le sillage du paragraphe 5 ; dans le 5 les membres doivent tous collectivement mettre en œuvre les sanctions et collaborer si nécessaire.
The problem with non-member States and the fact that they are not bound by collective discipline, sanctions may prove ineffective, which is why paragraph 6 asks the United Nations to approach third States so that they apply United Nations measures or at least do not thwart them.
 
Le problème avec les États non membres et qu’ils ne sont pas obligé à la discipline collective, les sanctions peuvent s’avérer inefficaces, c’est pourquoi le paragraphe 6 demande aux Nations Unies d’approcher les États tiers afin qu’ils appliquent les mesures des Nations Unies ou au moins ne les contrecarrent pas.
== Paragraph 7 ==
{{citation bloc|Aucune disposition de la présente Charte n'autorise les Nations Unies à intervenir dans des affaires qui relèvent essentiellement de la compétence nationale d'un État ni n'oblige les Membres à soumettre des affaires de ce genre à une procédure de règlement aux termes de la présente Charte; toutefois, ce principe ne porte en rien atteinte à l'application des mesures de coercition prévues au Chapitre VII.}}Nothing in the present Charter shall authorize the United Nations to intervene in the internal affairs of States.
== Paragraphe 7 ==
 
{{citation bloc|Aucune disposition de la présente Charte n'autorise les Nations Unies à intervenir dans des affaires qui relèvent essentiellement de la compétence nationale d'un État ni n'oblige les Membres à soumettre des affaires de ce genre à une procédure de règlement aux termes de la présente Charte; toutefois, ce principe ne porte en rien atteinte à l'application des mesures de coercition prévues au Chapitre VII.}}
This provision does not make much legal sense, it was inserted because it was very important to some powerful States.
 
Aucune disposition de la présente Charte n’autorise pas les Nations Unies à intervenir dans les affaires intérieures des États.
The United States to pass the charter to Congress and the USSR because it had a morbid conception of internal affairs, inserted a non-intervention clause.
 
Cette disposition ne fait juridiquement pas beaucoup de sens, elle fut insérée parce que certains États puissants y tenaient beaucoup.
The 7 only concerns United Nations intervention in internal affairs, but the intervention of one State in the internal affairs of another State is another principle.
 
Les États-Unis pour faire passer la charte au Congrès et l’URSS parce qu’elle avait une conception morbide des affaires intérieures, a fait qu’on a inséré une clause de non-intervention.
Either the United Nations has a competence recognized in the Charter and it can always exercise it or an organization does not have a competence because it is not recognized in the Charter. At that time, it cannot exercise it, so there is nothing left for the principle of non-intervention; there is only something political left, but nothing much more tangible.
 
Le 7 ne concerne que l’intervention des Nations Unies dans les affaires intérieures, mais l’intervention d’un État dans les affaires intérieures d’un autre État est un autre principe.
The competences of the United Nations cannot even be interpreted restrictively; any matter with international repercussions falls within the competence of the United Nations, the counterpart is that the Assembly can only recommend protecting the sovereignty of States, it is only discussing.
 
Ou bien les Nations Unies ont une compétence reconnue dans la Charte et elles peuvent toujours l’exercer ou une organisation ne possède pas une compétence parce que pas reconnue dans la Charte. À ce moment-là, elle ne peut pas l’exercer si bien qu’il ne reste rien pour le principe de non-intervention ; il reste quelque chose seulement de politique, mais rien de beaucoup plus tangible.
Paragraph 7 does not apply to the Security Council under article 7 and chapter 14, a political concession has been made because States love their internal affairs, but this rule does not make much sense, or one has competence and one can exercise it or one does not have competence and one cannot exercise it anyway.
On ne peut même interpréter restrictivement les compétences des Nations Unies ; tombe dans la compétence des Nations Unies toute question ayant une répercussion internationale, la contrepartie est que l’Assemblée ne peut seulement que recommander protégeant la souveraineté des États, elle ne fait que discuter.
Le paragraphe 7 ne s’applique pas au Conseil de sécurité en vertu de l’article 7 et du chapitre 14, on a fait une concession politique parce que les États aiment leurs affaires internes, mais cette règle ne fait pas beaucoup de sens, ou bien on possède une compétence et on peut l’exercer soit on n’a pas la compétence et on ne peut de toute manière l’exercer.


= Le principe du non-recours à la force =
= The principle of non-use of force =


= Annexes =
= Annexes =
*Conforti, B. (1986) Territorial Claims in Antarctica: A Modern Way to Deal with an Old Problem. Cornell International Law Journal. 19 (2), 249–258.
*“Uti Possidetis.” Encyclopædia Britannica, Encyclopædia Britannica, Inc., www.britannica.com/topic/uti-possidetis.
*Uti Possidetis Iuris - International Law - Oxford Bibliographies, 19 Sept. 2018, www.oxfordbibliographies.com/view/document/obo-9780199796953/obo-9780199796953-0065.xml.


= References =
= References =

Version actuelle datée du 14 mars 2022 à 22:48

Subjects of international law: States
Professeur(s) Robert Kolb

Lectures


The term "subject" has a very particular meaning in law. It refers to an entity that may have rights and duties in a particular legal system. Thus, one can be a subject of Swiss or international law, the subject is a holder according to the legal order.

The legal definition of the State[modifier | modifier le wikicode]

The main subjects of international law are States. The very first thing to do is to define it because the State has its own legal definition. No matter what sociologists, historians, political scientists call a state, in international law there is a definition of its own.

For example, Geneva is a State, but not in the sense of international law, it is based on the Swiss legal order. It is worth taking a closer look.

A State, as defined by international law, is defined by four cumulative qualities, an entity that wants to be a State must have four characteristics:

  1. a population
  2. a territory
  3. a government
  4. the entity has sovereignty

This gives the following definition in a nutshell: the State is an entity composed of a population, a territory, a government and which is sovereign.

The first three elements do not deserve much comment because they are always on the margins of sociology and law, because law is grafted onto a real fact. When describing a population and a territory, we navigate between sociological facts and the legal qualification we give it.

The sovereignty criterion is a legal concept that merits further comment.

Population[modifier | modifier le wikicode]

A state is not only a virgin space like the territory of the Moon or Jupiter, although this planet is composed only of gas. For a state, you need people, it is the physical basis for the existence of a state.

The population is not everything to everyone who lives in the territory of a State, because on that account there are also people who are in Antarctica, but who are not a State.

What matters is the persons linked to the State by a link of nationality. There is a population of the State when there is a person possessing the nationality of that State. The manner in which nationality is acquired or lost is regulated in principle by domestic law.

There are no minimum limits in the population of a state, there are no rules. There are micro-States, including island States, that are being lost due to rising water levels.

A very special case would be that of Vatican City. There are various theories, but a whole multitude of people accept that the Vatican City is a State under the 1929 Lateran Treaties, if it is a State it is a very particular State from the point of view of the population, because the Vatican City has some functional passports, but does not have automatically its own nationals, because each national has the nationality of his country of origin.

Whether it is multi-ethnic states where the population is partly nomadic, this has no influence, these are sociological facts that do not deprive the state of its population.

Territory[modifier | modifier le wikicode]

The State consists of a territory while the population is the physical basis of the State, the territory is the spatial basis of the State.

The state manifests itself in space, it occupies a portion of space in the world. Moreover, populations that have suffered diasporas are well aware of the importance of the territory and the attachment that populations have shown to their territory.

How is the territory defined from a legal point of view?[modifier | modifier le wikicode]

First of all, we need to have a common mistake that is to think that space is something flat. Space, therefore the territory of the State, is a three-dimensional space, namely the flat dimension and everything in the air and in the subsoil.

If the space has the flat and vertical dimension that it has exactly in the flat and vertical dimension?[modifier | modifier le wikicode]

With regard to the flat dimension, the territory of the State includes the continental territory, i.e. the territory on which one can walk, including lakes and rivers, but also internal waters such as, for example, ports and the territorial sea, which can extend under the law of the sea and the 1982 Convention on the Law of the Sea to 12,000 seafarers from the low tide lines.

Everything that happens in these 12 nautical miles happens on the State's territory, but ships can transit, including warships in peacetime that must announce themselves, while military submarines must come to the surface and tuck in the flag.

Beyond the territorial sea, the territory stops. If the coastal State has other maritime areas, this does not constitute its territory, it is the parts of the sea in which it has certain specific rights, namely the contiguous zone from 12,000 seafarers, i.e. 12,000 more or 24,000 seafarers. Exclusive economic zones give rise to certain rights to explore and exploit resources, and no other State may engage in activities there.

However, in these areas the rights are limited, foreign states have certain rights in the exclusive economic zone outside economic exploitation.

Borders stop at the borders of the territory, i.e. at the land borders and at the territorial sea. As for the two vertical dimensions, it is not necessary to waste time defining them.

The question of how far the State border extends vertically has never been found to be necessary to be determined. In practice, any activity that involves air so that means of air transport can circulate, in any space where there are aircraft activities, is the territory of the underlying State.

Everything that is not based on the existence of air as a means of circulation, namely the lowest orbit of satellites, outer space form is a common space for States and there is no sovereignty.

It is obvious that the State can exploit its mineral resources located underground, there has never been a need to ask how far we can go, because some limits cannot be reached. In reality, territorial sovereignty below the territory goes as far as the state can theoretically exist.

We can have very small micro-States in square kilometres, there is no minimum size. The Vatican City is a separate subject from the Holy See, the Holy See is undoubtedly a subject of international law.

A state may have enclaves within a foreign state such as Portugal in India until 1962 - 1963, even in Switzerland cantons have enclaves in other cantons.

The boundaries of the territory do not have to be totally and definitively defined. In other words, disputes over the extent of the territory or the location of certain borders do not mean that some States do not own a territory, it is sufficient for the State to exercise its effective authority over a territory of the globe even if its borders are contested.

Israel has a territory on which it applies its public power even if almost all its borders are contested.

It is not a question of territory, when we are talking about an artificially created space such as, for example, maritime oil platforms that have a special regime.

Government[modifier | modifier le wikicode]

We need effective and exclusive government. These words have their meanings, the word actually has their meaning, the government must exercise state functions and it must be exclusive, which means that it is this government and it alone that exercises state functions to the exclusion of any other state.

What are the state functions?[modifier | modifier le wikicode]

Central state functions: taxes, police, courts, external security, civil registers, etc. are the prerogatives of public authority exercised by the government.

Sometimes it may be doubtful if a sufficiently effective government exists and this doubt may crystallize in different directions. Thus, it may have been doubtful that there was a government when it came to territories populated by tribes that gathered at conferences through their leaders and the question was whether it formed a sufficient government.

In the question of Western Sahara[1] the question was whether or not the tribes at the time of colonization and even after that who were on this territory formed a government. The Court struggled with the issue because we do not want to calibrate Western models on African territory and on the other hand the government has its own legal definition.

The Court stated in paragraph 149[2] the criterion that common superior bodies are needed in order to have governments, a simple conference is not enough, common superior bodies are needed.

What are the consequences of the situation?[modifier | modifier le wikicode]

In the case of the failing-states, the government has collapsed, there is no longer a government as there was in Somalia.

International law makes a very clear distinction between the formation of a new State and the maintenance of a constituted State.

To maintain a government, a government is needed, even if it is sometimes difficult to determine whether the government is effective, because the government can impose its authority in a transitional manner.

When it comes to maintaining an already constituted state, if there is a population, a state and no government, this argument is not supported; the state is maintained against "winds and tides". Somalia had its state at the United Nations in the 1990s.

Why do we maintain a state?[modifier | modifier le wikicode]

If from the legal point of view one accepts the argument that a state no longer exists because the government has collapsed then the territory would become a territory without a master and it would be taken over by the first one to come.

We do not want this by virtue of the principle of self-determination of peoples that is imposed in modern law, it is this fiction that prevails, because we do not want the territory to become a territory without a master subject to appropriation.

The type of government is traditionally indifferent to general international law, whether it is a democracy, a dictatorship, a royalty, a theocracy, etc. It is an internal matter and has no impact on its existence. In the field of human rights, the distinction is constant.

Sovereignty from the perspective of international law[modifier | modifier le wikicode]

We will only talk about sovereignty in the legal sense of the term, we can use the word "sovereignty" in a whole other series of sciences and with different connotations. We will only discuss the legal meaning of this term.

In international law, sovereignty is the ultimate decision-making power, the power to decide in the last resort.

In other words, it is the fact that, with regard to a jurisdiction, there are no human authorities superior to "us", if that is the case, we are sovereign. There is no recourse, no organ, no human body that is not superior and that attracts the decision to it. If there is someone superior, he is the sovereign.

There are no higher human organs or bodies. Sovereignty only concerns the fact of deciding, it is necessary to consider if someone else can decide for him/her, it is "someone" of a superior who decides.

Sovereignty is necessary and compatible with international law. Just because a State is sovereign does not mean that it is not subject to international law, the State is a normative order, it is the State itself that decides to apply international law, whether it applies it or not.

Sovereignty is compatible with the existence of a higher legal order, because it is international law itself that recognizes and organizes the sovereignty of States. It would be contradictory to seek to free sovereignty from international law.

However, this does not mean that we are free to ignore international law, because it would mean that it is not binding, it simply remains the de facto power to violate international law.

Some authors reject this term, because they believe that this term has been abused too much in the past, so they have proposed another conceptualization, it is the Vienna School with Hans Kelsen.

The state has international immediacy. This means that the State in the sense of international law is subject only to international law and to nothing else there is nothing between the State and international law, it is subject to nothing but international law. We find the idea that no one decides for someone else, the only thing we are subject to is superior law.

The image of immediacy subject only to international law also explains why a federated state such as the canton of Geneva is considered a state within the meaning of Swiss federal law because it has a population, a territory, and a government, but it is not a state within the meaning of international law because between Geneva and international law there is something that is federal law, so Geneva is not only subject to international law, but also to federal law. In this sense, Geneva is not sovereign and therefore is not a State in the sense of international law, but a State in the sense of Swiss law by a long tradition.

In Switzerland, it is said that the cantons are sovereign. It is a concept of sovereignty of Swiss federal law. We must keep in mind that sovereignty is the ultimate decision-making power, but not freedom from a higher legal order, at the same time if we can decide in the last resort then we are sovereign.

When the state is constituted, the existence of the state is fictionally maintained even if the government fails for a period of time until the state is dissolved.

The same is obviously not true for the territory and the population, a state that is without territory and population, so it disappears in the same way as if it were dissolved, as was the case, for example, in Yugoslavia.

The fiction of state maintenance is only in the case of a temporary failure of the state.

It may happen in a State without governmental functions that an international civil administration of the United Nations is sent, however, under no circumstances is this administration sovereign over the territory, the United Nations does not acquire territories, but administers them in order to return them. The policy of the United Nations is never to want to stay very long, because a government could fail on the United Nations.

In sovereignty there are still some points that can be added, some of which are quite thorny.

The degree of independence that sovereignty implies[modifier | modifier le wikicode]

Sovereignty is the power to decide in the last resort on matters that concern the prerogatives of the state, but what is the degree of independence?

This raises the question of the degree of independence, for example there are extreme cases where independence is totally lacking, as in the case of puppet states that are purely remote-controlled states, we establish a façade of independent government, but in reality this supposedly independent government and remote-controlled by another.

The classic example is the Manchukuo state created in 1932 by the Japanese on Manchuria, but under Chinese allegiance. There was absolutely nothing independent about this state. Such a State is not a State in the sense of international law, it lacks sovereignty, the ultimate decision-making power is lacking.

Apart from these extreme cases, the practice is quite liberal, it does not require a very high degree of independence in order for a sovereign state to exist and are proof of this the USSR's areas of influence in Eastern Europe. These states could decide on a whole series of issues autonomously, but on a whole series of issues they could decide autonomously whether they were ready for the Soviet tanks to land.

The practice has been very liberal, it is enough to have a minimum of autumnal decisions, which is the minimum power of independence that is the one you do not have when you are a puppet state and more particularly a "puppet entity" since it is precisely not a state. For any non-remote-controlled state, it is considered a state.

Another issue related to independence and sovereignty is that there must be a willingness to be independent and sovereign in order to be independent[modifier | modifier le wikicode]

Sometimes an entity, at least for a long time, does not consider itself an independent state, but considers itself part of an existing territory or state with the legitimate government, as in the case of mainland China and Taiwan. National China considers that they do not form a separate state even if they are; this problem was considered a problem of government legitimacy.

There is this question of the legitimacy of the government which is superimposed on the other questions, it may happen that a State cannot be considered as a sovereign State if it does not assert it itself.

Then there is the problem of federal integrations[modifier | modifier le wikicode]

There are groups that do not integrate very well, as was the case in Switzerland. The federal process raises the question that when entities come closer together, they remain independent; they form States in the sense of international law, but at some point we switch to the federal State and it can be difficult to determine sovereignty; sovereignty can be lost in stages, it can become fragmented, decision-making power can be gradually lost.

If the European Union is to integrate, there will be transfers to Brussels. The integration process exposes that sovereignty can exist by degree in the sense that it is gradually ceded. This raises a question of degree. The major decisions in Europe are taken by national states, so there can be no doubt that they are sovereign states.

From a legal point of view, sovereignty is really at home in conjunction with territory, which means that it is mainly on its territory that the State has its sovereignty[modifier | modifier le wikicode]

Sovereignty is at its peak, "I dictate what happens on my territory precisely because it is my territory".

Everything is reversed, however, from an extraterritorial point of view, sovereignty is in need of justification, to assert extraterritorial jurisdiction requires more specific titles, it is not enough to assert sovereignty.

There are cases where sovereignty can be asserted.

Imagine ships flying the Swiss flag in the high seas, if we want to do acts of sovereignty over this ship in Antarctica we could do so it is extraterritorial, but there are recognized titles. If we are in another state, sovereignty is bent in favour of the other, it would be denying the sovereignty of the other, if we do acts of sovereignty over another state we do not give it the ultimate decision-making power, we decide in its place.

One last remark on sovereignty is a remark on terminology, it is true that terminology is not entirely fixed.

The conclusion of an agreement, i.e. a treaty, is always an act of sovereignty[modifier | modifier le wikicode]

We are free to conclude it or not to conclude it, we can also modulate it through reservations. Then, we ratify or not, it is here that sovereignty is exercised, there is the ultimate decision to accept or not these standards; we decide in the last resort.

Once accepted, one is no longer as free legally as before, one has rights, but also obligations that one owes to the other State; one will say that the subjective positions of this State have been increased.

This limits his freedom of action, inclines his freedom of action to a certain direction, it does not affect his sovereignty, he is no less sovereign since he has accepted the treaty. There is the question of whether or not to accept the treaty, which is a question of sovereignty and is a freedom of last resort, then there is the freedom of action, which is reduced on the one hand and increased on the other, but does not affect sovereignty, because we have been free to choose it.

The powers[modifier | modifier le wikicode]

Basically the term "competence" is better even in French, but in English the term "power" is used, so the term "pouvoir" is also a bridge to Anglo-Saxon vocabulary.

However, according to the authors, a whole series of distinctions can be made between "power" and "competence". We will consider that each of these two terms is equivalent.

Sovereignty is not only a power to make the ultimate decisions, it also has a whole series of particular consequences. Sovereignty forms norms of international law, sovereignty in action is the power to decide, sovereignty is also a norm that guarantees the State this ultimate decision-making power.

This norm of sovereignty gives rise to a whole series of normative concretizations, or other norms that are added to sovereignty such as State immunities; the State enjoys immunities from the civil and criminal jurisdiction of other States. The French President cannot be compelled to go to a Swiss court. Another example is the protection of internal affairs, i.e. the non-intervention in internal affairs, which protects the power to decide independently and to conduct a policy of its own.

Competences also derive from sovereignty, the State has competences because it is sovereign, the State has its competences originally, it does not acquire them because it has been given them.

The United Nations has no power over Geneva, all the powers of the United Nations are derived from the Charter of the United Nations, so that they can do something, it must be recognized in the Charter.

The State can automatically act, it does not need to be given a competence to possess it, it originally possesses it. The State has the original competence which is inherent in sovereignty, so sovereignty extends into a very concrete power of action, the power to decide in the last resort is concretized in the various actions of the State.

What are the competencies of a state?

There are basically three types of skills, but not all of them are of primary importance.

  • territorial competences: it is the competence to take action on its territory.
  • people skills: the ability to do things in relation to its nationals.
  • gear-related skills: skills exercised on ships flying its flag or outer spacecraft.

On peut se pose la question de savoir qu’est-ce qu’une compétence ?

Jurisdiction is simply a legal power. There is a power that is recognized by a standard of right to act in a certain sense, it is a competence. We mainly speak of "competences" in the public domain, we will speak of "powers" in a more neutral sense.

It is a power to do something recognized by law; you can do something, but it is recognized by a legal standard.

Territorial jurisdiction[modifier | modifier le wikicode]

Sometimes we say territorial sovereignty. This territorial jurisdiction has two components, the second and most important of which is:

  • the plenitude
  • the exclusivity

Territorial jurisdiction is distinguished by its fullness and exclusivity. Plenitude is turned towards the interior of the state, exclusivity and turned towards other states, i.e. the exterior of the state.

What is plenitude?[modifier | modifier le wikicode]

It is a legal presumption that the State has full competence to do any act on its territory unless prohibited by international law. It is assumed that the State has all the jurisdiction on its territory. This is what distinguishes a State from an international organization. The State automatically has all the powers on its territory, it must not be given power, it already has it, it can only limit it afterwards.

On the contrary, an international organization is based on the principle of specialization, it only has competences that are attributed to it.

From the new skills acquired by the State in terms of new technologies, it is obvious that the State automatically has the power to regulate, take administrative measures and submit activities that take place on its territory. They have all the powers except those prohibited by international law and therefore those that States have agreed to renounce.

What is exclusivity?[modifier | modifier le wikicode]

This is a very important point, a masterpiece of public international law; it is the fact that the State on its territory is the only one to the exclusion of all others that can act as a public authority on that territory. In Switzerland, it is only Switzerland that can perform acts of public authority to the exclusion of any other State.

This rule of territorial impermeability is obviously quite fundamental, because it makes it possible to explain and delimit the sovereignty of one in relation to the jurisdiction and sovereignty of the other.

Modern international law is based on territorial States, so one can do acts of sovereignty over one's territory, but one must refrain from doing so over others. It is a basic principle, the delimitation of each person's spheres, sovereignty over their own territory and not that of others and certain rights over common spaces.

The rule is indeed very important and that is why there are very strong positions in the case law; the International Court of Justice has been able to insist on this rule several times.

In the 1927 Lotus case, a ship with this name, Series A number X page 18[3],

"apart from the primary limitation imposed by international law on the State is to exclude - unless there is a permissive rule to the contrary - any exercise of its power in the territory of another State. In this sense, jurisdiction is certainly territorial; it could not be exercised outside the territory, except by virtue of a permissive rule deriving from customary international law or a convention.

The current Court in the Corfu Channel case[4][5] at page 35 of 1949 states that "between independent States, respect for territorial sovereignty is one of the essential foundations of international relations and international law also requires respect for political integrity".

We must see how far this goes because the principle has a scope of surprising importance and density.

There are activities that violate the exclusivity of the State's territorial jurisdiction[modifier | modifier le wikicode]

Abduction on foreign territory[modifier | modifier le wikicode]

A State sends agents to the territory of another State to abduct a person and bring him or her into the territory of the sponsoring State. The Eichmann case is most famous when Israel sent agents to Argentina to capture and kidnap Eichmann on trial in the Jerusalem district.

In this case, there was obviously a violation of Argentina's territorial sovereignty, so the Security Council found this violation and Israel apologized; the Argentine did not insist on seeing Eichmann's background.

Whether a person who has been abducted can be tried in the territory to which he or she has been brought depends on domestic law, there are States where this is not possible, because the police are refused the opportunity to make arbitrary arrests, and in a whole series of other States domestic law allows persons captured by methods contrary to international law to be tried.

Fraudulent acts to kidnap an individual in order to circumvent extradition measures[modifier | modifier le wikicode]

Undercover German state agents may invite a German to Zurich to arrest him. This type of fraudulent labour has been convicted several times. This type of violation of territorial sovereignty is done by circumventing extradition measures, by fraudulent labour by circumventing the possibility of deciding in the last instance.

In the Federal Court Decision ATF 117 I 337 it is stipulated: "the rule of good faith prohibits a State from using coercion or deception to seize a person it seeks and who is staying in the territory of another State where he or she would enjoy extradition immunity. Any improper machination to remove an individual from such immunity in order to bring him or her to the territory of the pursuing State or to the territory of another State which would in principle be obliged to extradite him or her shall be prohibited. The requested State to whose territory a person has been attracted by such procedures has a duty not to condone them by accepting an extradition request from the offending State"[6].

Investigations and all forms of evidence gathering[modifier | modifier le wikicode]

Some persons may be directly agents of a foreign State or sometimes persons who do not have a direct link with a foreign State, such as a lawyer who performs acts reserved for mutual legal assistance.

With regard to agents sent abroad, in Switzerland, it happened during Mitterrand's time to see massive capital leaks from France; there were customs investigations in Switzerland in order to discover bank accounts of French nationals, but this was a violation of Switzerland's territoriality jurisdiction, because France had acquired extraterritoriality jurisdiction.

In the context of a lawyer in a federal case, a certain H against Zurich had investigated and gathered evidence in the context of an investigation in Australia. This Zurich lawyer was convicted and confirmed by the Federal Court on the basis of the Federal Criminal Code because his acts had the nature of acts of mutual legal assistance and therefore of public authority for the benefit of a foreign State.

These acts are reserved for mutual legal assistance authorities, the foreign State must make a request for it to investigate and collect evidence in the context of mutual legal assistance, otherwise it is a violation of the sovereignty of the Swiss Confederation, which is punishable under the federal code.

Sending official documents abroad by mail[modifier | modifier le wikicode]

Sending official documents such as a letter of obligation to appear before a criminal or civil court is an act of public authority, it cannot be done by sending a letter abroad unless there is authorization through agreements, again, such court shipments are made through mutual legal assistance bodies. All this is done through state bodies.

Exercise of voting rights abroad and postal voting[modifier | modifier le wikicode]

If it is by correspondence, it is part of the official sending of documents abroad, but votes can be made in embassies or consulates, voting is an act of public authority, it is only granted in the case of agreements.

In 1989, the practice of the Swiss State changed by admitting that there is a vote in embassies. The embassy is not part of foreign territory, the embassy is in the territory of the host state, but there are immunities, so the territory of an embassy is part of the host country.

Switzerland feared that with many foreigners there would be fairly "active" campaigns and violence on its territory, particularly in the case of the Cold War; in a declaration of 12 April 1989, the Swiss Confederation motivated the change in practice and reserved the right to return to this practice.

Tax collection[modifier | modifier le wikicode]

Raising taxes is an act of public authority. Taxes cannot be levied on foreign territory, for example through an embassy.

There was a dispute between the federal authorities and the Embassy of Bosnia and Herzegovina. From 1992 to 1995, there was the Bosnian war, it happened that the diplomatic representation of Bosnia and Herzegovina levied a war tax on Yugoslav nationals in Switzerland.

Bosnia found it a good idea to levy a tax in Switzerland on Bosnian nationals in order to finance the war effort. However, the federal authorities became aware of this practice by sending a letter to the embassy stating that the tax levy was illegal.

What about the protection of nationals in the broader sense of the term, i.e. a quasi-consular service that advises its nationals and promotes its culture?

There were such centres in accordance with Italian law under a 1985 law. Italy wanted to maintain contact with its nationals.

Were these Italian immigration committees contrary to the exclusivity of Swiss territorial sovereignty?

The conclusion was that these immigration committees were not contrary to the integrity of Swiss sovereignty since they were not activities of public authority, advising nationals is not an act of public authority.

Territorial integrity and exclusivity are not simply a matter of invasion by military forces, but a much more subtle issue; states are concerned about territorial sovereignty and suspect every time a foreign state wants to commit an act of public authority on its territory with, possibly, reprehensible practices that may endanger its authority.

At the same time, such a rigid principle of territorial impermeability has never been practicable and is even less so today in a period of globalization; however, there are a whole series of exceptions:

Exceptions based on treaties or agreements[modifier | modifier le wikicode]

Treaties are written texts whereas an agreement is not necessarily written. There is a whole series of agreements that provide for exceptions, including massive exceptions to territorial integrity and exclusive territorial jurisdiction, such as:

  • military bases

Military bases around the world that are sometimes based on agreements by stipulating the good will of the adversary through more or less gentle pressures or through agreements concluded entirely freely, such as Japan in the 1950s, then surrounded by communist states, with the exception of nationalist China, which did not have any military influence.

  • customs agreements

In 1923, there was an agreement between Switzerland and Liechtenstein in the field of customs activities, Liechtenstein devolved customs to Switzerland, which makes acts of sovereignty over another territory without calling into question Liechtenstein's territorial sovereignty.

Ad-hoc permission outside an agreement or treaty[modifier | modifier le wikicode]

These are special permissions for foreign authorities to carry out certain acts on the territory of a State. Sometimes, States grant authorizations to foreign investigators outside of mutual assistance agreements. There may be special agreements so that judges of the International Court of Justice may come in the course of their duties.

The last time this happened was in 1997 when the Court visited the water project between Hungary and Slovakia. The dispute allowed the Court to visit the site to observe and investigate.

The judges of the International Court are agents of the United Nations who cannot make acts of authority outside this framework, and Hungary and Slovakia had invited them to make their observations.

Exception to the custom of general international law[modifier | modifier le wikicode]

  • the war occupation

In international armed conflict, it happens that the army of one State progresses while the army of another State retreats because of the fortunes of the war. The advancing army advances into the territory of the enemy it will control by making the territory an occupied territory that is controlled by conventions. During a period of armed conflict, there is not only occupation of a territory if one finds oneself in a de facto position of occupying it, but one has a duty to administer it, one cannot refuse one's duty as an occupying force, one is the only public power in the territory.

War occupation is one of the situations provided for where the State has the right and duty to administer a territory that does not belong to it in the place of the sovereign.

  • diplomatic and consular services

Each State has embassies and consulates abroad, embassies, above all, perform acts of public authority.

These acts are carried out on the territory of a foreign State, the Embassy's premises remain on the host territory.

Under ancient customary international law, codified in the Vienna Conventions on Diplomatic and Consular Relations, agents of the sending State operating within the framework of diplomatic or consular missions may carry out all acts of public authority granted by international law against the foreign State.

Espionage is not one of them. This does not include a series of other acts, such as the Moroccan embassy, which had pronounced a divorce between Moroccan nationals. The question was whether this divorce could be recognised in Switzerland; the Federal Court refused, because under Swiss law, according to Swiss public policy, a divorce cannot be pronounced by an embassy, but only by a court, which is why this divorce cannot be pronounced in Switzerland and beyond what is permitted by the diplomatic service with a violation of sovereignty.

  • international organisations

They are not States, but they do act of public authority, and of course these international organizations under customary international law and headquarters agreements have the power to do all acts recognized to them either under international law or headquarters agreements.

An international organization is not necessarily an intergovernmental organization, it can also be any international body. All these bodies act as public authorities.

Exceptions based on bilateral custom[modifier | modifier le wikicode]

In the case of enclaves, the right of passage is based on a bilateral custom implying that one must pass through the territory of a State to reach its enclaves.

The principle of territorial exclusivity is well established and there are a whole series of exceptions, a large number of more or less broad agreements and exceptions, it is not in violation of sovereignty, but it is accepted.

Personal competence[modifier | modifier le wikicode]

What is meant by "personal competence"?[modifier | modifier le wikicode]

This is the jurisdiction of a State over all its citizens. No matter where the nationals are, there is a personal jurisdiction of the State, on its State personal jurisdiction is confused with its territorial jurisdiction, a State can do a whole lot of things on its territory.

Personal jurisdiction has its own value when nationals are not in the territory of the State, but in the territory of another State or in common areas; there are recognized territorial jurisdictions, a Swiss always remains subject to Swiss law wherever he is in the world, this is called personal jurisdiction. It is in the case of nationals abroad that personal competence is perceived. In this respect, a distinction must be made between two types of "jurisdiction":

  • normative competence: competence to enact rules.
  • executive competence: competence to enforce rules.

In English, there are terms such as "juridiction to prescrive" and "juridiction to enforce".

A distinction must be made because when nationals are abroad they are subject to the normative jurisdiction of the host State's State, but Switzerland may lay down rules for its nationals even if they are abroad.

When the national is abroad if he is in the territory of another State, the competence of the State of origin to enforce the rule it imposes on its national and placed in brackets, the person cannot be taken back to his country of origin, as this would violate the exclusivity of the territorial jurisdiction of the other State.

Extradition may be requested for offences and crimes under certain conditions, and laws may also be enforced, i.e. executed, if the national is on a ship flying the national flag, in the high seas or in the Antarctic.

In common spaces, the law can be enforced, executive competence persists in common spaces.

What about nationals, because jurisdiction is only over persons with nationality?[modifier | modifier le wikicode]

International law does not have rules on the granting of nationality, it leaves this question to domestic law, it must be determined under international law; but international law still knows limits in terms of the nationalities it is prepared to recognize.

International law limits, but does not have rules in the first place.

The most frequent rules that apply in different States is an international practice and recognized by all States are:

Acquisition of nationality at birth, there are two systems[modifier | modifier le wikicode]

  • blood law
  • territorial right

These terms denote the acquisition of nationality by descent in the case of blood law, the child receives the nationality of his or her parents, and the law of the land means that a child born in the territory of domiciled parents acquires the nationality of that State there.

Reasons for subsequent acquisition or loss[modifier | modifier le wikicode]

There are also recurrent things such as naturalization when certain conditions for the establishment of a State are met, or if certain things have been done or a service rendered to a State are grounds for naturalization under domestic law.

Sometimes there are also reasons that are much more particular, some states at some point in their history have forgotten the acquisition of nationality; in the 1920s in Mexico if one bought land one obtained de facto Mexican nationality, Porfirio Diaz says "poor Mexico, so far from God so close to the United States"[7][8]. This feature was finally abandoned.

You have to imagine beyond that, sometimes in the world there are things you can't think of.

Concerning the limits that international law proposes to nationality and what the limits to nationality mean[modifier | modifier le wikicode]

There are cases of granting a nationality under domestic law that may seem abusive or not internationally recognised, as if, for example, Russia considers that the entire world population is its nationals by sending tax forms to everyone.

There are real disputes over nationalities approached in a "bizarre" way; one of the famous cases was a case that almost concerned Switzerland, namely Liechtenstein: the Nottebohm case, this case was decided by the International Court of Justice in 1950[9][10][11].

A German national has been living in Guatemala for some time and has established his business; when the Second World War began, Guatemala at some point entered the war.

Nottebohm anticipated that Guatemala would go to war against its country of origin; if Guatemala goes to war against Germany then it becomes an enemy national causing damage to its trade knowing that at that time the property of nationals of enemy nationality could be confiscated.

He had to get rid of German nationality as soon as possible; he had relations with Liechtenstein; Nottebohm obtained a nationality in an extraordinary way in a few weeks outside the ordinary procedures and simply through some relations with the payment of a sum against the payment of a sum.

Guatemala entered the war against Germany; at that time, Guatemala considered Nottebohm to be an enemy national and confiscated his assets.

Liechtenstein has defended its national by holding Guatemala accountable for a violation of international law through a violation of one of its nationals.

The case comes before the International Court of Justice with Judge Guggenheim; the Court rules that the limit that applies under international law to the acquisition of nationality and that there must be an effective connecting link, a nationality given by simple complacency is not a nationality that is based on an effective connecting link.

An effective connecting link and the fact that a national is bound more to a particular territory than to any other State in the world; if there is such an effective connecting link, at that time the nationality becomes enforceable.

The Court did not say that Nottebohm is German or Liechtenstein, nationality may be different according to the States; for Lichtenstein, Nottebohm is a Liechtensteiner because he has acquired Liechtenstein nationality and has the right to treat him as a Liechtenstein national, German law may consider him as a German national.

Guatemala could be justified because there was no effective connecting link, while Nottebohm was considered a German national because it had no effective connecting link with Liechtenstein, it is not enforceable.

There is a distinction between nationality acquired by modalities recognized by international law and nationality acquired by modalities that are not recognized by international law.

In cases where nationality is acquired in accordance with recognized procedures, then nationality is enforceable, when nationality is acquired outside those procedures, it is not enforceable, a third State is not obliged to recognize it; in the case of Liechtenstein and Nottebohm, Guatemala was not obliged to recognize it as a Liechtenstein national.

The effective link of connection causes problems, we understand why, moreover, today this is a problem in a globalised world. There are also other reasons, Judge Guggenheim had a dissenting opposition.

We see the limit of the International Court called in the Nottebohm case, we must refer to that case to note that an acquired nationality is not opposable to a third State.

In criminal law, words are used that have to do with the personal jurisdiction of a State in criminal matters.

We have for the criminal jurisdiction of a State[modifier | modifier le wikicode]

Principle of territoriality[modifier | modifier le wikicode]

Corresponds to territorial jurisdiction, a State may prosecute all crimes committed on its territory, regardless of the nationality of the persons concerned.

Personality principle[modifier | modifier le wikicode]

Personal competence, there is the distinction between the principle of active personality and the principle of passive personality:

  • active personality: means that a State may prosecute all crimes committed by one of its nationals anywhere in the world under the sole condition that it constitutes a crime at the scene. If you do something legal in Australia, you can't be punished in Switzerland. For blood crimes, a crime committed in Australia allows Switzerland to have legal jurisdiction.
  • passive personality: a State acquires criminal jurisdiction over anyone who has committed a crime against one of its nationals anywhere in the world; this is a contested principle, it means that if one goes to Australia and is killed there by a national of nationality X, Switzerland acquires criminal jurisdiction over him, it can prosecute him by criminal jurisdiction and Switzerland can request extradition.

Principle of state security[modifier | modifier le wikicode]

It is a series of crimes where the State acquires jurisdiction over crimes related to espionage or counterfeiting of Swiss currency.

Principle of universality[modifier | modifier le wikicode]

This is important for international law, the principle that a state can prosecute certain crimes wherever they are committed in the world even if it has no connection with that country.

For a State to have criminal jurisdiction to prosecute a specific crime it must have a connection to that crime, these are public services.

There are situations where it is considered that a crime has been committed affecting the interests of all States and therefore all States are granted punitive jurisdiction; this is the case either because the crime has been committed in a common area and there is no territorial jurisdiction such as piracy, which is an act of violence committed for private reasons by one ship on another private ship at sea, which is why there is this offence with universal jurisdiction: each State that captures pirates has jurisdiction because the crime was committed in a common area.

There are crimes that affect all humanity and we do not want criminals to rest, these are war crimes, crimes against humanity and genocide.

There are exceptional cases where States are obliged to prosecute under universal jurisdiction on the basis of certain anti-terrorist conventions and serious offences such as offences under the Geneva Convention on Humanitarian Law.

In the majority of cases, universal jurisdiction is merely a factual matter of how it can and cannot be exercised.

The way in which it can exercise is linked to domestic law, if there is no territorial link with the crime, the State can exercise universal jurisdiction and not in absentia. This universal jurisdiction makes it possible to prosecute for certain crimes either committed in common areas or for crimes of great importance to the community. It will be recalled that Balthazar Garzon in Spain had proceeded on this basis with respect to Mr. Pinochet.

Competences relating to crafts[modifier | modifier le wikicode]

These are on the one hand state-owned vessels, followed by aircraft and spacecraft. From the point of view of international law, a ship is no longer considered, as formerly by fiction, to be part of the floating territory of a State and an aircraft part of the mobile territory; the State of registration of a craft is now considered to be the State that is responsible for the proper functioning of its devices and is the State that exercises jurisdiction over the account on board its vessels, aircraft and spacecraft.

This is true for both state vehicles themselves and warships, but here the question is broader. The State also has duties in relation to civilian vessels such as the obligation to control the safety of such vessels or working conditions, the State incurs its own responsibility, even for commercial vessels the State exercises its jurisdiction.

The territory of the State and its delimitation[modifier | modifier le wikicode]

The territory of the State and its delimitation raises two sets of problems:

First, the territory of the State refers to the problem of the acquisition and loss of the State: how can a State acquire and lose territory?

Secondly, it raises the problem of the territory's membership in one or the other as well as disputes over the delimitation of the territory.

On the one hand, we are wondering how to acquire the territory, and on the other hand, how to determine the territory.

If we apply this problem to islands, there is an attribution problem, but if we think of continental territory, we automatically have delimitation problems.

We discuss all this material very often using the term legal "title". A title is a fact that the legal order recognizes as the basis of law in a territory, it is therefore a fact recognized by the legal order giving rise to a right in a territory.

For a territory to belong to us, it is necessary to produce a title, so the title is always a fact to which the legal system affects a consequence.

What are the facts recognized by the legal system to acquire and concurrently to lose it?

There are a few of them:

Title of occupation of the territory without a master[modifier | modifier le wikicode]

A territory without a master can be acquired by the first occupier, today the time when people rushed to territories to occupy them is over, but the occupation remains a valid and important title for two reasons:

  • because of intertemporal law if someone disputes certain territories, someone can argue that he occupied them five centuries ago when he was without a master, this title continues to have effects to this day.
  • if an island emerges in the high seas, it may be subject to occupation.

The term "occupation" is the same as that of "war occupation", but it is different; war occupation is not a title of acquisition of territory, but a title of administration of territory during an armed conflict, there is prohibition to annex, occupation is that of a territory without a master, occupation of the tera nullius.

It is also possible to claim a title of conquest in the same waters, but it is now prohibited to conquer and annex territory by force under article 4, paragraph 2, of the Charter of the United Nations.

Once again it is a question of intertemporal law, if one can assert a title as if one had conquered a territory in the 13th century then one can still assert this title today.

Treaty - Agreement(s)[modifier | modifier le wikicode]

Territory can be acquired through treaty-based land transfers.

In the past, land transfers were very often carried out. Today, this is much less the case because the self-determination of peoples has been achieved through this process. In the 1950s, the French territory was transferred to Switzerland in order to expand Geneva International Airport, but this portion was returned elsewhere[12].

On the other hand, we can have the formation of new states organised through a treaty; the current Germany was born from the 2+4 treaty[13][14]. The treaty is a very important vector for acquiring the territory and is also the main vector used for delimiting the territory.

Prescription acquisitive[modifier | modifier le wikicode]

The possibility of acquiring a territory by the prolonged, peaceful and continuous exercise of public power without any other State protesting against this practice. There is a State on a portion of territory that acts of public power for a prolonged period of time with the acquiescence of the other States, which is equivalent to title.

Because of the self-determination of peoples today, these are only marginal areas.

Protest is essential to preserve one's rights, if one does not protest against the public authority then one loses this territory, if one protests, acquisition by prescription can never take place. Some authors do not like the term "acquisitive prescription", because it is a matter of private law, but the mechanism is similar.

There are certain natural modalities or facts that make territory acquired by other states such as alluvium; if a state has a maritime coast and the coasts move because the sands sediment, then the territory is acquired by alluvium, its territory has moved, but automatically it acquires it.

The same is true for rivers, there are cases where the border is in the middle of rivers. It is a line in the river, there are sometimes very dynamic rivers that move, causing the border to move; this means that one State is growing, but the other is shrinking. This type of phenomenon is of minor importance, but a natural fact and not voluntary and subject to the acquisition of the territory.

The loss of territory is concomitant, a state could abandon a portion of territory if it no longer wants to, but that is not relevant.

As for the delimitation, what are the legal facts when delimiting territory? In other words, what is the legal basis for delimiting between territories?[modifier | modifier le wikicode]

We have several important principles:

Accord(s) - Traité[modifier | modifier le wikicode]

Delimitation is almost always by agreement, sometimes a sequence of agreements on a border covers sectors, agreements that have modified or rectified borders are often bouquets of agreements.

When the Court of Justice deals with disputes between African or Latin American States, it will always have to deal with treaties from the 19th or even 13th century. It is always the title at the time the delimitation was made that continues to prevail. It is therefore necessary to interpret the treaty of the time and know what the parties could mean.

The International Court of Justice has informed us about a case between Libya and Chad[15][16] concerning a border dispute that a treaty may fix the border, but that the border acquires a value independent of the treaty established, in other words, the treaty establishes the border, but at that moment the border becomes a legally detachable fact.

This means that if the treaty expires, if it is not renewed or denounced, the border remains, it is the principle of border stability.

The boundary or title created by the treaty has more permanence than the treaty itself, the treaty may disappear, but the boundary remains. In the Court's view, the Treaty must give rise to a permanent border, "once agreed, the border remains, because any other approach would deprive the fundamental principle of border stability, the importance of which the Court has repeatedly stressed"[17].

Delimitation can only be joint evidence between the States concerned, the same can be said of land borders; delimiting a legally binding or legally recognized border can only be the work of the States concerned jointly, if done alone, the other State is not bound by the border that is being attempted to be imposed.

If each State unilaterally delineates borders, we would have non-accepted borders. Since the principle is that a boundary can only be legally delimited by agreement, treaties are the basis for delimitation.

The delineation of borders is found in agreements that are usually bilateral because a border is normally bilateral, separating State A from State B.

In the case of the Swiss borders, in François Schröter's book, all the borders of Switzerland have been delimited by agreements, some of which were concluded with the kings of France.

It is in the treaties that we find the title to know where a certain border crosses.

In a dispute between Libya and Tunisia, the Court said that the border is detached from the treaty and to its own existence, the fact that the treaty disappears at some point is not relevant for the extinction of a border.

It may be uncertain where the border passes exactly, treaties describe the borders, but sometimes they do it wrong and imprecisely, or they are old treaties with topographical problems. In this case, it is a question of interpreting the treaty and also a question of filling the gap in the treaty, the aim is to eliminate uncertainty by specifying where the border crosses or by calling on a judge who can determine or cross the border.

Uti Possidetis juris[modifier | modifier le wikicode]

It is possession according to the law and not according to the fact.

What does "uti possidetis" mean?

It is a principle originally applicable to decolonization; at some point in history, many new States have been created as a result of decolonization.

These states had no pre-constituted borders because they were part of a former colonial empire, only internal administrative borders existed in relation to colonial power; in the French colonial empire, there were constituencies subjecting the different parts of the territories to separate governors.

When decolonization took place, already in Latin America in the 19th century and then in Africa in the 20th century, the States concerned decided to maintain the former colonial administrative borders, which were formerly internal borders, by ensuring that after decolonization these borders became international borders; in other words, to transform internal administrative borders into international borders, as was already the case with administrative borders, this must remain.

This principle was chosen because it was the only one that could immediately ensure a clear and secure border in these areas, in the absence of a use possidetis we would not have had borders at all, we would have had to conclude border treaties that would have easily led, in Africa in particular with its structural instabilities and composite States, as the African States themselves have recognized, to fratricidal struggles; if the decolonization war lasts, there would have been a risk of border struggles later on, adding to the effort of decolonization wars the rout of border wars.

The Organization of African Unity, by a resolution of 1964, considered that the old administrative borders should be maintained by recognizing them as international borders[18][19][20].

First of all, the uti possidetis is Latin America with critical dates of 1810 and 1823, the decolonization of the Spanish Empire; the borders with Brazil were already international borders. European states have applied this principle in the context of the decomposition of federal states for the former USSR and Yugoslavia.

Legally, the only certain thing is that the principle applies in the event of decolonization, for federal States this principle has been applied because it is quite practical, but it is not certain that the law requires it; at the time when these federal States broke down, this was not yet the case.

The key judgment establishing the principle of uti possidetis as a general tool of decolonization is the judgment of the Chamber of the Court on the case of the territorial dispute between Burkina Faso and Mali in 1986[21].

At the time of decolonization, a boundary is automatically established, the former colonial administrative limitation; when the judge is called upon to say or cross the boundary exactly, the uti possidetis line is not always obvious in territories that are difficult to access, the Court and the arbitrator must always turn to critical dates and look at where the administrative boundaries were.

Uti possidetis meant that you automatically have a border and that it cannot be unilaterally changed; this does not mean that borders are frozen and that borders cannot be changed; it can be changed either by agreement, the states concerned can conclude agreements and change borders.

In Africa even more than elsewhere, the borders drawn by the colonizer were perfectly arbitrary. There are therefore often many reasons to rectify these old borders, it must be done by agreement; touching the borders means moving very quickly towards armed conflicts.

At the same time, a formal agreement is not always required; if one State administers a portion of a State beyond the uti possidetis and the other State does nothing and is silent in response to the claims, this situation is sufficient to modify the uti possidetis rule; this is referred to as acquiescence to adverse claims and in particular the case of the territorial maritime and island dispute of El Salvador and Honduras[22].

The Court tells us at page 412 of the judgment, "it is obviously open to these States to modify by agreement the boundaries separating them, and certain forms of activity or inactivity could be deemed to be acquiescence at a different limit than in 1821. »

Some forms of activity or inactivity are a form of acquiescence to the prolonged adverse claim.

The principle of uti possidetis can be modified, but this must not come from unagreed unilateral attitudes because it raises conflicts.

General principle of border stability[modifier | modifier le wikicode]

The use possidetis is one aspect of this; in modern international law, there is a principle of border stability.

It has been expressed in various forms, as was the Hague Court in the Treah Vihar Temple case in 1962, "Generally speaking, when two countries define a border between them, one of their main objectives is to reach a stable and definitive solution. This is impossible if the route thus established can be challenged at any time on the basis of a constantly open procedure, and if rectification can be requested whenever an inaccuracy in relation to a provision of the basic treaty is discovered[23].

The principle of border stability aims to avoid conflicts and in particular armed conflicts and it is understandable because the border is a very sensitive issue, the border defines home, it is linked to a sense of security, but also to the well-being of populations; the population and States in modern times moreover with their way of conceiving things based on the idea of the nation further increases the sense of perimeter and security that distinguishes us from the other.

Border insecurity very easily generates unrest because it is psychologically traumatic.

In the practice of States, there is the development of the principle of border stability, which has a whole series of concrete implications.

In the Libya v. Chad case, the Court said that a boundary cannot be separated from the treaty, but the boundary remains if the treaty is extinguished; in the succession of States to the treaty, that is, when a territory moves from one to the other, there are principles in the Vienna Convention on Succession of States to the treaty. In Articles 11 and 12 there is the rule that treaties establish borders and that they contain territorial statutes.

The Vienna Convention states that it is not possible to assert a change of circumstances with regard to a border even if the circumstances have fundamentally changed; this is an application of the principle of border stability.

In a restrictive interpretation of the law of States, one should not unilaterally touch the providers; when it is in concert everything is possible or almost possible within the limits of the self-determination of peoples; when it is unilateral, one should be careful.

The effectivities[modifier | modifier le wikicode]

In the law of delimitation there is on the one hand the title either the treaty or the use possidetis; but it happens in life that the effectivities are not in conformity with the title, it is the things that happen on the ground and in particular who administers.

If we have a line set by a treaty that leaves part of the territory to State A, in fact for 80 years State B has been administering that small part of the territory and that is not in accordance with the treaty, but there is an effectiveness, a reality that has taken root. In the colonial field, we speak of colonial effectiveness.

The question is, what is the relationship between title and effectiveness?

As a general rule, there can be no doubt as to what the answer is, the title prevails because the treaty is the law and effectiveness and the fact, the fact cannot prevail over the law.

This rule is not without exception; first of all, if there is acquiescence, i.e. acquisitive prescription, effectiveness is recognized and similarly induced, but it is no longer a simple effectiveness, because there is an effective administration of the State that is not entitled, but the other State has acquiesced becoming something bilateral, there is an exercise of power; the title State has remained silent, creating a trust that it is losing interest in the territory.

At some point, courts consider that effectiveness has become law through the tacit acceptance of the other party.

The International Court of Justice has considered this type of problem, title on the one hand, effectiveness on the other, and has given it an extremely nuanced perspective, as was the case, for example, in the case of the border dispute between Burkina Faso and Mali in §63.

The Court refers to four possible relationships between effectiveness on the one hand and law on the other:

Effectiveness corresponds to the right, i.e. the title[modifier | modifier le wikicode]

Effectiveness is aligned with the law, the border must cross there and both states administer what the treaty has affected countries.

Effectiveness only occurs as confirmation of the title. The Chamber of the Court was able to apply this principle in the case of the land and island border dispute El Salvador v. Honduras in 1992.

El Salvador successfully presented a whole series of effectivities, presenting them as confirmation of its Spanish titles of uti possidetis. The Chamber of the Court confirmed El Salvador's reading or presents its arguments at page 397 §59.

Effectiveness does not correspond to the title[modifier | modifier le wikicode]

There is a divorce between the two and an opposition between effectiveness and title. The general rule is that the holder of the security should be preferred.

One situation in which the Court has had the opportunity to apply this rule is the dispute between the land and maritime border between Cameroon and Nigeria in 2002.

The Court concluded that in this case there was a conflict between Cameroon's conventional titles and Nigeria, which had the effectiveness, according to the title certain areas were allocated to Cameroon and Nigeria had entered these territories and administered them; according to the Court the holder of the title must prevail and therefore this territory belongs to Cameroon.

Effectiveness does not coexist with any title[modifier | modifier le wikicode]

We have effectiveness, but no title; in this case, according to the Court, effectiveness must be taken into consideration and will very often be decisive.

The case of sovereignty over Pulau Ligitan and Pulau Sipadan, is a 2002 case between Indonesia and Malaysia; these are two small islands relatively far from the central area of the States concerned, the Court discards the conventional titles that the parties have presented to it, because according to the interpretation that the Court gives to these treaties they do not extend so far into the sea.

If this is the case, there is no title and at the same time the successor States could not acquire the title.

What if you don't have a title?[modifier | modifier le wikicode]

The Court turns to effectivities, it notes that Malaysia has better effectivities; the Court notes that Indonesia has none that have not made any act of sovereignty.

Malaysia, on the other hand, can do two things: the executive regulatory activity relating to fishing, namely the capture of torture and birds and the construction and maintenance of lighthouses by means of navigation; these two activities are sufficient to give Malaysia the title.

Effectiveness coexists with a title, but the title is not clear[modifier | modifier le wikicode]

This is a fairly common situation, but it is no longer clear where the line passes.

The treaty may be unclear, the line uti possidetis or the description is inconclusive; in this case in particular in the case of effectiveness at the time the title was concluded because effectiveness immediately after the time of decolonization tends to show what the parties considered to be the title.

The presumption is that the parties administered the territory assigned at the time, if we no longer know where the uti possidetis line passes, then we must refer to the actual activities at the time of colonization, the parties behaved according to what they had agreed or what the law granted them.

In the El Salvador v. Honduras dispute, there was a problem with some islands in the Gulf of Fonseca; the old titles in this marginal area were not clear, so the Chamber of the Court considered it appropriate to take into account the actual conduct of the States concerned during the period immediately following independence, thus determining the respective membership of these islands in the Gulf of Fonseca drawing the border in this area.

Role of equity[modifier | modifier le wikicode]

This is not a fundamental role, but sometimes it is not insignificant; there are certain compromises, such as an agreement by which a dispute is submitted to an arbitrator or a judge, sometimes the arbitrator can rule in equity, he must not only limit himself to the title, but also to equitable considerations reflecting the effectiveness of the activities that have created links.

The arbitrator may for equitable reasons modify the boundary or draw one based on what he or she considers to be fair only when the parties agree, equity also plays a role in the interpretation of the title or in the filling of gaps in the title.

The first situation is that the arbitrator is free to draw certain lines, depending on what he considers fair, if the States agree to give him this mission, then the arbitrator will draw the border.

In other cases, the arbitrator does not have this mission; he cannot modify the law according to what he considers to be equity. In the latter case, the arbitrator is bound by the law and nevertheless equity can play a certain role.

The arbitrator applies the law and the treaty; there are two roles that equity can play:

Equity can be used by the arbitrator in interpreting the title, sometimes the title is not very clear, the description of the boundary line is confusing, the geomorphological aspects have changed over time, so if there is uncertainty in a certain area and the boundary could cross either here or there, then we could, since we are covered by the title, rely on equity.

If we draw the line according to line A possible according to the title, but if we take line 1 we are in a desert region where there are water points that are fundamental for the population, if we take line A the water points are all on the side of A. If line B, also possible according to the title, shares the water points either 2 between 2 or 1 against 3, there would be a reason to prefer line B because it shares more equitably water points that are crucial for the populations in the region.

If the shelter does not have the notion of modifying the law by equity, if line A is the one provided for by the title and one can say with certainty what is provided for then it is line A; the assumption is that the title is not clear allowing either line A or B because it is compatible with the description of the title; equity can intervene within the law to recommend interpretation B rather than interpretation A.

To fill gaps in the title, it may be defective in some areas. The most radical case is a line uti posidetis, if in the archives the documents relating to this sector of the border are missing, we have nothing. In this case, the judge or arbitrator applies the equity praeter legem, on the margins of the law and in reinforcement of the law, thus filling a gap, and will then fix a boundary assuming that the parties want him to fix the boundary.

It would be counterproductive and non-compliant if the arbitrator said that he cannot delimit, equity must be used at the edge and in support of the law.

In the case of the territorial and maritime island dispute El Salvador v. Honduras before the Chamber of the International Court of Justice there were six border sectors over a considerable number of kilometres which were to be delimited, in one of these sectors the border uti possidetis could no longer be determined as the sector between the source of the Negro-Quiagara River and the Malpaso de Similaton border pillar, between these two points the titles were not loquacious; the Chamber of the Court therefore relied on an 1869 treaty also concerning the area in question and said that it took over the border contained in that treaty because it seemed fair to it, the treaty was not applicable because it had not been ratified by the two States; a non-binding treaty was issued for a small part of the border which was inserted in the judgment on the basis of equity praeter legem, pages 514 - 515 of the 1982 Code.

Role of geographical maps[modifier | modifier le wikicode]

What is the value of maps in the delimitation?

The answer must be sought in a fundamental distinction that jurisprudence makes. In the judgment on the border dispute between Burkina Faso and Mali, on pages 582 and 583 of the compendiums, the distinction is between the cards of a whole that are an integral part of a treaty that is binding and all other cards that are not an integral part of a treaty and are not binding. The map was part of the treaty is supposed to be legally binding, the map is a legal standard with considerable weight that can be decisive. Such a case is mentioned in a border dispute between Somalia and Eritrea.

In all other cases, the maps are only sources of information of varying weight depending on their quality, technical reliability and the neutrality of the bodies that produced them.

Case law has sometimes shown annoyance because arbitrators and judges are flooded with it. The parties produce hundreds of maps, some of which have relative value, either inaccurate or contradictory; they have relatively limited usefulness; the case law pushes back a little bit, depending on the circumstances.

Such a map that is not part of a treaty may also become more important if it is acquiesced in.

If the opposing party accepts the relevance of this map, the arbitral award is relevant between Ethiopia and Eritrea in the collection of arbitral awards. The case law on page 115 teaches us that a map can question a line and does not necessarily need to have the same probative value.

When a map is produced only to confirm or question a line, but not to establish an asset, case law tells us that the probative value of this type of argument does not need to be subjected to the same force of conviction.

In the case of maritime delimitations, States such as Libya and Tunisia may be bordering and it is necessary to see where the boundary extends in order to separate their continental shelf from their territorial sea. There is the case where there are several States with States facing each other, so we must delimit, because this indicates that there is an overlap.

This whole branch of law is complicated because the fact of being applied, the configurations are different each time, all this influences the drawing of the lines, hence a rich but detailed jurisprudence on the principles applicable in this field.

The fundamental principles of inter-State relations[modifier | modifier le wikicode]

It is not a question of going into detail, but of making us aware of its existence, because this Article 2 contains almost all the rules of modern international law.

Resolutions 25 - 26 are an authentic interpretation of Article 2; Article 2 of the Statute on clear but nevertheless incomplete formulas that raise problems of interpretation.

The General Assembly has taken the trouble to adopt a resolution of great importance since it proposes to give everyone an interpretation of the provisions of article 2, which adds the principle of cooperation between States and the self-determination of peoples.

First paragraph[modifier | modifier le wikicode]

« L'Organisation est fondée sur le principe de l'égalité souveraine de tous ses Membres. »

It is a bizarre, caustic and even unexpected formulation because it merges two heterogeneous elements between "equality" and "sovereignty" by specifying that one is inseparable from the other. One State cannot impose its sovereignty on the other because this would violate the equality of sovereigns.

Sovereignty in 1945 had bad press, that was one of the reasons why the League of Nations had sunk, for aggressive powers had emanated the world from a long and hard war, a tendency to do whatever one wants; one wanted to infer this sovereignty in the reminder of equality, forcing one to take into account the other, because sovereignty is not a prerogative that one has alone.

On "sovereign equality", it seems important to understand what it says and does not say, on the principle of equality, what equality says is legal equality in the first place, i. e. the fact that no State can be considered as being diminished, there is no second category State but the first category on an equal footing.

It does not seem like much to us, but in 1945 it was not, we were emerging from the era of mandates, protectorates and colonies that continued to exist.

In other words, what Article 2 §1 seeks to achieve beyond the equal dignity of States is also the right recognized by international law for each State to have rights and obligations and to be subject to the same rights and obligations of general international law, each State has the same right to have rights and obligations and is subject to the same law and obligations of general international law.

There is also the part of what equality does not mean, first of all it would be wrong to say that each State has the same rights and obligations under international law; this is completely wrong. There is only the same capacity to have rights and obligations and the same capacity of general international law that does not apply to the particular law.

The State that has contracted will have more rights and obligations imposed on it under the treaty, the State that does not have a contract will not have these rights and obligations under the treaty. If we take the particular law all States differ, the more we are involved in particular legal situations the more rights and obligations we will have.

Secondly, equality also does not mean that States are de facto equal, States are de jure equal to a certain extent for general law, they are not de facto equal.

The large and powerful state is not de facto equal to the small and weak state, which does not prevent us from fighting for more equality between states.

Thereafter, the principle of equality is not a norm of ius cogens, it can be waived, as it is the case in all weighted voting systems or some States admit that they will not have the same weight in the vote. This status of inequality must be accepted by particular law which will prevail over the general rule of equality by virtue of the lex specials rule which prevails over the general rule from which the treaty derogates.

Finally, in resolution 25-26, States must be treated despite their differences, so there is no discrimination between States according to their political systems or otherwise legal equality cannot be modulated according to a State's political, economic and social orientations.

Paragraph 2[modifier | modifier le wikicode]

« Les Membres de l'Organisation, afin d'assurer à tous la jouissance des droits et avantages résultant de leur qualité de Membre, doivent remplir de bonne foi les obligations qu'ils ont assumées aux termes de la présente Charte. »

In paragraph 2 it is the question of good faith. This provision was inserted in 1945 in response to the "paper rag doctrine" that some states had applied since the First World War; what is a treaty against the dignity and survival of the German people: it is a paper rag.

We cannot have an international order based on a minimum of security, we oblige States to fulfil this charter in good faith.

In very brief terms, this paragraph recalls pacta sund servanda, treaties must be respected, applied and interpreted in good faith involving the spirit in such a way that the letter does not seek to avoid the spirit.

Paragraph 3[modifier | modifier le wikicode]

« Les Membres de l'Organisation règlent leurs différends internationaux par des moyens pacifiques, de telle manière que la paix et la sécurité internationales ainsi que la justice ne soient pas mises en danger. »

This is an important rule of modern international law that gives rise to a whole branch of international law; it is sometimes rightly said that nothing can be stronger than the weakest link.

Paragraph[modifier | modifier le wikicode]

« Les Membres de l'Organisation s'abstiennent, dans leurs relations internationales, de recourir à la menace ou à l'emploi de la force, soit contre l'intégrité territoriale ou l'indépendance politique de tout État, soit de toute autre manière incompatible avec les buts des Nations Unies. »

This is a very fundamental principle of modern international law, since it is a principle of great importance, it is impossible to summarize it in any word.

Paragraph[modifier | modifier le wikicode]

« Les Membres de l'Organisation donnent à celle-ci pleine assistance dans toute action entreprise par elle conformément aux dispositions de la présente Charte et s'abstiennent de prêter assistance à un État contre lequel l'Organisation entreprend une action préventive ou coercitive. »

It is the assistance that members owe to the organization when it takes action under either Chapter 7 or the Security Council that is pending peace-keeping measures that are therefore binding. All States have an obligation to assist the United Nations in the implementation of sanctions.

Paragraph 6[modifier | modifier le wikicode]

« L'Organisation fait en sorte que les États qui ne sont pas Membres des Nations Unies agissent conformément à ces principes dans la mesure nécessaire au maintien de la paix et de la sécurité internationales. »

This paragraph refers to non-member States following in the footsteps of paragraph 5; in paragraph 5, all members must collectively implement sanctions and cooperate if necessary.

The problem with non-member States and the fact that they are not bound by collective discipline, sanctions may prove ineffective, which is why paragraph 6 asks the United Nations to approach third States so that they apply United Nations measures or at least do not thwart them.

Paragraph 7[modifier | modifier le wikicode]

« Aucune disposition de la présente Charte n'autorise les Nations Unies à intervenir dans des affaires qui relèvent essentiellement de la compétence nationale d'un État ni n'oblige les Membres à soumettre des affaires de ce genre à une procédure de règlement aux termes de la présente Charte; toutefois, ce principe ne porte en rien atteinte à l'application des mesures de coercition prévues au Chapitre VII. »

Nothing in the present Charter shall authorize the United Nations to intervene in the internal affairs of States.

This provision does not make much legal sense, it was inserted because it was very important to some powerful States.

The United States to pass the charter to Congress and the USSR because it had a morbid conception of internal affairs, inserted a non-intervention clause.

The 7 only concerns United Nations intervention in internal affairs, but the intervention of one State in the internal affairs of another State is another principle.

Either the United Nations has a competence recognized in the Charter and it can always exercise it or an organization does not have a competence because it is not recognized in the Charter. At that time, it cannot exercise it, so there is nothing left for the principle of non-intervention; there is only something political left, but nothing much more tangible.

The competences of the United Nations cannot even be interpreted restrictively; any matter with international repercussions falls within the competence of the United Nations, the counterpart is that the Assembly can only recommend protecting the sovereignty of States, it is only discussing.

Paragraph 7 does not apply to the Security Council under article 7 and chapter 14, a political concession has been made because States love their internal affairs, but this rule does not make much sense, or one has competence and one can exercise it or one does not have competence and one cannot exercise it anyway.

The principle of non-use of force[modifier | modifier le wikicode]

Annexes[modifier | modifier le wikicode]

  • Conforti, B. (1986) Territorial Claims in Antarctica: A Modern Way to Deal with an Old Problem. Cornell International Law Journal. 19 (2), 249–258.
  • “Uti Possidetis.” Encyclopædia Britannica, Encyclopædia Britannica, Inc., www.britannica.com/topic/uti-possidetis.
  • Uti Possidetis Iuris - International Law - Oxford Bibliographies, 19 Sept. 2018, www.oxfordbibliographies.com/view/document/obo-9780199796953/obo-9780199796953-0065.xml.

References[modifier | modifier le wikicode]

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  2. Sahara occidental, avis consultatif; C.I.J. Recueil 1975, p. 12. (COUR INTERNATIONALE DE JUSTICE RECUEIL DES ARRÊTS, AVIS CONSULTATIFS ET ORDONNANCES SAHARA OCCIDENTAL AVIS CONSULTATIF DU 16 OCTOBRE 1975)"Dans la présente affaire, les renseignements dont la Cour dispose montrent qu'au moment de la colonisation espagnole il existait de nombreux liens d'ordre racial, linguistique, religieux, culturel et économique entre des tribus et émirats dont les populations habitaient la région saharienne qui fait aujourd'hui partie du territoire du Sahara occidental et de la République islamique de Mauritanie. Cependant ces renseignements révèlent aussi l'indépendance des émirats et de nombre de ces tribus les uns à l'égard des autres et, malgré certaines formes d'activité commune, l'absence d'institutions ou d'organes, même réduits au minimum, qui leur auraient été commun. La Cour ne peut donc conclure que les éléments en sa possession permettent de considérer que les émirats et tribus existant dans la région constituaient, suivant une autre expression utilisée par la Cour dans l'affaire de la Réparation des dommages subis au service des Nations Unies, « une entité capable d'être bénéficiaire d'obligations incombant à ses membres » (ibid., p. 178). Que l'on définisse l'ensemble mauritanien comme le Bilad Chinguitti, ou comme la nation chinguittienne ainsi que la Mauritanie le suggère, ou encore comme une forme de ligue ou d'association, la difficulté demeure qu'il n'avait pas le caractère d'une personne ou d'une entité juridique distincte des divers émirats et tribus qui le constituaient. On ne peut donc accepter la thèse suivant laquelle le il ad Chinguiti aurait été une « entité » ou un « ensemble » mauritanien jouissant d'une certaine forme de souveraineté au Sahara occidental"
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  8. "Pobre México tan lejos de Dios y tan cerca de Estados Unidos. En realidad fue escrita por Nemesio García Naranjo, intelectual regiomontano" - Malos Vecinos, Ángeles González Gamio; La Jornada
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