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=== Classic concept of political violence ===
=== Classic concept of political violence ===
Le concept classique de la violence politique instaure un lien entre l’usage de la violence et la puissance publique et politique. Il peut y avoir un rapport entre l’usage de la violence et la puissance publique et politique. Il n’y  a pas d’interrogation sur la légitimité de la violence, elle renvoie à la relation au politique qui s’exerce dans un cadre qui soit légitime ou illégitime.
The classic concept of political violence establishes a link between the use of violence and public and political power. There may be a relationship between the use of violence and public and political power. There is no question about the legitimacy of violence, it refers to the relationship to politics that is exercised in a legitimate or illegitimate framework.
   
   
Deux arguments évoqués pour justifier l’usage de la violence :
Two arguments put forward to justify the use of violence:


:1) La violence comme principe d’action défensive
:1) Violence as a principle of defensive action
C’est l’idée selon laquelle l’usage de la force serait légitime dans la mesure où le bien est défendu :
It is the idea that the use of force would be legitimate to the extent that the good is defended:
*soit l’État peut se tromper et il n’est pas infaillible ;
* or the state can be wrong and it's not infallible;
*soit l’État ne se trompe jamais et à ce moment-là il n’avait pas de raisons de remettre en cause la légitimité de sa violence.
* or the state is never wrong and at that time it had no reason to question the legitimacy of its violence.
:2) Violence at the service of a just cause  
:2) La violence au service d’une cause juste
It is a mode of legitimation that has always existed:
Il s’agit d’un mode de légitimation qui a toujours existé
* legitimacy of war intentions or violent actions through idealistic arguments;
*légitimité des intentions guerrières ou des actions violentes par des argumentations idéalistes ;
* the relationship to religion and morality is the most evoked.
*le rapport à la religion et à la morale est le plus évoqué.  
In these considerations and this conception of political violence, there is the question of the purpose of violence in order to defend the rule of law, but with a danger on the part of public actors that if one is too violent it is likely to re-mobilize the opposition.
 
Dans ces considérations et cette conception de la violence politique, il y a la question du but de la violence dans le but de défendre l’état de droit, mais avec un danger du côté des acteurs publics qui est que  si on est trop violent il est probable de remobiliser l’opposition.  
The symbolic question and how far it is possible to go, the blunder which is an act of violence that leads to a serious thing that is very costly in symbolic terms and can therefore be denounced as a barbaric and brutal act.
 
La question symbolique et de savoir jusqu’où il est possible d’aller, la bavure qui est un acte de violence qui aboutit à une chose grave qui coûte très cher sur le plan symbolique et peut être dès lors  dénoncé comme un acte barbarie et de brutalité.  
Beyond a certain threshold, repressive violence arouses rejection, explaining why when politicians use violence they must argue and explain it. The question of political violence often involves the construction of a discourse. A rationality of judging the use of violence must be constructed.
 
Violence in the service of a just cause is a moral interpretation of violence. Moral law has an important outlet in the 1980s which is the right of international interference. -


Au-delà d’un certain seuil, la violence répressive  suscite du rejet expliquant pourquoi lorsque les politiques usent de la violence ils doivent l’argumenter et  l’expliciter. La question de la violence politique passe souvent par la construction d’un discours. Il faut fabriquer une rationalité de jugement de l’usage de la violence.
The right of international interference was a curious invention that was almost against the nature of international law. If populations are killed and victims of genocide, the international community must exercise a right of international interference in the name of human rights. Thus humanitarian law justifies military intervention in certain countries. Therefore, military intervention can be justified in the name of peace.
La violence au service d’une cause juste est une interprétation morale de la violence. Le droit de la morale a un débouché important dans les années 1980 qui est le droit d’ingérence international.-
Le droit d’ingérence international a été une invention assez curieuse qui fut presque contre nature du droit international. Si des populations sont meurtries et victimes de génocides, la communauté internationale doit faire usage d’un droit d’ingérence international au nom du droit humain. Ainsi le droit humanitaire justifie l’intervention militaire dans certains pays. Dès lors, l’intervention militaire peut se justifier au nom de la paix.


=== The concept of infrapolitical violence ===  
=== The concept of infrapolitical violence ===  
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=== The concept of meta-political violence ===
=== The concept of meta-political violence ===
Le concept de violence métapolitique signifie que la violence dépasse les frontières du politique de l’État-nation ou qui subordonne le politique à des nouveaux enjeux stratégiques. Ce sont par exemple la violence politique ou religieuse, ou encore des violences qui surgissent de la modernité, c’est-à-dire de la forme de violence métapolitique  au nom d’un intérêt général.
The concept of meta-political violence means that violence transcends the boundaries of nation-state politics or subordinates politics to new strategic issues. It is, for example, political or religious violence, or violence that emerges from modernity, i. e. the form of meta-political violence in the name of a general interest.
 
Origine de la violence métapolitique :
The origin of meta-political violence:
*critique de la surmodernité des sociétés avancées
* criticism of the over-modernity of advanced societies
*la critique de la laïcisation politique et de la perte de lien avec le spirituel
* criticizing political secularization and the loss of connection with the spiritual
*ensemble des frustrations nées de la modernité
* all the frustrations born of modernity


=== Extreme violence vs. barbarism ===
=== Extreme violence vs. barbarism ===
La violence extrême est la violence qui a perdu tous les modes classiques de régulation qui est souvent gratuite et qui aboutit à une perte de rationalité absolue. C’est tout ce qui est de l’ordre de la violence gratuite spécifique comme le viole des femmes comme armes de guerre dans certaines guerres africaines, mais aussi les guerres de purification ethnique, c’est détruire l’autre de façon absolue. Cela signifie le dérèglement des formes classique de la violence, elle est qualifiée d’extrême parce qu’elle est qualifiée de violence au-delà de la violence, c’est une violence qui n’aurait plus aucun rituel et qui est une cruauté extrême.
Extreme violence is violence that has lost all the classic modes of regulation, which is often gratuitous and leads to a loss of absolute rationality. This is all that is about the specific gratuitous violence, as women rape it as weapons of war in some African wars, but also wars of ethnic cleansing, is to destroy the other in an absolute way. It means the deregulation of the classical forms of violence, it is called extreme because it is described as violence beyond violence, it is violence that would no longer have any ritual and is extreme cruelty.
* Exponentiality of physical violence against persons
* process of regression in relation to the process of civilization
* deregulation of war laws and principles
* deinstitutionalization of violence: violence no longer has an institutional form.
This raises the question of what threshold can we speak of extreme violence. It is a question of the order of philosophy, but in the case of extreme violence, there might be a transition between rationality and irrationality.


*exponentialité des violences physiques sur les personnes
The theory of extreme violence undermines all the theories of Clausewitz and Machiavelli on war, one is beyond rationality, one enters into barbarism in its purest form.
*processus de régression par rapport au processus civilisation
 
*dérégulation des lois et principes de la guerre
Michel Henry was born in 1922 and died in 2000 and wrote ''La barbarie'' publised in 1987 observing the rise of extreme violence by wondering what barbarism is and how man's amputation is played out in a system of barbarism.
*désinstitutionnalisation de la violence : la violence n’a plus de forme institutionnelle.
Ainsi, on peut se poser la question de savoir à partir de quel seuil peut-on parler de violence extrême. C’est une question de l’ordre de la philosophie, cependant dans le cas de la violence extrême, il y aurait peut-être un passage entre rationalité et irrationalité.
La théorie de la violence extrême met à mal toutes les théories de [[Guerre|Clausewitz]] et de [[La Renaissance italienne|Machiavel]] sur la guerre, on est au-delà de toute rationalité, on rentre dans la barbarie à l’état pur.  
Michel Henry né en 1922 et décédé en 2000 rédigea un ouvrage intitulé ''La barbarie'' en 1987 constatant la montée de la violence extrême en s’interrogeant sur ce qu’est la barbarie et sur comment se joue l’amputation de l’homme dans un système de barbarie.


== Hannah Arendt[1906 - 1975] and Radical Evil ==
== Hannah Arendt[1906 - 1975] and Radical Evil ==


[[Image:Hannah Arendt.jpg|right|thumb|150px|Extrait d'un timbre allemand imprimé en 1988 à l'effigie de Hannah Arendt.]]
[[Image:Hannah Arendt.jpg|right|thumb|150px|Extract from a German stamp printed in 1988 with the effigy of Hannah Arendt.]]


Hannah Arendt est philosophe de formation, élève de Heidegger, elle s’exile en France entre 1933 et 1940 avant de s’installer aux États-Unis à partir de 1941. Elle est une philosophe politique très importante sur la société, la culture, le totalitarisme, la violence. C’est une philosophe incontournable du XXème siècle.
Hannah Arendt is a philosopher by training, a pupil of Heidegger, she exiled in France between 1933 and 1940 before moving to the United States in 1941. She is a very important political philosopher on society, culture, totalitarianism and violence. She is an inescapable philosopher of the 20th century.
   
   
Arendt a vu les deux guerres mondiales, la Guerre froide, tous les totalitarismes, dans son ouvrage ''Le système totalitaire'' elle postule que le mal est en l’homme, au fond, le XXème siècle a inventé un mal inédit qui est un mal radical. C’est quelque chose qui était inconnu des hommes auparavant, car c’est quelque chose qui résiste à toutes les catégories théologiques et philosophiques occidentales. Au fond, c’est quelque chose qui échappe à toute la connaissance qui  était accumulée sur la société, la guerre, la violence pendant des générations.
Arendt saw the two world wars, the Cold War, all totalitarianism, in her work ''The totalitarian system'' she postulates that evil is in man, deep down, the twentieth century invented an unprecedented evil that is a radical evil. This is something that was previously unknown to men, because it is something that resists all Western theological and philosophical categories. Basically, it is something that escapes all the knowledge that has been accumulated about society, war and violence for generations.


{{#ev:youtube|oIA97t0kjYw|375|center}}
{{#ev:youtube|oIA97t0kjYw|375|center}}
   
   
C’est quelque chose qui est un mal absolu en l’homme. Il faut remonter à Kant, car il abordé le mal absolu dans l’être humain, ainsi, il a montré qu’il y avait en l’homme une potentialité du mal impossible à penser et à conceptualiser. Ainsi, sa théorie est une tentative de penser le mal et le nouveau mal ainsi que la transformation du monde moderne qui était incompréhensible dépassant les formes de rationalités.
It is something that is an absolute evil in man. It is necessary to go back to Kant, because he approached the absolute evil in the human being, thus, he showed that there was in man a potentiality of evil impossible to think and conceptualize. Thus, his theory is an attempt to think evil and new evil as well as the transformation of the modern world that was incomprehensible beyond the forms of rationality.
 
Arendt va contester la théorie du bouc émissaire à propos des juifs, ils ne porteraient pas simplement le mal des autres, mais c’est l’antisémitisme nazi, on les tue avant tout parce qu’ils sont juifs.
Arendt will challenge the scapegoat theory about Jews, they would not just harm others, but it is Nazi anti-Semitism, they are killed first and foremost because they are Jews.
 
Ainsi, elle va travailler sur le mal radical dont apparait une notion importante qui est le concept de superfluité. Dès lors, il y a la possibilité de tuer en masse parce qu’à un moment donné l’homme n’est plus rien, il n’est plus un être conscient, dès lors il n’appartient plus à l’humanité. Elle dénote  trois types de camps de concentration :
Thus, she will work on the radical evil of which appears an important notion which is the concept of superfluity. From then on, there is the possibility of mass killing because at some point man is no longer anything, he is no longer a conscious being, and hence he no longer belongs to humanity. It denotes three types of concentration camps:
*Hadès : tout ce qui est au XXème siècle la gestion des apatrides, des asociaux ;
* Hades: all that is in the twentieth century the management of stateless, asocial people;
*Purgatoire : ce sont les camps de rééducation des individus que l’on considère dangereux ;
* Purgatory: it is the camps for the rehabilitation of individuals that are considered dangerous;
*Enfer : c’est le camp d’extermination qui est la mort concrétisée par les camps d’extermination des juifs.  
* Hell: it is the extermination camp that is the death concretized by the extermination camps of the Jews.
Hell is the place of dispossession as a man, man is dispossessed first of all legally. The first thing that happens in a concentration camp is the evasion of the individual from the protection of laws. The second thing is abandonment to any regulation, the camp becomes a wild place where there is no management, aristocrats are criminals; it is the place where the personality is destroyed. The last phase is the destruction of individuality. The Nazi project as such is to make man an animal by forcing him to live in order to survive and feed himself, to make him a being without consciousness.
L’enfer est le lieu de la dépossession en tant qu’homme, l’homme est dépossédé d’abord juridiquement. La première chose qui arrive dans un camp de concentration est la soustraction de l’individu à la protection des lois. La deuxième chose est l’abandon à toute régulation, le camp devient un lieu sauvage ou il n’y a pas de gestion, les aristocrates sont les criminels ; c’est le lieu où se détruit la personnalité. La dernière phase est la destruction de l’individualité. Le projet nazi en tant que tel est de faire de l’homme un animal en l’obligeant à l’animalité pour survivre et se nourrir, en faire un être sans conscience.  
 
Jorge Semprun tells us how, in order to survive this absolute violence, he stared at a tree that represents a metaphorical mythology of freedom.
Jorge Semprun raconte comment pour arriver survire dans cette violence absolue, il fixe son regard sur un arbre qui représente une métaphore mythologie de la liberté.
 
From then on, absurdity becomes the management mode to arrive at animality in order to make man lose the consciousness of solidarity that would have allowed him to survive in the camps explaining the destruction of the moral conscience of man before his assassination. It should be noted that in order to reduce human beings to the state of animals, we must reduce the ability to think about the time when we are projected into an absolute immediacy that destroys cohesion.
Dès lors, l’absurde devient le mode de gestion pour arriver à l’animalité afin de faire perdre à l’homme la conscience de la solidarité qui lui aurait permis de survivre dans les camps expliquant la destruction de la conscience morale de l’homme avant son assassinat. Il faut noter qu’afin de réduire l’homme à l’état d’animal il faut réduire la capacité à penser le temps où on est projeté dans une immédiateté absolue qui détruit la cohésion.


== Hannah Arendt and the banality of evil ==
== Hannah Arendt and the banality of evil ==
[[File:Adolf Eichmann at Trial1961.jpg|thumb|Adolf Eichmann en avril 1961 lors de son procès à Jérusalem.]]
[[File:Adolf Eichmann at Trial1961.jpg|thumb|Adolf Eichmann in April 1961 during his trial in Jerusalem.]]


Arendt va s’interroger sur le pardon et le procès Eichmann. [http://fr.wikipedia.org/wiki/Adolf_Eichmann Eichmann] est un petit fonctionnaire nazi, il est chargé de la logistique de la déportation des juifs d’Europe. Son emploi  de petit fonctionnaire est d’encadrer les trains pour qu’ils partent vers l’est. Il sera récupéré par les services secrets israéliens en Argentine l’amenant à Jérusalem où il sera jugé.   
Arendt is going to ask about forgiveness and the Eichmann trial. Eichmann is a small Nazi civil servant, responsible for the logistics of deporting Jews from Europe. His job as a small civil servant was to supervise the trains so that they would move eastward. He will be recovered by the Israeli secret services in Argentina, taking him to Jerusalem where he will be tried.   
 
La grande question est de juger de sa culpabilité parce qu’au chef de l’accusation il va y avoir la question de l’extermination des juifs qui a été décidé en 1942 lors de la [http://fr.wikipedia.org/wiki/Conf%C3%A9rence_de_Wannsee conférence de Wannsee], cependant aucune trace écrite n’a été conservée.  
The big question is to judge his guilt because on the count of the charge there is going to be the issue of extermination of Jews which was decided in 1942 at the Wannsee conference, however no written record has been kept.
 
Ce qui frappe Arendt est qu’Eichmann est un petit fonctionnaire qui se comporte comme un petit fonctionnaire se défendant sur le fait qu’il a agi en tant que fonctionnaire en s’occupant de logistique de l’appareil de déportation. Ainsi, ayant obéi aux ordres, il ne se sent pas coupable, il n’a fait que son devoir.  
What strikes Arendt is that Eichmann is a small civil servant who behaves like a small civil servant defending himself against the fact that he acted as a civil servant by handling the logistics of the deportation aircraft. Thus, having obeyed orders, he does not feel guilty, he has only done his duty.
 
Arendt's speech and say that one does not have to deal with an inhumane monster, but an ordinary man. It is not a monster because it is simply stupid not understanding the link between private individuals and universal not feeling responsible.{{citation bloc|We expected to meet a human monster, we had to make an ordinary man less of a monster than a clown;}}
   
   
Le discours d’Arendt et de dire que l’on n’a pas à faire a un monstre inhumain, mais un homme ordinaire. Ce n’est pas un monstre parce qu’il est simplement stupide ne comprenant pas le lien entre particuliers et universel ne se sentant pas responsables.
Evil is therefore ordinary. What Eichmann describes is an ordinary reality, it is something that can be in each of us who, depending on particular circumstances, can lead to the most serious crimes. Man in historical and political circumstances, if he does not have a specific consciousness he can do dramatic things. The spirit of evil watchfulness is only waiting for the right moment to push the individual into radical evil.
{{citation bloc|Nous nous attendions à rencontrer un monstre humain, nous avons eu à faire un homme ordinaire soit moins un monstre qu’un clown;}}
Le mal est dès lors ordinaire. Ce que décrit Eichmann est une réalité ordinaire, c’est quelque chose qui peut être en chacun de nous qui en fonction de circonstances particulières peut mener à commettre les plus grands crimes. L’homme dans des circonstances historiques et politiques, s’il n’a pas une conscience spécifique il peut faire de choses dramatiques. L’esprit du mal veille est n’attend que le moment favorable pour pousser l’individu au mal radical.
Ce que montre le procès Eichmann est la banalité du mal. Au fond, dans la banalité du mal, il se passe que l’individu n’est pas dans la possibilité d’intégrer le réel. Sa thèse fondamentale est que la méchanceté peut être causée par l’absence de pensée. Ce qui aurait poussé Eichmann à faire cela est qu’il ait été incapable de penser son action. Dès lors, il n’y a pas d’action sans pensé. Si on ne pense plus l’action on est dans la compulsion, on reproduit un dispositif sans le penser, dès lors on a plus la capacité de penser sa propre action.  


{{citation bloc|Nous nous attendions à rencontrer un monstre humain, mais nous avons affaire à un homme ordinaire… soit moins un monstre qu’un clown… L’homme mauvais serait donc chacun d’entre nous… S’il se laisse glisser et entraîner insensiblement il parvient dans des circonstances historiques et politiques à commettre les plus grands crimes. Il n’y a pas plus de génie dans le mal que dans le bien, mais seulement des hommes ordinaires, en qui l’esprit du mal veille et n’attend que le moment favorable pour souffler et les pousser au mal radical, de sorte qu’il y a disproportion entre le mal commis et l’apparence tout ordinaire de l’être humain qui l’a accompli;}}
What the Eichmann trial shows is the banality of evil. Deep down, in the banality of evil, it happens that the individual is not in the possibility of integrating reality. His fundamental thesis is that wickedness can be caused by the absence of thought. What would have prompted Eichmann to do this is that he was unable to think about his action. Therefore, there is no action without thinking. If you don't think about the action any more, you are in the compulsion, you reproduce a device without thinking about it, then you no longer have the ability to think about your own action.{{citation bloc|We expected to meet a human monster, but we are dealing with an ordinary man... not so much a monster as a clown... The bad man would therefore be each of us... If he slips and drags himself into the air, he manages in historical and political circumstances to commit the greatest crimes. There is no more genius in evil than in good, but only ordinary men, in whom the spirit of evil watches over and waits for the right moment to blow and push them into radical evil, so that there is a disproportion between the evil done and the ordinary appearance of the human being who has accomplished it;}}


Comme aime à le souligner le professeur Rémi Baudoui, admirateur de Arendt, {{citation|IL N’Y A PAS D’ACTION SANS PENSÉE.}}
As Professor Rémi Baudoui, admirer of Arendt, likes to point out,"THERE IS NO ACTION WITHOUT THINKING."


== The concept of violence ==
== The concept of violence ==
La violence possède un caractère instrumental, elle s’apparente à la puissance, mais elle n’est pas la puissance, le pouvoir et une aptitude de l’homme à agir. La violence peut détruire le pouvoir en place, mais elle est incapable de le créer.
Violence has an instrumental character, it is similar to power, but it is not man's power, power and ability to act. Violence can destroy existing power, but it is incapable of creating it.
 
Arendt va contester le concept de violence légitime de Max Weber : il ne faut pas parler de violence légitime parce qu’il y a un usage de la violence fait par les États qui est illégitime.D’autre part, il n’a jamais eu de gouvernement exclusivement fondé sur la violence, mais il faut parler de violence instrumentale, c’est-à-dire de l’usage de la violence comme un instrument d’action. L’usage de la violence ou l’usage répété de la violence peut être considéré comme une forme d’impuissance absolue du politique.  
Arendt is going to challenge Max Weber's concept of legitimate violence: we must not speak of legitimate violence because there is an illegitimate use of violence by states; on the other hand, there has never been a government based exclusively on violence, but we must speak of instrumental violence, that is to say, the use of violence as a tool for action. The use of violence or the repeated use of violence can be seen as a form of absolute powerlessness of politics.
 
Si à un moment donné, il n’y a plus que le recours à la violence, cela n’est plus faire de la politique. Dès lors, il y a des risques de substituer la violence au pouvoir, c’est-à-dire de rentrer dans des régimes de terreur tout comme l’avait énoncé Robespierre sous la terreur révolutionnaire en justifiant le cycle de violence et de terreur absolue afin de gouverner au nom de la morale, de la justice et au nom de la République française.
If at some point there is only the use of violence, it is no longer political. From then on, there is a risk of substituting violence for power, that is to say, of entering into regimes of terror as Robespierre had enunciated in revolutionary terror, justifying the cycle of violence and absolute terror in order to govern in the name of morality, justice and the name of the French Republic.
Le danger que pointe Arendt est que la violence peut devenir dans certains cas une fin en soi, alors, c’est la fin du politique et de la politique. Ainsi, la violence détruit le pouvoir, mais ne peut le créer.


{{citation bloc|En résumé, il ne suffit pas de dire que, dans le domaine politique, il ne faut pas confondre pouvoir et violence. Le pouvoir et la violence s’opposent pas leur nature même ; lorsque l’un des deux prédomine de façon absolue, l’autre est éliminé. La violence se manifeste lorsque le pouvoir est menacé, mais si on la laisse se développer, elle provoquera finalement la disparition du pouvoir. Il en résulte que la non-violence ne devrait pas être considérée comme le contraire de la violence. Parler d’un pouvoir non violent est en fait une tautologie. La violence peut détruire le pouvoir, elle est parfaitement incapable de le créer.|Hannah Arendt, Du mensonge à la violence, trad. fr G. Durand, Paris, Calmann-Lévy, 1972, p.166}}
Arendt's danger is that violence can in some cases become an end in itself, so it is the end of politics and politics. Thus, violence destroys power, but cannot create it.{{citation bloc|To sum up, it is not enough to say that power and violence should not be confused in the political sphere. Power and violence do not oppose each other by their very nature; when one of them dominates in an absolute way, the other is eliminated. Violence occurs when power is threatened, but if allowed to develop, it will eventually lead to the loss of power. As a result, non-violence should not be seen as the opposite of violence. Talking about non-violent power is actually tautology. Violence can destroy power, it is perfectly incapable of creating it.|Hannah Arendt, Du mensonge à la violence, trad. fr G. Durand, Paris, Calmann-Lévy, 1972, p.166}}


= Annexes =
= Annexes =

Version du 11 février 2018 à 17:59

Languages

Etymology of the word "violence"

Etymology makes it possible to understand all the reflections in political science on the concept of violence.

The root of the word violence is the violated word created in the 1080s, which is the violation of a person's integrity; it is the violation of the person's physical, moral and personal integrity.

This word will then be extended to institutions and the moral order. The word will evolve towards the 13th century, meaning the abuse of force. The one who would use violence and the one who would abuse his strength, that is to say, he who uses his strength for purposes that are contrary to good conventions. From 1342 onwards, the verb "to violate" appears which denotes the fact that there is an action in violence. What characterizes violence in the first sense is an action, it has a dimension of intentionality. To act violently is to act with intent in an abrupt and immediate manner. In the 16th century, the adjective "violently" and the expression "to do violence" appears, which shows that we are talking about an action.

Thus, violence is the domain of action and the order of human action, which is intentional, an intention of action. The essential component is strength. However, there are many other dimensions, one can be in psychological or moral abuse. It is not necessarily something of the order of aggression by force, it is an aggression of moral spirit.

Violence is within the realm of action, there is intentionality of action that is violence. One possible mode of expression of violence is the use of force and de facto coercion. It is a constraint to change position because of the damage done.

Hannah Arendt will contrast violence that requires instruments with what she calls the power of power. In essence, violence must be distinguished from power and power because power is directly instrumental. Thus, she will question the expression of different forms of violence.

Scientific fields of reflection

Cognitivists have been working scientifically on violence for about 30 years. The central concept is the concept of aggression expressed by Konrad Lorenz in the 1970s. He will first question what aggressive behaviour is and whether it would not be the natural instinct of man. Depending on the context and the nature of the contextual situation, aggression would be natural to man.

Science and biology refers to the question of impulses on the instinct of aggression that is in all living beings and found in nature. So there could be a commonality that would be aggression.

Aggression should also be seen as a mode of expression and action. We can see the passage from a medical cognitive science to a question. A cultural and political issue. Thus, expression would not be a means of expression, aggressiveness makes it possible to express individuality. The expression of individuality is nevertheless an expression of communication.

In essence, the three-dimensional nature of violence is taken as biological factors.

There are biological factors, factors related to the subject's personality, knowing that aggression is partly related to the difficulty of being social, thus a child, the less it is socialized young the more violence and aggression emerges. These three circles make it possible to understand these factors of socioaffective exchanges and to what extent this can be managed.

The fundamental challenge in limiting aggression and violence can be the ability of individuals to control their environment.

Emotion is at the heart of the subject, it is the perception and reading of his situation. The concept of emotion is important because it allows us to understand these situations where there is a loss of rationalization; indeed, it is because we feel aggression that we can express aggression.

These three dimensions are important and explain situations of aggression, i. e. a situation of the order of perception.

If political science is interested in violence, it is because the very heart of political science is the question of action, if we talk about the hypothesis that violence is action, then there is a theory to be forged. On the other hand, it is a contextual theory i. e. the relationship between the individual and the collective f but it is the collective dimension.

The question is how do we move from an individual fact to a collective fact and how can we qualify violence as a societal fact? We integrate into an analysis of a functioning and social regulation that raises the question of political management as a fundamental fact.

Classical theories of violence

Hobbes and the theory of violence as social utility

Thomas Hobbes.

According to Hobbes, there are three possible levels of violence:

  • Level of interindividual relations in the state of nature;
  • Level of international warfare;
  • Level of war between ruler and rebel.

Hobbes lists three causes of violence:

  • rivalry;
  • mistrust;
  • pride.

This leads to wars and conflicts.

Level of interindividual relations in the state of nature

Thus, violence is unreasonable, it is a space of passion. The paradox is that violence is passionate and unreasonable, but it leads to rational action.

Opposition = unreasonableness = passion = anarchy

The underlying question is whether the action can be rational, can it therefore be called irrationality?

Level of International Warfare

The transition to the state of war is a Westphalian state theory, states that are at war with each other.

The first hypothesis is the desire for accumulation, which means that each State wants to acquire more power at a given moment in time to reign over the others. The state of war is a state of accumulation that will triumph thanks to the sovereign and public institutions, it is a state of appropriation of resources. For this to work, it does not mean that violence will be reported on the war side, but that the state will have to deal with its own violence.

In Hobbes' theory, violence can always reappear within the framework of the state, because it must by definition be instrumentalized towards ends and objectives, it will have to defend itself from the outside, but also from violence within its own system.

Thus, Hobbes hypothesizes that violence will be channelled, but it will exist within the state even if the fundamental issue is the war between states.

Level of war between ruler and rebel

Even if there is violence in the state of nature, violence between states in a Westphalian system with control of violence within themselves, there is no doubt that there can be a third which is the war between the sovereign is the rebel between the one who holds power and the one who disputes.

What is of interest in Hobbes' theory is that he describes violence as a story and as the assumption that violence remains and cannot disappear as such.

George Sorel and Contesting Violence

Georges Sorel.

Sorel is a state socialist, Marxist, trade unionist and revolutionary then he will drift to the extreme right. His book Réflexion sur la violence publié en 1906[1] is interesting, because it will pose violence as a collective. It will take up elements that structure it by saying that violence is not spontaneous, it is not spontaneous and unpredictable, it would be contrary to the order of constitution and a will in action.

Chapter 1. Class struggle and violence Chapter 2. Bourgeois decadence and violence Chapter 3. Prejudices against violence Chapter 4. The proletarian strike Chapter 5. Productive General Strike Chapter 6. The morality of violence Chapter 7. Producer morale

If violence is collective violence, which is used to change social relations and to fight against capitalist poverty and bourgeois exploitation, there is a form of morality of violence, hence it is not considered as amoral, but profoundly moral.

The class struggle is a positive violence, because it is the way to put pressure on the bosses to get social progress. We have to look at the forms of violence that can animate the proletariat to obtain a response to these legitimate demands.

This also makes it possible to understand one of the impasses of terrorism and extremist movements that start from the legitimacy of violence in the name of oppression, which is the theory of anarchism. Since violence is legitimate, we are going to start attacking the bourgeoisie, which justifies a morality of the acts. From the ethical and philosophical point of view, from the moment one starts from the hypothesis of violence as a moral one can reach extremes.

The debate on morality and violence is fraught with the issue of politics and how the issue of politics is analyzed.

René Girard et la violence sacrificielle

René Girard.

René Girard was a trained philosopher born in 1923 and died on November 4, 2015.[2]. He was a professor at the major American universities and is also a member of the Académie française. His entire career has been based on works of philosophy, religion and ethics. He is very interesting because he is in the great lineage of structural anthropologists and has worked all his life on the issue of violence and the sacred.

  • La violence et le sacré[3]
  • Le Bouc-émissaire[4]
  • Le sacrifice[5]

What is interesting is that he will re-read all the founding myths of societies to question the issue of violence. His fundamental assumption is that the individual act is of no use in itself, it must be taken in a matter of collective system.

Basically, all individuals are caught up in a mechanical process of imitation strategies, this is what he calls the theory of mimicry. Individual acts are nothing in themselves and are part of a mimetic process towards the society inscribed in a collective mimetic destiny, whether it be in loving relationships or in emotional relationships. Thus violence cannot escape this mimicry.

Girard's first very strong theoretical point is to say that every society is constituted in violence, it is a structuring concept. Therefore, every society has a duty to control violence. Often, violence is mythical and sacrificial; it must control its violence. The paradox is that societies will build themselves with violence and must control it.

Violence is a space of myth, ritual and sacrificial practice, i. e. every society must have a historical consensualist relationship in its narration with violence.

Societal violence will be regulated in the scapegoat theory. Every society according to René Girard first builds a specific report on violence, not to prohibit it, but to frame and ritualize it. It is not a question of stopping violence, but of structuring and channelling it.

Therefore, the most important cause is to work on myths, since myth is the foundation of our society. The first work of philosopher is a cultural analysis of myths to decipher them not as a simple narrative, but to understand the mimetic meaning structure of violence, i. e. how the myth distributes and constructs violence as a phenomenon that will be incorporated into society.By deciphering them, we see the fundamental notions that allow us to understand how this theory of the sacrifice necessary to calm the gods emerges.

Girard's hypothesis is to say that any society must ward off violence by developing myths that themselves become rituals to exorcise violence while helping each other or encouraging controlled violence. Since violence is a constituent part of society, it must be controlled and channelled, but also occasionally encouraged by controlled violence. Controlled violence makes the societal system work.

We must divert societal violence from a system of society because the system of sacrifice is cohesive. The theory is that embezzlement implies that the faithful do not know the role played by violence. The theology of sacrifice is that the gods claim victims, it is to satisfy God that they can return to a normal order.

Sacrificial violence can therefore be understood as either alternative or substitute violence. We substitute a form of violence accepted by all the actors in the name of collective happiness, it is a symbolic transfer of the burden of violence. What is at stake is the transfer of collective violence through a collective game of re-designation of the guilty party or the guilty party.

Sacrifice to an important social function which is to appease the conflicts within society, it designates a substitute, it designates a third person who soothes the conflicts. Sacrifice makes it possible to appease conflicts within any society, hence the usefulness of making constant sacrifice based on very strong symbolic rites.

The sacrifice that restores purity is a kind of perpetual rebirth that is the concept of scapegoat. That is, it is the theory that violence expels itself from violence, it must pay and atone for the sin of others, it is sacrificed in the name of all others. We limit violence to the maximum, but we will use it at the end to avoid greater violence, it is a transfer of charge.

The paradox is that as a result, society's violence still expels itself through violence. There can be no society without myth that is the very essence of society, there can be no society without mythical space because it is at the very foundation of the construction of this relationship between individuals and violence. Moreover, in any society there is the capacity to produce scapegoats. So any society produces scapegoats, all this is done without rationality of judgment, we are not going to question the veracity of the harmful action of the scapegoat.

The benefit is that the only interest of the device and the perception that society wins and has won something in particular, it gains a form of cohesion around a common goal.

State and political violence

Political violence and extreme violence

Four concepts are used today:

  • the classic concept of political violence;
  • the concept of infrapolitical violence;
  • the concept of meta-political violence;
  • the concept of extreme violence versus the barbarian.

Classic concept of political violence

The classic concept of political violence establishes a link between the use of violence and public and political power. There may be a relationship between the use of violence and public and political power. There is no question about the legitimacy of violence, it refers to the relationship to politics that is exercised in a legitimate or illegitimate framework.

Two arguments put forward to justify the use of violence:

1) Violence as a principle of defensive action

It is the idea that the use of force would be legitimate to the extent that the good is defended:

  • or the state can be wrong and it's not infallible;
  • or the state is never wrong and at that time it had no reason to question the legitimacy of its violence.
2) Violence at the service of a just cause

It is a mode of legitimation that has always existed:

  • legitimacy of war intentions or violent actions through idealistic arguments;
  • the relationship to religion and morality is the most evoked.

In these considerations and this conception of political violence, there is the question of the purpose of violence in order to defend the rule of law, but with a danger on the part of public actors that if one is too violent it is likely to re-mobilize the opposition.

The symbolic question and how far it is possible to go, the blunder which is an act of violence that leads to a serious thing that is very costly in symbolic terms and can therefore be denounced as a barbaric and brutal act.

Beyond a certain threshold, repressive violence arouses rejection, explaining why when politicians use violence they must argue and explain it. The question of political violence often involves the construction of a discourse. A rationality of judging the use of violence must be constructed.

Violence in the service of a just cause is a moral interpretation of violence. Moral law has an important outlet in the 1980s which is the right of international interference. -

The right of international interference was a curious invention that was almost against the nature of international law. If populations are killed and victims of genocide, the international community must exercise a right of international interference in the name of human rights. Thus humanitarian law justifies military intervention in certain countries. Therefore, military intervention can be justified in the name of peace.

The concept of infrapolitical violence

It relates to the economic and political changes in the world of the 1980s, i e. the weakening of the nation-state with a privatized political violence giving the possibility to armed groups that will constitute themselves as a system of forces to use violence to have a certain number of territorial, spatial and economic prerogatives. It is infrapolitical violence that complicatedly articulates legality and illegality, which no longer makes it possible to unravel what would be real political issues of what would constitute organized crime.

This refers to a concept of privatization of resources and articulates a joint legality and illegality in disadvantaged countries or regions where there are systems or the nation-state no longer has the power to control the territory.

The concept of meta-political violence

The concept of meta-political violence means that violence transcends the boundaries of nation-state politics or subordinates politics to new strategic issues. It is, for example, political or religious violence, or violence that emerges from modernity, i. e. the form of meta-political violence in the name of a general interest.

The origin of meta-political violence:

  • criticism of the over-modernity of advanced societies
  • criticizing political secularization and the loss of connection with the spiritual
  • all the frustrations born of modernity

Extreme violence vs. barbarism

Extreme violence is violence that has lost all the classic modes of regulation, which is often gratuitous and leads to a loss of absolute rationality. This is all that is about the specific gratuitous violence, as women rape it as weapons of war in some African wars, but also wars of ethnic cleansing, is to destroy the other in an absolute way. It means the deregulation of the classical forms of violence, it is called extreme because it is described as violence beyond violence, it is violence that would no longer have any ritual and is extreme cruelty.

  • Exponentiality of physical violence against persons
  • process of regression in relation to the process of civilization
  • deregulation of war laws and principles
  • deinstitutionalization of violence: violence no longer has an institutional form.

This raises the question of what threshold can we speak of extreme violence. It is a question of the order of philosophy, but in the case of extreme violence, there might be a transition between rationality and irrationality.

The theory of extreme violence undermines all the theories of Clausewitz and Machiavelli on war, one is beyond rationality, one enters into barbarism in its purest form.

Michel Henry was born in 1922 and died in 2000 and wrote La barbarie publised in 1987 observing the rise of extreme violence by wondering what barbarism is and how man's amputation is played out in a system of barbarism.

Hannah Arendt[1906 - 1975] and Radical Evil

Extract from a German stamp printed in 1988 with the effigy of Hannah Arendt.

Hannah Arendt is a philosopher by training, a pupil of Heidegger, she exiled in France between 1933 and 1940 before moving to the United States in 1941. She is a very important political philosopher on society, culture, totalitarianism and violence. She is an inescapable philosopher of the 20th century.

Arendt saw the two world wars, the Cold War, all totalitarianism, in her work The totalitarian system she postulates that evil is in man, deep down, the twentieth century invented an unprecedented evil that is a radical evil. This is something that was previously unknown to men, because it is something that resists all Western theological and philosophical categories. Basically, it is something that escapes all the knowledge that has been accumulated about society, war and violence for generations.

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It is something that is an absolute evil in man. It is necessary to go back to Kant, because he approached the absolute evil in the human being, thus, he showed that there was in man a potentiality of evil impossible to think and conceptualize. Thus, his theory is an attempt to think evil and new evil as well as the transformation of the modern world that was incomprehensible beyond the forms of rationality.

Arendt will challenge the scapegoat theory about Jews, they would not just harm others, but it is Nazi anti-Semitism, they are killed first and foremost because they are Jews.

Thus, she will work on the radical evil of which appears an important notion which is the concept of superfluity. From then on, there is the possibility of mass killing because at some point man is no longer anything, he is no longer a conscious being, and hence he no longer belongs to humanity. It denotes three types of concentration camps:

  • Hades: all that is in the twentieth century the management of stateless, asocial people;
  • Purgatory: it is the camps for the rehabilitation of individuals that are considered dangerous;
  • Hell: it is the extermination camp that is the death concretized by the extermination camps of the Jews.

Hell is the place of dispossession as a man, man is dispossessed first of all legally. The first thing that happens in a concentration camp is the evasion of the individual from the protection of laws. The second thing is abandonment to any regulation, the camp becomes a wild place where there is no management, aristocrats are criminals; it is the place where the personality is destroyed. The last phase is the destruction of individuality. The Nazi project as such is to make man an animal by forcing him to live in order to survive and feed himself, to make him a being without consciousness.

Jorge Semprun tells us how, in order to survive this absolute violence, he stared at a tree that represents a metaphorical mythology of freedom.

From then on, absurdity becomes the management mode to arrive at animality in order to make man lose the consciousness of solidarity that would have allowed him to survive in the camps explaining the destruction of the moral conscience of man before his assassination. It should be noted that in order to reduce human beings to the state of animals, we must reduce the ability to think about the time when we are projected into an absolute immediacy that destroys cohesion.

Hannah Arendt and the banality of evil

Adolf Eichmann in April 1961 during his trial in Jerusalem.

Arendt is going to ask about forgiveness and the Eichmann trial. Eichmann is a small Nazi civil servant, responsible for the logistics of deporting Jews from Europe. His job as a small civil servant was to supervise the trains so that they would move eastward. He will be recovered by the Israeli secret services in Argentina, taking him to Jerusalem where he will be tried.

The big question is to judge his guilt because on the count of the charge there is going to be the issue of extermination of Jews which was decided in 1942 at the Wannsee conference, however no written record has been kept.

What strikes Arendt is that Eichmann is a small civil servant who behaves like a small civil servant defending himself against the fact that he acted as a civil servant by handling the logistics of the deportation aircraft. Thus, having obeyed orders, he does not feel guilty, he has only done his duty.

Arendt's speech and say that one does not have to deal with an inhumane monster, but an ordinary man. It is not a monster because it is simply stupid not understanding the link between private individuals and universal not feeling responsible.

« We expected to meet a human monster, we had to make an ordinary man less of a monster than a clown; »

Evil is therefore ordinary. What Eichmann describes is an ordinary reality, it is something that can be in each of us who, depending on particular circumstances, can lead to the most serious crimes. Man in historical and political circumstances, if he does not have a specific consciousness he can do dramatic things. The spirit of evil watchfulness is only waiting for the right moment to push the individual into radical evil.

What the Eichmann trial shows is the banality of evil. Deep down, in the banality of evil, it happens that the individual is not in the possibility of integrating reality. His fundamental thesis is that wickedness can be caused by the absence of thought. What would have prompted Eichmann to do this is that he was unable to think about his action. Therefore, there is no action without thinking. If you don't think about the action any more, you are in the compulsion, you reproduce a device without thinking about it, then you no longer have the ability to think about your own action.

« We expected to meet a human monster, but we are dealing with an ordinary man... not so much a monster as a clown... The bad man would therefore be each of us... If he slips and drags himself into the air, he manages in historical and political circumstances to commit the greatest crimes. There is no more genius in evil than in good, but only ordinary men, in whom the spirit of evil watches over and waits for the right moment to blow and push them into radical evil, so that there is a disproportion between the evil done and the ordinary appearance of the human being who has accomplished it; »

As Professor Rémi Baudoui, admirer of Arendt, likes to point out,"THERE IS NO ACTION WITHOUT THINKING."

The concept of violence

Violence has an instrumental character, it is similar to power, but it is not man's power, power and ability to act. Violence can destroy existing power, but it is incapable of creating it.

Arendt is going to challenge Max Weber's concept of legitimate violence: we must not speak of legitimate violence because there is an illegitimate use of violence by states; on the other hand, there has never been a government based exclusively on violence, but we must speak of instrumental violence, that is to say, the use of violence as a tool for action. The use of violence or the repeated use of violence can be seen as a form of absolute powerlessness of politics.

If at some point there is only the use of violence, it is no longer political. From then on, there is a risk of substituting violence for power, that is to say, of entering into regimes of terror as Robespierre had enunciated in revolutionary terror, justifying the cycle of violence and absolute terror in order to govern in the name of morality, justice and the name of the French Republic.

Arendt's danger is that violence can in some cases become an end in itself, so it is the end of politics and politics. Thus, violence destroys power, but cannot create it.

« To sum up, it is not enough to say that power and violence should not be confused in the political sphere. Power and violence do not oppose each other by their very nature; when one of them dominates in an absolute way, the other is eliminated. Violence occurs when power is threatened, but if allowed to develop, it will eventually lead to the loss of power. As a result, non-violence should not be seen as the opposite of violence. Talking about non-violent power is actually tautology. Violence can destroy power, it is perfectly incapable of creating it. »

— Hannah Arendt, Du mensonge à la violence, trad. fr G. Durand, Paris, Calmann-Lévy, 1972, p.166

Annexes

  • Arendt, Hannah, and Dominique Séglard. "Édifier Un Monde": Interventions, 1971-1975. Paris: Éditions Du Seuil, 2007. Print.
  • Sorel, George : Reflexion sur la violence (livre)

References

  1. Sorel, Georges. Reflexions Sur La Violence. Version electronique: http://www.ultimorecurso.org.ar/drupi/files/Sorel_Reflexions_violence.pdf
  2. Jean Birnbaum (2015). Mort de René Girard, anthropologue et théoricien du « désir mimétique »Le Monde.fr. Retrieved 5 November 2015, from http://www.lemonde.fr/livres/article/2015/11/05/l-anthropologue-et-academicien-francais-rene-girard-est-mort_4803285_3260.html
  3. La Violence et le Sacré (1990), René Girard, éd. Hachette, coll. Pluriel, 2004 (ISBN 2-01-278897-1)
  4. Le Bouc émissaire, René Girard, éd. Grasset, 1982 (ISBN 2-253-03738-9)
  5. Le sacrifice, René Girard, éd. Bibliothèque Nationale, 2003, (ISBN 2-717-72263-7)