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| fr = La théorie égalitariste de la justice distributive de John Rawls | | fr = La théorie égalitariste de la justice distributive de John Rawls | ||
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== Concept VII – Overlapping consensus == | == Concept VII – Overlapping consensus == | ||
In this idea of ensuring that these diverse, all-encompassing doctrines of pluralism can nevertheless coordinate and cooperate in the acceptance of criteria of common political justice, the result of this cooperation would be what he calls the acceptance of | In this idea of ensuring that these diverse, all-encompassing doctrines of pluralism can nevertheless coordinate and cooperate in the acceptance of criteria of common political justice, the result of this cooperation would be what he calls the acceptance of a consensus by cross-checking, namely the idea that there would be a consensus that could be acceptable to the whole of this position around it, but all would agree that there would be an overlap across the board. The conceptions of individuals who have conceptions of the good may agree, but not all are based on a particular conception. All designs can support it, but you don't have to defend a design to defend this. He calls this consensus by cross-checking. | ||
Citizens have opposing religious, philosophical and moral views and affirm that political conceptions based on inclusive, different and antagonistic doctrines do not preclude political conceptions from constituting a shared viewpoint from which they can answer questions about key constitutional issues. What Rawls is interested in is defending a conception of justice that is subsequently embodied in a constitution that represents the formalization of the basic principles that govern our society. | Citizens have opposing religious, philosophical and moral views and affirm that political conceptions based on inclusive, different and antagonistic doctrines do not preclude political conceptions from constituting a shared viewpoint from which they can answer questions about key constitutional issues. What Rawls is interested in is defending a conception of justice that is subsequently embodied in a constitution that represents the formalization of the basic principles that govern our society. | ||
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If we start from the idea that the individual is an individual in the sense of Kant, a little bit of what the liberalism of Mills leads us to say, namely that we are individuals who come into the world with a disposition to autonomy, a faculty to be autonomous and we will be able to use this disposition in any social situation. With this conception, it is possible to say that any decision we make about our practices should at least be a product of an independent exercise in deciding and revising our design of the property. If we start from the idea that everything is negotiable, if we start from the idea that basically any belonging can be negotiated, that any position in relation to our religious beliefs can be negotiated, we risk harming individuals who have identities that are more inclusive and thicker than, for example, the question of whether we smoke or not. | If we start from the idea that the individual is an individual in the sense of Kant, a little bit of what the liberalism of Mills leads us to say, namely that we are individuals who come into the world with a disposition to autonomy, a faculty to be autonomous and we will be able to use this disposition in any social situation. With this conception, it is possible to say that any decision we make about our practices should at least be a product of an independent exercise in deciding and revising our design of the property. If we start from the idea that everything is negotiable, if we start from the idea that basically any belonging can be negotiated, that any position in relation to our religious beliefs can be negotiated, we risk harming individuals who have identities that are more inclusive and thicker than, for example, the question of whether we smoke or not. | ||
The question is whether it is really so easy for everyone, for any actor to join this | The question is whether it is really so easy for everyone, for any actor to join this consensus by cross-checking or does this conception of the individual who informs Rawls' position, at the end of the day, not focus too much on our Kantian and liberal understanding of the individual of his or her own autonomy and which puts itself at odds with other conceptions of the individual that would be different and that would be different? | ||
The more philosophical question is what are the philosophical but also anthropological premices about who we are as social animals, which must be implicitly posed in order to allow this consensus to be reached by | The more philosophical question is what are the philosophical but also anthropological premices about who we are as social animals, which must be implicitly posed in order to allow this consensus to be reached by cross-checking. For some people, the Rawls cross-check consensus is basically a way of preserving the power of the powerful by asking minorities somewhere to accept the terms of this justice, which is presented as political and acceptable to everyone, but which in reality is going in the direction of some cultural groups to the detriment of others. This is typical of multiculturalist criticism. Multiculturalism says that it doesn't work because we don't know what cultures do when the very idea of political justice doesn't make sense. One could imagine that these groups would exclude themselves from politics. | ||
Rawls' approach is interesting if we accept all this idea that we have to agree on a political concept, but basically what is the reason for this agreement? The communities will say that without a somewhat thicker conception of the good, one cannot defend this motivation to accept the political conception. This conception of the good that we need to do more will make sectarian theory and we start again the quest for the theory that would allow us to base politics. | Rawls' approach is interesting if we accept all this idea that we have to agree on a political concept, but basically what is the reason for this agreement? The communities will say that without a somewhat thicker conception of the good, one cannot defend this motivation to accept the political conception. This conception of the good that we need to do more will make sectarian theory and we start again the quest for the theory that would allow us to base politics. | ||
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Finally, does Rawls' conception of what Rawls has in mind work from an anthropological point of view, are we able to systematically separate things within ourselves between what is right and what is right? Is it not inevitable that this conception of the righteous does not hold because it will be torn between the different conceptions of the good that the actor will have to face? | Finally, does Rawls' conception of what Rawls has in mind work from an anthropological point of view, are we able to systematically separate things within ourselves between what is right and what is right? Is it not inevitable that this conception of the righteous does not hold because it will be torn between the different conceptions of the good that the actor will have to face? | ||
= Involvement of the difference principle = | =Involvement of the difference principle= | ||
This is one of the important points of Rawls' theory of justice which is the critique of meritocracy. In his theory of justice, Rawls contests utilitarianism and thus the sacrificial idea, but also the meritocratic criterion for the adjudication of justice. It's the idea that if we deserve what we have, it's right that we keep it. For Rawls, this idea of individual merit is unfounded. It starts from the idea that our talents, that the resources that allow us to be deserving are already the product of forms of collective cooperation. For him, individual merit is morally arbitrary because, on the one hand, we have no merit in having the talents we have, and very generally, this merit presupposes social preconditions. There is not something morally relevant in individual merit. Rawls questions this meritocratic principle. For Rawls, at a time when there is something that comes from cooperation among the individuals who make up a society in the production of merit and therefore some people's wealth, it is perfectly legitimate to tax them so that the poorest people can benefit from it. | |||
This is one of the important points of Rawls' theory of justice which is the critique of meritocracy. | |||
The question that arises is whether the justification of taxation activity is legitimate, whether it is legitimate to appropriate a part of the wealth produced freely by individuals and redistribute it, and does the interference that the State might have in taking part in research to reproduce wealth is basically tantamount to calling into question the free production of the wealth of individuals? Rawls' criticism is that nothing justifies questioning the intrinsic freedom that all actors carry in the name of redistribution. | The question that arises is whether the justification of taxation activity is legitimate, whether it is legitimate to appropriate a part of the wealth produced freely by individuals and redistribute it, and does the interference that the State might have in taking part in research to reproduce wealth is basically tantamount to calling into question the free production of the wealth of individuals? Rawls' criticism is that nothing justifies questioning the intrinsic freedom that all actors carry in the name of redistribution. | ||
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*Hinton, T., (ed.), 2015, The Original Position, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. | *Hinton, T., (ed.), 2015, The Original Position, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. | ||
*Kukathas, C., (ed.), 2003, John Rawls: Critical Assessments of Leading Political Philosophers, 4 vol., London: Routledge. | *Kukathas, C., (ed.), 2003, John Rawls: Critical Assessments of Leading Political Philosophers, 4 vol., London: Routledge. | ||
*Lloyd, S., (ed.), 1994, John Rawls's Political Liberalism, Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 75 (special double issue). | *Lloyd, S., (ed.), 1994, John Rawls's Political Liberalism, Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 75 (special double issue). | ||
*Lovett, F., 2011, Rawls's A Theory of Justice: A Reader's Guide, London: Continuum. | *Lovett, F., 2011, Rawls's A Theory of Justice: A Reader's Guide, London: Continuum. |