Modification de Kas yra nevalstybinis smurtas? Afganistano konflikto atvejis
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| fr = Qu’est-ce que la violence non-étatique ? Le cas des conflits afghans | | fr = Qu’est-ce que la violence non-étatique ? Le cas des conflits afghans | ||
| es = ¿Qué es la violencia no estatal? El caso del conflicto afgano | | es = ¿Qué es la violencia no estatal? El caso del conflicto afgano | ||
| | | lt = Kas yra nevalstybinis smurtas? Afganistano konflikto atvejis | ||
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Būtų lengva pasakyti, kad tai galioja ne tik Afganistanui, nes ten buvo keletas bandymų sukurti centrinę valdžią. Tarptautinis kontekstas neleidžia įgyvendinti šios sekos. Pasak Gilles'io Dorronsoro, bent jau iki sovietų pasitraukimo 1989 m. dėl žiaurios konkurencijos ir pilietinio karo mudžahedinų vadai vieni kitus naikino, kol buvo sukurta santykinė vidaus smurto monopolija - Talibano valstybė. Su Talibano iškilimu įžengiame į labai elesianišką logiką, kuri atsikratys savo priešininkų, kad įvestų vidaus smurto monopolį. | Būtų lengva pasakyti, kad tai galioja ne tik Afganistanui, nes ten buvo keletas bandymų sukurti centrinę valdžią. Tarptautinis kontekstas neleidžia įgyvendinti šios sekos. Pasak Gilles'io Dorronsoro, bent jau iki sovietų pasitraukimo 1989 m. dėl žiaurios konkurencijos ir pilietinio karo mudžahedinų vadai vieni kitus naikino, kol buvo sukurta santykinė vidaus smurto monopolija - Talibano valstybė. Su Talibano iškilimu įžengiame į labai elesianišką logiką, kuri atsikratys savo priešininkų, kad įvestų vidaus smurto monopolį. | ||
== | == Afghan Wars (1989 to the Present) and Paradoxes of Non-State Violence == | ||
[[Fichier:Guerre afghane 1.png|vignette]] | [[Fichier:Guerre afghane 1.png|vignette]] | ||
The emergence of Afghanistan's Mullah Omar is approaching a form of competition between actors with the Taliban, who will impose themselves on others and establish a monopoly on domestic violence. We are far from a strong state, but it must be pointed out that, at the level of the monopoly on domestic violence, the process was advanced. | |||
Contrary to previous regimes, the Taliban, despite an apparent greater interest in religion than in politics, have managed to impose a relative monopoly on domestic violence. But it was their loss of control over external violence that led to their downfall after 9/11. The Taliban relied heavily on foreign fighters to impose the monopoly of domestic violence with the onset of resource accumulation and at the same time, these non-state actors committed attacks outside Afghanistan's borders. Since then, the cycle of violence in Afghanistan has resumed a sequence as after 1989 with an invasion, insurgencies, counter-insurgency in the context of a civil war. These are elements that can refer to Charles Tilly and Norbert Elias. | |||
[[Fichier:Monopole fragile état afghan 1.png|left|vignette]] | [[Fichier:Monopole fragile état afghan 1.png|left|vignette]] | ||
" | The "Herat warlord" challenged the central government of Harmid Kharzai. It has its own security forces, raised its own taxes, had its own social services and a justice system. All this outside the competence of the central power. One could then say that Amir Ismail Khan controls his own state if there were not strong competition between him and the central government. In 2004, the Afghan army and Khan forces clashed. Khan lost and he was appointed Energy Minister becoming a member of a government he had fought against until then. | ||
Ismail Khan asks a question about the state's definition of Maw Weber, which is that the monopoly of legitimate violence claimed by the state is always territorialized. It is a monopoly on legitimate violence in a given territory. By varying the play of scales, perhaps the so-called "collapsing state" situations are actually the constitution of several states. If we look at the scale of a neighbourhood or a street, there is a monopoly on violence and there can be a state. Networks of interdependencies make it impossible in the long term to impose a monopoly of legitimate violence that is not contested by a central power or an actor who wants to take over the central power. The territorial dimension is very important and the territory is not simply a spatial scale that we want to vary. The territory is also defined by chains of interdependencies. | |||
After the intervention in 2011, first with an American-British coalition enlarged to NATO in 2003, there was a regionalization of power on the scale of Afghanistan, as well as a regionalization of power between 1993 and 1996. Since 2001, warlords have been controlling the big cities. Warlords control the security, fiscal and political apparatus of an entire province by exercising power from one of Afghanistan's major cities. For example, Amir Ismail Khan has a private army, he levies taxes, provides a number of public services and legitimately administers justice with the consent of the parties to the dispute and relies on his security forces. It can be said that he has his own state, there is a monopoly of legitimate violence on the province of Herat. It is interesting to note that the term "warlord" refers to medieval lords. | |||
The reason why it is better to talk about fragmentation of the monopoly of legitimate violence at the Afghan level is that the interdependency networks linking warlords together are never called into question. There are very important commercial exchanges on the Afghan scale, communications networks are dense and material interdependencies, there are also very strong symbolic interdependencies networks linked to the fact that Amir Ismail Khan can never challenge his Afghan identity and cannot define an identity specific to the province of Erat. Although he strongly contests and criticizes the central government in Kabul, this challenge is part of a strategic opposition between Amir Ismail Khan and Harmid Kharzai showing that he is not thinking as a sovereign on his territory. Its ultimate goal is to strengthen its power in Erat province to take over the capital and take control of the entire Afghan territory. One is not simply in a configuration where there are several monopolies of legitimate violence, but warlords are in constant struggle for central power, distinguishing it from a classical inter-state configuration. In 2004, the Afghan army and Ismail Khan's forces confronted each other and Ismail Khan lost. In 2004, the central government of Kharzai tried to consolidate its monopoly of legitimate power and took control of the Erat region. In the Afghan context of the time, losing to central power meant losing political autonomy from central power and being incorporated into central power. Ismail Khan's integration into the Afghan government after his military defeat marks his defeat in terms of autonomy and independence. | |||
The question is what will happen to Afghanistan in the short or medium term, because at the end of 2014, NATO's mission will withdraw from the country, but there will still be a force of 30,000 American and Alliance troops in another mission. At the same time, military forces are being reduced, while American support for the Afghan police and army is gradually being reduced. The question is whether the new president will succeed in consolidating his monopoly of legitimate violence on the Afghan territory, or whether we will have a return to fragmentation dynamics or even regionalization around the big cities, or whether there will be a regime change that would overthrow power in Kabul. Today, many actors in Afghanistan intend to continue to play a role and ensure that the current post-2001 post-construction remige remains in place. The question is whether there will be a continuation of the civil war or fragmentation dynamics. There are two scenarios, i. e. the same as the one in which Ahmed Shah's Empire was in the 18th century with non-state violence and fragmentation, or the one observed after the soviets left with a civil war between several competitors until the last one was imposed. | |||
= | = Annexes = | ||
*“How Do People Rebel? Mechanisms of Insurgent Alliance Formation.” The Graduate Institute of International and Development Studies, http://www.graduateinstitute.ch/home/research/research-news.html/_/news/research/2018/how-do-people-rebel-mechanisms-o | *“How Do People Rebel? Mechanisms of Insurgent Alliance Formation.” The Graduate Institute of International and Development Studies, http://www.graduateinstitute.ch/home/research/research-news.html/_/news/research/2018/how-do-people-rebel-mechanisms-o | ||
= | = References = | ||
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