Modification de Subjects of international law: States

{{Infobox Lecture
 | image = 
 | cours =
 | faculté = 
 | département = 
 | professeurs = [[Robert Kolb]] 
 | années = 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014, 2015
 | code =
 | enregistrement = 
 | précédent = 
 | suivant =
}}

The term "subject" has a very particular meaning in law. It refers to an entity that may have rights and duties in a particular legal system. Thus, one can be a subject of Swiss or international law, the subject is a holder according to the legal order.

= The legal definition of the State =
The main subjects of international law are States. The very first thing to do is to define it because the State has its own legal definition. No matter what sociologists, historians, political scientists call a state, in international law there is a definition of its own.

For example, Geneva is a State, but not in the sense of international law, it is based on the Swiss legal order. It is worth taking a closer look.

A State, as defined by international law, is defined by four cumulative qualities, an entity that wants to be a State must have four characteristics:
#a population
#a territory
#a government
#the entity has sovereignty
This gives the following definition in a nutshell: the State is an entity composed of a population, a territory, a government and which is sovereign.

The first three elements do not deserve much comment because they are always on the margins of sociology and law, because law is grafted onto a real fact. When describing a population and a territory, we navigate between sociological facts and the legal qualification we give it.

The sovereignty criterion is a legal concept that merits further comment.

== Population ==
A state is not only a virgin space like the territory of the Moon or Jupiter, although this planet is composed only of gas. For a state, you need people, it is the physical basis for the existence of a state.

The population is not everything to everyone who lives in the territory of a State, because on that account there are also people who are in Antarctica, but who are not a State.

What matters is the persons linked to the State by a link of nationality. There is a population of the State when there is a person possessing the nationality of that State. The manner in which nationality is acquired or lost is regulated in principle by domestic law.

There are no minimum limits in the population of a state, there are no rules. There are micro-States, including island States, that are being lost due to rising water levels.

A very special case would be that of the Vatican City. There are various theories, but a whole multitude of people accept that the Vatican City is a State under the 1929 Lateran Treaties, if it is a State it is a very particular State from the point of view of population, because the Vatican City has some functional passports, but does not have automatically its own nationals, because each national has the nationality of his country of origin.

Whether it is multi-ethnic states where the population is partly nomadic, this has no influence, these are sociological facts that do not deprive the state of its population.

== Territory ==
The State consists of a territory while the population is the physical basis of the State, the territory is the spatial basis of the State.

The state manifests itself in space, it occupies a portion of space in the world. Moreover, populations that have suffered diasporas are well aware of the importance of the territory and the attachment that populations have shown to their territory.

=== How is the territory defined from a legal point of view? ===
 
First of all, we need to have a common mistake that is to think that space is something flat. Space, therefore the territory of the State, is a three-dimensional space, namely the flat dimension and everything in the air and in the subsoil.
 
=== If the space has the flat and vertical dimension that it has exactly in the flat and vertical dimension? ===
With regard to the flat dimension, the territory of the State includes the continental territory, i.e. the territory on which one can walk, including lakes and rivers, but also internal waters such as, for example, ports and the territorial sea, which can extend under the law of the sea and the 1982 Convention on the Law of the Sea to 12,000 seafarers from the low tide lines.

Everything that happens in these 12 nautical miles happens on the State's territory, but ships can transit, including warships in peacetime that must announce themselves, while military submarines must come to the surface and tuck in the flag.

Beyond the territorial sea, the territory stops. If the coastal State has other maritime areas, this does not constitute its territory, it is the parts of the sea in which it has certain specific rights, namely the contiguous zone from 12,000 seafarers, i.e. 12,000 more or 24,000 seafarers. Exclusive economic zones give rise to certain rights to explore and exploit resources, and no other State may engage in activities there.

However, in these areas the rights are limited, foreign states have certain rights in the exclusive economic zone outside economic exploitation.

Borders stop at the borders of the territory, i.e. at the land borders and at the territorial sea. As for the two vertical dimensions, it is not necessary to waste time defining them.

The question of how far the State border extends vertically has never been found to be necessary to be determined. In practice, any activity that involves air so that means of air transport can circulate, in any space where there are aircraft activities, is the territory of the underlying State.

Everything that is not based on the existence of air as a means of circulation, namely the lowest orbit of satellites, outer space form is a common space for States and there is no sovereignty.

It is obvious that the State can exploit its mineral resources located underground, there has never been a need to ask how far we can go, because some limits cannot be reached. In reality, territorial sovereignty below the territory goes as far as the state can theoretically exist.

We can have very small micro-States in square kilometres, there is no minimum size. The Vatican City is a separate subject from the Holy See, the Holy See is undoubtedly a subject of international law.

A state may have enclaves within a foreign state such as Portugal in India until 1962 - 1963, even in Switzerland cantons have enclaves in other cantons.

The boundaries of the territory do not have to be totally and definitively defined. In other words, disputes over the extent of the territory or the location of certain borders do not mean that some States do not own a territory, it is sufficient for the State to exercise its effective authority over a territory of the globe even if its borders are contested.

Israel has a territory on which it applies its public power even if almost all its borders are contested.

It is not a question of territory, when we are talking about an artificially created space such as, for example, maritime oil platforms that have a special regime.

== Government ==
We need effective and exclusive government. These words have their meanings, the word actually has their meaning, the government must exercise state functions and it must be exclusive, which means that it is this government and it alone that exercises state functions to the exclusion of any other state.
 
=== What are the state functions? ===
Central state functions: taxes, police, courts, external security, civil registers, etc. are the prerogatives of public authority exercised by the government.

Sometimes it may be doubtful if a sufficiently effective government exists and this doubt may crystallize in different directions. Thus, it may have been doubtful that there was a government when it came to territories populated by tribes that gathered at conferences through their leaders and the question was whether it formed a sufficient government.
 
In the question of Western Sahara<ref>[http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/61/6195.pdf Sahara occidental,  avis consultatif; C.I.J. Recueil 1975, p. 12.] (COUR INTERNATIONALE DE JUSTICE  RECUEIL DES ARRÊTS,  AVIS CONSULTATIFS ET ORDONNANCES  SAHARA OCCIDENTAL  AVIS CONSULTATIF DU 16 OCTOBRE 1975)</ref> the question was whether or not the tribes at the time of colonization and even after that who were on this territory formed a government. The Court struggled with the issue because we do not want to calibrate Western models on African territory and on the other hand the government has its own legal definition.
 
The Court stated in paragraph 149<ref>[http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/61/6195.pdf Sahara occidental,  avis consultatif; C.I.J. Recueil 1975, p. 12.] (COUR INTERNATIONALE DE JUSTICE  RECUEIL DES ARRÊTS,  AVIS CONSULTATIFS ET ORDONNANCES  SAHARA OCCIDENTAL  AVIS CONSULTATIF DU 16 OCTOBRE 1975)"Dans la présente affaire, les renseignements dont la Cour dispose  montrent qu'au moment de la colonisation espagnole il existait de nombreux  liens d'ordre racial, linguistique, religieux, culturel et économique entre des  tribus et émirats dont les populations habitaient la région saharienne qui fait  aujourd'hui partie du territoire du Sahara occidental et de la République  islamique de Mauritanie. Cependant ces renseignements révèlent aussi  l'indépendance des émirats et de nombre de ces tribus les uns à l'égard  des autres et, malgré certaines formes d'activité commune, l'absence  d'institutions ou d'organes, même réduits au minimum, qui leur auraient été  commun. La Cour ne peut donc conclure que les éléments en sa possession  permettent de considérer que les émirats et tribus existant dans la région  constituaient, suivant une autre expression utilisée par la Cour dans l'affaire  de la Réparation des dommages subis au service des Nations Unies, « une  entité capable d'être bénéficiaire d'obligations incombant à ses membres »  (ibid., p. 178). Que l'on définisse l'ensemble mauritanien comme le Bilad Chinguitti, ou comme la nation chinguittienne ainsi que la Mauritanie le  suggère, ou encore comme une forme de ligue ou d'association, la difficulté  demeure qu'il n'avait pas le caractère d'une personne ou d'une entité  juridique distincte des divers émirats et tribus qui le constituaient. On ne peut  donc accepter la thèse suivant laquelle le il ad Chinguiti aurait été une  « entité » ou un « ensemble » mauritanien jouissant d'une certaine forme de souveraineté au Sahara occidental"</ref> the criterion that common superior bodies are needed in order to have governments, a simple conference is not enough, common superior bodies are needed.

=== What are the consequences of the situation? ===
In the case of the failing-states, the government has collapsed, there is no longer a government as there was in Somalia.

International law makes a very clear distinction between the formation of a new State and the maintenance of a constituted State.

To maintain a government, a government is needed, even if it is sometimes difficult to determine whether the government is effective, because the government can impose its authority in a transitional manner.

When it comes to maintaining an already constituted state, if there is a population, a state and no government, this argument is not supported; the state is maintained against "winds and tides". Somalia had its state at the United Nations in the 1990s.

=== Why do we maintain a state? ===
If from the legal point of view one accepts the argument that a state no longer exists because the government has collapsed then the territory would become a territory without a master and it would be taken over by the first one to come.

We do not want this by virtue of the principle of self-determination of peoples that is imposed in modern law, it is this fiction that prevails, because we do not want the territory to become a territory without a master subject to appropriation.

The type of government is traditionally indifferent to general international law, whether it is a democracy, a dictatorship, a royalty, a theocracy, etc. It is an internal matter and has no impact on its existence. In the field of human rights, the distinction is constant.

= Sovereignty from the perspective of international law =
We will only talk about sovereignty in the legal sense of the term, we can use the word "sovereignty" in a whole other series of sciences and with different connotations. We will only discuss the legal meaning of this term.

In international law, sovereignty is the ultimate decision-making power, the power to decide in the last resort.

In other words, it is the fact that, with regard to a jurisdiction, there are no human authorities superior to "us", if that is the case, we are sovereign. There is no recourse, no organ, no human body that is not superior and that attracts the decision to it. If there is someone superior, he is the sovereign.

There are no higher human organs or bodies. Sovereignty only concerns the fact of deciding, it is necessary to consider if someone else can decide for him/her, it is "someone" of a superior who decides.

Sovereignty is necessary and compatible with international law. Just because a State is sovereign does not mean that it is not subject to international law, the State is a normative order, it is the State itself that decides to apply international law, whether it applies it or not.

Sovereignty is compatible with the existence of a higher legal order, because it is international law itself that recognizes and organizes the sovereignty of States. It would be contradictory to seek to free sovereignty from international law.

However, this does not mean that we are free to ignore international law, because it would mean that it is not binding, it simply remains the de facto power to violate international law.

Some authors reject this term, because they believe that this term has been abused too much in the past, so they have proposed another conceptualization, it is the Vienna School with Hans Kelsen.

The state has international immediacy. This means that the State in the sense of international law is subject only to international law and to nothing else there is nothing between the State and international law, it is subject to nothing but international law. We find the idea that no one decides for someone else, the only thing we are subject to is superior law.

The image of immediacy subject only to international law also explains why a federated state such as the canton of Geneva is considered a state within the meaning of Swiss federal law because it has a population, a territory, and a government, but it is not a state within the meaning of international law because between Geneva and international law there is something that is federal law, so Geneva is not only subject to international law, but also to federal law. In this sense, Geneva is not sovereign and therefore is not a State in the sense of international law, but a State in the sense of Swiss law by a long tradition.

In Switzerland, it is said that the cantons are sovereign. It is a concept of sovereignty of Swiss federal law. We must keep in mind that sovereignty is the ultimate decision-making power, but not freedom from a higher legal order, at the same time if we can decide in the last resort then we are sovereign.

When the state is constituted, the existence of the state is fictionally maintained even if the government fails for a period of time until the state is dissolved.

The same is obviously not true for the territory and the population, a state that is without territory and population, so it disappears in the same way as if it were dissolved, as was the case, for example, in Yugoslavia.

The fiction of state maintenance is only in the case of a temporary failure of the state.

It may happen in a State without governmental functions that an international civil administration of the United Nations is sent, however, under no circumstances is this administration sovereign over the territory, the United Nations does not acquire territories, but administers them in order to return them. The policy of the United Nations is never to want to stay very long, because a government could fail on the United Nations.

In sovereignty there are still some points that can be added, some of which are quite thorny.

== The degree of independence that sovereignty implies ==
Sovereignty is the power to decide in the last resort on matters that concern the prerogatives of the state, but what is the degree of independence?

This raises the question of the degree of independence, for example there are extreme cases where independence is totally lacking, as in the case of puppet states that are purely remote-controlled states, we establish a façade of independent government, but in reality this supposedly independent government and remote-controlled by another.

The classic example is the Manchukuo state created in 1932 by the Japanese on Manchuria, but under Chinese allegiance. There was absolutely nothing independent about this state. Such a State is not a State in the sense of international law, it lacks sovereignty, the ultimate decision-making power is lacking.

Apart from these extreme cases, the practice is quite liberal, it does not require a very high degree of independence in order for a sovereign state to exist and are proof of this the USSR's areas of influence in Eastern Europe. These states could decide on a whole series of issues autonomously, but on a whole series of issues they could decide autonomously whether they were ready for the Soviet tanks to land.

The practice has been very liberal, it is enough to have a minimum of autumnal decisions, which is the minimum power of independence that is the one you do not have when you are a puppet state and more particularly a "puppet entity" since it is precisely not a state. For any non-remote-controlled state, it is considered a state.

== Another issue related to independence and sovereignty is that there must be a willingness to be independent and sovereign in order to be independent ==
Sometimes an entity, at least for a long time, does not consider itself an independent state, but considers itself part of an existing territory or state with the legitimate government, as in the case of mainland China and Taiwan. National China considers that they do not form a separate state even if they are; this problem was considered a problem of government legitimacy.

There is this question of the legitimacy of the government which is superimposed on the other questions, it may happen that a State cannot be considered as a sovereign State if it does not assert it itself.

== Then there is the problem of federal integrations ==
There are groups that do not integrate very well, as was the case in Switzerland. The federal process raises the question that when entities come closer together, they remain independent; they form States in the sense of international law, but at some point we switch to the federal State and it can be difficult to determine sovereignty; sovereignty can be lost in stages, it can become fragmented, decision-making power can be gradually lost.

If the European Union is to integrate, there will be transfers to Brussels. The integration process exposes that sovereignty can exist by degree in the sense that it is gradually ceded. This raises a question of degree. The major decisions in Europe are taken by national states, so there can be no doubt that they are sovereign states.

== From a legal point of view, sovereignty is really at home in conjunction with territory, which means that it is mainly on its territory that the State has its sovereignty ==
Sovereignty is at its peak, "I dictate what happens on my territory precisely because it is my territory".

Everything is reversed, however, from an extraterritorial point of view, sovereignty is in need of justification, to assert extraterritorial jurisdiction requires more specific titles, it is not enough to assert sovereignty.

There are cases where sovereignty can be asserted.

Imagine ships flying the Swiss flag in the high seas, if we want to do acts of sovereignty over this ship in Antarctica we could do so it is extraterritorial, but there are recognized titles. If we are in another state, sovereignty is bent in favour of the other, it would be denying the sovereignty of the other, if we do acts of sovereignty over another state we do not give it the ultimate decision-making power, we decide in its place.

One last remark on sovereignty is a remark on terminology, it is true that terminology is not entirely fixed.

== The conclusion of an agreement, i.e. a treaty, is always an act of sovereignty ==
We are free to conclude it or not to conclude it, we can also modulate it through reservations. Then, we ratify or not, it is here that sovereignty is exercised, there is the ultimate decision to accept or not these standards; we decide in the last resort.

Once accepted, one is no longer as free legally as before, one has rights, but also obligations that one owes to the other State; one will say that the subjective positions of this State have been increased.

This limits his freedom of action, inclines his freedom of action to a certain direction, it does not affect his sovereignty, he is no less sovereign since he has accepted the treaty. There is the question of whether or not to accept the treaty, which is a question of sovereignty and is a freedom of last resort, then there is the freedom of action, which is reduced on the one hand and increased on the other, but does not affect sovereignty, because we have been free to choose it.

=The powers=
Basically the term "competence" is better even in French, but in English the term "power" is used, so the term "pouvoir" is also a bridge to Anglo-Saxon vocabulary.

However, according to the authors, a whole series of distinctions can be made between "power" and "competence". We will consider that each of these two terms is equivalent.

Sovereignty is not only a power to make the ultimate decisions, it also has a whole series of particular consequences. Sovereignty forms norms of international law, sovereignty in action is the power to decide, sovereignty is also a norm that guarantees the State this ultimate decision-making power.

This norm of sovereignty gives rise to a whole series of normative concretizations, or other norms that are added to sovereignty such as State immunities; the State enjoys immunities from the civil and criminal jurisdiction of other States. The French President cannot be compelled to go to a Swiss court. Another example is the protection of internal affairs, i.e. the non-intervention in internal affairs, which protects the power to decide independently and to conduct a policy of its own.

Competences also derive from sovereignty, the State has competences because it is sovereign, the State has its competences originally, it does not acquire them because it has been given them.

The United Nations has no power over Geneva, all the powers of the United Nations are derived from the Charter of the United Nations, so that they can do something, it must be recognized in the Charter.

The State can automatically act, it does not need to be given a competence to possess it, it originally possesses it. The State has the original competence which is inherent in sovereignty, so sovereignty extends into a very concrete power of action, the power to decide in the last resort is concretized in the various actions of the State.

What are the competencies of a state?

There are basically three types of skills, but not all of them are of primary importance.
*territorial competences: it is the competence to take action on its territory.
*people skills: the ability to do things in relation to its nationals.
*gear-related skills: skills exercised on ships flying its flag or outer spacecraft.
 
On peut se pose la question de savoir qu’est-ce qu’une compétence ?

Jurisdiction is simply a legal power. There is a power that is recognized by a standard of right to act in a certain sense, it is a competence. We mainly speak of "competences" in the public domain, we will speak of "powers" in a more neutral sense.

It is a power to do something recognized by law; you can do something, but it is recognized by a legal standard.

== Territorial jurisdiction ==
Sometimes we say territorial sovereignty. This territorial jurisdiction has two components, the second and most important of which is:
*the plenitude
*the exclusivity
 
Territorial jurisdiction is distinguished by its fullness and exclusivity. Plenitude is turned towards the interior of the state, exclusivity and turned towards other states, i.e. the exterior of the state.
 
== What is plenitude? ==
It is a legal presumption that the State has full competence to do any act on its territory unless prohibited by international law. It is assumed that the State has all the jurisdiction on its territory. This is what distinguishes a State from an international organization. The State automatically has all the powers on its territory, it must not be given power, it already has it, it can only limit it afterwards.

On the contrary, an international organization is based on the principle of specialization, it only has competences that are attributed to it.

From the new skills acquired by the State in terms of new technologies, it is obvious that the State automatically has the power to regulate, take administrative measures and submit activities that take place on its territory. They have all the powers except those prohibited by international law and therefore those that States have agreed to renounce.

== What is exclusivity? ==
This is a very important point, a masterpiece of public international law; it is the fact that the State on its territory is the only one to the exclusion of all others that can act as a public authority on that territory. In Switzerland, it is only Switzerland that can perform acts of public authority to the exclusion of any other State.

This rule of territorial impermeability is obviously quite fundamental, because it makes it possible to explain and delimit the sovereignty of one in relation to the jurisdiction and sovereignty of the other.

Modern international law is based on territorial States, so one can do acts of sovereignty over one's territory, but one must refrain from doing so over others. It is a basic principle, the delimitation of each person's spheres, sovereignty over their own territory and not that of others and certain rights over common spaces.

The rule is indeed very important and that is why there are very strong positions in the case law; the International Court of Justice has been able to insist on this rule several times.

In the 1927 Lotus case, a ship with this name, Series A number X page 18<ref>PUBLICATIONS DE LA COUR PERMANENTE DE JUSTICE  INTERNATIONALE  SÉRIE A - N10;  Le 7 septembre 1927 - [http://www.icj-cij.org/pcij/serie_A/A_10/30_Lotus_Arret.pdf RECUEIL DES ARRETS  AFFAIRE DU « LOTUS »])</ref>, 

"apart from the primary limitation imposed by international law on the State is to exclude - unless there is a permissive rule to the contrary - any exercise of its power in the territory of another State. In this sense, jurisdiction is certainly territorial; it could not be exercised outside the territory, except by virtue of a permissive rule deriving from customary international law or a convention.

The current Court in the Corfu Channel case<ref>AFFAIRE DU DÉTROIT DE CORFOU (FOND) - arrêt du 9 avril 1949; [http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/1/1646.pdf Résumés des arrêts, avis consultatifs et ordonnances de la Cour internationale de Justice - Document non officiel]</ref><ref>COUR INTERNATIONALE DE JUSTICE  RECUEIL  DES ARRÊTS, AVIS CONSULTATIFS ET ORDONNANCES -  [http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/1/1644.pdf AFFAIRE DU DETROIT  DE CORFOU  (FOND)] -  ARRET DU 9 AVRIL 1949</ref> at page 35 of 1949 states that "between independent States, respect for territorial sovereignty is one of the essential foundations of international relations and international law also requires respect for political integrity".

We must see how far this goes because the principle has a scope of surprising importance and density.

== There are activities that violate the exclusivity of the State's territorial jurisdiction ==

=== Abduction on foreign territory ===
A State sends agents to the territory of another State to abduct a person and bring him or her into the territory of the sponsoring State. The Eichmann case is most famous when Israel sent agents to Argentina to capture and kidnap Eichmann on trial in the Jerusalem district.

In this case, there was obviously a violation of Argentina's territorial sovereignty, so the Security Council found this violation and Israel apologized; the Argentine did not insist on seeing Eichmann's background.

Whether a person who has been abducted can be tried in the territory to which he or she has been brought depends on domestic law, there are States where this is not possible, because the police are refused the opportunity to make arbitrary arrests, and in a whole series of other States domestic law allows persons captured by methods contrary to international law to be tried.

=== Fraudulent acts to kidnap an individual in order to circumvent extradition measures ===
Undercover German state agents may invite a German to Zurich to arrest him. This type of fraudulent labour has been convicted several times. This type of violation of territorial sovereignty is done by circumventing extradition measures, by fraudulent labour by circumventing the possibility of deciding in the last instance.

In the Federal Court Decision ATF 117 I 337 it is stipulated: "the rule of good faith prohibits a State from using coercion or deception to seize a person it seeks and who is staying in the territory of another State where he or she would enjoy extradition immunity. Any improper machination to remove an individual from such immunity in order to bring him or her to the territory of the pursuing State or to the territory of another State which would in principle be obliged to extradite him or her shall be prohibited. The requested State to whose territory a person has been attracted by such procedures has a duty not to condone them by accepting an extradition request from the offending State"<ref>[http://jumpcgi.bger.ch/cgi-bin/JumpCGI?id=BGE-117-IB-337&lang=fr 117 Ib 337]  - Extrait de l'arrêt de la Ire Cour de droit public du 14 octobre 1991 dans la cause P. contre Office fédéral de la police (recours de droit administratif)</ref>.

=== Investigations and all forms of evidence gathering ===
Some persons may be directly agents of a foreign State or sometimes persons who do not have a direct link with a foreign State, such as a lawyer who performs acts reserved for mutual legal assistance.

With regard to agents sent abroad, in Switzerland, it happened during Mitterrand's time to see massive capital leaks from France; there were customs investigations in Switzerland in order to discover bank accounts of French nationals, but this was a violation of Switzerland's territoriality jurisdiction, because France had acquired extraterritoriality jurisdiction.

In the context of a lawyer in a federal case, a certain H against Zurich had investigated and gathered evidence in the context of an investigation in Australia. This Zurich lawyer was convicted and confirmed by the Federal Court on the basis of the Federal Criminal Code because his acts had the nature of acts of mutual legal assistance and therefore of public authority for the benefit of a foreign State.

These acts are reserved for mutual legal assistance authorities, the foreign State must make a request for it to investigate and collect evidence in the context of mutual legal assistance, otherwise it is a violation of the sovereignty of the Swiss Confederation, which is punishable under the federal code.

=== Sending official documents abroad by mail ===
Sending official documents such as a letter of obligation to appear before a criminal or civil court is an act of public authority, it cannot be done by sending a letter abroad unless there is authorization through agreements, again, such court shipments are made through mutual legal assistance bodies. All this is done through state bodies.
 
=== Exercise of voting rights abroad and postal voting ===
If it is by correspondence, it is part of the official sending of documents abroad, but votes can be made in embassies or consulates, voting is an act of public authority, it is only granted in the case of agreements.

In 1989, the practice of the Swiss State changed by admitting that there is a vote in embassies. The embassy is not part of foreign territory, the embassy is in the territory of the host state, but there are immunities, so the territory of an embassy is part of the host country.

Switzerland feared that with many foreigners there would be fairly "active" campaigns and violence on its territory, particularly in the case of the Cold War; in a declaration of 12 April 1989, the Swiss Confederation motivated the change in practice and reserved the right to return to this practice.

=== Tax collection ===
Raising taxes is an act of public authority. Taxes cannot be levied on foreign territory, for example through an embassy.

There was a dispute between the federal authorities and the Embassy of Bosnia and Herzegovina. From 1992 to 1995, there was the Bosnian war, it happened that the diplomatic representation of Bosnia and Herzegovina levied a war tax on Yugoslav nationals in Switzerland.

Bosnia found it a good idea to levy a tax in Switzerland on Bosnian nationals in order to finance the war effort. However, the federal authorities became aware of this practice by sending a letter to the embassy stating that the tax levy was illegal.

What about the protection of nationals in the broader sense of the term, i.e. a quasi-consular service that advises its nationals and promotes its culture?

There were such centres in accordance with Italian law under a 1985 law. Italy wanted to maintain contact with its nationals.

Were these Italian immigration committees contrary to the exclusivity of Swiss territorial sovereignty?

The conclusion was that these immigration committees were not contrary to the integrity of Swiss sovereignty since they were not activities of public authority, advising nationals is not an act of public authority.

Territorial integrity and exclusivity are not simply a matter of invasion by military forces, but a much more subtle issue; states are concerned about territorial sovereignty and suspect every time a foreign state wants to commit an act of public authority on its territory with, possibly, reprehensible practices that may endanger its authority.

At the same time, such a rigid principle of territorial impermeability has never been practicable and is even less so today in a period of globalization; however, there are a whole series of exceptions:

=== Exceptions based on treaties or agreements === 
Treaties are written texts whereas an agreement is not necessarily written. There is a whole series of agreements that provide for exceptions, including massive exceptions to territorial integrity and exclusive territorial jurisdiction, such as:
*military bases
Military bases around the world that are sometimes based on agreements by stipulating the good will of the adversary through more or less gentle pressures or through agreements concluded entirely freely, such as Japan in the 1950s, then surrounded by communist states, with the exception of nationalist China, which did not have any military influence.
*customs agreements
In 1923, there was an agreement between Switzerland and Liechtenstein in the field of customs activities, Liechtenstein devolved customs to Switzerland, which makes acts of sovereignty over another territory without calling into question Liechtenstein's territorial sovereignty.

=== Ad-hoc permission outside an agreement or treaty ===
These are special permissions for foreign authorities to carry out certain acts on the territory of a State. Sometimes, States grant authorizations to foreign investigators outside of mutual assistance agreements. There may be special agreements so that judges of the International Court of Justice may come in the course of their duties.

The last time this happened was in 1997 when the Court visited the water project between Hungary and Slovakia. The dispute allowed the Court to visit the site to observe and investigate.

The judges of the International Court are agents of the United Nations who cannot make acts of authority outside this framework, and Hungary and Slovakia had invited them to make their observations.

=== Exception to the custom of general international law ===
*the '''war occupation'''
In international armed conflict, it happens that the army of one State progresses while the army of another State retreats because of the fortunes of the war. The advancing army advances into the territory of the enemy it will control by making the territory an occupied territory that is controlled by conventions. During a period of armed conflict, there is not only occupation of a territory if one finds oneself in a de facto position of occupying it, but one has a duty to administer it, one cannot refuse one's duty as an occupying force, one is the only public power in the territory.

War occupation is one of the situations provided for where the State has the right and duty to administer a territory that does not belong to it in the place of the sovereign.
*'''diplomatic and consular services'''
Each State has embassies and consulates abroad, embassies, above all, perform acts of public authority.

These acts are carried out on the territory of a foreign State, the Embassy's premises remain on the host territory.

Under ancient customary international law, codified in the Vienna Conventions on Diplomatic and Consular Relations, agents of the sending State operating within the framework of diplomatic or consular missions may carry out all acts of public authority granted by international law against the foreign State.

Espionage is not one of them. This does not include a series of other acts, such as the Moroccan embassy, which had pronounced a divorce between Moroccan nationals. The question was whether this divorce could be recognised in Switzerland; the Federal Court refused, because under Swiss law, according to Swiss public policy, a divorce cannot be pronounced by an embassy, but only by a court, which is why this divorce cannot be pronounced in Switzerland and beyond what is permitted by the diplomatic service with a violation of sovereignty.
*'''international organisations''' 
They are not States, but they do act of public authority, and of course these international organizations under customary international law and headquarters agreements have the power to do all acts recognized to them either under international law or headquarters agreements.

An international organization is not necessarily an intergovernmental organization, it can also be any international body. All these bodies act as public authorities.

=== Exceptions based on bilateral custom ===
In the case of enclaves, the right of passage is based on a bilateral custom implying that one must pass through the territory of a State to reach its enclaves.

The principle of territorial exclusivity is well established and there are a whole series of exceptions, a large number of more or less broad agreements and exceptions, it is not in violation of sovereignty, but it is accepted.

== Personal competence ==

=== What is meant by "personal competence"? ===
This is the jurisdiction of a State over all its citizens. No matter where the nationals are, there is a personal jurisdiction of the State, on its State personal jurisdiction is confused with its territorial jurisdiction, a State can do a whole lot of things on its territory.

Personal jurisdiction has its own value when nationals are not in the territory of the State, but in the territory of another State or in common areas; there are recognized territorial jurisdictions, a Swiss always remains subject to Swiss law wherever he is in the world, this is called personal jurisdiction. It is in the case of nationals abroad that personal competence is perceived. In this respect, a distinction must be made between two types of "jurisdiction":
*'''normative competence''': competence to enact rules.
*'''executive competence''': competence to enforce rules.
In English, there are terms such as "juridiction to prescrive" and "juridiction to enforce".

A distinction must be made because when nationals are abroad they are subject to the normative jurisdiction of the host State's State, but Switzerland may lay down rules for its nationals even if they are abroad.

When the national is abroad if he is in the territory of another State, the competence of the State of origin to enforce the rule it imposes on its national and placed in brackets, the person cannot be taken back to his country of origin, as this would violate the exclusivity of the territorial jurisdiction of the other State.

Extradition may be requested for offences and crimes under certain conditions, and laws may also be enforced, i.e. executed, if the national is on a ship flying the national flag, in the high seas or in the Antarctic.

In common spaces, the law can be enforced, executive competence persists in common spaces.

=== What about nationals, because jurisdiction is only over persons with nationality? ===
International law does not have rules on the granting of nationality, it leaves this question to domestic law, it must be determined under international law; but international law still knows limits in terms of the nationalities it is prepared to recognize.

International law limits, but does not have rules in the first place.

The most frequent rules that apply in different States is an international practice and recognized by all States are:

==== Acquisition of nationality at birth, there are two systems ====
*blood law
*territorial right
 
These terms denote the acquisition of nationality by descent in the case of blood law, the child receives the nationality of his or her parents, and the law of the land means that a child born in the territory of domiciled parents acquires the nationality of that State there.
 
==== Reasons for subsequent acquisition or loss ====
There are also recurrent things such as naturalization when certain conditions for the establishment of a State are met, or if certain things have been done or a service rendered to a State are grounds for naturalization under domestic law.

Sometimes there are also reasons that are much more particular, some states at some point in their history have forgotten the acquisition of nationality; in the 1920s in Mexico if one bought land one obtained de facto Mexican nationality, Porfirio Diaz says "poor Mexico, so far from God so close to the United States"<ref>"¡Pobre México! ¡Tan lejos de Dios y tan cerca de los Estados Unidos!"</ref><ref>"Pobre México tan lejos de Dios y tan cerca de Estados Unidos. En realidad fue escrita por Nemesio García Naranjo, intelectual regiomontano" - [http://www.jornada.unam.mx/2013/07/14/opinion/030a1cap Malos Vecinos, Ángeles González Gamio; La Jornada]</ref>. This feature was finally abandoned.

You have to imagine beyond that, sometimes in the world there are things you can't think of.

=== Concerning the limits that international law proposes to nationality and what the limits to nationality mean ===
There are cases of granting a nationality under domestic law that may seem abusive or not internationally recognised, as if, for example, Russia considers that the entire world population is its nationals by sending tax forms to everyone.

There are real disputes over nationalities approached in a "bizarre" way; one of the famous cases was a case that almost concerned Switzerland, namely Liechtenstein: the Nottebohm case, this case was decided by the International Court of Justice in 1950<ref>[http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/18/9009.pdf C.I J. Mémoires, 49aire Nottebohm (Liechtenstein c. Guatemala),  vol. I]</ref><ref>COUR INTERNATIONALE DE JUSTICE RECUEIL DES ARRETS,  AVIS CONSULTATIFS ET ORDONNANCES - [http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/18/2057.pdf AFFAIRE NOTTEBOHM  (LIECHTENSTEIN c. GUATEMALA)] - ARRÊT DU 18 NOVEMBRE 1953 </ref><ref>COUR INTERNATIONALE DE JUSTICE  RECUEIL DES ARRETS,  AVIS CONSULTATIFS ET ORDONNANCES  - [http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/18/2674.pdf AFFAIRE NOTTEBOHM  (LIECHTENSTEIN c. GUATEMALA),  DEUXIÈME PHASE] -  ARRÊT DU 6 AVRIL 1955</ref>.

A German national has been living in Guatemala for some time and has established his business; when the Second World War began, Guatemala at some point entered the war.

Nottebohm anticipated that Guatemala would go to war against its country of origin; if Guatemala goes to war against Germany then it becomes an enemy national causing damage to its trade knowing that at that time the property of nationals of enemy nationality could be confiscated.

He had to get rid of German nationality as soon as possible; he had relations with Liechtenstein; Nottebohm obtained a nationality in an extraordinary way in a few weeks outside the ordinary procedures and simply through some relations with the payment of a sum against the payment of a sum.

Guatemala entered the war against Germany; at that time, Guatemala considered Nottebohm to be an enemy national and confiscated his assets.

Liechtenstein has defended its national by holding Guatemala accountable for a violation of international law through a violation of one of its nationals.

The case comes before the International Court of Justice with Judge Guggenheim; the Court rules that the limit that applies under international law to the acquisition of nationality and that there must be an effective connecting link, a nationality given by simple complacency is not a nationality that is based on an effective connecting link.

An effective connecting link and the fact that a national is bound more to a particular territory than to any other State in the world; if there is such an effective connecting link, at that time the nationality becomes enforceable.

The Court did not say that Nottebohm is German or Liechtenstein, nationality may be different according to the States; for Lichtenstein, Nottebohm is a Liechtensteiner because he has acquired Liechtenstein nationality and has the right to treat him as a Liechtenstein national, German law may consider him as a German national.

Guatemala could be justified because there was no effective connecting link, while Nottebohm was considered a German national because it had no effective connecting link with Liechtenstein, it is not enforceable.

There is a distinction between nationality acquired by modalities recognized by international law and nationality acquired by modalities that are not recognized by international law.

In cases where nationality is acquired in accordance with recognized procedures, then nationality is enforceable, when nationality is acquired outside those procedures, it is not enforceable, a third State is not obliged to recognize it; in the case of Liechtenstein and Nottebohm, Guatemala was not obliged to recognize it as a Liechtenstein national.

The effective link of connection causes problems, we understand why, moreover, today this is a problem in a globalised world. There are also other reasons, Judge Guggenheim had a dissenting opposition.

We see the limit of the International Court called in the Nottebohm case, we must refer to that case to note that an acquired nationality is not opposable to a third State.

In criminal law, words are used that have to do with the personal jurisdiction of a State in criminal matters.

=== We have for the criminal jurisdiction of a State ===

==== Principle of territoriality ====
Corresponds to territorial jurisdiction, a State may prosecute all crimes committed on its territory, regardless of the nationality of the persons concerned.
 
==== Personality principle ====
Personal competence, there is the distinction between the principle of active personality and the principle of passive personality:
*'''active personality''': means that a State may prosecute all crimes committed by one of its nationals anywhere in the world under the sole condition that it constitutes a crime at the scene. If you do something legal in Australia, you can't be punished in Switzerland. For blood crimes, a crime committed in Australia allows Switzerland to have legal jurisdiction.
*'''passive personality''': a State acquires criminal jurisdiction over anyone who has committed a crime against one of its nationals anywhere in the world; this is a contested principle, it means that if one goes to Australia and is killed there by a national of nationality X, Switzerland acquires criminal jurisdiction over him, it can prosecute him by criminal jurisdiction and Switzerland can request extradition.
 
==== Principle of state security ====
It is a series of crimes where the State acquires jurisdiction over crimes related to espionage or counterfeiting of Swiss currency.
 
==== Principle of universality ====
This is important for international law, the principle that a state can prosecute certain crimes wherever they are committed in the world even if it has no connection with that country.

For a State to have criminal jurisdiction to prosecute a specific crime it must have a connection to that crime, these are public services.

There are situations where it is considered that a crime has been committed affecting the interests of all States and therefore all States are granted punitive jurisdiction; this is the case either because the crime has been committed in a common area and there is no territorial jurisdiction such as piracy, which is an act of violence committed for private reasons by one ship on another private ship at sea, which is why there is this offence with universal jurisdiction: each State that captures pirates has jurisdiction because the crime was committed in a common area.

There are crimes that affect all humanity and we do not want criminals to rest, these are war crimes, crimes against humanity and genocide.

There are exceptional cases where States are obliged to prosecute under universal jurisdiction on the basis of certain anti-terrorist conventions and serious offences such as offences under the Geneva Convention on Humanitarian Law.

In the majority of cases, universal jurisdiction is merely a factual matter of how it can and cannot be exercised.

The way in which it can exercise is linked to domestic law, if there is no territorial link with the crime, the State can exercise universal jurisdiction and not in absentia. This universal jurisdiction makes it possible to prosecute for certain crimes either committed in common areas or for crimes of great importance to the community. It will be recalled that Balthazar Garzon in Spain had proceeded on this basis with respect to Mr. Pinochet.

== Competences relating to crafts ==
These are on the one hand state-owned vessels, followed by aircraft and spacecraft. From the point of view of international law, a ship is no longer considered, as formerly by fiction, to be part of the floating territory of a State and an aircraft part of the mobile territory; the State of registration of a craft is now considered to be the State that is responsible for the proper functioning of its devices and is the State that exercises jurisdiction over the account on board its vessels, aircraft and spacecraft.

This is true for both state vehicles themselves and warships, but here the question is broader. The State also has duties in relation to civilian vessels such as the obligation to control the safety of such vessels or working conditions, the State incurs its own responsibility, even for commercial vessels the State exercises its jurisdiction.

= The territory of the State and its delimitation =
The territory of the State and its delimitation raises two sets of problems:

First, the territory of the State refers to the problem of the acquisition and loss of the State: how can a State acquire and lose territory?

Secondly, it raises the problem of the territory's membership in one or the other as well as disputes over the delimitation of the territory.

On the one hand, we are wondering how to acquire the territory, and on the other hand, how to determine the territory.

If we apply this problem to islands, there is an attribution problem, but if we think of continental territory, we automatically have delimitation problems.

We discuss all this material very often using the term legal "title". A title is a fact that the legal order recognizes as the basis of law in a territory, it is therefore a fact recognized by the legal order giving rise to a right in a territory.

For a territory to belong to us, it is necessary to produce a title, so the title is always a fact to which the legal system affects a consequence.

What are the facts recognized by the legal system to acquire and concurrently to lose it?

There are a few of them:

== Title of occupation of the territory without a master ==
A territory without a master can be acquired by the first occupier, today the time when people rushed to territories to occupy them is over, but the occupation remains a valid and important title for two reasons:
*because of intertemporal law if someone disputes certain territories, someone can argue that he occupied them five centuries ago when he was without a master, this title continues to have effects to this day.
*if an island emerges in the high seas, it may be subject to occupation.
The term "occupation" is the same as that of "war occupation", but it is different; war occupation is not a title of acquisition of territory, but a title of administration of territory during an armed conflict, there is prohibition to annex, occupation is that of a territory without a master, occupation of the tera nullius.

It is also possible to claim a title of conquest in the same waters, but it is now prohibited to conquer and annex territory by force under article 4, paragraph 2, of the Charter of the United Nations.

Once again it is a question of intertemporal law, if one can assert a title as if one had conquered a territory in the 13th century then one can still assert this title today.

== Treaty - Agreement(s) ==
Territory can be acquired through treaty-based land transfers.

In the past, land transfers were very often carried out. Today, this is much less the case because the self-determination of peoples has been achieved through this process. In the 1950s, the French territory was transferred to Switzerland in order to expand Geneva International Airport, but this portion was returned elsewhere<ref>[http://www.admin.ch/opc/fr/classified-compilation/19560067/index.html 0.748.131.934.91] - Texte original Convention entre la Suisse et la France concernant l'aménagement de l'aéroport de Genève-Cointrin et la création de bureaux à contrôles nationaux juxtaposés à Ferney-Voltaire et à Genève-Cointrin Conclue le 25 avril 1956 Approuvée par l'Assemblée fédérale le 5 oct. 1956 Entré en vigueur le 6 mars 1958</ref>.

On the other hand, we can have the formation of new states organised through a treaty; the current Germany was born from the 2+4 treaty<ref>Dufourcq Bertrand. 2+4 ou la négociation atypique. In: Politique étrangère N°2 - 2000 - 65e année pp. 467-484.  doi : 10.3406/polit.2000.4952 url : http://www.persee.fr/web/revues/home/prescript/article/polit_0032-342x_2000_num_65_2_4952</ref><ref>[http://mjp.univ-perp.fr/traites/1990traite2+4.htm Traité portant règlement définitif concernant l'Allemagne], [http://mjp.univ-perp.fr/mjp.htm Digithèque de matériaux juridiques et politiques]</ref>. The treaty is a very important vector for acquiring the territory and is also the main vector used for delimiting the territory.

== Prescription acquisitive ==
The possibility of acquiring a territory by the prolonged, peaceful and continuous exercise of public power without any other State protesting against this practice. There is a State on a portion of territory that acts of public power for a prolonged period of time with the acquiescence of the other States, which is equivalent to title.

Because of the self-determination of peoples today, these are only marginal areas.

Protest is essential to preserve one's rights, if one does not protest against the public authority then one loses this territory, if one protests, acquisition by prescription can never take place. Some authors do not like the term "acquisitive prescription", because it is a matter of private law, but the mechanism is similar.

There are certain natural modalities or facts that make territory acquired by other states such as alluvium; if a state has a maritime coast and the coasts move because the sands sediment, then the territory is acquired by alluvium, its territory has moved, but automatically it acquires it.

The same is true for rivers, there are cases where the border is in the middle of rivers. It is a line in the river, there are sometimes very dynamic rivers that move, causing the border to move; this means that one State is growing, but the other is shrinking. This type of phenomenon is of minor importance, but a natural fact and not voluntary and subject to the acquisition of the territory.

The loss of territory is concomitant, a state could abandon a portion of territory if it no longer wants to, but that is not relevant.

== As for the delimitation, what are the legal facts when delimiting territory? In other words, what is the legal basis for delimiting between territories? ==
 
We have several important principles:
 
=== Accord(s) - Traité ===
Delimitation is almost always by agreement, sometimes a sequence of agreements on a border covers sectors, agreements that have modified or rectified borders are often bouquets of agreements.

When the Court of Justice deals with disputes between African or Latin American States, it will always have to deal with treaties from the 19th or even 13th century. It is always the title at the time the delimitation was made that continues to prevail. It is therefore necessary to interpret the treaty of the time and know what the parties could mean.

The International Court of Justice has informed us about a case between Libya and Chad<ref>COUR INTERNATIONALE DE JUSTICE  RECUEIL DES ARRÊTS,  [http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/83/6897.pdf AVIS CONSULTATIFS ET ORDONNANCES  AFFAIRE  DU DIFFÉREND TERRITORIAL  (JAMAf-IIRIYA ARABE LIBYENNEITCHAD)] - Arrêt du 3 février 1994</ref><ref>Koskenniemi Martti. L'affaire du différend territorial Tchad/Libye (arrêt de la Cour internationale de Justice du 3 février 1994). In: Annuaire français de droit international, volume 40, 1994. pp. 442-464.  doi : 10.3406/afdi.1994.3202 url : http://www.persee.fr/web/revues/home/prescript/article/afdi_0066-3085_1994_num_40_1_320</ref> concerning a border dispute that a treaty may fix the border, but that the border acquires a value independent of the treaty established, in other words, the treaty establishes the border, but at that moment the border becomes a legally detachable fact.

This means that if the treaty expires, if it is not renewed or denounced, the border remains, it is the principle of border stability.

The boundary or title created by the treaty has more permanence than the treaty itself, the treaty may disappear, but the boundary remains. In the Court's view, the Treaty must give rise to a permanent border, "once agreed, the border remains, because any other approach would deprive the fundamental principle of border stability, the importance of which the Court has repeatedly stressed"<ref>[http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/83/6896.pdf Dyjgrend territorial (Jurnuhiriyu arabe libyenne/Tclzad),  arrêt, C.I. J. Recueil 1994, p. 37] </ref>.

Delimitation can only be joint evidence between the States concerned, the same can be said of land borders; delimiting a legally binding or legally recognized border can only be the work of the States concerned jointly, if done alone, the other State is not bound by the border that is being attempted to be imposed.

If each State unilaterally delineates borders, we would have non-accepted borders. Since the principle is that a boundary can only be legally delimited by agreement, treaties are the basis for delimitation.

The delineation of borders is found in agreements that are usually bilateral because a border is normally bilateral, separating State A from State B.

In the case of the Swiss borders, in François Schröter's book, all the borders of Switzerland have been delimited by agreements, some of which were concluded with the kings of France.

It is in the treaties that we find the title to know where a certain border crosses.

In a dispute between Libya and Tunisia, the Court said that the border is detached from the treaty and to its own existence, the fact that the treaty disappears at some point is not relevant for the extinction of a border.

It may be uncertain where the border passes exactly, treaties describe the borders, but sometimes they do it wrong and imprecisely, or they are old treaties with topographical problems. In this case, it is a question of interpreting the treaty and also a question of filling the gap in the treaty, the aim is to eliminate uncertainty by specifying where the border crosses or by calling on a judge who can determine or cross the border.

=== Uti Possidetis juris ===
It is possession according to the law and not according to the fact.

What does "uti possidetis" mean?

It is a principle originally applicable to decolonization; at some point in history, many new States have been created as a result of decolonization.

These states had no pre-constituted borders because they were part of a former colonial empire, only internal administrative borders existed in relation to colonial power; in the French colonial empire, there were constituencies subjecting the different parts of the territories to separate governors.

When decolonization took place, already in Latin America in the 19th century and then in Africa in the 20th century, the States concerned decided to maintain the former colonial administrative borders, which were formerly internal borders, by ensuring that after decolonization these borders became international borders; in other words, to transform internal administrative borders into international borders, as was already the case with administrative borders, this must remain.

This principle was chosen because it was the only one that could immediately ensure a clear and secure border in these areas, in the absence of a use possidetis we would not have had borders at all, we would have had to conclude border treaties that would have easily led, in Africa in particular with its structural instabilities and composite States, as the African States themselves have recognized, to fratricidal struggles; if the decolonization war lasts, there would have been a risk of border struggles later on, adding to the effort of decolonization wars the rout of border wars.

The Organization of African Unity, by a resolution of 1964, considered that the old administrative borders should be maintained by recognizing them as international borders<ref>Borella François. Le régionalisme africain en 1964. In: Annuaire français de droit international, volume 10, 1964. pp. 621-637.  doi : 10.3406/afdi.1964.1782 url : http://www.persee.fr/web/revues/home/prescript/article/afdi_0066-3085_1964_num_10_1_1782</ref><ref>Sorel Jean-Marc, Mehdi Rostane. L'uti possidetis entre la consécration juridique et la pratique : essai de réactualisation. In: Annuaire français de droit international, volume 40, 1994. pp. 11-40.  doi : 10.3406/afdi.1994.3181 url : http://www.persee.fr/web/revues/home/prescript/article/afdi_0066-3085_1994_num_40_1_3181</ref><ref>[http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/149/17312.pdf SEPARATE OPINION OF JUDGE YUSUF] about Uti possidetis juris and the OAU/AU principle on respect of borders are neither identical nor equivalent</ref>.

First of all, the uti possidetis is Latin America with critical dates of 1810 and 1823, the decolonization of the Spanish Empire; the borders with Brazil were already international borders. European states have applied this principle in the context of the decomposition of federal states for the former USSR and Yugoslavia.

Legally, the only certain thing is that the principle applies in the event of decolonization, for federal States this principle has been applied because it is quite practical, but it is not certain that the law requires it; at the time when these federal States broke down, this was not yet the case.

The key judgment establishing the principle of uti possidetis as a general tool of decolonization is the judgment of the Chamber of the Court on the case of the territorial dispute between Burkina Faso and Mali in 1986<ref>COUR INTERNATIONALE DE JUSTICE  RECUEIL DES ARRÊTS,  AVIS CONSULTATIFS ET ORDONNANCES - [http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/69/6447.pdf AFFAIRE DU DIFFÉREND FRONTALIER  (BURKINA FASO/RÉPUBLIQUE DU MALI)], arrêt du 22 décembre 1986</ref>.

At the time of decolonization, a boundary is automatically established, the former colonial administrative limitation; when the judge is called upon to say or cross the boundary exactly, the uti possidetis line is not always obvious in territories that are difficult to access, the Court and the arbitrator must always turn to critical dates and look at where the administrative boundaries were.

Uti possidetis meant that you automatically have a border and that it cannot be unilaterally changed; this does not mean that borders are frozen and that borders cannot be changed; it can be changed either by agreement, the states concerned can conclude agreements and change borders.

In Africa even more than elsewhere, the borders drawn by the colonizer were perfectly arbitrary. There are therefore often many reasons to rectify these old borders, it must be done by agreement; touching the borders means moving very quickly towards armed conflicts.

At the same time, a formal agreement is not always required; if one State administers a portion of a State beyond the uti possidetis and the other State does nothing and is silent in response to the claims, this situation is sufficient to modify the uti possidetis rule; this is referred to as acquiescence to adverse claims and in particular the case of the territorial maritime and island dispute of El Salvador and Honduras<ref>COUR INTERNATIONALE DE JUSTICE  RECUEIL DES ARRÊTS,  AVIS CONSULTATIFS ET ORDONNANCES - [http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/75/6637.pdf AFFAIRE DU DIFFÉREND FRONTALIER  TERRESTRE, INSULAIRE ET MARITIME  (EL SALVADOR/HONDURAS)] , ORDONNANCE DU 13 DÉCEMBRE 1989</ref>.

The Court tells us at page 412 of the judgment, "it is obviously open to these States to modify by agreement the boundaries separating them, and certain forms of activity or inactivity could be deemed to be acquiescence at a different limit than in 1821. »

Some forms of activity or inactivity are a form of acquiescence to the prolonged adverse claim.

The principle of uti possidetis can be modified, but this must not come from unagreed unilateral attitudes because it raises conflicts.

== General principle of border stability ==
The use possidetis is one aspect of this; in modern international law, there is a principle of border stability.

It has been expressed in various forms, as was the Hague Court in the Treah Vihar Temple case in 1962, "Generally speaking, when two countries define a border between them, one of their main objectives is to reach a stable and definitive solution. This is impossible if the route thus established can be challenged at any time on the basis of a constantly open procedure, and if rectification can be requested whenever an inaccuracy in relation to a provision of the basic treaty is discovered<ref>Cot Jean-Pierre. L'arrêt de la Cour internationale de Justice dans l'affaire du temple de Préah Vihéar (Cambodge c. Thaïlande - Fond). In: Annuaire français de droit international, volume 8, 1962. pp. 217-247.  doi : 10.3406/afdi.1962.969 url : http://www.persee.fr/web/revues/home/prescript/article/afdi_0066-3085_1962_num_8_1_969  </ref>.

The principle of border stability aims to avoid conflicts and in particular armed conflicts and it is understandable because the border is a very sensitive issue, the border defines home, it is linked to a sense of security, but also to the well-being of populations; the population and States in modern times moreover with their way of conceiving things based on the idea of the nation further increases the sense of perimeter and security that distinguishes us from the other.

Border insecurity very easily generates unrest because it is psychologically traumatic.

In the practice of States, there is the development of the principle of border stability, which has a whole series of concrete implications.

In the Libya v. Chad case, the Court said that a boundary cannot be separated from the treaty, but the boundary remains if the treaty is extinguished; in the succession of States to the treaty, that is, when a territory moves from one to the other, there are principles in the Vienna Convention on Succession of States to the treaty. In Articles 11 and 12 there is the rule that treaties establish borders and that they contain territorial statutes.[[Fichier:Convention de Vienne sur le droit des traités de 1969 - article 11.png|vignette|center|700px|[http://legal.un.org/ilc/texts/instruments/francais/traites/1_1_1969_francais.pdf Convention de Vienne sur le droit des traités de 1969] - [http://www.admin.ch/opc/fr/classified-compilation/19690099/index.html#a11 article 11]]]

[[Fichier:Convention de Vienne sur le droit des traités de 1969 - article 12.png|vignette|center|700px|[http://legal.un.org/ilc/texts/instruments/francais/traites/1_1_1969_francais.pdf Convention de Vienne sur le droit des traités de 1969] - [http://www.admin.ch/opc/fr/classified-compilation/19690099/index.html#a12 article 12]]]

[[Fichier:Convention de Vienne sur le droit des traités de 1969 - article 62.png|vignette|center|700px|[http://legal.un.org/ilc/texts/instruments/francais/traites/1_1_1969_francais.pdf Convention de Vienne sur le droit des traités de 1969] - [http://www.admin.ch/opc/fr/classified-compilation/19690099/index.html#a62 article 62]]]The Vienna Convention states that it is not possible to assert a change of circumstances with regard to a border even if the circumstances have fundamentally changed; this is an application of the principle of border stability.

In a restrictive interpretation of the law of States, one should not unilaterally touch the providers; when it is in concert everything is possible or almost possible within the limits of the self-determination of peoples; when it is unilateral, one should be careful.

=== The effectivities ===
Dans le droit de la délimitation il y a d’un côté le titre soit le traité soit l’uti possidetis ; mais il arrive dans la vie que les effectivités ne soient pas conforment au titre, ce sont les choses qui se passent sur le terrain et en particulier qui administre.
 
Si on a une ligne fixée par un traité qui laisse une partie du territoire à l‘État A, en fait depuis 80 ans l’État B administre cette petite partie du territoire et cela n’est pas conforme au traité, mais il y a une effectivité, une réalité qui s’est implantée. Dans le domaine colonial, on parle d’effectivité coloniale.
 
La question est de savoir qu’elle est la relation entre le titre et l’effectivité ?
 
En règle générale, il ne peut faire de doute de quel est la réponse, le titre l’emporte parce que le traité est le droit et l’effectivité et le fait, le fait ne peut prévaloir contre le droit.
 
Cette règle n’est pas sans exception ; tout d’abord s’il y a acquiescement, soit la prescription acquisitive, l’effectivité se voit reconnue et de même induite, mais ce n’est plus une simple effectivité, car il y a une administration effective de l’État qui n’a pas droit, mais l’autre État a acquiescé devenant quelque chose de bilatéral, il y a un exercice de pouvoir ; l’État titre est resté silencieux créant une confiance qu’il se désintéresse du territoire.
 
À un certain moment, des tribunaux considèrent que l’effectivité est devenue du droit par l’acceptation tacite de l’autre partie.
 
La Cour Internationale de Justice a considéré ce genre de problèmes, titre d’un côté, effectivité de l’autre et lui a donné un éclairage extrêmement nuancé comme ce fut par exemple le cas dans l’affaire du différend frontalier entre le Burkina Faso et le Mali au §63.
 
La Cour évoque quatre rapports possibles entre l’effectivité d’un côté et le droit de l’autre :
 
=== L’effectivité correspond au droit c’est-à-dire au titre ===
L’effectivité est alignée sur le droit, la frontière doit passer là et les deux états administrent ce que le traité a affecté aux pays.
 
L’effectivité n’intervient que comme confirmation du titre. La chambre de la Cour a pu appliquer ce principe dans l’affaire du différend frontalier terrestre et insulaire El Salvador contre Honduras en 1992.
 
Le Salvador présentait avec succès toute une série d’effectivités, les présentant comme confirmation de ses titres espagnols d‘uti possidetis. La chambre de la Cour a confirmé la lecture du Salvador ou elle présente ses arguments à la page 397 §59.
 
==== L’effectivité ne correspond pas au titre ====
Il y a un divorce entre les deux et une opposition entre l’effectivité et le titre. La règle générale en la matière est qu’il y a lieu de préférer le titulaire du titre.
 
Une situation dans laquelle la Cour a eu l’occasion d‘appliquer cette règle est celle du différend entre la frontière terrestre et maritime entre le Cameroun et le Nigeria en 2002.
 
La Cour conclut que dans ce cas il y avait conflit entre les titres conventionnels du Cameroun et le Nigeria qui possédait les effectivités, selon le titre certaines zones revenaient au Cameroun et le Nigeria avait pénétré ces territoires et les administrait ; selon la Cour le titulaire du titre doit prévaloir et donc ce territoire revient au Cameroun.
 
==== L’effectivité ne coexiste avec aucun titre ====
Nous avons une effectivité, mais pas de titre ; dans ce cas selon la Cour, l’effectivité doit être prise en considération est sera très souvent décisive.
 
L’affaire de la souveraineté sur Pulau Ligitan et Pulau Sipadan, est une affaire de 2002 entre l’Indonésie et la Malaisie; il s’agit de deux petites iles relativement loin de la zone centrale des États concernés, la Cour écarte des titres conventionnels que les parties lui ont présentés, car selon l’interprétation que la Cour donne à ces traités ils ne s’étendent pas si loin dans la mer.
 
S’il en est ainsi, il n’y a pas de titre et en même temps les États successeurs ne pouvaient acquérir le titre.
 
=== Que faire si on est dépourvu de titre ? ===
 
La Cour se tourne vers les effectivités, elle constata que la Malaisie possède de meilleures effectivités ; la Cour constate que l’Indonésie n’en a aucune n’ayant fait aucun acte de souveraineté.
 
En revanche quant à la Malaisie, elle peut deux activités : l’activité règlementaire exécutive relative à la pèche à savoir capturer des tortus et des oiseaux et à la construction et l’entretien de phares à l’aide de navigation ; ces deux effectivités suffisent pour donner le titre à la Malaisie.
 
==== L’effectivité coexiste avec un titre, mais le titre n’est pas clair ====
C’est une situation assez fréquente, mais on ne sait plus exactement où la ligne passe.
 
Le traité peut être peu clair, la ligne uti possidetis ou la description est peu concluante ; dans ce cas notamment dans le cas des effectivités à l’époque où le titre était conclu parce que les effectivités immédiatement après le moment de la décolonisation tendent à montrer ce que les parties considéraient être le titre.
 
La présomption est que les parties administraient le territoire assigné à l’époque, si on ne sait plus où passe la ligne uti possidetis alors il faut se référer aux effectivités au moment de la colonisation, les parties se comportaient en fonction sur quoi elles s’étaient accordées ou ce que le droit leur concédait.
 
Dans le différend El Salvador contre Honduras, il y avait un problème avec certaines iles dans le golfe de Fonseca ; les titres anciens dans cette zone marginale n’étaient pas clairs donc la chambre de la Cour a considéré qu’il était approprié de prendre en compte le comportement effectif des États intéressés pendant la période qui a immédiatement suivi l’indépendance déterminant ainsi l’appartenance respective de ces iles dans le golfe de Fonseca traçant la frontière dans cette zone.
 
==== Rôle de l’équité ====
C’est un rôle qui n’est pas fondamental, mais parfois il n’est pas négligeable ; il existe certains compromis soit un accord par lequel on soumet un litige à un arbitre ou à un juge, parfois l’arbitre peut statuer en équité, il ne doit pas s’en tenir seulement au titre, mais aussi à des considérations équitables reprenant des effectivités qui ont créé des liens de rattachement.
 
L’arbitre peut pour des motifs équitables modifier la frontière ou en tracer une en fonction de ce qu’il estime être équitable uniquement lorsque les parties s’accordent, l’équité joue aussi un rôle dans l’interprétation du titre ou dans le comblement de lacunes contenues dans le titre.
 
La première situation est que l’arbitre est libre par rapport au droit, il peut en fonction de ce qu’il considère équitable tracer certaines lignes, si les États s’accordent à lui donner cette mission alors l’arbitre va tracer la frontière.
 
Dans les autres cas, l’arbitre n’a pas cette mission il ne peut modifier le droit en fonction de ce qu’il estime être l’équité. Dans ce dernier cas, l’arbitre est lié par le droit et néanmoins l’équité peut jouer un certain rôle.
 
L’arbitre applique le droit et le traité ; il a y deux rôles que l’équité peut jouer :
 
L ‘équité peut servir à l’arbitre dans l’interprétation du titre, il y arrive que le titre ne soit pas très clair, que la description de la ligne frontière soit confuse, que les aspects géomorphologiques aient changés depuis le temps, si donc il y a une incertitude dans une certaine aire et que la frontière pourrait passer soit par ici ou soit par-là, on pourrait à ce moment-là, puisqu’on est couvert par le titre, on pourrait faire fond sur l’équité.
 
Si on trace la ligne en fonction de la ligne A possible selon le titre, mais si on prend la ligne 1 on est dans une région désertique ou il y a des points d’eau qui sont fondamentaux pour la population, si on prend la ligne A les points d’eau sont tous du côté de A. Si la ligne B, également possible selon le titre, partage les points d’eau soit 2 entre 2 soit 1 contre 3, il y aurait un motif de préférer la ligne B parce qu’elle partage plus équitablement des points d’eau capitaux pour les populations dans la région.
 
Si l’abrite n’a pas la notion de modifier le droit par l’équité, si la ligne A est celle qui est prévue par le titre et qu’on peut dire avec certitude ce qui est prévu alors c’est la ligne A ; l’hypothèse est que le titre n’est pas clair permettant soit la ligne A ou B parce que compatible avec la description du titre ; l’équité peut intervenir à l’intérieur du droit afin de recommander l’interprétation B plutôt que l’interprétation A.
 
Pour combler des lacunes que laisse le titre, il peut être défaillant dans certaines zones. Le cas le plus radical est une ligne uti posidetis, si dans les archives il manque les documents relatifs à ce secteur de la frontière, on n’a rien. Dans ce cas le juge ou l’arbitre applique l’équité praeter legem, en marge du droit et en renforcement du droit, comblement de lacune donc, et il fixera à ce moment-là une frontière en supposant que les parties veulent qu’il fixe la frontière.
 
Il serait contreproductif et non-conforme si l’arbitre disait qu’il ne peut délimiter, il faut utiliser l’équité au bord et en appui du droit.
 
Dans l’affaire du différend territorial et maritime insulaire El Salvador contre Honduras devant la chambre de la Cour Internationale de Justice il y avait six secteurs de frontières sur un nombre considérable de kilomètres qui étaient à délimiter, dans l‘un de ces secteurs la frontière uti possidetis ne pouvait plus être déterminée à savoir le secteur entre la source du fleuve Negro-Quiagara et le pilier frontière de Malpaso de Similaton, entre ces deux points les titres n’étaient pas loquaces ; la chambre de la Cour a dès lors fait fond sur un traité de 1869 concernant aussi la zone en cause et a dit qu’elle reprenait la frontière contenue dans ce traité parce qu’elle lui paraissait équitable, le traité n’était pas applicable parce qu’il n’avait pas été ratifié par les deux États ; un traité pas contraignant a été émis pour un petit secteur de la frontière qui a été insérée dans l’arrêt sur la base de l’équité praeter legem, page 514 – 515 du recueil de 1982.
 
=== Rôle des cartes géographiques ===
Quelle est la valeur de cartes géographiques dans la délimitation ?
 
La réponse doit être recherchée dans une distinction fondamentale que la jurisprudence fait. Dans l’arrêt sur le différend frontalier entre le Burkina Faso et le Mali page 582 et 583 des recueils, la distinction est entre les cartes d’un tout qui font partie intégrante d’un traité ayant force obligatoire et toutes les autres cartes ne faisant partie intégrante à un traité et ne faisant force contraignante. La carte faisait partie du traité est censée être juridiquement contraignante, la carte est une norme juridique ayant un poids considérable pouvant être décisive. Un cas de ce genre est évoqué dans un différend frontalier entre la Somalie et l’Érythrée.
 
Dans tous les autres cas, les cartes ne sont que des sources d’informations de poids variable en fonction de leur qualité de leur fiabilité technique, ainsi que de la neutralité des organes qui les ont produites.
 
La jurisprudence a montré parfois de l’agacement parce que les arbitres et les juges en sont inondés. Les parties produisent des centaines de cartes dont certaines ont une valeur relative, soit elles ne sont pas précises soit elles se contredisent ; elles ont une utilité relativement limitée ; la jurisprudence repousse un tout petit peu, cela dépend des circonstances.
 
Une telle carte qui n’est pas partie d’un traité peut également devenir plus importante si elle fait l’objet d’un acquiescement.
 
Si la partie adverse admet la pertinence de cette carte, la sentence arbitrale est intéressent entre l’Éthiopie et Érythrée dans le recueil des sentences arbitrales. La jurisprudence à la page 115 nous apprend qu’une carte peut mettre en doute une ligne et elle n’a pas nécessairement besoin d’avoir la même force probante.
 
Lorsqu’une carte est produite uniquement pour confirmer ou mettre en doute une ligne, mais non pas pour fonder un acquis, la jurisprudence nous apprend que la force probante de ce genre d’argument n’a pas besoin d’être soumise à la même force de conviction.
 
Dans le cas de délimitations maritimes, il arrive que des États soient limitrophes comme la Libye et la Tunisie et il faut voir où la limite se prolonge afin de séparer leur plateau continental et leur mer territoriale. Il y a le cas où il y a plusieurs États avec des États qui se font face alors il faut délimiter, car cela indique qu’il y a un chevauchement.
 
Toute cette branche du droit est compliquée parce que le fait d’être appliqué, les configurations sont à chaque fois différentes, tout cela influe sur le tracé des lignes, d’où une jurisprudence riche, mais détaillée sur les principes applicables en la matière.

<gallery mode="packed-hover">
Fichier:Burkina fasoMali croquis 2.png|[http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/69/6447.pdf Différend frontalier, arrêt, C.I.J. Recueil 1986]
Fichier:Burkina fasoMali croquis 3.png|[http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/69/6447.pdf Différend frontalier, arrêt, C.I.J. Recueil 1986]
Fichier:Burkina fasoMali croquis 4.png|[http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/69/6447.pdf Différend frontalier, arrêt, C.I.J. Recueil 1986]
Fichier:Burkina fasoMali croquis 5.png|[http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/69/6447.pdf Différend frontalier, arrêt, C.I.J. Recueil 1986]
Fichier:Burkina fasoMali croquis 6.png|[http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/69/6447.pdf Différend frontalier, arrêt, C.I.J. Recueil 1986]
</gallery>

= Les principes fondamentaux des relations entre États =
[[Fichier:CHARTE DES NATIONS UNIES - article 2.png|vignette|center|700px|[https://www.un.org/fr/documents/charter/pdf/charter.pdf Charte des Nations Unies] - [https://www.un.org/fr/documents/charter/chap1.shtml Chapitre I : Buts et principes - article 2]]]
 
Il ne s’agit pas d’aller dans le détail, mais de nous sensibiliser à son existence, car cet article 2 contient presque toutes les règles du droit international moderne.
 
Les résolutions 25 – 26 sont une interprétation authentique de l’article 2 ; l’article 2 statut sur des formules claires, mais néanmoins lacunaires posant des problèmes d’interprétation.
 
L’Assemblée générale a pris la peine d’adopter une résolution de grande importance puisqu’elle se propose de donner à tous une interprétation sur les dispositions de l‘article 2 rajoutant le principe de la coopération entre États et l’autodétermination des peuples.
 
== Paragraphe premier ==
{{citation bloc|L'Organisation est fondée sur le principe de l'égalité souveraine de tous ses Membres.}}
 
C’est une formulation bizarre, causasse voire inattendue parce qu’elle fait la fusion entre deux éléments hétéroclites entre « égalité » et « souveraineté » en précisant que l’un est indissociable de l’autre. Un État ne peut imposer sa souveraineté à l’autre parce que cela enfreindrait l’égalité entre les souverains.
 
La souveraineté en 1945 avait mauvaise presse, c’était un des motifs pour lequel la Société des Nations avait sombré, pour des puissances agressives avaient émané le monde d’une guerre longue et dure, une tendance à faire tout ce que l’on souhaite ; on a voulu inférer cette souveraineté dans le rappel de l’égalité obligeant à tenir compte de l‘autre, car la souveraineté n’est pas une prérogative qu’on a seule.
 
Sur « l’égalité souveraine », il est, semble-t-il, important de comprendre ce qu’elle dit et ne dit pas, sur le principe d’égalité, ce que dit l’égalité c’est l’égalité juridique en tout premier lieu c’est-à-dire le fait qu’aucun État ne peut être considéré comme étant diminué, il n’y a pas d’État de seconde catégorie que de la première catégorie sur un pied d’égalité.
 
Cela nous parait peu, mais en 1945 cela ne l’était pas, on sortait de l‘époque des mandats, des protectorats, des colonies qui continuaient à perdurer.
 
En d’autres termes, ce que veut faire admettre l’article 2 §1 au-delà de l’égale dignité des États, c’est aussi la faculté que reconnaît le droit international à chaque État d’avoir des droits et des obligations et d’être soumis aux mêmes droits et obligations du droit international général, chaque État a la même faculté d’avoir des droits et des obligations et est soumis au même droit et obligations du droit international général.
 
Il y a aussi le volet de ce que l’égalité ne veut pas dire, tout d’abord il serait faux de dire que chaque État a les mêmes droits et obligations en vertu du droit international; c’est complètement faux. Il y a uniquement la même capacité d’avoir des droits et des obligations ainsi que la capacité égale du droit international général ne s’appliquant pas au droit particulier.
 
L’État qui aura contracté se verra imposer plus de droits et d’obligations en fonction du traité, l’État qui n’a pas contrat n’aura pas ces droits et obligations en vertu du traité. Si on prend le droit particulier tous les États diffèrent, le plus on est parti à des situations de droit particulier le plus on aura des droits et des obligations.
 
Deuxièmement, l’égalité ne veut pas dire non plus que les États sont égaux de fait, les États sont égaux de droit jusqu'à un certain point pour le droit général, ils ne sont pas égaux du point de vue du fait.
 
L’État grand et puissant n’est pas de fait égal à l’État petit et faible n’empêchant pas de lutter pour plus d’égalité entre les États.
 
Par la suite, le principe de l’égalité n’est pas une norme de ius cogens, on peut y renoncer, c’est le cas dans tous les systèmes de vote pondérés ou certains États admettent qu’ils n’auront pas le même poids dans le vote. Il faut accepter ce statut d’inégalité par du droit particulier qui primera sur la règle générale d’égalité en vertu de la règle lex specials qui prévaut à la règle générale auquel le traité déroge.
 
Enfin, dans la résolution 25 – 26, on doit traiter les États malgré leurs différences donc il n’y a pas de discrimination entre États en fonction de leurs régimes politiques ou autrement l’égalité juridique ne peut pas être modulée en fonction des orientations politiques, économiques et sociales d’un État.
 
== Paragraphe 2 ==
{{citation bloc|Les Membres de l'Organisation, afin d'assurer à tous la jouissance des droits et avantages résultant de leur qualité de Membre, doivent remplir de bonne foi les obligations qu'ils ont assumées aux termes de la présente Charte.}}
 
Au paragraphe 2 c’est la question de la bonne foi. Cette disposition a été insérée en 1945 en réaction à la « doctrine du chiffon de papier » que certains États avaient appliquée depuis la Première guerre mondiale ; qu’est-ce qu’un traité contre la dignité et la survie du peuple allemand : c’est un chiffon de papier.
 
On ne peut avoir un ordre international fondé sur un minimum de sécurité, on oblige les États à remplir cette charte de bonne foi.
 
En terme très bref, ce paragraphe rappelle pacta sund servanda, les traités doivent être respectés, appliqués et interprétés de bonne foi mettant en jeu l’esprit de manière à ce que la lettre ne vise pas à éviter l’esprit.
 
== Paragraphe 3 ==
{{citation bloc|Les Membres de l'Organisation règlent leurs différends internationaux par des moyens pacifiques, de telle manière que la paix et la sécurité internationales ainsi que la justice ne soient pas mises en danger.}}
 
C’est une règle importante du droit international moderne donnant lieu à toute une branche du droit international ; on dit parfois à juste titre que rien ne peut être plus fort que le maillon le plus faible.
 
== Paragraphe ==
{{citation bloc|Les Membres de l'Organisation s'abstiennent, dans leurs relations internationales, de recourir à la menace ou à l'emploi de la force, soit contre l'intégrité territoriale ou l'indépendance politique de tout État, soit de toute autre manière incompatible avec les buts des Nations Unies.}}
 
Il s’agit d’un principe tout à fait fondateur pour le droit international moderne, s’agissant d’un principe de grande importance le résumer en quelque mot est impossible.
 
== Paragraphe ==
{{citation bloc|Les Membres de l'Organisation donnent à celle-ci pleine assistance dans toute action entreprise par elle conformément aux dispositions de la présente Charte et s'abstiennent de prêter assistance à un État contre lequel l'Organisation entreprend une action préventive ou coercitive.}}
 
C’est l’assistance que les membres doivent à l’organisation lorsqu’elle prend des mesures en vertu du chapitre 7 soit du Conseil de sécurité qui pend des mesures pour maintenir la paix qui sont donc contraignantes. Tous les États ont l’obligation d’assister les Nations Unies dans la mise en œuvre des sanctions.
 
== Paragraphe 6 ==
{{citation bloc|L'Organisation fait en sorte que les États qui ne sont pas Membres des Nations Unies agissent conformément à ces principes dans la mesure nécessaire au maintien de la paix et de la sécurité internationales.}}
 
Ce paragraphe a trait aux États non membres s’inscrivant dans le sillage du paragraphe 5 ; dans le 5 les membres doivent tous collectivement mettre en œuvre les sanctions et collaborer si nécessaire.
 
Le problème avec les États non membres et qu’ils ne sont pas obligé à la discipline collective, les sanctions peuvent s’avérer inefficaces, c’est pourquoi le paragraphe 6 demande aux Nations Unies d’approcher les États tiers afin qu’ils appliquent les mesures des Nations Unies ou au moins ne les contrecarrent pas.
 
== Paragraphe 7 ==
{{citation bloc|Aucune disposition de la présente Charte n'autorise les Nations Unies à intervenir dans des affaires qui relèvent essentiellement de la compétence nationale d'un État ni n'oblige les Membres à soumettre des affaires de ce genre à une procédure de règlement aux termes de la présente Charte; toutefois, ce principe ne porte en rien atteinte à l'application des mesures de coercition prévues au Chapitre VII.}}
 
Aucune disposition de la présente Charte n’autorise pas les Nations Unies à intervenir dans les affaires intérieures des États.
 
Cette disposition ne fait juridiquement pas beaucoup de sens, elle fut insérée parce que certains États puissants y tenaient beaucoup.
 
Les États-Unis pour faire passer la charte au Congrès et l’URSS parce qu’elle avait une conception morbide des affaires intérieures, a fait qu’on a inséré une clause de non-intervention.
 
Le 7 ne concerne que l’intervention des Nations Unies dans les affaires intérieures, mais l’intervention d’un État dans les affaires intérieures d’un autre État est un autre principe.
 
Ou bien les Nations Unies ont une compétence reconnue dans la Charte et elles peuvent toujours l’exercer ou une organisation ne possède pas une compétence parce que pas reconnue dans la Charte. À ce moment-là, elle ne peut pas l’exercer si bien qu’il ne reste rien pour le principe de non-intervention ; il reste quelque chose seulement de politique, mais rien de beaucoup plus tangible.
 
On ne peut même interpréter restrictivement les compétences des Nations Unies ; tombe dans la compétence des Nations Unies toute question ayant une répercussion internationale, la contrepartie est que l’Assemblée ne peut seulement que recommander protégeant la souveraineté des États, elle ne fait que discuter.
 
Le paragraphe 7 ne s’applique pas au Conseil de sécurité en vertu de l’article 7 et du chapitre 14, on a fait une concession politique parce que les États aiment leurs affaires internes, mais cette règle ne fait pas beaucoup de sens, ou bien on possède une compétence et on peut l’exercer soit on n’a pas la compétence et on ne peut de toute manière l’exercer.

= Le principe du non-recours à la force =

= Annexes =

= References =
<references />

[[Category:Robert Kolb]]
[[Category:droit]]
[[Category:droit International Public]]
[[Category:relations internationales]]  
[[Category:2011]] 
[[Category:2012]]  
[[Category:2013]] 
[[Category:2014]]
[[Category:2015]]