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[[Image:Battle of Issus.jpg|right|350px|thumb|Alexandre et Darius face à face  [http://sbanap.campaniabeniculturali.it/ Musée archéologique national de Naples.]]]
[[Image:Battle of Issus.jpg|right|350px|thumb|Alexandre et Darius face à face  [http://sbanap.campaniabeniculturali.it/ Musée archéologique national de Naples.]]]


We are going to develop substantive reflections and work on the question of how a science, in this case political science, has managed to grasp the war well or badly. We are in a very important phase of unfortunate transformation of wars on the planet and at the same time we are going to treat the subject from the point of view of political science.
We are going to develop substantive reflections and work on the question of how a science, in this case, political science, has managed to grasp the war well or badly. We are in a very important phase of unfortunate transformation of wars on the planet and at the same time, we are going to treat the subject from the point of view of political science.


War is first and foremost a phenomenon of struggle between state powers, i. e. between governments and to think of conflict as an object of conflict between nation-states. From the 19th century onwards, partisan warfare began. It is a change of nature, because they are individuals who go to war against a state. On the other hand, another conceptual reversal is worrying, because we are entering into wars that no longer have any reason to stop.  
War is first and foremost a phenomenon of struggle between state powers, i.e. between governments and to think of conflict as an object of conflict between nation-states. From the 19th century onwards, partisan warfare began. It is a change of nature, because they are individuals who go to war against a state. On the other hand, another conceptual reversal is worrying, because we are entering into wars that no longer have any reason to stop.  


{{Translations
{{Translations
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The consequences are particularly important, especially human ones. At the time of the Solferino war, there were 40,000 military deaths and 1 civilian death. The First World War resulted in losses of 50% of military personnel and 50% of civilians, as the strategy changed. Strategy is a war economy, an oversized war effort that takes people hostage.
The consequences are particularly important, especially human ones. At the time of the Solferino war, there were 40,000 military deaths and 1 civilian death. The First World War resulted in losses of 50% of military personnel and 50% of civilians, as the strategy changed. Strategy is a war economy, an oversized war effort that takes people hostage.


= Qu’est-ce que la guerre ? =
= What is war? =
The economy of war has changed its nature, it is wars of duration that are taking hold. This war economy, which will have to put production tools at the service of armaments, will have repercussions in terms of strategy.
The economy of war has changed its nature, it is wars of duration that are taking hold. This war economy, which will have to put production tools at the service of armaments, will have repercussions in terms of strategy.


The economy of war, which will have to put production tools at the service of the armaments industry, will have consequences for the end of strategy, therefore the objective is to destroy the production tools. We go into wars where we have 10% of military deaths and 90% of civilian deaths.
The economy of war, which will have to put production tools at the service of the armaments industry, will have consequences for the end of strategy, therefore the objective is to destroy the production tools. We go into wars where we have 10% of military deaths and 90% of civilian deaths.


The first inversion is that it is interesting to wonder about war, because it is an inversion of normality which is peace, we remain in civilizational. What we see is that war is a suspended time which is paradoxically the continuity of the debate in another form, because war is always a form of discussion. War is of great interest to political science and many fields, because it is the continuation of politics by other means, hence the importance of totally destroying one's opponent.
The first inversion is that it is interesting to wonder about war because it is an inversion of normality which is peace, we remain in civilizational. What we see is that war is a suspended time which is paradoxically the continuity of the debate in another form, because war is always a form of discussion. War is of great interest to political science and many fields because it is the continuation of politics by other means, hence the importance of totally destroying one's opponent.


George Bataille defines war as "a supreme game, a strategic game, a game in which you put on the green carpet absolutely everything you have, your life". Therefore, the outcome must produce a winner and a loser.
George Bataille defines war as "a supreme game, a strategic game, a game in which you put on the green carpet absolutely everything you have, your life". Therefore, the outcome must produce a winner and a loser.


It is the inversion of a system and dialogue by force.
It is the inversion of a system and dialogue by force.
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= War: an object of struggle between state powers =
= War: an object of struggle between state powers =
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On the other hand, it will make war illegitimate in other cases, such as the war of conquest, because a nation-state is not meant to conquer other states, so this war is unfair.
On the other hand, it will make war illegitimate in other cases, such as the war of conquest, because a nation-state is not meant to conquer other states, so this war is unfair.


The law of war in Grotius's theory is also a law of peace, because it will be qualified as the conditions of peace. If the aggressor is in a position of injustice, he or she must be punished by other States.
The law of war in Grotius's theory is also a law of peace because it will be qualified as the conditions of peace. If the aggressor is in a position of injustice, he or she must be punished by other States.


=== Thomas Hobbes ===
=== Thomas Hobbes ===
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The state of nature can be either chaos or absolute equality. Hobbes is on the side of chaotic interpretation because the state of nature would raise the impulses of individuals who are destructive impulses leading to war.
The state of nature can be either chaos or absolute equality. Hobbes is on the side of chaotic interpretation because the state of nature would raise the impulses of individuals who are destructive impulses leading to war.


To avoid war, it is necessary to build a strong state by establishing reason by abandoning the theory of natural law in order to pass to a social contract. What underpins the modern state is the ability to live through the contract that guarantees peace. In the missions that Hobbes thinks about the modern state there is the construction of an army, because it guarantees peace.
To avoid war, it is necessary to build a strong state by establishing reason by abandoning the theory of natural law in order to pass to a social contract. What underpins the modern state is the ability to live through the contract that guarantees peace. In the missions that Hobbes thinks about the modern state there is the construction of an army because it guarantees peace.


=== Emmanuel Kant ===
=== Emmanuel Kant ===
Kant will look at what he called peace-building and the means to achieve perpetual peace and how to construct a legal theory of peace.
Kant will look at what he called peace-building and the means to achieve perpetual peace and how to construct a legal theory of peace.


Peace cannot be based on emotion and affect, it is based on rationality. Therefore, only reason can lead men to accept peace, it is a moral reason. The only solution is to think of a mutualisation of different ones.[[Image:Kant foto.jpg|thumb|left|100px|Portrait of Emmanuel Kant]]
Peace cannot be based on emotion and affect, it is based on rationality. Therefore, only reason can lead men to accept peace, it is a moral reason. The only solution is to think of a mutualisation of different ones.
 
[[Image:Kant foto.jpg|thumb|left|100px|Portrait of Emmanuel Kant]]


We must invent an international law of peace, which is the management of power relations between nations on the basis that regulation is necessary because there will always be wars.
We must invent an international law of peace, which is the management of power relations between nations on the basis that regulation is necessary because there will always be wars.


Kant's important contribution will be to say that the public international law that must be built will not be the right of the strongest. It must be something else that is a right of peace that is not a right of war. A universal peace must be built, but above all it is necessary to think of three levels of peace:
Kant's important contribution will be to say that the public international law that must be built will not be the right of the strongest. It must be something else that is a right of peace that is not a right of war. A universal peace must be built, but above all, it is necessary to think of three levels of peace:
*'''domestic political rights''': if all countries adopt a republican constitution, conflicts within countries could be managed.
*'''domestic political rights''': if all countries adopt a republican constitution, conflicts within countries could be managed.
*'''inter-federal/inter-state international law''': if a law of peace has been created within states by a system of republican constitution, there may be a system of partnership relations between states.
*'''inter-federal/inter-state international law''': if a law of peace has been created within states by a system of republican constitution, there may be a system of partnership relations between states.
*'''International hospitality law''': this is the capacity of States to dialogue in perpetual peace. It is a cosmopolitan international law.
*'''International hospitality law''': this is the capacity of States to dialogue in perpetual peace. It is a cosmopolitan international law.


He is an interesting thinker, because he is the author and creator of the emergence of a public international law of peace on the basis that everything must be freely agreed and that it is necessary to fight against any autocratic system, that is to say, the personalization of power, that can lead to war.
He is an interesting thinker because he is the author and creator of the emergence of a public international law of peace on the basis that everything must be freely agreed and that it is necessary to fight against any autocratic system, that is to say, the personalization of power, that can lead to war.


=== Hegel ===
=== Hegel ===
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Hegel will question the war by interpreting it as a subjective behaviour of being. Basically, war cannot stop because it allows the individual's subjectivity to be situated in a political field. From then on, war cannot disappear because in a certain way it allows subjectivities to exist and will allow the different peoples to overcome their oppositions in order to solidify themselves.
Hegel will question the war by interpreting it as a subjective behaviour of being. Basically, war cannot stop because it allows the individual's subjectivity to be situated in a political field. From then on, war cannot disappear because in a certain way it allows subjectivities to exist and will allow the different peoples to overcome their oppositions in order to solidify themselves.


War has an extraordinary advantage, because it succeeds in sublimating the differences of individuals in the space of the nation-state, it gathers and erases the contradictions referring directly to René Girard's theories.
War has an extraordinary advantage because it succeeds in sublimating the differences of individuals in the space of the nation-state, it gathers and erases the contradictions referring directly to René Girard's theories.


=== Machiavel ===
=== Machiavel ===
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[[Fichier:Santi di Tito - Niccolo Machiavelli's portrait.jpg|thumb|right|150px|Portrait posthume de Machiavel par Santi di Tito, au Palazzo Vecchio de Florence]]
[[Fichier:Santi di Tito - Niccolo Machiavelli's portrait.jpg|thumb|right|150px|Portrait posthume de Machiavel par Santi di Tito, au Palazzo Vecchio de Florence]]


Machiavelli is a humanist in a principality of Florence who organizes citizens' militias and writes The Prince where he will describe the modes of government. Machiavelli works on the qualities of the governor and for this he must appropriate the art of warfare that is necessary for his power which holds a moral virtue. Therefore, the end justifies the means, because the most important thing is to achieve objectives no matter how you obtain them. A moral objective through war is not serious if it is not in itself moral, because the objective holds the whole device.
Machiavelli is a humanist in a principality of Florence who organizes citizens' militias and writes The Prince where he will describe the modes of government. Machiavelli works on the qualities of the governor and for this, he must appropriate the art of warfare that is necessary for his power which holds a moral virtue. Therefore, the end justifies the means, because the most important thing is to achieve objectives no matter how you obtain them. A moral objective through war is not serious if it is not in itself moral, because the objective holds the whole device.


When an individual is described as machiavellian, it is suggested that there is a contradiction between the affirmation of goals and the management of means to achieve them.
When an individual is described as Machiavellian, it is suggested that there is a contradiction between the affirmation of goals and the management of means to achieve them.


At Machiavelli, there is a very worrying trend because the issue of war is valued.
At Machiavelli, there is a very worrying trend because the issue of war is valued.


=== Antoine-Henri de Jomini ===
=== Antoine-Henri de Jomini ===
Antoine-Henri de Jomini fut capitaine de l’armée suisse et rédigea un traité de l’art de la guerre avec une méthode d’analyse stratégique en posant la question : qu’est-ce que la stratégie ?
Antoine-Henri de Jomini was captain of the Swiss army and wrote a treatise on the art of war with a method of strategic analysis, asking the question: what is strategy?


C’est un ensemble d’éléments sur lequel on voit un effort de gestion du terrain :
It is a set of elements on which we see an effort to manage the land:
*le positionnement des troupes ;
* the positioning of troops;
*l’analyse in situ des forces en présence ;
* in situ analysis of the forces involved;
*les modalités de l’attaque des points faibles ;
* how to tackle weaknesses;
*les conditions tactiques de la poursuite de l’ennemi ;
* the tactical conditions for pursuing the enemy;
*les conditions de la maîtrise du mouvement ;
* conditions of movement control;
*l’intégration du concept de mobilité et de surprise ;
* integration of the concept of mobility and surprise;
*la ruse comme les fausses attaques, l’apparence de décrochements et les contre-attaques.
* trickery such as false attacks, the appearance of setbacks and counter-attacks.


=== Carl von Clausewitz ===
=== Carl von Clausewitz ===
Pour Clausewitz, la guerre est une relation entre des objectifs politiques et des buts de guerre. Lorsque l’on dit que les guerres d’aujourd’hui sont des guerres sans fin, c’est parce qu’on a perdu leurs objectifs politiques.
For Clausewitz, war is a relationship between politics and war aims. When we say that today's wars are endless wars, it is because we have lost their political objectives.


La guerre sans fin se développe parce que s’oublie un des principes fondamentaux de la guerre westphalienne qui est que si nous faisons la guerre dans un système westphalien, c’est pour aller vers la paix et non pas pour rester en guerre. Lorsque l’on dit que le temps de la guerre est un temps d’inversion, cela veut simplement dire que la guerre est un temps d’inversion pour revenir vers la paix.
The never-ending war is developing because one of the fundamental principles of the Westphalian war is forgotten, which is that if we are waging war in a Westphalian system, it is to go towards peace and not to stay at war. When we say that wartime is a time of inversion, it simply means that war is a time of inversion to return to peace.[[Image:Clausewitz.jpg|thumb|right|185px|Carl von Clausewitz]]


[[Image:Clausewitz.jpg|thumb|right|185px|Carl von Clausewitz]]
War is a parenthesis whose construction of the balance of power is solely for the purpose of exiting the war. When Clausewitz speaks of war as a political construct, he recalls a fundamental point: war is the continuation of politics by other means.  


La guerre est une parenthèse dont la construction du rapport de force n’a que pour objet la sortie de la guerre. Lorsque Clausewitz parle de la guerre comme une construction politique, il rappelle une chose fondamentale qui est que la guerre est la continuation de la politique par d’autres moyens.  
In the spirit of the Westphalian war, war is subordinate to politics. If today's war is so dangerous, it is because it becomes an endless war because the political objective is forgotten. From then on, we return to a permanent state of war because we no longer have the state or institutional structures that remind us that war must end at some point in time.


Dans l’esprit de la guerre westphalienne, la guerre est subordonnée au politique. Si la guerre d’aujourd’hui est si dangereuse, c’est parce qu’elle devient une guerre sans fin parce que l’objectif politique est oublié. Dès lors, on rentre dans un état de guerre permanent parce que l’on a plus les structures étatiques ou institutionnelles qui rappellent que la guerre à un moment donné doit s’arrêter.
When we look at war-torn territories like Darfur over the years, national, international and state structures dissolve, showing that they are almost privatized wars because the structures are no longer there.


Lorsque l’on étudie des territoires en guerre comme le Darfour, au fil des années, les structures nationales, internationales et étatiques se dissolvent montrant que ce sont des guerres presque privatisées parce que les structures ne sont plus là.
Clausewitz is important because war is basically the continuation of politics by other means, which means that at some point we will have to return to politics. Without politics, i. e. the ability to structure conflict, it is impossible to emerge from war, which explains why some countries today are in a permanent state of war.


Clausewitz est important, parce qu’au fond, la guerre est la continuation de la politique par d’autres moyens, cela signifie qu’il va falloir à un moment donné revenir vers la politique. Sans politique, c’est-à-dire de capacité à structurer le conflit, il est impossible de sortir de la guerre ce qui explique que certains pays d’aujourd’hui sont dans un état de guerre permanent.
For Clausewitz, the danger is that war will escape politics. It is imperative that war be controlled by politics because it is the very capacity and register of war. If war escapes politics, it is war that will replace politics, in this case, we are going crazy in something that escapes us.


Pour [[Guerre|Clauswitz]], le danger est que la guerre échappe au politique. Il faut absolument que la guerre soit maitrisée par le politique, car c’est la capacité et le registre même de la guerre. Si la guerre échappe au politique, c’est la guerre qui va remplacer le politique, dans ce cas nous rentrons dans la folie dans quelque chose qui nous échappe.
War can be a formidable machine for negotiating peace. War is waged because discussion is no longer possible, but also because war allows peace to be renegotiated.
 
La guerre peut être une formidable machine de négociation de la paix. La guerre se fait parce que la discussion n’est plus possible, mais aussi parce la guerre permet de renégocier la paix.


=== Maurice Davie ===
=== Maurice Davie ===
Selon Davie dans l'article ''The Evolution of War'' publié en 1930<ref>"Book Review:The Evolution of War: A Study of Its Role in Early Societies. Maurice R. Davie." Am J Sociol American Journal of Sociology 35.6 (1930): 1114.</ref>, la guerre dans les sociétés primitives renvoie à :
According to Davie in the article ''The Evolution of War'' publié en 1930<ref>"Book Review:The Evolution of War: A Study of Its Role in Early Societies. Maurice R. Davie." Am J Sociol American Journal of Sociology 35.6 (1930): 1114.</ref>, war in primitive societies refers to:
*la concurrence vitale pour la survie du groupe :
* vital competition for the survival of the group:
*les différends religieux ;
* religious differences;
*la vengeance de sang ;
* blood revenge;
*la gloire.
* glory.


=== Marvin Harris ===
=== Marvin Harris ===
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[[Fichier:MarvinHarris.jpg|thumb|right|Marvin Harris]]
[[Fichier:MarvinHarris.jpg|thumb|right|Marvin Harris]]


Pour Harris, comme relaté dans son ouvrage ''Cows, Pigs, Wars and Witches: The Riddles of Culture'' publié en 1973<ref>Cows, Pigs, Wars and Witches: The Riddles of Culture. London: Hutchinson & Co. 1975. ISBN 0-09-122750-X. Reissued in 1991 by Vintage, New York. (version complète pdf:http://monoskop.org/images/5/5b/Harris_Marvin_Cows_Pigs_Wars_and_Witches_The_Riddles_of_Culture_1974.pdf)</ref> dans une société traditionnelle, il existe quatre théories sur l’origine de la guerre dans les sociétés primitives :
For Harris, as described in his book ''Cows, Pigs, Wars and Witches: The Riddles of Culture'' publié en 1973<ref>Cows, Pigs, Wars and Witches: The Riddles of Culture. London: Hutchinson & Co. 1975. ISBN 0-09-122750-X. Reissued in 1991 by Vintage, New York. (version complète pdf:http://monoskop.org/images/5/5b/Harris_Marvin_Cows_Pigs_Wars_and_Witches_The_Riddles_of_Culture_1974.pdf)</ref> In a traditional society, there are four theories about the origin of war in primitive societies:
*la guerre comme solidarité : elle soude une population, c’est une mode de préfabrication de la légitimité ;
* War as solidarity: it welds a population together, it is a mode of prefabrication of legitimacy;
*la guerre comme jeu : dimension ludique de la guerre, le sport peut être perçu comme la continuité de la guerre ;
* war as a game: playful dimension of war, sport can be perceived as the continuity of war;
*la guerre propre à la nature humaine ;
* The war of human nature;
*la guerre comme continuation de la politique : elle permet de fabriquer de la politique.
* War as a continuation of politics: it makes it possible to make politics.


== La guerre et la paix : un objet juridique et de gouvernance internationale ==
== War and peace: a legal and international governance object ==


=== Le droit de la guerre ou droit de La Haye ===
=== The Law of War or The Hague Law ===
Nous avons parlé  du traité de Westphalie qui engageait une première réflexion sur l’état central de la guerre et le droit de la guerre que l’on appelle aussi le droit de la Haye. C’est le droit qui consiste à pouvoir faire la guerre ; la guerre est soumise au droit public international, il y a des règles. L’attaque de Pearl Harbour est une rupture de la condition même de la guerre.
We talked about the Treaty of Westphalia, which initiated a first reflection on the central state of war and the law of war, also known as Hague law. It is the right to be able to wage war; war is subject to international public law, there are rules. The Pearl Harbour attack is a breach of the very condition of war.
 
Le droit de la guerre fixe des droits est des devoirs pour les belligérants dans la conduite des hostilités. À partir du moment où l’on rentre en guerre, il y a des devoirs et des droits.
The law of war sets out rights is a duty for the belligerents in the conduct of hostilities. From the moment we return to war, there are duties and rights.
 
Ils portent sur la limitation des moyens comme par exemple l’interdiction de munitions qui peuvent affecter les populations civiles. De plus, le droit de la guerre définit des règles et prévoit des sanctions pour ceux qui les enfreindraient. C’est pourquoi il y a souvent au Conseil de sécurité des Nations-Unies des textes qui sont pris contre certains pays qui ont outrepassé les règles de la guerre.
They concern the limitation of means such as, for example, the prohibition of ammunition that may affect civilian populations. Moreover, the law of war defines rules and provides for sanctions for those who violate them. That is why there are often texts in the United Nations Security Council that are taken against certain countries that have overstepped the rules of war.


=== Le droit international humanitaire ou droit de Genève ===
=== International humanitarian law or Geneva law ===
{{Article détaillé|L'individu en tant que sujet du droit international}}
{{Article détaillé|L'individu en tant que sujet du droit international}}


C’est un droit humanitaire qui a pour objet de  protéger ceux qui ne participent pas aux combats et notamment les populations civiles. Ce droit est important, car il a été créé à Genève en 1949 et il est un des fondements juridiques de la protection de civils en cas de conflits armés.  
It is a humanitarian law whose purpose is to protect those who do not take part in the fighting, particularly the civilian population. This right is important because it was created in Geneva in 1949 and is one of the legal foundations for the protection of civilians in armed conflict.  
 
Il y a des lois importantes qui font des distinctions fondamentales entre civil et militaire en temps de guerre. Ce qui est en jeu est le statut du combattant et du prisonnier de guerre.  
There are important laws that make fundamental distinctions between civil and military in times of war. What is at stake is the status of the combatant and the prisoner of war.
 
Ces protocoles ont été plus ou moins adoptés par différents États et justifient la jurisprudence du crime de guerre. Le principe de crime de guerre est celui qui enfreint les règles de la guerre. Le paradoxe est que l’on a un droit international de faire la guerre, un droit international humanitaire de la guerre, mais il n’y a pas de droit international de sortie de guerre.
These protocols have been more or less adopted by different states and justify the jurisprudence of war crimes. The principle of war crimes is the one that violates the rules of war. The paradox is that we have an international right to make war, an international humanitarian law of war, but there is no international right to leave war.


Il y a deux concepts globaux qui dictent la recherche mondiale d’une gouvernance de la sécurité :
There are two global concepts that dictate the global search for security governance:
*'''l’universalité''' : tous les êtres humains appartiennent à l’universel ;
*'''universality''': all human beings belong to the universal;
*'''d’humanité''' : tout le monde appartient à une communauté humaine qui ne peut accepter tout acte inhumain. Si on appartient à une collectivité humaine il est possible dès lors de qualifier des actes d’inhumanité, c’est-à-dire le droit international public s’intéresse  au principe d’inhumanité parce qu’il met en cause le principe des droits de l’homme. C’est parce qu’il  a le principe d’humanité que l’on peut poursuivre des tortionnaires et des dictateurs.
*of '''humanity''': everyone belongs to a human community that cannot accept any inhuman act. If one belongs to a human collectivity, then it is possible to qualify acts as inhuman, i. e. public international law is interested in the principle of inhumanity because it challenges the principle of human rights. It is because he has the principle of humanity that torturers and dictators can be prosecuted.
These two concepts were at the foundation of global governance, first at the heart of the League of Nations, but which could not avoid the First World War and then through the United Nations Organization in 1945 with the creation of the Security Council, peace-keeping and peace-making.
Ces deux concepts ont été au fondement de la gouvernance mondiale d’abord au cœur de la Société des Nations, mais qui n’a pu éviter la Première guerre mondiale et puis à travers l’Organisation des Nations-Unies en 1945 avec la création du Conseil de Sécurité, du peace-keeping et du peace-making.


= Les guerres des partisans =
= Partisan Warfare =
Elles introduisent les modifications substantielles qui interviennent aux XIXème siècle et XXème siècle. C’est un changement de paradigme, car le concept de parti entend celui qui va défendre une position. La guerre du partisan nous ramène du côté de la gestion des individus plutôt que du côté de la gestion de l’État.  
They introduce substantial changes that occurred in the 19th and 20th centuries. It is a paradigm shift because the party concept means whoever is going to defend a position. The partisan war brings us back to the management of individuals rather than the management of the state.  


== Une nouveauté : la guerre du partisan ==
== A novelty: partisan warfare ==
Le partisan est celui qui prend parti en défendant une position. C’est quelqu’un qui n’appartient pas au corps régulier de l’armée, il prend les armes pour défendre une cause.  
The partisan is the one who takes sides in defending a position. He is someone who does not belong to the regular corps of the army, he takes up arms to defend a cause.  
   
   
=== Aymon de Gingins-La-Sarraz ===
=== Aymon de Gingins-La-Sarraz ===
Gingins-La Sarraz était un officier Suisse au service de la principauté de Naples et publie un livre qui s’intitule ''La guerre défensive en Suisse''. Sa théorie est que la Suisse est neutre et il faut renforcer ses capacités défensives, pour maintenir la neutralité suisse il faut fabriquer des partisans qui puissent se mobiliser en cas d’agression.
Gingins-La Sarraz was a Swiss officer serving the Principality of Naples and publishes a book titled ''La guerre défensive en Suisse''. His theory is that Switzerland is neutral and it is necessary to strengthen its defensive capacities, in order to maintain Swiss neutrality it is necessary to build supporters who can mobilize in the event of aggression.
 
Pour défendre la Suisse, il faut renforcer les capacités de la guerre en renforçant les insuffisances des troupes par des troupes de partisans. Les partisans servent à pallier le manque de troupes régulières.  
In order to defend Switzerland, it is necessary to strengthen the capabilities of the war by strengthening the inadequacies of the troops with partisan troops. Partisans are used to make up for the lack of regular troops.
 
La guerre partisane renvoie à des groupes irréguliers qui peuvent se mobiliser dans des systèmes d’attaque et de réponse. Ici, la guerre des partisans est pensée comme un moyen de résister à l’invasion étrangère pour protéger la Suisse ou les autrichiens.
Partisan warfare refers to irregular groups that can mobilize in systems of attack and response. Here, partisan warfare is seen as a means of resisting foreign invasion in order to protect Switzerland or the people of Austria.
 
=== Carl Schmitt: The theorizing of partisan warfare ===
[[image:PapenSchleicher0001.jpg|thumb|Schmitt advises the von Papen government (left) and Schleicher (right) on the constitutional issue.]]
 
Carl Schmitt is a sulphurous character by his position for the Nazis in 1933. In Partisan Theory, published in 1962, it appears that modern warfare is going to be a partisan war. These are groups of individuals who are going to engage in battle and this will be done from an important moment, the Napoleonic War in Spain.
 
Napoleon's war in Spain shows for the first time the birth of the partisan as a subject and as a personality who will mobilize to drive out Napoleonic troops.
 
The partisan theory is very important, because Schmitt is the first to think that we are entering a new era of conflict and that this new era of conflict is no longer essentially inter-state conflicts, but partisan conflicts, i. e. splits of wars on the planet in which groups of individuals as a partisan subject to radical discourse and ideology will mobilize against one or more states. Since then, the partisan is an irregular army.
 
== The concept of revolutionary warfare ==
Irregular wars are emerging in the great phases of liberation that will mobilize populations against the dominant power. During the Second World War, it will be the resistance against the Nazis, but then it will be the FLN against the French and in Egypt the Egyptian supporters against the British power, etc. It will be the FLN.
 
The characteristics of partisan warfare are that it is wars that have no uniform and have a strong commitment and ideology. Moreover, partisan warfare is an asymmetric war, the partisan does not have the armaments of the nation-state. To win these wars, you have to play different tools such as the surprise ruse. It's extreme mobility that contrasts with classic warfare.
 
Revolutionary war is a Maoist concept which considers that revolution can only be achieved through politico-military action. It is a transition to urban guerrilla warfare, as the city becomes the jungle of partisan warfare, mainly in the 1960s and 1970s. The great failure of the partisan war is the Che war in Bolivia.
 
= Warsfare Today =
 
== New incidences ==


=== Carl Schmitt : la théorisation de la guerre des partisans ===
=== Modern warfares damage the Westphalian system ===
[[image:PapenSchleicher0001.jpg|thumb|Schmitt conseille le gouvernement von Papen (à gauche) et Schleicher (à droite) dans la question constitutionnelle]]
The great question in political science and international relations questions the passage from the end of the Westphalian wars to endless wars that would show that the war has basically changed its meaning. This is what some authors call the return to Hobbsian anarchy, i. e. a permanent state of war.


Carl Schmitt est un personnage sulfureux par sa prise de position pour les nazis en 1933. Dans la ''Théorie du partisan'', ouvrage publié en 1962 apparait que la guerre moderne va être une guerre de partisans. Ce sont des groupements d’individus qui vont s’engager dans la bataille et cela va se faire à partir d’un moment important qui est la guerre napoléonienne en Espagne .
Hobbsian anarchy would be a return to the state of nature in a state of perpetual warfare in a massive use of force in international relations, which is a regressive force and this in a generalized state of anarchy and on the assumption that each wants to build its power to the detriment of the other.
La guerre de Napoléon en Espagne montre pour la première fois la naissance du partisan en tant que sujet et en tant que personnalité qui va se mobiliser pour chasser les troupes napoléoniennes.
La théorie du partisan est très importante, car Schmitt est le premier à penser que nous entrons dans une nouvelle ère de conflit et que cette nouvelle ère de conflit n’est plus essentiellement des conflits interétatiques, mais des conflits de partisans  c’est-à-dire des fractionnements de guerres sur la planète dans lesquels des groupes d’individus en tant que partisan soumis à une radicalité du discours et a une idéologie vont se mobiliser contre un ou plusieurs États. Dès lors, le partisan est une armée irrégulière.


== Le concept des guerres révolutionnaires ==
It is the idea that war is returning very quickly to the system of international relations and will have an extremely important impact. These are diffuse wars that will affect civilians much more than the military and these are wars that will be more radical because there are no rules of regulation.
Les guerres irrégulières émergent dans les grandes phases de libération qui vont mobiliser des populations contre la puissance dominante. Pendant la Seconde guerre mondial, cela sera les résistances contre les nazis, mais ensuite cela va être le FLN contre les français et en Égypte les partisans égyptiens contre le pouvoir anglais, etc.
Les caractéristiques de la guerre de partisan est que ce sont des guerres qui n’ont pas d’uniforme et qui ont un engagement ainsi qu'une idéologie forte. De plus, la guerre de partisan est une guerre asymétrique, le partisan n’a pas les armements de l’État-nation. Pour remporter ces guerres, il faut jouer d’outils différents à savoir la ruse la surprise. C’est une mobilité extrême qui ‘oppose à la guerre classique.
La guerre révolutionnaire est un concept maoïste qui considère que la révolution ne peut être faite que dans le cadre d'une action politico-militaire. C’est un passage à la guérilla urbaine, car la ville devient la jungle du combat partisan qui se situe principalement dans les années 1960 et 1970. Le grand échec de la guerre de partisan est la [[Sécurité nationale et lutte antiterroriste : l’exemple de l’Amérique latine|guerre du Che]] en Bolivie.


= Des guerres aujourd’hui =
=== The perpetual state of war ===
These are wars that will have a considerable impact on nature, we have accelerated destruction of natural resources: we come to the hypothesis in these wars that have no structure any more if we want to destroy the other we must destroy his resources. Since then, nature has been used as a source of pollution and mass destruction.


== De nouvelles incidences ==
On the other hand, in these wars will destroy each other's culture, because it is the destruction of others as human beings, destroying their identity and memory.


=== Les guerres modernes mettent à mal le système westphalien ===
== Endless warfares ==
La grande question en science politique et en relations internationales s’interroge sur le  passage entre la fin des guerres westphaliennes à des guerres sans fin qui montreraient qu’au fond la guerre a changé de sens. C’est ce que certains auteurs appellent le retour à l’anarchie hobbsienne, c’est-à-dire à un état de guerre permanent.
War was an exceptional and peace a normality, which leads us to wonder whether war is becoming a normality and peace does not become something of the extraordinary. Peace can rise almost as an impossible horizon to reach.
L’anarchie hobbsienne serait un retour à l’état de nature dans un état de guerre perpétuelle dans un recours massif à la force dans les relations internationales qui est une force de régression et cela dans un état d’anarchie généralisé et dans l‘hypothèse que chacun veut construire son pouvoir au détriment de l’autre.
C’est l’idée que la guerre revient de façon très rapide dans le système des relations internationales et va avoir un impact extrêmement important. Ce sont des guerres diffuses qui vont toucher beaucoup plus les civils que les militaires et ce sont des guerres qui vont être plus radicales parce qu’il n’y a pas de règles de régulation.


=== L’état de guerre perpétuelle ===
The never-ending war is a war that no longer has any purpose by becoming part of everyday life through destruction. It will also create a specific economy. In never-ending wars, it is necessary to build specific economies that generally revolve around drugs, which are made in an impossible peace, because there is no legitimate interlocutor to build peace.
Ce sont des guerres qui vont avoir des impacts considérables sur la nature, on a des destructions de ressources naturelles accélérées : on en vient à l’hypothèse dans ces guerres qui ne n’ont plus de structure que si l'on veut détruire l’autre il faut détruire ses ressources. Dès lors, on utilise la nature comme facteur de pollution et agent de destruction massive.  
D’autre part, dans ces guerres ont va détruire la culture de l’autre, car c’est la destruction d’autrui en tant qu’être humain, on détruit son identité et sa mémoire.


== Des guerres sans fin ==
In some cases, this can be explained by the war in Iraq, since the Gulf War began, we have been entering a permanent cycle of warfare. From then on, peace becomes a conceptually unthinkable horizon.
La guerre relevait d’un exceptionnel et la paix d’une normalité ce qui nous amène à nous demander si la guerre en devient pas être une normalité et la paix ne devient pas quelque chose de l’ordre de l’extraordinaire. La paix peut relever presque comme un horizon impossible à atteindre.
La guerre sans fin est une guerre qui n’a plus de but en s’insérant dans le quotidien par des destructions. Elle va d’autre part instaurer une économie spécifique. Dans les guerres sans fin, il faut constituer des économies spécifiques qui se situent généralement autour de la drogue qui se fait dans une paix impossible, car il n’y a pas d’interlocuteur légitime pour construire de la paix.  
Selon certains cas, on peut l’expliquer à la guerre en Irak, depuis le début de la guerre du Golfe, nous entrons dans un cycle permanent de la guerre. Dès lors, la paix devient un horizon conceptuellement impensable.


== Une nouvelle théorie politique Michael Walzer ==
== A new political theory, Michael Walzer ==


[[Fichier:MichaelWalzer-USNA-Lecture.jpg|thumb|200px|Michael Walzer.]]
[[Fichier:MichaelWalzer-USNA-Lecture.jpg|thumb|200px|Michael Walzer.]]


Walzer a publié un ouvrage intitulé ''Guerres justes et injustes''<ref>Walzer, Michael. Guerres Justes Et Injustes: Argumentation Morale Avec Exemples Historiques. Paris: Belin, 1999.</ref> qui pose une réflexion d’un point de vue philosophico-politique sur la guerre et sur la notion guerre juste. Il reprend l’interrogation initiale de [[La naissance du concept moderne de l’État|Hobbes]] sur la qualification de la guerre, il va être un théoricien du paradigme légaliste, car il considère que pour que la guerre puisse devenir juste il faut que ce soit une guerre encadrée.
Walzer published a book titled ''Guerres justes et injustes''<ref>Walzer, Michael. Guerres Justes Et Injustes: Argumentation Morale Avec Exemples Historiques. Paris: Belin, 1999.</ref> which provides a philosophical-political reflection on war and the concept of just war. He goes back to Hobbes's initial interrogation on the qualification of war, he is going to be a theorist of the legalistic paradigm, because he considers that in order for war to become just, it must be a framed war.


Une guerre juste est une guerre maitrisée, c’est une guerre de combattants légaux. En d’autres termes, il y a une légalité de la guerre. Il va pointer les paradoxes, à savoir le lien entre concepts de guerre juste et morale disant que la guerre est un objet d’anormalité,dans le concept de guerre il n’y a pas quelque chose de moral.
A just war is a controlled war, a war of legal combatants. In other words, there is a legality of war. He will point out the paradoxes, namely the link between the concepts of just and moral war, that war is an object of abnormality, in the concept of war there is not something moral.


La préoccupation philosophique de Waltz et sa théorie politique est de s’interroger sur la fabrication de la morale sur un objet qui est profondément immoral et où peut-on qualifier la question de la morale.
Waltz's philosophical preoccupation and his political theory is to question the fabrication of morality on an object that is profoundly immoral and where the question of morality can be qualified.


Il va s‘interroger les situations dans lesquelles la morale peut être restaurée dans la guerre. La guerre est morale lorsqu’il y a une situation défensive face à une agression extérieure. Il y a une situation morale de guerre dans la nature employée. Si on institue une codification des armements, il y a une sorte de morale même si nous fabriquons des armes immorales.
He will question the situations in which morality can be restored in war. War is moral when there is a defensive situation in the face of external aggression. There is a moral situation of war in the nature employed. If we institute a codification of armaments, there is a kind of morality even if we manufacture immoral weapons.


La gestion du terrorisme est amorale, car dans une gestion de conflit asymétrique, on pose la question de la surprise comme un acte militaire, en plus le terrorisme a besoin de publicité, il est nécessaire d’effrayer et de terroriser. Dans la dimension terroriste, il y a une dimension amorale. On ne s’attaque qu’aux plus faibles dans un axe qui n’est pas déclaré par la guerre.
The management of terrorism is amoral because, in an asymmetric conflict management, the question of surprise is raised as a military act, in addition to terrorism needs publicity, it is necessary to frighten and terrorize. In the terrorist dimension, there is an amoral dimension. Only the weakest are attacked in an axis that is not declared by the war.


Il va de plus réfléchir sur la question de la moralité et le retour du politique. Pour Waltz, le paradigme légaliste ne peut refuser la question des règles de la conduite de la guerre. C’est pourquoi Philippe Delmas pose la question dans son livre éponyme du ''Bel Avenir de la Guerre''<ref>Delmas, Philippe. Le Bel Avenir De La Guerre. Paris: Gallimard, 1995.</ref>.
He will also reflect on the question of morality and the return of politics. For Waltz, the legalistic paradigm cannot refuse the question of the rules of conduct of war. This is why Philippe Delmas asks the question in his eponymous book of the ''Bel Avenir de la Guerre''<ref>Delmas, Philippe. Le Bel Avenir De La Guerre. Paris: Gallimard, 1995.</ref>.


= Annexes =
= Annexes =
*"Clausewitz and the Blue Flower of Romanticism: Understanding."International Relations And Security Network. N.p., n.d. Web. 25 Sept. 2014. <http://www.isn.ethz.ch/Digital-Library/Articles/Detail/?lng=en&id=183843>.
*"Clausewitz and the Blue Flower of Romanticism: Understanding."International Relations And Security Network. N.p., n.d. Web. 25 Sept. 2014. <http://www.isn.ethz.ch/Digital-Library/Articles/Detail/?lng=en&id=183843>.
*"(Audio) Conférence #2 - Pierre Hassner, "Guerre Et Paix Au XXIe Siécle" - 27 Janvier 2014. <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=fJJ3ptIm5Pg&list=PLai4NNFe3eJMYFKhqqNLe0VqrB5av3ljQ>.
*"(Audio) Conférence #2 - Pierre Hassner, "Guerre Et Paix Au XXIe Siécle" - 27 Janvier 2014. <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=fJJ3ptIm5Pg&list=PLai4NNFe3eJMYFKhqqNLe0VqrB5av3ljQ>.
*NATO StratCom COE; Mark Laity. (2018, August 10). What is War?. Retrieved from https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Gj-wsdGL4-M
*ouvrages
*ouvrages
**[http://www.icrc.org/fre/resources/documents/publication/p0361.htm Un souvenir de Solferino, Henry Dunant] : ouvrage complet à télécharger
**[http://www.icrc.org/fre/resources/documents/publication/p0361.htm Un souvenir de Solferino, Henry Dunant] : ouvrage complet à télécharger

Version du 20 octobre 2018 à 05:24

Alexandre et Darius face à face Musée archéologique national de Naples.

We are going to develop substantive reflections and work on the question of how a science, in this case, political science, has managed to grasp the war well or badly. We are in a very important phase of unfortunate transformation of wars on the planet and at the same time, we are going to treat the subject from the point of view of political science.

War is first and foremost a phenomenon of struggle between state powers, i.e. between governments and to think of conflict as an object of conflict between nation-states. From the 19th century onwards, partisan warfare began. It is a change of nature, because they are individuals who go to war against a state. On the other hand, another conceptual reversal is worrying, because we are entering into wars that no longer have any reason to stop.

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Why did political science take an interest in war?

Political science is concerned with war because it is a component of the human condition. All societies have encountered on the way the war progressed. The luck that Europe has had in not knowing war since 1945, with the exception of the former Yugoslavia, is something very rare in the history of humanity.

There is also a historical concomitance between war and the birth of political science. Political science will be born as a disciple at a time when we are questioning the ability to live together, that is to say around the First World War. On the other hand, the 21st century will be the century of wars with wars between the United States and Spain, Great Britain, Japan is the shock of two world wars.

Revolutionary wars will be born from decolonization. It is the fact that the frozen world implies by the weight of identity claims and autonomy in the face of colonizations. The problem of nuclear war will soon arise leading twice to the potential third world war with the Korean War and the Cuban missile crisis. In contemporary times, UN wars emerged with the Gulf Wars and the Afghanistan War.

We are in a world at war that is going to go very far and then it goes as far as terrorism. The implications of 9/11 for the wars in Afghanistan have been proven.

The consequences are particularly important, especially human ones. At the time of the Solferino war, there were 40,000 military deaths and 1 civilian death. The First World War resulted in losses of 50% of military personnel and 50% of civilians, as the strategy changed. Strategy is a war economy, an oversized war effort that takes people hostage.

What is war?

The economy of war has changed its nature, it is wars of duration that are taking hold. This war economy, which will have to put production tools at the service of armaments, will have repercussions in terms of strategy.

The economy of war, which will have to put production tools at the service of the armaments industry, will have consequences for the end of strategy, therefore the objective is to destroy the production tools. We go into wars where we have 10% of military deaths and 90% of civilian deaths.

The first inversion is that it is interesting to wonder about war because it is an inversion of normality which is peace, we remain in civilizational. What we see is that war is a suspended time which is paradoxically the continuity of the debate in another form, because war is always a form of discussion. War is of great interest to political science and many fields because it is the continuation of politics by other means, hence the importance of totally destroying one's opponent.

George Bataille defines war as "a supreme game, a strategic game, a game in which you put on the green carpet absolutely everything you have, your life". Therefore, the outcome must produce a winner and a loser.

It is the inversion of a system and dialogue by force.

War: an object of struggle between state powers

An ancient phenomenon vs. modern interstate warfare

An ancient phenomenon

What is interesting to question is the mythical dimension of war, i. e. how states construct a discourse of war that engages the concept of sacrifice.

When we study war, there is ideological mobilization to facilitate the cohesion of the mass. The one who disagrees with the war is a renegade, he betrayed the cause. After 9/11, very few intellectuals were able to say that George Bush was wrong in calling terrorism a war, and this position was an absolute heroism because they were being stigmatized by the American media.

War can only be lived in a sublimated way, in other words, rationality can lose weight in evaluations.

Modern Warfare

Banquet of the Amsterdam Civic Guard on the occasion of the Münster Peace by Bartholomeus van der Helst, painted in 1648

The Thirty Years' War which lasted from 1618 to 1648 is a religious war which will involve great powers, namely France against Austria and Sweden. This war led to the Treaty of Westphalia, which laid the foundations for modern warfare.

The treaty of Westphalia enshrines the sovereignty of states, war can only be inter-state wars, therefore at the very heart of the issue of inter-state warfare there is the state is the idea of the nation-state that led to conduct the war. The international public law of war is a nation-state law that lays down rules for the conduct of war:

  1. will invent modern diplomacy;
  2. States are sovereign, and it is States that are the foundation of the international order, so to make a war, a process must be followed;
    1. proclaim a declaration of war;
    2. we must know how to end the war with peace treaties.

The theorization of war

The great debate is that from a political science point of view we have long lived on a pseudo-obvious pseudo of war because war historically was brought back to the side of art to have "the art of war". For Plato and Aristotle, what defines politics is that politics is an "art".

The art of warfare is a constructed technique, as is the art of politics, which has attracted war on the strategy side. Napoleon's military genius is that he contravenes the laws of war, he always organises himself into a system so that his adversaries believe that there is no surprise when the art of warfare is defined according to procedures. In this paradox, war is both the norm and the surpassing of the norm that cries out for surprise. There is a space in the strategy that made it possible to avoid analysing war as a more complicated object of the social sciences.

War is an object of philosophy that raises a problem of culture and conscience: the fundamental question is therefore whether one can in the same way that suicide is a social fact, war is a social phenomenon that one can study as such, so war can be thought of, it is something that one can analyse on the side of philosophy and especially political philosophy.

Hugo Grotius

Hugo Grotius
Portrait par Michiel Jansz. van Mierevelt (1631).

Grotius has written a book entitled De jure belli ac pacis on the law of war and the law of peace, he will examine the possibility of a law of war. These are still topical issues with the notions of just war and unjust war. Grotius wonders whether it is possible to build a law of war and to what extent it can play the war itself or stop it. The law of war is possible in two specific cases:

  • Defensive war: only defensive war is fair: protecting populations from an external aggressor.
  • Coercive war: intended to punish those who hijack and oppose the law.

On the other hand, it will make war illegitimate in other cases, such as the war of conquest, because a nation-state is not meant to conquer other states, so this war is unfair.

The law of war in Grotius's theory is also a law of peace because it will be qualified as the conditions of peace. If the aggressor is in a position of injustice, he or she must be punished by other States.

Thomas Hobbes

Article détaillé : La naissance du concept moderne de l’État.
Leviathan, or Treatise on Matter, Form and Power of an Ecclesiastical and Civil Republic, 1651.

In Leviathan, Hobbes will reflect on the causes of the civil war by asking himself about the motivations of the war. It will be the foundation of modern state building to tell us that it will be the state of nature.

The state of nature can be either chaos or absolute equality. Hobbes is on the side of chaotic interpretation because the state of nature would raise the impulses of individuals who are destructive impulses leading to war.

To avoid war, it is necessary to build a strong state by establishing reason by abandoning the theory of natural law in order to pass to a social contract. What underpins the modern state is the ability to live through the contract that guarantees peace. In the missions that Hobbes thinks about the modern state there is the construction of an army because it guarantees peace.

Emmanuel Kant

Kant will look at what he called peace-building and the means to achieve perpetual peace and how to construct a legal theory of peace.

Peace cannot be based on emotion and affect, it is based on rationality. Therefore, only reason can lead men to accept peace, it is a moral reason. The only solution is to think of a mutualisation of different ones.

Portrait of Emmanuel Kant

We must invent an international law of peace, which is the management of power relations between nations on the basis that regulation is necessary because there will always be wars.

Kant's important contribution will be to say that the public international law that must be built will not be the right of the strongest. It must be something else that is a right of peace that is not a right of war. A universal peace must be built, but above all, it is necessary to think of three levels of peace:

  • domestic political rights: if all countries adopt a republican constitution, conflicts within countries could be managed.
  • inter-federal/inter-state international law: if a law of peace has been created within states by a system of republican constitution, there may be a system of partnership relations between states.
  • International hospitality law: this is the capacity of States to dialogue in perpetual peace. It is a cosmopolitan international law.

He is an interesting thinker because he is the author and creator of the emergence of a public international law of peace on the basis that everything must be freely agreed and that it is necessary to fight against any autocratic system, that is to say, the personalization of power, that can lead to war.

Hegel

Portrait of Hegel par Schlesinger (1831)

Hegel will question the war by interpreting it as a subjective behaviour of being. Basically, war cannot stop because it allows the individual's subjectivity to be situated in a political field. From then on, war cannot disappear because in a certain way it allows subjectivities to exist and will allow the different peoples to overcome their oppositions in order to solidify themselves.

War has an extraordinary advantage because it succeeds in sublimating the differences of individuals in the space of the nation-state, it gathers and erases the contradictions referring directly to René Girard's theories.

Machiavel

Article détaillé : La Renaissance italienne.
Portrait posthume de Machiavel par Santi di Tito, au Palazzo Vecchio de Florence

Machiavelli is a humanist in a principality of Florence who organizes citizens' militias and writes The Prince where he will describe the modes of government. Machiavelli works on the qualities of the governor and for this, he must appropriate the art of warfare that is necessary for his power which holds a moral virtue. Therefore, the end justifies the means, because the most important thing is to achieve objectives no matter how you obtain them. A moral objective through war is not serious if it is not in itself moral, because the objective holds the whole device.

When an individual is described as Machiavellian, it is suggested that there is a contradiction between the affirmation of goals and the management of means to achieve them.

At Machiavelli, there is a very worrying trend because the issue of war is valued.

Antoine-Henri de Jomini

Antoine-Henri de Jomini was captain of the Swiss army and wrote a treatise on the art of war with a method of strategic analysis, asking the question: what is strategy?

It is a set of elements on which we see an effort to manage the land:

  • the positioning of troops;
  • in situ analysis of the forces involved;
  • how to tackle weaknesses;
  • the tactical conditions for pursuing the enemy;
  • conditions of movement control;
  • integration of the concept of mobility and surprise;
  • trickery such as false attacks, the appearance of setbacks and counter-attacks.

Carl von Clausewitz

For Clausewitz, war is a relationship between politics and war aims. When we say that today's wars are endless wars, it is because we have lost their political objectives.

The never-ending war is developing because one of the fundamental principles of the Westphalian war is forgotten, which is that if we are waging war in a Westphalian system, it is to go towards peace and not to stay at war. When we say that wartime is a time of inversion, it simply means that war is a time of inversion to return to peace.

Carl von Clausewitz

War is a parenthesis whose construction of the balance of power is solely for the purpose of exiting the war. When Clausewitz speaks of war as a political construct, he recalls a fundamental point: war is the continuation of politics by other means.

In the spirit of the Westphalian war, war is subordinate to politics. If today's war is so dangerous, it is because it becomes an endless war because the political objective is forgotten. From then on, we return to a permanent state of war because we no longer have the state or institutional structures that remind us that war must end at some point in time.

When we look at war-torn territories like Darfur over the years, national, international and state structures dissolve, showing that they are almost privatized wars because the structures are no longer there.

Clausewitz is important because war is basically the continuation of politics by other means, which means that at some point we will have to return to politics. Without politics, i. e. the ability to structure conflict, it is impossible to emerge from war, which explains why some countries today are in a permanent state of war.

For Clausewitz, the danger is that war will escape politics. It is imperative that war be controlled by politics because it is the very capacity and register of war. If war escapes politics, it is war that will replace politics, in this case, we are going crazy in something that escapes us.

War can be a formidable machine for negotiating peace. War is waged because discussion is no longer possible, but also because war allows peace to be renegotiated.

Maurice Davie

According to Davie in the article The Evolution of War publié en 1930[1], war in primitive societies refers to:

  • vital competition for the survival of the group:
  • religious differences;
  • blood revenge;
  • glory.

Marvin Harris

Marvin Harris

For Harris, as described in his book Cows, Pigs, Wars and Witches: The Riddles of Culture publié en 1973[2] In a traditional society, there are four theories about the origin of war in primitive societies:

  • War as solidarity: it welds a population together, it is a mode of prefabrication of legitimacy;
  • war as a game: playful dimension of war, sport can be perceived as the continuity of war;
  • The war of human nature;
  • War as a continuation of politics: it makes it possible to make politics.

War and peace: a legal and international governance object

The Law of War or The Hague Law

We talked about the Treaty of Westphalia, which initiated a first reflection on the central state of war and the law of war, also known as Hague law. It is the right to be able to wage war; war is subject to international public law, there are rules. The Pearl Harbour attack is a breach of the very condition of war.

The law of war sets out rights is a duty for the belligerents in the conduct of hostilities. From the moment we return to war, there are duties and rights.

They concern the limitation of means such as, for example, the prohibition of ammunition that may affect civilian populations. Moreover, the law of war defines rules and provides for sanctions for those who violate them. That is why there are often texts in the United Nations Security Council that are taken against certain countries that have overstepped the rules of war.

International humanitarian law or Geneva law

Article détaillé : L'individu en tant que sujet du droit international.

It is a humanitarian law whose purpose is to protect those who do not take part in the fighting, particularly the civilian population. This right is important because it was created in Geneva in 1949 and is one of the legal foundations for the protection of civilians in armed conflict.

There are important laws that make fundamental distinctions between civil and military in times of war. What is at stake is the status of the combatant and the prisoner of war.

These protocols have been more or less adopted by different states and justify the jurisprudence of war crimes. The principle of war crimes is the one that violates the rules of war. The paradox is that we have an international right to make war, an international humanitarian law of war, but there is no international right to leave war.

There are two global concepts that dictate the global search for security governance:

  • universality: all human beings belong to the universal;
  • of humanity: everyone belongs to a human community that cannot accept any inhuman act. If one belongs to a human collectivity, then it is possible to qualify acts as inhuman, i. e. public international law is interested in the principle of inhumanity because it challenges the principle of human rights. It is because he has the principle of humanity that torturers and dictators can be prosecuted.

These two concepts were at the foundation of global governance, first at the heart of the League of Nations, but which could not avoid the First World War and then through the United Nations Organization in 1945 with the creation of the Security Council, peace-keeping and peace-making.

Partisan Warfare

They introduce substantial changes that occurred in the 19th and 20th centuries. It is a paradigm shift because the party concept means whoever is going to defend a position. The partisan war brings us back to the management of individuals rather than the management of the state.

A novelty: partisan warfare

The partisan is the one who takes sides in defending a position. He is someone who does not belong to the regular corps of the army, he takes up arms to defend a cause.

Aymon de Gingins-La-Sarraz

Gingins-La Sarraz was a Swiss officer serving the Principality of Naples and publishes a book titled La guerre défensive en Suisse. His theory is that Switzerland is neutral and it is necessary to strengthen its defensive capacities, in order to maintain Swiss neutrality it is necessary to build supporters who can mobilize in the event of aggression.

In order to defend Switzerland, it is necessary to strengthen the capabilities of the war by strengthening the inadequacies of the troops with partisan troops. Partisans are used to make up for the lack of regular troops.

Partisan warfare refers to irregular groups that can mobilize in systems of attack and response. Here, partisan warfare is seen as a means of resisting foreign invasion in order to protect Switzerland or the people of Austria.

Carl Schmitt: The theorizing of partisan warfare

Schmitt advises the von Papen government (left) and Schleicher (right) on the constitutional issue.

Carl Schmitt is a sulphurous character by his position for the Nazis in 1933. In Partisan Theory, published in 1962, it appears that modern warfare is going to be a partisan war. These are groups of individuals who are going to engage in battle and this will be done from an important moment, the Napoleonic War in Spain.

Napoleon's war in Spain shows for the first time the birth of the partisan as a subject and as a personality who will mobilize to drive out Napoleonic troops.

The partisan theory is very important, because Schmitt is the first to think that we are entering a new era of conflict and that this new era of conflict is no longer essentially inter-state conflicts, but partisan conflicts, i. e. splits of wars on the planet in which groups of individuals as a partisan subject to radical discourse and ideology will mobilize against one or more states. Since then, the partisan is an irregular army.

The concept of revolutionary warfare

Irregular wars are emerging in the great phases of liberation that will mobilize populations against the dominant power. During the Second World War, it will be the resistance against the Nazis, but then it will be the FLN against the French and in Egypt the Egyptian supporters against the British power, etc. It will be the FLN.

The characteristics of partisan warfare are that it is wars that have no uniform and have a strong commitment and ideology. Moreover, partisan warfare is an asymmetric war, the partisan does not have the armaments of the nation-state. To win these wars, you have to play different tools such as the surprise ruse. It's extreme mobility that contrasts with classic warfare.

Revolutionary war is a Maoist concept which considers that revolution can only be achieved through politico-military action. It is a transition to urban guerrilla warfare, as the city becomes the jungle of partisan warfare, mainly in the 1960s and 1970s. The great failure of the partisan war is the Che war in Bolivia.

Warsfare Today

New incidences

Modern warfares damage the Westphalian system

The great question in political science and international relations questions the passage from the end of the Westphalian wars to endless wars that would show that the war has basically changed its meaning. This is what some authors call the return to Hobbsian anarchy, i. e. a permanent state of war.

Hobbsian anarchy would be a return to the state of nature in a state of perpetual warfare in a massive use of force in international relations, which is a regressive force and this in a generalized state of anarchy and on the assumption that each wants to build its power to the detriment of the other.

It is the idea that war is returning very quickly to the system of international relations and will have an extremely important impact. These are diffuse wars that will affect civilians much more than the military and these are wars that will be more radical because there are no rules of regulation.

The perpetual state of war

These are wars that will have a considerable impact on nature, we have accelerated destruction of natural resources: we come to the hypothesis in these wars that have no structure any more if we want to destroy the other we must destroy his resources. Since then, nature has been used as a source of pollution and mass destruction.

On the other hand, in these wars will destroy each other's culture, because it is the destruction of others as human beings, destroying their identity and memory.

Endless warfares

War was an exceptional and peace a normality, which leads us to wonder whether war is becoming a normality and peace does not become something of the extraordinary. Peace can rise almost as an impossible horizon to reach.

The never-ending war is a war that no longer has any purpose by becoming part of everyday life through destruction. It will also create a specific economy. In never-ending wars, it is necessary to build specific economies that generally revolve around drugs, which are made in an impossible peace, because there is no legitimate interlocutor to build peace.

In some cases, this can be explained by the war in Iraq, since the Gulf War began, we have been entering a permanent cycle of warfare. From then on, peace becomes a conceptually unthinkable horizon.

A new political theory, Michael Walzer

Michael Walzer.

Walzer published a book titled Guerres justes et injustes[3] which provides a philosophical-political reflection on war and the concept of just war. He goes back to Hobbes's initial interrogation on the qualification of war, he is going to be a theorist of the legalistic paradigm, because he considers that in order for war to become just, it must be a framed war.

A just war is a controlled war, a war of legal combatants. In other words, there is a legality of war. He will point out the paradoxes, namely the link between the concepts of just and moral war, that war is an object of abnormality, in the concept of war there is not something moral.

Waltz's philosophical preoccupation and his political theory is to question the fabrication of morality on an object that is profoundly immoral and where the question of morality can be qualified.

He will question the situations in which morality can be restored in war. War is moral when there is a defensive situation in the face of external aggression. There is a moral situation of war in the nature employed. If we institute a codification of armaments, there is a kind of morality even if we manufacture immoral weapons.

The management of terrorism is amoral because, in an asymmetric conflict management, the question of surprise is raised as a military act, in addition to terrorism needs publicity, it is necessary to frighten and terrorize. In the terrorist dimension, there is an amoral dimension. Only the weakest are attacked in an axis that is not declared by the war.

He will also reflect on the question of morality and the return of politics. For Waltz, the legalistic paradigm cannot refuse the question of the rules of conduct of war. This is why Philippe Delmas asks the question in his eponymous book of the Bel Avenir de la Guerre[4].

Annexes

References

  1. ↑ "Book Review:The Evolution of War: A Study of Its Role in Early Societies. Maurice R. Davie." Am J Sociol American Journal of Sociology 35.6 (1930): 1114.
  2. ↑ Cows, Pigs, Wars and Witches: The Riddles of Culture. London: Hutchinson & Co. 1975. ISBN 0-09-122750-X. Reissued in 1991 by Vintage, New York. (version complète pdf:http://monoskop.org/images/5/5b/Harris_Marvin_Cows_Pigs_Wars_and_Witches_The_Riddles_of_Culture_1974.pdf)
  3. ↑ Walzer, Michael. Guerres Justes Et Injustes: Argumentation Morale Avec Exemples Historiques. Paris: Belin, 1999.
  4. ↑ Delmas, Philippe. Le Bel Avenir De La Guerre. Paris: Gallimard, 1995.
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