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To understand how struggles will lead to the creation of modern states, we must go back to the late antiquity and early Middle Ages.
To understand how struggles will lead to the creation of modern states, we must go back to the late antiquity and early Middle Ages.


= Les conditions d’émergence de l’État au Moyen-Âge =
= Conditions for the emergence of the State in the Middle Ages =


== La chute de l’Empire romain ==
== The fall of the Roman Empire ==


[[Fichier:Roman empire at is heigh 1.jpg|200px|vignette]]
[[Fichier:Roman empire at is heigh 1.jpg|200px|vignette]]


L’Antiquité classique est caractérisée par degré relativement élevé d’organisation politique et militaire par rapport à la période antérieure et qui lui succède. La chute de l’Empire romain d’occident en l’an 476 va voir un triomphe partiel de la tradition germanique des « bandes armées » et le « faide »/ « feud ». Là où il y avait l’Empire romain très étendu qui parvenait à organiser politiquement l’essentiel du continent européen et efficace militairement, avec la chute de l’Empire romain il va y avoir une fragmentation totale du territoire de l’ancien Empire romain qui va voir apparaitre des unités politiques beaucoup plus petites qui vont s’affronter sur les anciens territoires de l’Empire romain.
Classical antiquity is characterized by a relatively high degree of political and military organization in comparison with the previous and succeeding period. The fall of the Western Roman Empire in the year 476 will see a partial triumph of the Germanic tradition of "armed bands" and the "Faid" / "feud". Where there was the extensive Roman Empire that managed to politically organize most of the European continent and militarily efficient, with the fall of the Roman Empire, there will be a total fragmentation of the territory of the former Roman Empire, which will see much smaller political units emerge and clash in the former territories of the Roman Empire.


[[Fichier:Empire romain invasion barbares 1.jpg|200px|vignette]]
[[Fichier:Empire romain invasion barbares 1.jpg|200px|vignette]]


L’État moderne en tant qu’appareil administratif et bureaucratique efficace va émerger. Cette émergence n’aurait pas été possible si l’Empire romain avait perduré parce qu’un empire se caractérise par le fait qu’il incorpore sans concurrent extérieur, cela ne le force pas à se centraliser, d’imposer le monopole de la violence légitime. Un empire, tant qu’il est empire n’a pas de concurrent extérieur donc il n’a pas besoin de se renforcer en interne par exemple en extrayant plus de ressources économiques ou en augmentant les obligations militaires parce qu’il n’a pas d’ennemi extérieur.
The modern state as an effective administrative and bureaucratic apparatus will emerge. This emergence would not have been possible if the Roman Empire had endured because an empire is characterized by the fact that it incorporates without external competitor, this does not force it to centralize, to impose the monopoly of legitimate violence. An empire, as long as it is an empire, has no external competitor so it does not need to strengthen itself internally, for example by extracting more economic resources or increasing military obligations because it has no external enemy.


Cela va cesser avec la chute de l’Empire romain avec des royaumes qui vont s’affronter pour reconstituer l’Empire romain. C’est dans cet affrontement que pour survivre dans la concurrence politique entre royaumes et tribus sur un même territoire progressivement ces entités politiques vont être menées à extraire de plus en plus d’impôts et de ressources militaires puisque ce n’est qu’à cette condition que ces entités politiques peuvent survivre et voir l’émergence des États modernes.
This will stop with the fall of the Roman Empire with kingdoms that will clash to reconstitute the Roman Empire. It is in this confrontation that, in order to survive in the political competition between kingdoms and tribes on the same territory, these political entities will gradually be led to extract more and more taxes and military resources, since it is only on this condition that these political entities can survive and see the emergence of modern states.


== Les origines de la féodalité ==
== The origins of feudalism ==


Le système qui va émerger avec la chute de l’Empire romain ne va plus être fondé sur un principe impériale mais un principe féodal. C’est un système dans lequel le pouvoir politique et militaire est fragmenté à l’échelle du continent européen. Va s’installer une concurrence politique et militaire acerbe entre ces unités politiques et militaires dispersées dans lesquels chaque royaume va avoir intérêt à se renforcer intérieurement notamment en créant une administration efficace pour prélever des impôts et une armée. Va se créer au fur et à mesure une administration de plus en plus grande pour payer le personnel et lever encore plus d’impôt. Va se mettre en place un processus autoentretenu par lequel les machines guerrières que sont les royaumes et les aristocrates militaires vont constituer un monopole de la violence sur un territoire donné. Le paradoxe de l’État moderne est qu’il va finir beaucoup plus centralisé, efficace et militairement puissant que ne l’étaient les empires de jadis. La chute de l’Empire romain était vue comme une période de régression. On voit l’Empire romain comme étant la forme la plus aboutie d’autorité politique et que la féodalité serait un mode de régression, mais cette régression, désorganisation et la dispersion du pouvoir va permettre de créer un nouveau modèle politique qui est l’État moderne qui va définir plus centralisé, hiérarchisé et efficace que ne l’était l’Empire romain d’occident.
The system that will emerge with the fall of the Roman Empire will no longer be based on an imperial principle but on a feudal principle. It is a system in which political and military power is fragmented across the European continent. There will be bitter political and military competition between these scattered political and military units in which each kingdom will have an interest to strengthen itself internally, in particular by creating an efficient administration to collect taxes and an army. As time goes by, an ever-growing administration will be created to pay staff and raise even more taxes. A self-sustaining process will be set up whereby the war machines of the military kingdoms and aristocrats will constitute a monopoly of violence in a given territory. The paradox of the modern state is that it will end up much more centralized, efficient and militarily powerful than the empires of yesteryear. The fall of the Roman Empire was seen as a period of regression. The Roman Empire is seen as the most advanced form of political authority and feudalism would be a mode of regression, but this regression, disorganization and dispersal of power will create a new political model that is the modern state that will define more centralized, hierarchical and effective than the Western Roman Empire.


On considère que le Moyen-Âge commence avec la chute de l’Empire romain. Pendant cette période, il y a des tentatives permanentes de recréer l’Empire romain par de la « centralisation », mais la fragmentation prévaut en Europe occidentale. Une multitude de rois vont tenter de restaurer l’empire. Le principe d’unité perdue va plutôt être un élément de fragmentation que d’unité. Le système féodal émerge après la chute de l’empire de Charlemagne au IXème siècle comme système politique et surtout militaire combinant d’une part la fusion du fief et de l’office public renvoyant à l’héritage romain, d’autre part le principe vassalique renvoyant à l’héritage germanique. À l’échelle presque continentale de l’Europe va s’installer un ordre féodal qui tente de restaurateur l’Empire romain, mais qui assume la fragmentation.
The Middle Age is considered to begin with the fall of the Roman Empire. During this period, there were permanent attempts to recreate the Roman Empire through "centralization", but fragmentation prevailed in Western Europe. A multitude of kings will try to restore the empire. The principle of lost unity will be an element of fragmentation rather than unity. The feudal system emerged after the fall of Charlemagne's empire in the 9th century as a political and above all military system combining on the one hand the fusion of the feud and the public office referring to the Roman heritage, and on the other hand the vassalic principle referring to the Germanic heritage. On the almost continental scale of Europe, a feudal order was to be established which attempted to restore the Roman Empire, but assumed fragmentation.


== Système féodale ==
== Feudal system ==


[[Fichier:Feudal pyramid 1.png|vignette]]
[[Fichier:Feudal pyramid 1.png|vignette]]


Le système féodal est fondé sur l’échange entre un monarque qui contrôle des territoires, mais qui n’a pas d’armée et des aristocraties militaires qui ont des armes et la capacité de faire la guerre, mais dont les territoires sont donnés par le roi. C’est de ce principe que le système féodal va émerger. Un système féodal et fondé sur la distinction entre suzerains et vassaux. Le suzerain a besoin de protection et de ressources militaires, pour cela il va engager des relations contractuelles avec des vassaux qui sont des seigneurs de guerre qui ont besoin de territoire. Le suzerain va alors donner un fief au vassal qu’il va pouvoir contrôler en échange de quoi le vassal aura des obligations militaires pour protéger le suzerain lorsqu’il est attaqué de l’extérieur.
The feudal system is based on the exchange between a monarch who controls territories, but has no army and military aristocracies who have weapons and the ability to wage war, but whose territories are given by the king. It is from this principle that the feudal system will emerge. A feudal system based on the distinction between suzerains and vassals. The suzerain needs protection and military resources, for this he will enter into contractual relations with vassals who are warlords who need territory. The suzerain will then give a fief to the vassal that he will be able to control in exchange for which the vassal will have military obligations to protect the suzerain when attacked from the outside.


Ce qui engendre une relation verticale est le besoin de terre renvoyant à un principe de distribution de terres en échange d’obligations militaires vis-à-vis du niveau supérieur. Au fur et à mesure que les territoires sont redistribués de suzerains à vassal et à sous-vassal, les fiefs se fragmentent. Il y a un principe de morcellement et de division territorial. Cela veut aussi dire que la capacité du roi et des vassaux à faire la guerre dépend de l’allégeance fluctuante de leurs vassaux. En réalité chaque vassal et chevalier est en quelque sorte autonome de telle sorte que si son suzerain est menacé, il peut faire défaut même si cela rompt le lien féodal. Bien souvent un vassal à souvent plusieurs fiefs légués par différents suzerains. Les niveaux supérieurs et en particulier le roi ne sont jamais certains de sa puissance militaire. Il n’y a pas de monopôle de la violence légitime de la part du roi, mais un principe de dispersion du territoire morcelé en fiefs, mais aussi en unité militaires morcelées en multiples chevaleries qui caractérise le Moyen-Âge.
What creates a vertical relationship is the need for land, which refers to a principle of land distribution in exchange for military obligations to the higher level. As territories are redistributed from suzerains to vassal and subvassal, fiefdoms become fragmented. There is a principle of fragmentation and territorial division. It also means that the ability of the king and vassals to wage war depends on the fluctuating allegiance of their vassals. In reality, each vassal and knight is in some way autonomous so that if his suzerain is threatened, he may be lacking even if it breaks the feudal bond. Quite often a vassal often has several fiefdoms bequeathed by different suzerains. The higher levels and especially the king are never certain of his military power. There is no monopoly on the king's legitimate violence, but a principle of dispersal of the territory divided into fiefdoms, but also into military units divided into multiple chivalries that characterize the Middle Ages.


Politiquement, le système féodal est un système fragmenté, multiple, avec des allégeances multiples, changeantes et qui se chevauchent, c’est un pouvoir dispersé. D’un point de vue militaire c’est un système de chevaliers plutôt que les phalanges fondées sur une multiplicité de soldats créant des unités militaires compactes et la solidarité mutuelle. Le système féodal valorise la prouesse individuelle menant à une individualisation de la guerre dans un système d’allégeance, mais ce sont des solidarités plus distantes que celles de la phalange et beaucoup plus aléatoires. In fine, la guerre reste une question d’estimation personnelle et individuelle dans le choix de l’allégeance. Il y a un brouillage de la guerre et de la vengeance personnelle.
Politically, the feudal system is a fragmented, multiple system, with multiple allegiances, changing and overlapping, it is a dispersed power. From a military point of view it is a system of knights rather than phalanxes based on a multiplicity of soldiers creating compact military units and mutual solidarity. The feudal system values the individual prowess leading to an individualization of war in a system of allegiance, but they are more distant than those of the phalanx and much more random. Ultimately, war remains a matter of personal and individual estimation in the choice of allegiance. There is a blurring of war and personal revenge.


La « Faide » renvoie à la vengeance et la vendetta entre familles. La vengeance se dit « Werra » en germanique qui va être latinisé en « Gwerra » puis sera décline en « War » et « guerre ». Le terme de guerre trouve sa source entre ces luttes entre seigneurs féodaux au Moyen-Âge. C’est une métaphore que ce sont ces luttes et le climat de compétition entre chevaliers, seigneurs et rois sur le continent européen que va émerger l’État moderne. C’est donc unsystème politico-militaire basé sur la « décentralisation », mais qui maintient un pouvoir de guerre limitée dans les mains du roi.
Faid "refers to revenge and vendetta between families. Revenge is called "Werra" in Germanic which will be Latinized in "Gwerra" then will be declined in "War" and "war". The term war finds its source between these feudal struggles between feudal lords in the Middle Ages. It is a metaphor that it is these struggles and the climate of competition between knights, lords and kings on the European continent that the modern state will emerge. It is therefore a politico-military system based on "decentralization", but which maintains a limited war power in the hands of the king.


== La France sous Hugues Capet au Xème siècle ==
== France under Hugues Capet in the 10th century ==


[[Fichier:France sous Hugues Capet au Xème siècle 1.png|vignette]]
[[Fichier:France sous Hugues Capet au Xème siècle 1.png|vignette]]


La France est divisée en différents territoires avec le domaine royal autour de Paris. Tous les autres territoires du royaume de France ont été légués à d’autres seigneurs qui eux-mêmes les ont légués à leur vassaux. Le territoire qui appartient au roi est petit par rapport au Royaume de France lui-même contrôlé par des seigneurs différents. Le roi contrôle très peu son royaume montrant à quel point le territoire est fragmenté et à quel point il n’y a pas de monopole de la violence légitime et donc il n’y a pas d’État moderne de très loin absent. Il y a des réseaux d’obligations militaires très complexes entre ces Ducs, Comte et le Roi.
France is divided into different territories with the royal estate around Paris. All the other territories of the Kingdom of France were bequeathed to other lords, who themselves bequeathed them to their vassals. The territory that belongs to the king is small in comparison with the Kingdom of France, which is itself controlled by different lords. The king has very little control over his kingdom, showing how fragmented the territory is and how much there is no monopoly on legitimate violence, and therefore there is no modern state by far absent. There are very complex networks of military obligations between these Dukes, Count and the King.


Ces royaumes d’Europe sont des systèmes fragmentés entre nobles, différents rois à l’échelle du continent européen, mais aussi entre rois et leurs vassaux. Au final, le roi n’est qu’un seigneur parmi d’autres. Va s’enclencher un processus qui par la dynamique même de cette compétition va créer progressivement l’État moderne comme analysé par Charles Tilly dans son ouvrage Coercion, Capital, and European States. Il explique que ce système féodal va faire émerger des unités politiques de plus en plus centralisées, efficaces bureaucratiquement et qui in fine vont parvenir sur un territoire relativement élargi à monopoliser la violence légitime.
These kingdoms of Europe are fragmented systems between nobles, different kings on the scale of the European continent, but also between kings and their vassals. In the end, the king is only one of many lords. A process will begin which, by the very dynamics of this competition, will gradually create the modern state as analyzed by Charles Tilly in his book Coercion, Capital, and European States. He explains that this feudal system will lead to the emergence of political units that are more and more centralized, bureaucratically efficient and that will eventually succeed in monopolizing legitimate violence over a relatively large territory.


= War-making/State-making =
= War-making/State-making =

Version du 8 février 2018 à 18:34

The idea is to talk about what is sometimes called the paradigm of war-making and state-making, often equated with Charles Tilly, who considers that it is wartime activity that has contributed to the emergence of the State and that it is the State that has shaped a way of waging war leading to total war, such as the First and Second World Wars. We will focus on the historical conditions of the emergence of the modern state.

The State is not a universal mode of organization that has not always existed and does not exist everywhere, especially with failed States. The state has emerged in Europe with the demand for a monopoly on legitimate violence and on a specific territory. The State is also defined by its territoriality, by having a differentiated administration of the political society which is on its territory with an administration which, in principle, is independent and provides for the general interest in the public domain. The State has the capacity to define an autonomous political sphere in which its government can claim allegiances that are in principle exclusive to the population. One can think of empires or even the emerging states in the Middle Ages with populations that could have allegiances other than to their king as well as to the pope, an emperor, a local lord.

Westfaelischer Friede in Muenster (Gerard Terborch 1648)

We will discuss the specificity of the State in relation to city-states and empires. The state is not the only form of political organization, despite what we tend to consider today. After the Westphalian treaties of 1648, states became the only model in international relations. Then, we will see how the modern state emerges from the Middle Ages and what are the specific conditions for the emergence of the modern state. Finally, we will discuss Charles Tilly's paradigm of war-making and state-making, which shows how war has shaped the state and how wartime activity has contributed to the special conditions in Europe allowing the emergence of the state.

How did the modern state and thus the modern warfare that it is shaping in its image emerge? The period before the late Middle Ages, which is the end of antiquity, was marked by the Roman Empire which saw itself as the most successful political construction, organizing the two coasts of the Mediterranean around Rome and bringing the "pax romana". The Roman Empire had many flaws and shortcomings that will partly explain its decadence and its end, which will allow it to create the conditions from which a new form of hierarchical and organized political organization will lead to the modern state. The modern state, even if in principle it covers a territory smaller than the empires in organisational and military terms, will prove to be much more efficient than the empires that preceded it. However, it is its destruction that will create the conditions for the particular political form of the modern state to emerge in Europe. How? How?

States, City-States and Empires

We tend to use these terms interchangeably. We think that a city-state is going to be smaller than a state, that the empire is going to be bigger. Historically, these are more precise and different truths. In On the medieval origins of the Modern State published in 1970, Joseph Strayer shows that the state as we think it did not always exist and that if it became dominant at any given time, it was not necessarily inevitable. These are special conditions that make us think the state we think today has become the only dominant and recognized form of international law. It shows that in the Middle Ages, there were two forms of political organizations that could compete with the state.

According to Strayer, the modern or national state, which should not be confused with the nation-state, is beginning to emerge between the 11th and 13th centuries. The state ends up according to Max Weber's definition as claiming the monopoly of legitimate violence in a given territory. But the game is not played in advance: there are still two types of political entities that can compete with nascent states, namely empires and city-states. The question arises as to what characterizes these two forms of political organization, what characterizes the modern state and how empires and city-states can be defined in relation to the Weberian definition.

Empires

The Consummation of Empire. Oil on canvas, 1836, 51 × 76 in.[1][2]

The empire refers to a military notion. The word comes from the Latin "imperium" referring to the power and authority of the military leader. The empire was built by military power, conquest and expansionism. This term of "imperialism" where the "empire" is above all a military power before being a political power. The idea of empire is linked to the idea of infinite spatial expansion. One can imagine the empire as a political entity based on military force tending to extend as far as it is allowed to do so given the military balance of power. According to Max Weber, the state is characterized by the territoriality of an empire that extends as far as possible. If one state is in a region where all other states are weak, it will do the same. When there is an imbalance of power, the States, despite their territoriality, did not hesitate to launch expansionist policies, especially with the phenomenon of colonization where the State extends its empire. Infinite expansionism is in principle impossible, which makes the state and inter-state character within the international system in which it is developing.

This has three implications:

  • The empire does not recognize "sovereign equality": its only way of recognizing foreign groups is through incorporation. In international law, what characterizes relations between States is the principle of sovereign equality. The empire does not have a foreign policy, foreign policy and diplomacy as we think and conceptualize it today precisely because the objective of the empire and its practice is to extend to infinity. What lies outside the empire is considered as uncivilized or with a vocation to integrate into the empire.

The empire has no borders, only steps: it ideally extends its power throughout the "known" world, there is no discreet space. The steps of the empire are an area where authority declines further away from this capital. Today, some postulate that Russia maintains an imperial policy with seemingly blurred external borders. For an empire, there are concentric circles and the farther away from the center of these circles the less the influence is strong.

  • The empire does not assimilate the populations it incorporates and does not necessarily question pre-existing political forms as long as they fulfil military and economic obligations.
  • If a political entity is simply based on infinite military expansionism, it is certain that it will certainly not have the time or the administrative capacity to work on assimilating its populations so that there will be cultural homogenization. There will not be an autumn political sphere in which a state can claim exclusive allegiance from its people. Empires tend to be extremely heterogeneous with populations associated with the empire and incorporated while claiming a different political authority, but which the empire tolerates as long as it is not powerful enough to subjugate them.
  • double principle of incorporation and differentiation: according to the historian of empires Frederick Cooper, empires are based on incorporation, but at the same time on a principle of differentiation since within the empire the difference between Latin and Germanic peoples is maintained for the Roman Empire, Chinese and Mongolian for the Chinese Empire. There is a differentiation between different categories of populations. In the colonies, colonial subjects have a different status from the national population, it is not because they are incorporated that they are assimilated. Historically, states have pursued policies of territorial annexation.

The Chinese Empire saw itself as the Middle Kingdom, and the further away from the center and the further away from that middle of the world, the less authority the Chinese emperor had. Empires consider that the outside of the empire is the "uncivilized" world in which it is destined to expand. This is true of the Roman Empire, but also of all empires. They are based on a universalism which considers that in principle the world must be unified under the authority of the empire and that it is impossible for an empire to recognize other empires. The Holy Roman Empire had the ambition to unify Europe and the world, especially if the emperor managed to become the head of Christianity, which holds authority over the whole of humanity to be Christianised. When it is said that there are entities incorporated into the empire, it refers to the exclusive allegiance to a central government and the monopoly of legitimate violence, that is to say that the local kingdoms and chiefs incorporated into the Empire remain the owners of their arms and armies and use force on the territories they control what is tolerated by the empire provided that this does not come

At the time, the main source of wealth and control of territories that it is possible to cultivate. To exert an imperium on ever-increasing territories means having more and more wealth. Empires have no outside rivals and if they do, they incorporate them. Empires live in relative self-sufficiency. It is also necessary to understand that their military and economic power and function of the spatial extent of its territories that it controls. The more territories are incorporated into the empire, the more tax and military obligations there are. This creates military power and economy that feeds the machine of expansionism that is the empire with the weakness that by incorporating and maintaining differentiations, the empire is weak internally and strong externally. Internally, there are still royalties, chiefs and tribes that can turn against the emperor. There are often internal wars, splits, and hence the absence of a legitimate monopoly.

Cities-States

The city-states are kingdoms, republics or democracies at the level of a city. The originality lies in the fact that the city-state is a political unity at the level of a city. The city-state has no hinterland and hinterland without economic autonomy in terms of subsistence needs. The subsistence goods of agricultural origin come from abroad, hence the fact that city-states are based on trade. They are political units not based on imperialism, but on commercial power. The state city is a small political unit with an urban character, strong integration and weak cultural differentiation. All free male citizens shared a common language, a common culture that is a form of proximity. There was a strong cohesion based on intercohesion within the city distinguishing the city-state from the more disparate empire. In the city-state, they are people with weak cultural differentiation sharing the same culture, highly integrated.

City-states are often linked to a commercial function and capital accumulation at the crossroads of trade routes, markets or ports. The strength of the city-state is its cohesion and its weakness is its small size, but also its lack of autonomy for its subsistence since the city-state is cut off from the hinterland. Modern states, unlike city-states, manage to create the same sense of cohesion, but in a territory much larger than that of a city.

Strengths and Weaknesses of Empires, Cities-States and States

Strengths Weaknesses
Empires - Size-related power (extensive model)
- Low external competition
Internal divisions, administrative weakness, internal wars, weak integration, "Imperial overstretch".
Cities-States Strong policitcal cohesion and integration Small size = risk of incorporation by more powerful entities, economic dependence on the "Hinterland", no "granary".

Empires and city-states are opposed to each other. This will enable the modern state to exist by combining the strengths of these two models while avoiding their weaknesses.

The State combines the "strengths" of both models, avoiding their "weaknesses".

The state as defined by Max Weber is marked by integration and relatively strong cohesion based on nationalism, political allegiance at the centre. In a modern state, in principle, there is not only one city, but several cities, rural and rural populations. Despite the diversity of cities and rural populations, the State will succeed in creating the same situation as a city-state, but on a broader and more diversified scale. There is political homogenization and political participation that are organized around the federal or central government. It is a political allegiance in principle exclusive with national cohesion within the so-called "modern state".

At the same time, the modern state manages to extract military and economic resources from its population. It is an intensive model of extracting military and economic resources through a centralized administration without the need for infinite expansion. It is the intensity of resource extraction from the population that characterizes the modern state. The transformation of the state as a war from state to "nation into weapon" is something that only a modern state can do, empires were incapable of doing.

These two elements reinforce each other. If we impose extremely high taxes and increase the military obligations of a population that otherwise has no particular allegiance to the central government, we will create a state of civil war or even separatist and secessionist entities, if this model of extracting the population is possible, it is not only if there is a centralised and organised model, but also because there is strong cohesion, cohesion and solidarity.

The fact that the modern state combines the strengths of the two models shows that the state is linked to elimination struggles between political entities. When there are wars between an empire and city-states, there is good reason to believe that city-states will be incorporated into the empire unless the empire divides internally. When there are modern states present, these states incorporate cities and destroy empires because they have the strength and not the weaknesses. The state will be created by war and impose itself through war to eventually become the dominant model in Europe. Elias emphasizes the extent to which the idealtypical state is linked to playoff struggles between political entities.

To understand how struggles will lead to the creation of modern states, we must go back to the late antiquity and early Middle Ages.

Conditions for the emergence of the State in the Middle Ages

The fall of the Roman Empire

Roman empire at is heigh 1.jpg

Classical antiquity is characterized by a relatively high degree of political and military organization in comparison with the previous and succeeding period. The fall of the Western Roman Empire in the year 476 will see a partial triumph of the Germanic tradition of "armed bands" and the "Faid" / "feud". Where there was the extensive Roman Empire that managed to politically organize most of the European continent and militarily efficient, with the fall of the Roman Empire, there will be a total fragmentation of the territory of the former Roman Empire, which will see much smaller political units emerge and clash in the former territories of the Roman Empire.

Empire romain invasion barbares 1.jpg

The modern state as an effective administrative and bureaucratic apparatus will emerge. This emergence would not have been possible if the Roman Empire had endured because an empire is characterized by the fact that it incorporates without external competitor, this does not force it to centralize, to impose the monopoly of legitimate violence. An empire, as long as it is an empire, has no external competitor so it does not need to strengthen itself internally, for example by extracting more economic resources or increasing military obligations because it has no external enemy.

This will stop with the fall of the Roman Empire with kingdoms that will clash to reconstitute the Roman Empire. It is in this confrontation that, in order to survive in the political competition between kingdoms and tribes on the same territory, these political entities will gradually be led to extract more and more taxes and military resources, since it is only on this condition that these political entities can survive and see the emergence of modern states.

The origins of feudalism

The system that will emerge with the fall of the Roman Empire will no longer be based on an imperial principle but on a feudal principle. It is a system in which political and military power is fragmented across the European continent. There will be bitter political and military competition between these scattered political and military units in which each kingdom will have an interest to strengthen itself internally, in particular by creating an efficient administration to collect taxes and an army. As time goes by, an ever-growing administration will be created to pay staff and raise even more taxes. A self-sustaining process will be set up whereby the war machines of the military kingdoms and aristocrats will constitute a monopoly of violence in a given territory. The paradox of the modern state is that it will end up much more centralized, efficient and militarily powerful than the empires of yesteryear. The fall of the Roman Empire was seen as a period of regression. The Roman Empire is seen as the most advanced form of political authority and feudalism would be a mode of regression, but this regression, disorganization and dispersal of power will create a new political model that is the modern state that will define more centralized, hierarchical and effective than the Western Roman Empire.

The Middle Age is considered to begin with the fall of the Roman Empire. During this period, there were permanent attempts to recreate the Roman Empire through "centralization", but fragmentation prevailed in Western Europe. A multitude of kings will try to restore the empire. The principle of lost unity will be an element of fragmentation rather than unity. The feudal system emerged after the fall of Charlemagne's empire in the 9th century as a political and above all military system combining on the one hand the fusion of the feud and the public office referring to the Roman heritage, and on the other hand the vassalic principle referring to the Germanic heritage. On the almost continental scale of Europe, a feudal order was to be established which attempted to restore the Roman Empire, but assumed fragmentation.

Feudal system

Feudal pyramid 1.png

The feudal system is based on the exchange between a monarch who controls territories, but has no army and military aristocracies who have weapons and the ability to wage war, but whose territories are given by the king. It is from this principle that the feudal system will emerge. A feudal system based on the distinction between suzerains and vassals. The suzerain needs protection and military resources, for this he will enter into contractual relations with vassals who are warlords who need territory. The suzerain will then give a fief to the vassal that he will be able to control in exchange for which the vassal will have military obligations to protect the suzerain when attacked from the outside.

What creates a vertical relationship is the need for land, which refers to a principle of land distribution in exchange for military obligations to the higher level. As territories are redistributed from suzerains to vassal and subvassal, fiefdoms become fragmented. There is a principle of fragmentation and territorial division. It also means that the ability of the king and vassals to wage war depends on the fluctuating allegiance of their vassals. In reality, each vassal and knight is in some way autonomous so that if his suzerain is threatened, he may be lacking even if it breaks the feudal bond. Quite often a vassal often has several fiefdoms bequeathed by different suzerains. The higher levels and especially the king are never certain of his military power. There is no monopoly on the king's legitimate violence, but a principle of dispersal of the territory divided into fiefdoms, but also into military units divided into multiple chivalries that characterize the Middle Ages.

Politically, the feudal system is a fragmented, multiple system, with multiple allegiances, changing and overlapping, it is a dispersed power. From a military point of view it is a system of knights rather than phalanxes based on a multiplicity of soldiers creating compact military units and mutual solidarity. The feudal system values the individual prowess leading to an individualization of war in a system of allegiance, but they are more distant than those of the phalanx and much more random. Ultimately, war remains a matter of personal and individual estimation in the choice of allegiance. There is a blurring of war and personal revenge.

Faid "refers to revenge and vendetta between families. Revenge is called "Werra" in Germanic which will be Latinized in "Gwerra" then will be declined in "War" and "war". The term war finds its source between these feudal struggles between feudal lords in the Middle Ages. It is a metaphor that it is these struggles and the climate of competition between knights, lords and kings on the European continent that the modern state will emerge. It is therefore a politico-military system based on "decentralization", but which maintains a limited war power in the hands of the king.

France under Hugues Capet in the 10th century

France sous Hugues Capet au Xème siècle 1.png

France is divided into different territories with the royal estate around Paris. All the other territories of the Kingdom of France were bequeathed to other lords, who themselves bequeathed them to their vassals. The territory that belongs to the king is small in comparison with the Kingdom of France, which is itself controlled by different lords. The king has very little control over his kingdom, showing how fragmented the territory is and how much there is no monopoly on legitimate violence, and therefore there is no modern state by far absent. There are very complex networks of military obligations between these Dukes, Count and the King.

These kingdoms of Europe are fragmented systems between nobles, different kings on the scale of the European continent, but also between kings and their vassals. In the end, the king is only one of many lords. A process will begin which, by the very dynamics of this competition, will gradually create the modern state as analyzed by Charles Tilly in his book Coercion, Capital, and European States. He explains that this feudal system will lead to the emergence of political units that are more and more centralized, bureaucratically efficient and that will eventually succeed in monopolizing legitimate violence over a relatively large territory.

War-making/State-making

Ce n’est pas un processus intentionnel

Ce n’est pas un processus intentionnel, mais quelque chose qui va résulter d’une lutte :

  • « compétition interne » au sein des Royaumes entre seigneurs pour la terre : des espaces de plus en plus grands concentrés dans les mains de seigneurs de moins en moins nombreux dans le cadre de « luttes éliminatoires ». Pour Norbert Elias, lorsqu’il y a une concurrence entre différentes unités que rien ne distingue, il y a de fortes chances que progressivement les unités les plus faibles soient éliminées, mais que progressivement émerge un monopôle. Lorsqu’on parle de concurrence et de compétition sur un territoire, personne ne peut empêcher les seigneurs les plus puissants dans le cadre du système féodal de vaincre les seigneurs moins puissants jusqu’à qu’il ne reste plus que les seigneurs les plus puissants jusqu’à arriver à un monopole. Elias explique comment progressivement le roi va émerger comme le seigneur le plus puissant sur un territoire. Il y a une compétition interne et progressivement dans une lutte militaire, des espaces de plus ne plus grands vont être concentrés jusqu’à ce qu’il ne reste qu’un seigneur qui par ce biais va imposer un monopole de la violence légitime cela par des luttes d’intérêts par le principe de monopole.
  • « compétition externe » entre Royaumes sur un continent unifié par le culte de la restauration de l’empire et des interdépendances économiques : les monarques veulent unifier le monde chrétien, mais sans en avoir les ressources spirituelles puisque c’est le pape qui les détient. Cette compétition passe donc par la guerre et requiert l’extraction de ressources et donc des capacités administratives. À chaque fois qu’un État ou un royaume se centralise et se bureaucratise un peu plus qu’un autre, il devient plus puissant militairement et plus dangereux pour les autres royaumes qui devront en faire de même. Par exemple, la Révolution française est un renversement de régime qui va de pair à un mouvement de centralisation de l’État français. En 1793 va avoir lieu un phénomène de levée en masse où l’ensemble de la population française va être mobilisée contre les puissances extérieures. Tous les États européens vont devoir faire de même sinon ils vont se faire renverser par la France. Napoléon par ses victoires va forcer les autres États européens à se centraliser et à attiser un nationalisme. Dans la compétition interétatique vont être obligés de faire de même les États. Il va y avoir une compétition qui passe par la guerre obligeant chaque État à se renforcer en rendant l’extraction de ressource sur sa population plus efficace.
  • ces administrations permettent au monarque d’affermir son pouvoir sur les seigneurs, mais ne le dispense pas de négocier leur participation aux guerres : selon Tilly dans Coercion, Capital, and European States, AD 990–1990 publié en 1990, en utilisant à la fois la compétition interne même à la prééminence à un même souverain et la compétition entre rois sur le continent européen par le biais des interdépendances stratégiques va mener à la centralisation étatique qui va in fine mener à la création de l’État moderne. Au Royaume-Uni, cette négociation a donné lieu à la Magna Carta en 1215 qui est un document par lequel les aristocrates anglais acceptent de soutenir les guerres menées par le roi d’Angleterre Jean sans Terre, en contrepartie, le roi doit permettre une certaine représentation politique à l’aristocratie et donc aux seigneurs féodaux. Le principe de la Magna Carta est « no taxations without representation ». Les aristocrates soutiennent le roi à condition de pouvoir participer à la prise de position politique quant à la paix et à la guerre. C’est l’origine historique du parlementarisme. Le principe de négociation entre monarque d’une part et seigneurs féodaux de l’autre va voir la mise en place d’un compromis au fondement de la démocratie parlementaire à l’issue d’un long processus. Le monarque a pour obligation de négocier avec l’aristocratie militaire qui en vertu de fragmentation l’oblige à limiter son pouvoir afin d’obtenir le soutien financier et militaire de la part de ses vassaux. La Révolution française est à la fois un processus de centralisation et de démocratisation.

La France sous Louis XI : 1423 – 1483

À la différence de la France de Hugues Capet, progressivement, le domaine royal va être étendu progressivement qu’il s’accapare les fiefs des autres seigneurs. Le territoire royal est étendu bien au-delà de l’Île-de-France jusqu’à l’unification du royaume de France qui établit un monopole fiscal, administratif et militaire par l’État à savoir le monarque sur l’ensemble du territoire.

France sous Louis XI.jpg

War-Making/ State-Making

L’accumulation de territoires dans le « domaine royal » va générer des luttes éliminatoires internes, mais c’est aussi une lutte externe qui va obliger chacun des rois à centraliser le pouvoir en interne, de concentrer des ressources dans les administrations royales qui deviennent plus distinctes de la personne du roi. Sous la féodalité, le roi est le « primus inter pares ». Le pouvoir du roi était relatif à sa propriété personnelle. Au fur et à mesure que l’État se centralise, qu’il concentre des pouvoirs de plus en plus grands, du pouvoir et des ressources financières, qu’il met en place des administrations de plus en plus efficaces, qu’il monopolise des armées, le pouvoir du roi commence à se distinguer de la personne du roi. Ce qui était la fortune personnelle du roi va devenir le budget de l’État. Le système politique qui prévalait dans les royaumes du Moyen-Âge était patrimonial. Un pouvoir patrimonial est un pouvoir pour celui dont ses ressources politiques sont sa propriété privée. Ce qui caractérise le pouvoir patrimonialiste est que les ressources du roi en tant que chef politique sont la propriété privée de ce chef politique. Au fur et à mesure que l’État se renforce, se centralise et qu’émerge l’État moderne, le pouvoir va devenir de moins en moins patrimonialiste menant à une distinction entre personne privée et publique avec le roi en tant que personne et le roi en tant que couronne. Émerge la théorie mystique que le roi a deux corps, un corps physique et un corps symbolique. Au fur et à mesure que le pouvoir se centralise et se renforce, il se distingue de la personne du roi dont les pouvoirs personnels vont être ainsi limités.

Le pouvoir de la violence légitime ne vaut rien sans un monopole de la violence fiscale. Dans un État moderne, non seulement seul le gouvernement peut décider du recours à la force et de pouvoir lever des impôts en opposition à ce qui prévalait durant la période féodale. Pour Charles Tilly, « La guerre fait l’État et l’État fait la guerre » caractérisant le trajectoire historique de l’Europe occidentale liant intimement la construction de la guerre au pouvoir de l’État.

Le premier paradoxe est que les royaumes féodaux d’Occident vont devenir plus centralisés que les empires d’Europe centrale et orientale. Byzance qui était l’hériter de l’Empire romain d’Orient et ensuite de l’Empire ottoman voulaient incarner les principes de l’Empire romain avec le principe d’unification d’un continent voire plus et une forte organisation bien plus que ne l’était les systèmes féodaux. Progressivement, ces monarchies féodales vont devenir plus centralisées, plus efficaces militairement et politiquement. Cela marque la victoire des États modernes sur des empires qui n’ont pas su survivre à la lutte éliminatoire.

Le deuxième paradoxe est le fait que, selon Michael Mann, le roi en tant que « pouvoir despotique » décline alors même que le « pouvoir infrastructurel » augmente. C’est le pouvoir de l’État en tant qu’entité publique distincte de la personne du roi à changer et reformer la société en interne. Les États ont décidé au XIXème siècle d’homogénéiser la culture nationale et la langue nationale. L’État moderne a été capable d’imposer à l’entièreté de sa société politique, une homogénéisation culturelle, linguistique et juridique. L’État moderne est bien plus puissant du point de vue du pouvoir infrastructurel, mais en même temps, le pouvoir despotique du pouvoir exécutif est bien mois important dans les États modernes.

Du « Saint Empire Romain Germanique » (962 – 1806) à l’État-garnison prussien et l’Allemagne

Le Saint Empire romain germanique qui est l’un des héritiers de l’Empire romain avec une volonté de l’Empereur de recréer un Empire fondé sur le christianisme est rendu difficile à cause d’une forte compétition interne et une forte compétition externe qui va mener à une concentration du pouvoir, à une accumulation du pouvoir politique qui va mener à l’émergence de l’Allemagne. Ce n’est pas l’empereur qui va l’emporter, mais c’est une principauté à l’intérieur de cet empire qui est la Prusse qui va unifier les territoires et créer l’Allemagne moderne à partir d’une centralisation et d’une accumulation non pas entre les mains de l’Empereur, mais à travers le royaume de Prusse. Ce qui est important dans ce processus de construction des États européens par le war making/state making est qu’on va aboutir à un monopole de la violence légitime sur un territoire donné.

La pacification intérieure : Norbert Elias

Progressivement, le pouvoir de l’exécutif à la capacité de mener des guerres de plus en plus puissantes en interne et en externe. Le monopole de la violence intérieur et extérieur signifie aussi que la société dans son ensemble, ses élites et notamment les aristocrates perdent la capacité à faire usage de la violence privée. En interne, selon Elias, il y a la pacification intérieure avec une violence de moins en moins prégnante sur le territoire national. Cette pacification intérieure est liée à la pacification de l’État parce que monopoliser la violence légitime c’est priver l’usage de la violence privée menant à un développent d’une maîtrise de soi, d’une autodiscipline et d’une retenue dans les mœurs. Muchembled constate un déclin de la violence interpersonnelle depuis le XVIIème siècle.

Le duel à l'épée, par Jacques Callot, 1617[3]

Les monarchies traditionnelles au Moyen-Âge n’avaient pas de police. L’État moderne invente la police qui a pour caractéristique de recourir à une violence moindre avec une culture de la force minimale dans l’idée d’utiliser la force en dernier recours de manière proportionnelle. Cela correspond à un moment où l’État lui-même devient de plus en plus violent et tente de pacifier la population. Cela correspond à un moment qui confirme et renforce la tendance de long terme de pacification des sociétés européennes. Néanmoins, la modernité politique coïncide aussi avec les génocides et les guerres d’annihilation d’où la dimension schizophrène de l’État moderne.

Louis XIII interdit les duels en 1626. Au fur et à mesure que les seigneurs de guerres perdent la capacité à mener des guerres privées, c’est ce qu’on appelle la curialisation des guerriers. Ils vont progressivement transformer leur pratique de violence dans un sens de les mettre en forme, de ne plus mener des guerres privées, mais en même temps de recourir à la violence pour défendre leur honneur à travers la pratique du duel. Les duels sont en quelque sorte ce qui reste du pouvoir traditionnel des aristocrates à mener des guerres privées sans recours au roi. L’interdiction du duel symbolise qu’à partir de 1626, le roi se veut d’avoir le monopole absolu sur toute forme de violence légitime et toute forme qui peut être exercée par les individus. Cette décision peut sembler anecdotique, mais en même temps elle symbolise la création de l’État et de l’émergence du monopole de la violence légitime en retirant le droit de recourir à la violence interpersonnelle.

Conclusion

L’extraction accrue de ressources militaires à travers les taxes et les recrues au service de la guerre requiert une bureaucratisation accrue. La bureaucratisation accrue nécessite et permet une extraction de plus en plus débridée de ressources ainsi que de mener des guerres de plus en plus meurtrières. Leur interaction dans un système « proto-international » qui prévaut en Europe sous le système féodal et durant la Renaissance dans lequel aucun royaume ne peut devenir plus fort que tous les autres, contribue à l’émergence de l’État wébérien.

Notes

Bibliographie

Références

  1. Erreur Lua : impossible de créer le processus : proc_open n’est pas disponible. Vérifiez la directive de configuration PHP « disable_functions ».
  2. Erreur Lua : impossible de créer le processus : proc_open n’est pas disponible. Vérifiez la directive de configuration PHP « disable_functions ».
  3. En garde ! Les duels dans Gallica | Gallica Blog.bnf.fr, (2015). En garde ! Les duels dans Gallica | Gallica. [online] Available at: http://blog.bnf.fr/gallica/index.php/2014/03/13/en-garde-les-duels-dans-gallica/ [Accessed 17 Feb. 2015].