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*external: mobilization of external actors outside the political sphere ("outside lobbying") is often considered as a last resort decision or a complementary strategy. If the interest group refuses or acknowledges that it is not going to use external strategies, this means that it is linked to the internal and cooperative strategy. Very often interest groups will play on both. This can take different forms such as litigation, protest, protest, demonstrations, violence, etc.
*external: mobilization of external actors outside the political sphere ("outside lobbying") is often considered as a last resort decision or a complementary strategy. If the interest group refuses or acknowledges that it is not going to use external strategies, this means that it is linked to the internal and cooperative strategy. Very often interest groups will play on both. This can take different forms such as litigation, protest, protest, demonstrations, violence, etc.


= Pluralisme vs. néocorporatisme =
= Pluralism vs. neocorporatism =


== Modèle pluraliste de la démocratie : les groupes d’intérêt sont considérés comme positifs et naturels ==
== Pluralist model of democracy: interest groups are seen as positive and natural ==


David B. Truman dans ''The Governmental Process'' publié en 1951 interprète les groupes d’intérêt comme l’organisation de citoyens conscients qui, en faisant valoir leurs revendications, contribuent à l’information des décideurs et, par ce biais, à une meilleure qualité des textes législatifs.
David B. Truman in The Governmental Process, published in 1951, interprets interest groups as the organization of conscious citizens who, by advocating their claims, contribute to informing decision makers and, in so doing, to improving the quality of legislation.


Selon Schmitter, dans ''Still the century of corporatism?'' publié en 1979, le modèle pluraliste est un {{citation|système de représentation des intérêts dans lequel les unités constitutives sont organisées en un nombre non spécifique de catégories multiples, volontaires, en compétition entre elles, non organisée hiérarchiquement et qui s’autodéterminent (en ce qui concerne le type ou la nature des intérêts), qui ne sont pas autorisées de manière particulière ou reconnues, subventionnées, créées par l’État et qui n’exercent pas le monopole de l’activité à l’intérieur de leurs catégories respectives}}. Dans ce modèle l’accès au processus de décision politique doit être ouvert à tous les groupes intérêts, il n’y a pas besoin de conditions de représentativité pour être associé au processus politique ce qui veut dire qu’il n’y a pas de favoritisme de l’État envers un groupe d’intérêt, il va intégrer tous les groupes d’intérêts, d’autre part, il n’y a pas de hiérarchie dans les groupes d’intérêts et aucun groupe d’intérêt n’a de monopole sur une thématique donnée, tous les groupes d’intérêt on vocation à donner leur point de vue. L’idéal au cœur de ce modèle pluraliste est un idéal de compétition entre les points de vue et cette discussion démocratique entre tous les points de vue et groupes d’intérêt va permettre d’aboutir à la meilleure décision possible. Il n’y a pas de risque de capture et pas de privilèges. Peters dans ''The politics of bureaucracy'' publié en 2001 parle d’idéal pluraliste à savoir {{citation|self-regulating universe of pressure groups formulating public policy}} comme condition de l’énonciation de l’intérêt public à l’opposition de la notion de capture qui subvertit la politique publique en politique privée les critiques ont porté sur deux postulats :
According to Schmitter, in Still the century of corporatism? published in 1979, the pluralistic model is a "system of interest representation in which constituent units are organized into a non-specific number of multiple, voluntary, competing categories, which are not hierarchically organised and self-determined (as regards the type or nature of interests), which are not specifically authorised or recognised, subsidised, created by the State and which do not exercise a monopoly of the activity within their respective categories ". In this model, access to the political decision-making process must be open to all interest groups, there is no need for conditions of representativeness to be associated with the political process, which means that there is no favouritism on the part of the State towards a particular interest group, It will integrate all the interest groups, on the other hand, there is no hierarchy in the interest groups and no interest group has a monopoly on a given topic, all the interest groups are called upon to give their point of view. The ideal at the heart of this pluralistic model is an ideal of competition between points of view and this democratic discussion between all points of view and interest groups will lead to the best possible decision. There is no risk of capture and no privileges. Peters in The politics of bureaucracy published in 2001 speaks of pluralistic ideals, namely "self-regulating universe of pressure groups formulating public policy" as a condition of the public interest statement to the opposition of the notion of capture that subverts public policy into private policy, the critics have focused on two postulates:
*l’égalité des groupes d’intérêt ;
* equality of interest groups;
*l’intérêt de tout le monde pour la « chose publique ».
* everyone's interest in "public policy"


== Première critique majeure de la vision pluraliste : le phénomène de la capture et les pratiques néo-corporatistes ==
== First major critic of the pluralist vision: the phenomenon of capture and neo-corporatist practices ==


Pour Lowi, dans ''American Business, Public Policy, Case-Studies, and Political Theory'' publié en 1964, le modèle pluraliste est limité dans les faits, car il y a l’apparition du « iron triangle » dans le processus de décision politique entre certains groupes d’intérêt, agences du gouvernement et commissions du Congrès. Les trois types d’acteurs avaient une vision spécifique de ce qu’était la politique en monopolisant la décision. Dans ''The Theory of Economic Regulation'' publié en 1971, Stigler montre que les agences gouvernementales ont été capturées de l’administration et des politiques publiques par certains groupes d’intérêt.
For Lowi, in American Business, Public Policy, Case-Studies, and Political Theory, published in 1964, the pluralistic model is effectively limited, as there is the appearance of the "iron triangle" in the political decision-making process between certain interest groups, government agencies and congressional commissions. All three types of actors had a specific vision of what politics was by monopolizing the decision. In The Theory of Economic Regulation published in 1971, Stigler shows that government agencies have been captured from government administration and public policy by certain interest groups.


Dans ''Liberal corporatism and party government'' publié en 1982, Lehmbruch et Schmitter ont développé un modèle opposé au modèle pluraliste qui est le modèle néo-corporatiste basé sur une reconnaissance mutuelle et des échanges développés entre l’État et certains groupes d’intérêt. L’accès n’est pas donné à tout le monde et il est limité. Les conditions de représentativité et d’expertise sont des conditions importantes pour le choix et la sélection du groupe d’intérêt pertinents. Les conditions de représentativité et d’expertise sont importantes et tous les groupes d’intérêts ne recouvrent pas ces conditions donc on va intégrer les groupes d’intérêts les plus pertinents. C’est un modèle qui se justifie par la collaboration privilégiée, mais c’est parce qu’ils sont plus représentatifs et parce qu’ils ont plus d’expertise. Il y a une hiérarchie entre les acteurs avec des groupes d’intérêts plus puissants que les autres faisant que certains groupes d’intérêts peuvent avoir un monopole sur une thématique donnée. Le pouvoir politique reconnait à tel ou tel groupe d’intérêt un monopole sur telle ou telle thématique. Il n’ y a pas de discussion ouverte et démocratique, mais une discussion beaucoup plus cadrée et un cercle beaucoup plus fermé pour essayer de trouver les solutions entre acteurs qui se connaissaient. Ce modèle s’oppose point par point au modèle pluraliste, ce n’est pas un dénie de démocratie, mais reconnaître la supériorité de certaine groupes en vertu de critères qui ont une légitimité.
In Liberal corporatism and party government published in 1982, Lehmbruch and Schmitter developed a model opposed to the pluralistic model, which is the neo-corporatist model based on mutual recognition and developed exchanges between the state and certain interest groups. Access is not given to everyone and is limited. The conditions of representativeness and expertise are important for the selection and selection of the relevant interest group. The conditions of representativeness and expertise are important and not all interest groups cover these conditions, so we will integrate the most relevant interest groups. It is a model that is justified by privileged collaboration, but it is because they are more representative and because they have more expertise. There is a hierarchy of actors with more powerful interest groups than others, so that some interest groups may have a monopoly on a given issue. Political power recognises that a particular interest group has a monopoly on a particular issue. There is no open and democratic discussion, but a much more framed discussion and a much more closed circle to try to find solutions between actors who knew each other. It is not a denial of democracy, but to recognize the superiority of certain groups by virtue of criteria that have legitimacy.


Pour Schmitter, le néocorporatisme est un {{citation|système de représentation des intérêts dans lequel les unités constitutives sont organisées en un nombre limité de catégories uniques, obligatoires, non compétitives, organisées hiérarchiquement et différenciées fonctionnellement, reconnues ou autorisées (si ce n’est créé) par l’État qui leur concède délibérément le monopole de la représentation à l’intérieur de leurs catégories respectives}}. Dans ''Corporate lobbying in the European Union: towards a theory of access'' publié en 2002, Bouwen propose une relecture actuelle au travers de la grille analytique des « rapports d’échange » entre l’accès aux processus décisionnels garanti par le gouvernement et l’expertise et la représentativité/légitimité assurée par les groupes d’intérêt. Tous les groupes d’intérêt ne sont pas égaux et il est normal de donner plus de poids à ceux qui ont plus d’expertise et de représentativité.
In Schmitter's view, neo-corporatism is a "system of representation of interests in which constituent units are organized into a limited number of unique, mandatory, non-competitive, hierarchically organized and functionally differentiated categories, recognized or authorized (if not created) by the State which deliberately grants them a monopoly of representation within their respective categories". In Corporate lobbying in the European Union: towards a theory of access published in 2002, Bouwen proposes a current re-reading through the analytical grid of "exchange relationships" between government-guaranteed access to decision-making processes and expertise and representativeness/legitimacy ensured by interest groups. Not all interest groups are equal and it is normal to give more weight to those with more expertise and representativeness.


== Seconde critique majeure de la vision pluraliste : le paradoxe de l’action collective ==
== Second major criticism of the pluralist vision: the paradox of collective action ==


Mancur Olson dans ''The logic of collective action. Public goods and the theory of groups'' publié en 1966 montre que l’intérêt et la mobilisation pour les affaires publiques ne va pas de soi. Pour Oslon, plus un groupe latent est de grande taille (et défends des intérêts généraux et à long terme), moins il a de chance de réussir à s’organiser pour promouvoir les intérêts communs de ses membres. La contribution individuelle au succès du groupe paraît marginale, la rétribution individuelle à attendre du groupe est réduite, les coûts totaux d’organisation sont élevés bien que les coûts moyens ou marginaux diminuent en raison des économies d’échelle.
Mancur Olson in The logic of collective action. Public goods and the theory of groups published in 1966 shows that interest and mobilization for public affairs is not self-evident. For Oslon, the larger a latent group is (and defends general and long-term interests), the less likely it is to succeed in organizing itself to promote the common interests of its members. The individual contribution to the group's success seems marginal, the individual reward to be expected from the group is reduced, the total organizational costs are high, although the average or marginal costs decrease due to economies of scale.


Dans la plupart des cas, les concessions où les avantages que vont obtenir, vont être disponible pour l’ensemble des travailleurs, mais pas simplement pour les syndicats. C’est le paradoxe de l’action collective : personne ne participera à une action collective à laquelle chacun aurait un intérêt que tous participent (phénomène de « free riding » ou du passager clandestin) à moins que le groupe ne fournisse des « incitations sélectives » y compris négatives, par exemple la non- protection juridique des travailleurs non affiliés à un syndicat. Il n’y aurait pas d’intérêt spontané à participer à la chose publique et donc il faut créer les conditions de cet intérêt. Olson milite pour des incitations sélectives. La question est de savoir comment mobiliser les gens au service d’une cause si cet intérêt pour la chose publique n’est pas spontané. Il y a un idéal pluraliste et des faits qu’on observe qui montrent que cet idéal peine à se mettre en place.
In most cases, the concessions where the benefits that will be obtained will be available to all workers, but not just to the unions. This is the paradox of collective action: no one will participate in a collective action in which everyone would have an interest in everyone participating (free riding or stowaway phenomenon) unless the group provides "selective incentives" including negative ones, such as the lack of legal protection for workers not affiliated to a trade union. There would not be any spontaneous interest in participating in public affairs and therefore we must create the conditions for this interest. Olson campaigns for selective incentives. The question is how to mobilize people to serve a cause if this interest in public affairs is not spontaneous. There is a pluralistic ideal and there are facts that show that this ideal is hard to implement.


= En guise de synthèse intermédiaire =
= As an intermediate synthesis =


Il faut prendre en compte différent critères tels que les liens entre types de régimes démocratiques, types de politiques publiques, émergence et types de groupes d’intérêts, répertoires d’action mobilisés, nature des relations entre groupes d’intérêt et administration publique en particulier ?
Different criteria must be taken into account, such as the links between types of democratic regimes, types of public policies, emergence and types of interest groups, mobilised action directories, nature of the relations between interest groups and public administration in particular?


Dans ''Les groupes d’intérêt sous la Ve République'' publié en 1983, Wilson tente de faire une synthèse proposée pour proposer une typologie qui va être affinée par Offerlé dans ''Sociologie des groupes d’intérêt'' publié en 1994. Wilson et Offerlé distinguent trois modèles à savoir le modèle pluraliste, le modèle néo-corporatiste et le modèle protestataires. Les trois premières catégories sont les plus développées.
In Les groupes d' intérêt sous la Ve République published in 1983, Wilson attempts to make a proposed synthesis to propose a typology that will be refined by Offerlé in Sociologie des groupes d' intérêt published in 1994. Wilson and Offerlé distinguish three models: the pluralistic model, the neo-corporatist model and the protestor model. The first three categories are the most developed.[[Fichier:App1 Administration et groupes d’intérêt synthèse intermédiaire 1.png|center|400px|vignette]]


[[Fichier:App1 Administration et groupes d’intérêt synthèse intermédiaire 1.png|center|400px|vignette]]
= Modes of interaction between administrations and interest groups: networks of public action =


= Modes d’interactions entre administration et groupes d’intérêt : les réseaux d’action publique =
Marsh and Rhodes propose to analyse the intermediation of interests between civil society (interest groups) and political power (administration) through the concept of "policy networks". It is not a totalizing vision, but an empirical tool. The idea is the disaggregation of actors (e. g. individual administrative services), their interests, resources, action directories, powers. Depending on the empirical cases to be analysed, the situations will be totally different. This model aims to empirically analyze the relationships between interest groups and public decision making.


Marsh et Rhodes proposent d’analyser l’intermédiation des intérêts entre la société civile (groupes d’intérêt) et le pouvoir politique (administration) au moyen du concept de « réseaux d’action publique » (policy networks). Ce n’est pas une vision totalisante, mais un outil empirique. L’idée est la désagrégation des acteurs (par ex. services administratifs individuels), de leurs intérêts, ressources, répertoires d’action, pouvoirs. Suivant les cas empiriques que l’on va analyser, les situations seront totalement différentes. Ce modèle vise à analyser empiriquement les relations entre groupes d’intérêt et décision publiques.
For Atkinson and Coleman in Strong States and Weak States: Sectoral. Policy Networks in Advanced Capitalist Economies published in 1986,"Political networks can take variable forms and for this reason, their study requires a more nuanced categorization than the differentiation between weak or strong states or between pluralistic formulas and corporatists.


Pour Atkinson et Coleman dans ''Strong States and Weak States: Sectoral. Policy Networks in Advanced Capitalist Economies'' publié en 1986, {{citation|Les réseaux politiques peuvent prendre des formes variables et pour cette raison, leur étude nécessite une catégorisation plus nuancée que la différenciation entre un État faible ou un État fort ou celle qui oppose des formules pluralistes aux corporatistes}}.
Marsh and Rhodes establish a fine typology of policy networks according to three criteria:
* the stability of the composition of networks: are they always the same actors that dominate public decision-making processes over time or is there a fluid composition that has changed according to the political interests considered?
* their exclusivity: do networks make it possible to integrate other actors or exclude all actors that have not been integrated into these networks?
* the intensity of interdependencies in terms of resources to be exchanged: is there an exchange of resources between the actors, do the actors need each other to implement a given public policy, if this is the case, there is a form of interdependence. It is a process of self-sufficiency between the partners concerned.


Marsh et Rhodes établissent une typologie fine des formes de « policy networks » suivant trois critères :
== Forms of networks (continuum) (according to Rhodes and Marsh, 1995:44) ==
*la stabilité de la composition des réseaux : est-ce que ce sont toujours les mêmes acteurs qui dominent les processus de décision publique dans la durée ou y a-t-il une composition fluide qui eut changé en fonction des intérêts politiques considérés ;
*leur caractère exclusif : est-ce que les réseaux permettent d’intégrer d’autres acteurs ou excluent-ils tous les acteurs qui n’ont pas été intégrés dans ces réseaux ;
*l’intensité des interdépendances en termes de ressources à échanger : est-ce qu’il y a un échange de ressource qui se fait entre les acteurs, est-ce que les acteurs ont besoin les uns des autres pour mettre en œuvre une politique publique donnée, si c’est le cas, il y a une forme d’interdépendance. C’est un processus d’autosuffisance entre les partenaires concernés.
 
== Formes de réseaux (continuum) (selon Rhodes and Marsh, 1995: 44) ==


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== Un exemple : les réseaux d’action publique en Belgique (Varone et Schiffino, 2004) ==
== An example: public action networks in Belgium (Varone and Schiffino, 2004) ==


[[Fichier:App1 réseau action publique belgique 1.png|center|vignette|400px]]
[[Fichier:App1 réseau action publique belgique 1.png|center|vignette|400px]]


= Références =
= References =
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<references />



Version du 20 février 2018 à 09:43

Bezes distinguishes the "political roles" of the administration. Public administration can influence not only the content of public policies, but also when decisions are made and put on the agenda ("framing") and thus ensure that a political decision has to be taken. Public policy can have a very strong influence on decision-making (expertise, asymmetry of information). Bezes also distinguishes between the intermediation power of interests ("capture") and public policy networks, but also the implemented power ("implementation deficits") and the resources of action (and resistance).

Interest groups: definition, strategies and action directories

In its broadest sense, an interest group is defined as an entity seeking to represent the interests of a specific section of society in the public sphere, including the media, public opinion, etc. It is defined as an entity that seeks to represent the interests of a specific section of society in the public sphere. In a closer understanding, an interest group will seek to defend a cause, but with the public authorities. In this case, we are talking about lobbying, a lobby group as an incorporated organization that seeks to influence the public authorities in a way that is favourable to its interests.

A distinction must be made between interest groups and political parties, even if there are Labour, agrarian, green, car, etc. parties. The interest group does not present candidates for election, it defends sectoral interests of a part of the population or a cause that is limited, it does not defend the public good and the general interest, but rather special interests, the interest group is not intended to compromise between different interests; on the other hand, the interest group will seek to have an impact in a given sector, it is not responsible for coordinating with other areas of public policy. There may be significant differences between interest groups and political parties, but this does not prevent interest groups from becoming partly political.

There are three components of an interest group:

  • interest: Braud distinguishes between identity groups where a particular category of the population and groups rather attached to the defence of a cause is defended. There is as much typology as there are forms of interest that can be defended;
  • Organised entity: has resources, structures and is professionalised;
  • Various repertoires of action to influence public authorities: interest groups can mobilize different repertoires of actions and strategies to try to influence the public authorities which will depend on the existing opportunity structure and therefore the interest group will determine its repertoire and strategy of action according to position in the political system as well as opportunities in the political system. Depending on the context, the interest group will choose the type of strategy to advance or promote the interests it defends. For Charles Tilly in Big Structures, Large Processes, and Huge Comparisons (1984):"Every population has a limited repertoire of collective actions, i. e. means of acting together on the basis of shared interests".

In The Interest Groups 2006, Grossman and Saurugger distinguish action directories from interest groups. Action directories are the means (or strategies) that interest groups use to advance or defend their interests. They presuppose the mobilization of different resources (financial, cognitive, organizational, legal, temporal, etc.). These resources can be applied to different action directories. Rather, resources are intended to act from within, in particular the first two categories where public authorities have to negotiate with the powers of interest in order to take decisions, there is consultation with interest groups, and the other categories are aimed at putting pressure on decision-makers:

  • Negotiation (institutionalized) and consultation (informal): lobbying;
  • the use of (objective) expertise and the provision of arguments: it is a means of complementing the representative democracy which makes room for a certain number of points of view, so hearing interest groups makes it possible to hear other points of view;
  • protest: mobilization of supporters of the cause, the media, public opinion;
  • judicialisation: the courts take decisions which appear to be synonymous with defending the general interest and which are binding on public authorities. It is possible to appeal to different courts to have the courts contradict the action taken by the public authorities;
  • politicization: transformation into a political part.

On the one hand, there is an internal strategy with a privileged relationship with the government and public administration and an attempt is made to influence interest. On the other hand, there are external strategies. Interest groups have a number of strategic resources.

For Grossman and Saurugger these strategies can be:

  • internal and cooperative: expertise is a key resource for a part of the population that has knowledge that brings information that can be used for political decision-making. Representativeness means that the interest group represents a particular group with the capacity to mobilize a group in favour of or against a political decision. He practically has veto power. If the public administration or political authorities know that they cannot reconcile the favours of a particular interest group, they risk facing a referendum. This is a cooperative strategy with the public administration. There is a risk of capture which means that the public administration no longer risks working for the general interest, but for a specific group. From the interest group's point of view, there is the issue of limiting freedom of expression (the requirement of discretion and confidentiality) because there is somewhere a duty of discretion. If the interest group and a partner and interlocutor in political decision-making, the interest group has a duty of discretion not to criticize the decision taken by the public authorities. There is also the confidentiality test. The risk would be that of being muzzled, the interest group becomes a partner, but it can no longer be an opponent, there is a risk of limiting the freedom of expression. It is a case of a diffuse exchange relationship. The administration will receive information and expertise and the interest group will have access to decision-making processes. It is difficult to measure the equivalence of the exchange. This internal and cooperative strategy is not a measurable exchange, but it is something much more based on a diffuse and non-quantifiable relationship of trust between interest groups and public administration. Many interest groups favour this strategy, which has a strong impact on public authorities.
  • external: mobilization of external actors outside the political sphere ("outside lobbying") is often considered as a last resort decision or a complementary strategy. If the interest group refuses or acknowledges that it is not going to use external strategies, this means that it is linked to the internal and cooperative strategy. Very often interest groups will play on both. This can take different forms such as litigation, protest, protest, demonstrations, violence, etc.

Pluralism vs. neocorporatism

Pluralist model of democracy: interest groups are seen as positive and natural

David B. Truman in The Governmental Process, published in 1951, interprets interest groups as the organization of conscious citizens who, by advocating their claims, contribute to informing decision makers and, in so doing, to improving the quality of legislation.

According to Schmitter, in Still the century of corporatism? published in 1979, the pluralistic model is a "system of interest representation in which constituent units are organized into a non-specific number of multiple, voluntary, competing categories, which are not hierarchically organised and self-determined (as regards the type or nature of interests), which are not specifically authorised or recognised, subsidised, created by the State and which do not exercise a monopoly of the activity within their respective categories ". In this model, access to the political decision-making process must be open to all interest groups, there is no need for conditions of representativeness to be associated with the political process, which means that there is no favouritism on the part of the State towards a particular interest group, It will integrate all the interest groups, on the other hand, there is no hierarchy in the interest groups and no interest group has a monopoly on a given topic, all the interest groups are called upon to give their point of view. The ideal at the heart of this pluralistic model is an ideal of competition between points of view and this democratic discussion between all points of view and interest groups will lead to the best possible decision. There is no risk of capture and no privileges. Peters in The politics of bureaucracy published in 2001 speaks of pluralistic ideals, namely "self-regulating universe of pressure groups formulating public policy" as a condition of the public interest statement to the opposition of the notion of capture that subverts public policy into private policy, the critics have focused on two postulates:

  • equality of interest groups;
  • everyone's interest in "public policy"

First major critic of the pluralist vision: the phenomenon of capture and neo-corporatist practices

For Lowi, in American Business, Public Policy, Case-Studies, and Political Theory, published in 1964, the pluralistic model is effectively limited, as there is the appearance of the "iron triangle" in the political decision-making process between certain interest groups, government agencies and congressional commissions. All three types of actors had a specific vision of what politics was by monopolizing the decision. In The Theory of Economic Regulation published in 1971, Stigler shows that government agencies have been captured from government administration and public policy by certain interest groups.

In Liberal corporatism and party government published in 1982, Lehmbruch and Schmitter developed a model opposed to the pluralistic model, which is the neo-corporatist model based on mutual recognition and developed exchanges between the state and certain interest groups. Access is not given to everyone and is limited. The conditions of representativeness and expertise are important for the selection and selection of the relevant interest group. The conditions of representativeness and expertise are important and not all interest groups cover these conditions, so we will integrate the most relevant interest groups. It is a model that is justified by privileged collaboration, but it is because they are more representative and because they have more expertise. There is a hierarchy of actors with more powerful interest groups than others, so that some interest groups may have a monopoly on a given issue. Political power recognises that a particular interest group has a monopoly on a particular issue. There is no open and democratic discussion, but a much more framed discussion and a much more closed circle to try to find solutions between actors who knew each other. It is not a denial of democracy, but to recognize the superiority of certain groups by virtue of criteria that have legitimacy.

In Schmitter's view, neo-corporatism is a "system of representation of interests in which constituent units are organized into a limited number of unique, mandatory, non-competitive, hierarchically organized and functionally differentiated categories, recognized or authorized (if not created) by the State which deliberately grants them a monopoly of representation within their respective categories". In Corporate lobbying in the European Union: towards a theory of access published in 2002, Bouwen proposes a current re-reading through the analytical grid of "exchange relationships" between government-guaranteed access to decision-making processes and expertise and representativeness/legitimacy ensured by interest groups. Not all interest groups are equal and it is normal to give more weight to those with more expertise and representativeness.

Second major criticism of the pluralist vision: the paradox of collective action

Mancur Olson in The logic of collective action. Public goods and the theory of groups published in 1966 shows that interest and mobilization for public affairs is not self-evident. For Oslon, the larger a latent group is (and defends general and long-term interests), the less likely it is to succeed in organizing itself to promote the common interests of its members. The individual contribution to the group's success seems marginal, the individual reward to be expected from the group is reduced, the total organizational costs are high, although the average or marginal costs decrease due to economies of scale.

In most cases, the concessions where the benefits that will be obtained will be available to all workers, but not just to the unions. This is the paradox of collective action: no one will participate in a collective action in which everyone would have an interest in everyone participating (free riding or stowaway phenomenon) unless the group provides "selective incentives" including negative ones, such as the lack of legal protection for workers not affiliated to a trade union. There would not be any spontaneous interest in participating in public affairs and therefore we must create the conditions for this interest. Olson campaigns for selective incentives. The question is how to mobilize people to serve a cause if this interest in public affairs is not spontaneous. There is a pluralistic ideal and there are facts that show that this ideal is hard to implement.

As an intermediate synthesis

Different criteria must be taken into account, such as the links between types of democratic regimes, types of public policies, emergence and types of interest groups, mobilised action directories, nature of the relations between interest groups and public administration in particular?

In Les groupes d' intérêt sous la Ve République published in 1983, Wilson attempts to make a proposed synthesis to propose a typology that will be refined by Offerlé in Sociologie des groupes d' intérêt published in 1994. Wilson and Offerlé distinguish three models: the pluralistic model, the neo-corporatist model and the protestor model. The first three categories are the most developed.

App1 Administration et groupes d’intérêt synthèse intermédiaire 1.png

Modes of interaction between administrations and interest groups: networks of public action

Marsh and Rhodes propose to analyse the intermediation of interests between civil society (interest groups) and political power (administration) through the concept of "policy networks". It is not a totalizing vision, but an empirical tool. The idea is the disaggregation of actors (e. g. individual administrative services), their interests, resources, action directories, powers. Depending on the empirical cases to be analysed, the situations will be totally different. This model aims to empirically analyze the relationships between interest groups and public decision making.

For Atkinson and Coleman in Strong States and Weak States: Sectoral. Policy Networks in Advanced Capitalist Economies published in 1986,"Political networks can take variable forms and for this reason, their study requires a more nuanced categorization than the differentiation between weak or strong states or between pluralistic formulas and corporatists.

Marsh and Rhodes establish a fine typology of policy networks according to three criteria:

  • the stability of the composition of networks: are they always the same actors that dominate public decision-making processes over time or is there a fluid composition that has changed according to the political interests considered?
  • their exclusivity: do networks make it possible to integrate other actors or exclude all actors that have not been integrated into these networks?
  • the intensity of interdependencies in terms of resources to be exchanged: is there an exchange of resources between the actors, do the actors need each other to implement a given public policy, if this is the case, there is a form of interdependence. It is a process of self-sufficiency between the partners concerned.

Forms of networks (continuum) (according to Rhodes and Marsh, 1995:44)

Types de réseau Caractéristiques du réseau
Communauté de politique publique Stabilité, membres très fortement sélectionnés, interdépendance verticale, articulation horizontale limitée.
Réseau professionnel ibid. et sert les intérêts d’une profession donnée. C’est une vision sectorielle de la community policy.
Réseau intergouvernemental Nombre de membres limité, interdépendance verticale limitée, articulation horizontale importante.
Réseau de producteurs Nombre de membres fluctuant, interdépendance verticale limitée, sert les intérêts des producteurs.
Réseau thématique Nombre de membres important et changeant, interdépendance verticale limitée.

An example: public action networks in Belgium (Varone and Schiffino, 2004)

App1 réseau action publique belgique 1.png

References