Introduction to the course on international humanitarian law - Historique des versions

Arthur le 28 mai 2019 à 09:58

2019-05-28T09:58:24Z

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	\| assistants =		\| assistants =
	\| enregistrement =		\| enregistrement =
	\| cours = [[~~Droit international humanitaire~~]]		\| cours = [[International humanitarian law]]
	\| lectures =		\| lectures =
	*[[Introduction to the course on international humanitarian law]]		*[[Introduction to the course on international humanitarian law]]

Arthur : /* Rationale and degree of effectiveness of a law of armed conflict */

2019-05-28T09:49:45Z

Rationale and degree of effectiveness of a law of armed conflict

← Version précédente		Version du 28 mai 2019 à 11:49
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	It is therefore quite interesting to see that some political parties may think that the best thing is to have no international rules so that the State remains free to do what it wants. It is quite interesting to contrast this with a whole series of branches of the state such as the military branch where one might think that the latter really wants to be free, in a case of armed conflict where the survival of the state is at stake, is it not worth having your hands free. However, apparently not always. This old idea of discipline and the fact that armed conflict is fought according to rules may come up again.		It is therefore quite interesting to see that some political parties may think that the best thing is to have no international rules so that the State remains free to do what it wants. It is quite interesting to contrast this with a whole series of branches of the state such as the military branch where one might think that the latter really wants to be free, in a case of armed conflict where the survival of the state is at stake, is it not worth having your hands free. However, apparently not always. This old idea of discipline and the fact that armed conflict is fought according to rules may come up again.

	The effectiveness of a law of armed conflict is not a legal issue. The effectiveness of the law of armed conflict is the question of whether it has a real impact on the ground. Generally, there are violations, and there is also compliance with the rule. ~~When~~ is it more ~~detailed~~?		The effectiveness of a law of armed conflict is not a legal issue. The effectiveness of the law of armed conflict is the question of whether it has a real impact on the ground. Generally, there are violations, and there is also compliance with the rule. What is it more in detail?

	What we have is, on the one hand, a considerable effort by the military forces to comply with legal requirements, an effort that has been growing in recent years. But there are already some striking old examples. A good example of such a long-standing trend is the treatment of prisoners of war by the Wehrmacht during the Second World War. If there is one State that is not very sympathetic, that has little regard for international law and international humanitarian law, it was obviously Nazi Germany. Now, what do we see? Let us take Marcel Junot’s book, which visited these camps in Germany and wrote a book entitled Le troisième combattant, in which he recounts what he saw in the various theatres of war in which he was and including this one. What do we see? It can be seen that the Wehrmacht treated British prisoners of war in a more than fair manner. The great complaint of the British in German POW camps visited by Junot was that there were not enough showers to take regular showers. On the other hand, Russian prisoners of war, Marcel Junot was first denied access to these camps, but through relations, he obtained the right to enter them. His description of it is too cruel. There is an absolutely enormous difference in treatment in both cases. It would probably be explained politically by the fact that the British were seen as an airborne civilized nation and that the Russians and Slavs were seen as sub-humans who had to be cleaned up. But there is more to it than that, because in the German Wehrmacht, there were also people who respected regulations and laws without necessarily being ideologues, and for these people, apparently this was the case with the camp commander, it was simply a question of the applicability of the 1929 Geneva Convention. The Wehrmacht argued that in relation to the British, it was bound by the 1929 Convention. Germany was not bound by the 1929 Convention with Russia because Russia had not ratified, so Russian prisoners of war could be treated differently, on the other hand, customary law was not at the forefront at the time.		What we have is, on the one hand, a considerable effort by the military forces to comply with legal requirements, an effort that has been growing in recent years. But there are already some striking old examples. A good example of such a long-standing trend is the treatment of prisoners of war by the Wehrmacht during the Second World War. If there is one State that is not very sympathetic, that has little regard for international law and international humanitarian law, it was obviously Nazi Germany. Now, what do we see? Let us take Marcel Junot’s book, which visited these camps in Germany and wrote a book entitled Le troisième combattant, in which he recounts what he saw in the various theatres of war in which he was and including this one. What do we see? It can be seen that the Wehrmacht treated British prisoners of war in a more than fair manner. The great complaint of the British in German POW camps visited by Junot was that there were not enough showers to take regular showers. On the other hand, Russian prisoners of war, Marcel Junot was first denied access to these camps, but through relations, he obtained the right to enter them. His description of it is too cruel. There is an absolutely enormous difference in treatment in both cases. It would probably be explained politically by the fact that the British were seen as an airborne civilized nation and that the Russians and Slavs were seen as sub-humans who had to be cleaned up. But there is more to it than that, because in the German Wehrmacht, there were also people who respected regulations and laws without necessarily being ideologues, and for these people, apparently this was the case with the camp commander, it was simply a question of the applicability of the 1929 Geneva Convention. The Wehrmacht argued that in relation to the British, it was bound by the 1929 Convention. Germany was not bound by the 1929 Convention with Russia because Russia had not ratified, so Russian prisoners of war could be treated differently, on the other hand, customary law was not at the forefront at the time.

Arthur le 28 mai 2019 à 09:07

2019-05-28T09:07:14Z

Arthur le 28 mai 2019 à 09:05

2019-05-28T09:05:40Z

Voir les modifications

Arthur le 28 mai 2019 à 09:01

2019-05-28T09:01:51Z

← Version précédente		Version du 28 mai 2019 à 11:01
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	\| cours = [[Droit international humanitaire]]		\| cours = [[Droit international humanitaire]]
	\| lectures =		\| lectures =
	*[[Introduction ~~au cours de droit~~ international ~~humanitaire~~]]		*[[Introduction to the course on international humanitarian law]]
	*[[~~Les sources du droit des conflits armés~~]]		*[[Sources of the law of armed conflict]]
	*[[~~L’applicabilité du droit des conflits armés~~]]		*[[The applicability of the law of armed conflict]]
	*[[~~Les règles matérielles du droit des conflits armés~~]]		*[[The substantive rules of the law of armed conflict]]
	*[[~~Les règles du droit des conflits armés~~ non-~~internationaux~~]]		*[[The rules of the law of non-international armed conflicts]]
	}}		}}

Arthur le 28 mai 2019 à 09:01

2019-05-28T09:01:15Z

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	{{Translations		{{Translations
	\| en = Introduction ~~to the course on~~ international ~~humanitarian law~~		\| fr = Introduction au cours de droit international humanitaire
	\| es = Introducción al curso de derecho internacional humanitario		\| es = Introducción al curso de derecho internacional humanitario
	}}		}}

Arthur : /* The separation of ius in bello and ius ad bellum; the principle of the equality of belligerents under the law of war */

2019-05-28T09:00:42Z

The separation of ius in bello and ius ad bellum; the principle of the equality of belligerents under the law of war

← Version précédente		Version du 28 mai 2019 à 11:00
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	= The separation of ius in bello and ius ad bellum; the principle of the equality of belligerents under the law of war =		= The separation of ius in bello and ius ad bellum; the principle of the equality of belligerents under the law of war =
			Let's comment with a pure grammar point. "Jus in bello" and "jus ad bellum" are terms that refer to the law of armed conflict as "jus in bello", and "jus ad bellum" refers to a part of the law of peace, that which deals with legitimate causes, legally recognized causes, legal causes for the use of force. In certain circumstances, States may use force, the whole branch and when force may be used, and therefore the whole branch of peacekeeping is referred to as "jus ad bello".

	~~Commentons par un pur~~ point ~~de grammaire~~. ~~« Jus~~ in ~~bello » et « jus~~ ad ~~bellum » sont des termes qui désignent pour « jus~~ in ~~bello »~~, ~~le droit des conflits armés~~, ~~et « jus~~ ad ~~bellum » désigne une partie du droit de la paix~~, ~~celui qui traite des causes légitimes~~, ~~des causes juridiquement reconnues~~, ~~des causes légales pour recourir à la force~~. ~~Dans certaines circonstances, les États peuvent recourir à la force~~, ~~toute cette branche et quand est-ce qu’on peut utiliser la force et par conséquent toute la branche du maintien de la paix est désignée sous le terme « jus ad bello »~~.		The grammar point is therefore as follows. It should be noted that we say "jus in bello" and that we say "jus ad bellum". The difference for latinists is clear, because "in" governs the ablative, "bello" is ablative, and "ad" governs the accusative, therefore "um" which is the accusative. All this is of mediocre importance, it is true, but since these terms are used very often, it is very embarrassing to make mistakes and say "jus ad bello", it is very incompetent. If ever, it is better to use the terms "peacekeeping" and "law of armed conflict".

	~~Le point de grammaire est donc le suivant~~. ~~Remarquons qu’on dit « jus in bello » et qu’on dit « jus ad bellum »~~. ~~La différence pour les latinistes est claire~~, ~~car « in » gouverne l’ablatif~~, ~~« bello » est de l’ablatif~~, ~~et « ad » gouverne l’accusatif~~, ~~par conséquent « um » qui est de l’accusatif~~. ~~Tout cela est d’une importance médiocre il est vrai~~, ~~mais comme ces termes sont utilisés très souvent~~, ~~il est très gênant de se tromper et de dire « jus ad bello »~~, ~~cela fait très incompétent. Si jamais~~, ~~il vaut mieux utiliser les termes « maintien de la paix » et « droit des conflits armés »~~.		First, why is the equality of belligerents before the law of war so important and what do we already mean by "equality of belligerents" before the law of war? The question relates to the question of the application of the rules of the law of armed conflict and the great principle of the law of armed conflict, the irremovable dogma of the law of armed conflict, the first proposal, the axiom with which matter survives or disables, is that each belligerent applies the same rules because he is bound by the same rules. Reciprocity therefore perfect. Limitations on the conduct of hostilities apply equally to all belligerents provided they have ratified a convention if it is to be applicable. This is a very basic matter of treaty law. Without this principle, the law of armed conflict would not be viable for a variety of reasons. The most obvious is that without reciprocity, respect for the law would collapse, no belligerent would accept to be bound by rules that other parties do not respect and that it is not bound by the law. It is therefore quite obvious that if the law is not applied as well, the party who is the victim of an excessive practice is immediately given the reason to adopt the same excessive practice and therefore we begin to spiral downwards, towards what we call total war, that is, unlimited war. If this were the case, it would still be unfortunate, because it would mean that there would no longer be any IHL that would work in the end, that total war would bring exactly what States do not want, namely disproportionate destruction, excessive destruction to the detriment, first of all, already, of protected persons.

	~~D’abord~~, pourquoi est-ce que l’égalité des belligérants devant le droit de la guerre est si importante et qu’entendons-nous déjà par « égalité des belligérants » devant le droit de la guerre ? la question a ~~trait à la question de l’application des règles du droit du conflit armé et le grand principe du droit des conflits armés, le dogme inamovible du droit des conflits armés~~, ~~la proposition première~~, ~~l’axiome avec lequel la matière survie ou déchoie~~, est celle que chaque belligérant applique les mêmes règles parce qu’il est tenu par les mêmes règles. Réciprocité donc parfaite. Les limitations dans la conduite des hostilités s’appliquent à tous les belligérants de la même manière à condition qu’ils aient ratifié une convention si celle-ci doit être applicable. Cela est de l’ordre du droit des traités tout à fait élémentaires. S’il n’y avait pas ce principe, ~~le droit des conflits armés ne serait pas viable pour tout un tas de raisons~~. La plus évidente est que sans réciprocité, le respect du droit s’écroulerait, aucun belligérant n’accepterait d’être tenu par des règles que d’autres parties ne respectent pas et qu’elle n’est pas tenue de respecter en droit. Il est donc tout à fait évident que si on n’applique pas le droit également, on donne immédiatement à la partie qui est victime d’une pratique excessive, la raison d’adopter la même pratique excessive et donc on commence à aller en spirale vers le bas, vers ce que nous appelons la guerre totale, c’est-à-dire, la guerre illimitée. S’il en était ainsi, cela serait quand même fâcheux pare que cela voudrait dire qu’il n’y a plus aucun DIH qui fonctionnerait à la fin, que la guerre totale apporterait exactement ce que les États ne veulent pas, à savoir une destruction hors proportions, une destruction excessive au détriment, tout d’abord, déjà, des personnes protégées.		It is possible to treat prisoners of war badly, to kill them in certain circumstances, but we are off to a bad start here. Because obviously, from one person to another, from generalizations to generalizations, from reactions to reactions, have ended with barbarism. This is why it is essential to maintain this equality in the application of the law of war. Each party must apply equally.

	~~Il est possible de mal traiter les prisonniers de guerre~~, ~~les tuer dans certaines circonstances~~, ~~mais là on est mal parti~~. ~~Parce qu’évidemment~~, ~~de proche en proche~~, ~~de généralisations en généralisations~~, ~~de réactions en réactions~~, ~~ont fini avec la barbarie~~. ~~C’est donc la raison pour laquelle il est capital de maintenir cette égalité dans l’application du droit de la guerre~~. ~~Chaque partie doit appliquer également~~.		This may seem trivial. Each of the parties is bound by rules that it has accepted in conventions, each of the parties to the conflict is bound by universal customary rules that apply universally. The problem is that this is not at all commonplace, because in history we have always had trends, always and again recently, we have had them now, during the United States wars in Afghanistan or Iraq, there was exactly the same argument again and it came out in the 1950s in another context and even before that in another context against Hitler in particular. What is the difficult point here? It is quite simply that there are situations in which a belligerent feels in possession of a just cause of war. The simplest example is that of the aggressed and the aggressor. It is possible to vary, by saying that one is the civilized state and designating the other as a barbaric terrorist. It's the same theme, but with a variation. What we end up with if we think about this argument to its final point is that these belligerents do not simply say that he is the good and the other Hitler, but they say that as one defends a just cause, then he must still have more freedoms also in bello to defend himself. It is not normal for the "bad guy" and the "good guy" to be bound by the same rules because it is playing into the hands of the "bad guy". It would be normal for the "good" one to have a few more latitudes in order to defend civilization, to defend the aggressor against the aggressor, and so on.

	~~Cela peut paraître banal~~. ~~Chacune des parties est tenue par des règles qu’elle~~ a ~~acceptées dans des conventions~~, ~~chacune des parties au conflit est tenue par les règles coutumières universelles qui s’appliquent justement universellement~~. ~~Le problème est que cela n’est pas du tout banal~~, ~~car dans l’histoire nous avons toujours eu des tendances~~, ~~toujours et encore récemment~~, ~~nous les avons encore maintenant~~, ~~lors des guerres des États-Unis en Afghanistan ou encore en Irak~~, il y avait exactement la même argumentation de nouveau et elle ressortait dans les années 1950 dans un autre contexte et encore avant dans un autre contexte contre Hitler notamment. Quel est le point difficile ici ? C’est tout simplement qu’il y a ~~des situations dans lesquelles un belligérant se sent en possession d’une juste cause de guerre~~. ~~L’exemple le plus simple est celui de l’agressé et de l’agresseur~~. ~~Il est possible de varier~~, ~~en disant que l’on est l’État civilisé et en désignant l’autre comme terroriste barbare~~. ~~C’est le même thème~~, ~~mais avec une variation~~. ~~Ce à quoi on aboutit si on pense cet argument jusqu’à son point final est que ces belligérants ne se bornent pas tout simplement à dire qu’il est le bien et l’autre Hitler~~, ~~mais ils disent que comme l’un défend une cause juste~~, ~~alors il doit quand même avoir plus de libertés aussi~~ in bello ~~pour se défendre~~. ~~Il n’est pas normal que le « méchant » et le « bon » soient tenus par les mêmes règles parce que cela est faire le jeu du « méchant~~. ~~Il serait normal que le “bon” puisse avoir quelques latitudes de plus afin de défendre la civilisation~~, ~~pour défendre l’agressé contre l’agresseur~~, ~~et ainsi de suite~~.		The argument is simply an argument to reduce or erase the equality of the belligerents before the law of war. The key point of the law of armed conflict is to deny such a distinction and to continue to say that the rules apply equally to everyone, whether they are "aggressors" or "aggressed", whether they are "good" or "bad". Not all the rules, it is true. In peace law, a distinction is made between the aggressor and the aggressed, between the "good" and the "bad". There are sanctions against the aggressor, there are United Nations sanctions, but there is still responsibility, all this is a given. The whole law of peace is based on discrimination between those who violate the law and those who do not in this example. But not the law of war, not the law of armed conflict. There is an island here where this principle of distinction between the belligerents, of discrimination according to the justice of the case, does not extend. The whole law of peace does, when we get to the last reduction against barbarism, which is the law of armed conflict, no. This is the reason for the separation of jus in bello and jus ad bellum because jus ad bellum are the causes of wars, the legitimate causes of war. That is exactly what it means to know who the aggressor is and who the aggressor is. The jus ad bellum is based on this distinction, we leave it to him, it is legitimate in this context. But what they say, separation between the two.

	L’argument est tout simplement un argument de réduction ou d’effacement de l’égalité des belligérants devant le droit de la guerre. Le point capital du droit des conflits armés est de nier une telle distinction ~~et de continuer à dire que les règles s’appliquent également à tous qu’ils soient “agresseurs” ou “agressé”~~, qu’il soit “bon” ou “mauvais”. Non pas toutes les règles il est vrai. Dans le droit de la paix, on distingue entre l’agresseur et l’agressé, entre le “bon” et le “mauvais”. Il y a des sanctions contre l’agresseur, il y a des sanctions de Nations Unies, mais encore de la responsabilité, tout cela est acquis. Tout le droit de la paix est basé sur une discrimination entre celui qui viole le droit et celui qui ne le viole pas dans le cadre de cet exemple. Mais pas le droit de la guerre, pas le droit des conflits armés. Il y a ici une ile où ce principe de distinction entre les belligérants, de discrimination en fonction de la justice de la cause ne s’étend pas. Tout le droit de la paix oui, lorsqu’on arrive au dernier réduit contre la barbarie qui est le droit des conflits armés, non. C’est là la raison de la séparation du jus in ~~bello et du~~ jus ad bellum ~~parce que le~~ jus ad bellum ~~se sont les causes de guerres~~, ~~les causes légitimes de guerre. C’est exactement cela de savoir qui est l’agresseur et qui est l’agressé. Le~~ jus ~~ad bellum est basé sur cette distinction-là, on la lui laisse, il est légitime dans ce contexte. Mais ce qu’on dit, séparation entre les deux~~.		This distinction, which is made in the jus ad bellum, remains in the jus as bellum, cannot be translated into the jus in bello or equality between the belligerents must remain absolutely necessary.

	~~Cette~~ distinction ~~qui est faite dans le jus ad bellum~~, ~~elle reste dans le jus as bellum~~, ~~elle ne peut pas être traduite dans le jus in bello ou l’égalité entre les belligérants doit rester absolument de mise~~.		Everyone is the aggressed one, always. No State claims to be the aggressor. For example, the Security Council never says who the aggressor is and who the aggressor is, it takes action under Chapter VII. Therefore, if we accepted a system of distinction based on who is good and who is bad, the result would be that everyone would simply claim to be good and take liberties with regard to the law of armed conflict. If we want to have a law of armed conflict, we cannot allow that.

	~~Tout le monde est l’agressé~~, ~~toujours~~. ~~Aucun État ne se dit être l’agresseur~~. ~~Par exemple~~, ~~le Conseil de sécurité ne dit jamais qui est l’agresseur et l’agressé~~, ~~il prend des mesures selon le chapitre VII~~. ~~Dès lors~~, si on ~~acceptait un système de distinction en fonction de qui est bon et qui est mauvais~~, ~~le résultat serait que tout simplement chacun se proclamerait être bon et prendrait des libertés par rapport au droit des conflits armés. Si nous voulons avoir un droit des conflits armés~~, on ~~ne peut pas permettre cela~~.		That is what it is all about, the causes of war, the justice of the cause of war has no impact on the law of armed conflict, the rules in the law of armed conflict must also be applied. Politically, this is very difficult to make understood sometimes. As for terrorism, moreover, we must bear in mind that the terrorist phenomenon is not subject to the law of armed conflict, to a very large extent it is not because terrorists are not belligerents in any case, so we are not in the field of IHL, we do not have to apply any equality to them, they are quite simply criminals. The problem arises when there is an armed group acting as a belligerent or a government that is allied with such a group and these groups act as a belligerent and there is a real armed conflict. With regard to Afghanistan and the United States, Convention III applied to persons captured on the battlefield during the battle and therefore Guantánamo detentions were not in conformity. For all the others who have been captured somewhere in the world, trafficked here and there to deliver them to the Americans, all of them are outside the law of armed conflict because they were not captured during an armed conflict on a battlefield.

	~~Voilà de quoi il s’agit~~, les causes de guerre, la justice de la cause de guerre n’a pas d’incidence sur le droit des conflits armés, les règles dans le droit des conflits armés doivent être appliquées également. Politiquement, cela est très difficile à faire comprendre parfois. Quant au terrorisme d’ailleurs, il faut bien garder à l’esprit que le phénomène terroriste n’est pas soumis au droit des conflits armés, en très grande partie il ne l’est pas parce que les terroristes ne sont pas des belligérants de toute manière, donc nous ne sommes pas dans le domaine du DIH, nous n’avons pas à leur appliquer une égalité quelconque, ce sont tout simplement des criminels. Le problème se pose lorsqu’il y a un groupe armé qui agit comme un belligérant ou un gouvernement qui est allié d’un tel groupe et que ces groupes agissent comme belligérant et qu’il y a un vrai conflit armé. En ce qui concerne l’Afghanistan et les États-Unis, c’est pour les personnes capturées sur le champ de bataille, lors de la bataille que s’appliquait la convention III et donc les détentions de Guantánamo n’étaient pas conformes. Pour tous les autres qui ont été capturés quelque part dans le monde, trafiqué par ci et par là pour les livrer aux Américains, tous ceux-là sont en dehors du droit des conflits armés parce qu’ils n’ont pas été capturés lors d’un conflit armé sur un champ de bataille.		Therefore, the principle of the equality of belligerents applies only in the context of armed conflicts and terrorism is a phenomenon that goes much further than armed conflict.

	~~Donc le principe de l’égalité des belligérants ne s’applique que dans le cadre des conflits armés et le terrorisme est un phénomène qui va beaucoup plus loin que le conflit armé~~.

	= Annexes =		= Annexes =

Arthur : /* Terminology */

2019-05-28T08:59:43Z

Terminology

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	== Terminology ==		== Terminology ==
			Since we have defined our subject matter, we can move on to terminology. How to designate what we have just discovered as the object of IHL. We see that there is a whole series of terms, a multiplicity of terms, almost a cacophony of terms. In any case, there are four that are most commonly used, namely "law of war", "law of armed conflict", "humanitarian law" or even "international humanitarian law", and then "jus in bello".

	Puisque nous avons défini notre matière, nous pouvons passer à la terminologie. Comment désigner ce que nous venons de découvrir comme objet du DIH. On voit qu’il y a toute une série de termes, une multiplicité de termes, presque une cacophonie de termes. ~~Il y a en tout cas quatre qui sont les plus utilisés~~, ~~à savoir « droit de la guerre », « droit des conflits armés », « droit humanitaire » voire « droit international humanitaire », et puis « jus in bello »~~.		Let us not get lost here in the meanders of terminology. Therefore, only two remarks.

	~~Ne nous perdons pas ici dans les méandres de la terminologie~~. ~~Dès lors~~, ~~seulement deux remarques~~.		The first remark is that it is possible to take all these terms as synonymous. It is therefore possible to use each of them to designate the three branches presented. It is a habit that has been taken to use them synonymously even if it is not entirely clean. The term most used today by almost everyone, except a few specialists, by the Security Council, which is very fond of it, by our Department of Foreign Affairs, namely the FDFA, which is a worshipper of it, by the ICRC, which is considered to be its inventor, namely international humanitarian law and which therefore loves it so much that it tries not to see it adulterated, all these actors love international humanitarian law because it is the most sympathetic of all. To say that we make the law of war is old-fashioned and old-fashioned, but it also refers to a very unpleasant object. To say that we are doing humanitarian work is still very good. From then on, this term in the spirit of modernity supplanted the others. We can take that as synonymous because that's the practice today.

	~~La première remarque est qu’il est possible de prendre tous ces termes comme étant synonymique. Il est donc possible d’utiliser chacun d’entre eux pour désigner les trois~~ branches ~~présentées~~. ~~C’est une habitude qui a été prise ainsi de les utiliser de manière synonymique même si cela n’est pas entièrement propre. Le terme le plus utilisé aujourd’hui par tous pratiquement~~, ~~sauf par quelques spécialistes~~, ~~par le Conseil de sécurité qui en est très friand~~, ~~par notre département des affaires étrangères~~, ~~à savoir le DFAE qui en est un adorateur~~, ~~par le CICR qui passe pour être son inventeur~~, ~~à savoir du droit international humanitaire et qui dès lors l’aime en point qu’il essaie de point l’en voir adultérer~~, ~~tous ces acteurs adorent le droit international humanitaire pare que c’est le plus sympathique de tous~~. ~~Dire qu’on fait du droit de la guerre fait ringard et vieux jeu~~, ~~mais aussi~~, ~~cela désigne un objet fort antipathique~~. ~~Dire qu’on fait de l’humanitaire est quand même très bien. Dès lors~~, ~~ce terme dans l’esprit de la modernité a supplanté les autres. On peut prendre ça pour synonymique parce que c’est la pratique aujourd’hui~~.		The second remark is that if we wish to be a little more rigorous in terms, which is not always prohibited when we are in the law, but it is not always imposed in this area, at that time, it would be better to reserve the term "law of armed conflict" for all three branches presented as generic terms covering the whole, the three branches, or even the others if there are still minor branches such as treaties in war, all this, the law of armed conflict, or the law of war, and humanitarian law should either be reserved for the law of Geneva, but this is almost unrealistic today, or for the law of Geneva and the law of The Hague. Geneva law, Hague law, humanitarian law, that is fine, the law of armed conflict when it comes to including neutrality and even certain rules of maritime warfare that have nothing to do with humanitarian issues, in particular maritime catches, and therefore the capture of vessels in war, which is more a matter of armed conflict than humanitarian law. If we wish to be rigorous, we should consider that IHL is the most important part of the law of armed conflict, but it does not exhaust its contours. But each time we use these terms we must define them and say in what sense we use them, because there is no absolutely fixed use and the authors, the actors also have either broader or narrower versions.

	La deuxième remarque est que si on souhaite être un peu plus rigoureux dans les termes, ce qui n’est pas toujours interdit lorsqu’on est dans le droit, mais ce n’est pas toujours imposé en la matière, à ce moment-là, il vaudrait mieux réserver le terme « droit des conflits armés » à l’ensemble des trois branches présentées comme termes génériques couvrant le tout, les trois branches voire les autres s’il y a encore des branches mineures comme les traités dans la guerre, tout cela, droit des conflits armés, ou droit de la guerre, et droit humanitaire devraient soit être réservé soit au droit de Genève, mais cela est presque irréaliste aujourd’hui, soit alors au droit de Genève et au droit de La Haye. Droit de Genève, droit de La Haye, droit humanitaire, cela est très bien, droit des conflits armés lorsqu’il s’agit d’inclure aussi la neutralité voire d’ailleurs certaines règles de la guerre maritime qui n’ont rien à voir avec l’humanitaire et notamment aux prises maritimes donc la capture de navires en guerre qui relève plus des conflits armés que du droit humanitaire. Si on ~~souhaite être rigoureux~~, ~~il faudrait considérer que le DIH est la partie la plus importante du droit des conflits armés, mais qui n’en épuise pas les contours~~. Mais il faut à chaque fois qu’on utilise ces termes les définir et dire dans quel sens on les utilise, car il n’y a pas un usage absolument fixe et les auteurs, les acteurs également ont des versions soit plus larges soit plus étroites.		The third point is the separation of jus in bello and jus ad bellum and the question is linked to the principle of belligerents under the law of war, it is nothing more than a variation on this theme, it is nothing more than a way of implementing the principle of the equality of belligerents under the law of war. It sounds very abstract and should be mentioned.

	Le troisième point est la séparation du jus in bello et du jus ad bellum et la question est liée au principe des belligérants selon le droit de la guerre, ce n’est rien d’autre qu’une variation sur ce thème, ce n’est rien d’autre qu’une manière de mettre en œuvre le principe de l’égalité des belligérants selon le droit de la guerre. Cela sonne très abstrait et il faut le préciser.		= The separation of ius in bello and ius ad bellum; the principle of the equality of belligerents under the law of war =

	= ~~La séparation du~~ ius in bello ~~et du~~ ius ad ~~bellum~~ ; ~~le principe de l’égalité des belligérants selon le droit de la guerre~~ =

	Commentons par un pur point de grammaire. « Jus in bello » et « jus ad bellum » sont des termes qui désignent pour « jus in bello », le droit des conflits armés, et « jus ad bellum » désigne une partie du droit de la paix, celui qui traite des causes légitimes, des causes juridiquement reconnues, des causes légales pour recourir à la force. Dans certaines circonstances, les États peuvent recourir à la force, toute cette branche et quand est-ce qu’on peut utiliser la force et par conséquent toute la branche du maintien de la paix est désignée sous le terme « jus ad bello ».		Commentons par un pur point de grammaire. « Jus in bello » et « jus ad bellum » sont des termes qui désignent pour « jus in bello », le droit des conflits armés, et « jus ad bellum » désigne une partie du droit de la paix, celui qui traite des causes légitimes, des causes juridiquement reconnues, des causes légales pour recourir à la force. Dans certaines circonstances, les États peuvent recourir à la force, toute cette branche et quand est-ce qu’on peut utiliser la force et par conséquent toute la branche du maintien de la paix est désignée sous le terme « jus ad bello ».

Arthur : /* The three branches of armed conflict */

2019-05-28T08:59:02Z

The three branches of armed conflict

← Version précédente		Version du 28 mai 2019 à 10:59
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	== The three branches of armed conflict ==		== The three branches of armed conflict ==
			The law of armed conflict is a branch that formerly opposed international peace law. It regulates belligerent relations and therefore the rules that apply in times of armed conflict between the belligerents. This basically has three sets of rules.

	~~Le droit des conflits armés est une branche qui anciennement s’opposait au droit international de la paix~~. ~~Elle réglemente les rapports de belligérance donc les règles qui s’appliquent en période de conflit armé entre les belligérants~~. ~~Cela comporte fondamentalement trois volets de règles~~.		First, there are rules on the protection of certain people who are sometimes called victims of war, it would be better to say potential or current victims of war, because people are also protected before they are harmed. Persons so protected are basically persons who no longer participate in hostilities or who have never participated in them. Those who are now outside the war and who are being protected in this respect, namely the wounded and sick, the shipwrecked also in the theatre of maritime war, prisoners of war, i. e. combatants who are no longer fighting following surrender, for example, and who are now in the control of the opposing party, and finally civilians in any case insofar as they do not participate directly in hostilities. When civilians take a direct part in hostilities, they lose part of their immunity. A civilian is not always someone who does not commit an act of hostility, it is still a journalist's nonsense to believe it, obviously it is not at all true.

	~~Premièrement~~, ~~il y a des règles sur la~~ protection ~~de certaines personnes qu’on appelle parfois les victimes de la guerre~~, ~~il serait mieux de dire les victimes potentielles ou actuelles de la guerre~~, car sont protégées aussi des personnes avant qu’elles ne subissent un tort. Les personnes ainsi protégées sont fondamentalement les personnes qui ne participent plus aux hostilités ou qui n’y ont jamais participé. Celles qui sont désormais en dehors de la guerre et qu’on essaie de protéger à ce titre, à savoir les blessés et les malades militaires, ~~les naufragés aussi dans le théâtre de la guerre maritime~~, ~~les prisonniers de guerre~~, c’est-à-dire les combattants qui ne combattent plus suite par exemple à une reddition et qui sont désormais dans le contrôle de la partie adverse et enfin les civiles en tout cas dans la mesure où ils ne participent pas directement aux hostilités. Lorsqu’ils participent directement aux hostilités, les civiles perdent une partie de leur immunité. Le civil n’est pas toujours quelqu’un qui ne fait pas d’acte d’hostilité, c’est encore une fadaise de journaliste que de le croire, évidemment ce n’est pas du tout vrai.		We also sometimes call this branch presented, namely the protection of persons, we also sometimes call it the law of Geneva because it was from the very beginning, since the first convention of 1864, the capital object, the heart, the epicentre of the Geneva conventions. It deals mainly with the protection of people.

	~~Nous appelons aussi parfois cette branche présentée~~, ~~à savoir la protection des personnes~~, ~~nous appelons aussi cela parfois le droit de Genève parce que c’était depuis le tout début~~, ~~depuis la première convention de 1864 l’objet capital~~, ~~le cœur~~, ~~l’épicentre des conventions de Genève~~. ~~Elle traite surtout de la protection des personnes~~.		Then there is a second set of rules, the rules on the conduct of hostilities. Rules on the means and methods of warfare, in other words, the conduct of hostilities, are also sometimes referred to. This is the hot phase of the conflict when belligerents clash through their armed forces or when armed groups fight against government forces or when dissident army forces fight against loyalist government forces. There are various hypotheses, but in any case, we are still in the heat of the moment, there is effective belligerence and rules on the limitation of means and methods to be adopted. These are typically restrictive rules, excluding certain means, methods or restricting permitted means and methods.

	~~Il y~~ a ~~ensuite un deuxième volet de règles qui sont les règles sur la conduite des hostilités~~. ~~On dit aussi parfois des règles sur les moyens et les méthodes de guerre~~, ~~autrement dit~~, ~~la conduite des hostilités~~. Il s’agit là de la phase chaude du conflit lorsque les belligérants s’affrontent à travers leurs forces armées ou lorsque des groupes armés luttent contre des forces gouvernementales ou lorsque des forces de l’armée dissidentes luttent contre des forces loyalistes du gouvernement. ~~Il y~~ a ~~des hypothèses diverses~~, ~~mais en tout cas, on est toujours dans le feu de l’action, il y~~ a ~~belligérance effective et des règles sur la limitation de moyens et des méthodes à adopter~~. ~~Ce sont là des règles typiquement limitatives~~, ~~on exclut certains moyens~~, ~~certaines méthodes ou on restreint les moyens et les méthodes permis~~.		Why "average" and "method"? There is no synonymy. We call a "means" everything that is physical, especially weapons. A shell is a means, a bomb is a means. We call everything that is not physical, but rather tactical warfare. Thus, for example, the use of the threat not to take prisoners, i.e. to kill all those who surrender, is a prohibited method and not a prohibited means. Similarly, the use of perfidy is a prohibited method and not a prohibited means. Moreover, the distinction is not of great legal importance, but it should be noted that "means" and "method" are distinguished according to this modality.

	Pourquoi « moyen » et « méthode » ? Il n’y a pas synonymie. Nous appelons un « moyen » tout ce qui est physique notamment les armes. Un obus est un moyen, une bombe est un moyen. Nous appelons méthode tout ce qui n’est pas physique, ~~mais plutôt de la tactique de guerre~~. ~~Ainsi, par exemple, le recours à la menace de ne pas faire de prisonniers~~, ~~c’est-à-dire de tuer tous ceux qui se rendent est une méthode interdite et non pas un moyen interdit. De la même manière~~, ~~le recours à la perfidie est une méthode interdite et non pas un moyen interdit. Par ailleurs~~, ~~la distinction n’a pas de grande importance juridique~~, ~~mais il faut savoir que « moyen » et « méthode » se distinguent selon cette modalité-là~~.		We call the rules on the conduct of utilities, we also sometimes call this the Hague law. The reason for this is that in the old Hague Conventions, unlike the Geneva Conventions, the core of the regulations concerned the conduct of hostilities and it is in any case, especially in this respect, that the 1907 Hague Regulations are still important today.

	~~Nous appelons les règles relatives à la conduite des utilités~~, ~~nous appelons cela aussi parfois le droit de La Haye~~. ~~La raison en est que dans les anciennes conventions de La Haye~~, ~~contrairement aux conventions de Genève~~, ~~le cœur de la réglementation portait sur la conduite des hostilités et c’est en tout cas~~, ~~surtout à ce titre~~, ~~que le règlement de La Haye de 1907 est aujourd’hui encore important~~.		Thirdly, there is also the right of neutrality in the law of armed conflict. The right of neutrality, contrary to what is sometimes thought, is a branch of the law of armed conflict, because neutrality affects the relationship that belligerent States have with non-belligerent States. It is part of the law of armed conflict, not the law of peace. The belligerent must respect certain obligations towards neutral states and neutral states have rights towards belligerents. Since it is the relationship of belligerency that sets out the duties of neutrality, it is logical that this branch should be part of the law of armed conflict. For states that are not permanently neutral, such as Switzerland because Switzerland has a special status, there are international commitments following the Vienna Congress of 1815 that were unilaterally accepted to be permanently neutral, which implies duties in peacetime, such as not being part of NATO. But for the other States, almost all the other States in the world that do not have a permanent neutral status, neutrality only comes to light and exists in the case of an armed conflict. It is only if an international armed conflict takes place somewhere that the question of neutrality arises, otherwise it does not exist. If, by assumption, there were no armed conflict in the world, no State would be neutral and would not be bound by any obligation of neutrality, except permanent staff such as Switzerland.

	~~Troisièmement~~, il y a aussi, dans le droit des conflits armés le [[Les principes fondamentaux des relations entre États#La neutralité\|droit de neutralité]]. Le droit de neutralité, contrairement à ce qu’on pense parfois, est une branche du droit des conflits armés, parce que la neutralité touche le rapport que les États qui sont belligérants ont avec les États qui ne sont pas belligérants. Cela fait partie du droit des conflits armés, cela n’est pas du droit de la paix. Le belligérant doit respecter certaines obligations vis-à-vis des États neutres et les États neutres ont des droits vis-à-vis des belligérants. Étant donné que c’est le rapport de belligérance qui fixe les devoirs de neutralité, ~~il est logique que cette branche fasse partie du droit des conflits armés. Pour les États qui ne sont pas en permanence neutres comme la Suisse parce que la Suisse a un statut spécial~~, ~~il y~~ a des engagements internationaux suite au Congrès de Vienne de 1815 qui furent acceptées unilatéralement d’être neutre en permanence ce qui implique des devoirs en temps de paix comme, par exemple, de ne pas faire partie de l’OTAN. Mais pour les autres États, ~~presque tous les autres États dans le monde qui n’ont pas un statut de neutralité permanente~~, ~~la neutralité ne vient à jour et n’existe que dans le cas d’un conflit armé~~. ~~Ce n’est que si un conflit armé international a lieu quelque part que la question de la neutralité surgit~~, ~~autrement~~, ~~sinon elle n’existe pas. Si par hypothèse~~, ~~il n’y avait aucun conflit armé dans le monde~~, ~~aucun État ne serait neutre et ne serait tenu par aucune obligation de neutralité~~, ~~sauf les permanents comme la Suisse~~.		The three branches of armed conflict are the rules on the protection of persons, the rules on the conduct of hostilities and the rules on neutrality and some more distant matters that are not really important, such as, for example, a branch of the law of armed conflict which, according to the most commonly adopted classification, affects the fate of treaties when there is an armed conflict. Are the treaties that are concluded between States in peacetime still in armed conflict, do they still have to be implemented, are they suspended, are they terminated by the facts of war, this is an issue that the International Law Commission is still dealing with at the moment, but we will not look at it here because it is far too specific.

	Les trois branches de conflits armés sont les règles sur la protection des personnes, les règles sur la conduite des hostilités et les règles sur la neutralité et quelques matières plus lointaines qui ne sont pas franchement importantes comme, par exemple, une branche relevant du droit des conflits armés qui selon al classification la plus communément adoptée touche au sort des traités lorsqu’il y a un conflit armé. Les traités qui sont conclus entre les États en temps de paix subsistent-ils dans un conflit armé, doivent-ils encore être appliqués, sont-ils suspendus, sont-ils terminés par les faits de la guerre, c’est une question que la commission du droit international traite encore en ce moment, mais nous ne la regarderons pas ici, car étant beaucoup trop spécifique.		== Terminology ==

	== ~~Terminologie~~ ==

	Puisque nous avons défini notre matière, nous pouvons passer à la terminologie. Comment désigner ce que nous venons de découvrir comme objet du DIH. On voit qu’il y a toute une série de termes, une multiplicité de termes, presque une cacophonie de termes. Il y a en tout cas quatre qui sont les plus utilisés, à savoir « droit de la guerre », « droit des conflits armés », « droit humanitaire » voire « droit international humanitaire », et puis « jus in bello ».		Puisque nous avons défini notre matière, nous pouvons passer à la terminologie. Comment désigner ce que nous venons de découvrir comme objet du DIH. On voit qu’il y a toute une série de termes, une multiplicité de termes, presque une cacophonie de termes. Il y a en tout cas quatre qui sont les plus utilisés, à savoir « droit de la guerre », « droit des conflits armés », « droit humanitaire » voire « droit international humanitaire », et puis « jus in bello ».

Arthur : /* Terminologie : « droit de la guerre », « droit des conflits armés », « droit international humanitaire », « ius in bello » */

2019-05-28T08:57:37Z

Terminologie : « droit de la guerre », « droit des conflits armés », « droit international humanitaire », « ius in bello »

← Version précédente		Version du 28 mai 2019 à 10:57
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	The effectiveness of IHL is a matter of inventory and nuances. IHL has many different functions, sometimes it is true that it is effective, sometimes it is not effective, even where it is not, it has some functions as we would lose unnecessarily if we repealed it.		The effectiveness of IHL is a matter of inventory and nuances. IHL has many different functions, sometimes it is true that it is effective, sometimes it is not effective, even where it is not, it has some functions as we would lose unnecessarily if we repealed it.

	= ~~Terminologie~~ : ~~« droit de la guerre »~~, ~~« droit des conflits armés »~~, ~~« droit~~ international ~~humanitaire »~~, « ius in bello » =		= Terminology: "law of war", "law of armed conflict", "international humanitarian law", "ius in bello" =

	== ~~Les trois~~ branches ~~de conflits armés~~ ==		== The three branches of armed conflict ==

	Le droit des conflits armés est une branche qui anciennement s’opposait au droit international de la paix. Elle réglemente les rapports de belligérance donc les règles qui s’appliquent en période de conflit armé entre les belligérants. Cela comporte fondamentalement trois volets de règles.		Le droit des conflits armés est une branche qui anciennement s’opposait au droit international de la paix. Elle réglemente les rapports de belligérance donc les règles qui s’appliquent en période de conflit armé entre les belligérants. Cela comporte fondamentalement trois volets de règles.

← Version précédente		Version du 28 mai 2019 à 11:07
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	The first objection does not necessarily have decisive weight.		The first objection does not necessarily have decisive weight.

	As for the second, the one on experience, it may seem more formidable like everything that has emerged in the categories of reality. But here again, before talking about the effectiveness or efficiency of IHL, let us already note that what we see as a violation, we certainly see it very well because all these violations are exposed in the open in newspapers and elsewhere. Of course, we see nothing at all, because we will never have news in any newspaper to tell us that a particular State has respected a particular dusty rule of the law of armed conflict that the journalist obviously knows absolutely nothing about. How would it be new to say that the right of occupation has been respected in such and such a detailed rule of thumb or that prisoners of war have been treated properly in relation to ~~Convention III~~, all this is not new.		As for the second, the one on experience, it may seem more formidable like everything that has emerged in the categories of reality. But here again, before talking about the effectiveness or efficiency of IHL, let us already note that what we see as a violation, we certainly see it very well because all these violations are exposed in the open in newspapers and elsewhere. Of course, we see nothing at all, because we will never have news in any newspaper to tell us that a particular State has respected a particular dusty rule of the law of armed conflict that the journalist obviously knows absolutely nothing about. How would it be new to say that the right of occupation has been respected in such and such a detailed rule of thumb or that prisoners of war have been treated properly in relation to Convention III, all this is not new.

	Professor Kolb suggests not getting caught up in cookie-cutter judgments that would be part of the whole. The violations are there, in the non-international armed conflict, the violations are so numerous that compliance with the rules is as bad as it gets; but for the non-international armed conflict, the situation is entirely different. There is an opposite balance there, there is an overwhelming majority of rules that are respected most of the time and then some violations, some of which are not obvious and questionable. One of the mistakes journalists make is to think that as soon as a civilian dies in a bombardment, IHL has been violated. If IHL is better known, this is by no means the case and IHL accepts even fairly significant civilian collateral deaths if the military advantage is significant enough to counterbalance this unfortunate event in ~~Article 51 § 5~~.b of the First Additional Protocol and related customary law. There is violation and there is also respect in the international armed conflict, more respect than violations in the non-international armed conflict, much more violations than respects; we must be intellectually honest.		Professor Kolb suggests not getting caught up in cookie-cutter judgments that would be part of the whole. The violations are there, in the non-international armed conflict, the violations are so numerous that compliance with the rules is as bad as it gets; but for the non-international armed conflict, the situation is entirely different. There is an opposite balance there, there is an overwhelming majority of rules that are respected most of the time and then some violations, some of which are not obvious and questionable. One of the mistakes journalists make is to think that as soon as a civilian dies in a bombardment, IHL has been violated. If IHL is better known, this is by no means the case and IHL accepts even fairly significant civilian collateral deaths if the military advantage is significant enough to counterbalance this unfortunate event in Article 51 § 5.b of the First Additional Protocol and related customary law. There is violation and there is also respect in the international armed conflict, more respect than violations in the non-international armed conflict, much more violations than respects; we must be intellectually honest.

	So far we have established one thing, that we are not ridiculous, that we are not grotesque, that we are not grinning except to do an IHL course. All this is possible somewhere, but now positively, what are the reasons for having IHL? That it is possible answers another objection, but does not yet give us a justification for the subject we are dealing with.		So far we have established one thing, that we are not ridiculous, that we are not grotesque, that we are not grinning except to do an IHL course. All this is possible somewhere, but now positively, what are the reasons for having IHL? That it is possible answers another objection, but does not yet give us a justification for the subject we are dealing with.
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	It is therefore quite interesting to see that some political parties may think that the best thing is to have no international rules so that the State remains free to do what it wants. It is quite interesting to contrast this with a whole series of branches of the state such as the military branch where one might think that the latter really wants to be free, in a case of armed conflict where the survival of the state is at stake, is it not worth having your hands free. However, apparently not always. This old idea of discipline and the fact that armed conflict is fought according to rules may come up again.		It is therefore quite interesting to see that some political parties may think that the best thing is to have no international rules so that the State remains free to do what it wants. It is quite interesting to contrast this with a whole series of branches of the state such as the military branch where one might think that the latter really wants to be free, in a case of armed conflict where the survival of the state is at stake, is it not worth having your hands free. However, apparently not always. This old idea of discipline and the fact that armed conflict is fought according to rules may come up again.

	The effectiveness of a law of armed conflict is not a legal issue. The effectiveness of the law of armed conflict is the question of whether it has a real impact on the ground. Generally, there are violations, there is also compliance with the rule. When is it more detailed?		The effectiveness of a law of armed conflict is not a legal issue. The effectiveness of the law of armed conflict is the question of whether it has a real impact on the ground. Generally, there are violations, and there is also compliance with the rule. When is it more detailed?

	What we have is, on the one hand, a considerable effort by the military forces to comply with legal requirements, an effort that has been growing in recent years. But there are already some striking old examples. A good example of such a long-standing trend is the treatment of prisoners of war by the Wehrmacht during the Second World War. If there is one State that is not very sympathetic, that has little regard for international law and international humanitarian law, it was obviously Nazi Germany. Now, what do we see? Let us take Marcel Junot’s book, which visited these camps in Germany and wrote a book entitled Le troisième combattant, in which he recounts what he saw in the various theatres of war in which he was and including this one. What do we see? It can be seen that the Wehrmacht treated British prisoners of war in a more than fair manner. The great complaint of the British in German POW camps visited by Junot was that there were not enough showers to take regular showers. On the other hand, Russian prisoners of war, Marcel Junot was first denied access to these camps, but through relations, he obtained the right to enter them. His description of it is too cruel. There is an absolutely enormous difference in treatment in both cases. It would probably be explained politically by the fact that the British were seen as an airborne civilized nation and that the Russians and Slavs were seen as sub-humans who had to be cleaned up. But there is more to it than that, because in the German Wehrmacht, there were also people who respected regulations and laws without necessarily being ideologues, and for these people, apparently this was the case with the camp commander, it was simply a question of the applicability of the 1929 Geneva Convention. The Wehrmacht argued that in relation to the British, it was bound by the 1929 Convention. Germany was not bound by the 1929 Convention with Russia because Russia had not ratified, so Russian prisoners of war could be treated differently, on the other hand, customary law was not at the forefront at the time.		What we have is, on the one hand, a considerable effort by the military forces to comply with legal requirements, an effort that has been growing in recent years. But there are already some striking old examples. A good example of such a long-standing trend is the treatment of prisoners of war by the Wehrmacht during the Second World War. If there is one State that is not very sympathetic, that has little regard for international law and international humanitarian law, it was obviously Nazi Germany. Now, what do we see? Let us take Marcel Junot’s book, which visited these camps in Germany and wrote a book entitled Le troisième combattant, in which he recounts what he saw in the various theatres of war in which he was and including this one. What do we see? It can be seen that the Wehrmacht treated British prisoners of war in a more than fair manner. The great complaint of the British in German POW camps visited by Junot was that there were not enough showers to take regular showers. On the other hand, Russian prisoners of war, Marcel Junot was first denied access to these camps, but through relations, he obtained the right to enter them. His description of it is too cruel. There is an absolutely enormous difference in treatment in both cases. It would probably be explained politically by the fact that the British were seen as an airborne civilized nation and that the Russians and Slavs were seen as sub-humans who had to be cleaned up. But there is more to it than that, because in the German Wehrmacht, there were also people who respected regulations and laws without necessarily being ideologues, and for these people, apparently this was the case with the camp commander, it was simply a question of the applicability of the 1929 Geneva Convention. The Wehrmacht argued that in relation to the British, it was bound by the 1929 Convention. Germany was not bound by the 1929 Convention with Russia because Russia had not ratified, so Russian prisoners of war could be treated differently, on the other hand, customary law was not at the forefront at the time.
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	When the French fought in Algeria, it was classified at the time as a non-international armed conflict, the problem was that the insurgents were fighting hard and were not ready to surrender because they knew that if they surrendered, they would be treated as seditious and sentenced to death if that happened. The ICRC delegate proposed at the time to the French General Salan to tell these people, the insurgents, that those who surrender would be treated as prisoners of war. He suggested that they should not apply IHL, the law of international armed conflict, but rather that they should apply a small part of international armed conflicts in the civil war. The French accepted and had some success with this policy because by guaranteeing the insurgents a prisoner of war status, i.e. rather a treatment of prisoners of war, which does not imply torture and no death sentence, there has been an evolution in the field of surrenders and it is nevertheless an advantage to encourage the adversary to stop fighting rather than to exacerbate in him the will to resist. This is a very small example that shows that even in non-international armed conflicts things can be achieved, sometimes even extraordinary things like the treatment of prisoners of war, no State accepts that in a non-international conflict, but sometimes there is an interest in doing so at the moment and so we still obtain a result that can be quite remarkable.		When the French fought in Algeria, it was classified at the time as a non-international armed conflict, the problem was that the insurgents were fighting hard and were not ready to surrender because they knew that if they surrendered, they would be treated as seditious and sentenced to death if that happened. The ICRC delegate proposed at the time to the French General Salan to tell these people, the insurgents, that those who surrender would be treated as prisoners of war. He suggested that they should not apply IHL, the law of international armed conflict, but rather that they should apply a small part of international armed conflicts in the civil war. The French accepted and had some success with this policy because by guaranteeing the insurgents a prisoner of war status, i.e. rather a treatment of prisoners of war, which does not imply torture and no death sentence, there has been an evolution in the field of surrenders and it is nevertheless an advantage to encourage the adversary to stop fighting rather than to exacerbate in him the will to resist. This is a very small example that shows that even in non-international armed conflicts things can be achieved, sometimes even extraordinary things like the treatment of prisoners of war, no State accepts that in a non-international conflict, but sometimes there is an interest in doing so at the moment and so we still obtain a result that can be quite remarkable.

	The effectiveness of IHL is a matter of inventory and nuances. IHL has many different functions, sometimes it is true that it is effective, sometimes it is not effective, even where it is not, it has some functions as we would lose unnecessarily if we repealed it.		The effectiveness of IHL is a matter of inventory and nuances. IHL has many different functions; sometimes it is true that it is effective, sometimes it is not effective, even where it is not, it has some functions as we would lose unnecessarily if we repealed it.

	= Terminology: ‘law of war’, ‘law of armed conflict’, ‘international humanitarian law’, ‘ius in bello’ =		= Terminology: ‘law of war’, ‘law of armed conflict’, ‘international humanitarian law’, ‘ius in bello’ =
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	This distinction, which is made in the jus ad bellum, remains in the jus as bellum, cannot be translated into the jus in bello or equality between the belligerents must remain absolutely necessary.		This distinction, which is made in the jus ad bellum, remains in the jus as bellum, cannot be translated into the jus in bello or equality between the belligerents must remain absolutely necessary.

	Everyone is the aggressed one, always. No State claims to be the aggressor. For example, the Security Council never says who the aggressor is and who the aggressor is, it takes action under ~~Chapter VII~~. Therefore, if we accepted a system of distinction based on who is good and who is bad, the result would be that everyone would simply claim to be good and take liberties with regard to the law of armed conflict. If we want to have a law of armed conflict, we cannot allow that.		Everyone is the aggressed one, always. No State claims to be the aggressor. For example, the Security Council never says who the aggressor is and who the aggressor is, it takes action under Chapter VII. Therefore, if we accepted a system of distinction based on who is good and who is bad, the result would be that everyone would simply claim to be good and take liberties with regard to the law of armed conflict. If we want to have a law of armed conflict, we cannot allow that.

	That is what it is all about, the causes of war, the justice of the cause of war has no impact on the law of armed conflict, the rules in the law of armed conflict must also be applied. Politically, this is very difficult to make understood sometimes. As for terrorism, moreover, we must bear in mind that the terrorist phenomenon is not subject to the law of armed conflict, to a very large extent it is not because terrorists are not belligerents in any case, so we are not in the field of IHL, we do not have to apply any equality to them, they are quite simply criminals. The problem arises when there is an armed group acting as a belligerent or a government that is allied with such a group and these groups act as a belligerent and there is a real armed conflict. With regard to Afghanistan and the United States, ~~Convention III~~ applied to persons captured on the battlefield during the battle and therefore Guantánamo detentions were not in conformity. For all the others who have been captured somewhere in the world, trafficked here and there to deliver them to the Americans, all of them are outside the law of armed conflict because they were not captured during an armed conflict on a battlefield.		That is what it is all about, the causes of war, the justice of the cause of war has no impact on the law of armed conflict, the rules in the law of armed conflict must also be applied. Politically, this is very difficult to make understood sometimes. As for terrorism, moreover, we must bear in mind that the terrorist phenomenon is not subject to the law of armed conflict, to a very large extent it is not because terrorists are not belligerents in any case, so we are not in the field of IHL, we do not have to apply any equality to them, they are quite simply criminals. The problem arises when there is an armed group acting as a belligerent or a government that is allied with such a group and these groups act as a belligerent and there is a real armed conflict. With regard to Afghanistan and the United States, Convention III applied to persons captured on the battlefield during the battle and therefore Guantánamo detentions were not in conformity. For all the others who have been captured somewhere in the world, trafficked here and there to deliver them to the Americans, all of them are outside the law of armed conflict because they were not captured during an armed conflict on a battlefield.

	Therefore, the principle of the equality of belligerents applies only in the context of armed conflicts and terrorism is a phenomenon that goes much further than armed conflict.		Therefore, the principle of the equality of belligerents applies only in the context of armed conflicts and terrorism is a phenomenon that goes much further than armed conflict.

Introduction to the course on international humanitarian law - Historique des versions

Arthur le 28 mai 2019 à 09:58

Arthur : /* Rationale and degree of effectiveness of a law of armed conflict */

Arthur le 28 mai 2019 à 09:07

Arthur le 28 mai 2019 à 09:05

Arthur le 28 mai 2019 à 09:01

Arthur le 28 mai 2019 à 09:01

Arthur : /* The separation of ius in bello and ius ad bellum; the principle of the equality of belligerents under the law of war */

Arthur : /* Terminology */

Arthur : /* The three branches of armed conflict */

Arthur : /* Terminologie : « droit de la guerre », « droit des conflits armés », « droit international humanitaire », « ius in bello » */

Arthur : /* Rationale and degree of effectiveness of a law of armed conflict */

Arthur : /* The separation of ius in bello and ius ad bellum; the principle of the equality of belligerents under the law of war */

Arthur : /* Terminology */

Arthur : /* The three branches of armed conflict */

Arthur : /* Terminologie : « droit de la guerre », « droit des conflits armés », « droit international humanitaire », « ius in bello » */